PIR06.

11 1

Politics of Islamic Resurgence -Lebanon (2)

V. Comparison of Musa Sadfs Movement to Other Revival Movements (cont'd)

C. Constituency
In Egypt, Syria, and Turkey: Islamist movements found supporters
among social groups who felt excluded from their fair share of the
spoils
(E.g. upper class Sunnis in Syria, excluded from the spoils of power by
the minority Alawi regime;
the educated poor with no employment prospects in Egypt;
traditional urban artisans and traders hurt by economic modernization
everywhere in Muslim world
Constituency of Sadr's movement:
Partially: the Shiite poor ("the disinherited, the deprived, the wretched
of the earthn )
Partially: Shiites who had "made it" (wealthy and educated Shiites who
wanted a larger share ofnational prestige and more opportunities in the
civil service and public affairs)
I.e. a cross-class alliance ...but all felt "excluded"
D. Tactics
i. Embrace the use of violence?
Largely no. Sadr disavowed violence; only reluctantly agreed to create
a Shia militia (called AMAL) in 1975 in the context of burgeoning civil
war in the name ofself-defenseSecond: did Musa Sadr organize a mass­
based, grass roots movement, like, say the Muslim Bros?
ii. Mobilize the masses?
Yes. Sadr organized general strikes, mass demonstrations, etc.
PIR06.11 2

E. Ideological Content

Musa Sadr's movement -- not driven by a religious missionary vision

But still made use of religious symbols and themes to mobilize the
Shia
His goals were reformist

but the movement's ideology was quite revolutionary.

Sadr preached a radical reinterpretation of Shia symbols and themes.

Classic Shia tradition: a tradition of defeat and dispossession; preached

quiesence, political passivity, submission, dissimulation, and maintaining a
distance from politics

This was the lesson drawn from one of the founding myth of Shism, the
Kerbala story.
But Sadr reworked the Kerbala story: ,stripped it ofits sorrow and lament and
made it an episode of political choice and courage, of defiance, and political
activism and resistance to the powers that be

VI. General Lesson about IdeolQ&y and Culture

A. Ideology and culture are extremely plastic (i.e. malleable)

Given the right conditions they can be reinterpreted to mean exactly the
opposite of what they have traditionally meant.

B. Role of context in defining content of a cultural tradition

Khomeini = another Shiite preacher of Shia activism at this time

But Khomeini

was a rabid hater of other faiths (e.g. the Bahais, the Jews);

was fanatically conservative in his interpretation of Shia tradition (e.g.

(Obliged women to wear the chador, not simply modest clothes;
endorsed polygamy, called for reinstatement of the traditional
Islamic punishments for adultery (stoning) and thievery (cut off the
hand ofthe thief)
PIR06.11 3

By contrast: Musa Sadr

was a tolerant modernist
winked at notions of women's rights and abortion,
he doubted that polygamy was really endorsed by Islam
Preached ecumenicism, (interfaith understanding)
Explanation of different interpretation of tradition:
Different context
Khomeini came from a land where Sma were the majority and Shiism was the
dominant faith
In this context he could afford to be a dogmatic purist (spared doubts and
compromise)...
Musa Sadr working in a multi-sectarian society
To be effective politically, to further the interests of the community one had to
work with other communities, one had to compromise

General Lesson: where a culture is not majoritarian there is an incentive to be

more open, more tolerant, less extremist.
Policy Lesson: Inclusion of Islamists is likely to lead to moderation, so long as
Islamists do not constitute a majority
Under these conditions, inclusion will moderate Islamists: it will practice them
in the rules of the game, and teach them compromise and pragmatism
Past evidence of the moderating power of political inclusion: role of inclusion
of anti-system communist parties in Europe in the 50s and 60s

.. - - - - - . _ - . _ . _.. _.... --.-----~---.. -_._­

PIR06.11 4

VI. Inclusion as the Remedy for Extremism? The Case ofHizballah

A. Background:

Origins: Seminarians trained in the Shia religious academies ofNajaf(in

Iraq) and educated in a new form of Shiism that preached activism and
political engagement

(E.g. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah; Subhi al-Tufayli)

These clerics settled in Lebanon in the early 70s and established a

network of schools, clubs, and charitable associations

Different from Musa Sadr: did not accept the Lebanese pluralist system
were unwilling to accept Christian rule over Muslims in Lebanon

Embraced the Iranian model

Iran provided a variety ofsupports that boosted the power and influence
of Hizballah (officially formed in 78):

i. Iran channeled financial aid to Hizballah

(Funds religious schools, clinics, water systems, hospitals)

ii. Iran channeled arms to Hizballah (and paid the salaries of

Hizaballah's militia men)

iii. Iran provided men to fight alongside the Shia.

B. Comparison of Hizballah and Musa Sadr's movement

i. Goals
Hizballah's stated goal: overthrow the pluralist system in Lebanon and
replace it with an Islamic regime on the Iranian model

Sadr's movement: goal was reformist; sought Shia integration into

PIR06.11 5

Lebanon's multi-sectarian system

ii. Tactics
Hizballah endorsed use violence (terror, kidnapping)

Sadr's movement: largely renounced violence

iii. Constituencies

Hizballah:

Socially: Hizballah drew its strongest base from the poorest

Shia trapped in the "misery belt" of slums
surrounding Beirut

Georgraphically: Hizballah was strongest around Beirut and in the

in the Bekaa valley/the Eastern portion of Lebanon

Musa Sadr's movement:

Socially: Amal drew its base from poor as well as upper class
Shia

Georgraphically: Amal found its stronghold in the Southern

Lebanon (area around Jebl AmI)

( Hizballah was relatively unsuccessful in building a base in South

Lebanon because it followed the foreign policy line of Iran, embracing
the Palestinian cause and war and the liberation ofIsrael, launched from
South Lebanon)
PIR06.11 6

C. Inclusion of Hizballah Post-Civil War

1. Conclusion of civil war in Lebanon in 1990; restoration of a

confessional political system with some reform in distribution
of power between confessional groups (Taif accord)

AMAL endorses Taif accord

Hizballah rejects it (still rejects a pluralist multi-confessoinal

system; still demands creation of an Islamic state)

National elections held: 1992

Although Hizballah originally was adamant in its rejection ofthe

system, it chooses to participate in the elections

Why? Dd not want to be cut out of the spoils of politics

Impact: Hizballah has been forced to play the game ofcoalitional

politics

has been forced to make alliances with other

groups to achieve its ends in politics

Has focused on on pragmatic issues ...like

sewers and schools, not just absolutist ends

I.e. inclusion has led to Hizballah's defacto

acceptance of the system

Inclusion has moderated Hizballah, at least in

national politics (though not in its foreign policy)

Reinforces idea that inclusion of Islamists in the political game can be

moderating as least when they do not constitute a political majority.