1 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Moncupa v. Enrile
Gutierrez, Jr., J. Disclaimer: Majority of this digest is from our very own CrimPro Sanidad Digests. I opted to add more details, since maikling kaso lang naman pala ito. Facts: Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa and others were arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 pm corner of D. Tuazon St. and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. On April 23, 1982, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against Moncupa and (8) others on the allegations that he was a National Democratic Front staff member. After two separate investigations conducted the Chief Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and Investigating Fiscal, it was determined that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. However, both recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33. Accordingly, 2 separate informations were filed against the petitioner, illegal possession of firearms before the court the Court of First Instance of Rizal and violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. The petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-subversion Law. Significantly, during this petition, his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. In view of that, motions for bail by the petitioner were denied by the lower court. Petitioner filed the instant petition Respondents in return of the writ, justified the validity of the petitioners confinement on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. On the contrary, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on August 30, 1983, affirming that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders from the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President. Issue/Held/Ratio: Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioners temporary release? Yes, in view of the fact that the respondents failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioners freedom of movement should not be lifted. It was noted that attached to the petitioners temporary release were the following restrictions: 1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. 2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. 3)

141 SCRA 233 (1986)

His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." 4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. Even though the petitioner concedes that his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, restrictions that were imposed by respondents, constitutes an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom . The petitioner points out that his temporary release did not render instant petitioner moot and academic but instead, it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitutes restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa such as limitation of freedom movement, since it is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. The present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioner is lifted temporarily or permanently Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration. As an effect, a release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. The petition is granted. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void.

2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Villavicencio v. Lukban
Malcolm, J: Facts (from http://www.scribd.com/doc/35479363/Villavicencio-vs-Lukban): Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes. This decision is actually an explanation for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus Ratio: One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. o

39 Phil 778 (1919)

If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. o The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us. o As to criminal responsibility if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." o The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Respondents Contentions/Courts Ruling: (1) There is a defect in parties petitioners The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. Petitioners had standing in court.

3 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 (2) The Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. GENERAL RULE: To avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. o Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. o In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ. (3) The person in question is not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Torres and Araullos dissents pertain to the contempt part and not to the habeas corpus part.

4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

In re Ashraf Kunting
Azcuna, J.: Facts: Petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. o Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order. In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus: o considering that the accused is a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution. RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved. Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. o Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. o He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. o It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan. Issue: whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper. NO Ratio:

487 SCRA 602 (2006)

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.6 In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court. Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. The trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. I In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said motion, comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court.

5 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo et. al.

Brion, J. Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly. Issue/ Held: WON the writ of habeas corpus shall be issued- YES (copy paste ng habeas corpus part na yan)

621 SCRA 481 (2010)

Ratio: In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we resolve to set aside the CAs dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839). For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus petition and require him together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano to produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not be released from detention. The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in light of the evidence previously submitted to it, the proceedings already conducted, and the subsequent developments in this case (particularly the CHR report) as proven by evidence properly adduced before it. The Court of Appeals and the parties may require Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund Dag-uman, Melissa Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon Manuel to testify in this case. ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. ON CONTEMPT Evidence was merely circumstantial BUT investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only conclude that the CAs dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e., without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step warranted by the evidence in the proceedings related to Jonass disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may transpire. DISPOSITIVE: (baka kasi mahalaga or tanungin ni maam) In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives: 1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

6 2. DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws; DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution; AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

3.

4. 5.

6.

In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.