death of Plato. He found the Platonic school flourishing under Xenocrates, and Platonism the dominant philosophy of Athens.

He 1. Life thus set up his own school at a place called the Lyceum. When teaching at the Lyceum, Aristotle had a habit of walking about as Aristotle was born in 384 BCE at Stagirus, a now extinct Greek colony and seaport on the coast of Thrace. His father Nichomachus was court physician to King Amyntas of Macedonia, and from this began Aristotles long association with the Macedonian Court, which considerably influenced his life. While he was still a boy his father died. At age 17 his guardian, Proxenus, sent him to Athens, the intellectual center of the world, to complete his education. He joined the Academy and studied under Plato, attending his lectures for a period of twenty years. In the later years of his association with Plato and the Academy he began to lecture on his own account, especially on the subject of rhetoric. At the death of Plato in 347, the pre-eminent ability of Aristotle would seem to have designated him to succeed to the leadership of the Academy. But his divergence from Platos teaching was too great to make this possible, and Platos nephew Speusippus was chosen instead. At the invitation of his friend Hermeas, ruler of Atarneus and Assos in Mysia, Aristotle left for his court. He stayed three year and, while there, married Pythias, the niece of the King. In later life he was married a second time to a woman named Herpyllis, who bore him a son, Nichomachus. At the end of three years Hermeas was overtaken by the Persians, and Aristotle went to Mytilene. At the invitation of Philip of Macedonia he became the tutor of his 13 year old son Alexander (later world conqueror); he did this for the next five years. Both Philip and Alexander appear to have paid Aristotle high honor, and there were stories that Aristotle was supplied by the Macedonian court, not only with funds for teaching, but also with thousands of slaves to collect specimens for his studies in natural science. These stories are probably false and certainly exaggerated. 6. Upon the death of Philip, Alexander succeeded to the kingship and prepared for his subsequent conquests. Aristotles work being finished, he returned to Athens, which he had not visited since the 1. Physics (explains change, motion, void, time) On Sophistical Refutations (informal fallacies) Physical works 5. debate) 4. syllogism) Topics (rules for effective arguments and Posterior Analytics (scientific method and 3. 2. modality) Prior Analytics (syllogistic logic) On Interpretation (propositions, truth, he discoursed. It was in connection with this that his followers became known in later years as the peripatetics, meaning to walk about. For the next thirteen years he devoted his energies to his teaching and composing his philosophical treatises. He is said to have given two kinds of lectures: the more detailed discussions in the morning for an inner circle of advanced students, and the popular discourses in the evening for the general body of lovers of knowledge. At the sudden death of Alexander in 323 BCE., the proMacedonian government in Athens was overthrown, and a general reaction occurred against anything Macedonian. A charge of impiety was trumped up against him. To escape prosecution he fled to Chalcis in Euboea so that (Aristotle says) The Athenians might not have another opportunity of sinning against philosophy as they had already done in the person of Socrates. In the first year of his residence at Chalcis he complained of a stomach illness and died in 322 BCE.

1.

Logic Categories (10 classifications of terms)

2. elements) 3. constituents) 4. disasters)

On the Heavens (structure of heaven, earth,

5. revolutions)

Politics (best states, utopias, constitutions,

On Generation (through combining material

6. debate)

Rhetoric (elements of forensic and political

Meteorologics (origin of comets, weather,

7.

Poetics (tragedy, epic poetry)

1.

Psychological works On the Soul (explains faculties, senses, mind, imagination)

7. Ethics

Ethics, as viewed by Aristotle, is an attempt to find out our chief end or highest good: an end which he maintains is really final.

2. Prophesying

On Memory, Reminiscence, Dreams, and

Though many ends of life are only means to further ends, our aspirations and desires must have some final object or pursuit. Such a chief end is universally called happiness. But people mean such different things by the expression that he finds it necessary to

1. habits) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Works on natural history History of Animals (physical/mental qualities,

discuss the nature of it for himself. For starters, happiness must be based on human nature, and must begin from the facts of personal

On the parts of Animals On the Movement of Animals On the Progression of Animals On the Generation of Animals Minor treatises Problems Philosophical works

experience. Thus, happiness cannot be found in any abstract or ideal notion, like Platos self-existing good. It must be something practical an human. It must then be found in the work and life which is unique to humans. But this is neither the vegetative life we share with plants nor the sensitive existence which we share with animals. It follows therefore that true happiness lies in the active life of a rational being or in a perfect realization and outworking of the true soul and self, continued throughout a lifetime.

1.

Aristotle expands his notion of happiness through an analysis of Metaphysics (substance, cause, form, potentiality) 2. friendship) 3. 4. Eudemain Ethics Magna Moralia Irrational Nicomachean Ethics (soul, happiness, virtue, Rational Appetitive Moral Virtue the human soul which structures and animates a living human organism. The parts of the soul are divided as follows:

Calculative Intellectual Virtue

Vegetative Nutritional Virtue

curbing fear too much, then we are said to be rash, which is a vice. If, on the other extreme, we develop a deficient character trait by

The human soul has an irrational element which is shared with the animals, and a rational element which is distinctly human. The most primitive irrational element is the vegetative faculty which is responsible for nutrition and growth. An organism which does this well may be said to have a nutritional virtue. The second tier of the soul is the appetitive faculty which is responsible for our emotions and desires (such as joy, grief, hope and fear). This faculty is both rational and irrational. It is irrational since even animals experience desires. However, it is also rational since humans have the distinct ability to control these desires with the help of reason. The human ability to properly control these desires is called moral virtue, and is the focus of morality. Aristotle notes that there is a purely rational part of the soul, the calculative, which is responsible for the human ability to contemplate, reason logically, and formulate scientific principles. The mastery of these abilities is called intellectual virtue.

curbing fear too little, then we are said to be cowardly, which is also a vice. The virtue of courage, then, lies at the mean between the excessive extreme of rashness, and the deficient extreme of cowardice. Aristotle is quick to point out that the virtuous mean is not a strict mathematical mean between two extremes. For example, if eating 100 apples is too many, and eating zero apples is too little, this does not imply that we should eat 50 apples, which is the mathematical mean. Instead, the mean is rationally

determined, based on the relative merits of the situation. That is, it is as a prudent man would determine it. He concludes that it is difficult to live the virtuous life primarily because it is often difficult to find the mean between the extremes.

Most moral virtues, and not just courage, are to be understood as falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. His list may be represented by the following table:

Aristotle continues by making several general points about the nature of moral virtues (i.e. desire-regulating virtues). First, he argues that the ability to regulate our desires is not instinctive, but learned and is the outcome of both teaching and practice. Second, he notes that if we regulate our desires either too much or too little, then we create problems. As an analogy, Aristotle comments that, either excess or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is fatal to strength. Third, he argues that desire-regulating virtues are character traits, and are not to be understood as either emotions or mental faculties.

Vice of Deficiency Cowardice Insensibility Illiberality Pettiness Humblemindedness Want of Ambition Spiritlessness Surliness Ironical Depreciation Boorishness Shamelessness Callousness

Virtuous Mean Courage Temperance Liberality Munificence High-mindedness Right Ambition Good Temper Friendly Civility Sincerity Wittiness Modesty Just Resentment

Vice of Excess Rashness Intemperance Prodigality Vulgarity Vaingloriness Over-ambition Irascibility Obsequiousness Boastfulness Buffoonery Bashfulness Spitefulness

The core of Aristotles account of moral virtue is his doctrine of the mean. According to this doctrine, moral virtues are desireregulating character traits which are at a mean between more extreme character traits (or vices). For example, in response to the natural emotion of fear, we should develop the virtuous character trait of courage. If we develop an excessive character trait by

inadequacies of absolute justice but be also an idea of moral progress. The prominent virtue of this list is high-mindedness, which, as being a kind of ideal self-respect, is regarded as the crown of all the other virtues, depending on them for its existence, and itself in turn tending to intensify their force. The list seems to be more a deduction from the formula than a statement of the facts on which the formula itself depends, and Aristotle accordingly finds language frequently inadequate to express the states of excess or defect which his theory involves (for example in dealing with the virtue of ambition). Throughout the list he insists on the autonomy of will as indispensable to virtue: courage for instance is only really worthy of the name when done from a love of honor and duty: munificence again becomes vulgarity when it is not exercised from a love of what is right and beautiful, but for displaying wealth. This idea of morality is given by the faculty of moral insight. The truly good person is at the same time a person of perfect insight, and a person of perfect insight is also perfectly good. Our idea of the ultimate end of moral action is developed through habitual experience, and this gradually frames itself out of particular perceptions. It is the job of reason to apprehend and organize these particular perceptions. However, moral action is never the result of a mere act of the understanding, nor is it the result of a simple desire which views objects merely as things which produce pain or pleasure. We start with a rational conception of what is advantageous, but this conception is in itself powerless without the natural impulse which will give it strength. The will or purpose implied by morality is thus either reason stimulated to act by desire, or desire guided and controlled by understanding. These Justice is used both in a general and in a special sense. In its general sense it is equivalent to the observance of law. As such it is the same thing as virtue, differing only insofar as virtue exercises the disposition simply in the abstract, and justice applies it in dealings with people. Particular justice displays itself in two forms. First, distributive justice hands out honors and rewards according to the merits of the recipients. Second, corrective justice takes no account of the position of the parties concerned, but simply secures equality between the two by taking away from the advantage of the one and adding it to the disadvantage of the other. Strictly speaking, distributive and corrective justice are more than mere retaliation and reciprocity. However, in concrete situations of civil life, retaliation and reciprocity is an adequate formula since such circumstances involve money, depending on a relation between producer and consumer. Since absolute justice is abstract in nature, in the real world it must be supplemented with equity, which corrects and modifies the laws of justice where it falls short. Thus, morality requires a standard which will not only regulate the Moral weakness of the will results in someone does what is wrong, knowing that it is right, and yet follows his desire against reason. For Aristotle, this condition is not a myth, as Socrates supposed it was. The problem is a matter of conflicting moral principles. Moral action may be represented as a syllogism in which a general principle of morality forms the first (i.e. major) premise, while the particular application is the second (i.e. minor) premise. The conclusion, though, which is arrived at through speculation, is not always carried out in practice. The moral syllogism is not simply a matter of logic, but involves psychological drives and desires. Desires can lead to a minor premise being applied to one rather than another of two major premises existing in the agents mind. Animals, on the other hand, cannot be called weak willed or factors then motivate the willful action. Freedom of the will is a factor with both virtuous choices and vicious choices. Actions are involuntary only when another person forces our action, or if we are ignorant of important details in actions. Actions are voluntary when the originating cause of action (either virtuous or vicious) lies in ourselves.

incontinent since such a conflict of principles is not possible with them.

Main Points of Aristotle's Ethical Philosophy

1. The highest good and the end toward which all human Pleasure is not to be identified with Good. Pleasure is found in the consciousness of free spontaneous action. It is an invisible experience, like vision, and is always present when a perfect organ acts upon a perfect object. Pleasures accordingly differ in kind, varying along with the different value of the functions of which they are the expression. They are determined ultimately by the judgment of the good person. Our chief end is the perfect development of our true nature; it thus must be particularly found in the realization of our highest faculty, that is, reason. It is this in fact which constitutes our personality, and we would not be pursuing our own life, but the life of some lower being, if we followed any other aim. Self-love accordingly may be said to be the highest law of morals, because while such self-love may be understood as the selfishness which gratifies a persons lower nature, it may also be, and is rightly, the love of that higher and rational nature which constitutes each persons true self. Such a life of thought is further recommended as that which is most pleasant, most self-sufficient, most continuous, and most consonant with our purpose. It is also that which is most akin to the life of God: for God cannot be conceived as practising the ordinary moral virtues and must therefore find his happiness in contemplation. purpose or motivation. Man has personal moral responsibility for his actions. Friendship is an indispensable aid in framing for ourselves the higher moral life; if not itself a virtue, it is at least associated with virtue, and it proves itself of service in almost all conditions of our existence. Such results, however, are to be derived not from the worldly friendships of utility or pleasure, but only from those which are founded on virtue. The true friend is in fact a second self, and the true moral value of friendship lies in the fact that the friend presents to us a mirror of good actions, and so intensifies our consciousness and our appreciation of life. Book I, Chap. 13: Nature of Ethics and methods of studying Ethics. Subjects Covered in The Nicomachean Ethics 5. Moral virtue cannot be achieved abstractly it requires moral action in a social environment. Ethics and politics are closely related, for politics is the science of creating a society in which men can live the good life and develop their full potential. acquired by a combination of knowledge, habituation, and self-discipline. 3. Moral virtue is a relative mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, and in general the moral life is one of moderation in all things except virtue. No human appetite or desire is bad if it is controlled by reason according to a moral principle. Moral virtue is wisdom. For this one requires sufficient external goods to ensure health, leisure, and the opportunity for virtuous action. 2. One attains happiness by a virtuous life and the development of reason and the faculty of theoretical activity is directed is happiness, which can be defined as continuous contemplation of eternal and universal truth.

4. Virtuous acts require conscious choice and moral

Book I, Chap. 412: Discussion of Happiness and the good as the ends of human life.

Book II, Chap. 14: Discussion of Moral Virtue.

power or fame or learning--but why? We seem to think that these are "good" things to do, in some sense of "good". But what does that mean? What do we do the things "for the sake of"? (We do some things "for the sake of" other things, e.g. we seek money in order to buy things we need or like; we like the things we buy either in themselves or for another reason, e.g. because we think that they will give us status in the eyes of others; we seek status in the eyes of others because...? There must be a reason, otherwise, why bother?) It is this ultimate reason that Aristotle is studying in the Ethics.

Book II, Chap. 59: The Doctrine of the Mean. He wants to see what this ultimate reason, this "final good" would involve, and how we can go about trying to attain it.

Book III, Chap. 15: Moral purpose and moral responsibility.

Book III, Chap. 612, and Book IV: Discussion of particular moral virtues.

Chapter 4.

Aristotle suggests that "happiness," eudaimonia, is the "highest good." He understands "happiness" as "living well and doing well."

Book V: Discussion of Justice.

Chapter 7.

Book VI: The Intellectual Virtues.

Book VII: Continence and Incontinence.

Happiness is that for the sake of which all other things are done, and it is "final" (ultimate and complete) and "self-sufficient": it is pursued for its own sake (final); it is something which, taken by itself, makes life desirable and not deficient in anything (selfsufficient).

Books VIII and IX: Friendship.

Book X, Chap. 15: Further discussion of Pleasure.

But, what does that mean? What does it involve? What kind of thing is it? If we are talking about human happiness (and we don't have access to any other kind, after all), perhaps we need to look at the "function" (ergon) of a human, i.e. at the specific activities and capacities that make a human human (1097b).

Book X, Chap. 68: Happiness, the end of human life.

Book X, Chap. 9: Relationship of Ethics and Politics. Book One

There are several possible reasons for approaching the question of human happiness from this angle. It may at first seem odd, in that a "function" might seem to us to be something automatic, or something that has little or no relationship to enjoyment (for example, unflavored soybeans might serve the purpose of nourishing us, and do it well, but we might not enjoy eating them). Or it might sound as if Aristotle is saying that humans have a "use", that we are merely tools.

Chapter 1. But these modern connotations are not what Aristotle has in mind. The "functions" or "workings" he has in mind are our activities as humans, the things we use to get what we want and need, and the activities we do in order to live as humans. That is, imagine that you had to describe humans to a creature from another planet. How would you indicate which things on earth were humans? It's not looks alone that make one human; dummies and robots look like humans; and the space alien might even think that chimpanzees and gorillas look confusingly like humans. Now, if the space alien could understand language, we could tell it about the activities that we think are characteristic of humans, and those that are unique to humans. These would be what Aristotle means by the "function" of humans (maybe other animals have them, but we don't know.)

"The good" is that at which all things aim--all activities, choices, actions, investigations (seekings), arts or crafts or skills or trades, etc. That is, we do what we do for a reason (even if that reason is "having fun" or "survival"--these are still reasons, and we wouldn't do things "for fun" or "for survival" if we did not think that fun and survival were in some way "good" things). Or, put another way, we speak of "actions," "choices," etc.; and we distinguish these from their goals or ends or products. But every action or choice is said to have an aim or goal or end or completion.

If we did not think that doing something would bring us some good, or get us into a better position, or prevent pain or sadness or death, we would not do the thing.

So if we do what we do for a reason, what is that reason? What do we hope to attain? Put another way, we do things for fun, we do things for survival, we do things to make others feel good (or not), we do things to help others (or not), we do things to get money or

Thus one reason for looking at humans' "function" in the discussion of happiness would be that if we left out anything that made us human, anything that we need to use or enjoy using in our lives, we wouldn't be talking about happiness: we would be leaving out something and talking about a life that lacks something

important.

Another reason is that it is precisely through our specifically human functioning that choice is possible as we know it, and that the question of happiness can even arise!

That is, we share certain functions (nutrition, respiration, growth) with all life forms; we share some functions with other animals (movement, appetites, sensation) - 1098a. But there are also life activities that seem to Aristotle to be unique to humans, activities that make humans human, or at least reflect what makes humans human. These activities are those of the "rational element" in us, activities related to reasoning and choice. Thus Aristotle suggests that "the proper [i.e. special] function of a human, then, consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle [i.e. a source of reasoning] or, at least, not without it" (1098a).

Aristotle now discusses what virtue or excellence must be. In Book One, Ch. 13, he had said that people distinguish 2 kinds of virtue or excellence: "intellectual" virtues such as theoretical wisdom (wisdom involving knowledge of theories, among other things, as described in the Metaphysics), understanding, and practical wisdom (discussed below); and "moral" or "ethical" virtues or excellences, such as courage, generosity, self-control/moderation, and justice. The "moral" virtues are the subject of the Nicomachean Ethics, and as Aristotle notes, the name 'ethics' in Greek reflects the fact that virtues seem to be developed by means of habit (ethos in Greek). That is, virtues are not inborn, to Aristotle, though the capacity to develop virtues is inborn in all of us. And of course, it is not all habits that impart virtues; there are also habits that work against virtues. For example, if we develop the habit of paying no attention to money or to other people's needs, we are unlikely to become generous (at least, not consistently generous); if we develop the habit of never trying anything new or unknown, we will not learn certain kinds of courage.

He notes too that when we speak of the function of something, we mean the way it works when it functions correctly or best, or when it works excellently. For example, if the function of a car is to convey people from place to place safely, and if your car stalls out all the time or can't convey people because the doors keep falling off, you might say that your car does not perform its function. The function of a car is what a car does when it does what it is supposed to do - not what your car might happen to do. Or we might say that your function at your job is given by your job description; if you perform up to standard then you are performing your function. Your function at your job is not what you do if you neglect your work. The implication for what Aristotle is saying is that when we speak of the proper function of a human as an activity of soul in conformity with a source of reasoning, we mean not merely using reasoning any way we feel like at the moment, but using and acting on reasoning well - whatever that involves.

Chapter 4.

Aristotle suggests that we become virtuous by performing virtuous acts, or by acting virtuous. But he is aware of how odd that sounds. He clarifies the contention by saying that he does not mean that merely happening to perform any action that happens to be just makes you just, that merely happening to do something courageous (or something courageous people do) means that you are courageous, etc. First of all, some awareness and skill are involved. We don't say that a person is literate if he or she can copy letters that someone else wrote, while not knowing how to read him- or herself. Similarly, we don't say that a person is just if he or she did something just without knowing that it was just, or without knowing why it was just - or if he or she only did it because someone else told him/her what to do, or forced him/her to do it.

Thus he notes: "If we take the proper function of a human to be a certain kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of soul and consists in actions performed in conjunction with the rational element,..., and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the excellence appropriate to it; we reach the conclusion that the good of a human is an activity of soul in conformity with excellence or virtue [of the rational element and of our ability to act on our decisions] (1098a)."

Moreover, says Aristotle, "an act is not performed justly or with self-control [simply] if the act is of a certain kind, but only if in addition the agent [(person who does the act)] has certain characteristics as he/she performs it" (1105a). That is, being morally virtuous or excellent requires more than simply doing the right thing. You also have to do it in a certain way, for certain reasons, in order to have true excellence: - you must know what you are doing (you're not being generous if you don't know the value of what you give, for example)

Thus "happiness" will be activity of soul in accordance with this sort of virtue or excellence. That is, to "live well and do well" involves deciding and acting in conformity with our source of reasoning. (Keep in mind that reasoning is a process, not a source of all our values or wants or needs.) What Aristotle seems to have in mind when he says that happiness is an activity of soul in conformity with the excellence of the rational principle is that it is through reasoning, conscious choice, understanding and evaluating the consequences of our actions, and learning how to put our choices into action effectively that we will be able to do as much as we can to achieve our goals. It is also by living in that way that we will develop all the capacities and abilities that we consider worthwhile in themselves. If our reasoning is poorly developed or poorly used, we will be like cars that stall or that won't go where they are steered: we won't be able to tell how to achieve the results we desire, we may make disastrous choices that were avoidable, things will almost never turn out as we think they will, and so on.

- you must choose to act the way you do (as opposed to being forced to do something, or doing something by accident) - you must choose to act this way or to do this thing for its own sake (you're not being courageous if you are acting only to impress people, and would not do the same thing if no one was watching. You must choose your action because you think that it is good in itself.) - your act must "spring from a firm and unchangeable character or habit" (you have not acted with moral excellence if you acted on a whim, or if you simply did what your friends were doing without considering whether this was an appropriate thing to do - and why. You must try to be consistent, and if that turns out badly, you must try to understand why.) (1105a-b)

Book Two

Chapter 6.

Chapter 1.

Aristotle now tries to determine what virtue or excellence involves. He concludes that "virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice; it consists in observing the mean [(middle point)] relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a person of practical wisdom would use to determine it." (1107a)

For example, Aristotle will say in Chapter 7, we consider what we call "courage" to be a virtue (a good quality to have), and it is a mean or middle point between cowardice and recklessness. We consider what we call "moderation" or "self-control" to be a virtue, and it is a mean between insensitivity (lack of feeling or desire; or refusal of all feeling or desire) and indulgence. In other words, a person is thought to be cowardly if he/she runs away or surrenders at the slightest sign of threat or danger, or if he/she exhibits a lot of fear at situations that are not really very dangerous (or, not considered dangerous by his/her society's standards) - and acts on that fear. A person is considered to be reckless if he/she does dangerous things unnecessarily, or shows no fear at things that are considered (in his/her society) to be very dangerous, etc. The person who is considered courageous is one who exhibits a level of fear that is considered (in his/her society) to be appropriate in each situation, who faces necessary dangers without letting fear get the better of him/her (this is not the same as not feeling fear at all), and who does not do dangerous things that are not necessary.

This does not mean that we must wait around for someone who convinces us that he/she has practical wisdom to tell us what to do - for if we lack practical wisdom, we might not be able to tell who really has it. At the same time, Aristotle is cautioning us against assuming that we already know what is right. Instead, he seems to be suggesting that the search for and development of practical wisdom is an ongoing process, and that it is important for each one of us to start the process now. That is, we must start by doing what we think is the "mean" in each situation that involves a choice. We may start by trying to live up to our society's standards, in so far as we recognize them. But that is not enough, because we must come to understand whether these things are really the best to do, whether they really have the best effects, why they should be chosen, what makes a particular result the one most worth seeking, and so on. We must observe and investigate both the actions we perform and the standards we used in choosing them; and we must evaluate the actions, their results, and our standards. (This may mean searching for a clear standard, as Socrates did...) Only if we can show that we understand why an action or its reason is best, will we really be able to be virtuous or excellent. In the meantime, the best thing will be to start the investigation of this (recall Socrates at Apology 38a) - that is, the best thing will be to search for virtue and practical wisdom. This will require both action and contemplation or reasoned investigation. The Starting Point for Practical Reasoning We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning. (This is why Aristotle often talks in term of a practical syllogism, with a major premise that identifies some good to be achieved, and a minor premise that locates the good in some present-to-hand situation.) At the same time, he is acutely aware of the fact that reasoning can always be traced back to a starting point that is not itself justified by further reasoning. Neither good theoretical reasoning nor good practical reasoning moves in a circle; true thinking always presupposes and progresses in linear fashion from proper starting points. And that leads him to ask for an account of how the proper starting points of reasoning are to be determined. Practical reasoning always presupposes that one has some end, some goal one is trying to achieve; and the task of reasoning is to determine how that goal is to be accomplished. (This need not be means-end reasoning in the conventional sense; if, for example, our goal is the just resolution of a conflict, we must determine what constitutes justice in these particular circumstances. Here we are engaged in ethical inquiry, and are not asking a purely instrumental question.) But if practical reasoning is correct only if it begins from a correct premise, what is it that insures the correctness of its starting point?

This raises two issues that must be discussed. First, in most societies there are different behavioral norms or expectations for different segments of the population. For example, it is considered normal and acceptable for small children to be afraid of things such as darkness, nightmares, unfamiliar people or animals, and so on; and the children are not considered cowardly if they ask for help in dealing with these things (or if they cry or run). Adults would be considered cowardly if they behaved as such children do. Aristotle is well aware of this, and takes it into account, for he refers to a "mean relative to us," i.e. a mean relative to each person or to each social segment or role.

Second, Aristotle is aware that different societies have different expectations or norms for what might be considered the appropriate behaviors and reactions for each segment that the society perceives itself to have.

Practical wisdom is discussed in Book Six, Chapter 5. There Aristotle says that practical wisdom is a "truthful characteristic of acting rationally (literally, 'along with reason') in matters good and bad for humans." That is, it involves being aware of and preserving (not denying or ignoring) what is true, and choosing and acting on this in a reasoning way. The person with practical wisdom (if such a person exists) will be one who can see what is good for him- or herself and for humans in general. Practical wisdom, then, includes both an aspect of understanding and an aspect of action. One who claims to know what to do in a given situation but then does not act on this will not have practical wisdom.

Aristotle's point concerning virtue or excellence would be that virtue or excellence involves choosing and doing something appropriate (neither excessive or deficient) in each situation where choice is involved. But he emphasizes that some people will not be good judges of this, at least at first. They may not recognize when choice is really possible, or may not realize what choices they have. They may be mistaken about what is really appropriate in each situation. Only the person who has practical wisdom will know what is right, and will be able to explain why that is what is right.

Aristotle replies: Virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom the things leading to it (1144a7-8). By this he cannot mean that there is no room for reasoning about our ultimate end. For as we have seen, he gives a reasoned defense of his conception of happiness as virtuous activity. What he must have in mind, when he says that virtue makes the goal right, is that deliberation typically proceeds from a goal that is far more specific than the goal of attaining happiness by acting virtuously. To be sure, there may be occasions

when a good person approaches an ethical problem by beginning with the premise that happiness consists in virtuous activity. But more often what happens is that a concrete goal presents itself as his starting pointhelping a friend in need, or supporting a worthwhile civic project. Which specific project we set for ourselves is determined by our character. A good person starts from worthwhile concrete ends because his habits and emotional orientation have given him the ability to recognize that such goals are within reach, here and now. Those who are defective in character may have the rational skill needed to achieve their ends the skill Aristotle calls cleverness (1144a23-8)but often the ends they seek are worthless. The cause of this deficiency lies not in some impairment in their capacity to reasonfor we are assuming that they are normal in this respectbut in the training of their passions.