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Parco v. CA
De Castro, J. Facts: Guardianship proceeding was instituted for the incompetent SOLEDAD Rodriguez in Br. 1, CFI Quezon, Judge (Justice) Melencio-Herrera presiding. FRANCISCO Rodriguez was appointed as her guardian. The case was transferred (provisionally) from Br. 1 to Br. 4 (per Sec. 51 of the Judiciary Act) to help unclog the docket of Br. 1. Thereafter, the case proceeded in Br. 4, Judge Kayanan presiding. FRANCISCO applied and obtained authorization to dispose of 3 parcels of land belonging to his ward, ostensibly for the latters support, maintenance and medical treatment. The buyers of the lands are Sps. PARCO Several months after the sale, FRANCISCO filed a petition in Br. 4, invoking Sec. 6 of Rule 96, praying that Sps. PARCO be ordered to appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards the 3 lots in question which are allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and embezzled and upon failure to do, to hold Sps. PARCO in contempt of court. FRANCISCO alleged that the transfer of lands to PARCO were in truth pursuant to a LOAN agreement (pacto de retro sale/equitable mortgage). Further, FRANCISCO alleged that he had an agreement with PARCO that the latter will not cede/transfer the subject lots to a 3rd party but that PARCO did so just the same Before Br. 4 could resolve the Rule 96 petition, Br. 1 issued an Order claiming back this guardianship case. Br. 4 relented and undertook to transmit the records of the case to Br. 1. This notwithstanding, FRANCISCO somehow prevailed over Judge Kayanan, such that a hearing date was all of a sudden magically set for the Rule 96 petition! Naturally, PARCO failed to appear and was declared in default. FRANCISCO presented evidence ex parte and ultimately obtained favorable judgment from Br. 4. PARCO was ordered to return the lots in question to SOLEDAD (thru her guardian FRANCISCO) PARCO moved for reconsideration, contending that Br. 4 did not have jurisdiction over the case in view of Br.1s reassertion of jurisdiction over the guardianship case and that IN ANY CASE, Br.4 did not have competence to rule on the ownership of the lots in question in view of its limited/special jurisdiction as a guardianship court. MR denied. Elevated to CA. CA flip-flopped, but the in end, PARCO still lost~ hence, this petition Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. Which has jurisdiction, Br.4 or Br.1? Br.1. Jurisdiction is vested in the court and not in any particular branch/judge. Also, the various branches of the CFI are coordinate and co-equal courts, one branch stands on the same level as the other. TRUE, it is recognized that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. HOWEVER, considering the unusual circumstances in this case, the actions of Br.4 must be understood as undue interference on Br.1

111 SCRA 262 (1982)

Under the law, Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help unclog the docket of Br.1. BUT, when Judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case, he merely sits as a judge of Br.1 not as presiding judge of Br.4! Jurisdiction never departed Br.1! Br.4 lost its jurisdiction over the guardianship proceeding when Judge Kayanan ordered the return of the records to Br.1. From that point of time, all subsequent proceedings and processes in connection with or related to the guardianship proceeding undertaken by Br.4 became irregular. It amounted to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of Br.1 INTERFERENCE by one co-equal/co-ordinate CFI branch on another is abhorred by the very system of judicial administration. The judicial stability of the decrees or orders of the courts would be a meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice if such practice of interference is allowed. WON Br.4 exceeded its limited/special jurisdiction as guardianship court in deciding OWNERSHIP of the lots in question under Rule 96 and ordering their reconveyance to the ward via his guardian YES! The jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings vis--vis Rule 96, Sec. 6 is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward. The guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. Only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable. HOWEVER, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings. IN THE CASE AT BAR, on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the ward SOLEDAD Rodriguez over the 3 parcels of land in question does not appear to be clear and undisputable. What is certain is that the sale of the properties in question was duly approved by Br.4 Judge under Rule 97 (sale of property of a ward). ALSO, it must be noted that while the original urgent petition prayed merely for the examination of PARCO regarding the alleged concealing, conveyance and embezzling of the questioned properties, the judgment ordered reconveyance. ADMITTEDLY, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This requires the determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings

2.

2 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Aquino, J., dissenting: The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed because (1) PARCO inexcusably did not file a record on appeal (2) the question as to whether the guardianship court should set aside the conveyances is not a jurisdictional question but merely a procedural matter which could be waived and (3) PARCO and the guardian FRANSCISO hoodwinked the guardianship court to the ward's prejudice. It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to protect persons under disability (parens patriae) to set aside the transfers to the petitioners and thus avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of the ward and do justice in this case. Technicalities should be eschewed AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Paciente v. Dacuycuy et. al.

Gutierrez, J. Facts: Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia, and 2 minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City. Leonardo inherited this land from his deceased father. Wife sold the lot to Dumdum for 10k. Wife then filed a petition for guardianship over the persons and estate of the minors which was granted. Dumdum sold the lot (TCT under name) to Paciente for 15k. Paciente mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation for P30k. The Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, filed a manifestation informing the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte that the lot had been registered in the name of Paciente and that it was mortgaged to the bank. Guardianship court ordered Paciente and the bank to appear and show cause why the TCT should not should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority from the court. Paciente and the manager did not appear. Instead, Dumdum appeared and explained that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia to Paciente without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the minors. Guardianship court issued an order requiring Paciente and the manager to explain why the TCT should not be cancelled for their failure to first secure judicial authority before disposing of the said property. Pacientes husband told the court that Paciente was an innocent purchaser for value of the lot in question. Guardianship court issued an order requiring Paciente and Dumdum to deposit to the clerk of court 10k as additional consideration for the lot, otherwise the TCT in the name of Paciente will be cancelled. Guardianship court issued a resolution denying the MR and directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the TCT in the name of Paciente and to issue a new TCT in favour of Paciente, Shirley and LeAndro Homeres because of Paciente and Dumdum failed to comply with the previous order. Issues/Held: (1) WON it was proper for the court to order the delivery or return of the subject lot? YES Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court are intended to effect the delivery or return of the property conveyed are concerned valid. While it is true that in previous cases we ruled that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, we also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return.

114 SCRA 924 (1982)

In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs. San Agustin). The guardianship court merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.

(2) WON it was proper for the court to order the delivery of an additional Php10k? NO It was issued without a hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property but the time frame for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is true that when Paciente and Dumdum failed to give the additional amount, the second order directing the cancellation of the title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first order. Considering, however, Paciente's protestations of violations of due process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under guardianship, the guardianship court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable price of the lot, if its alienation is found to be in the best interests of the wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.

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Garcia vda. de Chua v. CA

Kapunan, J. Nature: Appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Facts: During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. They had two children: Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. 28 May 1992 Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City 2 July 1992Vallejo filed with the RTC of Cotabato City a Petition for declaration of heirship, guardianship over the persons and properties of her illegitimate children by Roberto. She also prayed for the issuance of letters of administration The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and directed that notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City 21 July 1992 herein petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. On 21 August 1992, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The court ruled that Antonietta Garcia had no personality to file the motion to dismiss not having proven her status as wife of the decedent. Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the RTC of Cotabato had already taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of all others. 31 August 1992, upon motion of private respondent, the trial court issued an order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, a first cousin of the deceased, as special administrator of the decedent's estate. On the same day, the trial court, likewise, issued an Order appointing Florita Vallejo as guardian over the persons and properties of the two minor children. CA While private respondent may have alleged in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that petition was for guardianship, the fact remains that the very allegations of the original petition unmistakably showed a twin purpose: (1) guardianship; and (2) issuance of letters of administration. As such, it was unnecessary for her to republish the notice of hearing through a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The amended petition was filed for the only reason stated in the motion for leave: so that the "case title can properly and appropriately capture or capsulize in clear terms the material averments in the body of the pleadings. In other words, there being no change in the material allegations between the original and amended petitions, the publication of the first in a newspaper of general circulation sufficed for purposes of compliance with the legal requirements of notice.

287 SCRA 33 (1998)

Moreover, the appellate court ruled that the petitioner's remedy is appeal from the orders complained of under Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, not certiorari and prohibition.

Issue/Held/Ratio: 1) W/N the petition filed by Vallejo was only for guardianship and not for letters of administration NO. The title alone of the original petition clearly shows that the petition is one which includes the issuance of letters of administration. 2) W/N the original petition contains the jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. YES. Even though the original petition failed to indicate the residence of the deceased at the time of death, such omission was cured by the amended petitions 3) W/N petitioner has legal standing to file the M2D NO. She failed to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent since she couldnt produce their marriage contract Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent 4) 5) Deprivation of due process? NO, since she wasnt an interesteted, party, then she is not entitled to notice of the proceedings of the trial court What was the proper remedy for petitioner? an ordinary appeal, not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition is warranted. W/N the ruling of the CA treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of Gomez vs. Imperial: The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. NO. Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower court was merely one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased. While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.

6)

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Yangco v. CFI
Moreland, J. Quickie: There was a decree declaring that Luis Yangco was a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his property. No notice was given to the petitioner personally, the only notice of any kind proceedings was required by the CFI to be sent to the mother- in- law and the the brother in law, the latter being the acting manager of the business of Luis. The Court held that the decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift is void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the Rules requires personal notice to the alleged spendthrift when he is a resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides that notice is to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the hearing. Therefore, the notice to the mother - in- law and brother- in law of the alleged spendthrift was of no legal value. Facts: Luis Yangco was 21 years of age, the owner of property valued at nearly P1M, a resident of the Philippines and temporarily traveling abroad at the time the proceedings were had which terminated in the declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment of a guardian of his property. The proceedings were begun by Teodoro R. Yangco, as a relative and friend. No notice was given to the petitioner personally, the only notice of any kind in the proceedings was required by the CFI to be sent to Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, the mother-in- law and brother-in-law, respectively, of Luis, the latter being the acting manager of the business of Luis. Issue: WON the CFI decree is void YES. Decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing a guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. Ratio: In proceedings of this case, notice as required by the statute is jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a valid decree in the premises. Sec 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires personal notice to the alleged spendthrift when he is a resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides that notice is to be given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced on the hearing. The statute does not authorize a substitute service except in cases where, as in Sec 572, the person for whose property the guardian is sought to the appointed is a resident of a foreign country. Personal notice being essential under the statute, the notice to the mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the alleged spendthrift was of no legal value.

29 Phil 183 (1915)

To declare a person of full age to be incompetent to manage his affairs and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold and manage his property is a serious thing. It takes from him one of the greatest privileges of life in contravention of those fundamental rights which all men naturally have to possess, control, manage and enjoy their own property. It is for this reason that the courts generally hold that the statute permitting a declaration incompetency and the appointment of guardians for the property of incompetents must be strictly followed, and any material departure therefrom, especially with respect to notice, results in a loss of jurisdiction. So careful was the Legislature to see to it that no one should be declared an incompetent and deprived of his property without full opportunity to be heard that, in framing Sec 559, it not only required personal notice to the alleged incompetent but also provided that he shall be present in court during the proceedings, if he be able to attend; and the ability to attend does not, in our judgment, relate to absence but to physical condition. It has been urged that sec 572 permits the practice adopted in this case. It provides: "When a person liable to be put under guardianship, according to the provisions of this chapter, resides without the Philippine Islands, and has estate therein, any friend of such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or otherwise, may apply to the judge of Court of First Instance in any province in which there is any estate of such absent person, for the appointment of a guardian, and if, after notice given to all interested, in such manner as such court orders, by publication or otherwise, and a full hearing and examination, it appears proper, a guardian for such absent person may be appointed.... The word "resides" as used has, as a matter of language, a meaning perfectly clear and definite and requires no interpretation or construction to give it full significance. That the petitioner in this case did not reside "without the Philippine Islands" is unchallenged by the facts in this case. He resided here and his absence was for travel and not for residence. Even if sec 572 is applicable, still the notice required by the section has not been given. No notice whatever was given to the alleged incompetent, either by publication or otherwise, and he certainly is one of the parties "interested." Although no personal notice was given to the alleged spendthrift, the only notice given at all being solely to his mother-in-law and brother-in-law, the court, nevertheless, made a decree declaring him a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his property without taking any evidence and with absolutely nothing before it to justify such a decree except the petition and the answer thereto of Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, which says that according to our information and belief the facts stated in said petition are true, and we do not oppose the petition made by the said Teodoro R. Yangco. No evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears of record, and the court, in making the order of prodigality and decreeing the appointment of a guardian, had no more knowledge of the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to manage his affairs that he had before the petition was presented. Sec 560 provides that the court shall appoint a guardian of his person and estate only "after a full hearing and examination upon such petition" and where "it appears

6 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 to the court or Judge" from such full hearing and examination "that the person in question is incapable of taking care of himself and managing his property." It is not a full hearing and examination to have A allege that B is an incompetent and to have C come in and admit the allegation. The court, before it can make the decree as provided for in the law, must have before it competent evidence demonstrating the facts necessary to sustain the decree, and that evidence must be clear and definite. The law is not satisfied unless the court has before it facts which will justify the decree. In proper cases, of course, the admissions made by way of answer or otherwise by the party alleged to be a spendthrift may be taken into consideration by the court in the determination of the question involved and, under certain circumstances, will doubtless be sufficient to sustain a decree of incompetency; but even such admissions should be received with caution, for in cases of this character the foundation of the petition is, in a way, the incompetency of the person against whom the petition is directed and the court should accept his admissions with considerable hesitation. If there is doubt the court should, in spite of his admissions, proceed with the hearing of the case and require the production of evidence substantiate the allegation of incompetency. Except by his own consent, it is legally impossible to declare a and incompetent and deprive him of his property without clear and positive evidence upon which the declaration and the deprivation are based AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Guerrero v. Teran
Johnson, J. Nature: Appeal from CFI Facts: The defendant Leopoldo Teran was, on the 17th day of September, 1901, appointed as administrator of said estate. The record also discloses that the defendant entered into a bond in the sum of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such representative of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz. Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay appointed Maria Muoz y Gomez as guardian for the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz The said Maria Muoz y Gomez was the actual representative of the said Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Sanchez Muoz in the administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz, from and after the 18th day of March, 1902, until the 6th day of October, 1906, Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay, for the reason that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez was not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time for her appointment (the 18th day of March, 1902) removed her as such guardian and appointed as guardian of said minors Felix Samson Plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. This amount was claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant upon the theory that the defendant had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz Lower court found that the evidence that the defendant, as administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Muoz, or that part of the said estate belonging to the plaintiff, owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46, with interest at 6 per cent until the same amount should be fully paid. Issue/Held: Whether Teran is the one liable for the indebtedness or the guardian Maria Munoz- Maria Munoz Ratio: The mere fact, that she had been removed as said guardian did not relieve her, nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said guardian. It must be clear, therefore, that the said Maria Muoz y Gomez is responsible to the said minors for administration of their interests in the estate of the said Antonio Sanchez Muoz from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on the 18th day of March, 1902, up to the time of her removal on the 6th day of October, 1906. If during this time she allowed other persons to handle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. Unquestionably, she may have an action against the persons to whom she entrusted the direct management of said estate for any loss which they may have negligently and corruptly occasioned her.

13 Phil 212 (1909)

Therefore, if any loss occurred to the plaintiff between the 18th day of March, 1902, and the 6th day of October, 1906, they have a right of action only against the said Maria Muoz y Gomez as their legal guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their estate. In the claim presented by the plaintiff against the defendant no dates are given showing the time of the particular loss and losses occasioned by the defendant. As was said above, the defendant was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from the 17th day of September, 1901, up to the time that he was superseded by the said Maria Muoz y Gomez, on the 18th day of March, 1902. There is no proof showing that any of the losses constituting the amount which the plaintiff claims occurred within this period. However, the defendant acknowledged that of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, he owes to them the sum of P188.39. Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

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Nery et. al. v. Lorenzo et. al.

Fernando, J. Facts: Bienvenida de la Isla is the widow of deceased Leonico Lorenzo and mother to their 6 children. In a guardianship proceeding, Bienvenida was named the childrens guardian. As such guardian, she applied and obtained authorization from the guardianship court to sell, as she did thereafter sell, a parcel of land to Sps. Nery The vendor, Bienvenida and children/wards, later challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the guardianship court, it could be impugned as they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship proceeding was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and Perfecto Lorenzo, being notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The trial court nullified the sale on the basis of the jurisdictional defects raised by Bienvenida and Lorenzo, et al. Sps. Nery appealed to the CA, and there the trial court was overturned. The sale of the land was declared valid~ hence, this petition Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the sale was valid NO! "When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." (Sec. 3, Rule 93) THIS IS JURISDICTIONAL! Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." IN THE CASE AT BAR, it was proved that NO NOTICE was ever given to the two elder Lorenzo children who were, at the time of the guardianship proceeding, already 14yo or older. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. POLICY: Whenever childrens welfare may be affected, the laws solicitude should manifest. The rights of the young are not to be ignored. Their immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have a claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. POLICY: where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. A mother could have an "interest opposed to that of her children." THUS, the Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were notified as is required by law.

44 SCRA 431 (1972)

Dispositif: The failure of the CA to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in a judgment of substantial legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must be maintained. SALE IS INVALID.

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Zafra-Sarte v. CA
Fernando, J. Facts: Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the appointment of a legal guardian over the person and property of Remigia Zafra, whom she alleged to be an incompetent person, afflicted with mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable to take care of herself and to manage her property. She prayed for her appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia, claiming that she is a niece of the latter. The petition was opposed by Julian Lua (common-law husband) and by Francisco Unabia (half-brother of Remigia). They prayed that either of them be appointed legal guardian of Remigia, should she be found incompetent. Guardianship court found Remigia to be really mentally deranged and for this reason appointed Zafra-Sarte legal guardian. Pending the resolution of the MR(filed by the oppositors)and before the period for appeal had expired, Guardianship court directed the issuance of the corresponding letters of guardianship. Zafra Sarte submitted the required bond of P1k and took her oath of office as legal guardian. MR denied. Oppositors filed their notice of appeal and deposited their appeal bond of P120 and they also filed their Record on Appeal. Guardianship court approved the record on appeal. Guardianship court acted favourably on the urgent motion of Zafra-Sarte to enable her to bring the ward to the hospital and the court ordered the oppositiors to transfer and surrender the person of the incompetent to Zafra-Sarte. Oppositors filed a MR, praying that the status quo as to the custody of Remigia, who is under the charge of Felisa Unabia, be maintained during the pendency of their appeal. Denied. Oppositors filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction. CA annulled and set aside the order issued by the guardianship court and declared that the writ of preliminary injunction stayed until such time the CA shall have the opportunity to review the merits of the order appointing Zafra-Sarte as legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia. Issue/held: WON CA erred in setting aside the orders of the guardianship court. YES Zafra-Sarte the power of the CA suspend the effectivity of an order appointing a guardian in the event of an appeal therefrom was decided in Mercader v. Wislizenus. She quoted an excerpt: "The order declaring the incompetency and appointing a guardian was good, until reversed or set aside, and authorized the guardian, in spite of the appeal, to do whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to protect the property of the incompetent." Ratio:

32 SCRA 175 (1970)

It is to be admitted that the excerpt resulted from the realization of this Court that there was the fear, not without basis, that the property of the person adjudged incompetent could be frittered away during the pendency of such appeal or converted to the use of designing persons. The above consideration does not detract from the general principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal. No such weighty and persuasive reason that would call for a different ruling may be discussed. The above statement from the opinion of Justice Moreland is thus impressed with a force sufficient to give more than legal color to what was ordered by the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations of Manila. For it to yield deference to such a pronouncement by this Court cannot certainly earn the stigma of a grave abuse of discretion. CA relied on 2 California decisions (Coburn v. Hynes and O'Donnel v. Sixth Judicial District). They speak to the effect that upon the filing of in appeal, the guardian appointed was automatically precluded from exercising her functions. As correctly noted in the brief for petitioner the holding of each of the above cases to that effect is predicated on relevant statutory provisions of the State of California. As a matter of fact, such a doctrine goes back to an 1892 pronouncement of the California Supreme Court.CA should have displayed less receptivity to the persuasive force of the above doctrine. It might have been otherwise if there was no Mercader ruling.

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Pardo de Tavera v. El Hogar Filipino et. al.

Padilla, J. Facts: A parcel of land was registered in the names of Andres Luna de Pardo de Tavera, single; Carlos Pardo de Tavera, married to Belen Ramirez; Gonzales; Maria Audotte Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 3 years of age, single; Roberto Pardo de Tavera y Ramirez, 9 years of age, single; and Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, 11 years of age, single 6 August 1930 the co-owners agreed to organize a corporation under the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. for the purpose of building a modern structure on the parcel of land and to that end they also agreed to accept shares of stock of the corporation to be organized in exchange for their respective shares in the parcel of land and building erected thereon to be transferred to the corporation 12 August 1930 the duly appointed guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano, mother of the minor, filed a petition in the probate court praying for the approval of the agreement referred to and seeking authority to accept shares of stock of the corporation in exchange for the share of the minor in the property approved The Tavera-Luna, Inc., was incorporated and the guardian of the minor Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano transferred her share in the property on 16 January 1931. After the transfer of the shares of the co-owners in the property, TCT was cancelled and another was issued in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. Tavera-Luna Inc obtained 2 loans from El Hogar Filipino, Inc., both of which were secured by a mortgage on the property, but since they werent able to pay, not long after the construction of the building known as Crystal Arcade was finished, El Hogar took over the possession and management of the property to apply the rents, after deducting management expenses, to the payment of the mortgagee debt and then foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and purchased the whole property at public auction sale for P1,363,555.37 The mortgagor having failed to redeem the property, the mortgagee consolidated its title and the certificate of title in the name of Tavera-Luna, Inc. were cancelled and were issued in the name of the mortgagee, El Hogar Filipino, Inc. nearly nine months after the filing of the original complaint in this case, El Hogar sold the whole property to Magdalena Estate, Inc. for P1,400,000 in Japanese war notes 17 November 1942 Carmen Pardo de Tavera y Lopez Manzano brought an action in the CFI of Manila to annul the transfer of her right, share and interest in the property made by her guardian to Tavera-Luna, Inc. to which the court rendered judgment granting the same

98 Phil 481 (1956)

Issues/Held/Ratio: 1) W/N the action is barred by the statute of limitations NO. plaintiff became of age and released from guardianship on 19 November 1940 and the action was brought on 17 November 1942, or within the period provided for in section 579, Act No. 190: No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a guardian can be maintained by the ward, or by any person claiming under him, unless it is commenced within three years next after the termination of the guardianship, or, when a legal disability to sue exists by reason of minority or otherwise, at the time when the cause of action accrues, within three years next after the removal of such disability. 2) W/N the order of the probate court was a nullity. NO! a. Lack of jurisdiction of the probate court? NO, there is no doubt that the court has jurisdiction. b. But, the petition wasnt verified! Lack of verification of a petition is not a jurisdictional defect. c. It is not necessary for a grant of authority to the guardian to sell the estate of the ward to state that the income is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family or to maintain or educate the ward when a minor. It is enough, as the other alternative of the law provides, that it appears t o the satisfaction of the court that it is for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or some part thereof should be sold, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security. The petition of the guardian falls under the last quoted part of section 569, Act No. 190. That part of the section, requiring the probate court to enter an order directing the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate to appear before the court at a time and place therein specified, was substantially complied with, because the next kin to the ward was her own guardian and mother and all persons interested in the estate of the ward were her uncles and aunt who agreed to make the transfer of their respective shares in the property to the corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc. next of kin are those whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. There were no creditors to the wards estate. Notice to the next of kin to the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear before the judge or court, at the time and place therein specified, was not necessary, because the next of kin to the ward and all persons interested in the estate were her mother and guardian, uncles and aunt. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that part of the provision of section 569, Act No. 190, has been complied with. Hearing on the petition, as required in said section does not necessarily mean that witnesses testify or documents be produced or exhibited. If the court be satisfied that the allegations of the petition are true and the interested persons or close relatives of the ward did not object because they themselves were interested in the scheme to organize a

11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 corporation to which all their shares in the property were to be transferred, the provisions of the law on hearing were also complied with. The conclusion arrived at renders it unnecessary for us to pass upon the question whether El Hogar Filipino, Inc. was a purchaser for value and in good faith. o even if the loan was granted when the certificate of title was still in the name of the Plaintiff and her co-owners, the fact that the loan was applied for by an entity that was in the process of organization and by the same persons who were the registered owners of the property, the mortgagee was entitled to rely upon the order of the probate court granting authority to the guardian to make the transfer of the share of her ward in the property and was not bound to inquire further to find out whether there were irregularities committed or defects or vices that would render the order null and void. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Crisostomo v. Endencia
Imperial, J. Quickie: Guardian was appointed for petitioner. When petitioner was released from the hospital, petitioner filed a petition asking the court to declare that she had recovered her mental faculties. Court ordered the termination of this guardianship.9 months later, the brother of the incompetent filed a motion in the guardianship proceeding asking that the case be reopened alleging that the order is null and void because it was entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and without hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality. In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under this section (1) that a verified petition be presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, or any friend of his; (2) that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and (3) that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the incompetent thereof. The requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially complied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous. Facts: court, on April 21, 1933, appointed the herein petitioner guardian of the person and property of the incompetent while the incompetent was already released from the National Psychopathic Hospital of Mandaluyong, Province of Rizal, where she had been confined, the petitioner, such guardian, filed a verified petition asking that the court which took cognizance of the guardianship case declare that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties, that she was able to take care of her person and to administer her property, cancel the bond filed by the guardian, and order the termination and filing away of the record petition was supported and accompanied by a verified statement of the incompetent Petition was likewise supported and accompanied by two medical certificates of Doctors Alfredo L. Guerrero and Ramon Syquia, the court declared the said Petrona Crisostomo able to take care of her person and to administer her own property, wherefore, it orders the termination of this guardianship, the cancellation of the bond of the guardian and the final filing away of this case. After the lapse of about nine months from the issuance of the order of February 29, 1936, that is, on November 9 of the same year, the respondent Ramon Crisostomo, brother of the incompetent, filed a motion in the guardianship proceedings and in the same court which had taken cognizance of said special proceedings, asking that the restoration order of February 29, 1936 be set aside, that the case be reopened, and that a new guardian of the person and property of Petrona Crisostomo be appointed, o alleging as grounds that the aforesaid order is null and void because entered without notice to the nearest relatives of the incompetent and without hearing and that the latter had not yet recovered her mentality.

66 Phil 1 (1938)
The petition objected to this petition on the ground that the order sought to be annulled had already become final and that the court had already lost jurisdiction to reverse or annul the same, but on December 15, 1936, the respondent judge issued an order annulling that of February 29 of the same year.

Issue: validity of the order of restoration to capacity of February 29, 1936 YES Ratio: section 575 is not squarely applicable because its provisions are general in character and that the case should be governed by section 562 because its provisions are special in character and the question at issue directly comes under the said provisions. SEC. 562. Restoration of competency. Any person who has been declared insane or incompetent, or the guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree or any friend, may apply, by petition, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the appointment of guardians is made, and have the fact of his restoration to capacity judicially determined. The petition shall be verified by oath, and shall state that such person is then sane and competent. Upon receiving the petition, the court must appoint a day for hearing before the court, and shall cause notice of the trial to be given to the guardian of the person so declared insane or incompetent and to the ward. On the trial, the guardian, or relatives of the person so declared insane or incompetent, and in the discretion of the court any other person, may contest the right to the relief demanded. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify, and may be called and examined by the court on its own motion. If it be found that the person be of sound mind, and capable of taking care of himself and property, his restoration to capacity shall be adjudged and the guardianship of such person, if such person be not a minor, shall cease. In order that a court taking cognizance of the guardianship of an incompetent may issue a valid order restoring him to capacity it is necessary, under this section that a verified petition be presented by the incompetent, his guardian, or any relative of such person within the third degree, or any friend of his; that said petition should allege that the incompetent has recovered his mental faculties or his legal capacity, as the case may be; and that upon receiving the petition the court should set the same for hearing and notify the guardian and the incompetent thereof. At the hearing, the guardian, the relatives of the incompetent, and, in the discretion of the court, any other person may oppose the remedy sought. The section does not require notice of the hearing to any other person except the guardian and the incompetent. In the case under study it happened that the verified petition was signed by the guardian himself and was supported and accompanied by the sworn statement of the incompetent. In the petition it was stated that the incompetent had recovered her mental faculties and this allegation was corroborated by her in her sworn statement when she stated that she had already recovered her mental faculties.

13 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 In these circumstances the only logical conclusion is that the requisites of section 562 have at least been substantially complied with and that the notice and the hearing were unnecessary and superfluous. It is true that under the section the respondent Ramon Crisostomo could have appeared at the hearing and opposed the petition, but this right given to him by law is not absolute in the sense that he is also entitled to a personal notice. His situation is like that of a person who, not being a defendant in an ordinary action and not having been notified of the complaint, learns of the existence of the suit and discovers that he has a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation; there is no question that he would be entitled to take part therein as intervener, but he cannot successfully ask for the annulment of the judgment to be rendered on the ground that he had a right to be cited or notified and to be present at the trial because it happened that he had an interest in the case. Section 562, like the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be liberally interpreted pursuant to the provision of section 2 thereof in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. If, as it seems, the intention of the respondent Ramon Crisostomo is to annul the donation which the incompetent made of her property in favor of the petitioner, the courts are open for him to bring an action for that purpose. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN

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Vda. de Bengson v. PNB

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Nature: Appeal from lower court Facts: As the mother of a veteran who died in World War II, Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson became entitled to certain accrued insurance benefits which amounted to P10,738 as of July 1, 1957, and to a monthly death compensation for the rest of her life, all extended by the United States Veterans Administration. Upon inquiry which showed that the beneficiary was incompetent, the Veterans Administration filed Special Proceeding No. 586 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, where in due course, an order was entered adjudging her to be an incompetent and appointing the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as guardian of her estate comprising the monies due from the said Veterans Administration. Letters of guardianship were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank. Alleging that she had regained her competence, her ward, by counsel, filed a petition asking for an order terminating the guardianship, and for delivery to her of the residuary estate. Attached to this petition was a medical certificate attesting that she was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge of her environmental surroundings. This was opposed by the Veterans Administration on the ground that by reason of her advanced age (78), physical and mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The son of the ward, Francisco Bengson, filed a "Manifestation" where he prayed to be appointed guardian of the ward's estate in place of the Philippine National Bank, and for the balance of her estate to be withdrawn or transferred from the Philippine National Bank's main office to its branch at San Fernando, La Union, in his account as guardian. Lower court ordered in favor of Francisco Bengson and granted his Issue/Held: WON the order to appoint Francisco Bengson is proper-NO Ratio: The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules. When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.... (emphasis supplied). Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from office except for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno. This is also the American law (39 C.J.S., p. 657).

3 SCRA 751 (1961)

Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya, 74 Phil. 254; Gabriel vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25) has been held sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person is insuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid down the grounds for removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as to the existence of any of those grounds. No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of the Philippine National Bank as guardian was founded. Neither in Francisco Bengzon's manifestation nor in the orders of the lower court is it made to appear that the Philippine National Bank had become incapable of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout, the Philippine National Bank has discharged its trust satisfactorily. The it has received commissions allowed by law for its services is no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank's commission averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to disburse in bond premiums. Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward and more convenient for the administration of the estate. A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent reasons (39 C.J.S. 65); otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal. As to the alleged inconvenience of the guardian of the incompetent's person having to come to Manila to obtain money for the ward's sustenance, the same can be obviated by merely requiring the appellant Bank to keep part of the moneys in the San Fernando (La Union) branch, without altering the guardianship.

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In re Guardianship of Inchausti
Street, J. Facts: CFI Manila, upon the due application, appointed Maria Consuelo Rico vda. de Inchausti as guardian of the person and property of her son JOSE de Inchausti, on the ground that the latter had become demented and incapable of properly caring for himself and estate. Soon after this, the ward JOSE was, upon the advice of physicians, sent to Barcelona, Spain, where he has continued to reside. Manuel Soler, friend to the incapacitated JOSE, filed a petition in the guardianship proceedings, asking the court to rehabilitate him (declare JOSE to be of sound mind) and bring the guardianship to an end. This was opposed by the mother/guardian on the grounds (1) that the ward had not been given sufficient notice of the hearing and (2) that it had not been satisfactorily shown that he is now capable of taking care of himself and property. Trial judge adjudged the ward, JOSE, to be of sound mind. A further order was made requiring the mother/guardian to render her accounting~ from this decision, the guardian appealed Issue/Held/Ratio: WON JOSE was properly rehabilitated and guardianship properly terminated YES! On the NOTICE requirement On the subject of the judicial restoration of incompetents to capacity, the (old) RULES declares that, upon receiving the petition , the court shall appoint a day for the hearing and cause notice of the same to be given to the ward. IN THE PRESENT CASE, the clerk of the guardianship court sent a cablegram to the US Consulate at Barcelona, Spain requesting him to notify JOSE de Inchausti that a petition for his restoration to capacity will be heard in the CFI Manila on October 19, 1918. The Consul General duly replied to the CFI, saying that the cablegram was received by JOSE and that the latter had been duly notified. THEREFORE, notice to the ward had been given as required by law. THUS, no error was committed by the trial court when it proceeded, on the appointed day, to dispose of the petition (for restoration of capacity) upon its merits in accordance with the proof then submitted. The notification of the ward required in the RULES is not intended as a personal service of process in the sense necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the ward. It is, therefore, of no moment that the person to be notified was living in a foreign country and thus beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila court. Nor is the manner in which the court procured service of the notice of any importance. It is sufficient that the notice was given.

40 Phil 682 (1920)

THEREFORE, the guardianship court had jurisdiction of the cause (of action) and the parties; and notification to the ward where the petition to rehabilitate him is presented by a friend is required merely as an assurance that the individual chiefly concerned shall have cognizance of what is being done. It at least gives him an opportunity to advise the court in case action taken by the mover of the petition was officious or unauthorized.

Is JOSE really rehabilitated? YES! Upon the question of the propriety of the order declaring the ward to be of sound mind and requiring the guardian to submit her accounts, the evidence fully sustains the action taken by the court. The evidence supports the conclusion that the violent access of dementia which manifested itself prior to the original appointment of the guardian passed off after JOSE was taken away from Manila in 1915 and the same extreme manifestations of derangement have not reappeared. Furthermore, the evidence shows that at the time the petition for his rehabilitation was heard, the ward was in normal mental state and had been in this condition for a period sufficiently long to justify the belief that he is permanently restored. Under these circumstances it would be highly improper to prolong the guardianship The opposition to the termination of the guardianship seems to be based chiefly on the fear entertained by his mother/guardian that JOSE, if placed in control of his large property, will prove to be a spendthrift. Even though this fear should be wellfounded, it affords no reason for maintaining a guardianship which had its origin in his mental incapacity. If he is, or should hereafter prove to be, a spendthrift, proper proceedings can be instituted to protect him from wasteful proclivities. Dispositif: The order appealed from is AFFIRMED, and the cause is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with said order. No special pronouncement will be made as to costs. So ordered.

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Chin Ah Foo et. al. v. Concepcion et. al.

Malcolm, J. Facts: Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo) was charged in the CFI Manila with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. CFI rendered judgment declaring the accused not responsible for the crime, and dismissing the case, but requiring the reclusion of the accused for treatment in San Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with Art. 8 of the Penal Code, with the admonition that the accused be not permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining the permission of the court. Chan Sam was confined for approximately 2 years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts to obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of the murdered man, who contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably other members of his own family who were living in Hongkong. Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles were delegated to examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam. After the report of the doctors had been submitted, oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. CFI sustained the court's right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to Hongkong to join his wife in that city. Issue/Held: WON Sec.1048 of the Administrative Code impliedly repealed Art. 8 of the Penal Code? NO Ratio: Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are: 1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval. When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. Section 1048 of the Administrative Code provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following: When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.

54 Phil 775 (1930)

An examination of article 8, par. 1 discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution. On the other hand, Sec. 1048 grants to the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has exercised his authority in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion. Contrasting the two, it is self-evident that for Sec. 1048 to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to find an implied repeal of a portion of Art. 8. But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal none is presumed to be intended. The most reasonable supposition is that when the Legislature placed the provision, from which Sec. 1048 was derived, on the statute books, it did so without any consideration as to the effect of the new law on Art. 8. It is likewise a canon of statutory construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together, this should be done. The authority of the courts can be sustained in cases where the courts take action, while the authority of the Director of Health can be sustained in other cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. This latter construction is reinforced by that portion of Sec. 1048 which requires the Director of Health to notify the Judge of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patients is confined by order of the court. They can be construed so that both can stand together. Considering Art. 8 as in force and construing this article and Sec.1048, we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Art. 8. We think also that the converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with Art. 8 cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.

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Jones v. Hortiguela
Concepcion, J.: Nature: appeal from CFI of Cebu Facts: Jones married Escano in December1914 and had a child with her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings to have he rhusband judicially decared ana bsentee. The court issued an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec. 1919). Later ,Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escana died intestate leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly. However, upon Angelitas marriage and her reaching the age of majority, she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother since the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was void because only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization of the second marriage. For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escao, the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog Issue/Held: WON the subsequent marriage can be considered void. Ratio: On this point (recording of marriage), the court a quo very correctly stated as follows: Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be fined not less than twentyfive and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. Madridejo vs. De Leon:"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one said requisites." U. S. vs. De Vera:"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries, marriages recorded in their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when through the omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage, it was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."

64 Phil 179 (1937)

Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead. Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition of the properties of the intestate estate. The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that the petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings. SIDE ISSUE: As to the administrator's fees: Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and moderate compensation. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the deceased Escao prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and considering the importance of the inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's services.

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Tol-Noquera v. Villamor et. al.

Cruz, J. Facts: DAYA Tol-Noquera filed a petition to be appointed administratrix of the property belonging to the absentee, REMEGIO Tol. DAYA alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of REMEGIO, who had been missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain DIOSDADO Tol had fraudulently secured a free patent over REMEGIO's property and had obtained title thereto in his name. She was seeking the administration of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover the said property. DIOSDADO opposed the petition, arguing that DAYA is not REMEGIOs natural child, and that in any case, he owns the property in question CFI dismissed DAYAs petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the Torrens title. CFI also ruled that it was useless to appoint an administrator to the absentees property since the said property belonged to another person~ hence, this appeal by DAYA Issue/Held/Ratio: WON the CFI properly dismissed DAYAs petition for administration of absentees property? NO! Contrary to the CFIs position, DAYAs petition was not intended as a collateral attack on a Torrens title. Although DAYA alleged that there was a need to appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped, this did not amount to a collateral attack on the title. There was nothing in the petition to indicate that DAYA would attack the title issued to DIOSDADO in the same proceeding. In fact, DAYA declared that whatever remedy she might choose would be pursued in another venue, in a proceeding entirely distinct and separate from her petition for appointment as administratrix. DIOSDADO next contends that since DAYA claims she is an illegitimate child of REMEGIO, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting from the relatives of her father this is IMMATERIAL DAYAs disqualification as an heir does not inhibit her from petitioning for a declaration of absence or to be appointed as an administratrix of the absentee's estate. Per the Civil Code, when a person disappears from his domicile his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary (Art. 381). The spouse present shall be preferred as such representative when there is no legal separation. But if the absentee left no spouse, ANY competent person may be appointed by the court. (Art. 383).

211 SCRA 616 (1992)

PERIODS: After 2 years without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and 5 years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared. (Art. 384). The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation (Art. 386). The following may ask for the declaration of absence: (1) The spouse present; (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same; (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; (4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death (Art. 385). RULE: It is NOT necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. The question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not controlling. What is material is whether DAYA is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of REMEGIO and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix of his estate sadly, the trial court did not even bother to look into these issues! The trial court instead dwelled on the issue of WON the property titled to DIOSDADO is really owned by him. BUT this should be resolved in another proceeding! The right of DAYA to be appointed administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue. And even if we assumed that DIOSDADOs title is already indefeasible because of the lapse of the one-year period for attacking it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one who is unjustly deprived on his property. One of these is a claim for reconveyance. BUT this remedy can only be availed of by DAYA after she is appointed administratrix of the estate of the absentee. Dispositif: The petition is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for determination of the legal personality of Daya Maria Tol to petition the declaration of Remigio Tol's absence and of her competence to be appointed as administratrix of his estate.SO ORDERED.