Callon (1993) Is Science - Public Good - Fifth Mullins Polytechnic

Is Science a Public Good?
Fifth Mullins Lecture, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 23 March 1993 Author(s): Michel Callon and Geof Bowker Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 395-424 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/689955 . Accessed: 31/03/2013 13:25
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Is Science a Public Good? Fifth Mullins Lecture, VirginiaPolytechnicInstitute, 23 March 1993

Michel Callon Institute for Advanced Study,Princeton Ecole des Mines de Paris
Shouldgovernmentsaccept the principle of devotinga proportionof their resourcesto of economics,science shouldbe considered fundingbasic research? Fromthe standpoint as a public good and for that reason it should be protectedfrom marketforces. This article tries to show that this result can only be maintainedat the price of abandoning argumentstraditionallydeployedby economiststhemselves.It entails a completereversal of our habitualways of thinkingaboutpublic goods. In order to bring this reversal about, this article draws on the central results obtained by the anthropology and sociology of science and technologyover thepast severalyears. Science is a public good, not because of its intrinsicpropertiesbutbecause it is a sourceof diversityandflexibility.
It is a great honor for me to be invited to give this fifth Nick Mullins for me to escape, for a few momentsat least, Lecture.It is also an opportunity their own history,socithe tyrannyof the disciplines. When reconstructing ologists of science have generallynot been very reflexive. Like otherscientists, they list opposing schools, models, and ways of thinking.They talk in terms of breakthroughs, turningpoints, and ruptures.These differences are doubtless useful, allowing us to define ourselves through what we are opposed to. But they make us forgetthose who triedto link, to translate,and to createcompatibilities.Nick Mullins was one of this tribeof mediators.He knew how to navigatebetween social networksand the dynamicsof knowloccurrence edge, betweenthe qualitativeanalysisof texts andthequantitative of words. I only met Nick Mullins a few times, but in a way I feel very close to him. I share his impatience to see the continually reborn opposition between the qualitativeand the quantitative.I share his impatienceto see disciplinesignorantof each other,which would gain throughcooperation.As
Vol.19No.4, Autumn & Human 1994 395-424 Science, Values, Technology, ? 1994SagePublications Inc.
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a continuationof Nick Mullins's project,I have chosen as my theme today one that is at the boundarybetween economics and sociology--that of the of science. progressiveprivatization Whether we like it or not, this question cannot be put off any longer. Scientists themselves are worriedaboutit, as are we. During a session held on 28 October 1992 at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) headquarters in Paris, Doctor Charles directorat the CentreNationalde la RechercheScientifique Auffray,research (CNRS), presentedrecentresultsobtainedfromthe HumanGenomeProject. He announcedthe decision madeby Frenchresearchers to offer theirdiscoveries to the international The of his talk was to "oppose community. purpose some Americaninitiativesto patentcertainportionsof the hereditary patrimony of the humanrace"(Nouchi 1992, 1). This is an exemplaryepisode. It demonstrates the increasinglyopenconfrontation withinthe field of scientific researchbetween two logics: thatof disclosureand thus the free circulation of information andthatof privateproperty andthusthe retentionof information. Science is becomingimportant to economic interestsandwhen the state intervenes,more and more often it takes the side of the latter. This change and the controversiesthat go along with it constitutea fine topic for researchin science studies. A numberof studies would have to be carried out to understandbetter what is at stake in these confrontations: theirarguments, identifyingtheprotagonists, charting looking at the alliances into which they enter. Today,I would like to follow anothercourse and take some steps along a much more risky path. I do not intend to carryon business as usual in the sociology of science, but to look at some questions that we are all facing, questions that are difficult for us to avoid any longer and that would be cowardly to shelve. Should we accept the privatizationof science or not? Shouldwe defendat all costs the ideaof a science accessibleto all, circulating shouldwe celebratethe fact thatbusiness, which freely?Or,on the contrary, for such a long time has stood accused of taking no interestin research,is finally recognizingits importance? Weneedto look atthesequestionsin a contextwiderthanthatof economic elementof ourculturallife, efficiency alone. Science constitutesan important and we would find it difficult to accept private interests taking it over completely.However, my topic today will be somewhat more restricted.I will limit myself to examiningand discussing the economic argumentsthat might be advancedin favor of the supportof science by the state. Should of theirresources, governmentsacceptthe principleof devotinga proportion that is, our resources, to funding basic research?And if so, what are the
a Public Good? 397 / Is Science Callon
grounds-in particularthe economic grounds-for such a decision? My answerto the firstquestionwill be an unambiguous yes. Fromthe standpoint of economics, science shouldbe considereda publicgood, andfor thatreason it shouldbe protectedfrommarketforces-if only to ensurea betteroperation of the market.However,I will tryto show thatthis resultcan only be obtained at the price of abandoningargumentsgenerally advanced by economists themselves. It entails a complete reversalof our habitualways of thinking about public goods, and a new definition of them. In order to bring this reversalabout,I will drawon the centralresultsobtainedby the anthropology and sociology of science and technology over the past several years.1This consequences paperwill discuss the natureof this reversaland its attendant realms. in the political and organizational particularly
Science as a Public Good in Economic Theory Let me startfrom the analysisproposedby political economists. Generations of studentshave learnedthat science is a public good. This principle has been embraced by economists of all shades. It has inspired science policymakers.It is supportedby scientiststhemselves and even seems to fit in with the commonsenseview. The argumentusually developed by economists comprises three propositions:(1) Scientific knowledge has a certain into thatmakeits completetransformation numberof intrinsiccharacteristics a commodityimpossible;(2) as a result,marketmechanismscause business to underinvestin scientific production;(3) to redressthis market'sfailure, governmentsshould stimulateinvestmentsboth throughdirect intervention and throughincentive schemes. I will start,then, with the economic definitionof science as a public good, or ratheras a quasi-publicgood, and then go on to drawa certainnumberof science as a good and conclusions. Therearetwo partsin the demonstration: then science as a quasi-publicgood.2 Science as a Good First,scientific knowledgeis assimilableto theclass of goods. It is difficult to say here exactly what is meantby the word goods. One could just as well call it a thing. The main point is thatscientific knowledgeis endowed with a physical natureto the extentthatit can circulate,be exchanged,or be engaged in commercialtransactions. Being a thing, scientific knowledgecan even be stolen. This materialismmight seem vulgarand shockingbut it is, neverthe-
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less, perfectly defensible. In orderto make it consistentand robust,economists use the conceptof information. As I will show below, theirreductionist of information is a first of conception step toward a better understanding science as an economic activity.Accordingto Dasguptaand David: "Informationis knowledgereducedto messages thatcan be transmitted to decision informationtheoreticview thatsuch messages agents.We take the standard have informationcontent when receipt of them causes some action"(Dasguptaand David 1992, 9). This definitionhas two important elements. First, the idea of a message a material base. A presupposes message might be one or a set of writtenor oralstatements. It mightalso be somethingthatis inscribedin a humanbeing, a substance,a machine,or a product.A piece of informationis knowledge put into a certainform,thatis, inscribedinto a more or less durablebase that can be transmitted. I will develop the consequencesof this fundamental idea later.For the time being, I just wantto set out the positionof manyeconomic theorists. Whatevermeans areused to transmitit, this message is not consideredto be informationunless it leads to an action, causes someone to act. The statement:"DNA's structureis a double-helix"is only informationto the extentthat it has a use value for the personreceiving it. Knowledgethathas not been transformedinto informationis of no interest to the economist, becauseit does not exist in a form thatallows circulationandexchange. It is not a thing, a good thatcan be mobilized, and it cannotbe transformed into a commodity. Informationcan take very differentforms. For example, Dasgupta and David propose readopting the classical distinction between explicit and incorporated knowledge.Explicit knowledge is also referredto as "codified knowledge," which is "expressed in a format that is usually standardized andcompact,so as to permiteasy,low cost transmission, verification,storage andreproduction" (DasguptaandDavid 1992,9). The archetypesof codified knowledgeare obviously statementsmade in ordinarylanguage:"DNA has a double-helix structure" or "the sun emits neutrinos." But many codes are in use. Eachdisciplinehas its own language:mathematics and sociology, for example,do not sharethe same code. Incorporated knowledge standsin contrastwith codified knowledge. As its nameindicates,incorporated knowledgecan be inscribedin humanbodies or in machines.This knowl(scientists,technicians,etc.) or in instruments edge takes the form of savoirfaire,know-how,rules of thumb,andtechnical automatamallof which play an essential partin the interpretation of results and the setting up and conduct of experiments.3 This involves looking on
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science as a craftactivity.If one wantsto play the piano, bore throughmetal, or resolve a partialdifferentialequation,it is not sufficientto know how it is the gestures and the know-how that done; one needs to have incorporated cannotbe reproducedsimply by being made explicit. Indeed, no articulated descriptioncan exhaustthe contentof these gestures. Codified statements,bodies, machines,substancesare a few of the mesthem sengersthatareputintocirculationandthatmakethose who appropriate act. Whethercodified or incorporated, knowledge can be treatedas a good. can all be exchanged, Texts, scientists, samples, and measuringinstruments stolen, dissimulated,or lent out. We now need to ask underwhatconditionsknowledgecan be transformed into a commoditythatcan be exchangedin the marketplace. It is herethatthe concept of public good must be introduced. Science as a Quasi-Public Good The notion of public good was introducedinto public finance to justify possible interventionsby governmentsinto economic life. It is based on the idea that any good has intrinsicpropertieslinked to its form or its physical characteristics,and that these propertiesdetermineits ability to become a marketable This treatproductfor the purposesof commercialtransactions. ment of goods generally operatesalong two dimensions:excludabilityand rivalry.As we will see, thereareotherpossible characteristics-also inherent ones-but the most important propertyis that of rivalryor nonrivalry. a) To decide whether scientific knowledge that has been previously reducedto the stateof information can be transformed into a commodity,one needs to ask firstwhetherit can be appropriated or not. Indeed,for something to be a commodity it must be possible to transferpropertyrights.A good is (or exclusive) if it is possible for the personusing or consuming appropriable it to prevent any other potential user or consumer from doing the same; otherwiseit is nonappropriable (or nonexclusive).Is scientific knowledgean exclusive good? In otherwords, if A sells informationto B, is appropriable, B then assuredof enjoying the exclusive use of that information? Economists qualify their treatmentof this issue. Ease of appropriation appearsto depend on the materialor the base in which the informationis inscribed. The more information is encoded in texts the harder it is to the more it is inscribedin humanbodies or technical artifacts, appropriate; the easierit is to assureits excludability. Forexample, it is easierto duplicate a statementthan to duplicatea mathematician or a sophisticatedinstrument whose blueprintsare locked away in a safe (Romer 1992). However, this
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difference is by no means absolute or intangible.A code might be more or less widely shared,more or less easy to break.It is well known that sevenscientistssometimesencryptedtheirresultsin orderto protect teenth-century themselves in futureprioritydisputeswithoutdivulging theirresults immediately. Thus, in 1610, Galileo sent the Tuscan ambassadorin Prague the announcementof his discovery of Jupiter'sthree following anagrammatic moons: SNAUSNRNUKNEOIETAKEYNUBYBEBYGTTAYROAS (Biagioli 1990). Or,closer to home, one might recall the work of mathematicians and computerprogrammers to code messages duringthe Cold War. The choice of a code for which many hold the key, itself constitutedas a public good, is not a necessary feature of science: it is a decision, not an inevitability. From this we will need to retain the following conclusion: even in the absence of formalrules, thatis, in the absenceof intellectualpropertyrights, a complete appropriation is possible because the producercan choose the substrate thatfacilitatesit. The qualificationof science as a quasi-publicgood ratherthanas a full-fledgedpublicgood derivesessentiallyfromthe fact that it is to a certaindegreeappropriable-whereasin standard theorya truepublic good has to be completely inappropriable.4 of a publicgood is nonrivalry. A good is rival when b) The secondattribute A and B compete for its use. "Youcan eat a fish, or I can, but not both of us" (Romer 1993, 354). A good is nonrival"becauseonce it has been produced, A and B are not rival for its use. I can listen to the musicalrecordingor take advantageof the softwarecode withoutin any way diminishingits usefulness to you or anyoneelse" (Romer 1993, 354). Froman economic point of view, the propertyof nonrivalryis essential. It means that the good's production costs are fixed: once the good has been produced, there is no need for costs in replicatingit. continuinginvestmentbecausethereareno production In terms of economic theory, science-taken here as the production of codified statements-is a prototypicalnonrivalgood. This is a consequence betweenscientificknowledgeandinformation. of the equivalenceintroduced If I tell you that I have heardfrom a good source that the Frenchair traffic controllersare going to go on strikenext week, you will be able to use that informationwithout preventingme from continuingto use it. In the same way, if I tell you the formulafor a growthhormone,I will still be able to use thatformula.Puttingyou in the know, giving you thatinformation,I am not therebydeprivingmyself of its use. ThusPiet Hut and JohnBahcallmight at the same time be writingthe same equationlinking the fate of two galaxies, whereasJohnBahcall cannotbe going to Trentonin the same Ford thatPiet Hutis at the same time drivingto Edison.5This propertyappliesalso to skills
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incorporatedin human beings. Mobilizing the skills and techniques of an expert does not preventanotherexpert from mobilizing the same skills and the same techniquesat the same time.6As I will show a little furtheron, this reasoning, even when applied to codified statements, that is, to explicit information,does not hold waterbut it does appearon the face of it to make sense. Economistsgenerallymake a lot of this characteristic-if it does not into a commodity. hold, then science can be transformed Scientific is said to that c) knowledge possess two furthercharacteristics are important fromourpoint of view. First,it is a durablegood, not destroyed or altered by its use. Even better, the more it is used the more its value increasesbecauseit provesits fecundity,widens the scope of its applications, andbecomes richer.Second, the production of knowledgeis uncertain: in the most extremecases it is impossibleto predicteitherresultsor theirusefulness. Let me summarizethe economists' arguments.In the absence of regulations, scientific knowledgeis a difficult-to-appropriate, nonrival,anddurable Its is in at least certain good. cases, with deep production surrounded, uncertainties. For an economist, this set of propertiesdefines a public good, or rathera quasi-publicgood, because not all the conditions are completely satisfied.The productionof a good, which by its intrinsicpropertieshas the status of a public good, cannot be guaranteedat an optimal level in the industryand business underinvestin scientific production.To marketplace: make up for this marketfailure,governmenthas to interveneeitherdirectly or throughan incentive system.7
The Contribution of Sociology and Anthropology of Science: Science Is Not a Public Good as Defined in Economic Theory Economists have displayed much skill in their attempts to prove an incompatibilitybetween science and the marketplace. They do not discuss this issue in terms of ideological preferences.Science does not have to be defended againsthypotheticalthreatsfrom the marketplace because its very natureprotects it from the marketand its excesses. It has to be supported because the marketis not sufficientlyinterestedin it. The problemis thatthe news from the front that is streaming in every day casts doubt on this seductive argument.Public laboratoriesare one after anotherfalling into private hands, either directly through takeovers and cooperative arrangements or indirectlythroughincentives and researchprograms.The thesis of in researchis becomingmore and moredifficultto support. underinvestment If the doctrineis unableto accountfor this dramatic evolution,it is because it is based on shaky hypotheses. Recent results in the sociology of science
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andtechnologymakeit easy to show thatthereis nothingin science to prevent it from being transformed into merchandise. I will firstreaffirm the materialist positionadoptedby economists.Science is a thing, or rathera set of complementary things: it does not exist outside of the diverse materialsin which it is inscribed.The anthropologyof science has gone even furtherin the descriptionof these materialsand their variety. Informationis codified in articlesand books, but also in patents,proposals, grants,reports,andmoregenerally,in whatLatourandWoolgar(1979) have called inscriptions.Furthermore, this anthropologyhas laid more emphasis thaneconomics on "theimportance of specific complexesof instruments and specialized materials,and the skills and techniquesneeded to utilize them" (Rouse 1993). In order to visualize this, try the following experiment Simon.Imaginecoloringtheoreticalstatementsin red, adaptedfrom Herbert and all other inscriptions and skills incorporatedin human beings and in green. A Martiancontemplatingour science from its planet instruments, would see a vast green ocean streakedwith very occasional and fragile red filaments. But economists, who are justifiably materialist in their definition of science, then adopta strangelyidealistvision when dealing with the issue of nonrivalry.Take the case where this thesis seems incontestable:that of codified statements. One of the first-and maybe one of the only-results of social studies of science has been to show thatan isolated statementor theoryis quite simply useless. You might print thousandsof copies of an article or a book and air-dropcopies in Laplandor in Bosnia-Herzegovina.You might similarly send well-trainedstudentsor well-calibratedinstruments to the far corners of the earth.However,if all these elements do not come togetherin a single placeat the sametime, thenthe disseminationwill have been a waste of time. the skills will not have any objectto which Nobody will adoptthe statement; they can be applied;the instrumentsand the machines will remain in their boxes. Icannotresisttellingyou the followinganecdote, notborrowed fromthe sociologyof science,butthatbringsout the necessityof this complementarity. On 7 May 1992, following up on the Los Angeles riots, Reuterssent the following dispatch:"Itis reportedthata rioterwho could not work out how to use a VCR he had stolenduringthe riotstook it straight backto the police." This fable, which clarifies what, following Austin, we could refer to as the conditionsof the felicity of usageof technology,can be appliedperfectlywell to science and its statements.You will never see a mafioso carryingout a If Watsonwas able to remove the holdupin a theoreticalphysics laboratory. X-ray diffractiondiagramsfrom Franklin'swastepaperbasket, they were only useful becauseCrick was thereto decipherthem. I proposecalling this
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thesis the thesis of the intrinsic inutility of statements (the thesis can be It is quite simply a consequence applied equally to skills and instruments). of HarryCollins's (1974) fundamentalwork on duplication.If I were not totally opposedto prizesbeing awardedfor individualwork,I would suggest that we call it Collins's Law. What he successfully demonstrated-contrary to what he sometimesaffirms-was not so muchthe thesis of experimenters' regressas the impossibilityof endowinga statementwith any meaningif the has not been done. In other work of the duplicationof skills and instruments words, it is impossible to mobilize the differentelements independentlyof each other. Fromthe point of view of my topic today,thatof economics, these results have far-reachingconsequences. Economic theorists tell us that if A uses statementE, thenthe latteris not damagedby the fact thatB also uses it. That is true,but only in exactly the same way as I can go out in my Ford Taurus, registration number BCD109876, without being inconvenienced by Mr. Brown going along in the same Ford Taurus,but this time with registration as usedby A is neithermorenorless similar numberBCD 109877.A statement to one used by B than one Ford Taurusis to another-or one tower of the WorldTradeCenterto its twin. Two similarstatementsused in two different situations constitute two different goods, whose use and implementation presupposespecific investments.Science, even in its most codified forms, cannotthereforebe considereda nonrivalgood (for more details see Insert).
Insert: Is Science a Local Public Good?8 Some economists might respondto this analysis that it is not necessary for a good to be accessible at zero cost in orderto be nonrival.To take into account the investmentand accumulatedcapabilities (skills, equipment, learning processes, and more generally, complementary assets) necessaryto make use of a nonrivalgood, all one needs to do is to introducethe concept of a local public good (Cornes and Sandler 1986). Thus a statementcan be consideredfreely availableto members of the community of specialists. For all those who have made the necessary investments,the statementis a nonrivalgood. This property fromothercommongoods. The use of a Ford distinguishesthe statement Taurus,just like the use of a statement, necessitates complementary investments(roadinfrastructure, learninghow to drive). But once these investmentshave been made, it remains a rival good. If they actually
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want to use a car, any person who knows how to drive, has a license, and has access to the road network has, over and above these, to lay out an amount of money corresponding to the marginal cost of producing another Ford Taurus. What distinguishes the statement from a Ford Taurus or a cigarette is that its reproduction cost is negligible. Thus one has to distinguish between free use of a good (its being without cost) and its availability (being "free"). To demonstrate the superficiality of this standard argument, consider the complete cost of the process leading from the production of a statement to its effective use (by way of its reproduction) instead of making an arbitrarydistinction between costs associated with supply and those associated with demand. Let us put ourselves at the point where the codified statement S1 has just been produced by A, and let us call the investments necessary for its elaboration I(0).9 Let us consider some actor B (or C) who wants to use S1, and let us reconstitute the various investments that have to be made in order to make this use possible. These investments fall into four categories:1? 1. Investmentsin the reproduction of S1 and in its delivery.Let us call the resultantstatementSI:. S l is formallyidenticalto S1, but it is inscribed in a differentmaterialbase; its delivery puts the statementin B's possession. Call these investmentsI(1). Comparedto reproductioncosts of goods like Ford Taurusesor Marlboros, I(1) for a codified statementis, with reason,generallyconsiderednegligible. 2. Investments in complementary assets. In orderto give meaningto S12and to be in a positionto use thatstatement,B has to acquireembodiedskills, know-how, instruments.He or she must also be able to mobilize other withoutwhich S12would remaina meaninglessstatementand statements, which themselves call for complementary investments.Let us call these investments I(2). This amountvaries accordingto one's field (it can be a criterion for distinguishing betweenbig andsmallscience) butit is always significant. 3. Investmentsin maintainingcomplementary assets, without which these investments lose their utilityor theirpertinence.Let us call these investmentsI(3). They serve, for example, to maintainthe physical and intellectualskills of researchers, engineers,andtechnicians;andto ensurethe of instruments, proper operationandreplacement libraries, databases,and metrologicalnetworks. Their amount varies by field, but this cost can neverbe considerednull or negligible. An actor B who has agreedto make the investmentI1 = I(1) + I(2) + I(3) is, at time t, in a position to understandS 2. This amount, then, the price to pay in orderto be able to vest significance in that represents statement. If B did not go beyondthese firstinvestments,he or she would be in no position to engage S 2 as a resourcein any productionprocess.
4. Investments in themobilizationof S12. This corresponds to the investments
to introduce asaninput in a production whoseoutput S~2 required process S2(in thecaseof academic scientific maybe otherstatements research), a pieceof technology, or a finished Theseinvestments, in turn, product. theacquisition demand of instruments, machines, skills,and, incorporated statements investments veryoften,other accompanied bycomplementary fortheir use.B constructs a newconfiguration. Without that,he required or she couldnot produce at all different fromwhatis already anything there. Letus calltheseinvestments I(4).Theycanbe verylarge-a much order of magnitude than as we have themselves, 1(2)andI(3),which higher is well captured in the seen, are already very high.This amplification formula: an investment in basicresearch of 1 unitleadsto an following investment in applied research of 10 andaninvestment in development of 100. I(4) justifiesthe now widely accepted assertion thatknowledge cannot be applied without transformation results beingtransformed-this from itsinsertion inanewproductive With Ii,butwithout configuration. I(4), B can repeat He or she canunderstand it andverifyits S12ad nauseam. butis condemned to partoting it. S~2 hasnousevalue without meaning I(4). Fromthe above, it follows that,in orderto become an economic good susceptibleof being mobilized in consumptionor productionactivity,a statementmust be accompaniedby a series of investments[I = I(1) + I(2) + I(3) + I(4)] withoutwhich it lacks any use value. Abandoningthe rigid distinctionbetweencosts associatedwith supply and those associatedwith demand-a meaninglessdistinctionin the case of a continuous in the coproducprocess wherethe user,as with any service,participates tion of the good thathe or she "consumes"-I measuresthe global costs of the transformation of a statementinto a complete economic good. In orderto be relevant,the classificationof economic goods musttherefore be anchoredin a comparativeanalysis of global costs, instead of just summing the costs of the reproductiveoperationsalone. In the case of the statement,I(1) is low, but I(2), I(3), and in particularI(4) are high. For the Ford Taurus,the cost profile is markedlydifferent.I(1) is high, I(2) and I(3) are middling, and I(4) can be considerednegligible. The of a cigaretteinto use value is different global cost of the transformation is yet again: I(1) high, I(2) and I(3) are low, and I(4) is null. These structuraldifferences demonstratethe flaw in concentratingon one particularlink in the chain of costs, insteadof taking them as a whole. Asserting that an isolated copy of a statementhas a use value is like of a cigaretteprovidesas much satisfactionas saying thata photograph the cigarette itself! It is only possible to say of statement S that it constitutesan intrinsicallynonrivalgood when one reducesthe chain of integralcosts to those investmentsnecessaryto producinga (photo)copy
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of the statement.Now the propertyof nonrivalry, which holds only for the very few who have borneI = I(1) + I(2) + I(3) + I(4) (and which in the case of science or technology constitutesthe communityof specialists), is the resultof a series of strategic(investment)decisions takenby
those actors. It is in no way an intrinsic property of the statements themselves: it would be better to call it an extrinsic property and to
consider variabledegrees of (non)rivalry.1l
Is scientific knowledgeby its very natureinappropriable? Does it possess the attributeof nonexcludability? First, economists themselves, as we have seen, have qualifiedtheirresponseto this question.They considerthe degree of appropriability or nonappropriability as stronglydependenton the form of the knowledge,thatis, on the choices madeby its producers: incorporated skills are easy to appropriate, codified informationmore difficult. Second, (non)appropriability appearsmuch more context dependentwhen we take into accountthe intrinsiclack of utility of statements.These can only be of interestto a restrictedcircle of potentialusers: the few scientists who have the necessary savoir faire and access to the necessaryinstruments. Further, scientists worldwide know throughtheir experience that the difficulty lies not so much in preventingtheircolleagues fromreadingwhatthey write,but in convincing them that they should read it. In fact, what is strikingabout scientificknowledge with respectto othergoods is the ease of its appropriationandthe amountof workneededto createa situationin which otheractors areinterested.12 Nor does its supposed durabilitywithstand closer scrutiny. Scientific knowledgeis indeed durable,but only at the price of the heavy investments neededto maintainit. In orderto makethe law f= ma availablein Singapore in 1993, a large numberof textbookshad to be publishedand sold, teachers had to drum the message into stubbornheads, research institutions and hadto develop, researchers hadto be trainedandpaid.Compared enterprises to the cost of maintaininga so-called universallaw, the cost of maintaining theAmericanarmyin Kuwaitpales into insignificance. Does the uncertaincharacter of knowledge productionlead to an underinvestmentthatdiscouragesactorswith risk aversion?Not at all. All studies of innovation in businesses bring out the degree of uncertaintyinvolved. Contraryto what many believe today, uncertaintiesabout the state of the marketare of infinitely greatermagnitudethanuncertaintiesabouttechnology. Yet firms continue to invest and do not hesitate to take very great commercialrisks. Rather,as the Japanesecase shows, what is needed is for
the state to force companiesto shouldertheir own responsibilities:this will result in heavy industrialinvestmentin researchand development(R&D).13 to the uncertainties of the marketplace, the uncertainties of science Compared are a bagatelle-and a cheap one at that. Through mobilizing some elementaryfindings from the sociology and of science-that of the multiplicityof the materialsupportsfor anthropology knowledge and that of their necessarycomplementarity-I have succeeded in completingthe workbegunby economiststhemselves,who, however,have not dared to bring it to its conclusion because of their wish to defend the of science.Scientificknowledge doesnotconstitute a publicgood independence as defined in economic theory.The privateor nonprivate natureof science is not an intrinsic property.Degrees of appropriability and of rivalry are the outcome of the strategicconfigurationsof the relevantactors,of the investments that they have alreadymade or are thinkingof making.14 Insofar as they both can be seen as commodities,thereis no differencebetween a Ford Taurus andthegeneraltheoryof relativity. Inotherwords,withoutinstitutions thathave been createdand reinforcedover centuries,withoutintenseenergy invested by scientists and the stateto make scientific knowledge public, the theory of relativitywould have never ceased being what it has always been: a potentiallyprivatizablegood, no differentfrom othergoods.15
Private Science: Irreversibility and Convergence Why continueto spend a lot of money to maintainsomethingas a public good when all it wants is to be absorbed by market forces? It takes a significantamountof money to divulge and circulatescientific information, and to invest in complementaryassets (training,equipment,etc.) to make knowledge mobilizable. Should we not just let the marketgo and move over to a decentralized allocation of resources?In order to examine the consequences of such a decision, let me try one of those thoughtexperimentsso dear to physicists. Imagine that science is completely privatized,that its productionis assured exclusively by for-profitorganizations.16 Recently, economists have carriedout studies that allow us to anticipate the consequences of such a situation.17 In their analysis of the relationships between technical change and economic competition, they have in effect uncovered two essential phenomena.The first is that of increasingreturns and the second is thatof cooperation. The concept of increasingreturns can be summarized in one sentence:the more a technology is producedand offered in the marketplace,the more it
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becomes interesting for the supplierto produceit andfor the userto consume it. Increasingreturnsarethe outcomeof two mechanisms.The firstrelatesto supply and is a result of what economists call learning.This takes various forms: learningby doing, by using, or even by interacting. It is by applying and using knowledge in all its forms (statements,machines,skills) that new ideas appear,new statementsare produced,skills evolve, and machines are transformed. rendersproduction moreperformative and Learning procedures productsbetteradapted.The second sourceof increasingreturnsis linked to the sociotechnical environmentthat emerges progressively alongside demand. Certain-ever more numerous techniques-give rise to so-called networkexternalities.The value of productsfor the user increaseswith their diffusion. It is betterto be the ten-millionthpurchaser of a fax or a telephone than the first. More generally,when a piece of technology is distributed, the skills necessary for its use become more common and easily available. Adjacenttechniquescome along to make its use easierandto enrichit. A car withoutgas stationsand distribution networks,withoutpetroltankers,without U.S. foreign policy, without the Gulf Warwould very quickly lose its usefulness. In the same way a computerbecomes more attractivethe more varied and available its programsand peripheralsare. The constructionof this sociotechnical environmenttakes time, but once it is in place it also generatesincreasingreturnsof adoption. The law of increasingreturns meansthatthe conjunctionof scientific and technicalknowledgeand the marketplace lead to the creationand consolidation of acquiredadvantages.The more investmentsthere are, the largerthe market becomes and the more varied the interests that work together to develop the same technoeconomic trajectory.This produces lock-ins-irreversiblesituations.From an economic point of view it is increasinglyless to optionsthatwere previouslyabandoned. Scientific and profitableto return technicalknowledgesuffersundera graveinjustice:thatwhich has prospered will be rewarded,that which has been unable to develop will fade away completely. Paul David (1994) has developed the concept of QWERTY economics to designatethis radicalinjustice.You might hate the QWERTY keyboard,but you have no otherchoice thanto use it. The possible world in has quitesimplydisappearedwhichyou haveaccessto some otherkeyboard as irreversibly as Kanak culture disappearedafter French colonization. Throughthe grace of increasingreturns-that strangeconspiracybetween technologyand the marketplace-we live in a world of productsthat others havechosen for us, withoutknowingthatthey were makingany choice. This the is whateconomistscall pathdependency:the firstdecisionspredetermine (Arthur1989). trajectory
/ Is Science a Public Good? 409 Callon
After increasingreturns,a second phenomenonmust be taken into account: that of cooperation.In order to explain it, we must deal with two As I have said, elements. The first is thatof sharingcosts and uncertainties. firmshave for a long time knownhow to manageuncertainty by coordinating and cooperating.In the domainof science andtechnologythis translatesinto a bundle of relationshipswith universities(such as agreements,recruitment of students, common laboratories)(Etzkowitz and Peters 1991) and into interfirm agreements (knowledge exchange, common research centers, etc.) (Lundvall 1992). In general, and particularlyin cases of cooperation between universitiesand industry,scientists'right to publish is recognized. But this rightis a resultof a politics of exchangeandof pooling of knowledge between partnerswho dispose of a monopoly over the investments necessary for the use of this knowledge. So this science, which seems to be a public science, is nothing otherthan a privategood sharedbetween several owners. The second element to take into account is tied to what economists call of assets.This is a horrible the complementarity phrase,butone thatdescribes a fundamental phenomenon.A given scientific andtechnicalresourcehas no intrinsic use. It must be associated with other scientific and technical resources (this is more and more apparentin fields like bio-optics) and also with production units,commercialdistribution networks,financialstrategies, and so on. A veritablecollective machineryis requiredto give knowledge a use or economic value (Teece 1988). Takentogether,the iron law of increasingreturnsand the ineluctabilityof cooperationleadsto two majorconsequences:first,science andtechnologywhetherthey are codified or incorporated-are endogenized, absorbedinto the economic system;and second, controlis exertedwithin collectives made up of firms, universitylaboratories,and captive users who make up what I have called flexible technoeconomicnetworks.These networkssubsist and evolve relatively autonomously,following their own trajectories(Callon 1992, 1993). These brief considerationscast light on the thought experiment that I In a regimeof perfectlyprivatizable science, science would suggestedearlier. be privatizedso rapidlyand so brutallythatit would become a captive of the technoeconomic networks I have evoked. And there would be a double movement toward irreversibilization and convergence.18 Irreversibilization would occur because the economic actors would follow the naturalpath of selected increasingreturnstogetherand so would continuealong trajectories by chance. The convergence-or moreprecisely,stabilizationof technological variety-would occurbecausethey would sharethe same knowledge,the
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same generic technology, and they would only be differentiatedin minor

ways.19
In such a configuration,the boundarybetween a science thatdivulges its resultsandone thatassurestheirconfidentialityis a resultof privatestrategic decisions thatmay lead to its transformation into a local public good, which we have seen as one possible mode of privatization(see insert)20 What is called public science is merely an adjunct of private science. From this perspective,state support,even when directedto publicly divulged science, can easily be interpretedas aid for actors who, for strategicreasons (risk sharing,cooperativeagreementsfor the purposesof profitingfrom completo makea fractionof the knowledgethatthey mentaryassets), have preferred nonrival and nonexclusive. produce This logic of privatescience underlinesa new kind of marketfailurethat is much more serious than all the others. In this scenario, the market transforms itself into a powerfulmachinefor constructing and irreversibility the limiting varietyof technologicaloptionsor the rangeof possible choices. It is not the marketthat is endangeringscience here, it is science that is paralyzingthe market.A surfeitof marketsmothersthe market. How should we analyze and react to this diagnosis? There are three possible attitudes. First, we could let science become a private good again and celebrate increasing irreversibilityand convergence that render investments more effective andmakethemyield greaterreturns.I would challengethis attitude on the grounds that it does not deal with the question of variety. In my opinion-and here Leibniz says exactly the same thing-a world in which thereis a greatdiversityof technologyandgoods accessibleto as manypeople as possible is betterthana world with less diversity.21 The second attitudeis to cling desperatelyto the old idea of science as a publicgood while acceptingthe investmentsnecessaryfor science to remain and/orreshape itself as a public good. This could be done by making its as costly as possible. It is easy to show that in this case the appropriation of spring competitionis broken,becauseno monopoly,even a temporary one, can be envisaged. Not enough marketkills the market.The compromises advocated by some involving peaceful coexistence between public and privatescience lead to divergence, as coordinationbetween the two is not assured-and if it were, then we would be back in the realm of private
science.
The thirdposition is one that I myself would adopt. Drawing on social studiesof science, I define science as a sourceof varietyand flexibility so as
/ Is Science Callon a Public Good? 411
to escape, in part,fromits commodificationandto open the way for a renewal of the economic definition of a public good.
Science as a Source of Variety and Flexibility In my discussion of science as a public good, I took it for grantedthat it was possible to reducescientificknowledgeto the statusof information. Now we havejust seen thatsuch a definitionleads to a dead end. It restrictsone's choice to two possible outcomes,both of which arehighly problematic.One could reinforceinstitutionsthatat greatcost would transform science into a nonrival,nonappropriable good. In this case, however,the economy would be groundto a halt. Or one could, inversely,ensurethatscience achieves the statusof a rival and appropriable good, but in this case one would condemn the economy to less varietyand to makingchoices irreversible. To avoid this impasse, we need to abandonthe notion of informationand use thatof networkin its place. In effect, the mainresultof scientific activity is not to produceinformationbut to reconfigureheterogeneousnetworks.22 Fromthis point of view economic and sociological analysesarecomplementary. The economics of technological change has made great strides in how the market attachedto technology has produced irreunderstanding versibilitiesandimpededthe increaseof variety. Forits part,the anthropology of science has enabled us to understand the productionof varietyas well as the progressiveirreversibility of choices. By linking the two approaches,it is possible to envisage a dynamics in which market irreversibilitiesare perpetuallycounterbalanced by science. Science as informationis either absorbedby the marketor is opposed to it. Science as a network,and as a sourceof variety,fights againstmarketrigiditiesand in thatstrugglein some cases ends up tied to the marketplace.23 Networks and Networks . . . The networksI am talkingaboutmust not be confused with the technical networksof engineers (e.g., the electronic superhighwaysthat Mr. Clinton wants to develop) nor with the social (friendship, specialist, confidence, reputation)networks of sociologists, nor for that matterwith the networks of statementsor texts that philosophersor specialists in discourse analysis love so much. Mine are a hybridof these three forms of networks(Callon 1994).
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If, for example, I wantedto talk aboutthe networkof Einsteinianphysics (alwaysassumingthatit is unifiedin some way), thenI would includearticles, books, and textbooks that present and circulateits constitutivestatements. But I would also includethe equipmentandmachinesin which it is inscribed, and skills embodiedin humanbeings (physicists,chemists, and also college studentswho are strugglingwith Lorentztransforms). To this we should add the institutionsthat supportand develop it: laboratories, governmentagencies, universities.This is today a sprawlingnetwork-admittedly fragile,but extended. Here and there it mingles with other networks, such as, for example, that of Newtonian physics, with which it sharesthe same human bodies. (What physicist, or even what college student, is not capable of shifting between the one and the other as needs be?) The two networks togethermakecertainmachineshold togetherandfunction.They commingle in thatthey form successive chaptersof the same textbooks. Such networkscan be found in all fields and all disciplines. A striking example of the varietyand heterogeneityof elements thatcan be associated is given by Robert Friedman(1989) in his descriptionof the network of meteorology. In that network, he juxtaposes military and civil aviation, of fisheries and agriculture, departments planes that collect data, standards that assure the coordinationof measurements, and calculationsand models thatmake predictions. Dynamics This leadsto thefollowing question:how do networkscome intoexistence and how do they extend themselves?In other words, how can one describe theirdynamics in termsthat describesimultaneouslythe creationof variety and the operation of processes of irreversibility?The response to these difficult questions can be found in works carriedout by sociologists and of science over the past few years. It can be summarizedin anthropologists two relatedconcepts:the concepts of local and extendedreconfiguration.
Local reconfigurations. Let me begin with the process of local reconfigu-
rationthat allows us to abandonthe fuzzy notion of "laboratories."24 The of networks-that is, the productionof new statements,the reconfiguration development of new instruments, or the elaboration of new skills and techniques-operates within groups with restricted membership. These groups'frontiersarefairlywell-defined;they areeithersmalleror largerthan a laboratory and are only rarelycoextensive with one. We are beginning to have enough descriptionsof these collectives to be able to draw more generalconclusions about them. First, one of their most
/ Is Science a Public Good? 413 Callon
is the diversityof elementsthatthese collectives draw strikingcharacteristics can find articlesalreadycomplete or in the process of Therein one together. being written, technicians, researchers,managers,specialists in industrial engineerson secondmentfrombusiness,machinesandinstruments, property, Ph.D. students,samples,lists of numbers,or frozenorgansthatcirculatefrom one lab to another.Panathenianfestivals with their long trails of citizens, metics, maidens, ephebes, animals, cavalry, and chariots constitute a less motley crew thanthose thatmingle togetherin these collectives. Second,each of the elementsdrawnintothe collective plays an activerole. It interactswith the others.The chromatograph producesdiagramsof which he takes a selection that or she thetechnician passeson to theresearchscientist out a calculationthat he or at and carries then who takes a look some article she converts into a draft article-do not quote or circulate-which is then passed on to a colleague, whose convictions are weakenedthereby,and so on. The natureof these interactions,the sequences of the elements are as varied as the local collectives. Here a machine is the principalactor, and and it produces.There,the researchers everythingdependson the inscriptions the ratsthatthey sacrificearethe mainagents.Elsewhere,phantomscirculate to another, fromone laboratory unifyingpracticesanddiagnoses,orequations almostagainsttheirwill, in new lines and proliferate engage mathematicians,
of inquiry.
the entitiesconcernedandmake These interactions modify and transform new ones appearin the form of statements,instruments, skills, beliefs, and to talk aboutthe process of the production substances.Thus it is appropriate of scientific knowledge as the work of reconfiguration (Knorr-Cetina 1992) or as the mangle of practice(Pickeringforthcoming). The reconfigurations producedby these collectives depend for the most part on elements that are broughttogether, on the local culture that they constitute.Problemsposed, deciding between giving preferenceto experiments or theories, favoring certaintypes of explanation,aversion to or, on interestin applicationsobviously dependon the identityof the the contrary, elements making up the collective and on the organizationof their interactions. Changethe compositionof the collective, and you change the content of its productions.For example, PeterGalison (1987) has arguedthat some basic concepts of particlephysics were alteredby the use of countersin the 1930s; they transformedelectrons from an aggregate to an enumerable concept. As Simon Schaffer(1992) andFreemanDyson (1992) have shown, thenthe descriptionof the behavior if one changes astronomers' instruments, If you of planetschanges. This principledoes not apply only to instruments. introducenew texts or new embodiedskills into collectives, then the reconfigured group will move in new directions.From this point of view, I must
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pay homage to Mullins, who first linked the form and compositionof these local collectives to the dynamicsof the contentof theirproductions(Mullins 1972). The morenumerousanddifferentthese heterogeneouscollectives are,the morethe reconfigurations producedarethemselvesvaried.The sourceof this diversity is the multiplicityand diversity of these local cultures.A lot still needs to be done to cast light on these cultures,which are mixturesof the andthe cosmopolitan.They aresimilarto the collages thatClifford particular Geertz(1986) talkedabout.It may be thatsome of thesecollectives, like some species in the Amazonianforest, are underthreatof extinction.25 Intermediariesand extended reconfigurations.To understandhow the irreversibilities createdby the marketcan be threatened by the productionof diversity,I need to explain how local collectives succeed in coming to grips with existing irreversibilities, and I must also explain how they extend the varietythatthey have createdoutsidetheirown milieu. I wantto understand how these restricted, local reconfigurations expandso thatin the end they can sometimesreconfigureentire,long networks.Here again, the anthropology of science pointsthe way to an answerto this important problem.The answer can be found in the concept of an intermediary. Eachelementdrawntogetherin a local collective refersto otherelements that it representsand that are present, through it, in the collective. The needs to be treatedwith respect. polysemy of the concept of representation In a local collective, the electronmicroscopemanifestsa whole networkof othermicroscopes,experts,observation routines,moreor less stabilizedrules for the interpretation of slides. Scientiststhemselves in the collective represent a whole networkof colleagues who have read the same articles,taken thesamecourses,attended the sameconferences,been trained to use the same instruments. The same thingholds for the statementsthey mobilize thatrefer to otherstatements,and also to othercollectives thatuse them, as well as to and savoir faire they are associatedwith. Grantswith a few the instruments can ensurethe presenceof the stateand its will. requirements well-protected Agreementswith firms or tradeassociationsintroducethese latterinto the localcollective. This collective seems to be confinedwithintheseboundaries, which is why I have called it local. In reality,each one of the elements that constituteit stands for networksthat can thus be found drawntogether,in confronting each other, or interacting with each other through representatives. Accordingly, I have chosen the concept of an intermediaryto designate the heterogeneous entities that constitute the local collective. Whetherone speaks of boundaryobjects like Starand Griesemer(1989) or
mediatorslike NortonWise (1992), in each case one is referring to the double natureof these intermediaries. andbodies They areat once things,statements, (visible, tangible,andheavy) and networksthatarerepresented, punctualized (Callon, Law, and Rip 1986; Latour 1987). These local collectives are like Leibniz'smonads.They area microcosm,butone thatcontainsa whole world in some sense enfolded into them. It is because sociologists and anthropologists have been able to unfoldthese pleatsone by one thatwe have succeeded in perceivingthe networksthatare drawntogetherin these collectives. The varietyof knowledgeproducedand its capacityto shakeup networks made irreversibleby the marketwill depend on the composition of these collectives. We could get an idea of the multiplicityof possible dynamicsby looking at two opposingextremes.In thefirstcase, the largenetworkspresent in the collectives via their interposedintermediariesare already in close contact and linked to each other. The local collective does some minor work, but this will not shake up existing connections.A bit reconfiguration of patchworkhas to be done-a few stitchesresewn-but the fabricitself is not greatlychanged.The currentstate of play is consolidated.In the second are not case, the large networkspresent via their interposedintermediaries yet connected. In this case, the local collective is in a position to propose some very original, innovative reconfigurationslinking together networks that had been separate.This leads to the proliferationof new states of the world. The first outcome is associated with routine work, consolidation, and continuedand stubbornimprovement.Connectionsare reinforced;there is greater irreversibilityand increasing returns.The second outcome corresponds to what is generally called invention:an unexpectedassociation of severalpreexistingnetworksthatup to thatpointwere strangers to each other. In this knittingprocess new statementsare proposed,new skills are develare designed. They allow bridgesto be built and oped, and new instruments links to be forged.This kind of reconfiguration is moreimprobable andmore radical the greater distance and less connection there was between the networksconcerned.26 Numerousworks on the emergenceof new specialties provide materialfor illustratingthis thesis. In each case, the workof the reconstruction of the circulationspaceof new will also be very different.In the first case, new statements intermediaries and skills will meet networkspreparedto receive them. Diffusion will be swift. In the second case, new circulation spaces need to be completely Thereis a needto convince,to translate sometimescontradictory reconfigured. interests,to createcompatibletechnologies, to install a technicalinfrastructure, to extend metrologicalchains, to train specialists, and to reconfigure
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society (Latour1987; O'Connell 1993). The cost of enlargingthe collective work can be very high. throughthis reconfiguration
Toward a Political Economy of Networks for the Production and Mobilization of Science I am now in a position to reformulate my initial questionin new termsto defendthe following thesis. The scientific enterpriseshould be organizedso as to permitthe developmentof the greatestpossible numberof reconfigurations and so as to assurethateach one of them has the same chance to grow. This presupposesthatat certainmomentsthese networkscan go as far as the with the creationof new productsand services offeredto users. marketplace, The marketcannotdo this becauseit operatesessentiallyaccordingto a logic of increasingreturns. Economicagents arecaughtin a strategicnetworkthat encouragesthem to continue doing what they know how to do or to want whatothershave wanted. Science is a publicgood when it can make a new set of entitiesproliferate andreconfigurethe existing statesof the world.Privatescience is the science that firms up these worlds, makes them habitable.This is why public and privatescience are complementary despite being distinct:each drawson the other.This definitionis independent of the identityof the actorsinvolved. A firmthatfunds diversityby supporting new collectives is producinga public good and the governmentagency that contributesto a yet strongerlinkage between the researchit funds and the perfectingof Tomahawkmissiles are a science thatcan doubtlessbe called private. supporting The reversalthatI have been proposinghas led us to choose as our point of departurethe dynamics of hybrid collectives ratherthan the concept of information.The mainly economic discourse that has held sway in recent yearshas resultedin ourforgettingthis realityby paperingit over. If we want to graspthe real economic significanceof science, we need to recognize it as asourceof varietyandto admitthatit can be moreor less rivalor appropriable accordingto the strategicconfigurationsinto which it enters.27 Considering thedynamicsof science in termsof the hybridcollectives andnetworksleads us to question the role of the state. The new doctrine will necessarily be differentfrom the old one. Its elaborationis doubly urgentbecause we are enteringinto a period in which the respectiveroles of the state and private in R&D work are being cast into doubt.From an economic point enterprise of view, what then mattersis the incentive system, or if you prefer,the rules of the game thatenable this complex dynamicto come into being. Fromthis pointof view, threeprinciplescan be invoked.28
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a) The first is a principleof free association. The knowledge produced, the statementsuttered,dependon the collection of intermeandparticularly diaries gatheredin a local collective. If you change the composition of the collective, then you will get otherstatements,which will be neithermore nor less robust, merely different. No collective should be ostracized a priori, regardless of the association of intermediaries that it is proposing. To assure a minimum of variety, representatives of existent but excluded social groups should be includedin these collectives. Introducethe point of view of women into medical research, and you will suddenly get new statements,new techniques, and new skills. New states of the world will of the body andof the begin to proliferatein new directions.Representations But the principleof equitybetween all natureof certaindiseases will change. intermediariesmust go further than this. It should also be extended to instruments, machines,embodiedskills. These shouldhave an equal rightto associate with, and participatein, local collectives. This principle of free associationis also a principleof free circulation,not of merchandisebut of intermediaries. b) The second principle is that of freedom of extension. Once a local it must have the collective exists and has begun its work of reconfiguration, means of constructingthe circulationspace of statementsand otherintermeand The necessarytransactions diariesthat it produces.This costs money.29 negotiationsenablingone to interestotheractors,to createtechnicalcompatibility, to adaptproductionto expectations,to convince, to displace, and to duplicaterepresentconsiderableinvestments.These investmentsassurethe passage from the local to the global and reconfigurethe networksthat are drawntogetherby the local collective. This principleis one of the rightto the throughthe multiplicationof conprogressiveproductionof irreversibility nections and alliances, and the accumulationof experience. c) The third principle is that of the fight against irreversibilityand themconvergence.Once the networksare in place, they tend to perpetuate selves and reinforcetheirconnections.Science becomes privatescience and to the acts henceforthto reducevariety.It providessignificantcontributions This strugglecan take variousforms. First of irreversibilities. reinforcement butsystematic,injusticetoward of all, it can involve thepracticeof measured, networksmade irreversible.These should not have any support.Moreover, certain constraintsshould be imposed on them, notably with respect to an obligation to divulge knowledge produced, to the duration of protection offered in returnfor this obligation, and to compatibilitybetween products proposedto consumers.But the most effective way of fightingirreversibility and convergence remains lending supportto emergentcollectives and encouragingtheirproliferation.
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An immense amountof effort will be necessary in orderto conceive of and implementthe proceduresand tools essential for an applicationof these principles.How can one measurethe degree of originalityof a new collective? How can one help it grow withoutgiving it too muchsupport? How can one measurethe degree to which it has been made irreversible? This could be the subjectof anotherarticle.30 Finally, I would like to add a few words about the tone adoptedin this presentation.It might appearsomewhat strange,even reprehensible,for a sociology of science that proclaimsitself agnostic, to adopta point of view that is largely normative.I believe that, in taking this step, I am merely completing the process of reflexivity. Such theoreticalreflexivity involves exhibitingnot only one's resultsbutalso the interestof theseresults:the social space thatthey designateand construct. Sociology and anthropologyare concerned with showing the role of irreducible contingencywithinthe sciences. Rules, practices,culturalforms, andrelationships withthingsall varyfromone collective to another. Diversity and the local are at the heartof science. By relentlesslypursuingthe task of chartingdiversitywithin an activity-science-that is generallyaccused of creatinguniformityanddestroyingthe wealthof traditional cultures,anthropology has made an importantdiscovery. Science is a public good, which must be preservedat all costs because it is a source of variety.It causes new statesof the world to proliferate.And this diversitydependson the diversity of interestsandprojectsthatareincludedin those collectives thatreconfigure natureand society.Withoutit, withoutthis source of diversity,the marketwith its naturalpropensityto transformscience into a commodity-would be ever moredoomed to convergenceand irreversibility. In the end, it would negate itself. Like Carnot'scycle, the economic machinecan only function with a source of heat and a source of cold! --Translatedby Geof Bowker Notes
1. There is little work establishing an explicit link between the anthropologyand the economics of science. Steve Fuller'swork providesa notableexception (Fuller 1993). 2. The following presentationis directly inspiredby Dasguptaand David's (1992) article, whichpresentseconomic doctrineon the subjectwith greatclarity.See also Romer(1992,1993). Whatis strikingaboutthis literature is the consensus of economists, whatevertheir school, on calling scientific knowledge a (quasi)public good.
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3. There have been a numberof propositionsfor alternativeclassifications of the various kinds of knowledge.The idea thatsome kindsof knowledgearetacit,whereasothersareexplicit is widely accepted. Authorsdisagree, however,on the extent to which tacit knowledge can be made explicit. For HarryCollins (1990), for example, therewill always be a hardcore of tacit knowledge that cannot be articulated.On the other hand, in their article, Dasguptaand David seem to feel that the form taken by knowledge (codified, embodied) does not depend on the normsat play.Forthem, the difference natureof knowledgeitself but simply on the institutional butis a consequenceof formsof incentives. between science andtechnologyis not one of nature, In the case of the scientific institution,researchersare rewardedfor divulging the knowledge thatthey produceby puttingit into circulationin the formof codified statements.Those working in technological enterprises,on the other hand, are rewardedfor making their knowledge as I am advancing The arguments inexplicit as possible-in orderto ensurebetterconfidentiality. do not force me to take sides in this debate.For the purposesof my analysis,it is sufficient that one accepts that thereare many kinds of materialsubstratesfor science, and that one substrate can at least partiallyif not totallysubstitutefor another-that is, thereis a possibleredistribution of any given piece of knowledge between the differentmaterialsin which it can be inscribed. For a good summaryof the variouspositions, see Cambrosio(1988). 4. The reasonswhy economistsneverthelesshesitateto considerscience as an exclusive good like others are not clear. Some would doubtless say that, in order to be validated, and thus discussed, scientific knowledge must necessarilytake the form of codified statements.Others would probablyunderlinethe importance of the cost linked to the transformation of knowledge into a completely exclusive good-a cost thatcan prove dissuasive for the actors. 5. Piet Hut and John Bahcall are both Fellows at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton.This text could only have been writtenwith the supportof the Institute,where I was invited to work duringthe year 1992-1993. 6. There are differences between economists on this point. Romer (1993), for example, explicitly said that knowledge embodied in human beings-in the last analysis reducible to neuralpathways-is a rival good. But Romerhas also stressedthe completely public character of codified statements,which he calls "stringsof bits" and which are for him the prototypeof nonexclusive and nonrivalgoods. Romeraddsan interestingelement here. He recalls thatthere is often a correlationbetween exclusivism and rivalry: nonrival goods are generally quite difficult to appropriate. But accordingto him, this shouldnot lead us to ignore the necessity for an analytic distinctionbetween the two dimensions.There are rival goods that are difficult to control-such as, for example, fish in the sea or sterile insects that farmersrelease into their fields to fight parasites.By the same token,accordingto him therearegoods thatareintrinsically nonrivalbut exclusive such as informationcodes or encryptedmessages. 7. The state's three modes of interventionare procurement, propertyrights, and patronage (the threePs). As Romer(1993) stresses,goods thatarebothnonrivalandnonappropriable pose a severe economic problem. If one rendersthem appropriable, which is always possible, but which has a certaincost (thatof reconfiguring them or giving themlegal protection),one creates a suboptimalsituation(becauseall the economic agents who could have made free use of them see thisrightbeing abrogated). This is why any measurestakenhave to be a compromisebetween encouragementand optimalization.For an analysis of these compromisesand their economic effects in the case of patentsystems, see Foray(1994) and Kabla(1993). 8. The following lines draw heavily on the comments of Dominique Guellec and on Dominique Foray's skepticism as well as on the reaction of my many economist colleagues duringoral presentations.I would like to thankthem all here for having helped me formulate
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more clearly the argument proposed,which, I fear,has not completely convinced them. Also, I have triedto respondto the friendlyand sharpcriticismsof one of the threeanonymousreferees of this paper. 9. The productioncost of a papervaries by discipline,but it is rarelyless than$100,000. 10. For a similarclassification,see Machlup(1984). 11. Within standardeconomic reasoning, the decisions of investments would depend on severalthings:the amountanddegreeof certaintyof expectedprofits(linkedto the mobilization of S) as reckonedby B, the associatedcosts /, and the conditionsof the appropriability of S. As shown later, appropriability or exclusivism of scientific knowledge is variable and depends notably on strategic choices made by the producersof knowledge whose evaluations take evidently intellectual propertylegislation into consideration.This legislation contributes,all of different things being equal, to defining the conditions of availabilityand appropriability goods (whetherthis be knowledge,techniques,or embodiedskills). Fromthe pointof view I am taking here, it thus participatesindirectly(by the effect that it has on the actors' investment of the degree of nonrivalry of scientific knowledge,reinforcing decisions) in the determination the extrinsic natureof this characteristic. 12. This case can obviously be greatly enhancedthroughintellectualpropertylegislation, which, all things being equal, contributesto define the conditionsof availabilityand appropriability of statements,techniques,or embodiedskills. 13. In Japan,85 percent of researchand development(R&D) spending is undertakenby privateenterprise.If one takes into account the fact that in countrieslike the United States or France a significant proportion of public funding goes to military research or to help companies, one gets percentages of the same order of magnitude for public support of academic research not directlylinked to programsor intereststhatcould be called private-in the sense that I will give this termin the section "Scienceas a Sourceof Varietyand Flexibility" (Nelson 1992). 14.The manykindsof configuration possible explain the profusionof models thathave been to which discoveryandinnovation proposedto accountfor the formsof competition/cooperation strategies give rise. These models integratemore or less systematically and completely the differentvariablesthat we have shown participatedirectlyor indirectlyin defining the degree of exclusivity or rivalryof the goods concerned(Joly and Ducos 1993). 15. For achieving such a privatizationone would need a very strict intellectual property system,extendedto science, and a low cost of protection,all rules thatexist for othergoods and makemarkettransactions possible. 16. We havejust seen that science cannotbe a public good in the sense of economic theory withoutthe outlay of investmentcosts. As a majorpartof these investmentshave alreadybeen of science into a completely privategood would suppose a profound made,the transformation of the rules of the game, a transformation transformation that would involve no less costly investments.For example, one would need to encourageeconomic agents to produceembodied skills ratherthan codified knowledge, to protect all statementsthat could not be embodied withouttherebyrenderingtheirdisclosureobligatoryandrenderingthetransmission of embodiedskills themselvesdifficult.Given thatthis is a thoughtexperimentandnot a realisticscenario, of science in societies thathaveinvestedheavily Ican ignorethe cost entailedby the privatization inrenderingpartof it nonprivatizable. Indeed,here I am lookingjust at the economic dynamics for thecase of a completely privatizablescience! 17.For an overview see, for example, Dosi et al. (1988). 18. Itis interestingto note thatneoclassicaleconomists, who are working from hypotheses quite different from those of evolutionaryeconomists (who have developed these notions of and path dependence),have been led to draw almost identical conclusions. Ina irreversibility
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networkexternalities,andthe totalprotection situationof imperfectinformation, apprenticeship, of innovations, it can be shown that companies competing in a single market tend both to minimize the diversityof their R&D projectsand to continuealong a given trajectoryin order to develop theirtechnicalcapital (Tirole 1989). 19. Such a situation,which I put forwardas an imaginaryone, is in fact not so differentfrom what we see before our eyes. In a recentarticlebased on statisticalanalyses,Nelson andWright systems: (1992) pointto whatthey call a technologicalconvergencebetweenadvancedindustrial the multiplicityof connectionsand the logic of increasingreturnsleads to a situationin which technologiesbecome more homogeneousand this dynamically. 20. Dasguptaand David recognize (see note 4) that there is no epistemological difference between public and privatescience (they call the lattertechnology). But given that they reduce science and technology to information,they cannot see thatthe disclosurealone is not enough to ensure theirnonrivalryand theirnonexcludability. 21. This preferenceevidently introducesa normativepoint of view. But it is of the same orderas Pareto'sdefinitionof the optimumor Rawls's principleof justice (Rawls 1972). If one is considering two situations, that one is collectively preferable in which the diversity of technologies and goods is greatest.The concretemeasureof diversityis of course a very sticky problem(Weitzman1992). 22. This is the reasonwhy it would be useless to refinethe analysisof science as information is precisely Whatis important or speedof circulation. conceptssuchas asymmetry by introducing the operationof a breakwith the traditional conceptionof information. 23. The frameworkof analysis proposedhere allows us to give a new and more relevant by linking it to the networksin which it circulates,and which meaningto the terminformation, have been developed at the same time as it has. the diversityof roles that the laboratory 24. KarinKnorrconvincingly demonstrates plays, as an organizationalstructure,in the dynamics of the productionof scientific knowledge, 1992). accordingto specialty (Knorr-Cetina 25. The analysisof these collectives has come a long way in the last years.For a stimulating presentation,see Haraway(1994). 26. For a good example of an analysis showing the possible dualityof these dynamics,see Cambrosioand Keating(1994). 27. It would be interestingto rereadhistoryin the light of this new definitionof science as a public good. One could then pay attentionto incentives,rules, and institutionalarrangements as a functionof their greateror lesser proclivityto favor the emergenceof new configurations and to ensurethe progressiveextension of the networksthatthey give rise to. 28. For an analysis closely relatedto thatgiven here, see Cowan (1991). 29. It could be said that it is a question of making marketconstructionpossible, that is, a supply and a demandlinked to a new good. 30. A rereadingof history,such as thatsuggestedin note 27, could be useful in helpingdraw some lessons from the past. How, over time in different disciplines, has this diversity been supported (or, on the other hand, weakened)? How has it had or not had the means for regeneratingindustrialstructures?
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Biagioli, Mario. 1990. Galileo's system of patronage.Historyof Science 28:1-62. Callon, Michel. 1992. The dynamics of techno-economicnetworks.In Technologicalchange and companystrategies, edited by R. Coombs, P. Saviotti, and V. Walsh,72-102. London: Academic Press. . 1993. Varietyandirreversibility in networksof techniqueconceptionand adoption.In Technologyand the wealthof nations,editedby DominiqueForayandChristopher Freeman, 232- 68. London:FrancisPinter. ----. 1994. Four models for the dynamicsof science. In Handbookof science, technology and society, editedby J. C. Petersen,G. E. Markle,S. Jasanoff,andT. Pinch.NewburyPark, CA: Sage. Callon, Michel, John Law, and Arie Rip, eds. 1986. Mapping the dynamics of science and technology.Sociology of science in the real world. London:Macmillan. Cambrosio,Alberto. 1988. "Goingmonoclonal":Art, science and magic in the day-to-dayuse of hybridomatechnology.Social Problems35:244-60. Cambrosio,Alberto,and Peter Keating. 1994. Monoclonalantibodies:Fromlocal to extended networks.Unpublishedmanuscript. Collins, Harry.1974. The TEA set: Tacit knowledge and scientific networks.Science Studies 4:165-86. ----. 1990. Artificialexperts:Social knowledgeand intelligentmachines.Cambridge,MA: MITPress. Comes, R., and T. Sandler. 1986. The theory of externalities,public goods and club goods. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Cowan,R. 1991. Tortoisesandhares:Choice amongtechnologiesof unknownmerit.Economic Journal 101:801-14. andPaulA. David. 1992. Toward anew economicsof science. Paperpresented Dasgupta,Partha, at the Center for Economic Policy Research Conference on the Role of Technology in Economics:A Conferencein Honorof NathanRosenberg,9 November,at StanfordUniversity,Palo Alto, California. David, Paul A. 1984. Clio and the economics of QWERTY.American Economic Review 75:332-37. Dosi, Giovanni,C. Freeman,R. Nelson, G. Silverberg,andL. Soete, eds. 1988. Technicalchange and economic theory.London:FrancisPinter. forAdvancedStudy, Dyson,FreemanJ.1992. Revolutionin astronomy. Facultylecture,Institute New Jersey. Princeton, Etzkowitz,Henry,andLois Peters.1991. Profitingfromknowledge:Organizational innovations andthe evolution of academicnorms.Minerva29:133-66. Foray,Dominique. 1994. Les brevetsdans la nouvelle economie de l'innovation: les roles des droitsde proprieteintellectuelle.Science TechnologieIndustrie,OCDE, 14, 127-161. Robert. 1989. Appropriating the weather.WilhemBjerknesand the constructionof Friedman, modernmeteorology.Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress. Fuller,Steve. 1993. Knowledgeas productandproperty.InThecultureandpowerof knowledge, editedby Nico Stehrand RichardEricson, 157-90. Berlin:Walterde Guyter. Galison,Peter. 1987. How experimentsend. Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press. Geertz,Clifford. 1986. The uses of diversity.TannerLectureson HumanValuesVII. Salt Lake City:Universityof Utah Press. Haraway,Donna J. 1994. A game of cat's cradle: Science studies, feminist theory, cultural studies.Configurations 2:59-71.
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Joly, Pierre-Benoit,and ChantalDucos. 1993. Les artifices du vivant: Strategiesd'innovation dans l'industriedes semences. IRA-Economica,Paris:Economica. Kabla,Isabelle. 1993. Le r61edu brevet dans les politiquespubliquesde l' innovation.Aspects theoriques.Unpublishedmanuscript. On the relationships Karin. 1992. The couch, the cathedraland the laboratory: Knorr-Cetina, in science. In Science as practice and culture,edited by between experimentandlaboratory AndrewPickering, 113-38. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress. Latour,Bruno. 1987. Science in action: How tofollow scientistsand engineersthroughsociety. UniversityPress. Cambridge,MA: Harvard Latour,Bruno, and Steve Woolgar.1979. Laboratorylife: The constructionof scientificfacts. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Lundvall,B. A., ed. 1992. National systemsof innovation.London:Belhaven. Machlup, F. 1984. Knowledge: Its creation, distribution,and economic significance. Vol. 3, The economics of information and human capital. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mullins,N. C. 1972. The developmentof a scientific specialty:The phage groupandthe origins of molecularbiology. Minerva10:51-82. Nelson, R. R., ed. 1992. National innovationsystems.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Nelson, Richard R., and Gavin Wright. 1992. The rise and fall of American technological leadership: The postwar era in historical perspective. Journal of Economic Literature 30:1931-64. Nouchi, Franck.1992. Les chercheursfrancaisen genetique moleculaireoffrent leurs decouLe Monde,29 October,1. vertes a la communautescientifiqueinternationale. O'Connell, Joseph. 1993. Metrology:The creationof universalityby the circulationof particulars. Social Studiesof Science 23:129-73. Pickering,Andrew.Forthcoming.The mangleof practice.AmericanJournalof Sociology. Rawls, J. 1972. A theoryof justice. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Romer, Paul M. 1992. Two strategiesfor economic development:Using ideas and producing ideas. In Proceedings of the WorldBankAnnual Conferenceon DevelopmentEconomics, DC: WorldBank Press. edited by L. Summersand S. Shah.Washington, ----. 1993. Implementinga national technology strategy with self-organizing industry investmentboards.BrookingPapers: Microeconomics2:345-99. Rouse, Joseph. 1993. What are cultural studies of scientific knowledge? Configurations 1:1-22. Schaffer, Simon. 1992. Where experiments end: Table-top trials in Victorian astronomy." Unpublishedmanuscript. Star, Susan Leigh, and James R. Griesemer. 1989. Institutionalecology, translationsand objects:Amateursandprofessionalsin Berkeley'sMuseumof Vertebrate boundary Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studiesof Science 19:387-420. Teece, D. J. 1988. Technologicalchange and the natureof the firm. In Technicalchange and economic theory, edited by G. Dosi, C. Freeman,R. Nelson, G. Silverberg,and L. Soete, 256-81. London:Macmillan. MIT Press. Tirole, Jean. 1989. The theoryof industrialorganization.Cambridge: Weitzman,X. 1992. On diversity.QuarterlyJournalof Economics 107: 363-405. Wise, Norton. 1992. Mediations:Enlightenment balancingacts, or the technologies of rationalism. In Worldchanges: ThomasKuhnand the natureof science, edited by Paul Horwitch, MIT Press. 207-56. Cambridge:
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Michel Callon is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovationa l'Ecole des Mines de Paris. He has publishedwidely in the sociology of science and technology,the sociology of translation,and the economicsof researchand development.He has pioneered a range of techniquesfor describing scientific and technical change, includingthe co-wordmethod.He is preparingan edited volume on the construction of markets and is currentlyworking on a book on modalities of coordination.

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Is Science a Public Good?

Is Science a Public Good? Fifth Mullins Lecture, VirginiaPolytechnicInstitute, 23 March 1993

Science, Technology,& HumanValues

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Callon / Is Science a Public Good?

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Callon/ Is Science a Public Good?

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