DRIVERS OF CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA: AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS FUELLING THE CONTINUING CONFLICT

Prepared by

Frank Emmanuel Muhereza Centre for Basic Research, 15 Baskerville Avenue, Kololo, P.O. Box 9863, Kampala. midconsult@yahoo.com /fmuhereza@cbr-ug.org

19 October 2010 (Revised Final Report)

Submitted to Oxfam GB in Uganda, Plot No. 3459, Tank Hill Rd, Muyenga. P.O. Box 6228, Kampala

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This study was made possible by funds secured under an 18 months grant from the Swedish Agency for International Development (SIDA) to Oxfam GB in Uganda to implement a project titled: Stepping stone to comprehensive peace and development, a peace and development project advocating for peaceful and community based conflict resolution and development in Karamoja that ended in August 2010. The author is grateful for the support to study team provided by Oxfam GB Country Programme team comprising: Mark Adams, Deputy Country Director; Francis Odokorach, Programme Officer Partnership and Advocacy (Pastoralism); Joseph Wangoolo, Programme Manager, Pastoralism, Kotido; and; Martin Orem, Programme Development Advisor, Kotido, who read through and made critical comments to earlier drafts of the document. Support in the collection of data was provided by John Senkumba and Francis Loyok Lokeris, and several research assistants, namely; Paul Lowok, Timothy Namuya, David Lokule and Alice Akello in Kotido; Damian Engor, Isiah Logwee, Albert Lopeyok and Abraham Komol in Kaabong; Merian Ambrose and Longok Michael in Amudat and Loli Raphael and Moses Chuna Kapolon in Napak district. The author is heavily indebted to their contribution. The author is also grateful to the various district officials as well as representatives of development partners and civil society in Karamoja who provided information that has been analysed in the report. To the community members in Amudat, Kaabong, Kotido and Napak districts who participated in focus group discussions, their insights will for ever be appreciated. This document is the work of the author, and the views expressed in the document are those of the author and not necessarily those of Oxfam

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 2 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 1 METHODS .................................................................................. 2 2.1 KEY CONCEPTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, SECURITY AND PEACE BUILDING........................................................................................................ 2 2.1.1 DEFINING CONFLICT ...................................................................................................2 2.1.2 TYPES OF CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA ...................................................................3 2.1.3 SECURITY ............................................................................................................................7 2.1.4 PEACE BUILDING............................................................................................................7 2.2 COLLECTION OF RESEARCH DATA............................................................ 8 2.2.1 SECONDARY DATA ........................................................................................................8 2.2.2 PRIMARY DATA ................................................................................................................8 2.3 TEAM COMPOSITION ..................................................................................... 9 3 FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSES OF CONFLICT, SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING ......................................................................................10 3.1 SHARED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS... 10 3.1.1 THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE FRAMEWORK .............................................. 10 3.1.2 BEYOND THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE FRAMEWORK .......................... 11 3.2 PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ANALYSIS OF THE DRIVERS OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA .......................................................... 12 4 CURRENT AND PLANNED EFFORTS TO SUPPORT PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES ...............................................14 4.1 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................... 14 4.1.1 LEVELS TARGETED FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT .................................15 4.1.2 TYPES OF CAPACITIES TARGETED ......................................................................16 4.2 COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT ................................................................. 16 4.2.1 EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ...........17 4.2.2 NURTURING PARTNERSHIPS ................................................................................... 17 4.2.3 BUILDING SYNERGIES WITH TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS .................. 17 4.3 LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENT ................................................................... 18 4.4 LINKING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ....................... 19 5 ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ............................................21 5.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ............................................................................................................. 21 5.1.1 THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1995 ......................................................... 21 5.1.2 LEGISLATION FOR REGULATING THE USE OF FIREARMS....................... 21 5.1.3 THE AMNESTY ACT, 2000 ........................................................................................... 22 5.1.4 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT .................... 22 5.1.5 THE DRAFT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BILL, 2009 ................................ 23 5.2 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION ............................................................................................................. 24 5.2.1 POLICY FRAMEWORK ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING .......................................................................................................................................24 5.2.2 THE POLICY FRAMEWORK ON DISARMAMENT IN KARAMOJA............. 25 5.2.3 KARAMOJA ACTION PLAN FOR FOOD SECURITY OF 2009 ........................ 25 5.2.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK ON PASTORALISM ........................ 26

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5.3 GAPS IN THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS ............................... 27 5.3.1 INTEGRATION OF MILITARY SECURITY AND PEACE BUILDING .........27 5.3.2 THE LACK OF A POLICY ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING .......................................................................................................................................27 5.3.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ...................... 28 5.3.4 APPLICATION OF AMNESTY TO KARAMOJONG WARRIORS.................... 28 5.3.5 INTEGRATION OF DDR ACTIVITIES IN KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT ..29 5.3.6 THE COMMERCIALISATION OF CROP FARMING IN KARAMOJA ...........29 5.3.7 THE SENDENTARISATION OF KARAMOJONG PASTORALISTS ............... 31 6 STRUCTURAL FACTORS THAT FUEL THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA ..................................................................32 6.1 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA.... 32 6.1.1 THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE HARSH PHYSICAL CONDITIONS .......32 6.1.2 THE POLITICAL MARGINALISATION OF KARAMOJA ..................................33 6.2 SECURITY FACTORS FUELLING THE ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA ................................................................................................................... 35 6.2.1 PROVISION OF STATE SECURITY TO COMMUNITIES IN KARAMOJA ..35 6.2.2 ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN KARAMOJA ............................... 37 6.2.3 THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLICIT FIREARMS .................................................. 38 6.2.4 COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND EXCESSES FROM DISARMAMENT ...........39 6.2.5 DISARMAMENT AND IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE KARAMOJONG .......41 6.2.6 ABSENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS DISARMAMENT .............................................. 41 6.2.7 RECOVERY OF RAIDED LIVESTOCK ...................................................................42 6.3 ECONOMIC FACTORS FUELLING CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA............. 43 6.3.1 LIVELIHOOD VULNERABILITIES IN KARAMOJA...........................................43 6.3.2 THE INTENSIFYING POVERTY CONDITIONS IN KARAMOJA ................. 44 6.3.3 COMMERCIALISATION OF RAIDING ...................................................................45 6.3.4 COMMERCIALISATION OF RECOVERY OF RAIDED LIVESTOCK...........46 6.3.5 CORRUPTION IN SERVICE DELIVERY.................................................................47 6.3.6 THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.............................. 48 6.3.7 MOBILE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY ........................ 48 6.4 POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND ARMED CONFLICT ........................... 49 6.4.1 THE POLITICS OF THE NEW DISTRICTS IN KARAMOJA ............................. 49 6.4.2 POLITICAL CORRUPTION .......................................................................................... 50 6.4.3 POLICY RESPONSES AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES ...................... 50 6.4.4 DUPLICITY AND COMPETITION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS ......................................................................................................................................51 6.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS FUELLING ARMED CONFLICT ............ 52 6.5.1 INTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL AND MODERN GOVERNANCE .......52 6.5.2 THE KARAMOJONG AND THEIR AFFINITY TO CATTLE............................ 53 6.5.3 THE CULTURE OF REVENGE .................................................................................. 54 6.5.4 TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ARMED CONFLICTS .......................... 56 6.5.5 MARRIAGE AND ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA ....................................57 6.5.6 CONSTRUCTION AND POLARISATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES.......59 6.5.7 MODERN RELIGION AND CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA ............................. 60 6.5.8 FUNCTIONAL ILLITERACY AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA .61 6.6 CROSS-BORDER DYNAMICS FUELLING ARMED CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA ................................................................................................................... 62 6.6.1 TRAFFICKING FIREARMS FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ............62 6.6.2 CROSS-BORDER PASTORAL ALLIANCES............................................................. 63

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6.6.3

CROSS-BORDER RAIDING ......................................................................................... 63

7 THE ACTORS FUELLING THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA ......................................................................................64 7.1 LOCAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS ........................................................... 64 7.1.1 THE ELDERS .................................................................................................................... 64 7.1.2 SEERS AND WITCHDOCTORS .................................................................................. 65 7.1.3 KARAMOJONG POLITICAL LEADERS ..................................................................65 7.1.4 THE ROLE PLAYED BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES............................................... 66 7.1.5 CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EMERGING PEACE INDUSTRY ......................... 68 7.1.6 WOMEN AS PURVEYORS OF CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA ........................... 68 7.1.7 KARAMOJONG YOUTH (KARACHUNAS)............................................................ 69 7.2 NATIONAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS ................................................... 71 7.2.1 THE STATE ....................................................................................................................... 71 7.2.2 THE MILITARY AND OTHER SECURITY AGENCIES .....................................72 7.2.3 POLITICAL LEADERS FROM KARAMOJA AT NATIONAL LEVEL ............73 7.2.4 THE BUSINESSMEN WHO TRAFFIC FIREARMS INTO KARAMOJA..........73 7.3 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS....... 73 7.3.1 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS.................................73 7.3.2 PASTORAL GROUPS FROM KENYA .......................................................................74 8 THE EMERGING SCENARIOS IN THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA..................................................................................74 8.1 THE IMMANENT KEY POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES.............................. 74 8.2 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT SCENARIO ....... 75 8.2.1 A SUMMARY OF FACTORS FUELLING THE CONFLICT................................ 75 8.2.2 WHICH FACTORS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS?..................... 77 8.3 THE KEY ACTORS FUELLING THE ARMED CONFLICTS .................... 77 8.4 PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE ACTION BY OXFAM GB AND OTHERS .... 78 8.4.1 ADVOCACY TARGETING THE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK ......78 8.4.2 CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES IN THE CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT 79 8.4.3 CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY-RELATED CHALLENGES ............. 80 8.4.4 CONSIDERATION OF THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES................................ 80 8.4.5 POLITICAL GOVERNANCE FACTORS ..................................................................81 8.4.6 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS .................................................................................... 82 8.4.7 CROSS-BORDER ISSUES............................................................................................... 82 9 10 SELECTED REFERENCES ............................................................83 APPENDICES ..........................................................................89

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Ajore Akinyangare Akoko Akuj Areom ASTU BCPR CIMICS CSO Danida DCA DDR EAPCCO Ekokwa EPL FAO FGD FGM GTZ IC/GLR INGO IPF IRC KADP Karachuna KDDS KDDS KIDDP KWG LC MAAIF MADEFO Manyattas MFPED NAADS NDP Ngawuoi NGO NRM NUDC NUPI OPM PDG PEAP PPA PRDP REDICOM Riamiriam SALWS SALWS SFG SSD UHRC UN Revenge raids culture of revenge Cattle thefts Karamojong god Collective raids Anti-Stock Theft Unit Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Civil-Military Co-operation Centres Civil Society Organisations Danish International Development Agency Dan Church Aid Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation Elder community meeting Exclusive Prospecting License Food and Agriculture Organizations Focus Group Discussions Female Genital Mutilation German Technical Cooperation International Conference on the Great Lakes Region International Non-governmental Organisations Indicative Planning Figures International Rescue Committee Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme Young Karamojong Warriors Karamoja Diocesan Development Services Karamoja Diocesan Development Services Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme Karamoja Working Group Local Council Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries Matheniko Development Forum Permanent homes Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development National Agricultural Advisory Services National Development Plan Temporary dry season grazing camps Non-governmental organisations National Resistance Movement Northern Uganda Data Centre Northern Uganda Peace Initiative Office of the Prime Minister Partners in Democracy and Governance Poverty Eradication Action Plan Priority Programme Areas Peace, Recovery and Development Plan Regional Disarmament Committee Moroto Nakapiripirit CSO Network Small Arms and Light Weapons Small Arms and Light Weapons Special Forces Group Social Services Department of Moroto Catholic Diocese Uganda Human Rights Commission United Nations

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UNDP UPDF UPDF WFP

United Nations Development Programme Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Uganda Peoples Defence Force World Food Programme

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INTRODUCTION

This is a report of a research study on drivers of conflict in Karamoja, which was commissioned by Oxfam GB in Uganda. Over the last two decades, Oxfam GB has been supporting vulnerable communities in Northern Uganda in general and Karamoja in particular through the implementation of programmes that focus on improving access to basic services and strengthening communities' ability to ensure their sustainable livelihoods. In Karamoja region, specifically, Oxfam GB has, over the last 5 years, provided significant support to peace building initiatives with strong emphasis on building the capacity of pastoralist communities to voice their own interests and organise themselves to jointly put in place initiatives for development. Oxfam GB recognises that a multi-faceted approach is required to address the complex challenges that face the population of Karamoja in achieving their socio-economic development as well as realise their rights; combining development and humanitarian programming; and undertaking advocacy and policy planning. Local, regional, national and international advocacy is needed to provide a powerful forum for the formulation of political solutions to structural problems in Karamoja, and ultimately to address the regional, national and cross-border issues relating to the area as one of the stepping-stones to comprehensive peace in Uganda. Overall, Oxfam GB recognises that there has been a significant increase in interest in conflict and peace-building issues in the region over the last two to three years. There has also been an increase in the number of actors based in and working on issues of food security, livelihood improvement and infrastructure within the region. Among these actors has been the government of Uganda. There has been an increased level of engagement with Karamoja from the Government of Uganda, which has stepped up its engagement with the region, with increased status of the Ministry dealing with Karamoja and an increased policy engagement. There has also been an increased engagement from donors, UN agencies and international and national Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of whom have produced a diversity of reports and carried out various assessments. This research on the Drivers of Conflict was intended to inform Oxfam GBs pastoralist programme in the region, by providing clear guidance for Oxfam programming, particularly in the areas of intervention in peace building (see appendix 1 for detailed Terms of reference). The study recognises the various roles played by other actors in the same area, not only to avoid duplication, but also to complement (add value to) already existing positive initiatives. On the one hand, programme activities will seek to directly target changes in policies, contribute to improved access to basic services, and promote sustainable human development for the population of the region. Specifically the research on the Drivers of Conflict was intended to achieve the following: 1. To develop an inventory of conflict, security and peace-building studies and assessments that have been carried out on Karamoja; 2. To analyse the inventoried studies and assessments of conflict, security and peace-building in Karamoja region in order to identify (a) the shared frameworks and common issues of analysis; (b) the key factors fuelling the continuing conflict; and (c) recommendations for action that have been proposed in these studies; 3. To develop an inventory and analysis of current and planned efforts to support peace and conflict-management activities in Karamoja; 4. To identify the gaps in Policy and Peace Building interventions, and make recommendations for future action by Oxfam and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society). Page 1 of 109

This report is divided into ten chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. Methods are discussed in chapter two. Chapter three contains a discussion on the frameworks for analysis of conflict, security and peace building. Chapter four contains a discussion of the current and planned efforts to support peace and conflict management activities. Chapter five is an analysis of the policy and legal framework for peace building and conflict resolution. Chapter six examines the structural factors that fuel the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja. Chapter seven examines the actors fuelling the continuing armed conflict. Chapter eight contains a summary of the key findings on the critical drivers of armed conflicts; a discussion of the future armed conflict scenarios. The chapter also contains proposals for future action by Oxfam GB and other development partners. Selected references are listed in chapter nine and appendices in chapter ten. 2
2.1

METHODS
KEY CONCEPTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, SECURITY AND PEACE BUILDING DEFINING CONFLICT

2.1.1

Conflicts are broadly defined as the different forms of disagreements over values. Values are the perceptions that different categories of individuals usually have of their rights, which define their identity and freedoms. Values are a collective expression of beliefs, interests and desire of a particular social group vis--vis another, with regards to how basic needs are expressed and pursued. Human beings have certain basic needs, which include: Security (physical e.g. shelter and safety; material e.g. food, clothing, healthcare, safe water); identity (cultural, religious, and ethnic); recognition (social, political); and development (adaptation to change). The distinction in the way these basic needs are expressed and pursued may be based on their vocation, for example, as cattle keepers or crop farmers, vis--vis others who are not; or even within these broad categories of vocations; or on internal distinctions based on clans and sub-clans (Muhereza, 2005).1 In Karamoja, for example, livestock raiding is a form of expression and pursuance of interests of the different Karamojong ethnic groups vis--vis the other ethnic groups that are subjected to raids. The collective expression of these basic needs by a particular social group can sometimes turn out to be exclusive to the values, beliefs, interests and desires of others, which leads to disagreement over values. Most of the time, these disagreements are reconcilable. Sometimes, however, they are incompatible, leading to outbreak of social conflicts. Conflicts can be violent. Sometimes, they are non-violent. Non-violent relationships include disputes, which are defined as the disagreements that people usually have over material interests that tend to be negotiable. Nonviolent conflicts are usually not negative or destructive. By the very nature of physical conditions of Karamoja, resource competition is part and parcel of their survival. This generates conflicts over ownership of and sometimes access to the ever-dwindling resources. Conflicts per se are endemic to any society (and not only Karamoja), simply because resources are not evenly distributed. In the dryland areas such as Karamoja, where pastoralism is predominant, competition for resources tends to generate violent conflicts because of a complex interplay between several interlocking and overlapping underlying factors, and several contributing factors that trigger conflicts.

. See also the following: Bush, D. Kenneth and Opp, J. Robert, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, in Buckles (1999: 185-204); Huggins (2004).

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2.1.2

TYPES OF CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA

Livestock raiding: One of the main forms of conflict in Karamoja is livestock rustling/raiding. This is defined as: the stealing or planning, organising, attempting, aiding or abetting the stealing of livestock by any person from one country or community to another, where the stealing is accompanied by dangerous weapons and violence.2 There are livestock raids within the respective ethnic groups (intra-ethnic raids) as well as between the various ethnic groups (inter-ethnic raids). Although different types of livestock such as cattle, donkeys, camels, goats, sheep, donkeys are rustled, reference in this research report is mostly on cattle because cattle are usually the most (although not only) raided livestock. Livestock raids take the following forms: (a) In the past, large scale collective raids (areom) were common. These usually served to rebuild herds of cattle depleted by drought, diseases, raids. They were also used for obtaining livestock needed for marriage and rituals; (b) Nowadays, cattle raids do not simply wait for stock-depleting disaster to occur for warriors to seek to replenish the herds. Rapacious/predatory raiding driven by commercial interest continues to occur. There are also small individual cattle thefts (akoko), which may escalate into collective revenge raids (ajore). The massive traditionally sanctioned raids (areom) are no longer common. Akoko are usually low intensity conflicts, but this does not always mean they do not involve extreme violence. On contrary, they may involve extreme violence with huge impact on those affected by the violence since they may involve torture, rape, death, looting, abduction, forced labour (for carrying loot for long distances), and sometimes leads to population displacement. The study team was informed that of recent, there have been many incidents when raiders, in addition to taking livestock, have also ransacked the granaries of their victims, carrying away all the food that they find. In Kaabong, the youth said: The Jie loot foodstuffs from granaries when they raid livestock. Of late, they have been using a devastating scorched-earth approach when they raid, destroying everything in their wake, including setting fire to manyattas.3 Armed conflicts between the State and Karamojong warriors: Conflict in Karamoja is also associated with disarmament, which has been accompanied with violence exacted by first the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) in a bid to forcefully remove illegal guns and ammunition from armed and recalcitrant Karamojong warriors. The process of disarmament has been associated with exaction of physical force during collection of the firearms, leading to various allegations of inhuman and degrading treatment, torture, and various forms of human rights violations (see Muhereza, 2010b; Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 13; Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2007). Much of the violence that is associated with disarmament has been because of the resistance to the voluntary surrender of firearms by some Karamojong warriors, which usually results in gunfights. Resource-based conflicts in Karamoja: Apart from the conflicts over livestock, which involve livestock rustling, there have also been different forms of conflicts over natural and non-physical resources in Karamoja. These conflicts are mainly over natural resources such as land, pastures and water, but also over other nonphysical forms of resources such as (technical and political) positions in the district local government

2 3

. See Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa, Draft Version 1.5 (20006-06-06), pp. 1-2.

. See Focus group discussion with Youth at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 5 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba)

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service. Land-based conflicts take many forms. They include conflicts over boundaries. There have been low-key contestations between the Bokora (present-day Napak district) with their Teso neighbours over the border. While this has not yet generated armed conflicts, it has a potential to do so. The establishment of settlements at Alekilek and Nakiriomet (Lomaroitoit) in historically contested sites between the Iteso and Karamojong has increased potential for future conflicts (Stites, Mazurana & Akabwai, 2007). When Bokora County was upgraded to a district, local Bokora politicians chose to name their district as Napak to increase their stake to the disputed areas around the border with Teso, because there had been an attempt by Katakwi district to establish a new subcounty in the same area with the name Napak.4 There were unconfirmed reports that the elite and powerful in Karamoja have been leasing and enclosing large chunks of land. There were further allegations that a well-connected Karamojong leased over 400 acres of land in Nadugent sub-county in anticipation for selling it to Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) for the establishment of an industrial Park in Moroto district. The land was surveyed at night and local communities were never consulted when the lease was being processed. Correspondingly, there was a reported increase in number of people fencing off large chunks of land in other green-belt areas of Karamoja.5 Many areas of Karamoja that separate rival ethnic groups are also rich in grazing resources (pastures and water) and are always competed for, sometimes violently. The areas between Kaabong and Kotido districts; Napak and Kotido districts; as well as the area around the confluence between Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Amudat districts which has been a raiding corridor and therefore a nomans- lands because of the incessant violence that has afflicted these areas. In Moroto district, the Lia swamps are competed for by the Matheniko and Tepeth, with the latter trying to claim ownership and exclusive use, and the Matheniko determined to ensure unrestricted right of access. World Vision has observed that the main source of tension in Kotido is resource based, manifested in form of inadequate pasture and water scarcity during the dry season, which leads to conflicts (World Vision, 2009a). In Kaabong, the well-watered western parts are occupied by the Napore who are predominantly settled crop cultivators. During the dry season, the Dodoth sign peace pacts with the Napore in order to access grazing pastures and water for their livestock within Napore territories. During this period there are no conflicts. Conflicts resume during the rainy season when the Dodoth break the peace pacts. The shared water sources and grazing land are a source of conflict when the different groups of Dodoth cattle keepers meet to graze and water animals (World Vision, 2009b: 6). There have also been low key contestations between local communities in Moroto district and not only mineral prospectors but also limestone mining concessionaires. Exclusive Mineral Prospecting Licenses (EPLs) have been issued to private companies for prospecting and extraction of limestone in different parts of Karamoja, some including permanent settlement areas, as well as dry and wet season grazing areas, critical water points, cultural sites and shrines, and towns and urban centres. Parts of Moroto municipality are covered under some EPL issued to individuals for marble and limestone prospecting and mining (Muhereza & Bledsoe, 2001). A report by World Vision International assessing local capacity for peace in Kaabong district identified struggles over the allocation of government resources, employment, and political positions within Kaabong district as a major cause of conflicts between the Napore and Dodoth ethnic

4 5

. Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . We were unable to verify this claim with Moroto District Lands Office, but this information was provided by a district official interviewed in Moroto who specifically requested to remain anonymous.

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groups. The Napore are more educated compared to the rest of the ethnic groups in Kaabong, including the Dodoth. They occupy the biggest proportion of key government and district positions. This has resulted into resource based conflicts like the struggle (World Vision, 2009b: 4). There are also conflicts over food. A report by World Vision argued that the main source of tension in Kotido is resource based tension due to the abject poverty and harsh climatic conditions, which manifests in form of inadequate pasture and water scarcity in dry season, as well as food insecurity and food raids (World Vision, 2009a: 4). There has been violence reported over food relief distributed by humanitarian agencies. These manifest in two forms. The first is violence at food aid distribution points, especially when the process has been poorly managed. Men carry walking sticks when coming to food distribution points, and often, they use them offensively. The second are attacks on homesteads by criminals who come to steal food from those who receive food rations. Seldom, these involve the use of firearms (see Muhereza, 2010d). Armed crime: Armed conflict is usually distinguished from armed crime. The latter is associated with violence that afflicts communities (even in peace times) from firearms, and may include armed robberies, domestic homicides. In communities afflicted by armed crime, fist-fights become firefights (IANSA, Oxfam & Saferworld, 2007). Due to the prolonged exposure to virulent armed conflicts, coupled with the absence of strong state structures for enforcing law and order, armed crime is rife. The absence of immediate opportunities for alternative livelihoods had forced the Karamojong to turn to old networks of crime to sustain their survival through criminal activities. Disarmed karachunas make up for the absence of jobs by using their weapons to make ends meet, hence widespread criminality. While law and order had improved markedly through out Karamoja over the past two years, there were still high levels of crime and criminality within the communities. Governments sustained disarmament campaign has made raiding very hazardous. Acts of criminality and lawlessness are manifested in various ways such as: breaking into houses and steal household properties; emptying granaries; stealing food aid (UNDP, 2010). In Kaabong, redundant youth who indulge in alcohol consumption resort to food raiding as a survival mechanism. They also raid food distribution centres to steal food intended to benefit community members (World Vision, 2009b: 5). The study team was informed that due to poverty, criminals were now stealing not only cattle, but also chicken, and household property such as mosquito nets and saucepans. Respondents made mention of emerging concepts used to refer to raiding such as: ata lonetia (mosquito nets); ata lokokoroi (chicken); or ata losupuriya (saucepans).6 A similar trend was reported in Kaabong, that the raids these days are indiscriminate, in the past, raids used to target cows, now they take even stocks in granaries, pigs, chicken and bicycles!7 During the dry season, the Karamojong are forced to move out in search of water and pastures. However, every time the dry season ends, Karamojong not only raid the livestock of their host as they return to Karamoja, but also destroy peoples granaries, raid food and animals, rape women and girls, in their host communities and along the way as they return to their homes within Karamoja. This phenomenon was observed among the Dodoth (World Vision, 2009a). In Karamoja, attacks and ambushes along the highways are common. These are usually carried out by young men and young men on holiday (from school) in search for school fees. These attacks have also been

6 7

. Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator Dodoth Agro-pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), Kaaabong held at DADO offices on 4th August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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carried out by warriors after a failed cattle raid when they have been intercepted by the UPDF or when a raid has been repulsed by those who were to be raided (World Vision, 2008). Sexual and Gender-based forms of violence: Karamoja is a patriarchal society where polygamy is widespread. Most men marry several wives, even when they cannot look after them well. Women are treated as the beasts of burden because they have to provide food to the large families even when households completely have no assets on the basis of which food is made available. Every day, they have to go and look for food they will cook for their large families. When they come back home without food, they get beaten by their husbands. Due to the state of insecurity, women suffer abuse when they go to the wells to fetch water or to the bushes to collect firewood (Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008). One other way women are exposed to gender-based violence is through marriage and the payment of bride price. Once bride-price has been paid for a Karamojong bride, even when they are beaten and tortured, women are not easily allowed to return to their parents. Once a husband passes away, his relatives take all his family property irrespective of whether the woman has children. The widow will still be expected to look after her children or at least look to her husbands relatives for compassion. Karamojong widow(s) are expected to be inherited by their late husbands relatives. Widow inheritance is widespread among all Karamojong ethnic groups without exception (Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008). Karamoja warriors have been accused of sexually harassing women in the communities where they go raiding. Cases of rape have been reported. Some gender-based forms of violence have also been associated with disarmament. Women are beaten and sometimes tortured to compel them to reveal where their husbands are hiding, or where they have kept their guns. Karamojong men complained that the army subjects people to different forms of torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CIDT) to extract confession about the possession of illegal firearms. There were allegations that mens private parts were tied, beaten, squeezed and sometimes pricked in ways that affect the ability of the victims to exercise their sexuality (Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008). Apart from the above, the traditional Karamojong courtship behaviour has been associated with rape, which is traditionally justified under the pretext of courtship, in contravention of provisions in the Penal Code. Women find it difficult to seek redress because crimes against women are not perceived as such by tradition. Marital rape is also common, and has been associated with alcohol abuse (Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008). Karamojong children also suffer different forms of violence, including abuse. Karamojong children suffer neglect and sometimes abandonment by their fathers. The majority of the children in Karamoja are not only subjected to hard physical labour, especially in herding of small livestock, they also lack adequate food, shelter, clothing and nutrition. Infant mortalities are very high. The majority of the children are traumatised due to exposure to violence in the communities, either as victims of livestock raiding activities or as active players (UNDP, 2010; Muhereza, Ossiya & OvonjiOdida, 2008). Among the Pokot, Tepeth and Kadam, the practice of subjecting children to Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is a form of violence against children and women. The three communities in Karamoja socialise their women into believing that female circumcision is in their best interest, and is a symbol of their culture and pride. Those who have not gone for FGM are abused and ridiculed by fellow women and their co-wives. Girls as young as five years are circumcised as a ritual to signify their passage to woman-hood, and many often get married off thereafter. Circumcision in women is associated with complications in child birth. Early marriages, which are common in these communities due to circumcision, are associated with high infant mortalities as young mothers have Page 6 of 109

a higher risk of developing pregnancy complications (UNDP, 2010; Muhereza, Ossiya & OvonjiOdida, 2008).
2.1.3 SECURITY

Security when defined in the traditional way focuses on the military security, which connotes the risk of invasion and the protection of the constitution of the country. In this study, we adopt a concept of human security, which entails freedom from fear, intimidation, and threats (real or potential), from whatever source, that undermine the basic rights, welfare and property of the population, their territorial integrity of their state, and the proper functioning of systems of governance.8 The concept of Human security was first used in the 1994 Human Development Report to look beyond the narrow perspective of national security (defined in terms of military threats and the protection of strategic foreign policy goals), towards a vision of security rooted in the lives of people. This concept of human security takes a holistic view of poor peoples needs, which encompasses two types of freedoms, namely; freedom from fear (referring to the threat of violence, crime and war) and freedom from want (referring to economic, education, health, water, environmental and other threats to peoples wellbeing).9 Insecurity, therefore, would, as noted by Ochieng-Odhiambo (2003) refer to the manifestation of conflict, which undermines personal and collective security, and is characterized by the incidence of violence, and should be addressed in the long-term with the objective of getting to its underlying or root causes; while insecurity may be addressed by short and medium term measures that answer to specific aspects of the problem. Ochieng-Odhiambo (2003) further argues that dealing with conflict and insecurity requires a multipronged approach that addresses both the general, long term as well as the specific, short-term aspects.
2.1.4 PEACE BUILDING

Peace building refers to way in which conflicts are resolved or managed. Peace building entails processes of addressing the underlying causes of conflicts in order to prevent the resumption of conflicts. Building lasting peace entails a wide range of activities that are associated with building capacity for indulging in making peace, reconciliation and societal transformation. It is a long term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Peace-building activities identify and support structures and systems that intend to strengthen and solidify peace. Building lasting peace entails putting in place policies, programmes and interventions that seek to create the conditions for conflict-affected societies to manage their difficulties without violence, in order to address the longer-term goals for peaceful co-existence, democratic governance and sustainable socio-economic development.10 An important complement and component of building peace is an effective government and institutions enabled and able to play its role in ensuring the rule of law, good governance and service delivery.

8 9

. See Republic of Uganda, Issues paper on the development of a conflict resolution and peace building policy for the government of Uganda February 2006, organized by Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI). . See http://www.humansecurity-chs.org
10

. See Government of the Republic of Uganda and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Peace Building and Disaster Risk reduction Programme, A project document proceeding the TRP project, April 2007. Page 7 of 109

2.2 2.2.1

COLLECTION OF RESEARCH DATA SECONDARY DATA

Both published and unpublished (grey literature from workshops, meetings, seminars and other fora) materials (including project/programme documents, briefs, progress monitoring reports on conflict, security and peace-building studies in Karamoja) from stakeholders currently undertaking interventions were obtained and analysed. The research team sought documents and reports on current and planned efforts to support peace and conflict-management activities in Karamoja that are relevant to the work of the current stakeholders. A list of reports and assessments on Karamoja that were inventoried for this study is included in appendix 2. The research team also sought policy statements and policy documents on conflict, security and peace-building that exist from the mandated government agencies, especially the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM); and Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). At the national level, existing draft Policy documents on conflict, security and peace-building, such as the Issues paper on the development of a conflict resolution and peace building policy for the Government of Uganda and the Draft National Reconciliation Bill were accessed and analysed to identify the frameworks that they use to analyse conflict, security and peace building as well as the extent to which they have common issues of analysis. These policies and legal instruments were analysed to determine what they have considered as the key factors fuelling the continuing conflict; and whether they have made any recommendations for action. Other secondary data sources that were sought out during the desk research in phase I of this study will included: the Hansards of the Parliament of Uganda; Newspaper documentations on issues of conflict, security and peace building in Karamoja. Published and unpublished materials (grey literature from workshops, meetings, seminars and other fora), were obtained from the stakeholders who are currently undertaking interventions on conflict, security and peace-building in Karamoja. Additional materials were obtained from the Internet; Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), and especially the Northern Uganda Data Centre (NUDC); UN agencies in Karamoja; International and national development organisations working in Karamoja; Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) working in Karamoja. A documentation of newspaper clippings on Karamoja since 1990 was obtained from the Centre for Basic Research Documentation centre.
2.2.2 PRIMARY DATA

Even if phase I was predominantly a desk study, there were a limited number of follow up interviews that were undertaken with key stakeholders. Much of the phase II research comprised following up on issues from the desk study in Phase I in order to validate the emerging analysis. The validation of the data that was generated from Phase I exercise was undertaken in Kotido, Kaabong, Amudat and Napak districts. The validation process entailed the following: Key informant interviews: Key informant interviews were held with Karamojong elites and leaders to cross-check and validate data and information generated from analysis of existing secondary sources. Non-randomly sampled key informants among Karamojong elites and opinions leaders were interviewed. The unstructured interviews were used to gain insights into perceptions of interviewees regarding the key factors fuelling the continuing conflict; and recommendations that they make for action to mitigate the negative impact of the conflicts. Key informant interviews were undertaken with representatives Page 8 of 109

of the stakeholders who were identified during the stakeholders mapping as having interventions in the area of conflict, security and peace building in Karamoja. A list of people interviewed has been included in appendix 3. Focus Group Discussions: In each of the four districts of Karamoja that were selected for the validation of the data generated from Phase I (namely Kotido, Kaabong, Amudat and Napak districts), Focus Group Discussions were conducted in one selected sub-county on the following issues: Which organisation has been undertaking interventions in your sub-county in the areas of conflict, security and peace building? What interventions are being undertaken by these organisations? What are the main causes of armed conflicts in your sub-county? Which factors have been the main causes of armed conflicts and insecurity in your sub-county? What are the other causes insecurity and armed conflicts in your sub-county? Are there any other actors who have contributed to the continuation of armed conflicts and insecurity in your sub-county? What has been the impact of the armed conflicts and insecurity in your sub-county? What interventions have been undertaken by government and development partners to address the conflicts? Why has the armed conflicts and insecurity in your sub-county continued? Are there any actors who benefit from the continuation of armed conflicts and insecurity in your sub-county?

In each of the study districts, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with elders, women and youth. The communities where these FGDs were conducted included the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county Kaabong district Napumpum village, Loposa Parish, Panyangara sub-county in Kotido District

The list of people who participated in each of these FGDs in the four selected communities in the four districts of Karamoja is appended (see appendix 4).
2.3 TEAM COMPOSITION

The overall Team Leader for the research study was Mr. Frank Emmanuel Muhereza, a senior Research Fellow at Centre for Basic Research, Kampala. The research team comprised two teams. Mr. Lokeris Francis Loyok headed the team in Amudat and Napak district and Mr. John Ssenkumba led the team in Kaabong and Kotido Districts. Both research teams were assisted by an array of local research assistants. In Amudat, the study team was assisted by Merian Ambrose and Longok Michael. In Napak district, research assistance was provided by Loli Raphael ( alias Apa Nothing) and Moses Chuna Kapolon. In Kotido, research assistance to the study team was provided by Paul Lowok, Timothy Namuya, David Lokule and Alice Akello. In Kaabong, research assistance was provided by Damian Engor, Isiah Logwee, Albert Lopeyok and Abraham Komol.

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FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSES OF CONFLICT, SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING

In this chapter, an analysis of the inventoried studies and assessments of conflict by development actors in Karamoja (see appendix 2), security and peace-building in Karamoja region is undertaken to identify shared frameworks and common issues of analysis. What this means is that in the consideration of the facts presented in the inventoried studies and assessments to explain the drivers of the continuing conflict in Karamoja, certain positions regarding (i) theoretical issues; (ii) approaches and strategies adopted, and; (iii) the logic in the design of interventions proposed; have been made sense of by the arrangement of the facts presented, which are here-below identified.
3.1 3.1.1 SHARED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE FRAMEWORK

All the inventoried studies and assessments of conflict by development actors in Karamoja have in one way of the other concerned themselves with different forms of analyses of the causes of the armed conflicts in Karamoja. In these studies, a number of variables have been considered in explaining the causes of Karamoja armed conflicts and drivers of the continuing conflict. Many of the inventoried studies and assessments make mentions of the diversities of benefits derived from the armed conflicts in Karamoja, where the conflict is predicated on struggles to access mainly livestock but also natural resources used for livestock production (water and pastures). All the studies and assessments discussed not only the armed conflicts in Karamoja, but also what causes it. Even without making mention of why the conflicts continued or had become difficult to end, it was evident that many of the reasons mentions as cause were still valid. One framework that the analyses in these inventoried studies and assessments share is the Greed and Grievance model that was developed by Collier and Hoeffler (1999). The armed conflicts in Karamoja that inventoried studies and assessments make reference to are conflicts associated with violent livestock raiding. There is a potential for conflict over ownership, access to and use of natural resources such as minerals, pastures and water, but these have for a long been overshadowed by the raiding of livestock. On one hand, analysis in many of the studies and assessments has concerned itself with understanding of, or making mention of the benefits those who are involved in the armed conflicts in Karamoja derive from it, in whatever form (whether in cash or in kind), hence the greed thesis. The latter mainly focus on the commercialisation of livestock raiding as the main form of conflict in Karamoja. On the other hand, the inventoried studies and assessments had also made reference to injustices or discontents by those involved in the armed conflicts to explain the causation of armed conflict, hence the grievances thesis. Here, the underlying ethnic, socioeconomic, or political grievances are central to the analysis. The studies and assessments mentioned marginalisation, exclusion and isolation of the Karamojong as a cause of the armed conflicts. Others specify the lack of political will, bad policies, and grievances emanating from the process of disarmament as well as its impact. It needs not much emphasis to show that in their analysis of the causes and continuation of the Karamoja armed conflicts, the inventoried studies and assessments have focused not only on both greed and grievances, but like other scholars who pointed to the limitations of this greed and grievances model, sought to focus on the continuation of the armed conflict as being the result of very highly complex systems of social-cultural, economic and political interactions, which cannot Page 10 of 109

be merely reduced to a juxtaposition of greed or loot-seeking on one hand and grievances or justice-seeking on the other hand Grievance (see for example Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003; Stuvy 2002).
3.1.2 BEYOND THE GREED AND GRIEVANCE FRAMEWORK

The Karamoja conflict defies the Greed and Grievance typologies in various ways. It is not about the capture of state power, but a struggle over renewable natural resources; mainly livestock (see Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 9), although Karamoja, which has the largest concentration of valuable mineral deposits than anywhere else in the country, has also been the subject of low-key contestations especially over prospecting rights and royalties between mineral prospectors and district local governments (see Muhereza & Bledsoe, 2001). There have also been conflicts between the mountain Tepeth and the Matheniko over limestone on the slopes of Mt. Moroto, with the former claiming that no other ethnic group should access the minerals because everything on the mountains is exclusive to the Tepeth. Apart from the low key contestations, none of the inventoried studies and assessments makes reference to the minerals of Karamoja as a cause of the Karamoja armed conflicts, or as a driver of the continuing conflict. None of the studies have also mentioned water and pastures as a cause of the Karamoja armed conflicts, or as a driver of the continuing conflict. By focusing on livestock raiding more as a conflict over livestock, than a conflict over natural resources required for livestock production (water and pastures), these inventoried studies and assessments share similarities in their consideration of the nature of the Karamoja conflict. While economic factors are important to explain why armed conflicts start and remain pervasive,11 we agree with Ballentine and Nitzschke (2003) that there are so many different perspectives as to how economic factors matter and how much they matter relative to other political and socio-cultural factors that are associated with armed conflicts. None of the inventoried studies and assessments have concerned themselves with a consideration of which factors are more important than others in the causation of armed conflicts in Karamoja. All the studies and assessments have however examined the totality of the key factors responsible for causing armed conflicts without pronouncing themselves on which was considered more important than others. To understand the causes, character, and dynamics of pervasiveness of armed conflicts associated with Karamojong cattle rustling, the facts presented in all the inventoried studies and assessments transcend the greed and grievances dichotomisation, implying the necessity for broadening and contextualising of the analytical framework to make it possible to look at the intersection of need, creed and greed. The inventoried studies and assessment made reference to ways in which need caused conflicts and had potential to sustain its continuation. Others suggested a need to consider the influence of creed. Inventoried studies and assessment show that need and creed may be intimately linked. The worsening poverty and inequality, coupled with marginalisation and exclusion create desires for achieving lifes basic needs and the gains pursued largely by exacting violence. The latter has largely been justified through a process of socialisation, ethnic polarisation and identity formation. Karamojong from a particular ethnic group identify themselves vis--vis those from another ethnic group, through a system of beliefs by which identity is constructed, hence the notion of creed.

11

. Stites & Akabwai (2009: 9) for example cite raiding as a mechanism for redistributing wealth and food; rebuilding herds after shocks and acquiring bride-wealth

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3.2

PROPOSED APPROACH FOR ANALYSIS OF THE DRIVERS OF THE CONTINUING CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA

Karamoja is the only place in the whole country where the State does not exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in Uganda. The use of excessive force has encountered significant challenges in stemming crime and criminality, manifested largely through livestock raiding. The fragile nature of situation is such that even with genuinely concerted efforts by government to end armed livestock raiding in Karamoja and improve community security, majority of the communities continue to perceive themselves as better protected by their own, rather than state security service providers (the UPDF and the Police) due to the never ending insecurity. The situation of armed conflicts in Karamoja is such that there are a myriad of risk factors that re-enforce the underlying factors that drive the conflicts, which are seldom understood, especially in the way in which they contribute not only to the start of armed conflicts, but also to their continuation. There are risk factors at household and community levels, as well as at the district and Karamoja-wide levels. Risks that increase the likelihood of armed conflicts continuing in Karamoja many times include cultural, social, political as well as economic factors way beyond the structural factors. There are widespread perceptions of political and economic deprivation or grievances. The harsh physical environment has increased resource scarcity and competition, leading to increased susceptibility to shocks and hazards, leading to vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters. The negative impact of the above factors has been exacerbated by weaknesses in the governance systems and structures (whereby the modern has failed to do away with the traditional, as well as build on its positive aspects). The criminal justice system is ineffective and is faced with huge backlogs. Corruption is widespread because it is difficult to monitor due to insecurity. Widespread use of excessive force by State institutions, coupled with the lack of effective service delivery, and limited investment in social policies and programming undermined confidence of the population in the ability of the state as a provider of security. Various analytical frameworks have made reference to these risk factors. One such framework is the greed and grievance model, and the subsequent improvement to this model, the need, creed and greed model (see discussions in the preceding section). There are very many dimensions of the new conflict dynamics in Karamoja which cannot be explained by focusing solely on need, creed and greed, and the importance of the different factors that drive the continuation of armed conflicts under each of these theses vary depending on the specific contexts in which these conflicts occur. The importance of understanding the inter-linkages, and possible intersections between need, creed and greed cannot be over-emphasised, largely because such a typology makes it difficult to appreciate the interrelationships between the various critical factors not only in the causation of the conflicts in the first place, but also in continuing to drive the conflicts. In our proposed analytical framework in this study on the drivers of armed conflict in Karamoja, it is intended to look at inter-play of factors that are internal to Karamoja and those that are external to Karamoja, and the various levels at which these factors come into play (and the actors to whom they apply), in order to discern how they mutually reinforce each other to explain the new dynamics driving the continuation of the armed conflicts. In a study on the impact of disarmament in Karamoja which was commissioned by Save the Children in Uganda (SCiUg), with support from the European Union, that was undertaken by the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, it is argued (in explaining the insecurity in Karamoja) that: Outside actors and policies have contributed to and exacerbated insecurity in Karamoja for decades, but it is those within Karamoja who bear primary responsibility for the disintegration of the security environment and the deleterious effects on the lives and livelihoods of the population of the region and adjacent areas. Even in periods when the rate of incidents of raids or attacks is low, the threat of insecurity is pervasive and limits the active pursuit of livelihood strategies (Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 9). Page 12 of 109

The dichotomisation of the causes of conflicts (and by inference the drivers of the continuing conflict) between root causes (underlying factors) and proximate causes (triggers) has been criticised for leading to a preoccupation with structural factors (see SantAnna, et al, 2007: 62). We are agreed with the latter criticism. This is because in conflict situations, the dynamics of conflict often shape and transform the structural factors and their significance, which, first and foremost, makes it difficult to decipher how emerging new dynamics of conflicts are associated with underlying structural factors; and secondly, creates a misleading impression that the conflict can be resolved once root causes are addressed.12 A structural functionalist framework would contend that the drivers of conflicts in Karamoja are associated with the failure of the structures, institutions and systems of the state responsible for not only the provision of public security, but also the rule of law and maintenance of law and order, in addition to the ineffectiveness of enforcement of conflict prevention measures. It would be argued in such a perspective that there are over-whelming structural constraints encountered in provision of security in Karamoja that predispose the communities to armed conflicts. However, inability by the state security forces to regulate community relations; as well as the inability to police disputes before they escalate into outright war has also continued to fuel the armed conflict in Karamoja in ways that a focus on structures alone is unable to capture. It should, however be mentioned from the outset, that unlike many armed conflicts in other parts of the country, the conflicts in Karamoja have been raging for now more than 30 years. The structural factors that explain the root causes of this conflict have been transformed by the dynamics of the conflict, making it sometimes difficult to differentiate between the root causes (or underlying factors) that drive the continuation of the conflicts, from the proximate factors that actually trigger off the continuing conflict. The approach in this report for analysing the drivers of conflicts in Karamoja is founded on the notion that the factors that fuel the continuation of armed conflicts are complex, multiple, sometimes inter-locked and often mutually re-enforcing (see Walker, 2008; SantAnna, et al, 2007: 64-5; DFID, 2002). To address armed conflicts in Karamoja would necessitate a multi-pronged, multi-level and multi-stakeholder approach. Just as there is no single cause of the continuing armed conflicts and violence in Karamoja, there cannot be a monolithic approach that captures all the changing dynamics of the continuation of armed conflicts. Programming necessary to respond to these conflict dynamics should be primarily sensitive to the various conflict dimensions referred to above, and inherently multi-faceted to take into consideration the various factors that fuel the continuation of the armed conflicts in Karamoja. Building on the framework of analysis of conflict development by SantAnna, et al (2007), it is argued in this study that the factors that fuel the continuation of conflicts relate to perceptions as well as objective factors, and to dynamic identity politics. They are intimately related to development issues, understood broadly to include political, economic and social development and issues of governance, human security, and sustainability. There are many factors operating at various levels that are fuelling the continued conflict in Karamoja. The key is how they combine and develop. These factors include:

12

. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam International, and Saferworld, acknowledge and recognise that due to the multi-faceted nature of the efforts needed to reduce armed violence, the root causes of armed conflict in Africa such as poverty, poor governance, and inequality must be addressed (IANSA, Oxfam, & Saferworld, 2007: 7). Page 13 of 109

Underlying or structural factors (such as weak states, social/ethnic division or exclusion, bad or authoritarian government, inequality, violent crime, impunity, inadequate institutions or social services, bad laws, environmental scarcity); The interests, relations, capacities, perceptions, identities and agendas of relevant actors (such as political leaders, military, corrupt elites, warlords, businessmen; development agencies, civil society groups); Dynamics (such as impacts of humanitarian assistance; national level policies; disarmament; politics in districts (within and between ethnic groups) and between districts; identity politics, the impact of and natural disasters such as drought and floods; in and out migrations).

None of these factors, on their own, necessarily lead to violent conflict. Most conflict processes are highly dynamic, and are driven by complex and shifting combinations of several factors and actors. An analysis of the drivers of the Karamoja conflict will entail a detailed examination of the structural factors and actors, and how they all combine in relation to specific dynamics of the conflicts in Karamoja. In this framework, few pre-suppositions about the primary causes or drivers of the Karamoja conflict are made, except that there are typically many contributing factors and the focus of analysis is to identify and assess each of them and then examine the ways in which their dynamic interaction drive conflict processes and risks.13 4 CURRENT AND PLANNED EFFORTS TO SUPPORT PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

In this chapter, current and planned efforts to support peace building and conflict management activities in Karamoja are inventoried and thereafter analysed, not only to identify whether there are shared frameworks and common issues, but also to identify gaps in the existing and planned peace building interventions. From our analysis of development partners programme documents accessed and interviews with various representatives of these organizations, the current and planned efforts by development partners in Karamoja focused mainly on capacity building; community empowerment; livelihood improvement and mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues. Our analysis of undertakings in these areas is as follows:
4.1 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

There was commonality in the proposed capacity building interventions by development partners supporting peace building and conflict prevention activities in Karamoja, including bilaterals/multi-lateral and International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs). Most development partners undertaking interventions in peace building and conflict management in Karamoja, including the multi-laterals (such as European Union), bi-laterals (such as Danida; USAID; GTZ; Irish Aid; the Netherlands Embassy; Swedish International Development Agency), and UN agencies (such as UNDP; World Food Programme; FAO) and International NGOs (such

13

. This framework has also been successfully used before by the Department for International Development (DfID), who combine an analysis of structures and actors and how the two interact with one another. The analysis of structures (structural analysis) focuses on the institutions (political, economic, social and military) which may predispose a country to violent conflict. It entails an actor-oriented analysis in which individual incentives and motivations for involvement in conflict are identified at various levels. This framework also considers conflicts as being dynamic social processes in which the original structural tensions are themselves profoundly reshaped and transformed as the conflicts progress. Hence, the notion that the beginning and end of a conflict can be identified is considered inappropriate. Therefore root causes may become decreasingly relevant in protracted conflicts, which have led to the transformation of the state and society (DfID, 2002).

Page 14 of 109

as Oxfam GB; IRC; World Vision International; Mercy Corps; Save the Children in Uganda; DanChurch Aid; ZOA Refugees Care) were using capacity development as an approach for supporting efforts geared at building lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for development. UNDP defines capacity as the ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner (UNDP, 2010). Capacity development entails a process through which the abilities of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner are obtained, strengthened, adapted and maintained over time.
4.1.1 LEVELS TARGETED FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

From the inventoried studies, assessments and programme documents of development partners in Karamoja which were accessed, as well as from consultations with stakeholders, capacity development for conflict resolution and peace building was being undertaken at the following levels: At the enabling environment level, capacity development has entailed strengthening the capacity of CSOs to undertake advocacy to ensure that (i) relevant policies and legislations to supporting sustainable peace building are in place; and that the power relations and the social norms are favourable for peace building; (ii) mandated agencies such as the district local governments, the Police and the Military do their work. An analysis of the conflict resolution and peace building work in Karamoja showed that there has been some engagement mainly by international development organisations at this level. Oxfam GB was involved in district and national level advocacy to improve security and the policy environment for pastoralists to secure their livelihoods. It was one of the few organisations whose interventions targeted changes in protection (for example over the issue of protected kraals) and disarmament policies (Oxfam GB, 2009). At the Organisational level, capacity development targeted policies, procedures and frameworks within organizations/institutions that make it possible for capacities of individuals in the organisation to connect and achieve collective goals. In order for this to be realized, the duty bearers have to have a capacity to guarantee rights and services for rights holders to claim and use. From the secondary literature that was available, and consultations undertaken, it was evident that development partners supported capacity development not only for governmental agencies and departments (including the Police, UPDF and the Judiciary), but also district and sub-county local authorities, as well as civil society organisations that targeted the improvement of the internal functioning of these agencies and organisations. Many of the local civil society organisations that were involved in peace building and conflict management, such as Dodoth Agro-pastoral Development Organisation (DADO); Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN); SSD Moroto; CARITAS Kotido; Warrior Squad Foundation, Kotido; Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme (KADP); Moroto and Nakapiripirit Civil Society Network (Riamiriam) received organisational development and capacity strengthening support. Capacity development support for governmental agencies and departments, for example entailed the following: support to human rights training for the military; mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution skills for civil society. Some civil society organisations received support to improve internal governance and management, including enhancing group dynamics and internal financial management skills. Development partners that were supporting capacity development for district local governments included the following among others: IRC; UNDP; WFP; GTZ; FAO. Among others, development partners who were undertaking interventions in peace and conflict management through partners included the following among others: EU; Danida; Oxfam GB; IRC; UNDP; Save the Children in Uganda; GTZ; FAO; DCA. Page 15 of 109

At the individual level, capacity development targeted the skills and knowledge vested in the people who are in the local governments. The focus of the capacity development is to enhance the skills, knowledge and experiences of the people affected by conflict. Almost every development partner in Karamoja had interventions that targeted capacity development for ordinary Karamojong through their various project activities on conflict resolution and peace building. There were organisations where most of the support targeted those in leadership positions (e.g. IRC). The following development partners (among others) were supporting capacity development at the individual level: IRC; UNDP; ZOA Refugee Agency; GTZ; WFP; FAO; SSD-Caritas Moroto; KADP.
4.1.2 TYPES OF CAPACITIES TARGETED

Our analysis of the secondary data available to us and the current and planned efforts to support peace and conflict management activities in Karamoja by the various stakeholders, it was evident that two types of capacities were targeted under capacity development support by development partners. The first was functional capacities. This type of capacity relates to the ability of the entity targeted for capacity development to function, for example, through ably engaging stakeholders; conducting assessments of situations; formulating policies, strategies and plans; developing, managing and implementing budgets; conducting monitoring and evaluations. For example, the partners supported by IRC and Oxfam GB who are involved in cross-border peace building activities are supported to undertake continuous peace meetings and dialogues for peaceful co-existence. Local CSOs that engaged stakeholders in meetings for peace and conflict management included, among others: KDDS; SSD Caritas-Moroto; KADP; Riamiriam; MADEFO. Capacity development strives to ensure that things that have to be in place for local governments to function (such as the financial and human resources; the physical infrastructure and the necessary logistics) are in place; and if they are not, that they are provided. Many development partners were supporting or planned to support capacity development in the area of physical infrastructure for promoting conflict resolution and peace building. A lot of work was being done in opening and maintenance rural feeder roads; provision of safe water for human consumption and livestock; construction of livestock market infrastructure. The Nakiloro market constructed by UNDP in collaboration with IRC was one such undertaking that had greatly contributed to strengthening peaceful relations and mutual co-existence between the Karamojong and Turkana of Kenya who bring their livestock and merchandise for sale. The second aspect of capacity building that development partners were supporting was the technical capacities of local civil society organisations. Technical capacities are those capacities associated with particular areas of professional expertise or knowledge, e.g. preparing ordinances; financial management, among others. In supporting capacity development for District Local Government, Civil Society and community structures, most development partner organisations, including the International NGOs such as IRC; Oxfam GB; Save the Children in Uganda, UNDP; ZOA Refugee Agency; GTZ; WFP; FAO; among others, were focusing both on functional capacities as well as technical capacities. These organisations supported different types of trainings to enhance technical capacities of their respective local partner organisations.
4.2 COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT

Community empowerment was being undertaken as an approach for preventing and resolving conflicts to achieve lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for development. This was justified variously: Page 16 of 109

4.2.1

EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Development partners support empowerment of communities through community-based structures in the belief that being closest to the causes of conflict; the communities are often best suited to mitigate the conflicts if community level peace and conflict management structures have been capacitated to implement activities on behalf of the community. These structures are also used to respond directly to community disputes and to intervene with intra and inter clan negotiations. For all the organisations that use community-based structures, there is always a challenge as to whether such structures offer the best avenue for bringing communities on board. Development partners who undertake interventions in peace and conflict management using community based strategies and through community-based structures include the following among others: Oxfam GB; IRC; KADP. Many were undertaking different kinds of civic education (ZOA; KADP; KDDS; SSD-Caritas, Moroto).
4.2.2 NURTURING PARTNERSHIPS

The continuing armed conflict in Karamoja has a regional dimension, which is very difficult to deal with without addressing the underlying contextual issues. Due to the porous international borders between Uganda and the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Sudan, there is a lot of trafficking in SALWs into Karamoja, which, in many ways has fuelled the armed conflict. Several development partners in Karamoja are responding to the need to address the conflict from a crossborder perspective by directly involving both the state and non-state actors (especially the civil society and local community structures). We are agreed with the analysis in a study undertaken by the Feinstein International Center on the need for governments and organizations working on conflict to develop a regional approach to address the root causes of conflict involving the pastoralists (see Stites, Akabwai, Mazurana & Ateyo, 2007). The approach that is being used by the majority of the international NGOs in Karamoja is to reinforce cross-border linkages amongst communities, civil society and government representatives through the regional peace-building networks. For example, such as approach is used by Oxfam GB; ACTED and IRC. IRC, for example, is supporting the strengthening of partnerships between CSO networks and national authorities, to enable cross-border civil society to mobilise the necessary government institutions to respond to the structural capacitators of conflict.14
4.2.3 BUILDING SYNERGIES WITH TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Many development partners are undertaking interventions to support the consolidation of peaceful relations between ethnic groups and within ethnic groups as well as strengthening capacity of local authorities to mediate conflict, as well as supporting civil society and community structures. Many of these interventions however have minimal influence on alternative mechanisms for peace building, especially the traditional cultural institutions (see UNDP, 2010; Muhereza, 2010b). Working through community level peace committees to respond to community disputes and to intervene in intra and inter-clan disputes does not in any way mean that the actual traditional authority structures are targeted (see UNDP, 2010). As often is the case, traditional authority

14

. Interview with Mr. Kevin Angom, Peace Building Assistant and Mr. Benjamin Ateu, Civil Society Development Officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC), held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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structures are always assumed to come on board through externally-imposed community level structures. Many times, initiated elders participate in these NGO-induced community structures, like they do participate in state structures such as Local Councils. More often, however, they do not. The reality is that when they do not involve themselves, they remain largely ineffectual. The Karamojong practice a traditional political system of gerontocracy where spiritual/divine/intercessory/mystical powers are exercised by senior elders (the mountains). For being nearer to their death, these senior elders also commune directly with the Karamojong god (called Akuj), and exercise some decision making powers. Senior elders also enjoy significant judicial powers when they convene as an ekokwa. The proliferation of firearms has eroded some of the powers of elders to make decisions, and to enforce the decisions and rules they make (enforcement powers). Their ability to exercise powers of adjudication (sanction and ensure compliance) had been greatly compromised, especially by armed youth who even when the elders cursed, the youth refused to obey their commands, and did not die. Without the monopoly of violence, the ability of elders to ensure compliance and enforce sanctions for arbitrary behaviour especially among those who are armed had been compromised but not completely eroded. In Karamoja two systems of authority exist side by side the traditional system of authority, which derives from the powers of elders and the formal system authority, which derive from the central state. The local councils at village (LC1), Parish (LC2), sub-county (LC3) and district (LC5) levels, and the councillors at sub-county and district level, as well as the chiefs belong to the formal domain. In the formal system, most of those who occupy positions of responsibility in leadership are uninitiated, and are therefore despised by the traditional system (see UNDP, 2010). Many of the initiatives they undertake in the areas of peace building and conflict prevention are of no consequences because they are not respected by the elders in whose domain such powers are domiciled. An initiative by an uninitiated LC3 chairperson cannot have the same consequence like that of an LC3 chairperson who is initiated. There were only a few LC3 chairmen in Karamoja who had been initiated (see UNDP, 2010). In all the study sites, no attempts had been made to have a structured engagement of cultural/traditional institution of elders in the promotion of conflict prevention and peace building.
4.3 LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENT

Livelihood is defined as the resources/assets, capabilities and activities required for the means of living. Resources are what one uses to derive a living, and assets are what one has that can be used for deriving a living. The resources/assets that are essential for livelihood include human capital; social capital, natural capital; physical capital; human capital and financial capital (Niehof (2004:324). Capabilities refer to means people have to access and put to productive use the resources they possess and the assets own (which in itself is influenced by existing policies, institutions and processes), while what they do with their resources/assets to earn a living using their capabilities is what broadly constitutes activities (see Muhereza, 2010a). To therefore speak about livelihoods in the context of a specific category of people would in broad terms refer to the way the people referred to, access and mobilise resources, to do what they do, and what they accomplish by doing it, which enables them to pursue goals necessary for their immediate and long-term survival (see also Nieholf, 2004; Chambers and Corway, 1992). For the Karamojong, livelihoods have revolved around crop farming; livestock production; foraging; casual labour, and formal wage employment. Interventions by development partners that have concerned themselves with improvement in livelihoods have focused on the promotion of mainly crop farming to increase food security. In most of these interventions, development partners Page 18 of 109

with livelihood improvement components have targeted improvement in food production through supporting land opening; provision of inputs such as seeds and planting materials; provision of agricultural extension services; training of farmers in modern husbandry practices; and setting up demonstration gardens. Some development partners have targeted the improvement in livestock production through supporting provision of veterinary extension services and access to veterinary drugs. Some development partners have supported provision of marketing infrastructure, and other water facilities for livestock. The following few examples are used to illustrate the fact that there have been very limited initiatives to integrate crop farming and livestock production through the development interventions being undertaken by most development partners in Karamoja. GTZ is piloting a livelihoods improvement programme in Karamoja. The project, which was commissioned on 1st July 2009 and will run up to 30th June 2012, has 4 components. The Livelihoods component focuses on agricultural land opening, opening land for settlement, distribution of agricultural inputs, provision of advisory services, trainings, establishment of demonstration gardens for vegetable growing at watering points. GTZ is only considering livestock restocking for the future. ZOA Refugee Agency, which is operating in Amudat district, is undertaking livelihoods improvement through supporting increased crop production; bee keeping; Food for Work and Vouchers for work. ZOA is also undertaking interventions intended to build community assets such as opening roads and construction of community water assets (water for production and safe water for domestic consumption) using local inputs. ZOA is also supporting civic education about formal/informal justice systems; education; marriage; Peace building and Conflict Prevention. ZOA is also supporting the strengthening of local Civil Society to partner with in the implementation of the above interventions. In the majority of the development interventions, very limited efforts have been made to integrate crop farming and livestock production in ways that enhance opportunities for conflict resolution and peace-building. For example, the major thrust of KDDS interventions in Amudat has been supporting peace dialogues between Pokot and the neighbouring Karamojong communities. In Kotido, Mercy Corps is implementing a project called Building Bridges to Peace Program. This project, which was launched on March 2009, is intended to address the key causes of conflict by engaging warring communities in joint livelihood programmes. Mercy Corps is supporting local mechanisms through peace structures in existence, or encouraging their formation; reinforcing existing peace initiatives; initiating joint livelihood projects. Mercy Corps supports 2 local CBOs as partners. In Kaabong, they support Kaabong Peace and Development Agency (KAPDA) which is engaged in cassava multiplication and inter-cropping activities. In Kotido, they support Karamoja Peace and Environment Protection Services (KAPEPS), which is active in agro-forestry, tree planting and fruit tree seedlings provision. Mercy Corps is also facilitating the construction of a joint market between Kotido and Kaabong along the road, and envisages that the commodities from the other two partner CBOs will feed into the joint market. Joint dams are also being constructed between warring communities. World Vision International currently has no peace building activity in Kotido, but it is undertaking food distribution on behalf of WFP.
4.4 LINKING SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

The literature on peace building and conflict resolution recognises that it broadly encompasses all processes that primarily entail peacefully managing current conflicts (conflict management) as well as eventually resolving these conflicts (conflict resolution), while at the same time providing a basis for prevention of the occurrence of similar and other conflicts in future Page 19 of 109

(conflict prevention).15 All the inventoried studies and assessments have concerned themselves with how to approach the issue of ensuring sustainable peace through managing current conflicts and preventing future conflicts. It was appreciated in all the inventoried studies and assessments that undertaking measures for conflict management and resolution on one hand, and conflict prevention on the other measures is relevant not only to mitigate the negative outcomes of conflicts but also to transform conflict and to respond to various conflict triggers, which in themselves entail significant engagement in building sustainable peace. All the inventoried studies and assessments acknowledge that there can be no development without peace and security and vice versa. Human security and development are inextricably linked in the region and peace-building plays an integral role in achieving both. In their approach to sustainable peace, all the inventoried studies and assessments share similarity in their framework of analysis. It is commonly understood that sustainable peace building entails addressing challenges afflicting the livelihoods of those afflicted by the armed conflicts. These inventoried studies and assessments show clearly that to build lasting peace necessitates a wide range of activities including, but not limited to, strengthening the capacity of institutions of the state mandated to provide security, justice and law and order, as well as undertaking concerted initiatives to promote dialogue, confidence building, reconciliation and societal transformation. In the inventoried studies and assessments, it emerges clearly that there are many interventions that have been preferred under the various programmes undertaken by development partners and local civil society organisations are short term in nature (most being one to three year projects) and therefore make minimal contributions to building lasting and sustainable peace. For example, IRC is currently implementing a two year regional cross-border project on strengthening the capacity of civil society for undertaking conflict resolution and prevention. Oxfam has been implementing a 24-months project titled: A stepping-stone to comprehensive peace: Advocating for peaceful and community based conflict-resolution and development in Karamoja from 1st September 2008 to 31st August 2010. ZOA is implementing a one year project on Food Security and Agricultural Livelihoods. The project is intended to enhance access to sustainable resources, public information and basic services; improve internal cohesion and self governance and enhance peace and stability. GTZ is currently implementing as a 3-year pilot project (from 1st July 2009 till 30th June 2012) titled: Food and Nutrition Security and Conflict Management Project. Sustainable peace building has to be a deliberate undertaking that is long-term and entails a commitment of a significant amount of resources.

15

. Peace-building, therefore, encompasses peaceful conflict management, resolution and prevention. Conflict prevention refers to actions, policies, procedures or institutions that contribute to the avoidance of the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle political disputes, or avoidance of the recurrence of violent conflict. On the other hand, peaceful conflict resolution refers to the termination of a conflict or dispute through the elimination of the underlying bases or causes of the conflict in a non-violent manner.

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ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

This chapter is an analysis of legal and policy framework for peace building and conflict resolution in Uganda. It seeks to identify the gaps in the legal and policy framework on the basis of which, make recommendations for future action by Oxfam and other actors (Government of Uganda, donors, the UN, and civil society).
5.1 5.1.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1995

The legal provisions that provide for engagement in peace building and conflict resolution are provided for in the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. It is stated in section III on National unity and stability (under political objectives) under sub-section (i) that: All organs of State and people of Uganda shall work towards the promotion of national unity, peace and stability. Sub-section (ii) states: Every effort shall be made to integrate all the peoples of Uganda, while at the same time recognising the existence of their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity. Sub-section (iii) states: Everything shall be done to promote a culture of cooperation, understanding, appreciation, tolerance and respect for each other's customs, traditions and beliefs. Sub-section (iv) states: there shall be established and nurtured institutions and procedures for the resolution of conflicts fairly and peacefully. Sub-section (v) states: the State shall provide a peaceful, secure and stable (Republic of Uganda, 1995).
5.1.2 LEGISLATION FOR REGULATING THE USE OF FIREARMS

Uganda has signed and ratified several international and regional agreements, protocols and declarations intended to control and eventually eradicate the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). These include the following: (1) United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects; (2) the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (ratified in April 2005); (3) the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons; (4) the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of the Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lake Region and Horn of Africa; the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (which government signed in April 2004, ratified in February 2005 came into Force in May 2006), and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa. During the 1st Meeting of the Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM), which was held in Kampala between 20 and 21 August 2010, Hon. Janet K. Museveni, Minister of State for Karamoja Affairs, while delivering a key-note address at the opening of the REDICOM meeting promised to follow up the EAPCCO Protocol on cattle rustling until it is ratified? The Penal Code Act (Cap. 120) contains various provisions that address issues of unlawful use of firearms. Explosives Act (Cap. 298) is intended to regulate the manufacture, storage and peaceful use of explosives. The Firearms Act (Cap. 299) makes it an offence for anyone to possess a firearm without a license, let alone using it to terrorise other persons. Section 3(1) of the Firearms Page 21 of 109

Act (Cap. 299) specifies that: No person shall purchase, acquire or have in his or her possession any firearm or ammunition unless, in respect of each such firearm, he or she holds a valid firearm certificate. The Act makes it an offence for anyone who does so, and is liable upon conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine not exceeding Ushs. 20,000/= or both (section 3(2)(b). Section 32(2) states that: anyone who displays a firearm in a public place in such a manner as to cause alarm to any member of the public commits an offence, and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine of Ushs. 6,000/= or both. Proposals have been made for revision of the fines under the Firearms Act. Due to limitations in the functioning of magistrates courts in areas of active conflicts such as Karamoja, Military Court Martial were lawfully established to hear cases involving the possession and use of weapons that are ordinarily the preserve of the military under the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act of 2005 (Cap. 307). For being in unlawful possession of arms, ammunition, equipment and other prescribed materials ordinarily being the monopoly of the army, Karamojong warriors make themselves subject to military law under section 15(1)(i) of the UPDF Act of 2005 (Cap. 307). By indulging in raiding activities using illegally owned arms and ammunition, Karamojong warriors commit an offence, for which they are liable, upon conviction, to suffer death (Section 33[1][2]). Hundreds of Karamojong warriors who have been forcefully disarmed or arrested in possession of illicit firearms have been charged, prosecuted and sentenced by the Court Martial.
5.1.3 THE AMNESTY ACT, 2000

The Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294) provides for an Amnesty for Ugandans involved in acts of a war-like nature in various parts of the country, including hostilities directed at the Government of Uganda, which were causing unnecessary suffering to the people in the affected areas. Amnesty means a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State. The criminal acts of raiding livestock made Karamojong warriors liable for criminal prosecution under various laws of Uganda, but did not necessarily make the Amnesty law applicable to them. It is their participation in military combat directed at government, in resisting the government disarmament campaign (including many times directly engaging the UPDF in gun battles) that made them potential beneficiaries of the amnesty law, in so far as it was an armed rebellion against government, and therefore an act of war. In Part II, section 3(1), amnesty is declared in respect of any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda by (a) actual participation in combat; (b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; (c) committing any other crime in the furtherance of the war or armed rebellion; or (d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed rebellion.16
5.1.4 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT

The development objectives of government in Karamoja have been expressed in the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP). There are several legal and policy processes that informed the design of the KIDDP. While there is no stand-alone national policy on Karamoja Disarmament, several policy proposals and guidelines related to disarmament in Karamoja exist. The NRM Government Ten Point Program No. 8 outlined governments commitment to develop Karamoja and resettle all displaced people. This was followed through in
16

. See Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294)

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both the PEAP of 2001 and of 2004, where government committed itself to ending the problem of cattle rustling through the development of multi-sectoral programs. There were also some policy initiatives regarding disarmament in Karamoja. Governments policy objectives in pursuing disarmament in Karamoja, especially its intentions to combine voluntary and forceful disarmament were outlined in a ministerial statement issued by the then Minister of State for Security. A circular issued by state House on 9 December 2001 contained guidelines for political leaders and the military in the region for undertaking mobilisation of the population for the disarmament exercise. Disarmament in Karamoja was one of the several actions that two government ministries were pursuing to achieve their policy objectives, namely; the Ministry of Defence and the OPM under the Department of Karamoja Affairs, and were variously emphasised in the respective Ministerial Policy Statements (see Muhereza, 2010a). While Karamoja disarmament issues have been the subject of parliamentary deliberations, no single law has yet been promulgated to deal with disarmament issues in Karamoja. The genesis of the current sustained disarmament campaign in Karamoja was the 15th March 2010 motion on disarmament by the Sixth Parliament in which Parliament passed a resolution urging government to undertake to disarm the Karamojong, and to establish a foundation for the development of Karamoja. No resolution on disarmament in Karamoja was ever made in the Seventh Parliament of Uganda (2001-2006). The most vicious forceful disarmament ever experienced in Karamoja was undertaken during the tenure of the Eight Parliament of Uganda, where discussions in parliament on disarmament mainly focussed on whether or not the UPDF used excessive force during disarmament, and in the process committed gross human rights violations (Muhereza, 2007).
5.1.5 THE DRAFT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BILL, 2009

Government of Ugandas desire and determination to genuinely implement its policy of reconciliation in order to establish peace, security and tranquillity throughout the whole country was espoused in the preamble of the Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294) which was enacted by parliament to end armed hostilities, and ensure the people of Uganda reconcile with those who have caused them suffering, so that together they can rebuild their communities.17 A draft Bill for enactment of a law to provide a framework for a national reconciliation process in Uganda and address the historical causes underlying violent conflicts and widespread or systematic violations or abuses of human rights has been finalised.18 The proposed law, which shall be known as the National Reconciliation Act, aims to provide for processes through which the legacies of past violations and abuses of human rights which were committed in Uganda from independence in 1962 to the date of assent, including all their relevant antecedents and circumstances shall be examined. Under the proposed law, a National Reconciliation Forum with the authority to recommend reparations for victims of human rights violations, hold perpetrators accountable, recommend measures to prevent the future violation of human rights, design and conduct symbolic nation-wide reconciliation activities, and provide for other related matters, shall be created. Internal consultations within the Justice, Law and Order sector stakeholders and development partners were still ongoing by August 2010, in anticipation for its presentation to Parliament for consideration.

17 18

. See Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294)

. See the Draft National Reconciliation Bill, 2009 (mimeo) Page 23 of 109

5.2 5.2.1

POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION POLICY FRAMEWORK ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING

The most consistent analysis of the relationship between conflict and poverty was first made in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of 2001, which provided the overarching national policy development framework within which all government programmes were developed and implemented. In the PEAP of 2004, the analysis that was presented was re-enforced, but specifically for Karamoja, provisions for supporting disarmament provided for under Pillar 3 which focussed on Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management. Under Pillar 3 of the 2004 PEAP, cattle rustling in Karamoja and neighbouring districts was identified as the second (out of four) major challenge to achieving the objectives of the PEAP. The PEAP of 2004 identified the ending of cattle rustling and dealing with internal displacement as some of its key priorities. In the 2004 PEAP, government proposed to undertake disarmament sensitively and peacefully. The PEAP also espoused governments commitment to ensuring that disarmament did not lead to human rights abuses or make the Karamojong vulnerable to attack from neighbouring armed pastoral groups. According to the PEAP, affected communities as well as other local stakeholders expected to benefit from the disarmament were to be involved in solving the problem of cattle rustling. In the PEAP of 2004, pastoralists were also defined among the vulnerable and marginalized on land (in addition to women, orphans and tenants). Government also developed the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda; a four-year over-arching strategic framework covering the period 2007 to 2010 has four strategic objectives namely: (1) consolidation of State authority; (2) rebuilding and empowering communities; (3) revitalization of the economy; and (4) peace building and reconciliation (Republic of Uganda, 2007a). PRDP placed a lot of emphasis on peace, recovery and development interventions. The Karamoja component of the PRDP was elaborated in the KIDDP, which took cognizance of the unique context of the armed conflict in Karamoja compared to other parts of the political North covered under PRDP. In April 2010, the National Development Plan (NDP) was published, and is intended to be the key plan shaping all the processes that capture all political thinking as well as the existing and emerging Government initiatives such as the current Government development programs for poverty reduction, growth, prosperity for all, and reconstruction in post-conflict areas. The vision for Uganda is: a transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years. Stability and peace are among the attributes of this vision. It is recognised in the NDP that peace stability and social cohesion in an environment of democracy, political and social tolerance are pre-requisites for development, and that Ugandans aspire to live peacefully with other countries and in harmony within their sociocultural and ethnic diversity (Republic of Uganda, 2010: 37). In a move intended to contribute towards the achievement of the attributes of the vision of Uganda as stipulated in the 2010 NDP, the Office of the Prime Minister is taking lead in the development of a National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building for Uganda. Stakeholder consultations are underway under the National Platform on Peace Building and Conflict Prevention, which holds monthly consultative meetings. Danida, UNDP and Government of Uganda had mobilized resources to support the Development of a National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building. By June 2010, a consultant to facilitate the process of design of the Policy, using an Issues Paper on the Development of a Conflict Resolution and Peace building

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Policy for Government of Uganda, of February 2006, developed by the former the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) had been hired for OPM by Danida.19
5.2.2 THE POLICY FRAMEWORK ON DISARMAMENT IN KARAMOJA

The achievement of governments development objectives in Karamoja have been expressed in the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), and centre around the improvement of security in the region through undertaking disarmament that also takes into consideration (integrates) the requisite development interventions to improve the wellbeing conditions of the local populations (Republic of Uganda, 2007b). The KIDDP, which was launched by government on 18 April 2008, is a medium-term development framework that harmonises the various Karamoja-specific development interventions by government (through the medium term sector budget framework processes), bi-lateral and multi-lateral development partners and international and national non-governmental organisations. In a bid to tone down on the use of force to undertake gun collection, which was evident in the draft KIDDP of 200520, the revised KIDDP of 200721, stipulated that the recourse to involuntary disarmament, especially the use of force would be a last resort primarily targeting those who used the illegal weapons for criminal activities (see Muhereza, 2007b). The approach in the 2007 KIDDP is to address the multi-dimensional challenges that Karamoja is faced with through a multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder, and multi-level approach. Interventions that were proposed under the KIDDP focussed on three major thematic areas, namely: (a) military-type operations for both voluntary/peaceful disarmament and forceful disarmament; (b) conflict management and peace building initiatives, and (c) development-type interventions for socio-economic transformation (Republic of Uganda, 2007b). Several interventions were planned for restoration of law and order in Karamoja, including strengthening the Police, Judiciary and other justice, Law and order sector actors. Development interventions under KIDDP target the underlying causes of the proliferation of firearms and ammunition, and in essence aimed to contribute towards the realisation of not only governments conflict resolution and peace building objectives but also stimulate the economic development of Karamoja, which will improve the livelihoods of the people of Karamoja in a sustainable manner.
5.2.3 KARAMOJA ACTION PLAN FOR FOOD SECURITY OF 2009

Governments policy framework for increasing food security in Karamoja is contained in the 2009 Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security (see Republic of Uganda, 2009a). The objective is to turn Karamojas greenbelt into a food basket for the rest of Karamoja in order, not only to end the dependency on food aid, but also increase incomes of the individual households in Karamoja. Through the Action Plan, government has planned to (i) increase availability of food supply to all households in Karamoja; (ii) diversify modes of production in Karamoja; (iii) undertake valueaddition and processing of crops and livestock products. Government has put in place a tractor hire scheme to increase the amount of land opened. Land is opened up for vulnerable households early

19

. See Minutes 03/06/10: Progress on the Development of National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Prevention, in Minutes of the Meeting of the National Platform on Peace Building and Conflict Prevention, held on 22 June 2010, at the Office of the Prime Minister 6th Floor Board Room.
20 21

. See Republic of Uganda (2005). . See Republic of Uganda (2007b: 56)

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before the start of the planting to enable them grow some crops. Development partners have supported the introduction of hand held tractors and ox-driven plough. Farm inputs (improved seeds and planting materials, as well as farm implements) have also been provided. The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), in collaboration with WFP and UPDF supported the establishment of several seed multiplication gardens in different parts of Karamoja (Republic of Uganda, 2009c).
5.2.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY FRAMEWORK ON PASTORALISM

In the PEAP of 2004, government proposed an over-arching policy and strategy was to be developed for the livestock sub-sector that would explicitly recognise the main national policy objectives of poverty reduction. While this policy was intended to reflect the current focus on not only maximising livestock production, but also the multiple contributions of livestock to livelihoods, it would also capture issues of pastoralism and pastoral farming system (Republic of Uganda, 2005: 55). Although governments policy position on pastoralism was considered as a component of the proposed Livestock Production Policy, there have been initiatives in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF) to develop a National Policy on Rangeland Use that would articulate issues of pastoralism, among others. A Final draft of this policy referred to as The Uganda Rangeland Development and Management Policy (Republic of Uganda, 2007c). A Pastoral Code, as provided for in the Rangeland Development and Management Policy, has also been developed specifically to regulate pastoral mobility and access to critical resources such as pastures and water; and livestock marketing and veterinary service delivery (Republic of Uganda, 2007d). While extremely relevant, both draft policy documents focus on rangeland development issues and the challenges of pastoralism in Uganda in general without specifically pronouncing themselves on the details of the context in Karamoja. Inputs into these policy drafts by relevant stakeholders including pastoralists in the affected regions have not yet been solicited for. Stakeholders forum to finalise them have not yet been held due to low prioritisation and lack of financial resources. The above notwithstanding, the policy position by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government with regards pastoralism has consistently centred around the rejection of nomadism, as a way of life that defines pastoralism as a system of production. President Museveni has been at the forefront of the struggles to eliminate nomadism among Bahiima, starting in 1966, after completed high school, when together with several colleagues, they led a struggle to educate nomads about modern husbandry practices and to resist being displaced from land to establish ranches (Y.K. Museveni, Mustard Seed, 1997). After coming to power in 1986, President Museveni initiated the restructuring of former government ranching schemes in a bid to find land to settle down nomadic pastoralist. In 1987, Government set up a 9-man Commission of Inquiry to look into the setting-up, management and working of the 207 ranches in the 5 government ranching schemes of Ankole, Buruli, Masaka, Singo and Bunyoro, with a view to effecting reforms and improving the efficiency of these and future ranches. The commission, in its report of December 1988, recommended, among other things, that government repossess 53 of the 96 ranches from individuals, companies and cooperative societies in the 5 ranching schemes. MAAIF announced on 27 September 1990 that President Museveni had constituted a 9-member board to restructure the ranching schemes. The board was required to scale down the ranches to 3, 2 and 1 square mile to resettle landless squatters and their livestock. As early as 1992, it was clear that government was keen to promulgate a law prohibiting nomadism as it leads to the spread of cattle-related diseases and land degradation due to over-

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grazing.22 In December 1994, a Minister of State for Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries, in charge of Anti-Nomadism and Water Development was appointed, and served until the May 1996 Presidential Election after which cabinet positions were restructured. In August 2006, the Minister of State for Animal Industries, Maj. Bright Rwamirama told Uganda cattle keepers who had been expelled from Tanzania with thousands of herds of cattle to stop redundant movements and buy their own land and settle.23 In August 2010, Hon. Janet Museveni, the Minister of State for Karamoja Affairs told a REDICOM meeting that: we reject the school of thought that wants to uphold the nomadic way of life as good and worthy perpetuating. Subscribers to this thinking maintain that communities such as the Karamojong of Uganda should be encouraged and assisted to perpetuate their nomadic lifestyles and live as their ancestors lived, forever wandering with their cattle from place to place in search of water and pastures.24 With the development partners circle, the Karamoja Working Group (KWG) of the Partners in Democracy and Governance (PDG) have developed a briefing note on (agro)-Pastoralism in Karamoja that will inform development partners position for the upcoming policy process on this issue.25
5.3 GAPS IN THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS

There are a number of gaps in legal and policy frameworks on peace building and conflict preventions that are discernible, and these included the following, among others:
5.3.1 INTEGRATION OF MILITARY SECURITY AND PEACE BUILDING

Although the responsibility for ensuring national security is constitutionally mandated to the UPDF, in Karamoja the UPDF does not have a total monopoly over the legitimate control over and use of means of violence, and Karamoja is the only place in the whole country where this is happening. The ownership of illicit firearms is prevalent in many parts of Karamoja. While the UPDF is the duty bearer in the provision of security, which it has been undertaking through the disarmament programme, the district local governments also have a role to play, since they are responsible for supporting the building of peace in communities afflicted by armed violence. There are challenges that the local government have encountered. Security provision is not a decentralised function, hence local governments (districts and sub-counties) in conflict afflicted Karamoja have a very limited role to play. As it were, there has been very limited integration of security provisioning (where the military takes the lead) and peace building (where the districts and NGOs take a lead role). Ordinarily, military security and (civilian) peace building are not mutually exclusive.
5.3.2 THE LACK OF A POLICY ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING

There are consequences of lacking a national policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building, which have affected the availability of fund for supporting conflict resolution and peace building activities at lower local government levels. Local Government budgets are structured on the basis of vote functions and codes provided by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED). Because of a lack of an approved national policy on Conflict Resolution

22 23 24 25

. See Nomadism will be outlawed - Museveni, New Vision, 18 February, 1992. . See Get land, Min tells herdsmen, in New Vision, 19 August 2996, pp. 6

. See Hon. Janet K. Museveni, Keynote address at the opening of the meeting of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Zone 3 Regional Disarmament Committee (REDICOM), held at Imperial Royale Hotel, Kampala, 20 August 2010. . See Briefing Note for the Police Dialogue on Agro-Pastoralism and Agriculture Production Systems in Karamoja, 1st Draft, August 2010.

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and Peace Building, it has not been possible to provide for a vote function on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building through which funds would be available to districts under Central Government Conditional funding grants. When Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) are submitted from the Ministry of Local Government, conflict resolution and peace building are usually excluded, since they are not considered as being part of Governments Priority Programme Areas (PPAs) for Poverty reduction. Even when the armed conflicts in Karamoja have been identified as the leading impediment to the development of Karamoja, conflict resolution and peace building interventions necessary to address the livelihood impacts of the conflicts is not one of the PPAs for which grant funds is available from the central government (UNDP, 2010). The 2010 National Development Plan (NDP) has considered peace building and conflict management issues under National Defence and Security which is an enabling sector. Under such circumstances districts in Karamoja have to undertake interventions using resources provided by development partners because locally generated revenues are insufficient to finance council business and pay salaries and emoluments. While security provision is still a centralised service, localised armed conflicts such as in Karamoja that pose a military security threat cannot be addressed using resources sent to the district from the centre. As a consequence, the capacity of the districts in Karamoja to respond to conflicts through undertaking peace building interventions has been seriously constrained. The districts have to rely on resources provided by development partners.
5.3.3 POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Although reference to a national policy of reconciliation was made in the in the preamble of the Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294) 26, there is no known policy document of national reconciliation in which this, and other related issues were clearly articulated. Since a draft National Reconciliation Bill for the enactment of a law to provide a framework for a national reconciliation process in Uganda and address the historical causes underlying violent conflicts and widespread or systematic violations or abuses of human rights has been finalised had been finalised,27 considerations need to be made to quickly development a National Policy on Reconciliation that will guide the operationalisation of the legal framework on national reconciliation.
5.3.4 APPLICATION OF AMNESTY TO KARAMOJONG WARRIORS

While the Amnesty Act of 2000 was applicable to Karamojong warriors who resisted the government disarmament campaign; used firearms to rebel against government; engaged government troops in gun battles, there was no clear framework under which the Amnesty Commission applied the amnesty law directly of matters pertaining to Karamojong and their livestock raiding. Since its creation, Amnesty Commission had been engrossed in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed rebel groups, and did not even ever make mention of Karamojong warriors as their potential clients. Although no Karamojong warrior has been listed among the beneficiaries of amnesty certificates by the Amnesty Commission, several Karamojong warriors received presidential amnesty or pardon through the UPDF. Through the UPDF, several Karamojong warriors who voluntarily surrendered their arms and ammunition were granted amnesty from prosecution for illegal possession of war materials ordinarily the preserve of the officers and

26 27

. See Amnesty Act of 2000 (Cap. 294)

. See the Draft National Reconciliation Bill, 2009 (mimeo) Page 28 of 109

men of the UPDF. The UPDF administered the process of granting the amnesty from prosecution, as well as the decommissioning of weapons that were collected from Karamojong warriors. The Karamojong beneficiaries of amnesty did not benefit from decommission arms, demobilisation, resettlement and reintegration as provided for in the Amnesty Act. The use of amnesty in Karamoja was not a blanket offer. It was granted to disarmed warriors depending on the circumstances pertaining to the manner of the disarmament. When it was decided that no more amnesty would be granted to Karamojong warriors; that decision was made, communicated and enforced by the UPDF (Muhereza, 2010b). It has not been clarified in the law how it is possible in Karamoja for the Amnesty Act to be administered by the UPDF.
5.3.5 INTEGRATION OF DDR ACTIVITIES IN KARAMOJA DISARMAMENT

The KIDDP presents a combined strategy of disarmament and development and reflects a collaborative effort between multiple stakeholders. Since 2006, there have been criticisms labelled against the implementation of the KIDDP, where government has been seen as giving more attention and commitment (in terms of both financial and human resources) to gun collection (through disarmament) than to the development component of the KIDDP (see Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 10). Although it was never explicitly mentioned anywhere (even in the KIDDP document), the KIDDP provided the framework within which Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) activities were to be undertaken in Karamoja. The harmonisation of DDR activities within KIDDP provided conceptual challenges. The armed conflict in Karamoja has never in any way been directed at state power, and this has consequently undermined the opportunities for disarmed warriors to benefit from convention DDR interventions. Those who benefited from DDR interventions usually sought presidential pardon under the Amnesty Act of 2000. They included armies that were defeated or surrendered or voluntarily decided to end armed rebellion. The policy framework on disarmament in Karamoja in general and the KIDDP in particular are weak with regards to the integration of DDR for disarmed Karamojong warriors. None of the KIDDP interventions specifically targeted disarmed warriors. There has not been any systematic documentation of warriors who have been disarmed. Between 2000 and 2002, those who disarmed benefited from incentives that were provided to those who handed in their guns. The incentives included an ox-plough, a bag of maize flour and a certificate as a token of appreciation. The management of the incentives generated enormous challenges that undermined the objective of disarmament, and were subsequently abandoned. Elsewhere in other parts of the country where the Amnesty Commission was spearheading DDR interventions, former combatants in rebel armies who received amnesty also benefited from resettlement and in some instances re-integration support. Many received skills trainings, start-up capital and psycho-social counselling. In Karamoja, Amnesty Commission did not establish an interest, although the amnesty process for armed warriors was managed by the UPDF. Even when the livelihoods of the majority of those who were disarmed depended entirely on their guns, they were not considered for DDR support under the various frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction. The possibility of receiving amnesty convinced many Karamojong warriors to surrender their guns, but not all of them (Muhereza, 2010b). In Karamoja, there have not been any consistent efforts towards a fully-fledged DDR programme for disarmed Karamojong warriors.
5.3.6 THE COMMERCIALISATION OF CROP FARMING IN KARAMOJA

As already argued above, government is undertaking various measures to expand and commercialise crop farming in Karamoja through the 2009 Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security Page 29 of 109

(see Republic of Uganda, 2009a). Governments policy objectives of ending dependency on food aid and increasing incomes of the individual households in Karamoja are extremely desirable. Turning Karamojas greenbelt into a food basket for the rest of Karamoja is not so much the problem. It is how this is hoped to be achieved and the consequences of doing so where there are problems. First, Karamojas green-belt areas where support for increasing crop farming is being concentrated are also dry season dispersal areas where livestock are taken at the peak of the drought. Supporting settled crop farming in these areas is a recipe for future resource competition and conflicts with herders (Muhereza, 2010a). Secondly, support to increasing crop farming has also been extended to other areas, including those where climatic conditions would not permit crop farming (Republic of Uganda, 2009c). Third, the government tractor hire purchase scheme has like previous tractorisation attempts, already encountered significant sustainability challenges. It is benefiting more the few who already have certain capacities. For the majority, the amount of land opened is still very small (Muhereza, 2010a). Without investment in irrigation technology and quick maturing and drought resistant improved crop varieties, interventions intended to increase food security in Karamoja are likely to encounter setbacks from the increasingly erratic rainfall patterns and intensified drought. Rain-fed cultivation in Karamoja is difficult to sustain even in the green-belt areas because of the physical environment and climatic conditions. More than 30 years ago, a severe drought was expected every 10 years. Over the years, severe droughts had become annualised. Karamoja suffered severe drought since 2005, only letting up this year (2010) when above-normal rains have been received for an extended period (Muhereza, 2010a; Republic of Uganda, 2009c). Crop pests and diseases were still widespread. Initially, farm inputs were distributed. This will in future become unsustainable if measures are not put in place to ensure farmers strengthen their own capacities. The nature of the soils require significant capital outlay to enable households to open land to grow enough crops to sustain their food requirements. These soils are difficult to get into good condition, and easy to spoil soil through bad tillage. When it rains, the soils easily get water-logged. They also easily crack excessively when continuously scorched by the sun. They dry up easily, and are also very difficult to moisten completely with the intermittent rains received in Karamoja. The first rains neither moisten nor penetrate a cleared surface soil to any useful extent. Because the soils have a poor moisture retention capacity, the rains just run-off the surface, carrying with them soil particles as well as the formed humus content (Muhereza, 2010a). An uncritical commercialisation and expansion of crop farming in the green belt areas reduces the land available for dry season grazing for pastoralists.28 In Karamoja, grazing resources in the wetter areas were usually reserved for the worst of dry season. Without putting in place deliberate safeguards, in Karamoja, it is not possible to expand crop farming in the green belt areas without a debilitating effect on livestock production, which in itself is likely to increase conflicts over access to resources. The expansion of crop farming in the green belt areas benefits fewer households than the number whose livelihoods are affected by a decline in livestock production. The future of sustainable livelihoods in Karamoja is seeking the most appropriate integration of crop farming and livestock production to the extent allowed by the constraints in the physical environment, without undermining any one of the two production systems (Muhereza, 2010a).

28

. This is an issue which has also been articulated in a briefing note on (agro)-Pastoralism in Karamoja that has been developed by the Karamoja Working Group (KWG) of the Partners in Democracy and Governance (PDG) to inform their position on the upcoming discussions on policy process regarding pastoralism in Karamoja (see Briefing Note for the Police Dialogue on Agro-Pastoralism and Agriculture Production Systems in Karamoja, 1st Draft, August 2010).

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5.3.7

THE SENDENTARISATION OF KARAMOJONG PASTORALISTS

The physical environment in Karamoja is such that crop cultivation is complementary to livestock rearing in most areas. Pastoralism makes the most economic use of an environment where no other non-extractive productive activity is viable in the short-run. Government policy towards pastoralism, as pointed out in the preceding sub-section, is that cattle keepers must settle down and adopt commercialised forms of cattle keeping, or adopt alternative forms of livelihoods, especially settled crop cultivation. This is largely because mobility by the Karamojong is associated with violent livestock raiding, which has undermined not only ability of government to deliver basic social services, but also the ability of the ordinary people to lead a life of their choice, without any fears. Karamojong pastoralism manifests significant diversities. Among the Pokot, largely due to insecurity, there are tendencies of pure-nomadism (or nomadic pastoralism) where the migration of herds occurs in family units with the pastoralists maintaining no particular home base. Among most of the Karamojong, semi-nomadism or transhumance is widely practiced where movement during livestock herding is limited to part of the family/herd or period of the year. The Karamojong maintain permanent homes (manyattas), and temporary dry season grazing camps (ngawuoi). Through maintaining mobility of their herd (and sometimes the households), the Karamojong are flexibly able to opportunistically utilize the fragile rangeland resources without necessarily undermining their natural capacity to regenerate (see Muhereza, 1997). The pastoralism practiced by the Karamojong has its challenges (mainly high incidence of diseases and lack of water), but it flexibly permits the herders and livestock owners to take advantage of resources wherever and whenever these are seasonally available in their respective exclusive ecological niches (see Muhereza, 2010a: 31; Muhereza and Ossiya, 2004; Muhereza, 1997b; Muhereza, 1996). The nature of crop farming in Karamoja is low input subsistence-based cultivation that is also extensively rain-fed. With the rainfall received in most parts of Karamoja being very low, uneven, unreliable and erratic, crops have a very high failure rate, and are therefore secondary to livestock rearing. Being secondary does not in any way make crops (especially cereals) any less important for the livelihoods of the pastoralists. The fact that some areas of Karamoja are better endowed with resources necessary for crop cultivation cannot be a justification for the sendetarisation of pastoralists, either to transform them into settled crop farmers or adopt settled pastoralism (Muhereza and Ossiya, 2004; Muhereza, 1997b; Muhereza, 1996). While nomadic pastoralism (especially pure nomadism) is untenable in the long-term (even the majority of the Karamojong no longer practise it), it would be a big mistake to undertake any interventions intended to force Karamojong pastoralists to settle down without any investment in improvement of their technological capacity to tame nature and harness resources without having to move the livestock to the resources (see Muhereza, 2010a). Water, pastures, veterinary services, as well as security have to be provided in situ, which is a forlorn call. Policies intended to promote the adoption of settled forms of lifestyles based on crop farming in Karamoja green-belts are oblivious of the dynamic relationships between crop cultivation and pastoralism. Adoption of settled crop farming in ecologically better endowed areas of Karamoja increases competition for scarce resources in these areas, and the resulting constraints to flexible livestock rearing makes the economic activities undertaken in such areas unsustainable in the long-run, and is a recipe for conflict.29

29

. ibid

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STRUCTURAL FACTORS THAT FUEL THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA

There are a multitude of structural factors at play at different levels in Karamoja that are fuelling the continuing armed conflict. These factors, which have a concrete historical context that cannot be abstracted out of reality, can be grouped into economic, political governance, institutional as well as physical factors, and are also operational at various levels, including: community, district and ate regional levels, and are examined here-below:
6.1 6.1.1 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS AND ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE HARSH PHYSICAL CONDITIONS

Many parts of Karamoja are semi-arid because they receive low rainfall amounts spread over a short period of time (not more than four months), and very high temperature during the dry season. The rest of the year is dry, with high temperatures, and in some places strong winds (see World Vision, 2008; Muhereza and Ossiya, 2004; Muhereza, 1997). Such conditions have affected not only crop farming and livestock production, and other forms of livelihood, but also have predisposed the Karamojong to conflict. Because rainfall amounts are low and unreliable, in most years, cultivation alone cannot support the nutritional and economic needs of communities. Different levels of malnutrition are widespread (FAO, 2009a: 19). Several respondents made reference to the climatic conditions becoming even more erratic and unpredictable, which has disrupted the old seasonal calendars for resource utilisation.30 Various respondents made reference to the fact that rainfall in Karamoja has become very erratic. Much of the rains are being received outside the known rainy season, and are characterised by heavy down pours that generate huge surface run-offs. While the rains have become unreliable, sometimes, they have been associated with flooding. The periods of drought have also become longer. Both the rains and the drought periods have become difficult to predict, making it difficult for crop farmers and livestock owners to plan accordingly. These climatic shocks have undermined both crop farming and livestock production in Karamoja. They have not only affected food security, and health and well being of the population, but also predisposed the communities to conflicts.31 Respondents in different parts of Karamoja described how the harsh physical conditions experienced in Karamoja made the Karamojong become what they are now. One respondent said for inhabiting the harsh physical environment in which they live, the Karamojong became hardy and war-like.32 Underlying these perceptions is the understanding that the impact of the physical environment is mediated by cultural, political and economic factors, which make it difficult for them to cope with the conditions in their physical environment. There are several writings that have made reference to the changing climatic conditions in Karamoja as having affected the livelihoods of the local populations (see for example, Stites &

30 31 32

. Interview with Rev. Joseph Lomongin, KDDS Team Leader, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Francis) . Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris).

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Akabwai, 2009; Walker, 2008: 5; Oxfam GB, 2008).33 Whether the changing climatic patterns in Karamoja can be solely attributed to climate change, which is defined by Oxfam GB (2008) as changes in climate from global warming which is due specifically to human actions causing excessive emissions of greenhouse gases, notably carbon dioxide from fossil fuel use is still subject of a lot of debate. What is clear however is the fact that respondents in different parts of Karamoja perceived the continuation of conflict to be associated with the inability of the people of Karamoja to respond to climatic shocks that Karamoja was experiencing, irrespective of their cause.34 The changes in the climatic patterns have re-enforced challenges that the people of Karamoja were already faced with, such as: food insecurity; declining crop and livestock productivity; as well as conflicts available over scarce resources. Underlying political and economic constraints have continued to make it harder for the Karamojong to cope with intensified drought as well as recover from the effects of the intensified drought.35
6.1.2 THE POLITICAL MARGINALISATION OF KARAMOJA

It has been argued in a number of writings that the cause of insecurity in Karamoja cannot be simply attributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the harsh physical environment experienced in Karamoja, but a complex interface between political marginalisation and chronic underdevelopment since the colonial period (see Emuria, 2009; Bevan, 2008). In this study, we make the same argument for the factors fuelling the continuing conflict in Karamoja. For long, Karamoja has suffered political and economic marginalisation that triggered armed conflict whose dynamics have evolved over the years. The peripheral status accorded to Karamoja, was, since the colonial period, and still is a major cause of the continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja, and is manifested in a diversity of ways, including the following among others: By the time the British arrived, the Jie had built a strong army equivalent to that of a modern state. The Karamojong were armed for survival and protection of their herds. Cattle raids had started by the 1930 as groups thought to replace cattle lost due to diseases. The colonial state considered Karamoja as a law and order problem, hence adopted a pacification policy in Karamoja. This entailed a number of interventions that ranged from shooting the Karamojong who resisted the authority of the state; burning their huts seizing their livestock and slashing their crops; taking away their land to establish protected areas. This confined them to a limited area, and also provided additional land for settler expansion in Kitale (Kenya). As a result of colonial government policies, the Pian, Matheniko, Upe and Bokora lost between 1500 - 2000 square miles of grazing land. The entire of Karamoja fell into one or another of the protected areas. Settlement, cultivation, and livestock grazing were restricted in the national park, game reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, and controlled hunting areas that made up the protected area. These reserves occupied some of the bestendowed areas of Karamoja, which were used during the dry season for grazing livestock. Permission to use for settlement and cultivation could be issued to only those persons lawfully resident in the respective areas before the protected areas were established, and only in the interest of better wildlife management. The establishment of these protected areas severely constrained

33 34 35

. See also Karani, Irene, Climate Change and Pastoralism: Case Study, Kotido District, An Oxfam GB Briefing Paper (undated)

. Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris).

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resource use and livestock grazing in Karamoja (see Muhereza, 1997a; Muhereza, 1997b; Muhereza, 1996; Mamdani, Kasoma & Katende, 1992). The colonial government policy of alienating grazing lands from the Karamojong was intended as deterrence to the increase of stock. This alienation of land from cattle keepers reduced dry season grazing pastures available to cattle keepers, and increased concentration of cattle over smaller areas, which led to resource depletion and created competition for available resources, and hence conflicts between cattle keepers and between cattle keepers and other resource users. In addition to land alienation, the colonial government introduced forced sales of livestock to contain over-stocking. When this failed, government resorted to outright confiscation of female stock. These policies were continued in the 1960s and 1970s (Muhereza, 1996; Muhereza, 1997a; Muhereza, 1997b). Political marginalisation of Karamoja continued during the post-independence period in Uganda under the respective governments, including Obote I (1966-1971); Idi Amin (1971-1979), and Obote II (1980-1985). It was only after the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power in 1986, when deliberate efforts were made to address the problems of Karamoja (Ochieng-Odhiambo, 2003; Muhereza, 1997b; Muhereza, 1996). Even with a clear commitment by the NRM government to address the challenges of development in Karamoja, the state has not been successful in restoring law and order in Karamoja. The functioning of the justice, law and order institutions (especially courts of law) is still constrained by structural and logistical challenges. The road infrastructure is very bad. Poor availability of infrastructures for provision of basic social services such as safe water, primary health care and education facilities; the absence of electricity makes it difficult to attract investment opportunities that could generate positive impact on local economy in Kampala (Bevan, 2008: 18; Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008). Central to governments campaign to bring development to Karamoja has been the disarmament campaign. Due to the manner in which disarmament has been implemented, Karamojong communities have developed mistrust against the state, which has undermined the achievement of governments development aspirations in Karamoja. Many policies that have been adopted by the government have instead contributed to the further marginalisation of the Karamojong. Marginalisation in Karamoja is demonstrated by the absence of all weather roads and electricity, which would create an enabling environment for change to be achieved, and as a result, the opportunities for transforming peoples livelihoods are very limited (Muhereza, 2010a). Respondents interviewed in Karamoja perceived state marginalisation of Karamoja to still be prevalent. One respondent wondered: If the government is serious about ending armed conflict in Karamoja, why has it not put all its resources in completely disarming the Jie who are the only ethnic group that is known to have mounted raids in every district of Karamoja?.36 In the on-going disarmament, those officers who seem to be effective in dealing with livestock raiding are usually transferred from Karamoja, and usually it is at a time when they appear to be making critical progress.37 These perceptions by Karamojong of their assumed marginalisation had created a lot of discontent and resentment of government interventions in their communities, including those intended to benefit them. The communities have therefore become harder to transform. The tendency among such perspectives is to view the factors fuelling the continuation of the conflict as interference by outsiders, and particularly government.

36 37

. Interview with Mr. Loduk Luke Maxmilian, Program Officer, Justice and Peace Program, CARITAS (SSD) Moroto, held on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Lokeris Loyok). . Ibid

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6.2 6.2.1

SECURITY FACTORS FUELLING THE ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA PROVISION OF STATE SECURITY TO COMMUNITIES IN KARAMOJA

Since coming to power in 1986, the NRM government has been grappling with ending the armed conflict through undertaking a wide range of disarmament interventions. Part of the problem has been the level of deployment of troops in Karamoja. Government announced in May 2010 that the problem of livestock raiding in Karamoja would be ended by December 2010. In July 2010, government announced that it had not only deployed over 17,000 soldiers in Karamoja sub-region, but that it had also created a battalion of Special Forces to operate in the difficult terrain, especially the mountainous areas where many remnants of Karamojong warriors resisting disarmament hide.38 The capacity of the UPDF to deal with incursions from armed pastoral groups from neighbouring countries, especially the Pokot and Turkana districts of Kenya, who in alliance with the Pokot of Amudat and Matheniko of Moroto, occasionally raid the Matheniko and Bokora (respectively) had greatly improved. The government was also placing a lot of focus on improving the wellbeing of the people of Karamoja. Community security as well as security for livestock was being addressed through deployment of regular police and the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU). A Police Post and an ASTU detach had been deployed in every sub-county in Moroto. In June 2010, President Museveni ordered the recruitment of 2,400 Local Defence Units (LDUs) in Karamoja to help to consolidate the peace that had been achieved by the security agencies in the region since disarmament started in 2001. The LDUs would operate as zonal forces on a one year contract with a salary of UGX. 100,000/= per month.39 Ten former warriors have been recruited per parish into LDUs, and were undergoing training at Olilim Police Training School. They would be equipped and deployed in the communities as zonal forces for the protection of livestock.40 While ASTU is concentrating on mopping up pockets of insecurity caused by habitual criminals and those who had refused to disarm or had rearmed, the LDUs will focus on protecting the livestock in the communities, and the regular Police on maintenance of law and order, which would release the UPDF to concentrate on protecting the international borders from attacks by armed pastoral groups from neighbouring countries.41 Although the security situation in Karamoja has improved significantly due to governments disarmament campaign, many recent studies have shown that insecurity may have increased in the villages (Muhereza, 2010b; Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 11). Despite the residual thuggery in the rural areas, President Museveni announced in July 2010 that the state has finally arrived in Karamoja, and with it peace.42 Livestock thefts have continued, implying that security improvement was still relative. This scenario, it has been argued, is the result of the following: there are still some capacity challenges affecting the military involvement in the disarmament campaign. A report by Danida has pointed to weaknesses in the mechanisms and institutions of the state responsible for the promotion of security as undermining the success that would have been achieved (Danida, 2005: 6). The Special Forces Group (SFG), which was thought to be better equipped and well facilitated has admitted to having suffered heavy causalities at the hands of ethnic Tepeth on Mt. Moroto.43

38 39 40 41 42 43

. See 17,000 troops deployed in Karamoja to boost security, New Vision 12 July 2010, pp.9 . See Museveni orders recruitment of 2,400 LDUs in Karamoja, New Vision 15 June 2010, pp. 9 . Ibid . See 17,000 troops deployed in Karamoja to boost security, New Vision 12 July 2010, pp.9 . See Pulkol Let down Karamoja Museveni, Sunday Monitor 11 July 2010, pp. 4, 7 . See Karimojong Rustlers killing us Muhoozi, the Daily Monitor 17 August 2010, pp. 1-2

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During the consultations with the local communities in Napak district, the apparent weaknesses in the disarmament campaign were made reference to.44 While guns have become so risky to hold onto to, those who continued to do so placed a very high premium on them, making it difficult to identify and remove the remaining guns through cordon and search operations. The increased deployment of troops has not led to identification of all those who still possessed illegal firearms. There are concerns about the effectiveness of troops deployment. There are still known raiding corridors where there is no deployment of troops. The strategy of deploying the UPDF along the international border and leaving ASTUs as zonal forces, and the LDUs for community security has not yet worked out properly. Military protection is not distributed equitably to all areas, which has left some areas more prone to raids and theft. Bokora youth wondered: if there was enough deployment in our area, how come the Jie overpower government forces.45 Under the disarmament program, the removal of guns was not always accompanied by an increase in amount of protection provided for those who refused to disarm or had re-armed. Government promised to protect people and their property after they disarmed. Those who had been raided after they disarmed felt government had not kept the part of its bargain. One Pokot elder said: Because of the way we are being attacked, we think that the government took away our guns and left us vulnerable to attacks by Karamojong. We have become like dogs. You could be in your hut and you hear foot steps outside your hut, your wife will not let you venture outside your hut because you only have sticks and cannot fight back.46 Many had re-armed to recover their livestock. Others refused to co-operate with the government. The inability of the army to provide security to those who disarmed or were disarmed escalated armed conflicts. When people who gave out their guns willingly have become victims to raids, the others in the community who still have their guns become reluctant to give them away. These are some of the guns that are still causing conflict in the region. In many communities, the presence of the UPDF was always appreciated as fending off opportunistic raiders. In Nagule-angolol village in Ngoleriet sub-county, raiders pounced on the livestock in the community at night, a few hours after the few soldiers who had been deployed to protect their livestock were withdrawn. The community members felt that among the soldiers who were withdrawn, there could have been one who passed on information to the Jie about the withdrawal of UPDF troops. Many times, even with UPDF presence, livestock have been raided from communities. Pokot youth noted that: Our cows have been taken away because of disarmament and the UPDF.47 Pokot women said Pokot herds are constantly raided by Pian because the Pian were never targeted for disarmament as much as the Pokot. The Pokot women said: The Pian find it easy to launch successful raids on our livestock because all our guns were taken during disarmament.48 Communities claimed raiders sometimes dare the UPDF, and even have the audacity to either tell them when they were coming for the raid or drive the raided animals so close to the UPDF detaches. When outnumbered, the UPDF soldiers do not engage. Many a times, however, the UPDF pursues and intercepts raiders, and sometimes forestalls raids from taking place.

44 45 46 47 48

. See Focus group discussion with Youth at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Ibid . Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza). . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose) . Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael).

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6.2.2

ENFORCEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN KARAMOJA

Our findings during the study are in agreement with Bevan (2008: 18) that the inability by the state security forces to regulate community relations and police disputes before they escalate into outright war is one of the main underlying factors fuelling the continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja (Bevan, 2008: 18). Without adequate provision of state security to communities in Karamoja, livestock thefts and insecurity are unlikely to end, and this is likely to continue undermining not only the on-going disarmament but also all efforts to prevent re-armament. A number of writings show that police presence throughout Karamoja has improved following the deployment of Police at every sub-county under the Restoration of Law and Order in Karamoja (RELOKA) programme (Muhereza, 2010b; UNDP, 2010). However, the impact of the Police and other institutions of the state responsible for enforcement of law and order such as the judiciary is still minimally felt, and mostly in the district towns. The regular police in Karamoja is still faced with many challenges. The Police Force was still stationed at district town, and has not yet been deployed in distant places such as Loroo sub-county in Amudat district and Loyoro sub-county in Kaabong district. Where they are present, they are bedevilled with logistical and infrastructural challenges that undermine their effectiveness. Most respondents in the communities said that once a case goes to the magistrates court, the defendant knows the case has been lost because it will be dismissed for lack of evidence or want of prosecution. Witnesses in Karamoja are still afraid of coming forward to give evidence for fear of reprisal attacks. As a result, suspects who commit crime spend a short time of remand and are released. A respondent in Moroto said the Police is referred to as ere a tata (my grandfathers house) because it functions as if it provides protection to criminals.49 In Amudat, officers of the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) the study team interacted with lacked transport to enable them to effectively track down raiders. The ASTU battalion D-Coy at Amudat did not have radio communication. They use mobile telephones. There was an incident in July 2010 when ASTU who had recovered raided livestock engaged in friendly-fire with UPDF patrol as they were returning to Amudat with the animals that had been recovered. The UPDF patrol mistook them for raiders. There is a lack of access to safe water for the officers in the ASTU barracks at Amudat. The nearest safe water source is over one kilometre away.50 Where there are gaps in presence of institutions of the state responsible for enforcement of law and order, the ground becomes fertile for conflicts to continue. Usually, this has been the justification for the military taking over some of the roles of the ordinary police. The manner in which this has been performed in the past has led to more conflicts. Many studies have shown that wherever mechanisms and institutions of the state responsible for the promotion of security and enforcement of law and order are weak or absent, local communities have taken upon themselves to provide security to the degree possible in the best way they know how (Muhereza, Ossiya & OvonjiOdida, 2008; Danida, 2005: 6). Unfortunately, traditional systems of governance and justice administration have in many areas been associated with excesses that lead to human rights violations, and sometimes to more conflicts (Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008).

49 50

. Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Interview with Sgt. Ayepa Michael, Commander, ASTU Battalion D-Coy Amudat, held at Amudat on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza)

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6.2.3

THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLICIT FIREARMS

There are many writings that have focussed on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Karamoja and armed conflict within Karamoja and between the Karamojong and their neighbours, both in-country and with pastoral groups in the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Sudan. In these studies, it has been argued that since time immemorial, the Karamojong competed for pastoral resources within and between different Karamojong ethnic groups. Livestock raiding was one of ways in which access to resources was negotiated. The acquisition of automatic rifles in 1979 accentuated armed conflicts associated with livestock raiding (see Mkutu, 2008; Muhereza, 1997b).51 While it is misleading, as argued by Bevan (2008: 21) to reduce the source of violence and insecurity in the region to simply the dynamics of cattle rustling made more lethal by small arms, it is also essential to recognise that the proliferation of SALWs in Karamoja is one of the key factors responsible for the continuation of the armed conflicts in Karamoja, and hence rather than being merely a symptom of Karamoja insecurity, it is one of the causes of the failure of the state to ensure community security. Due to the prevalence of SALWs, the negative effect on raiding on the social and economic fabric in the communities has been accentuated to levels that undermined sustainable peace and development in Karamoja. The introduction of small arms escalated the lethality of the violence that was associated with cattle raiding, as well as other forms of lawlessness. As clearly argued by Bevan (2008: 18), while small arms and light weapons are not the root cause of the armed conflicts, their prevalence has transformed and amplified the existing raiding tradition and made it difficult and expensive for the state to ensure community security. The prevalence of illegal Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWS) makes it difficult for conflicts to be resolved or managed peacefully, because of the inherent violent nature of the manner in which control over, access to and use of the resources has been conditioned. When SALWs are involved, the conflicts in communities tend to degenerate into armed conflicts. However, it is essential to add that Karamoja sometimes experiences violence where clubs, sticks and machetes are involved. The term armed conflicts, therefore, tends to refer to conflicts that involve the use of firearms. While none of the respondents consulted admitted they still possessed illegal firearms, they all reckoned that in their communities a few hard-core criminals still held onto their firearms. Pokot elders said during a community meeting that: In the past when we still had guns, when they attacked, we would defend our livestock. Now we have no guns, and are helpless. It is not true that Pokot have been getting guns from Kenya. If it was the case, we would defend our cows. Instead, the Pokot elders claimed, it was their Karamojong neighbours who still have guns. 52 In order to continue using their firearms, the raiders must be having access to ammunition. Pokot elders told the study team that at the end of July 2010, a herds-boy abducted by a combined force of Karamojong raiders from Loputuk, Rupa, Lotome and Lorengedwat had in their possession a metallic box container full of ammunition supplies. They told the herds-boy to go tell his Pokot people to prepare for more misery, since they still had plenty of bullets, and if they want they can also buy at UGX. 500/= each.53 Those who still have firearms were using them to their maximum advantage. The more those without firearms continue to be vulnerable to raids, the more they might be tempted to re-

51 52 53

. This argument has also been made by Karani, Irene, Climate Change and Pastoralism: Case Study, Kotido District, An Oxfam GB Briefing Paper (undated), pp. 4 . Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose). . Ibid

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arm. Pokot youth told the study team: If we had guns, we would not be loosing our livestock like this.54 With youth thinking as the Pokot Youth, any opportunity to acquire an illegal firearm is likely to be taken maximum advantage of. This will make it harder to end the Karamoja armed conflict. The inability to remove all illegal guns from the different ethnic groups had undermined the efforts intended to end armed conflicts in Karamoja. Bokora youth observed: The Jie still have guns because the government has not disarmed them, so how can we achieve peace when they are raiding us, and the government is not doing anything about it?.55 Pokot youth claimed: Why are the other ethnic groups (the Karamojong) allowed to keep their guns, when we were all supposed to have been disarmed? Why have the Pokot been treated unfairly by government?.56 Bokora women said they were always wary of communities in the mountains like the Tepeth who had not been totally disarmed.57 Pokot communities the study team interacted with in Lopedot indicated that because of continuous raids from the Pian and Matheniko, they were contemplating migrating to Kenya. We have now concluded that its that government that has led to this insecurity/conflict between the Pokot and the Pian. They treat the Pokot and the Pian differently, they have left the Pian to rearm and that is why the Pian are now raiding us and yet we dont have guns. The army even sells our animals that have been recovered.58 In Kotido, a respondent lamented that when the Jie go raiding in some communities in Bokora where they do not encounter any resistance, they torment their victim saying: who told you to be stupid and surrender your guns to the government? Now surrender to us all the animals and food in the granaries, so that next time when government fools you to hand in your guns, you will be wise enough not to do so! This has the effect of reducing disarmed men to the level of women, and is very degrading. This many times sparks off rearmament.59
6.2.4 COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND EXCESSES FROM DISARMAMENT

There have been widespread allegations of human rights violations, which have been associated with forceful disarmament in Karamoja in the inventoried assessments and studies as well as other reports (Muhereza, 2010b; Stites & Akabwai, 2009: 13; Muhereza, Ossiya & Ovonji-Odida, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2007). A committee instituted by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in July 2006 to investigate allegations of violations of Human rights by the UPDF during cordon and search operations found many of the allegations to be true, although some were exaggerated.60 In November 2006, after forceful disarmament was launched, the significant loses of life on the part of the UPDF and the warriors and the population, and the destruction of houses and granaries in one incident at Lopuyo in Rengen sub-county, Kotido district were acknowledged by the Minister of Defence, Dr. Crispus Kiyonga. Similar allegations of brutality by the army involving

54 55 56 57 58 59 60

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Youth held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose). . Focus group discussion with Youth at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Youth held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose). . Focus group discussion with Women at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael). . Interview with Ms. Betty Nakiru, Program Officer, Building Bridges to Peace Program, Mercy Corps, Kotido Office, held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . See report titled: Cordon and Search operations in Karamoja: Problems of Human Rights Violations between April and August 2006, 31 August 2006, submitted to the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister of Uganda.

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cases of rape, castration and extra-judicial killings were often cited during subsequent disarmament operations. The Minister of Defence said that some of the allegations made were true, although some other reports were found to have been exaggerated while others were outright false.61 In a statement issued on 11 November 2006, following a one week visit to Karamoja by an inter-agency assessment team, the UN said its assessment team was told by authorities and members of the community of cases of extrajudicial killings by the army. A source with the mission said: We saw graves and sites where such executions reportedly took place. Bullet cartridges and dry blood were still evident.62 During the study, widespread allegations of human rights abuses associated with forceful disarmament were made by not only the communities, but also civil society and development partners.63 It was alleged that those arrested during cordon and search operations were subjected to different forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment through torture to inflict pain so as to extract confessions about possessing illegal guns (Muhereza, 2010b; Muhereza, 2007). There have been claims that the army tortured people indiscriminately until some who had no guns confessed they had guns just to end pain.64 Disarmament that is accompanied by human rights violations creates potential for conflicts. In some communities, co-operation with the military in implementing cordon and search operations has not been forthcoming because of how these operations have been implemented. This has made it difficult for these operations to achieve as much success as they should have. It also should be mentioned that the cause of the continuation of the armed conflicts in Karamoja was not so much that there were these human rights violations, but that there was no restitution for those whose rights are violated by the military. Where the army has investigated and found its officer to have abused the human rights of those they are supposed to protect, the officers have been reprimanded, including being sentenced to jail terms. However, the victims have not been compensated. Even cases brought to the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) offices and offices of CMICCs, costs that have been awarded were not yet honoured. There is no systematic framework for dealing with documented cases of human rights violations in Karamoja. People end up taking the law into their own hands to exact revenge, which leads to conflicts. Some of the strategies that have been used by UPDF during the disarmament have been cited as reasons why the remaining guns had become hard to collect from the population. The disarmament has been on and off, making it difficult to achieve the strategic objectives of gun removal from the entire Karamoja once and for all. Lapses in the campaign gave opportunity for some die-hards to re-arm. Certain communities where raiders have continued originating from, such as the Jie have not been targeted for intensive disarmament.

61 62 63

. See Ministerial Statement by the Hon. Dr. Crispus Kiyonga, Minister of Defense on the Situation in Karamoja and the alleged UPDF deployment in Somalia, presented to the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, on Thursday 30 November 2006, pp.2. . See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Uganda: Govt urged to probe reported abuses during disarmament, IRIN News, 13 November 2006 (http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61547). . In Amudat, an official of a development agency said youth are severely tortured to coerce them to surrender their guns. Pokot elders interviewed in Loroo explained that the torture subjected to the youth had increased the levels of conflicts in the communities (Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010). In Kaabong, the study team was told that the sustained torture of youth who have handed in their guns has discouraged those who have not yet handed in their guns to do so, because they know that when they do so does not change their situation (Interview with Milton Lopiria, Program Coordinator, Warrior Squad, held in Kotido on 2 August 2010, by John Senkumba).
64

. See I want my cows back or else I will die, Sunday Monitor 21 February 2010, pp.3 (quoted in Muhereza, 2010b).

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6.2.5

DISARMAMENT AND IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE KARAMOJONG

As the disarmament campaign progressed, the numbers of guns collected dwindled until the UPDF began to indiscriminately arrest adult males from trading centres, markets and meetings whether called by government or NGOs. Unfortunately, such a strategy led to netting of some innocent people, rather than focusing on culprits only (Muhereza, 2010b). Those arrested would be forced to surrender guns to redeem their freedom, even when among them were some who genuinely did not have any guns, or had already surrendered the guns they had. There have been reports that women sell cows, to buy guns to take to the UPDF to redeem their husbands freedom from army detention.65 Sometimes when a raid takes place, the victims of raids are arrested and tasked to produce the guns they were using for defending themselves (Muhereza, 2010b). Sometimes, livestock are confiscated to bait their owners to surrender weapons they use for protecting the cattle in return for the livestock.66 There were also allegations that some UPDF officers extort money from disarmed people, on accusations that they were still armed.67 When the army fails to capture raiders and recover raided livestock, they confiscate the animals of community members from where the raids are believed to have originated. Some raiders have been passing near communities to disguise their movements. When the UPDF tracks foot marks, the community where they end suffer the wrath of the UPDF. Even after raided animals have been recovered, communities complained about the army demanding for payments before they give the animals back to the rightful owners. There were also claims that local leaders who facilitate recovery of raided animals ask for airtime and transport, and most of the time end up retaining some of the animals.68 Even when the correct numbers of animals raided have been recovered, less are likely to be returned to their owners as a result of these exactions. Every time recovered animals change hands, less is handed over to the proceeding party. Moving recovered animals from one detach to another often causes loss of some of these animals. Some community members have reported seeing army trucks leaving in the night and the communities believe that some of these trucks carry animals (Muhereza, 2010b).
6.2.6 ABSENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS DISARMAMENT

The over-arching allegation from a variety of stakeholders has been that the disarmament process was not uniformly conducted. The Jie perceive governments forceful disarmament exercise as having treated them more brutally than any other ethnic group, while the government was arming their immediate neighbours like the Ethur of Abim, to harm them. This has created resentment among the Jie towards the army and other non-Jie ethnic groups (World Vision, 2009a). Other ethnic groups have similar perceptions regarding how they have been disarmed vis--vis others. The Dodoth told the study team the same thing they believe that they were fully disarmed while the Jie still possessed their guns, which has on one hand, created a sense of powerlessness among the
65 66 67

. See Guns for freedom, New Vision 1 October 2006. See also Kjong women buy guns, New Vision 3 October 2006, pp. 7 (quoted in Muhereza, 2010b). . See 52 Warriors killed in UPDF clash, New Vision 15 February 2007, pp.1-2; 4 UPDF, 7 warriors killed in Kotido clashes, New Vision 14 February 2007, pp.3 (quoted in Muhereza, 2010b).

. See statement by Karamoja Parliamentary Group (KPG) on the excesses of the current forceful disarmament, dated 5 December 2006, intended for presentation to Parliament of the republic of Uganda, Mimeo. This accusation was repeated Interview with Mzee Losipole Aramtorit Wuapale, Pokot Elder from Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok).
68

. Interview with Mr. Stephene Abura, Programme Officer, Governance and Conflict Transformation, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme (KADP), held on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok).

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Dodoth of Kaabong, and on the other, led to a re-armament race. The Dodoth justify their perceptions about the Jie from the continued aggression by the Jie (World Vision, 2009b). In Bokora, the same feeling was encountered. The Bokora think the Matheniko did not hand in as many guns as they should, considering that they had more guns than any Karamojong group after 1979 when acquired guns from Moroto barracks. A report from Tufts University confirmed that the Bokora gave up a large number of their weapons in the 2001/2002 exercise, which left them open to attack as their neighbours did not hand in as many guns as the Bokora. Many of these groups, in particular the Matheniko and Jie, were stronger than the Bokora to begin with, and gained a clear military superiority after the Bokora were disarmed. The number of raids upon the Bokora increased rapidly following the disarmament. Because of the uneven nature of the disarmament exercise resulting in disarmament of the Bokora, while the Jie, Matheniko, Pian and the Pokot retained many guns (Stites, Mazurana & Akabwai, 2007).
6.2.7 RECOVERY OF RAIDED LIVESTOCK

Every different ethnic group one speaks to claims the UPDF favours their adversaries in the recovery of raided livestock. The army is perceived to sometimes as reluctant to follow raided animals. The Pokot elders claimed that the UPDF is biased against the Pokot. That when a raid originated from the Pokot, the army is quick to swing into action to assist the Karamojong recover any livestock that may have been raided. Pokot herds are even followed to the border with Kenya. But when the Karamojong raid the Pokot, the raiders are pursued for a short distance.69 The Bokora, Jie and Dodoth all echoed the same thing. Information about impending raids or raids which have already taken place is brought to the security agencies late. This makes it difficult to prevent raids or recover raided animals. Sometimes, they dont bring information because they think it will not be acted upon, in the way in which they prefer. Pokot women of Lopedet said: when the army meets with the herds boys who go to them to report raids, they beat them and accuse them of hiding guns.70 There have been challenges to the quick recovery of raided animals; getting accurate information on the numbers of livestock raided; return of recovered livestock to their owners. Pokot women consulted in Lopedet village, Loroo sub-county said: In the old times, when there was a raid, the sub-county officials, LCs, elders and youth would move as a team and follow the foot marks till their destination and recover them. But now the UPDF has become a problem, even when they recover the animals, they sell them.71 Recovery of stolen animals from the warring communities by the army is sometimes slow. There have been complaints that many times the number that is recovered is smaller than what was raided. This has caused dissatisfaction among the local communities, and as such some people have taken the law into their own hands, and counter-raided the other communities. The army also takes long to respond to the raids even when they are reported early. Often fewer animals are recovered.

69 70 71

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose) . Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael). . Ibid

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6.3 6.3.1

ECONOMIC FACTORS FUELLING CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA LIVELIHOOD VULNERABILITIES IN KARAMOJA

Due to historical neglect and marginalisation, the livelihoods of the majority of the people in Karamoja are characterised by inherent vulnerabilities because the people have neither enough livelihood assets, nor the capabilities to create or access the assets. Several peace actors are beginning to recognise that conflicts themselves are symptoms of a complex interplay of social, cultural, economic and political vulnerabilities that manifest in different forms of poverty. One of these actors was concerned that: some actors do not directly address the underlying causes of conflict, but spend all their time and resources on mere symptoms of the conflicts.72 Many of the peace building and conflict management interventions are unable to work for people affected by armed conflicts because they do not address issues of poverty, which some actors find difficulties appreciating. For example, a peace actor in Moroto could not understand why individual in the communities who are brought on board peace building initiatives usually ask for money (allowances) from them, through excuses such as: If you are giving me peace, what do I have in my pocket at the end of the day?73 In much of Karamoja, opportunities to make a living are very limited due to factors such as the arid weather conditions, exploitation of labour, gazetting of land, limited development of productive sectors, high illiteracy rates, and population displacement from their land. This creates a large pool of abundant manpower that can be easily and willingly mobilised for active participation in a myriad of conflicts. As a consequence, some people are forced to steal to survive. The high cost of living in Karamoja drives those who have no food to raid, and sell raided livestock to get money to buy food. The livelihood vulnerabilities, the armed conflicts and harsh physical environment and high levels of poverty re-enforce each other in ways that have narrowed the livelihood options of the people, and pre-disposed them to conflict. The loss of livelihoods had precipitated frustration, despair and hopelessness. Since raiding has, overtime, assumed the status of a mode of living, one needs a viable alternative to persuade those involved in it to stop it. This is partly the reason why it has been argued that conflicts in Karamoja have continued because the majority of the peace-building interventions do not address livelihoods issues. They do not provide an alternative to raiding. The absence of alternative livelihoods opportunities for the youth drives them into raiding. Even when they have been disarmed, the inability to provide them with alternative activities to productively occupy their time makes it difficult to sustain the relative peace achieved. It was rightly argued by one of the respondents that: The more youth are engaged in productive activities, the less they are likely to indulge in raiding. Practically, many interventions have not involved the youth sustainably. They are usually one-off activities.74 The latter was echoed by respondents in not only in Amudat, but also in Kaabong, Moroto and Kotido. In all these districts, there was concern about the high rate of crime and criminality in the villages. Indeed KIDDP was meant to link disarmament and development, and right from the start, had an incentive structure tied to voluntary handing in of guns but local leaders abused its implementation, and

72 73 74

. Interview with Robson Odora, Head Mercy Corps, Kaabong held at Mercy Corps office on 5 August, 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

. Interview with Mr. Theophillus Emanu, Food and Nutrition Security and Conflict Management Expert (Basic Infrastructure), GTZ Karamoja Programme, held at GTZ Offices, Moroto on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Interview with Ms. Joyce Achom, WFP Head of Sub-office, Nakapiripirit District, held at Amudat on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza)

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instead of giving the iron sheets and ploughs to those who handed in guns, they allocated these items to themselves. Not receiving incentives was a key fuelling factor to others refusing to disarm and continuing the conflict.75 Respondents consulted in Karamoja were in agreement with the above analysis. The lack of viable alternative productive activities leads to the able-bodied youth in the communities to be preoccupied with raiding and planning for their next raids. In both Kotido and Kaabong, the youth said they continued to engage in raiding because they had no alternative livelihood to engage in. In Panyangara, Kotido, Jie youth said: There is no comfortable life after handing in guns. There are no jobs and employment for youth who hand in guns. What do they expect us to do?76 In Kaabong, Dodoth youth claimed that government has not designed alternative livelihoods for disarmed youth implying that since it is the government that took away their gun livelihood, it is the one that is supposed to come up with an alternative.77 The views of the youth in Kaabong and Kotido were echoed by development partners. In Kaabong, an official from one of the development agencies put it thus: There is regional imbalance in development, and lack of alternative livelihoods to cattle. Government is perceived to have low or no commitment to developing Karamoja. This is evident in government not doing something about disarmed youth.78 The available alternatives to livestock, as a mode of livelihood, would have been in the nonfarm sector. The opportunities available have limited the population in both urban and rural areas to casual labour; quarrying stones; mining sand; selling firewood and grass; as well as charcoal production. Some of these alternative forms of employment, especially stone quarrying have exposed women and children to various forms of abuse, itself a form of violence experienced in Karamoja. Dodoth women in Kaabong district told the study team that: income generating activities such as stone quarrying are not user friendly. They have resulted in miscarriages because of the very demanding exertion it involves. The Dodoth Youth complained about the labour demands for quarrying, which had destroyed their sex drive by leaving them too exhausted to be of any use to their wives at home.79
6.3.2 THE INTENSIFYING POVERTY CONDITIONS IN KARAMOJA

There has been reference to the intensification of different forms of poverty conditions as being a trigger of the continuing armed conflicts in Karamoja, and vice versa (World Vision, 2009a; (World Vision, 2009b). Different forms of poverty are manifest in Karamoja despite the fact that the 2008 National Livestock census shows that Karamoja has the largest number of livestock population in the whole country. Income and consumption poverty in Karamoja are most pronounced than anywhere in Uganda. Poverty in Moroto manifests in form of the extremely low levels of access to basic social services such as safe water, health care and education, and poor hygiene and sanitation. The population with access to safe water supplies in Karamoja was still far below the national average of 65% of the rural population nationwide (Government of Uganda, 2009: 155-7). The districts of Karamoja have the lowest sanitation coverage at 7% on average.80 Diseases associated

75 76 77 78 79 80

. Interview with Mr. Godfrey Musinguzi Batwaza, District Internal Security Officer (DISO) Kotido district, held at DISO offices Kotido on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Focus group discussion with youth held at Napumpum village, Loposa Parish, Panyangara sub-county in Kotido District on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba). . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 6 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba). . Interview with Mr. Robson Odora, Head, Mercy Corps Kaabong, held at Mercy Corps offices on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by John Senkumba). . Focus group discussion with women at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 5 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba). The same view was echoed during Focus group discussion with Youth in the same village. . In the June 2009 Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) Statistical Abstracts, latrine coverage in Karamoja in 2008 was the lowest in the whole country. The same statistics were recorded for 2007. Abim district had 2%; Kaabong had 2%; Kotido had 2%; Moroto had 10%, and;

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with poor hygiene are prevalent in Karamoja, contributing to high family morbidity and child mortality rates. In responding to the situation, many households had adopted negative coping strategies that entangle the people of Karamoja in a vicious cycle of poverty, armed conflicts, marginalisation and environmental degradation. Due to poverty, many households are unable to afford food even when it is available in the market. The resulting food scarcity predisposes the people of Karamoja to compete for the available food, which leads to conflicts. A food security survey carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in August 2009 showed that up to 59% of the households in 15 selected subcounties in all the districts in Karamoja consumed only one meal per day, implying that the population is generally hardy. The number of respondents who consumed 1 meal a day was 69% in Abim; 45% in Kaabong; 51% in Kotido; 80% in Moroto, and; 52% in Nakapiripirit (FAO, 2009a: 18). The FAO Food Security survey also showed that over the last five years, it is not only the regularity of the meals that had changed for the worse (with more people being unable to consume more than one meal a day), the composition of their diets as well as nutritional values of the food consumed had also declined considerably, leading to different levels of acute and severe malnutrition (FAO, 2009a: 19). Logically, individuals who do not have food will resort to all possible avenues to get it, including stealing from those who have something. Bokora women of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Napak district said a combination of perpetual hunger and poverty in the community makes it difficult for the conflict to end.81 The widening of the inequality between those who have, and those who dont have, makes it very difficult for conflicts to end. Those who dont have try to find all possible means to survive. As Karamoja becomes more opened up to the outside world (globalised), the inequality has increasingly become more magnified. One actor put it in these terms: The Jie are also forced to raid due to abject poverty. Karamoja sub region is the poorest region with very harsh climatic conditions (very long spells of drought, unreliable rainfall): poor/no pasture land, coupled with poor soil texture and serious soil degradation where no meaningful agriculture can be undertaken. These conditions force the Jie to move out of their place to search for water and pasture for their animals; food for themselves, but every time they are leaving the host community, they destroy peoples granaries, raid food and animals, rape women and girls, thereby causing hatred for them by other ethnic groups (World Vision, 2009a).
6.3.3 COMMERCIALISATION OF RAIDING

Unlike in the past when raiding was influenced by cultural factors, it has, of late become increasingly commercialised. This phenomenon of the commercialisation of livestock raiding was first observed in the writings of Ocan (1992), who argued that there emerged warlords who sponsored raiding for private commercial gains. Large scale livestock raiding was no more. Commercialised raiding has become diversified as it is no longer the monopoly of the so-called warlords. Small groups of Karamojong warriors in the different communities now steal livestock for sale at non-designated marketing points within Karamoja or in neighbouring districts. Consultations with respondents in different parts of Karamoja revealed that the organisation and execution of many of the livestock raids was no longer the preserve of the so-called warlords. The net-benefit considerations for those who continue to indulge in raids are too attractive not to take advantage of.82 Among those profiteering from commercialised raids are businessmen who operate retail shops
Nakapiripirit had 3%. The national average increased from 59% in 2007 to 63% in 2008 (UBOS, 2009: 150). See also Republic of Uganda (2008: 185).
81 82

. Focus group discussion with Women at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Focus group discussion with women at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 6 August 2010

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in the towns and trading centres in Karamoja who use cattle theft to generate additional capital not only to boost the stocks of their businesses, but also continue to finance more livestock raids.83 Among them also include politicians who sponsor such raids, and dispose the proceeds from raids as quickly as they can before the army catches up with them (see Muhereza, 2010b; Muhereza, 2008). In Kaabong, the explicit transition in the dynamics of raiding were highlighted thus: The motive to sell has replaced cultural motives that existed before, and whereas organizing raids in the past was openly known in the community, nowadays it is very secretive.84 Because livestock raiding in Karamoja is self-financing, there will continue to be livestock raids as long as there is livestock in Karamoja, until the security and maintenance of law and order improves to make it difficult to continue to indulge in raiding. Several respondents informed the study team that raiders no longer bring raided livestock to kraals where community livestock were kept. Once a raid has been carried out, the raided livestock is loaded onto truck and transported out of Karamoja. Because raids have become commercialised, there are opportunistic thieves who think that they can raid and dispose off their loot before anyone finds out. In the past, warriors would simply steal livestock but not kill. Nowadays, they kill if they encounter anyone because they do not want to leave any traces. The economic returns associated with the sale of raided livestock have compelled many karachunas to continue the vice. Even as the scale of raiding and the number of guns involved in the raids has been significantly reduced due to disarmament, there are still some daring hardcore criminals who continue to attack not only unarmed communities, but also protected kraals. In Kotido, at the end of July 2010, between 30 and 50 Jie karachunas raided Nakapelmoru with only 4 guns. The rest had spears.85 Such incidents are common in different parts of Karamoja, where warriors were using a few guns to continue raiding. Bokora women of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Napak district said livestock traders have made it difficult for the conflict to end. Unfortunately, there exists a ready market for raided livestock provided by traders who buy it more cheaply than non-raided animals. The transaction costs and risks are not so high as to act as disincentives to raiding. 6.3.4
COMMERCIALISATION OF RECOVERY OF RAIDED LIVESTOCK

One of the primary functions of the security establishment is to ensure that the lives and properties of the citizens are protected. In Karamoja, preventing livestock raiding is as much a function of the security agencies as the recovery of raided livestock. There are many challenges that have been associated with the recovery of raided livestock. One of the major concerns has been the commercialization of the recovery of raided livestock, which has increased conflicts in the communities in Karamoja. Recovery and hand over of raided livestock to their owners is not wellstreamlined. Allegations of bribery involved in the hand over process of recovered livestock were mentioned to the study team not only by local civil societies in Moroto and Kaabong districts (who implicated both the political leaders and the military),86 but also by the military (who, on their part,

(facilitated by John Ssenkumba).

83 84 85 86

. Interview with Rev. Joseph Lomongin, Karamoja Diocesan Development Services (KDDS) Team Leader, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Francis Loyok Lokeris) . Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-Pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), held at DADO Offices on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Interview with Mr. Kevin Angom, Peace Building Assistant and Mr. Benjamin Ateu, Civil Society Development Officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC), held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Senkumba). . Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-Pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), held at DADO offices, Kaabong on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). Similar views were also expressed during an interview with Mr. Loduk Luke Maxmilian, Program Officer, Justice and Peace Program, CARITAS (SSD) Moroto, held at SSD offices Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Lokeris Loyok).

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implicated local political leaders). An army spokesman in Kotido said: local political leaders are in charge of handing over recovered animals, they demand bribes from those whose animals were recovered.87 In Moroto, the study team was told that some local leaders hold onto a few of the recovered livestock to take care of (airtime and transport) costs incurred during recovery of raided livestock. There have been reports that those whose animals have been recovered have been told by the local leaders to mobilise money to take to the UPDF commanders as facilitation in appreciation for recovering livestock that had been raided.88 One of the persons from whom a relative came to mobilise money for taking to the UPDF for recovering his livestock could not vouch on whether or not the money that was collected was handed over to the UPDF. The communities however did mention that when raided livestock are recovered by the military, not all are returned and handed over to their owners. To cope with this loss, herdsmen soon began to exaggerate the number of livestock involved whenever a raid occurred. The additional numbers would ostensibly be used to cover such contingencies (of taking care of the extra-costs incurred by local leaders and the UPDF officers). Those from whom more animals are recovered than were raided feel aggrieved, and often plan retaliatory raids. In Lochom village in Kaabong, Dodoth women interviewed during a focus group discussion said: not handing over recovered animals from raids makes community members annoyed and seek revenge as an alternative.89
6.3.5 CORRUPTION IN SERVICE DELIVERY

The inability of public institutions and other mandated agencies to deliver basic services to the people of Karamoja has been blamed for fuelling the continuing conflicts in Karamoja. Respondents mentioned that corruption in the delivery of social services has made it difficult for communities affected by conflict to adopt alternative livelihoods, which makes it difficult to end conflicts because poor people resort to thefts to survive. For example during distribution of goats under the National Agricultural Advisory services (NAADS) programme, only the local councils leaders and the well-to-do in the community get the inputs. The ordinary community members who are meant to be primary beneficiaries from such poverty reducing interventions do not benefit from such government programmes. 90 Due to corruption, services which are supposed to be delivered dont get delivered. Contractors hired by local governments do shoddy work because those who are supposed to supervise these service providers have either been compromised or have a conflict of interest. Contracts are awarded to firms in which those who award contracts in the local government have interests.91 World Vision has noted in a report assessing local capacity for peace in Kotido district that local government leaders abuse their powers by engaging in rampant corruption, taking advantage of the insecurity which makes it difficult for government programmes to be effectively
87 88

. Interview with Lt Ceasar Olweny, UPDF 5th Division spokesperson, held at Kotido Town, on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . This issue was mentioned during an interview with Mr. Loduk Luke Maxmilian, Program Officer, Justice and Peace Program, CARITAS (SSD) Moroto, held on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Lokeris Loyok). It was also mentioned in an interview with Mr. Stephen Abura, Programme Officer, Governance and Conflict Transformation, Karamoja Agro-Pastoral Development Programme (KADP), held on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok). The latter told the study team that once in Matheniko UGX. 1 million was collected to take to a UPDF Intelligence Officer, in addition to setting aside some big bulls for giving to commanders for assisting in recovering raided livestock.
89 90 91

. Focus group discussion with women at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 6 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba) . Focus group discussion with Youth at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Fr. Thomas Achia, Director, Social Services Department (SSD) Caritas, Moroto Catholic Diocese, held at SSD offices, Regina Mundi, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza)

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monitored (World Vision, 2009a: 10). Raiding has also continued partly because of corruption at various levels of public service. First, livestock are not supposed to be moved without movement permits, but when raids take place and animals are loaded onto Lorries, they are ferried through check points, implying that local government officials who man such check points let the vehicle through without proper documents. The veterinary officials who give movement permits to animals whose owners they are not sure of, are as guilty as the security officials who let stolen animals leave Karamoja. Both are as guilty as not only the transporters who move the stolen animals and the Karamojong warriors who do the actual raiding.92
6.3.6 THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

When relief is distributed by humanitarian agencies, it inevitably becomes a source of conflict, which sometimes turns violent. Recent assessments have shown that it is not the humanitarian assistance that causes the conflicts but the process through which the assistance is delivered that leads not only to dependence (hence creating a basis for conflicts) but also to actual confrontations (see Muhereza, 2010d; Opolot, 2010a; Opolot, 2010b; Opolot & Ssenkumba 2010; Ssenkumba 2010). When World Food Programme (WFP) distributes food to some community members and others dont get, those who dont get target those who get, and grab it from them.93 In Kaabong, Dodoth women interviewed in Sidok sub-county observed that: discrimination and unequal treatment in relief distribution leads to conflicts.94 It has been argued by World Vision International that targeting of only the rural community during distributing food relief items by humanitarian agencies has negatively impacted upon the recipient communities by increasing tensions with the urban communities. The strategy of distribution of food relief in group also increases tensions and suspicions as communities from different villages are clustered together. This resulting unequal sharing of food theft leads to violence as those who did not get grab food from those who got (World Vision, 2009a: 9).
6.3.7 MOBILE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

The Karamojong warriors are no longer the spear-wielding savage tribes that were encountered by famous elephant hunter, W.D.M. Bell at the end of the 19th Century.95 Many of those who indulge in raiding have also been exposed to modern technologies, such as the mobile telephone, which has fuelled the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja. Karamojong warriors use mobile phones to identify the location of the herds of their victims. Mobile phones are also used to link raiders with livestock traders who purchase the livestock immediately raids have occurred (Muhereza, 2008). It has also been claimed that unscrupulous businessmen in Kampala place textmessage orders with Karamoja youth to raid cattle, which are then supplied into the international market (Walker, 2008: 5). There have been arrests that the UPDF has made in the past involving political leaders who were issuing commands to warriors who had gone raiding. On 2 June 2008, there were violent clashes between Bokora and Jie, in which the Bokora raided 870 cattle from the

92 93 94 95

. Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Interview with Ms. Frida Amuron, Ag. District Community Development Officer (CDO), Amudat District, held at Amudat district headquarters on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Francis Loyok Lokeris). . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lochom village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District, held on 5 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba). . See Bell, W.D.M. 1949. Karamojo Safari. Suffolk: Hillman printers (Frome) Ltd.

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Jie. Several warriors killed and others injured on both sides. These raids were coordinated by an LC5 Councillor from one of the sub-counties in Moroto District and an LC3 Chairman of another subcounty also in Moroto District. During the fight, Bokora warriors lost their mobile phones and the two local leaders kept issuing commands, not knowing that they were talking to Jie who later surrendered the phones to the UPDF. The two Bokora political leaders kept calling the phones to find out how far the warriors had reached.96
6.4 6.4.1 POLITICAL GOVERNANCE AND ARMED CONFLICT THE POLITICS OF THE NEW DISTRICTS IN KARAMOJA

Karamoja now has seven districts, corresponding to the major ethnic groups. Abim is occupied by the Ethur; Kaabong by Dodoth; Kotido by Jie; Moroto by the Matheniko; Napak by the Bokora and Nakapiripirit by the Pian. In Karamoja, counties were named after the dominant ethnic groups. Within each of these districts, there are several minority ethnic groups. All counties had been elevated to district status. The recent elevation of Pokot county and Bokora county to districts (Amudat and Napak respectively) had intensified inter-ethnic conflicts between Pokot and the rest of the Karamojong; and between the Bokora and the Matheniko (with whom they shared Moroto district). The creation of new districts has escalated conflicts by entrenching the polarisations that already exist between the disparate ethnic groups. A respondent in Napak noted that once the district was granted, the majority of the Matheniko in the mother district of Moroto were glad to off-load the Bokora from the district service, since the Bokora were perceived to have been occupying most of the good positions in the district local government.97 The sub-division of the districts in Karamoja on ethnic lines has polarised the divisions among the people even the more. When Amudat was still part of Nakapiripirit, the division between the Pokot and Karamojong and amongst the Pokot were not as visible (and dangerous) as they have become. Now it was obvious that Amudat is for Pokot, and the non-Pokot do not feel at ease even working in the district local government in Pokot. Within Pokot, there were very incisive divisions that had developed on basis of sub-clans that had been further re-enforced along political party lines. These divisions are further entrenched by development agencies that tend to employ the Karamojong in their areas of origin. Many Karamojong minorities can speak the mainstream ngakarimojong but the Karamojong cannot, for example speak Pokot, Tepeth and Kadam. Ethnic hatred is not helped when it is commonly believed by all the different ethnic groups that when adversaries raid their animals, they are difficult to recover compared to others. Every ethnic group thinks the army does not do enough to recover animals from their adversaries. Pokot youth said: When livestock is raided from Pokot, they are difficult to recover from the Karamojong, but when the Karamojong are raided by the Pokot, their animals are quickly recovered.98 Pokot Youth, for example, claimed that the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) for Nakapiripirit who is also holding the portfolio for Amudat is biased in favour of the Karamojong because he is a Karamojong from Matheniko.99

96 97 98 99

. See Moroto District Councillors named in cattle rustling, Daily Monitor 17 June 2008, pp. 12

. Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Youth held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose). . Ibid.

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The communities in Nagule-Angolo said someone in the UPDF who is a Jie must have alerted their colleagues, because their animals were raided the night they UPDF were withdrawn.100 In each ethnic group, children are brought up knowing that the neighbouring ethnic group are their enemies. Such manifestation of ethnicity fuels conflicts because even within ethnic groups, there will be a tendency to become more inward looking to those with whom they share sub-clans. Different clans feel so different from each other to a point that they can raid from each other and kill each other. The elders and the local leaders do not even help the situation as they are also entangled in the situation.101
6.4.2 POLITICAL CORRUPTION

While economic corruption relates mainly with the pervasion of service delivery processes by those charged with the responsibility of delivering services for selfish individual/personal gain, political corruption relates to inappropriate behaviour by political leaders at various levels. Bokora women of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Napak district said conflicts had become extremely difficult to end because of corruption in the recovery of their raided animals perpetuated by their local leaders.102 Some LCs reportedly collect money from those who have lost their animals, claiming that it is airtime or fuel which is given to the army commanders. People who lose their livestock are asked to contribute money to be given back their livestock.103 A report by World Vision showed that Local Councils in Kotido are the least trusted because of corruption. They manipulate the illiterate community for their own gain. The elders are also less trusted because they no longer command resources, and are merely dependent on other productive groups (World Vision, 2009a: 15).
6.4.3 POLICY RESPONSES AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Over the years, different development partners have come on board to support government to address some of the critical development challenges in Karamoja. There have been problems with both the policy responses by government as well as with the support to government development programmes provided by development partners. Some of them have been considered as inappropriate to address the underlying challenges and root causes, which in itself has fuelled the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja. The main policy response to the civil conflict in Karamoja has been to disarm. But sustainable peace requires more than collection of guns. Even those directly involved in the disarmament have noted the inadequacy of this approach. The army spokesperson in the region queried whether disarming physically without disarming mentally was not a futile enterprise?104 The manner in which governments disarmament policy has been played out has undermined the achievement of some of the objectives of disarmament. For example, the confinement of livestock

100 101 102 103 104

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose).
. Interview with Mr. Theophillus Emanu, Food and Nutrition Security and Conflict Management Expert (Basic Infrastructure), GTZ Karamoja Programme, held at GTZ Offices, Moroto on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Focus group discussion with Women at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Interview with Lt Ceasar Olweny, UPDF 5th Division spokesperson, held at Kotido Town, on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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in protected kraals, without the basic infrastructure for disease control, and access to water and pasture led to increased livestock mortality due to malnutrition and disease. The establishment of protected kraals under disarmament not only led to loss of livestock due to increased incidence of diseases. It also made livestock in protected kraals very vulnerable to raids. On many occasions in many parts of Karamoja, protected kraals were attacked and all animals raided from the protection ring set up by the UPDF (Muhereza, 2010b; Emuria, 2009). Protected kraals were very soft targets for Karamojong raiders to the extent that the Karamojong had begun questioning governments commitment to protecting their livestock.105 After it became apparent that protected kraals would not achieve the objective they were intended to achieve, the army decided to disband them. This decision was enforced without providing an alternative protection system for the livestock of disarmed communities, which left their livestock vulnerable to attacks. Many people lost their livestock because of the haphazard manner in which the kraals were disbanded (UNDP, 2010). This increased conflicts in the communities, as those who lost their livestock blamed it on the UPDF. In a society like that of Karamoja, where almost everybody is needy, some of the government programmes that target a few individuals have been criticised for exposing the beneficiaries of such programme to violence. Under NAADS, inputs are given to a few model farmers leaving out the rest of the communities, who most of the time need the support more than those who benefit who are the better-off. Some NAADS beneficiaries who received goats were targeted and their goats raided.106 Besides inadequate and inappropriate policy responses and programmes, some respondents singled out the authoritarian approach used by government officials in delivering services. Specific reference was made to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), who decided that the best way to increase food security in Karamoja was to open up more land. They brought tractors and opened up land without consulting anyone. Then they brought cassava cuttings. Some people just took the sacks in which the cassava had been packed. Then they waited for the cuttings to dry, and used them for firewood. If they had been consulted before, they would have voiced their objections to the cassava and an alternative would have been suggested. The many failed programs in the various areas fuel the continuing conflict.107
6.4.4 DUPLICITY AND COMPETITION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS

Interventions by NGOs are sometimes unable to contribute significantly to peace building and conflict management because there is, either duplication in the interventions being undertaken by the various NGOs, or relevant synergies in their interventions have not been identified and builtupon. The conflict had become pervasive because there are many disjointed actions by development partners, with each organization implementing in its own cocoon and approach. An extreme manifestation of this was voiced thus: Peace actors seem to be competing for loyalty from community members, with some even maligning or tarnishing others!108 Whatever coordination is attempted at district stops there, and there is no attempt to harmonize what is done at sub-county and community level. For example, there are so many organisations that had created Peace Actors or Agents in different parts

105 106 107 108

. Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-Pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), held at DADO offices, Kaabong on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose) . Interview with Mr. Emojong Paul, Programme Officer, Caritas Kotido, held at Caritas Kitodo on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-Pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), held at DADO offices, Kaabong on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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of Karamoja, and none of them understood the strength and weaknesses of the other so as to compliment their activities better.109 There is no framework for responding to common challenges.
6.5 SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS FUELLING ARMED CONFLICT

The following socio-cultural factors were identified as key in fuelling the continuing armed conflicts in Karamoja:
6.5.1 INTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL AND MODERN GOVERNANCE

In Karamoja, there exists a modern system of governance (comprising elected and appointed leaders) and a traditional one (comprising elders), and both function parallel to each other. Most of the time, there has not been much interest in cultivating a positive relationship between them largely because the modern considers the traditional as illegal. They do not have respect for each other. In several senses, elected leaders are considered as aliens, for always siding with the modern governance system, sometimes against the basic tenets of the traditional authority system. A respondent told the study team that in Karamoja sometimes they elect a person to a position in the formal system as a way of getting rid of that person from the community. Sometimes, communities disown those they elect to civil leadership.110 The modern has therefore not benefited from the positive aspects in the traditional system. Peace building actors have had problems reaching out to the power holders in the traditional settings, which would have created opportunity to minimise the negative aspects of the traditional system. In Karamoja, the modern system of governance and justice administration is bedevilled by weaknesses and challenges, which makes traditional governance and justice systems to thrive. Peace building actors have had problems reaching out to the power holders in the traditional settings. Either, there has been a problem identifying how to actually engage the traditional institution, or there has been difficulty determining its embodiment considering that in most societies, those who wield power are old and senile and very few. Initially they lost power when youth acquired guns, but increasingly they have been unable to exercise their powers because they remained very few where they exist. There are isolated cases where initiated elders have also been elected onto political positions, such as Local Councils. Most of the time, elected leaders are young and un-initiated, and even if they wield a lot of political clout in the modern system, in the traditional set up, they are inconsequential. Even when local councils are listened to, their directives are not implemented until the initiated elders in the community have pronounced themselves on the key issues in the same way as the LCs. Sometimes NGOs imagine they can have it both ways have the LCs of their choice who are educated, and also involved elders in interventions areas as a way of bringing on board the traditional institutions. The manner in which elders have been brought on board activities planned by NGOs such as during peace building and conflict prevention interventions has not effectively integrated the authority of the traditional institutions. Most of the time, for example, individual elders have been identified and incorporated on Peace Committees, without those elders involved bringing on board the collective authority of the elders as a traditional governance institution. Mere co-opting of one or two elders on a Peace Committee does not in any

109 110

. Interview with Mr. Abongi Patrick, Conflict Mitigation Manager, IRC Karamoja Programme held on 5 August 2010, held IRC Programme Office, Moroto (Interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Interview with Mr. Milton Lopiria, Program Coordinator, Warrior Squad, Kotido held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Senkumba).

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way imply that the traditional authority structures and systems have been integrated into the peacebuilding and conflict prevention. There have been some efforts by some development partners to bring the traditional Karamojong elders on board. Those who make this effort think that by speaking with a few elders in a community meeting (perhaps even convened by the Local Council chairperson), buying a bull from the market and donating it to the elders to slaughter (under the mistaken belief that it is a sacrifice), and meeting the costs of such occasions (including providing transport and transport refunds for elders to the venue) is enough. Yet, as it later turns out, the elders who come on board do so as individuals who happened to be of an advanced age, and not as embodiment of the collective traditional structures. The elders who participate in such undertakings are usually handpicked by the development partners or their agents, without understanding that even if the people picked are the same people who in the traditional setting preside over the key traditional functions, outside the context within which traditional authority is exercised, their involvement remains inconsequential to the integration of the traditional institutions. Sacrifices that are used for seeking blessings for peace are donated by the elders, and cannot be bought from the market, and donated to the elders for religious rituals.
6.5.2 THE KARAMOJONG AND THEIR AFFINITY TO CATTLE

There are several schools of thought that attribute the continuation of the conflict to the cow, or the love that the Karamojong espouse towards the cow. In the first school of thought, it has been argued that the Karamojong have a high affinity for livestock. They are not only culturally dependent on cattle, their political and economic systems and lifestyles derive largely from the keeping of livestock (see World Vision, 2008). For a Karamojong to be called and qualify as a Karamojong, he must be in possession of cows. It is not accidental that the results of the 2008 National Livestock Census showed that of the 11,408,750 national cattle population, 19.8% (2,253,960 heads of cattle) were in Karamoja (Republic of Uganda, 2009b: 32). 111 In Karamoja, cows are the source of not only livelihood, but also family as well as its propagation through marriage. To the ordinary people of Karamoja, survival is difficult without the cow. When it is not there, you look for it. When it is taken away from you, you try to get it back. According to a report assessing local capacity for peace in Kotido district prepared by World Vision International, one of the most notorious Karamojong ethnic group that has perpetuated armed conflicts throughout Karamoja, the Jie are: inseparable from guns and cattle; culturally, they believe that all animals, especially cattle, belong to them, and any neighbour keeping cattle does so illegally. The Jie have therefore been raiding all the neighbouring districts of Kaabong, Abim and Moroto (World Vision, 2009a: 5). For the Karamojong, other alternatives other than livestock are difficult to consider as options because they are not viable given the rainfall patterns, soils and other agro-ecological conditions. For communities such as the Pokot where crop cultivation is possible in very specific areas such as Karita, households are reluctant to indulge in settled crop cultivation as their mainstay. Those who grow crops also keep livestock, like other Karamojong groups. Even in the settlements that are being established in the green-belt areas of Karamoja, whenever they can, household invest in livestock production. The Karamojong depend on the cow for its (by)products such as meat,

111

. Karamoja has more cows per square kilometre than any other parts of the country. Kotido district, with 694,250 heads of cattle, had the highest number in the whole country. Nakapiripirit was second in the whole country with 674,750 heads of cattle. Kaabong was third with 518,470 heads of cattle. Moroto was fifth with 352,870 heads of cattle, coming after Kiboga in fourth position. Abim had a paltry 13,630 heads of cattle (see Republic of Uganda, 2009b: 32).

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milk, blood, hides, as well as dung. When they need money to buy cereals, they sell their livestock and/or livestock products. The decline in the per capita population of livestock in much of Karamoja has made it hard for the community members to lead a settled lifestyle. The livelihoods of Karamojong are closely tagged to the cow. In areas where livestock have been raided these communities also seek them from other areas, preferably those who raided them. Because of the multiple functions of the cow, a Karamojong will do everything and anything to obtain the cows. And to the extent that they do, they are a cause of conflict. Bokora women of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Napak district said even when they are able to grow crops more than many areas of Karamoja (being in the green belt areas), in their community, they need livestock to survive, so those who do not have livestock go for raid in order to survive.112 Even without guns, many Karamojong risk their lives to raid. There were increasing incidents of raiders targeting herds-boys looking after animals, that they scare before taking off with their animals.113 The second school of thought links ownership of livestock to proliferation of illicit firearms. Those who have cows are insecure because they become the targets of raids. Because of not only the widespread ownership of livestock, but also the love for livestock, those who have no livestock will do anything to acquire them. Those who already have wish to acquire more. This makes ownership of livestock and possession of illegal firearms bed-fellows. A cow minus a gun is an invitation to be raided, just as much as a gun without a cow creates temptations for those who have the guns to use their guns to acquire cows. When they invest in bullets, they end up raiding to recover their investment. It is not only those without cows who raid. Even those who have cows still indulge in raiding to acquire even more. The third school of thought links Karamojong not just to cows, but to large numbers of cows. Their affinity is not just to a cow, but to large numbers of cows. Like all pastoralists, the love for cows drives them to accumulate them in their numbers. In Karamoja, those who have a few always aspire to acquire even more, even if this means doing it at the expense of others. Cultural practices and societal beliefs on ownership of animals have made it hard for people to seek alternative ways of survival. The communities believe that the only way to live is by having animals. As Karamoja increasingly gets integrated into the market, this cultural attachment to cattle is beginning to be challenged as some commentators are arguing that unlike in the past, the Karamojong no longer keep animals for prestige. The commercialization of raiding had changed the trend, as a new breed of people indulge in raids not simply because of their love for cattle, but to sell them to generate money and accumulate it in large amounts.
6.5.3 THE CULTURE OF REVENGE

In Karamoja, there is an enduring culture of revenge which undermines initiative to build peace. The use of violence has continued to be accepted as a means of resolving disputes and conflicts. Our consultations revealed that even with concerted government efforts to end livestock raiding, there is a way in which the practice is still glorified among the Karamojong. Those who succeed in their missions are held in high esteem. All the Youth who were interviewed at Lopedot said they had ever participated in raiding. Young boys start raiding the moment they learn how to

112 113

. Focus group discussion with Women at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Mr. Joseph Ngoli, District Internal Security Officer (DISO), Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

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handle a gun, at about 13-14 years. For the start, they mainly accompany the adults. Because violence is socially accepted, the culture of revenge (akinyangare) is pervasive in Karamoja, and at all levels, and among all categories of people, including politicians, teachers, priests, religious leaders, catechists. Acculturation involves extolling to children during periods of difficulty how their misery may have been occasioned by the raids of another ethnic group. The feeling of revenge in inculcated into the minds of the children. When they grow knowing that their misery is associated with another community, it will be a matter of time, and one day they will exact their revenge (anyanga). Death occasioned by raids creates a cycle of violence because it will certainly attract a revenge so that the other family also feels the pain of losing their loved ones and their livestock unless blood compensation has been quickly arranged.114 It is difficult for the Karamojong to forgive those who steal their livestock. When livestock is lost, it means a source of livelihood has been lost. Without cattle, many youth are redundant. In many communities in Karamoja, either there is a lack of structures for resolving and preventing conflicts, especially raids, thefts and/or other disputes take place (by encouraging dialogue to enable the recovery of animals after a raid), or if they exist, they lack adequate capacity to engage.115 Recovery and return of raided livestock has been the preserve of the UPDF, because it entailed confronting armed warriors. Following disarmament, local structures played a minimal role, beyond dialogue. The existing structures of the state and mechanisms created, for example, by the district authorities, for helping in recovery of raided livestock (e.g. Civil-Military liaison Co-operation centres and District Peace Committees) were not as effective, and were many times not accessible by all those who needed their assistance. There have been challenges encountered by the UPDF in the recovery of raided livestock. The communities affected by raids also expressed concerns about the recovery of raided livestock animals by the UPDF. In a nutshell, the community does not trust or have confidence in existing structures and mechanisms as well as the main actors involved in the recovery of raided livestock. No act of raid or cattle theft will pass without being avenged. When a raid takes place, and raided animals are not recovered, it generates a cycle of violence as those who are raided carry out a revenge raid. Usually when a revenge raid is undertaken, there is usually no regard for taking back the exact number that was raided. Usually the revenge involves even more animals than were raided. Those who lose their livestock, usually may not even be among the group that started the first raid, but will also plan a return raid. The cycle goes on and on without end. When a raid takes place, if raided livestock are not recovered and returned to their owners, there will always be no doubt as to whether or not a retaliatory raid will be carried out. It is usually a matter of time. When small raids take place and the UPDF does not recover the livestock raided, innocent people are affected as revenge raids will be carried out. Failure of the UPDF to recover raided animals has led to recurrence of revenge raids. There is a need for peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups. If livestock is stolen, there are traditional mechanisms used to recover the livestock. These mechanisms have been undermined, making it very difficult to stop revenge raids from taking place when raids occur. Pokot elders observed that if government compensated those who surrendered their guns but lost their livestock to raiding, them it would become easy to end revenge raids. Every ethnic group claims that it is the other that started the raids who need to do something to end the cycle of raiding. The Pokot elders said: Our karachunas go raiding to revenge their stolen livestock. If the Karamojong

114 115

. Interview with Mr. Abura Steven, Governance and Conflict Transformation Officer, KADP Moroto, held at KADP Office, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris)
. IRC has focused mainly on what happens after raids take place, and less on what happens before the raids.

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would stop, our boys would not go to raid them. We are tired of raids. The message should start with the Karamojong. Once the conflict with our neighbours is ended, it could help pave way for many things.116 Pokot elders claimed that most of the raids that were carried out by the Pokot were revenge raids. Revenge raiding in itself is one of those factors that make the resolution of these conflicts difficult. This drives the conflicts in two ways, first, when one persons animals are taken today, he organizes to go and raid them back shortly after. Secondly, children grow up with the knowledge that there are enemies that killed your parents especially fathers, this brings out the issue of revenge in to the fore. This occurs in both warring communities, setting the conflict into a cycle that never ends. However there have been changes in the duration the counter-raids would take. Initially this would take 4-5 years as a lot of consultations and preparations had to be made. There were even rules that had to be followed and the blessings to go with it, but this has reduced to weeks or even days due to the introduction of the gun. During the dry seasons when common grazing areas and watering points have to be shared, many communities seek peace. This is meant to be a good sign of peace but unfortunately when the warriors begin to identify their animals or whole herds with their colleagues, they begin to formulate ways of recovering them (Muhereza, 2010b). During the wet season when the herds are going back to their respective areas, these warriors launch raids to recover their animals. This sets the communities into a cycle of raids and revenge raids.
6.5.4 TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ARMED CONFLICTS

There are reports and assessment that point to the fact that the breakdown of traditional community structures, which previously helped to mitigate or contain conflict, led communities to slip into a deadly and ongoing cycle of raid and revenge. Our investigations in the study areas revealed that none of the raids that were taking place were officially sanctioned by the traditional council of elders, even where a few elders or seers may either be in know or may have lent their support to them. In most parts of Karamoja, traditional institutions have been weakened because the elders lost the monopoly over the ownership of guns. The elders still wield the spiritual powers to commune with the Karamojong god, but their ability to influence the end of the conflicts through peace building had been undermined by those who now sanction raids (Muhereza, 2010b). Raids are more likely to be sanctioned and blessed by the traditional elders council where these institutions had weathered the years of armed conflicts to remain strong, especially among the Pokot than anywhere in Karamoja at the present. Pokot youth told the study team that raids against their enemies, especially the Karamojong are always blessed and okayed by the elders and they are warned against killing anyone during the raids. The raids are accepted as a means of increasing livestock wealth. Initially the raids were conducted in a more non-violent manner, killings were avoided or minimized with little destruction of homes and property but this has changed over time. Now killings are more often seen during raids.117 Another change in this dynamic has been that whereas raids are sanctioned by witch-doctors and elders because they are believed to have supernatural powers for successful raids, nowadays elders and witchdoctors have taken advantage of this belief to economically gain out of the raids, hence perpetuating ethnic tensions (See World Vision, 2009b). Pokot elders told the study team that Pokot traditional institutions were still highly respected. Of all the different Karamojong ethnic groups, it was only among the Pokot where it was

116 117

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose) . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose)

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acknowledged that the elders could still sanction the arbitrary behaviour of the youth by subjecting errant youth who disobey their elders to caning using a cane ( sitet). The communal assemblies through which youth are disciplined (called ameto) are still widespread.118 However, even among the Pokot, there were bands of recalcitrant youth who engaged in raiding with the approval of their elders. Pokot elders told the study team that raids that are said to be carried out by the Pokot are not sanctioned by the elders. Pokot karachunas from Kenya ally with Pokot karachunas from the Uganda, and carry out raids without the knowledge of the Pokot elders. A respondent in Napak also observed that the Jie are able to organise massive raids all-over Karamoja because the old generation set of mountains (ngimoru) seem to have handed over power to the younger and more energetic generation set of the gazelles ( ngigetei) and yet the rest of Karamoja has not yet been able to do so. It would appear raiding by the Jie has the blessing of their traditional institutions, while in the other Karamojong ethnic groups, the younger generation who have the energy have no power to influence decisions over protection, which has left a vacuum that has been filled by self-seeking armed karachuna leaders who were raiding for individual aggrandisement.119
6.5.5 MARRIAGE AND ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA

There are very many ways in which poverty in Karamoja is linked to the continuation of conflict. One of the most critical channels is the institution of marriage. Apart from initiation, marriage is one other way that social classification takes place among the Karamojong. Among the elders, ones social status is fixed according to the chronological order of their initiation and marriage. The seniority of elders is judged according to their marital status. One who is not married is categorised as a youth regardless of his age. Being traditionally polygamous, the richer one is, the more women that person is expected to marry. Karamojong men value having many wives and children, and the more one has of these, the higher the social status and influence in society. The larger the family, the more powerful it is considered (see Nabuya, 2008: 57-58). Contrary to what has been described by Mkutu (2008) as the declining status of both men and women as defined by marriage caused by a diminishing cattle economy upon which marriage is dependent following the loss of livestock due to disease and raids, our findings show that marriage is still widely perceived as a strong institution in Karamoja, and is still highly revered symbolically and functionally, although it is acknowledged that its dynamics may have changed significantly. Ones status in society is defined not necessarily by how many wives one has married, but whether they have been fully married with bride wealth. The Karamojong sanctify and complete their marriage rituals with exchange of cows. Men who cannot fulfil this obligation are considered not men enough, by both their fellow men, and, more seriously, by the women. World Vision International has noted in a recent report that Jie youth in Kotido district carry out raids to acquire livestock to pay bride price, which was still very high (World Vision, 2009a). It is of immense pride to a Karamojong bride to be fully married traditionally. There are some men who, due to lack of cows, pay bride price in instalments ( ekicul). It has consequences. Another man can refund your instalment, and pay up the balance on bride wealth requested by the brides parents, and take away the woman (and the children). It rarely happens, but it is possible. When an in-law pays bride price, the clan members share the livestock. Marriage is used to build and

118 119

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose). . Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

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strengthen kinship ties. One who receives livestock following a marriage occasion is expected to support that family when it is their turn to be magnanimous. When a marriage has not involved the exchange of marriage gift to the nucleus and extended family members, it extricates from being an occasion for strengthening social networks, which are critical for creating peace. That is why a large number of cows are asked for as bride price. In olden days, the dowry used to be 100 or more animals, but because of the generally reduced numbers in all communities, now it has reduced. While the numbers have been declining, they are still high.120 A number of inventoried studies and assessments of conflict, security and peace-building in Karamoja have pointed out that marriages lead to armed conflicts because they promote raiding by young men because of the high bride price (see World Vision, 2009a; SNV & Pax Christi, 2004). Our findings seemed to suggest that this relationship was not always as direct as it has been presumed to be. It is true that the significance attached to the institution of marriage inspires many Karamojong to do everything it takes to get cows to marry properly, even if this means raiding (for those who dont have cows of their own). Raiding to get livestock to pay bride price which leads to conflicts is more likely to occur in conditions of poverty. It is therefore not the marriage that causes raiding, but the poverty that makes if difficult for young to sanctify their marriages traditionally. Pokot women who participated in a focus group discussion at Lopedet village in Loroo sub-county said that very poor people in the community often go raiding not only because of survival, but also because they need to marry, for which they need cows.121 The link between armed conflicts and marriage is mediated by poverty as follows: One, the number of cattle paid for bride price had reduced. At Lopedet village in Loroo sub-county, the study team was told that the number of livestock paid as bride price among the Pokot now ranges between 40-50 heads of cattle.122 Two, many people accept payment of bride price in kind (mainly in cash) as well as in instalments (ekicul). Nowadays, many people prefer to pay the monetary equivalent of the agreed upon number of cattle for the payment of bride price because cattle are an open invitation to being raided. A number of changes were taking place. Although women occasionally abuse men who have not paid bride price for their wives in full, which is still considered as one of the factors that drive young men into raiding,123 Pokot girls who were not married with cows, whom the study team interacted with, mentioned that their parents were okay with it.124 Pokot women told the study team that a man can have a wife without having to pay bride price because everyone acknowledges that people have become poorer.125 There was a lot of hesitation among Pokot youth to discuss the relationship between Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and bride price. At first the youth said that there was no difference in bride price between circumcised and uncircumcised women. They observed that those who are not circumcised dont have difficulty during child birth compared to those who are circumcised. All the youth who were present during a focus group discussion at Lopedot in Loroo sub-county said they were married and had all paid cows for the bride price. It was only after the youth were asked how in future payment of bride price was going to be a problem that one youth revealed that: No one can give you their cows if your daughter is not circumcised, and because people want cows, they will continue to

120 121 122 123 124 125

. Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael). . ibid . ibid . ibid . ibid . ibid

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circumcise their daughters. And as long as there are those who revere it as a Pokot tradition, there will always be those who seek livestock for bride price. These will raid if they cannot get from their relatives.126 Among the Pokot, FGM encourages early marriages. When a girl is circumcised at 12 years or below, she is married off immediately. The suitors have to look for cows to pay bride price. It is pride for the young boys to marry early. During the period of circumcision among the Pokot, there are many raids that are carried out in the neighbouring communities because of youth looking for cattle for paying their bride price.127
6.5.6 CONSTRUCTION AND POLARISATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES

Karamoja has different ethnic groups sharing not only close linguistics, but also genealogical characteristics such as clans and sub-clans as well as age-sets and generational sets systems, they have since time immemorial been engrossed in inter and intra-ethnic conflicts. Every ethnic group in Karamoja relies mainly on cultivating fear and propagating self-interest to construct a distinct politico-cultural identity to sustain, and reproduce itself as an entity. Ethnic identity is based on fear and hatred of the other Karamojong ethnic groups. Each ethnic group looks out to its own, and because of the ethnic group specific locations in the region, in the past, the Jie ethnic group were suspected to be the one perpetrating attacks in Kotido, and the Dodoth ethnic group were suspected to be the ones carrying out attacks in Moroto and Kaabong (World Vision, 2008). Anyone who is not a member of their ethnic group is considered as ngimoe (enemies). In every ethnic group where the study team carried out consultations, their neighbours were considered as their enemies. It is a common belief among the Karamojong that the livestock of your enemy can be, and, are always raided. While it is an abomination to kill a clans-mate, considered as ngikaitotoi, (or a brother), killing of a human being from another ethnic group does not attract reprimand under the traditional systems. 128 Prolonged conflict between different Karamojong ethnic groups, involving raids and counter-raids have polarised the various Karamojong ethnic groups to the extent that sustainable peace cannot be achieved in such a context of inter-ethnic rivalries and animosities. Since time immemorial, the heterogeneity of Karamojong ethnic groups has been exploited using a divide-and-rule approach for the pacification of the Karamojong. Instead, this served to undermine harmonious co-existence. The different ethnic groups consider themselves arch enemies (ngimoe ngulu ke ebanyet).129 The potential for recourse to violence to resolve their differences is immensely engrained in their socialisation. Children grow up knowing that those are our enemies since they have lost parents, siblings and other relatives to their enemies. The Pokot consider all their Karamojong neighbours as their enemies (puung) because they consistently raid their livestock. The Pokot the Tepeth and Kadam as their brothers, and hence do not raid each other. Outsiders can come and unite us, but it is temporary. It cannot last for long. The Karamojong are the ones who usually break the peace. They attack first.130 The Pokot are socialised to think they are the only ones who are safe, and anyone from another ethnic group is an enemy. The people of Pokot, like all other pastoral areas have had limited
126 127 128 129 130

. ibid

. Interview with Mr. Joseph Ngoli, DISO, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

. Interview with Mr. Abura Steven, Governance and Conflict Transformation Officer, KADP Moroto, held at KADP Office, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Ibid Page 59 of 109
. Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

exposure to what goes on in other parts of the country, hence they are unable to understand what is good and what is bad in their own environment. Among all Karamojong ethnic groups, raiding of livestock of their enemies is permissible, but they do not allow the killing of human beings during raids. Pokot women reminisced the times when the Pokot and Karamojong communities would share grazing grounds and water sources. During these times intermarriages even occurred, in fact some of the women were married from Pian and other communities such as the Matheniko. Pokot women mentioned that before the insecurity set in, the people of Lorengedwat, Nabilatuk and Matheniko would come for visits to their community especially on trade. Livestock thefts, which were then minimal, would be easily resolved. As inter-ethnic conflicts intensified, these social networks broke down, and became increasingly incapable of facilitating resolution of conflicts.131 It has been noted that the Jie consider themselves to be a superior ethnic group who should subdue other ethnic groups as a result they are so hostile to non-Jie communities and look at others suspiciously. Because of this, other ethnic groupings consider the Jie their enemy number one (World Vision, 2009a). The Dodoth, according to a report prepared by World Vision on local capacity for peace in Kaabong district, said the word jie means fighters, and thought that was why the Jie people consider themselves a superior ethnic group (the mighty warriors) in Karamoja. Other ethnic groups have been so much intimidated by the Jie that a seed of hate has been sown and everyone including children regard them to be the greatest enemy. A child during a Focus group Discussion said never reach where the Jie are, they will kill you (World Vision, 2009b). A development actor based in Moroto said that the Jie consider themselves as the Israelites of Karamoja.132 In Napak district, where The Jie send letters to their intended victims about their impending attack, and there were reports that several times this happened, the Jie have made good of their threats.133 The different sources of livelihoods between the Dodoth and Napore are also a cause of tensions between the two ethnic groups. The Dodoth are pastoralists, and think they are more superior to the Napore who are agro-pastoralists with the most fertile land and therefore have more food compared to the Dodoth. This leads to occasional food raids by the Dodoth (World Vision, 2009b: 6). It has also been observed in the World Vision International report that: The Dodoth are in conflict with the Napore because they are believed to be related to the Jie from Kotido. They are perceived as allied of the Jie and connive with them to raid cattle from the Dodoth. The Napore are more educated compared to the rest of the ethnic groups in Kaabong, including the Dodoth. They occupy the biggest proportion of key government and district positions. This has resulted into resource based conflicts like the struggle for allocation of government resources, employment, political positions within the district and corruption (World Vision, 2009b: 4).
6.5.7 MODERN RELIGION AND CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA

Conflicts in Karamoja have continued partly because of what has been done, and partly because what has not been done. Modern religion, including the churches and mosques as well inter-faith organisations have not only been preaching peace in the communities to help end conflict, they have also persuaded, counselled and explained to the people what every good person
131 132 133

. Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael). . Interview with Dr. Okori Edward, Head of Sub-Office, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Karamoja, held at FAO Offices, Moroto on 5 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

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needs to do in face of sin in the Karamojong society.134 The churches have been involved in a lot of peace building work. Nabuya (2008: 130) writes: in the parishes, priests and other pastoral agents tried to denounce any sort of violence and the evils connected with the wrong use of firearms. In Kotido, the Catholic Church was also involved in conflict work, which was justified thus: The philosophy of intervening in peace for CARITAS is based on the Catholic Social Teaching, and for Karamoja, it took on a programmatic angle because of the pervasiveness of the conflicts. It is intended to enhance the local capacity to manage conflicts sustainably, and to inculcate peace building skills. In Karamoja where a spirit of brotherhood is lacking, where there is clan enmity, and where there is very low value attached to life, peace and justice, the church finds that it must do something in this regard.135 There are some key things, however, that the modern religious faiths have not done, that may have made it difficult to end the conflicts in Karamoja. However, the preaching of loving ones neighbours, forgiveness and doing good unto others have not had as much influence on the Karamojong ethnic groups that target each other for raids. Nabuya (2008: 189) observed that for many people who had received baptism in Karamoja, faith has remained superficial, saying: the fact that serious atrocities are being committed in Karamoja leaves one wondering what role Christianity is playing in the life of these communities. While modern religion preaches brotherhood, Nabuya (2008: 195) noted that among the Karamojong, social acceptance, collaboration and Christian charity are mainly conditioned by clan and ethnic ties. That one often hears people say, kitee lore (loosely translated as be mindful of home or dont forget your people in your dealings or blood is thicker than water). The latter sometimes makes it difficult for the church to play a positive role in conflict management in Karamoja. The church structure itself has not been spared of the vice. Nabuya (2008: 195-6) writes: on a negative note, it is a pity to observe that the church structures are also not free from this unchristian and backward mentality of segregation along ethnic lines ethnic tensions exist within the church and surface at the occasion of the clergy to important ecclesiastical posts. In some parishes ethnic conflicts among the clergy has serious scandalised Christians and undermined the credibility of the church. The church cannot work efficiently for reconciliation without addressing the cultural and ethnic tensions. Bishop Kalanda who served as Bishop of Moroto from April 1981 to November 1991 observed that when the incumbent Bishop is from a different tribe, there is always ambition, jealousy and tribalism among priests.136 Sometimes these conflicts inside the church galvanise members of the communities on opposing sides. A member of clergy in Moroto told the study team that Clanism and ethnicity in the clergy might not be visible all the time, although it does sometimes manifest itself in very subtle ways, and it has permeated not only the clergy, but also public administration. It also affects the politicians and administrators in the way they make decisions at all levels.137 The above have contributed to the continuation of conflicts in Karamoja.
6.5.8 FUNCTIONAL ILLITERACY AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA

Karamoja region has the highest rates of adult illiteracy. Educated people understand issues better and value human life higher than the un-educated. People who have not gone to school have difficulties appreciating many issues. It would be harder to recruit young boys into raiding if they were in school. Illiteracy among the local population makes it difficult for information on negative
134 135 136

. Among the Christians, cattle raiding has been described a major chronic social sin of the Karamojong (see Nabuya, 2008: 55)

. Interview with Mr. Paul Emojong, Programme Coordinator, held at Caritas Kotido offices on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . See Rt. Rev. Dr. Paul L. Kalanda, Bishop Emeritus of Fort Portal Diocese, 50 years as a Priest: 21 December 1957-21 December 2007, pp. 40
137

. Interview with Fr. Thomas Achia, Director, Social Services Department (SSD) Caritas, Moroto Catholic Diocese, held at SSD offices, Regina Mundi, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza)

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impact of conflict to be widely disseminated and understood by the local population. Attitude change is also difficult to achieve. Due to functional illiteracy, the numbers of people in Karamoja who do not understand the laws that are applicable in the modern sector are still very many. Because of high levels of illiteracy, the relevant laws are not understood because publications are in English, and many people dont understand them. Most Ugandan radio programmes dont reach Amudat, yet the Radio is a very useful channel for communication. The Pokot language is very different from ngakarimojong. Very few people can communicate effectively. Due to high levels of illiteracy among the Karamojong communities, a large number of the population does not have the skills to do anything else. So they are poor and can only survive by raiding from other communities. Due to the high illiteracy of the people, the UPDF has found it easy to spoil the peace that had been achieved. People do not know how to secure their rights, where to go and from whom. They end up resorting to armed conflicts. In the past when conflicts were settled through traditional mechanisms, people knew how to resolve their disputes. There was always information that a raid was being planned. And before it could take place, the communities would come together to forestall the raid. The gun has been removed from many people, but their minds are still fixated on violence as well as the acquisition of illegal firearms. The Karamojong do not feel secure with government protection. They feel powerless and hopeless without guns. The love for the gun is still deeply entrenched despite the damage that it has caused to the communities. Peoples minds need to be disarmed as well. It is made worse when among some of the educated Karamojong, there is still inklings towards gun ownership. People take the law into their own hands either because they do not understand the procedures that are supposed to be followed in handling disputes (legal illiteracy), or even when they know, they take the law in their own hands through mob justice because it gives them an opportunity to settle the issues through the traditional system, where among other, compensatory relief is possible, and where justice will be seen to be done quickly.
6.6 6.6.1 CROSS-BORDER DYNAMICS FUELLING ARMED CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA TRAFFICKING FIREARMS FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Given the geopolitical location, the continuing conflict in Karamoja has been fuelled by cross-border dynamics. Karamoja is bordered to the north by Southern Sudan, in the East by the Turkana of Kenya and in the west by Acholi region. There are a lot of small arms trafficking from southern Sudan and Acholi region, which are just recovering from civil wars, into Karamoja through the Dodoth and Jie. Somalia, where there has not been a functional government for the last 18 years, is governed by warlords who have saturated the neighbouring countries with firearms, some of which find their way into Karamoja through Turkana (World Vision, 2008). In north Karamoja, starting in the early 1990s, a new source of guns and bullets emerged in the form of SPLA fighters in Southern Sudan. The Jie and Dodoth became heavily armed by exchanging their animals with the SPLA soldiers for sophisticated guns and other war materials such as bombs. Due to the arms they acquired, the Jie became bold enough to attack government soldiers, which yielded even more guns. Bullets were available in markets and brewing places for buying. By 1996/7, most people were armed, and they moved freely even to urban centres with their guns.138 The geographical proximity that the Dodoth have with the Toposa, an ethnic group from

138

. Interview with Joel Dengel, Programme Officer, Livelihoods, Oxfam GB held at Oxfam GB Kotido on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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southern Sudan allows them to always replace their guns after disarmament. This trafficking of firearms between the two groups has reinforced the ethnic tensions between the Dodoth and Napore ethnic groups in Kaabong and it poses a great security threat, not only to the Napore, but also to the entire community (World Vision, 2009b: 5). The porous district and international borders fuel the continuation of the conflict because they are a source of guns and are difficult for the military to police effectively, as one security agent said: In the past we have received information about people who have guns. When we go to arrest them, we find they have disappeared to the Kenyan side.139 Bokora women of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Napak district said the porous northern Karamoja border with southern Sudan made it possible for the infiltration of weapons to continue unchecked.140 An army spokesperson in Kotido and Jie youth expressed similar concerns.141
6.6.2 CROSS-BORDER PASTORAL ALLIANCES

One of the major factors that explain the continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja associated with livestock raiding has been the difficulties government has encountered ending rearmament by the Karamojong due to trafficking in SALWs from neighbouring countries. Pastoral cross-border alliances between Karamojong and pastoral groups from Kenya (mainly the Turkana and Matheniko and Pokot of Uganda and Pokot of Kenya) and the Jie and the Didinga of Southern Sudan and the Dodoth and Toposa of Southern Sudan are a major avenue of re-armament. These traditional pastoral alliances are supposed to be avenue for sharing trans-boundary resources especially during the peak of the dry season. Somehow, the Ugandan-side of the international borders with both Kenya and Sudan happens to be better endowed. Pastoral groups from Kenya and Sudan drive their livestock into Uganda for dry season grazing. The Pokot of Kenya drives their animals into Amudat district, while the Turkana drive their livestock into Moroto district. The Toposa normally drive their livestock towards the Kidepo valley. Unfortunately, these cross-border alliances have also been used not only to evade disarmament, but also to ferry illicit weapons into Karamoja, since the intensity of disarmament in the neighbouring countries is not as high as in Karamoja.
6.6.3 CROSS-BORDER RAIDING

These traditional grazing alliances often degenerate into raiding alliances by criminal elements from the different ethnic groups. The study team was told in Amudat that most of the Pokot raiding parties into Nakapiripirit, Bukwa and Moroto district comprised combined forces of Ugandan Pokot and Kenyan Pokot.142 Another Karamojong ethnic group that has an alliance with a pastoral group in a neighbouring country, who use their alliance to bolster their capacity to raid their neighbours, are the Matheniko. The Matheniko entered into a traditional pact of alliance with the

139 140 141

. Interview with Sgt. Ayepa Michael, Commander, Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) Battalion D-Coy Amudat, held at Amudat on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza)
. Focus group discussion with Women at Nagule-a-Ngolol village, Nagule-a-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District, held on 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Lokeris Loyok) . Focus group discussion with youth held at Napumpum village, Loposa Parish, Panyangara sub-county in Kotido District on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by John Ssenkumba). This issues was also raised during an interview with Lt Ceasar Olweny, UPDF 5th Division spokesperson, held at Kotido Town, on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).
142

. Interview with Mzee Losipole Aramtorit Wuapale, Pokot Elder from Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok).

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Turkana pastoralists at Lokiriama in 1973, and this past has survive till the todate. Through the Matheniko and Turkana alliance, raids have been conducted against the Jie, Tepeth and Bokora. The start of out-migrations from Bokora in 1979 and 1980 were occasioned by attacks from a combined force of the Matheniko and Turkana (Stites, Mazurana & Akabwai, 2007). Pokot women in Amudat viewed the Peace Pact made by the Turkana and the Matheniko as one of the reason that continues to fuel conflicts between the Matheniko and all its neighbours because of its over-riding objectives of aggression against other pastoral groups outside their alliance. Pokot women said on several occasions, raids by Matheniko on Pokot herds are usually executed by a combined force involving the Turkana.143 A Development actor in Kaabong also expressed the same sentiment that cross-border ethnic alliances between Karamojong and pastoral groups from neighbouring countries were one of the factors fuelling the continued conflicts in Karamoja. The Jie alliance with the Didinga always comes to life when aggression is high on their agenda. Whenever the Matheniko hold traditional ceremonies to commemorate their alliance with the Turkana, then Jie and other ethnic groups feel the heat, because they trigger violent raids.144 Apart from the cross-border raiding, there are significant difficulties in the recovery of raided livestock once these cross the international borders into Kenya or Sudan. The UPDF finds difficulty in following raided animals which are driven to Kenya. The porous border makes it easy to cross with and hide the raided animals in Kenya145. Because of the difficulties in tracking Pokot raiders into Kenya, the UPDF confiscates animals of Ugandan Pokot believed to be accomplices of those who raid and hide raided animals in Kenya.146 In August 2010, the UPDF was allowed to pursue Pokot raiders into areas Alale, where livestock raided from Nakapiripirit were recovered and returned to Uganda. 7 THE ACTORS FUELLING THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA

There are various categories of actors who have influenced the continuing conflict in Karamoja, mainly through their actions or inactions. It should be noted from the outset that many of these actors might have played double roles, in the sense that sometimes, they may also have positively contributed to ending the armed conflict in Karamoja. The ways in which the actors mentioned in this chapter have contributed to continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja are as follows:
7.1 7.1.1 LOCAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS THE ELDERS

World Vision has identified elders as the most powerful institution in the community because of their spiritual symbolism, to preside over rituals in the shrine in times of
143 144 145 146

. Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael).
. Interview with Mr. Emojong Paul, Programme Officer, Caritas Kotido, held at Caritas Kitodo on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Interview with Ms. Ludy Van Dijk, Programme Manager, ZOA Refugees Care, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Francis Lokeris Loyok) . Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose)

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calamity/disasters; they spearhead conflict resolution initiatives (World Vision, 2009a). Increasingly however, some have used their powers to sanction raiding for selfish individual reasons.
7.1.2 SEERS AND WITCHDOCTORS

In all Karamojong communities, the exercise of traditional authority involved the work of seers or traditional witch-doctors. These were mainly used to predict what would happen in the future and would prescribe what needed to be done to forestall calamity or disaster. Unfortunately, many have instead turned their skills into promoting raiding. World Vision observed that many youth in Kotido and Kaabong consult sorcerers/witch doctors for blessings as they go raiding instead of seeking the blessing of the elders (World Vision, 2009a; World Vision, 2009b: 7).
7.1.3 KARAMOJONG POLITICAL LEADERS

The local political leaders in Karamoja have done a lot of positive things that have promoted peace building and conflict management, and especially the ending of livestock raiding. In this subsection, we highlight those ways in which they have played an even bigger role in fuelling the continuing armed conflicts in Karamoja. The political leaders not only indulge in raiding (such as the some District Councillors in Moroto who were in June 2008 named as part of a group that indulging in and supporting cattle rustling147), they also fuel intra- and inter-district rivalries in order to nurture and entrench their own personal selfish political agendas. Due to high levels of illiteracy and poverty, the population of Karamoja rely and depend on their leaders for support, guidance and counsel. The role that elected politicians at all levels in Karamoja (Members of Parliament; Councillors at district and sub-county; as well as chairmen of districts, sub-counties, Parishes and villages) have played is also partly to blame for the continuation of armed conflict in Karamoja because political leaders manipulate their electorate to further selfish political interests. It was observed by World Vision International in a report assessing local capacity for peace in Kaabong district that there are personal differences between the District chairpersons of Kotido and Kaabong, which has reinforced ethnic tensions between the Dodoth of Kaabong and the Jie of Kotido. The report notes: It is believed that the two political figures mobilise and fuel cattle raids against the two districts, and there is some kind of war-lordism. This is further worsened by the fact that during the government disarmament exercise, the Dodoth believe that they were fully disarmed while the Jie still possessed their guns. This has created a sense of powerlessness among the Dodoth of Kaabong and they attribute the continued aggression by the Jie of Kotido to possession of guns while the Kaabong people do not possess guns. This has also created a desire among the Dodoth to acquire guns to be able to defend themselves against the Jie of kotido, hence reinforcing arms trade and trafficking between the Dodoth and the Toposa from southern Sudan (World Vision, 2009b: 4). The World Vision International has also observed that there have been accusations and counter-accusations between the area Member of Parliament, who is also the State Minister for Industry, and the LCV chairperson of Kaabong district. They both belong to the NRM political party but come from different ethnic groups, the Napore and Dodoth respectively. The minister is accusing the LCV chairperson of misappropriation of district resources, for example the LCV chairperson could not account for UGX.22 Billion for the Financial Year 2009/10. Furthermore, the MP for the Municipality (Napore) is in conflict with the Woman MP (Dodoth) because of the struggle for political power during elections. This has reinforced ethnic tensions between the Napore

147

. See Moroto District Councillors named in cattle rustling, Daily Monitor 17 June 2008, pp. 12

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and the Dodoth, occasionally fuelling food and cattle raids between the Napore and Dodoth ethnic groupings. (World Vision, 2009b: 4). On 12 June 2009, in an attempt to end the fighting between the Dodoth and Jie, kraal leaders from both ethnic groups signed an agreement to establish a joint grazing kraal in Loyoro so that the conflict between Kotido district and Kaabong people is reduced. Leaders of Kotido district signed this agreement as well, but the leaders of Kaabong refused to sign. There was a recess in fighting for about 3 weeks, and then raiding re-started. Local district leaders in Karamoja seem to have a vested interest in the conflict continuing. In order for conflict to be ended, local leaders must be convinced of this and they must persuade the people they lead that peace is necessary. But at village, parish and sub county level, leaders do not report those who come with raided animals to their areas, and they also do not pass over the information they have about those who still own and use guns, even where they know them very well. Known raid commanders usually drink with the leaders of the communities and they do not pass over information about them to the security agencies. This is the very reason why conflict has continued for such a long time. In one case in Nakapelimoru, cows were raided in 2009 from the Turkana, and when they were followed up, they found them being re-branded at the kraal of the local council chairman.148 In has been observed in a report by World Vision that cattle raids in Kaabong district have become a business orchestrated by political leaders. Politicians indirectly organise raids. When raided animals are recovered by the army, only a given proportion is declared and returned to the owners. The political leaders retain some of the animals recovered, which they sell for their personal gain. In some communities, there was a lot of acrimony and mistrust of the political leaders (World Vision, 2009b: 6). Some of these leaders have been elected into their positions because of either, directly participating in, orchestrating, and supporting the warrior-machinery in its various ramifications, or turning a blind eye to their actions. The leaders encourage their clans to raid other clans, and conceal information regarding raids that have been launched by their community members. Some of the leaders have been arrested for directing and giving instructions to raiders on mobile phones. When they speak in community meetings, they struggle to out-do each other in extolling how much they have stood by the warriors when they have been in time of need (Muhereza, 2010b; Muhereza, 2008). Some of the leaders directly organize and benefit from raiding. They fund and arm the raiders, and in their discussions in local government/council meetings, there is no explicit commitment to resolve the question of insecurity once for all.149
7.1.4 THE ROLE PLAYED BY LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The major reason why armed conflicts associated with raids had continued is that there isnt sufficient good will within the communities to end raids. The communities are not willing to volunteer information about who is still in possession of a gun. They are also not willing to give information about who, among those still in possession of guns, was planning a raid or had used it for raiding. Raids and cattle thefts are taking place all over Karamoja. Many of the perpetuators of these crimes are usually shielded by some leaders in the local communities.150 It is true some of those who go to raid are no longer living within the manyattas, having established permanent residence in
148 149 150

. Interview with Mr. Godfrey Musinguzi Batwaza, District Internal Security Officer (DISO) Kotido district, held at DISO offices Kotido on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Interview with Mr. Chengo Walter, Program Officer, World Vision Kotido Office, held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Senkumba). . Interview with Mr. Simon Lomoe, Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-Pastoral Development Organisation (DADO), held at DADO offices, Kaabong on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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the grazing kraals (the hard core criminals). It is also true that many raiders reside in permanent settlements. It is not possible that no one in the entire manyatta has an idea about what is going on. But why are they not willing to let the authorities in on this information? This is because of the following two factors, among others: the first is that the community has been blackmailed to acquiesce to the status quo due to fear of the consequences of speaking out. Reprisal attacks on those who give information about guns and raids are very common in Karamoja (see Oxfam, 2009: 4). In Napak and Amudat, respondents observed that when someone volunteers information, which is acted upon, the representatives of the state withdraw from the remote countryside when night falls, leaving the people at the mercy of marauding criminals. Respondents also observed that in the past, information has been provided and the UPDF has done nothing to stop raids or apprehend those who indulge in raids. Secondly, those who have provided information have instead been victimised, especially after some of them have provided misleading information to target the wrong people, divert the focus of the army, or incriminate innocent people with whom they have grudges. The information provided has to be evaluated first. This slows down security decision making, especially when the information provided is the correct information. This has led to the UPDF being blamed for not acting fast enough, even when information has been provided. Even when they know, Karamojong will not volunteer information about gun possession or potential raid, because of lessons they have learnt over time. From decades of minimal state presence, marginalisation and neglect, the Karamojong learnt that you look to each other for survival in a very harsh physical environment. The community which receives raided cattle accepts the vice and protects the one who has raided. Some people in the community have also taken the vocation of reporters or informers to the raiders, these people report to the raiders where to find the animals so that they can benefit from the loot. The study team was informed that some of the manyatta leaders also hide or do not report thefts of their kinsmen. When the community members go raiding or stealing these leaders conceal this information thus making it hard to completely stamp out thefts and thereby aid recovery of stolen animals. Some politicians and elites confuse the communities and this has made achievement of peace difficult.151 Even in terms of peace building initiatives, communities are usually often left out of the peace process, even where they are involved, they are only invited to participate, but not given an opportunity to take charge. So they dont feel part of the process, unlike if they initiated the process. Even the development programs that are determined by those who provide the resources engender very limited consultations. The Pokot communities consulted in Loroo sub-county were unanimous that they had not been given genuine opportunity to participate in building sustainable peace with their Karamojong adversaries. We want an opportunity to sit down with our aggressors and talk about the problems of livestock raiding.152 Initially the community members were empowered in that they would have meetings and lead a procession to go and make peace with the neighbouring community, but of late government was not involving local communities in peace making initiatives. Anyone who has lately attempted to hold a meeting is accused of inciting the community.153 In Amudat, there is acrimony in many communities due to recent raids, which the UPDF has not prevented. The last time the community in Loroo held a meeting with government officials, the communities were cordoned and disarmed immediately after the government officials left, and many tortured into
151 152 153

. Interview with Mr. Opio Bob, Deputy Resident District Commissioner (RDC) Moroto/Napak, held at Moroto on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose). . Focus group discussion with women at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held on 3 August 2010 (conducted by Lokeris Loyok and Longok Michael).

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submission that they had guns.154 Development partners are unable to secure the participation of communities in development interventions because of the on-going disarmament, where sometimes anyone encountered is targeted for disarmament.
7.1.5 CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EMERGING PEACE INDUSTRY

Civil society has been blamed for playing a role in the continuing armed conflict, notwithstanding the positive roles they may have played in other ways. It has been argued that some of civil society organisations involved in conflict management are not fully committed to the achievement of sustainable peace. Many respondents pointed to the fact that peace building had become a lucrative business for the NGOs undertaking peace building interventions as well as the state actors, with whom they are supposed to collaborate with. One actor summed up the condition thus: The conflict has also endured because the actors from outside address the physical and mechanical aspects of the conflict, and leave the difficult but important aspect of changing attitudes towards the gun and peace. This may be motivated by the fact that attitude change takes very long and the actors are seeking quick and visible things they can use to account to their funders.155 Besides, most actors from outside Karamoja do not consult on what matters most to the communities, and whatever they do appears as an imposition. In Kaabong, one elder asked an NGO person: who told you that we have problems here? Go and look for whatever problems you want to address elsewhere.156 The local people in the communities in Karamoja complained about researchers, consultants and NGO workers who earn huge allowances for undertaking peace building activities. A central government official in Amudat district referred to the work of NGOs as having created what he described as NGO-ism people prefer to go to meetings organised by NGOs, because they expect to be paid some allowances.157 A respondent argued that this had created dependency, as people invited into meeting in which the beneficiaries will always ask: ebore dyo kavera or akavera radio meaning is there something in black kaveera (polythene bag) to take home from the workshop? These two views underline the issues of concern on the peace industry. One development actor has observed: Conflict can also be said to have gained momentum because of the emergence of a peace industry, which promotes big events and big spending on festive galas which have little relevance to the events on the ground fuelling conflict. Immediate symptoms and not deep-rooted underlying causes are the ones being focused on by many peace actors.158
7.1.6 WOMEN AS PURVEYORS OF CONFLICTS IN KARAMOJA

Many observers have been critical of conflict management and peace building initiatives that do not recognise the role that women play in promoting conflict. Several studies have pointed out that women are usually instrumental in providing a moral justification for youth to resort to retribution, including indulging in raids. Mkutu (2008) acknowledged that women are active players

154 155 156 157 158

. Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Elders held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Merian Ambrose).

. Interview with Paul Emojong, Governance, Justice and Peace Officer, CARITAS Kotido, held on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). . Ibid
. Interview with Mr. Joseph Ngoli, DISO, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok)

. Interview with Paul Emojong, Governance, Justice and Peace Officer, CARITAS Kotido, held on 3 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba). Page 68 of 109

in pastoral resource-based conflicts because they have taken on new roles for their survival and the survival of the family, including making decisions about acquiring guns and ammunition, and branching out into alternative livelihoods. That, women also benefit greatly from raided cattle for feeding and clothing the family, using the milk, meat, skins and blood. They also receive money from the sale of raided cattle depending on their seniority and position within the family; they may also benefit from bride-wealth, thus women are involved in encouraging men to raid. In Amudat district, the study team was told that Pokot women do not contribute to raiding in any way, whether in making decisions regarding raids or directly participating.159 However, women were considered as being very close to the warriors (their husbands and children), and hence had capacity to speak with them and influence their thinking towards stopping raiding. Our assessment was that while the Pokot women did not indulge in raiding directly, they indirectly contributed to the continuation of armed conflict through circumcision and marriage (as we shall show later). In Kotido, the study team was informed that women contributed to the continuation of conflicts in act as a catalyst to the conflicts in several ways. Some of the raiding is to obtain cows for dowry. In some communities, women have become the custodians of the gun. The women also assist in preparing the cereals which the warriors take when the travel long distances to raid animals. It is also the women who prepare the beer to welcome back the warriors when the return from raiding. Indirectly, women abuse young men who have not participated in raiding, and refer to them as women, which inspire them to become courageous and participate actively in raiding.160
7.1.7 KARAMOJONG YOUTH (KARACHUNAS)

In order to achieve sustainable peace, the youth have to play a more direct, active and positive role, a fact which cannot be disputed. The inability to effectively include youth significantly undermines the potential for a lasting peace. The youth, particularly males, play an important role as influencers within their own communities. They are often the most likely to engage in raiding. The youth (most especially the male) play a role. If their livelihoods concerns are not responded to, or are not involved in building/creating peace, they easily resort to vices such as raiding and banditry, including those who had abandoned the practices. Because the exclusion of the youth from peace building initiatives undermines building peace at the local level, many organisations (e.g. Oxfam GB; IRC) support community-based structures for their involvement. There have, however been challenges encountered. Our investigations revealed that the category of Karamojong youth who are actively involved in actual raiding are seldom brought on board during initiatives for building peace. Either this was because they were simply unavailable and uninterested; were busy doing what they do best (raiding); or had not been ingeniously targeted and brought on board. When youth are involved, it is usually those who stay in the trading centres, and yet consultations with key stakeholders in all the communities revealed that there was an established group of out-law youth who had extricated themselves from the community fabric, and were permanently resident in the bush, forests and hills, who were responsible for perpetuating raids throughout Karamoja. These were completely outside the purview of cultural and civil community, and were typical peace spoilers, who are difficult to reach with messages of peace and reconciliation. Most of the youth who have been brought on

159 160

. Interview with Mzee Losipole Aramtorit Wuapale, Pokot Elder from Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Ms. Betty Nakiru, Program Officer, Building Bridges to Peace Program, Mercy Corps, Kotido Office, held in Kotido on 2 August 2010 (interviewed by John Senkumba).

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board are usually disarmed former karachunas. While they are usually instrumental in linking with their peers who may still be involved in active raiding, they still are unable to exercise significant influence over those who are unwilling to disengage from raiding. In the traditional system, Karamojong youth who are responsible for much of the raiding are excluded from the decision making processes because they are uninitiated. The opportunities for them to ascend from uninitiated to initiated categories are very limited by the rigid age sets and generational set systems of the Karamojong. Exclusion of youth had undermined the ownership of the peace building process, and hence its contribution towards sustainable peace. Pokot youth claimed that no genuine opportunities have been created for joint peace meetings between Pokot youth and their adversaries in other Karamojong ethnic groups and yet it is the youth that go to raid, saying: How can we then end the conflict when the youths are not involved?.161 Governments disarmament programme has affected the youth negatively. They were relieved of the responsibility of protecting their herds, which for much of the year, was a full time vocation. By making them redundant, idle, and extremely dangerous, disarmament inadvertently made it easy for youth to be mobilised for negative violence. Without viable alternative sources of livelihood, the youth who have to struggle to survive became a time bomb. When they lack food especially in periods of drought when there is a general food scarcity, they resort to raiding food or anything they can sell for survival. They spend time drinking and becoming rowdy. They plan food raids during the food distribution exercises in the community. The youth have been a serious source of continuing conflicts in the community (World Vision, 2009b). According to World Vision, the experience in Dodoth was such that disarmament of the youth has made them redundant, and idle, are a time bomb to the community. They lack alternative sources of livelihood and have to struggle to survive (World Vision, 2009b: 5). When such youth get a chance to raid, they do it without remorse. The redundancy among youth has led to the emergence of dangerous raiding dynamics, where traditional alliances are no longer respected that much by youth once they decide to execute their raids. Sometimes, they steal livestock from within their own communities. A World Vision International report assessing local capacity for peace in Kotido district observed Jie youth carry out livestock raids not only targeting neighbouring communities but also within Jie itself. Out of desperation, sometimes Jie youth raid cattle and food from one another, thereby causing intra-ethnic tensions (World Vision, 2009a). The possession of guns by the youth and redundancy among the youth has caused them to disrespect elders in society because they do not need the permission of the elders to do whatever they want to do. With their guns, the youth have fuelled and encouraged cattle raids. One of the reported changes in trends and patterns of youth involvement in conflict was that possession of guns by the youth and redundancy among the youth has caused them to disrespect elders in society because of the power it yields. The youth believe that the gun is the source of power and it has fuelled and encouraged cattle raids by the youth. However, because of the government disarmament exercise, a majority of the youth no longer possess guns. As such the youth have become redundant, and idle, and according to the district leaders they are a time bomb to the community. They lack alternative sources of livelihood and have to struggle to survive. This is reinforced during the drought seasons in times of food scarcity as they resort to raiding food or anything they can sell for survival. They spend time drinking and becoming rowdy. As a survival mechanism, they plan food raids during the food distribution exercises in the community. This has been a serious source of tension in the community (World Vision, 2009b).

161

. Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose)

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It was mentioned to the study team in Amudat that most of the raids into Amudat were executed by combined forces of rebellious youth from the Bokora, Pian and Matheniko.162 There is a category of youth who have rebelled both against the modern system and the traditional system, and rarely stay in the permanent settlements. Any peace building overtures that focus on the permanent settlements and the urban centres are unable to reach them. This category of youth have everything to loose by abandoning their livestock raiding vices. They are the greatest purveyors of violent livestock raiding activities in Karamoja. The bad news is that sometimes their action derelict traditional ethnic allegiance because they can perpetuate raiding within their own communities.
7.2 7.2.1 NATIONAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS THE STATE

We have argued that corruption is one of the factors that is fuelling the continuation of armed conflicts. Corruption that fuels the continuing conflict in Karamoja takes place at various levels, and the public officials at these levels who are involved in corruption are actors in the continuation of the armed conflicts in Karamoja. The local government veterinary staff who issue fake movement permits; the local government administration police who let those with fake permits of without permits pass the animal check points, and the security officials who escort livestock past these check points or protect those involved in anyway whatsoever are guilty of fuelling the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja. Mandated public officials are also guilty for not doing what they are supposed to do. Respondents in different parts of Karamoja perceived government representatives at various levels as having fuelled the continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja by not doing well what they are mandated to do (for which they are paid a salary). The UPDF are supposed to protect peoples property, including livestock. When livestock get raided, either from their custody or from the communities, they will have failed in their obligation towards those communities that genuinely surrendered their weapons is responding to governments call for disarmament, as well as those who were disarmed under the government disarmament programme. When a raid takes place, the UPDF is supposed to track the raiders to recover the raided animals. When the UPDF fails to recover raided livestock, they will have let down those whom they were supposed to protect in the first place. When they recover raided livestock, and fail to hand over all the recovered livestock to their owners, they will still have failed the people whose animals were recovered.163 In Amudat district, Pokot youth claimed that the RDC for Nakapiripirit who is also holding the portfolio for Amudat is biased in favour of the Karamojong because he is a Karamojong from Matheniko. Asked whether a Pokot RDC would be better, the Pokot youth observed that: An RDC who is not a Karamojong would be better. We are not even looking specifically for a Pokot RDC.164 The above has been corroborated by observations by the World Vision made in 2009, indicating that armed conflicts in Karamoja are being fuelled by corruption among leaders and abuse of power, Cattle raids have become a business orchestrated by political leaders, the police and the army. Raids are indirectly organised by politicians. After raiding there are attempts by the army to recover the stolen cattle. If all
162 163 164

. Interview with Mzee Losipole Aramtorit Wuapale, Pokot Elder from Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok). . Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Community Focus Group Discussion with Pokot Youth held at Lopedet village, Abilyep parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District, 3 August 2010.

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animals have been recovered, only a given proportion is declared and returned to the owners while the animals that have not been declared are sold for economic gain to benefit the leaders. This has caused a lot of suspicion and mistrust between the community and the political leaders (World Vision, 2009b).
7.2.2 THE MILITARY AND OTHER SECURITY AGENCIES

There are two main ways in which the security agencies responsible for ensuring the security in Karamoja are responsible for fuelling the continuation of armed conflicts in Karamoja. The first is their direct involvement in the raiding of livestock, and the second by failing to do what they were supposed to do to prevent livestock raiding or doing it badly. There are widespread claims about certain rogue elements within the UPDF indulging in cattle raiding, or behaving in a manner that perpetuated cattle rustling. Widespread claims regarding rogue elements within the UPDF who abet cattle raiding or sometimes directly indulge in the vice has led the state being labelled as one of the raiding tribes of Karamoja (UNDP, 2010). It has been noted by a report by World Vision that in Kaabong district, the Police and the army also orchestrate cattle raids because of personal economic gain (World Vision, 2009b: 6). On several occasions, UPDF officers have been arrested and charged in connection with theft of Karamojong livestock (Muhereza, 2008). Some communities affected by raids take advantage of the UPDF, either by claiming animals that do not belong to them, or by claiming more animals were raided than the actual number. In the process, such unscrupulous individuals have used the UPDF to raid others on their behalf (UNDP, 2010). In the village of Nagule-a-Ngolol in Ngoleriet Sub-county, Napak District where the consultations on the drivers of conflict took place, the Jie had raided approximately 500 heads of cattle 5 days earlier. The study team was informed in the community,165 as well as during interviews with a district official that the raid occurred on the day the UPDF platoon was withdrawn from the village.166 The perceptions about claims of the UPDF being unable to protect the communities from raiders were widespread in all the communities where the study was undertaken. In the communities where the consultation were carried out, questions were being asked about the armys commitment to ending the conflict, largely on account of some army officials who allegedly connive with the local leaders to get airtime and animals as payment for recovery of animals.167 In 2009, an army officer was reported to have sold 4 animals worth 700,000/= to 3 traders in Katanga (Moroto) after the animals had been recovered from the Jie.168 These accusations against the UPDF could not be independently verified by the study team. Although a UPDF officer whose opinion on these issues was sought dismissed the perceptions as baseless,169 these perceptions were driving conflict behaviour, and were common in many parts of Karamoja, had contributed to the escalation of the conflict.

165 166 167 168 169

. Community Focus Group Discussion with Bokora Elders held at Nagule-Angolo village, Nagule-Angolo parish, Ngoleriet sub-county, Napak District, 7 August 2010 (facilitated by Frank Muhereza and Moses Chuna Kapolon). . Interview with Mr. Chuna Moses Kapolon, Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District held at Napak District headquarters, Kangole on 4 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok) . Interview with Mr. Loduk Luke Maxmilian, Program Officer, Justice and Peace Program, CARITAS (SSD) Moroto, held on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Lokeris Loyok). . Interview with Mr. Abura Steven, Governance and Conflict Transformation Officer, KADP Moroto, held at KADP Office, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . See for example, interview with WO2 Wasukira Wassa, Moroto Civil Military Co-operation Centre (CMICC), held at Moroto CMICC offices, on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza).

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7.2.3

POLITICAL LEADERS FROM KARAMOJA AT NATIONAL LEVEL

Karamoja leaders at the national level have also acted in ways that have fuelled the continuing conflict in Karamoja. Instead of the political leaders condemning raids on their people as well as by their people, some of them celebrate when other communities are raided, and only raise concern when their own communities are raided. They hail their karachunas when they successfully raid other communities. Most Karamojong leaders do not report animals that have come into their territories, but are very quick at reporting when other communities raid their community. Some Karamojong leaders at the national level have not fully embraced the aspect of a common fight against armed conflict in Karamoja.170 Within districts, Karamoja MPs are involved in struggles for political power. In between districts, the Karamoja MPs turn a blind eye when their rivals are raided by their own (World Vision, 2009b)
7.2.4 THE BUSINESSMEN WHO TRAFFIC FIREARMS INTO KARAMOJA

There are businessmen who profit from the armed conflicts in Karamoja by selling arms and ammunition to the Karamojong warriors. Payment for the arms and ammunition is sometimes in cash, but most of the time in kind in form of livestock, which are raided. Many times, the UPDF has arrested traders ferrying firearms and several rounds of ammunition into Karamoja disguised in sacks of foodstuffs. Those who do the trafficking are either Karamojong based in the sprawling urban centres in Karamoja or non-Karamojong who are based outside Karamoja. There have been reports that proceeds from sale of raided animals have been invested by warriors involved in construction of commercial building which are rented out for income. Some of the rustlers had set up petty trade businesses financed from incomes from sale of rustled animals. The businesses are legal (because they pay licenses), but the capital was earned through illegal means (Muhereza, 2008). The beneficiaries also include the transporters who load stolen livestock; and the move the stolen animals and the Karamojong warriors who do the actual raiding. 171
7.3 7.3.1 REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL CONFLICT ACTORS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS

International development partners, including humanitarian agencies that mismanage the process of distribution of humanitarian assistance which leads to armed conflicts are also as guilty of fuelling armed conflicts in Karamoja as any other actors. There are development partners who fuel conflict by undertaking conflict management and peace building interventions using project-based approaches. Noted one respondent: the views of some of the development partners on peace building are inherently faulty. Peace building is a process, but some of them approach it like a one-off event!172

170 171 172

. Interview with Mr. Abura Steven, Governance and Conflict Transformation Officer, KADP Moroto, held at KADP Office, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris) . Interview with Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda, Rev. Abura Joseph, held at St. Phillip Cathedral, Moroto on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Loyok Lokeris). . Interview with Mr. Robson Odora, Head, Mercy Corps, Kaabong, held at Mercy Corps offices on 6 August 2010 (interviewed by John Ssenkumba).

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7.3.2

PASTORAL GROUPS FROM KENYA

Armed pastoral groups from Kenya, especially the Turkana and the Pokot have been identified as key conflict actors in Karamoja. The Turkana, who have an alliance with the Matheniko use their alliance to fuel armed conflicts inside Karamoja by combining with the Matheniko to raid the Jie, Bokora and Pokot. The Pokot of Kenya also ally with the Uganda Pokot to raid in Matheniko, Bokora, Pian, and Bukwo. The Pokot youth were asked why they allow Kenya Pokot to come and raid in Uganda. They said that during the dry season, the Kenyan Pokot come to graze in Uganda. When there animals are raided in Uganda, it becomes very difficult to stop them from carrying out revenge raids. The government has usually not helped the Pokot to recover their animals when they are raided by the Karamojong. The youth said they do not encourage the Kenyan Pokot to come and raid livestock from Uganda.173 8 THE EMERGING SCENARIOS IN THE CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA
THE IMMANENT KEY POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES

8.1

Whereas government has signed the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO) Protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa, the protocol has yet to be ratified and implemented to bring to effect the various measures that the government has put in place to control not only the proliferation of SALWs but also end livestock raiding in Karamoja. The proposals for revision of the provisions and fines under the Firearms Act 1970 need to be supported to bring to effect new legislative efforts to combat the proliferation of SALWs. There are other laws that would support efforts geared at ending the continuation of armed conflict in Karamoja that need to be supported. A National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in not yet in place, although there are efforts in OPM to finalise a draft. A Bill for enactment of a law to provide a framework for a national reconciliation process in Uganda and address the historical causes underlying violent conflicts and widespread or systematic violations or abuses of human rights has been finalised. The Bill is yet to be presented to Parliament. Advocacy needs to be undertaken to ensure that when this bill is presented to parliament for consideration, support can be generated from all political groups represented in the parliament. The KIDDP is the embodiment of governments development objectives in Karamoja. There are several legal and policy processes that informed the design of the KIDDP that have been expressed outside the KIDDP framework, which need to be consolidated into a single framework document as a stand-alone national policy framework, not only on Disarmament but also on the wider issues of demobilisation of former Karamojong warriors as well as their resettlement and reintegration and rehabilitation. Due to the lack of a national policy framework, the disarmament aspects in the KIDDP have been implemented as if gun-collection was all it entailed, giving lip attention to the development aspects of the programme. By the end of 2010, it will be 12 months since the implementation of the 2009 Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security commenced. The Action plan provides the governments policy

173

. Focus group discussion with Youth at Lopedot village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo sub-county, Amudat district, held on 3 August 2010 (facilitated by Loyok Lokeris and Merian Ambrose)

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framework for increasing food security in Karamoja. The results achieved and outcomes realised from its implementation need to be evaluated to learn lessons from the positive aspects as well as the challenges that have been encountered. Everyone would love to see an end to the dependency on food aid in Karamoja, and an increase in incomes of crop farming households in Karamoja. The efforts to expand and commercialise crop farming in Karamoja under the action plan are not so much the problem as with how this is to be achieved and the consequences of doing so. No considerations have been made to appropriately integrate crop farming with livestock production. Without putting in place deliberate safeguards, in Karamoja, it is not possible to expand crop farming in the green belt areas without a debilitating effect on livestock production, which in itself is likely to increase conflicts over access to resources. The future of sustainable livelihoods in Karamoja lies in an integrated farming system where none undermines the others. While there is no government policy document on pastoralism, its policy intentions are very clear from statements that have been made by the executive. Cattle keepers must settle down, abandon livestock production because it is associated with not only nomadism, but also armed conflicts, and adopt settled crop farming, because it is associated with less conflict. Drafts have been finalised for the Uganda Rangeland Development and Management Policy and the Pastoral Code for Uganda. These policy initiatives are intended to regulate issues of pastoral mobility; access to critical resources such as pastures and water and livestock marketing and veterinary service delivery. From the expressed government policy intentions, pastoralism is viewed as an unstable and undesirable system of production, which is inherently conflict prone, and incompatible with the government of Uganda violence-reduction and development objectives in Karamoja. However, we are agreed with Bevan (2008: 23) that in Karamoja specifically, there has been a parallel tendency for policies to focus on disarmament without addressing the factors that either have made the pastoral system more unstable, or that have allowed conflicts arising from systemic instability to progress unchecked (see also Muhereza and Ossiya, 2004).
8.2 8.2.1 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT SCENARIO A SUMMARY OF FACTORS FUELLING THE CONFLICT

Karamoja is the only place in Uganda where since the colonial period, the government has not had a total monopoly over the legitimate control over and use of means of violence at all times. The writings on the conflicts in Karamoja during the colonial period focussed on what were then considered as irrational and primordial ethnic, cultural and religious factors as being important in explaining the cause of the armed conflicts in Karamoja. These writings pointed to the ethnic parameters, cultural rigidities as well as continued pervasiveness of the Karamojong traditional religion as important contributory factors to the conflicts in Karamoja.174 It is true that these factors explain some dimensions of the conflicts, but on their own, have increasingly become incapable of justifying why the armed conflict in the first place has continued, and subsequently become difficult to end. Currently, there is an increasing appreciation that factors within Karamoja are as important in fuelling the continuing conflict as factors from outside Karamoja. Several key factors made reference to in the past that are still important in understanding the continuing conflict, although they manifest in different ways, included the following: competitive

174

. When the colonial government encountered significant challenge to pax britanica in Karamoja, they hired the best anthropologists from Oxford University to come and study the Karamojong and recommend the best way to pacify them. That was partly how Dyson Hudson ended up with some of the most classical writings on the social organisation of the Karamojong.

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electoral politics; the opening up of Karamoja to the outside world; inappropriate policy responses and inadequate development programmes; poor coordination and integration of development interventions; corruption in the delivery of basic social services; and cross-border raiding. The link between marriage and livestock raiding has also been explicitly made, through not only the changing dynamics in most parts of Karamoja, but more specifically female genital mutilation among the Pokot of Amudat district. The following new dimensions, which explain the continuation of armed conflicts in Karamoja have been identified: climate change, and not so much the adverse effects it is having of the population, but their inability to cope with the adversities; the commercialisation of not only raiding, but also the recovery of raided livestock as well as peace building; challenges in humanitarian assistance; mobile telephone communication technologies; the nature of stakeholder involvement in conflict management and peace building; the creation of new districts and increased polarisation of ethnicities; the negative roles played by political leaders in the disarmament campaign; the challenges faced by the military in undertaking disarmament in Karamoja. This study also shows that far from collapsing, there were certain residual elements of traditional institutions that need to be integrated in modern governance. Over the years, new studies emerged which identified new dynamics of conflicts in Karamoja. A number of studies identified several other factors that explained the root causes of the armed conflict in Karamoja, in addition to cultural issues. For example, a 2003 Oxfam GB study on the key causes of conflict in Karamoja identified the following as being critical (among others): culture; poverty; political isolation; government policy on Karamoja; the prevalence of illicit firearms; the collapse of traditional authority, and ineffectiveness of modern institutions of governance and the failure of local political leadership (Ochiengh-Odhiambo, 2003). Due to the minimal presence of the state in many parts of Karamoja, SALWs proliferated, leading to high rates of crime and violent livestock raiding, which undermined not only the traditional authority of elders, but also the respect for the modern political governance institutions. The inability to maintain law and order led to intensification of different forms of conflicts, which in combination with further deteriorating of an already fragile physical environment (through prolonged drought and low erratic rainfall) made the communities extremely vulnerable to disasters such as crop failure, famine, human and livestock diseases and poverty that reinforced the occurrence of armed conflicts. The factors that cause of the continuation of armed conflicts include factors internal to the Karamojong society as well as external shocks, and all are mutually reinforcing. It is true, for example as argued by Bevan (2008: 18) that small arms are primary tools of violence. However, they cannot be described merely as just symptoms of Karamoja insecurity. By changing the dynamics of the conflicts in Karamoja, it is only fair and fitting to ensure the proliferation of SALWs is comprehensively addressed beyond simply undertaking collection of illicit firearms to include tangible measures to address not only community security issues but also livelihoods as well as provision of the physical, social and economic infrastructures. A holistic approach that focuses on comprehensive solutions involving multi-disciplinary and multistakeholder and multi-level interventions to address all the dimensions of the problems of the armed conflict in Karamoja are required.

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8.2.2

WHICH FACTORS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS?

While it is true that small arms are one of the primary tools of the armed violence in Karamoja, and as noted by a development partner in Amudat, if people did not have guns, they would need a lot of skills to raid,175 raiding has become difficult to execute with the gun following the intensification of forceful disarmament operations in Karamoja. However, instead of easing, raiding dynamics have simply changed. Large scale raiding parties are no more, but cattle thefts of small groups of people with fewer (or even no) guns have increased. This implies that SALWs in Karamoja cannot therefore be described as Bevan (2008: 18) has, merely as symptoms of Karamoja insecurity. They are instruments of the violence and central to the changing dynamics of the armed conflicts. By changing the dynamics of the conflicts in Karamoja, it is only fair and fitting to ensure the proliferation of SALWs is comprehensively addressed beyond simply undertaking collection of illicit firearms, to include tangible measures to address not only community security issues but also livelihoods as well as provision of the physical, social and economic infrastructures. A holistic approach that focuses on comprehensive solutions involving multi-disciplinary and multistakeholder and multi-level interventions to address all the dimensions of the problems of the armed conflict in Karamoja are proposed in this study. Many of the factors identified above as still critical in fuelling the continuation of the armed conflict in Karamoja. This is because the emerging dynamics of conflict often shape and transform the root causes of the armed conflicts. In our framework of analysis, the factors that fuel the continuation of armed conflicts are complex, multiple, sometimes inter-locked and often mutually re-enforcing. No single factor can explain the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja, just as much as there can be no monolithic approaches that can capture all the changing dynamics of the armed conflicts that can intelligibly explain its continuation. The interaction between the various factors that explain the continuation of the armed conflict are continuously undergoing complex permutations that compound the peaceful and final resolution of the conflict. There cannot be a single solution to the continuation of armed conflicts in Karamoja, just as there is no single cause of the continuing armed conflicts and violence. The current approach to containing and reducing armed violence through disarmament has been military-heavy as more has been done by the military. There is a need for improving the functioning of the Police in order to enhance the physical presence of the state.176 Similar efforts need to be undertaken to enhance access to basic social services such primary health care, safe water, education, as well as requisite physical and economic infrastructures such as roads, electricity, markets in order to stimulate alternative livelihood opportunities. To address armed conflicts in Karamoja would necessitate a multi-pronged, multilevel and multi-stakeholder approach.
8.3 THE KEY ACTORS FUELLING THE ARMED CONFLICTS

The key actors who have fuelled the continuing conflict in Karamoja have been both from within and from outside Karamoja. They have included actors at the national level, district, subcounty and community level. Some of the actors have been at the international level. Their roles have both directly and indirectly fuelled the conflict. Among the following categories, they have been individuals who have played a very critical role in the continuing armed conflict in Karamoja:

175 176

. Interview with Ms. Ludy Van Dijk, Programme Manager, ZOA Refugees Care, Amudat District, held at Amudat, 2 August 2010 (interviewed by Frank Muhereza and Lokeris Loyok). . This issue has also been noted by Stites & Akabwai (2009: 10)

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the representatives of the state in Karamoja who takes sides with one group against another during raids; the appointed public officials in Karamoja, including the District Veterinary officials (who act in a manner that foments the continuation of raiding); members of the security forces, especially those officers of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF); and the regular Police, Anti-stock Theft Unit (ASTUs) and Local Administration Police, who in one way or the other act in ways that lead to the continuation of livestock raiding. The actors that have fuelled the continuing armed conflicts in Karamoja also include: some of the political leaders from Karamoja at various levels (including the members of parliament; District (LC5), sub-county (LC3) and village (LC1) chairpersons; district and sub-county councillors who overtly or covertly support livestock raiding; the elders and seers/traditional witch doctors (especially those who sanction raids for individual selfish gains); the Karamojong youth ( karachuna), especially those who have rebelled against the modern and the traditional systems; Karamojong women (especially those whose actions indirectly contribute to the continuation of armed conflict through circumcision and marriage; the businessmen in Karamoja who support livestock raiding because of the financial benefits that they derive from the vice, as well as the local communities who turn a blind eye to the undesirable actions of their own. Certain civil society organisation and international development organisations have also been blamed for playing a role in so far as their actions make it difficult for sustainable peace to be achieved.
8.4 PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE ACTION BY OXFAM GB AND OTHERS

On the basis of the gaps identified in the analysis of the policy and legal framework, as well as in the peace and conflict-management activities undertaken or planned to be undertaken, this section provides proposals for future action by Oxfam GB and other actors to enhance contribution to sustainable peace.
8.4.1 ADVOCACY TARGETING THE POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The following policy and legal recommendations are proposed for future action by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society): 1. Support the finalisation of a draft policy framework for the improvement of pastoralism in Uganda in order to harmonise the different political and ideological standpoints. The opportunities available to the people of Karamoja for intensification of crop farming in the green belt areas need to be carefully analysed to determine how to sustainably manage the fragile ecological niches without undermining the viability of their livelihood systems, as well as seeking out opportunities for promoting the integration of crop farming with livestock production. 2. Support the development of guidelines for regulating the movement of herds, which is essential to enable pastoralists take advantage of opportunities that their fragile ecosystem provides, given the low levels of technological development in harnessing nature to make resources available for livestock production. This will go along way in countering the uncritical dismissal of pastoral mobility, which pastoralists have adopted to maximise the survival of the pastoral household in very difficult circumstances. 3. Support access to veterinary extension services in hard-to-reach pastoral areas of Karamoja afflicted by armed conflicts through the promotion of the use of Community Animals Health Workers (CAHWs). Page 78 of 109

4. Support development interventions that enhance opportunities for increasing investment in infrastructure for value addition for livestock production in Karamoja. Significant opportunities exist for investment in the following areas: organised livestock marketing infrastructure; small scale milk cooling centres; meat processing plant; hides and skins processing facility; animal feeds production, especially the processing of hay to supplement natural pastures; improvement in control and treatment of livestock diseases and pests. Other areas of investment that need to be considered include: roads; access to water for humans and livestock as well as for irrigated crop farming; enhancement of the delivery of veterinary services, including strengthening the delivery of veterinary extension services; expanding alternative livestock and non-livestock-based forms of livelihood; and lastly, but not least, improvement of security for both the pastoralists and their livestock. 5. Continue to engage the on-going discussions at the national and district levels on the development of a policy framework on conflict resolution and peace building in Uganda. 6. Support the development a National Policy on Reconciliation. Initiatives to develop the policy framework for national reconciliation should be expedited so that the policy can guide the discussions on national reconciliation processes. 7. Undertake advocacy targeting the members of parliament to ensure that when the draft National Reconciliation Bill comes up for debate in parliament, it is supported by all categories of political groups.
8.4.2 CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES IN THE CONTEXTUAL ENVIRONMENT

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address the issues in the contextual environment: Support local initiatives and efforts by people of Karamoja affected by adverse physical and ecological conditions to strengthen their capacity to cope as well as recover from the negative consequences of changing climatic conditions in order to enhance sustainable Karamojong livelihoods. The more the number of people supported to have viable alternative sources of income, the more the people of Karamoja will be in a position to respond to climatic and other shocks. Lobby government to ensure that logistical challenges undermining the functioning of the justice, law and order institutions (especially the Police and the Judiciary) are addressed. The current commitment by the NRM government to address the challenges of marginalisation and development in Karamoja should be accompanied by tangible initiatives to promote local involvement in the provision of community security, which will enhance the restoration of law and order in Karamoja. Lobby government to ensure there is a clear commitment to improve the road infrastructure in Karamoja, starting with the tarmacking of all roads to the district headquarters and connecting Karamoja to the national electricity grid so as to attract opportunities for investment that could generate positive impact on local economy in Kampala. Lobby government to improve the provision of basic social services such as safe water, primary healthcare and education facilities relevant to the needs of pastoral communities.

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8.4.3

CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY-RELATED CHALLENGES

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address security challenges observed during the study: Lobby government to ensure there is effective troop deployment in known raiding corridors where continued activities of armed Karamojong warriors are a cause of insecurity. Lobby government to increase troop deployment to deal with not only trafficking in small arms and light weapons across the international borders (from Kenya and Sudan), but also to stop the incursions from armed pastoral groups from neighbouring countries, especially the Pokot pastoralists from Kenya into Nakapiripirit district. Lobby government to enhance provision of community security as well as security for livestock through increased deployment of regular police and the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) and Local Defence Units (LDUs). The deployment of equipped zonal forces should also be enhanced to protect livestock from thefts perpetuated by common criminals in the communities. Lobby government to ensure that the apparent weaknesses in the disarmament campaign are addressed urgently so that the remaining firearms in the hands of civilians can be voluntarily surrendered. The local communities need protection for themselves and their property at night. Without adequate provision of state security to communities in Karamoja, livestock thefts and insecurity are unlikely to end, which will undermine not only the on-going disbarment but also all efforts to prevent re-armament. Lobby government to ensure that the presence of the regular police in Karamoja is improved beyond the urban centres. In order to achieve its objectives of ending Karamojong livestock raiding by December 2010, lobby government to make a clear commitment to be responsible for the loss of livestock of those who disarm, and in return for which the communities can be encouraged to ensure all those who still are in possession of illegal guns are reported to the authorities. Lobby government to ensure disarmament is sustained, total and simultaneous so that no single community retains any guns for harassing other communities that have disarmed.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

8.4.4

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address economic challenges observed during the study: Undertake community mobilisation and sensitisation to ensure that all school-age going children are enrolled in school. Government should also be lobbied to ensure that those enrolled in school are retained until they complete secondary education, and thereafter be given skills for alternative livelihoods. Lobby for resources to be made available for the construction of boarding schools all-over Karamoja so that in future all school-age going children in Karamoja are enrolled in boarding schools. Support learning visits for disarmed warriors to other parts of the country so that they can appreciate how other people live harmoniously with those they have no close blood relations. Page 80 of 109

Work to ensure that peace-building and conflict management interventions are designed in such a way that they also address pertinent livelihoods concerns in their respective areas of intervention. Youth who are disarmed should be enabled alternative livelihood opportunities in agriculture (crop and livestock sub-sectors) as well as non-farm sector to prevent them from reverting to raiding. Government should be lobbied to ensure sufficient resources are committed to sustainable crop farming (through provision of farm inputs and agricultural extension services). Constraints to livestock production, especially water for livestock and provision of veterinary services should also be addressed. In addition, support should also be extended to productive activities in the non-farm sector through which employment for youth can be generated (e.g. in limestone and marble mining). Lobby government to ensure that development projects undertaken in Karamoja, especially physical infrastructure integrate the desire to strengthen peace building and conflict management. During the provision of water facilities, priority should also be directed at promoting joint grazing of livestock between different ethnic groups so that the herders can begin to appreciate the importance of mutual co-existence. Market facilities, schools and health units that increase opportunities for different Karamojong ethnic groups to improve their relations with their neighbours should be encouraged as much as possible. Lobby government to promote the harvesting of rain water for not only domestic use, but also for aiding sustainable crop farming in Karamoja. People are already beginning to move to the more fertile areas to practice settled agriculture should be supported to adopt recommended water and soil conservation measures in order to forestall land degradation from increased land utilisation. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to support improvement in delivery of agricultural extension services for both livestock and crop.
POLITICAL GOVERNANCE FACTORS

8.4.5

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address political governance challenges observed during the study: Advocate for improvement in transparency and accountability in the implementation of all government development programs such as NAADS, PRDP, KIDDP, NUSAFII. The award of tender for contracts of works under several of these programmes has been compromised to favour companies where local politicians have direct interest, which affects the quality of services delivered. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to support an appropriate balance between the software interventions (skills training and knowledge enhancing workshops), and hardware interventions. Lobby government to ensure that all state structures are functioning as well as they should be. Government should be specifically lobbied to restore the expeditious working of courts at subcounty level so that justice is administered at the source.

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8.4.6

SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address the socio-cultural challenges observed during the study: Lobby government to improve the primary and secondary school curriculum to integrate issues of peaceful conflict management. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to bring on board all categories of stakeholders during interventions to build peace and undertake conflict management. Women, youth, manyatta leaders, community elders and seers should be appropriately brought on board at the same time, instead of targeting them separately. All those who have a role to play, such as religious leaders should also be brought on board. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to specifically target attitude change among the people of Karamoja in a sustained long-term strategy. Dialogue and sensitisation in favour of disarmament will succeed where the individuals in Karamoja have a mental predisposition that is favourable to disarmament. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to provide trauma counselling and healing to different categories of people in the communities in Karamoja in order to enable them lead normal lives. Lobby government and other development partners in Karamoja to support the integration of the institution of elders (the council of elders) in peace building and conflict management interventions undertaken in Karamoja.
CROSS-BORDER ISSUES

8.4.7

The following are proposed for consideration by Oxfam GB and other actors (Government of Uganda, Donors, the UN, and Civil Society) in order to address cross-border issues observed during the study: Lobby government to increase deployment of troop along the common borders, as well as to undertake cross-border infrastructure development projects such as water points, roads, markets, schools, health centres, among others in ways that enhance achievement of sustainable peace. Lobby government of Uganda to continue to pursue a harmonised regional approach with the governments of Kenya and Sudan in undertaking regional disarmament interventions to address cross-border dynamics of livestock raiding activities as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

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Ballentine Karen and Heiko Nitzschke. 2003. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict. International Peace Academy (IPA) Policy Report, Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW). Bevan, James. 2008. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Ugandas Most Deprived Region. An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Billon, Philippe Le. 2000. The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know, Humanitarian Practice Network, Paper No.33, Overseas Development Institute, London. Buckles, Daniel (ed). 1999. Cultivating Peace: Conflict and collaboration in Natural Resources Management. Ottawa and Washington D.C.: IDRC and World Bank Institute. Chambers, R., and G., Conway. 1992. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st Century. IDS Discussion Paper No. 296. Sussex: IDS. Collier Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 1999. Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War, Washington, D.C.: DECRG, World Bank, mimeo. Collier Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2001. Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Policy Research Working Paper no. 2355. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Collier Paul, Lani Elliott, Hvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, D.C. and Oxford: the World Bank and Oxford University Press. Commission on Human Rights. 2006. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights. Report of the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda. Addendum. Mission to Uganda. Mimeo. DANIDA. 2005. Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Component in the Democracy, Justice and Peace Programme 2006 2010. Component Description. Final Draft. Mimeo. DANIDA. 2007. Review of the Danish Experiences at the Country Level in Fragile States: Northern Uganda Report. Mimeo. Department for International Development (DFID). 2002. Conducting Conflict Impact Assessments: Guidance Notes. London: DFID Duffield, Mark. 2000. Globalization, Trans-border Trade, and War Economies in Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (Eds.): Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Rienner. Emuria, Paul, Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Protected Kraals on Agro-pastoral livelihoods in Kaabong District, A Zero-draft report for the Food Security and Livelihood Sector, submitted to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), May 2009. FAO. 2009a. Karamoja Livelihood Programme (KALIP): Water and Rural Infrastructure Asset Development, Working Paper No. 1, Draft Final Report. 10th EDF KALIP Preparatory Study, June 2009 FAO. 2009b. Karamoja Livelihood Programme (KALIP) Agriculture and Livestock, Working Paper No. 2, Draft Final Report. 10th EDF KALIP Preparatory Study, June 2009 Fleming, W.M.G. The District Commissioner and Tribal Administration in Uganda: A Study of the Relationship between African Political Systems and Colonial Policy Achievement. PhD Thesis submitted to the North-western University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1964. Government of Uganda. National Focal Point (Undated) Establishment, Roles, Functions and Structure of the National Focal Point Page 83 of 109

Government of Uganda. 2009. Water and Environment Sector Performance Report 2009. Kampala: Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE). GTZ. 2010. Food and Nutrition Security Baseline Survey. Mimeo. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 1994. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict in International Security, Vol.19, No.1, pp.5-40. Huggins, Chris. 2004. Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: Situation Analysis, Policy Contexts and Opportunities for Intervention, A programme for Good Environmental Governance and Peace Building in the Great Lakes Region, for CARE International/International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP). Human Rights watch. 2007. Get the Gun!: Human Rights Violations by Ugandas National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region. Volume 19, No. 13(A), September 2007 Independence Institute (2006) Issue Backgrounder. Human Rights Atrocities: Consequences of United Nations Gun Confiscation in East Africa. International Rescue Committee (2010) Cross-Border Peace Building Partnership in Uganda and Kenya. Mimeo. Jeremy Ginifer. 2006. Internal Review of DFIDs Engagement with the Conflict in Northern Uganda. Evaluation Report EV663. Mimeo. Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. Karani, Irene (undated) Climate Change and Pastoralism, Case Study, Kotido District, Uganda. OXFAM Briefing Paper. Mimeo. Keen, David, Incentives and Disincentives for Violence, in Mads Berdel and David M. Malone (eds.) 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42. Mamdani, M., P.M.B. Kasoma and A.B. Katende. 1992. Karamoja: Ecology and History. CBR Working Paper No. 22. Kampala: Centre for Basic Research. Mamdani, M., P.M.B., Kasoma and A.B. Katende. 1992. Karamoja: Ecology and History, Centre for Basic Research Working paper No. 20. Centre for Basic Research, Kampala. Meszaros, F., Gutwein, B., A.M. Kelemen, & M. Oesterle. 2010. Pastoral Conflict in the Karamoja Region of Northeastern Uganda: A Literature Review, submitted to GTZ, Kampala, May 2010 (Draft). Mkutu, Kennedy Agade. 2008. Uganda: Pastoral Conflict and Gender Relations, Review of African Political Economy, 35:116, 237-254 Moroto Catholic Diocese, Social Services Department (SSD) 2009 Annual Report. Caritas Moroto: Social Services Department. Muhereza E.F. 2010a. The Opportunities and Challenges for the Diversification of Pastoralist Livelihoods in Karamoja, Paper presented at a Feedback Workshop on Disarmament and Sustainable Development in Karamoja, organised by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR), in collaboration with Centre for Basic Research (CBR), Kampala and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi, held at Entebbe Botanic Beach Hotel, 25-28 April 2010. Muhereza E.F. 2010b. A Mapping of the Disarmament initiatives undertaken in Karamoja Region of Uganda, Paper presented at a Feedback Workshop on Disarmament and Sustainable Development in Karamoja, organised by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR), in collaboration with Centre for Basic Research (CBR), Kampala and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi, held at Entebbe Botanic Beach Hotel, 25-28 April 2010. Muhereza, E.F. 2010c. A Documentation of the development of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) Master-Document, A Report prepared for the Project 1.1.2 Page 84 of 109

Disarmament of Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3 of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR), submitted to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi, 8 March 2010 (Draft 1) Muhereza, E.F. 2010d. The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Livelihoods Affected by Humanitarian Crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics in Karamoja, Teso, West Nile and Southern Sudan Entry Points. A National Synthesis Report, dated 18 January 2010 (Revised Final Report), Submitted to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), Uganda Country Office, Plot 17/19 Clement Hill Road, Kampala Muhereza E.F. 2008. The Political Economy of Cattle Rustling in Karamoja, Draft Report, submitted to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi, Kenya, 18 December 2008 Muhereza E.F., D. Ossiya and I. Ovonji-Odida. 2008. Options for Enhancing access to Justice, and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja, A report of a Study on Enhancing Access to Justice in Karamoja, funded by Danida-Human Rights and Good Governance Programme (HUGGO) and the Legal Aid Basket Fund (LABF), 22 December 2008 (Revised Final Report) Muhereza, E.F. 2007. The Politics of Security Decision Making in Uganda: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Forceful Disarmament in Karamojong, A Final Report (Revised). Submitted to the Conflict, Security and Development Group, Kings College London for a study titled: State Responsiveness to public security needs: The Politics of security decision-making, dated 10 July 2007. Muhereza, E.F. 2005. Social Justice on Land: Study on Land issues and Conflicts in the West-Southwest, report submitted to CARE International in Uganda, 14 October 2005 (mimeo) Muhereza, E.F. & S.A. Ossiya. 2004. Pastoralism in Uganda. People, Environment and Livestock: Challenges for the PEAP. Kampala: Uganda National NGO Forum & the Uganda Civil Society Pastoral Task Force. Muhereza, E.F., and D., Bledsoe. 2001. Common Property Resources study, Uganda PHRD Grant No. PHRD/02/04 Land Sector Analysis, presented to the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) Secretariat, 30 December 2001. Muhereza, E.F. 2001. Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD sub-region, Phase 2 Implementation, Report by National Expert, Uganda, Conflict, Disaster and Development Group, Centre for Development Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK, presented to IGAD Secretariat Djibouti, July 2001. Muhereza, E.F. 1997a. Cross-border grazing and the challenges for development in the dryland areas of Eastern Africa: the case of Karamoja, paper presented at an International Conference on Economic Integration and Trans-boundary Resources, organised the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), held at Ghion Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September 7-13, 1997. Muhereza, E.F. 1997b. An Analysis of the nature of Agro-pastoral Relationships in Karamoja: A Case study of the Bokora of Moroto District. CBR Working Paper No. 50, December 1997. Muhereza, E.F. 1996. Agriculture and Pastoralism in Karamoja: Competing or Complementary Forms of Resource Use?, in Abdel Ghaffar, M. Ahmed and Hassan A. Abdel Ati. 1996. Managing Scarcity: Human Adaptations in Eastern African Drylands. Proceedings of a Regional Workshop held on 24-26 August 1995. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. Nabuya, Daniel. 2008. Evangelisation of Karamoja in the 20th and 21st Century: A Journey through Decades of Trials and Blessings. Comboni Missionaries. Page 85 of 109

Nieholf, Anke, The Significance of Diversification for Rural Livelihood Systems, Food Policy, 29(2004), pp. 321-338 Ocan, C. 1992. Pastoral Crisis in Northern Uganda: The Changing Significance of Cattle Raids. Centre for Basic Research Working paper No. 21. Centre for Basic Research, Kampala. Ochieng-Odhiambo, M. 2003. The Karamoja Conflict: Origins, Impact and Solutions. Kampala: Oxfam GB and Fountain Publishers. Opolot, S.J. & J. Senkumba. 2010. The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics. The Karamoja Region Synthesis Report, Report submitted to the Interagency Steering Committee and World Food Programme (WFP) by Midconsult International Ltd, January 2010 Opolot, S.J. 2010a. The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics. A Synthesis Report for Kalodeke Village, Lokolia Parish, Kaabong Rural Sub County, Kaabong District in Karamoja Entry Point, Report submitted to the Inter-agency Steering Committee and World Food Programme (WFP) by Midconsult International Ltd, January 2010 Opolot, S.J. 2010b. The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics - Synthesis Report for Lorokumo Village, Rupa Sub County, Moroto District in Karamoja Entry Point , Report submitted to the Inter-agency Steering Committee and World Food Programme (WFP) by Midconsult International Ltd, January 2010 OXFAM GB. 2007. North Karamoja Pastoral Development Programme: Kotido, Uganda. End of Phase one External Evaluation (Draft Report) OXFAM GB. 2008a. A stepping Stone to Comprehensive Peace: Advocating for Peaceful and Community-Based Conflict Resolution and Development in Karamoja (Project Proposal) Mimeo. Oxfam GB. 2008b. Turning up the heat: Climate change and poverty in Uganda. Kampala: Oxfam GB in Uganda. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk/publications Oxfam GB. 2009a. A Stepping Stone to Comprehensive Peace: Advocating for Peaceful and Community-Based Conflict Resolution and Development in Karamoja, Annual Report 2008/9, 1 September 2008 0 31 August 2009, submitted to SIDA. OXFAM GB. 2009b. 2008/9 Annual Report to SIDA: A Stepping Stone to Comprehensive Peace: Advocating for Peaceful and Community-Based Conflict Resolution and Development in Karamoja. Mimeo. OPM, Plan of Action for Northern Uganda January 2008 December 2009 Final Draft for endorsement by FSC, Uganda Food Security Cluster Pugh, Michael and Neil Cooper with Jonathan Goodhand. 2004. War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges and Transformations, Lynne Rienner, London. Pugh, Michael, The Political Economy of Peace building: A Critical Theory Perspective, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005 Reno, William. 1998. Warlord Politics and African States, Lynne Publishers, London. Republic of Uganda. National Focal Point (Undated) Establishment, Roles, Functions and Structure of the National Focal Point Republic of Uganda. 1995. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. Kampala: Government Printers. Republic of Uganda. 2004. Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Kampala: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, November 2004. Page 86 of 109

Republic of Uganda. 2005. Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating conditions for promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2005-2008. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Republic of Uganda. 2006. Issues Paper on the Development of a Conflict Resolution and Peace building Policy for Government of Uganda, prepared by Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI), February 2006 Republic of Uganda. 2007a. Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda, 20072010. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Republic of Uganda. 2007b. Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating Conditions for Promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2007/08-2009/10. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister, 22 May 2007 (Revised Final Report). Republic of Uganda. 2007c. The Uganda Rangeland Development and Management Policy, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF), January 2007 (Final Draft) Republic of Uganda. 2007d. The Uganda pastoral Code, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF), January 2007 (Final Draft). Republic of Uganda. 2008. Annual Health Sector Performance Report for the Financial Year 2007/2008. Kampala: Ministry of Health, October 2008. Republic of Uganda. 2009a. Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security (2009-2014): Karamoja Agricultural and Pastoral Production Zones. Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister. Republic of Uganda. 2009b. The 2008 National Livestock Census Report. Kampala: Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) and Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), August 2009. Republic of Uganda. 2009c. Field Report on Food Security Assessment in Karamoja Region, Prepared by KIDDP National Coordination Unit, Ministry of Karamoja Affairs, Office of the Prime Minister, September 2009 Republic of Uganda. 2009d. Plan of Action for Northern Uganda January 2008 December 2009 Final Draft for endorsement by FSC, Uganda Food Security Cluster. Mimeo. Republic of Uganda. 2010. National Development Plan (NDP), 2010/11 2014/15, April 2010 Ross, L. Michael, Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: the Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil Wars, in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.) 2003. The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. A Project of the International Peace Academy (IPA). London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. SantAnna, S.S., K. Pishchikova, V. Mele, C. Croci, O. Greene, D. Lewis, V. Bartolucci, W. Benedek, S. Moore, A. Pedra & M. Vivona. 2007. Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The role of European Union, Theoretical & Methodological Framework and Guidance for the Project Final Report, Multipart Research Project, Work Packages 2 and 3 (Deliverables D.2.1, D.3.1 and D.3.2.). Pisa, Italy; Centre for International Cooperation & Security (CICS), University of Bradford, Bradford, United Kingdom; European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC), Graz, Austria. SNV and Pax Christi, Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building Local Capacity for Peace and Development in Karamoja, Uganda, 1 March 2004 Ssenkumba, J. 2010. The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics - Synthesis Report for Loroo Sub County, Nakapiripirit District, Karamoja Entry Point , Report submitted to the Inter-agency Steering Committee and World Food Programme (WFP) by Midconsult International Ltd, January 2010 Page 87 of 109

Stites, E., D. Mazurana & D. Akabwai. 2007. Out migration, Return and Settlement in Karamoja, Uganda: The Case of Kobulin, Bokora County. Briefing Paper of the Project on Livelihoods and Human Security in Karamoja. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University. Stites, E., D., Akabwai, D., Mazurana & P., Ateyo. 2007. Angering Akuj: Survival and Suffering in Karamoja, A Report on Livelihoods and Human Security in the Karamoja Region of Uganda. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University. Stites, Elizabeth and Darlington, Akabwai. 2009. Changing Roles, Shifting Risks: Livelihood Impacts of Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda. Medford, MA and Kampala: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University and Save the Children in Uganda. Stites, Elizabeth, Lorin Fries and Darlington, Akabwai. 2010. Foraging and Fighting: Community Perspectives on Natural Resources and Conflict in Southern Karamoja. Medford, MA and Kampala: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University and Save the Children in Uganda. Stuvy, Kirsti, War Economy and the Social Order of Insurgencies: An Analysis of the Internal Structure of UNITAs War Economy, Arbeitspapier No. 3/2002. Hamburg: Universitt Hamburg The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam International, and Saferworld. 2007. Africas missing billions: International arms flows and the cost of conflict, Briefing paper No. 107, October 2007. Available at: http://www.iansa.org/documents/missing_billions_Afr.pdf UBOS. 2009. Statistical Abstracts for 2009 (dated June 2009). Kampala: Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Uganda Joint Christian Council. 2009. Working through the Karamoja Traditional System. Magazine of the European Union joint project of UJCC, NURRU. UNDP. 2007. Uganda Human Development Report 2007: Rediscovering Agriculture for Human Development. Kampala: UNDP United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2010. Interim Report: Capacity Baseline mission for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Economic Recovery in Local Government, Moroto District, Northern Uganda. Kampala: United Nations Development Programme and Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)/Capacity Development Group (CDG), Final Report (prepared by Frank Emmanuel Muhereza), July 2010 Walker, Peter. 2008. Complexity and Context as the Determinants of the Future, Opinion paper, 7 July 2008. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University. Welch, C.P. 1969. Pastoralists and Administrators in Conflict: A study of Karamoja District, 1897-1968. Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of Masters of Arts of the University of East Africa. Mimeo. Wennmann, Achim, What is the political economy of conflict? Delimiting a debate on contemporary armed conflict, Paper presented at the World International Studies Conference, Ljubliana, 23-26 July 2008, mimeo World Vision International. 2008. The State of Karamoja: Security Assessment Report for Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Pader, prepared by Louis Lepage, Field Security Adviser, November 2008 (mimeo) World Vision International. 2009a. Do no harm: Local Capacities for Peace Assessment Report, Kotido District, April 2009 (mimeo). World Vision International. 2009b. Do no harm: Local Capacities for Peace Assessment Report, Kaabong District, April 2009 (mimeo).

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10 APPENDICES APPENDIX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON DRIVERS OF CONFLICT IN KARAMOJA
Introduction Oxfam GB, Uganda Pastoral programme launched its National Pastoral advocacy component as part of the nine-year North Karamoja Pastoral Development Programme. Oxfam GB has a running 18 months funding from SIDA Sweden to Implement Stepping stone to comprehensive peace and development a peace and development project advocating for peaceful and community based conflict resolution and development in Karamoja that ends in August 2010. Background Oxfam GB has been supporting vulnerable communities in both north eastern and northern Uganda for the last two decades through the implementation of programmes that focus on improving access to basic services and strengthening communities' ability to ensure their sustainable livelihoods. In Karamoja region in particular Oxfam has, over the last 5 years, provided significant support to peace building initiatives with strong emphasis on building the capacity of pastoralist communities to voice their own interests and organise themselves to jointly put in place initiatives for development. This project is based on the recognition that Oxfam programme activities in the region will on their own not be enough to tackle issues of advocacy and governance so as to reconcile relationships among neighbouring communities. Local, regional, national and international advocacy is needed to provide a powerful forum for the formulation of political solutions to structural problems in Karamoja, and ultimately to address the regional, national and cross-border issues relating to the area as one of the stepping-stones to comprehensive peace in Uganda. Oxfam also recognises that over the last two to three years there has been an increased level of engagement with Karamoja from government, donors, the UN and the NGO community which has seen an increased number of actors based in and working on issues of food security, livelihoods, peace and conflictresolution within the region. The Government of Uganda has also stepped up its engagement with the region, with increased status of the Ministry dealing with Karamoja and an increased policy engagement. There has been a significant interest in conflict and peace-building issues in the region, and a number of reports and assessments carried out by various organisations. This research is not meant to duplicate what has already been done, but to add value. Oxfams advocacy strives to address both the specific problems of the population in Karamoja and the broader challenge that this poses to peace and security in the region. On the one hand, advocacy activities directly target changes in protection policies, contribute to improved access to basic services, and address challenges to the practice of pastoralism. On the other hand Oxfams activities strive to contribute to an increased common understanding of wider regional problems across cultural and ethnic lines thereby contributing to comprehensive peace throughout Uganda. This assignment is hoped to inform Pastoral advocacy and provide clear areas of intervention in Peace Building, recognising the various roles played by other actors in the same area. The assignment The assignment will involve: 1. Developing an inventory and analysis of conflict, security and peace-building assessments that have been carried out for the Karamoja region, seeking to identify shared frameworks of analysis, common issues, key factors fuelling the continuing conflict, and recommendations for action; 2. Developing an inventory and analysis of current and planned efforts to support peace and conflictmanagement activities,

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3. The identification of gaps in policy and Peace Building interventions, and recommendations for future action by Oxfam and other actors (Government of Uganda, donors, the UN, and civil society). It is anticipated that this will involve a two-phase approach; Phase One will be based on secondary data (existing conflict and peace-building assessments, regional assessments, etc) and interviews of key informants. Once completed, phase two should involve primary research within Karamoja to validate the findings. Scope of the assignment To carry out secondary data collection and analysis, preparing a comprehensive inventory of conflict and peace building assessments; and current and planned policies and interventions related to conflict and peace-building in the region; identifying shared frameworks of analysis, common issues, key factors fuelling the continuing conflict, and recommendations for action (either primary research or other actions); Depending on the results of Phase 1, conduct data validation exercise in Kotido, Kaabong, Abim and Moroto districts Prepare a briefing paper (no more than 20 pages) and a policy brief (no more than 4 pages A4) Provide feedback at national level and Karamoja region. Intended Users of the Policy Document 1. Policy makers 2. The Government of Uganda 3. NGOs working in Karamoja 4. Community leaders. 5. Community members 6. Researchers 7. The donors and International community Expected output 1. A briefing paper (no more than 20 pages) 2. A policy brief of not more than 4 pages produced with the above. A policy brief is expected as the biproduct of this assignment with clear analysis and model of the conflict; a clear view of current policies and actions, their strengths and weaknesses, and recommendations. Timeframe The process is expected to start by July 5th and the final work should be completed by July 26th 2010. Assignment Competencies Profile Proven Conceptual, Analytical and critical thinking Demonstrated experience in carrying out secondary research, including the personal preparation of the reports Demonstrated ability to write clear, evidence-based and action oriented reports in English Demonstrated experience in participatory research Demonstrated knowledge and experience in both the theory and the practice of peace building and conflict resolution Demonstrated knowledge of conflict in Karamoja. Demonstrated experience of pastoral advocacy is an advantage Good presentation and verbal communication skills Willingness and ability to travel in the Karamoja region

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The suitable candidate: Oxfam GB is seeking suitably qualified individuals or organisations to carry out the above research. Interested individuals or organisations should respond in line with the Terms of Reference set out below, and provide the following information: 1. Personal CV or company profile 2. Details of the individuals who would carry out the work 3. Explanation of the methodology proposed to achieve the objectives of the evaluation 4. Plan for carrying out the work, including timings 5. Budget 6. One or more examples of recent work, similar in nature, prepared by the individual or organisation bidding for the work Consultancy Management Responsibility The consultant will work with the support of Programme Officer Partnership and Advocacy. The overall supervision and reporting line of the consultant is vested in the Uganda Pastoral Programme Manager. Applications should be sent to Mr. Odokorach Shanty Francis at the Oxfam GB offices, Plot No. 3459, Tank Hill Rd, Muyenga. P.O. Box 6228, Kampala in hard copy or in soft copy (Fodokorach@oxfam.org.uk). If delivering a hard copy also please supply a soft copy on CD or flash drive. Please use MS Word and MS Excel for the documents.

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APPENDIX 2: INVENTORY OF REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS ON KARAMOJA AUTHOR/YEAR/TITLE 1. Achim Wennmann (2008) What is the Political Economy of Conflict?: Delimiting a debate on Contemporary Armed Conflict. 2. Bevan, James (2008) Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Ugandas Most Deprived Region. 3. UN Office of the High Commission on Human Rights (2006) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights. Report of the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Uganda. 4. DANIDA (2005) Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Component in the Democracy, Justice and Peace Programme 2006 2010. 5. DANIDA (2007) Review of the Danish Experiences at the Country Level in Fragile States: Northern Uganda Report. 6. Nabuya, L.A. Daniel, (2009) Evangelisation of Karamoja in the 20th and 21st Centuries: A Contribution by the Comboni Missionaries through Decades of Trials and Blessings. 7. Emuria, Paul (2009) Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Protected Kraals on Agro-pastoral livelihoods in Kaabong District. 8. FAO (2009a) Karamoja Livelihood Programme (KALIP): Water and Rural Infrastructure Asset Development, Working Paper No. 1. 9. GTZ (2010) Food and Nutrition Security Baseline Survey. CONTENT/FOCUS OF THE REPORT This is a research paper presented at an international conference, and details theoretical considerations of factors that inform armed conflicts in Africa, which are relevant for understanding the dynamics of the armed conflict in Karamoja This article in an analysis of the dynamics of the disarmament programme in Karamoja, especially the challenges that the programme has encountered. It has been published as an occasional Paper. This report was published by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) in Uganda. It details the Human Rights Situation in Karamoja, specifically detailing some of the Human rights violations by the UPDF. AVAILABILITY This paper is available at: http://www.wiscnetwork.o rg/ljubljana2008/papers/W ISC_2008-339.pdf This article is available at: http://www.smallarmssurv ey.org/files/sas/publication s/o_papers_pdf/2008op21-Karamoja.pdf The report is available from UN OHCHR offices in Moroto and head office in Kampala. Available at: www.ohchr.org

This is an internal programme document that details Danida-HUGGOs intervention areas in supporting democracy, justice and peace building in Uganda in general, and Karamoja in particular. Reflection on past engagement in conflict environments This is an internal programme document that details Danida-HUGGOs experience in supporting peace building and conflict management in Northern Uganda, including Karamoja. This book has been published by the Comboni Missionaries and details the historical evolution of the relationship between missionaries and communities in Karamoja, citing some of the challenges encountered in ways that elicit a better understanding of the continuing conflict in Karamoja. This study was commissioned by FAO to detail the impact that protected kraals have had in Karamoja This study was supported by European Union and commissioned by FAO to inform the design of Karamoja Livelihood Programme (KALIP). This report detailed the status of food and nutrition in the country in general and Karamoja in particular

This programme document is available from Danida/ HUGGO offices. This programme document is available from Danida/ HUGGO offices

The book is available at the Catholic Bookshop in Moroto town

This report is available from the FAO Regional sub-office in Moroto This report is available from the FAO Regional sub-office in Moroto This report is available from the GTZ Karamoja

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10. Human Rights watch. 2007. Get the Gun!: Human Rights Violations by Ugandas National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region. 11. Kopel, D.B., P. Gallant, J. D. Eisen. 2006. Human Rights Atrocities: The Consequences of United Nations Gun Confiscation in East Africa, Independence Institute, Issue Backgrounder no. 2006-F, June 2006. 12. International Rescue Committee (2010) Cross-Border Peace Building Partnership in Uganda and Kenya. 13. IRC, Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in supporting the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating political participation and representation, A Concept Note, 2008. 14. Irene Karani (undated) Climate Change and Pastoralism, Case Study, Kotido District, Uganda. OXFAM 15. Jeremy Ginifer, DFID (2006) Internal Review of DFIDs Engagement with the Conflict in Northern Uganda. 16. Mkutu, Kennedy Agade. 2008. Uganda: Pastoral Conflict and Gender Relations 17. Muhereza E.F. (2008) The Political Economy of Cattle Rustling in Karamoja 18. Muhereza E.F. (2010a) The Opportunities and Challenges for the Diversification of Pastoralist Livelihoods in Karamoja

This is a report published by the Human Rights Watch on the human rights issues emerging from the forceful disarmament in Karamoja

Office This report is available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/re ports/2007/09/10/getgun-0?print

This is a conference paper which is highly critical on This report is available at: UNs support to gun collection activities for http://www.davekopel.org resulting into human rights violations /2a/foreign/kenyauganda.pdf

This report details regional interventions to build peace in the Karamoja cluster

This is an internal programme document by IRC that details planned intervention areas for strengthening capacity of civil society, local government and community structures to undertake conflict resolution/ mediation and prevention to ensure peace and prosperity and sustainable development and recovery in border areas inhabited by pastoralists. This is a briefing paper which was commissioned by Oxfam GB to help improve understanding of how climate change was affecting pastoralism in Karamoja This is an internal programme document which reviews DFIDs engagement with conflict in Northern Uganda This is a journal article that details the gender dimensions of armed conflicts in Karamoja

This report has been published as a newsletter article and is available from the IRC Karamoja programme office This is an internal programme document which can be accessed from IRC

Available at OXFAM National Office This is an internal programme document available at DFID Office

This article has been published in the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), Volume 35, Issue 116 of 2008 This is a yet-to-be published research report from a This report is available study commissioned by the Nairobi-based Institute from the Institute for for Security Studies (ISS) under its Mifugo Research Security Studies (ISS), Programme. Examines the political and economic Nairobi at factors behind cattle rustling (www.issafrica.org) This is a yet-to-be published research report from a This report is available study commissioned by the Institute for Security from the Institute for Studies (ISS), Nairobi, in collaboration with Security Studies (ISS), International Conference on Great Lakes Region Nairobi at (IC/GLR) under Project 1.1.2 on the Disarmament of (www.issafrica.org) Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3. It focuses on the

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19. Muhereza E.F., D. Ossiya and I. Ovonji-Odida. 2008. Options for Enhancing access to Justice, and Improving Administration of Law and Order in Karamoja

opportunities for alternative livelihood in Karamoja This is a report of a study supported by the Legal Aid Basket Fund and commissioned by DANIDAHUGGO to analyse the factors that influence access to justice and the administration of law and order in Karamoja. It also details proposals for enhancing access to justice in Karamoja. This a report of an assessment of capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Uganda, which informed the establishment of Conflict Early Warning (CEWARN) mechanisms in IGAD member states. The study was commissioned by IGAD and undertaken by the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Leeds, United Kingdom. This is a report of an analysis of security decision making commissioned by DFID and undertaken by the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG), at Kings College, University of London. The study focussed on forceful disarmament in Karamoja. This is a yet-to-be published research report from a study commissioned by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi, in collaboration with International Conference on Great Lakes Region (IC/GLR) under Project 1.1.2 on the Disarmament of Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3. It maps the various disarmament interventions in Karamoja This is a yet-to-be-published national synthesis report on the impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by crises in the following (sub-) regions: Karamoja, Teso, West Nile and Southern Sudan.

20. Muhereza, E.F. (2001) Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Capacity Assessment Study for the IGAD sub-region

The report is available from DANIDA/ HUGGO, Kampala. It can also be accessed at: http://www.scribd.com/do c/26254878/22-December2008-Karamoja-A2JREVISED-FINAL-Report The report is available at Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat

21. Muhereza, E.F. (2007). The Politics of Security Decision Making in Uganda: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Forceful Disarmament in Karamojong 22. Muhereza, E.F. 2010c. A Documentation of the development of the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP) MasterDocument 23. Muhereza, E.F (2010d) The Impact of Humanitarian Assistance on Livelihoods Affected by Humanitarian Crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics in Karamoja, Teso, West Nile and Southern Sudan Entry Points. 24. Ochieng-Odhiambo, M (2003) The Karamoja Conflict: Origins, Impact and Solutions 25. Opolot, S.J. & J. Ssenkumba (20100 The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian

This report is available from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi at (www.issafrica.org) This report is available from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi at (www.issafrica.org)

This report is available from the World Food Programme (WFP) Country office in Kampala.

This is a study which was commissioned by Oxfam GB in Uganda to analyse underlying or root causes of the armed conflict in Karamoja, its dynamics and impact. The report has been published by Fountain publishers and Oxfam GB. This is a yet-to-be-published report on the impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by crises that analyses the experiences from the districts of Kaabong, Moroto and Nakapiripirit in Karamoja region.

The report is available at: www.oxfam.org.uk/resourc es/learning/pastoralism/do wnloads/karamoja_conflict. pdf This report is available from the World Food Programme (WFP) Country office in Kampala.

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26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics. The Karamoja Region Synthesis Report Opolot, S.J. (2010a) The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics. A Synthesis Report for Kalodeke Village, Lokolia Parish, Kaabong Rural Sub County, Kaabong District in Karamoja Entry Point Opolot, S.J. (2010b) The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics - Synthesis Report for Lorokumo Village, Rupa Sub County, Moroto District in Karamoja Entry Point Oxfam GB (2007) Draft Report, North Karamoja Pastoral Development Programme, Kotido, Uganda. Oxfam GB (2008) Project Proposal, A stepping Stone to Comprehensive Peace: Advocating for Peaceful and Community-Based Conflict Resolution and Development in Karamoja. Oxfam GB (2009) Annual Report to SIDA: A Stepping Stone to Comprehensive Peace: Advocating for Peaceful and Community-Based Conflict Resolution and Development in Karamoja. Oxfam GB. 2008. Turning up the heat: Climate change and poverty in Uganda.

This is a yet-to-be-published report on the impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by crises for Kalodeke Village, Lokolia Parish, Kaabong Rural Sub County, Kaabong District in Karamoja region.

This report is available from the World Food Programme (WFP) Country office in Kampala.

This is a yet-to-be-published report on the impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by crises for Lorokumo Village, Rupa Sub County, Moroto District, Karamoja region.

This report is available from the World Food Programme (WFP) Country office in Kampala.

This is an internal project impact evaluation report which was undertaken by Oxfam GB in Uganda This is an internal project document that details Oxfam GB in Uganda intervention in building local capacity for peace building in Karamoja

This report is available at Oxfam GB Uganda Country. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk This report is available at Oxfam GB Uganda Country. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk This unpublished evaluation report is available at OXFAM GB Uganda Country. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk This report is available at Oxfam GB Uganda Country. Available at: www.oxfam.org.uk This report is available from OPM, Kampala at http://www.opm.go.ug

This is an annual report of an Oxfam GB project on community-based conflict-resolution as well as district and national level advocacy activities aimed at improving both the security and the policy environment for pastoralists and pastoral livelihoods in the Karamoja. This is a report published by Oxfam GB on the problem of climate change in Uganda This is an internal document of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) which details the plans by government to increase food security in Karamoja

32. Republic of Uganda (2009) Plan of Action for Northern Uganda January 2008 December 2009 Final Draft for endorsement by FSC, Uganda Food Security Cluster. 33. Republic of Uganda. National

This is a report about the functions of the National

This report is available at

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Focal Point (Undated) Establishment, Roles, Functions and Structure of the National Focal Point. 34. Republic of Uganda. 2005. Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating conditions for promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2005-2008. 35. Republic of Uganda. 2006. Issues Paper on the Development of a Conflict Resolution and Peace building Policy for Government of Uganda 36. Republic of Uganda. 2007a. Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda, 2007-2010. Kampala

Focal Point (NFP) on Small Arms and Light weapons (SAPWs) This is a programme document that details government of Uganda interventions for achieving disarmament and development in Karamoja

the NFP/SALWs at Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kampala This report is available from OPM, Kampala. It can also be accessed at: http://www.ugandaclusters .ug/dwnlds/0204Karamoja /KIDDP.pdf This report is available from OPM, Kampala at http://www.opm.go.ug This report is available from OPM, Kampala, and can be accessed at: http://www.ugandaclusters .ug/dwnlds/0502Programs /PRDP/PRDPSept2007.pd f This report is available from OPM, Kampala at http://www.opm.go.ug This report is available from OPM, Kampala at http://www.opm.go.ug This report is available from the SNV office in Kampala, at http://www.snvworld.org This report is available from the World Food Programme (WFP) Country office in Kampala.

This is an issues paper that was intended to inform the development of a National Policy on Conflict Resolution and Peace building This is a programme document that details government of Uganda interventions for achieving peace, recovery and development in conflictaffected Northern Uganda

37. Republic of Uganda. 2009a. Karamoja Action Plan for Food Security (2009-2014): Karamoja Agricultural and Pastoral Production Zones. 38. Republic of Uganda. 2009c. Field Report on Food Security Assessment in Karamoja Region 39. SNV and Pax Christi, (2004)Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building Local Capacity for Peace and Development in Karamoja, Uganda 40. Ssenkumba, J. 2010. The impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by humanitarian crises in Uganda: An Analysis of Communities and Humanitarian actors Perspectives on Socio-Cultural Dynamics - Synthesis Report for Loroo Sub-County, Nakapiripirit District, Karamoja Entry Point 41. Stites, E., D. Mazurana & D. Akabwai. 2007. Out-migration, Return and Settlement in Karamoja, Uganda: The Case of Kobulin, Bokora County. 42. Stites, E., D., Akabwai, D., Mazurana & P., Ateyo. 2007.

This is an action plan that details government of Uganda interventions for achieving food security in Karamoja This is an internal report on the assessment of food security in Karamoja region Commissioned

This is a yet-to-be-published report on the impact of humanitarian assistance on livelihoods affected by crises for Loroo Sub-county, Nakapiripirit District, Karamoja

This is a report prepared by the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University on the impact of armed conflicts in Bokora county, with specific reference to population movements. It also details the on-going return and resettlement initiatives. This is a report prepared by the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University on the

This report is available at: http://fic.tufts.edu/downlo ads/BokoraKaramojaUgan daReportTuftsJune2007.pdf This report is available at: http://fic.tufts.edu/downlo

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43.

44.

45. 46.

47.

48.

Angering Akuj: Survival and Suffering in Karamoja, A Report on Livelihoods and Human Security in the Karamoja Region of Uganda. Stites, Elizabeth and Darlington, Akabwai. 2009. Changing Roles, Shifting Risks: Livelihood Impacts of Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda. Stites, Elizabeth, Lorin Fries and Darlington, Akabwai. 2010. Foraging and Fighting: Community Perspectives on Natural Resources and Conflict in Southern Karamoja. Uganda Joint Christian Council (2009) Working Through the Karamoja Traditional System United Nations Development Programme, (2010) Interim Report: Capacity Baseline mission for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Economic Recovery in Local Government, Moroto District, Northern Uganda World Vision International. (2008). The State of Karamoja: Security Assessment Report for Abim, Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit and Pader World Vision International. 2009a. Do no harm: Local Capacities for Peace Assessment Report, Kotido District

livelihood challenges in Karamoja which have been informed by the armed conflicts

ads/AngeringAkuju-SurvivalandSufferinginKara moja.pdf This report is available at: http://fic.tufts.edu

This is a report prepared by the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University on the impact of disarmament on livelihoods in Karamoja This is a report prepared by the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University on the different perspectives by conflict affected communities on the resource-based drivers of conflict in Karamoja This issue of the newsletter published by UJCC details the various traditional approaches to peace building This is a report of an assessment of capacity for peace building in Moroto district Local Government which was undertaken by a UNDP/BCPR Mission

This report is available at: http://fic.tufts.edu

This newsletter is available from UJJC, Kampala This report is an internal UNDP Country programme document which is available from Country Office This report is available from World Vision International Country Office at www.worldvision.org/ This report is available from World Vision International Country Office at www.worldvision.org/ This report is available from World Vision International Country Office at www.worldvision.org/ The report is a draft internal programme document that is available from GTZ.

This is a security assessment report commissioned by the World Vision to help them understand the context within which they planned to engage

This is a security assessment report commissioned by the World Vision to understand local capacities for engaging with in the area of peace building in Kotido District This is a security assessment report commissioned by the World Vision to understand local capacities for engaging with in the area of peace building in Kaabong District This Draft report was prepared for GTZ, and provides an analysis of the dynamics of current pastoral conflicts. It identifies the key issues of conflicts and the impact of the conflict in Karamoja and the neighbouring regions. Analysis of the conflict dynamics in Karamoja

49. World Vision International. 2009b. Do no harm: Local Capacities for Peace Assessment Report, Kaabong District 50. Meszaros, F., Gutwein, B., A.M. Kelemen, & M. Oesterle (DED) Moroto. 2010. Pastoral Conflict in the Karamoja Region of North-eastern Uganda: A Literature Review

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APPENDIX 3: KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED FOR THE KARAMOJA STUDY ON DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
NAME OF OFFICIAL 1. Simon Lomoe 2. Loetse Atibu 3. Jimmy Logwee 4. Paul Achilla 5. Benjamin Ateu 6. Kevin Angom 7. David Modo 8. Robson Odora 9. Lt Ceasar Olweny 10. Joel Dengel 11. Paul Emojong 12. Godfrey Musinguzi B. 13. Milton Lopiria 14. Walter Chengo 15. Betty Nakiru 16. Engborg, Kasper 17. Aramtorit Losipole W. 18. Joseph Ngoli 19. Frida Amuron 20. Ludy Van Dijk 21. Rev. Joseph Lomongin 22. Joyce Achom 23. Robert Opio 24. Rev. Abura Joseph 25. Chuna Moses Kapolon 26. Dr. Okori Edward 27. Theophillus Emanu 28. Loduk Luke Maxmilian 29. Steven Abura 30. Patrick Abongi 31. Martha Iriama DESIGNATION Coordinator, Dodoth Agro-pastoral Development Organisation (DADO) In-Charge, Happy Cow Project, Nabilatuk In-Charge, Happy Cow Project, Amudat Coordinator, Happy Cow Project, Moroto Civil Society Development Officer, International Rescue Committee, Kotido Peace Building Assistant, International Rescue Committee, Kotido Programme Officer, Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) Head of Mercy Corps, Kaabong Office UPDF 5th Division Spokesperson Programme Officer, Livelihoods, OXFAM GB Governance, Justice, and Peace Officer, CARITAS Kotido District Internal Security Officer, Kotido Programme Coordinator, Warrior Squad Foundation, Kotido World Vision International, Kotido Office Programme Officer, Building Bridges to Peace, Mercy Corps, Kotido Office UNOCHA, Kampala Pokot Elder, Loroo sub-county, Amudat District DISO, Amudat District Ag. District Community Development Officer (CDO), Amudat District Programme Manager, ZOA Refugees Care, Amudat District KDDS Team Leader, Amudat District WFP Head of Sub-office, Nakapiripirit District Ag. Resident District Commissioner (RDC), Napak District Bishop of the Diocese of Moroto Church of Uganda Principal Personnel Officer (PPO), Napak District Head of Sub-Office, FAO Karamoja Food and Nutrition Security & Conflict Management Expert, GTZ Karamoja Program Officer, Justice and Peace Program, CARITAS (SSD) Moroto Governance and Conflict Transformation Officer, KADP Moroto Conflict Mitigation Manager, IRC Karamoja Programme DanChurch Aid (DCA) Program Officer, Food Security

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APPENDIX 4: LIST OF PEOPLE WHO PARTICIPATED IN FGDS FOR THE KARAMOJA STUDY ON DRIVERS OF CONFLICT Youth Focus Group Discussion at Lopedot Village, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo Sub-County, Amudat District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Siwareng Moses Nyagatiang Arimatum Lokapel Lopeikirep Loreng Lokoyokon Komolingiro Loriong Kapelingole Loyapangole Longuradou Maruk Akwangole Keree Musa Lokikon Loyole Lopetet

Women Focus Group Discussion, Nagule-A-Ngolol Village, Nagule-A-Ngolol Parish, Ngoleriet Sub-County, Napak District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Apuun Nachap Lomongin Maria Lowakori Apus Lokure Kuri Ichumar Apalogumo Lokeru Veronika Natalina Nauga Maria Manang Napala Ana Martina Abura Nyangan Akuo Nachaon Theresa Putan Lucia

Youth FGD, Nampumpum Village, Loposa parish, Panyangara sub-county, Kotido District. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Merion Merimer Komol Aparuk Loupe Lopuscou Lokor Saddam Lowok Paul Igira Apalottareng Loketei Nakolor Loden Apalomingo Loyep Apalokorikwang Logwala Lodeper Turukan Apaloporee Page 99 of 109

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Lochoro Lobuyet Lokwii Lonyangadam Lokwii Lochoch Amonyo Longurakuk Nyanga John Lowany Edadu Losikee Dapalee Akwach Lopiraa Meron Longoria Loeru Lonyangadomo Ikoo Nameriboku Omala Kalbin

Elders FGD, Nampumpum village, Loposa parish, Panyangara sub-county, Kotido District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. Lomothing Lochakareng Longer Lonyia Lokwii Lomeripus Lotee Apanacochia Alepit Rafael Lokolong Adolfo Abiel Apeei Lopir kol Kiyook Apalopacel Lokwii Alingiaboi Lokii Apaloongor Sagal Lokiitom Aguma Apamoit

Women FGD, Nampumpum Village, Loposa parish, Panyangara sub-county, Kotido District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Napuwa Lomong Ilokol Cecilia Naboi Reto Dengel Takan Amaryal Lokwang Lobora Look Moron Kuta Chilla Among Lomerimoe Okyaa Lomoron Lokone Angobei Naiki Kopir Adwongo Kotol Nakong Lucia Luwor Anna Nabul Nongok Anna Igira Lengoret Page 100 of 109

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Chilla Lokomwai Natyang Maria Nakiru Madelena Areman Margeret Ayugi Elizabeth Lamala Anna Lowunyang Anna Korobe Lorjono Igira Lucia Lorimong Wori Longok Maretina Akonya Sabina Akello Lucia Lokenya Namwoi Lodyar Otingiro Oyangan Madelena Angura Munyen Napeyok Maria

Youth FGD, Lochom Village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Chilla Loget, Kapel Napiria Munyos Coko Lomoe Lotibong Lomoe Lotipe Lochap mericar Louda Apalomeri Awong Joseph Moding Mateo Lokut Daniel Koryang Jackson Lobote Fericho Moding Tomas

FGD Men, Lochom Village, Kasimeri Parish, sidok sub county, Kaabong District 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Lokong Longok Likun John Lowonori Bruno Lomokol Jackob Rivatamoe Ilary Lochap Joseph. Ayela Donie Modo Lokon Paul Longetak Lokapel Marks Page 101 of 109

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Loure Monika Kapel Luciana Angura John Sagal Andreio Lokiria John Lokol Paul

Women FGD, Lochom Village, Kasimeri parish, Sidok sub-county, Kaabong District 1. Kilara Marry 2. Lokol Betty 3. Nakoru Maria 4. Nakang Betty 5. Nateng Butto 6. Lema Maratin 7. Nachap Maria 8. Longoli Sofia 9. Lemu Rose 10. Nakangi Lokodo 11. Narika Maritha 12. Nakurio Betty

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