Biraogo vs PTC

FACTS Pursuant to the slogan Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap posed by Pres. Noynoy Aquino in his campaign for Presidential election, he created Philippine Truth Commission by virtue of Executive Order No. 1. Said executive order was questioned by herein petitioners as violative of equal protection clause insofar as its objective is to investigate large scale graft and corruption during the previous administration under former president Arroyo. Petitioners contend that it did not meet the requisites for a valid classification as it singles out the previous administration as its sole object. Respondent, on the other hand, defended that it was based on widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. It further contends that the segregation of the preceding administration as the object of the fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely to bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration. ISSUE WON Executive Order No. 1 violates the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws HELD Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR., RTC, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro; and JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993, an administrative complaint was filed against him and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who charged them with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On February 21, 1994, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings and supporting documents, this Court dismissed the complaint against the two for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was subsequently denied. What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr. against Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which charges him with harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the first complaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering that the respondents in that case were complainant and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them because of the filing of the first case by the complainant. The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which, in a Memorandum dated 25 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. Nonetheless, the Court required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment. In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies the allegations against him. He avers that on the application by SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun; that on August 25,1993, a complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which the herein complainant Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that finding that the house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found was owned by complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probable cause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered their arrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after he was ordered by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo and Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theory that, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunitions were found, they had constructive possession of the same. He likewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit himself until after the preliminary examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issued, and only after complainant had filed a petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to be well taken. On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA for reevaluation, report and recommendation. On January 12, 1996, the OCA submitted a Memorandum, recommending dismissal of the supplemental complaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons: (1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance of search warrant with the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court. (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249). Complainant cannot insist that since his name was not included in the search warrant, the house designated to be searched did not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary investigation of witnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was no basis for respondent judge to order his arrest. (2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant of arrest against complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent judge in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassment purposes substantiated. To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son. The determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidence presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not the respondent in that case is named in the [1] proceedings for a search warrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA, the issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered on the basis of respondents finding that the place from where the guns and ammunitions were seized belonged to complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to him and claims that at the time of the search he was in Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant on precisely these grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to complainant and he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure were conducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted arbitrarily or that he abused

his powers so as to give ground for administrative disciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of judgment for which complainants remedy is judicial. What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by the complainant that respondent judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the criminal case, considering that the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier filed an administrative case against the judge and another one. We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere filing of an administrative case against a [2] judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing a case. An examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative cases were filed only to force the judge to inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him. As this Court held, if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there [3] would not be enough judges left to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. On the other hand, there is a remedy available to the party seeking the disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judges bias or prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really [4] the case. But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr. had previously been filed and it was paramount that respondent was free from any appearance of bias against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirt of revenge against complainant for the latters having filed an administrative disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called for sedulous regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the need of steering clear of the case because he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest in order to preserve at all times the faith and [5] confidence in courts of justice by any party to the litigation. Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed the admonition that a spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times [6] maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against complainant and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to [7] prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the following ground: In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it is the honest belief and finding of the Court that there is sufficient probable cause that the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was committed and that the named three (3) accused Joel Gamo, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and Leovigildo Mantaring Jr. are the ones probably guilty thereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was issued by undersigned against them. He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing to inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of justice. Parenthetically, the records show that the criminal complaints against herein complainant and his son were eventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor, but not without the following parting words: It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly prejudiced and suffered damages as a consequence of their inclusion in the criminal complaint. The unfortunate incident could have been avoided had the Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised the necessary prudence and judicial perpecuity [sic] expected of an impartial Judge in the conduct of preliminary investigation before issuance of warrant of arrest. WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Romero and Puno., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. 2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized." 3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. 4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643. DECISION GRIO-AQUINO, J p: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads: "WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. "In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)

Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads: "That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.) The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows: "That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.) Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.) Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder. In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court: 1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and 2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.

The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide: 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;" "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .' The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus: "To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances." The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized." There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip. The seizure of the finished and unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins; Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins; and Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins in violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203. A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search warrant. Thus, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant on January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Later, the respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence. They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building, where items in open display were allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized in the search warrant. The trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant and issued an advisory that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed. UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record. Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant application, as well as the warrant issued by the court itself. Issues: 1) Whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench; <br>(2) Whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; and <br>(3) Whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid. Held: <br><span style="font-weight:bold;"><span style="font-style:italic;">Search Warrant</span><span style="fontstyle:italic;"></span></span> <br> <br>A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. <br> <br>Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

Plain View Doctrine <br>The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant. Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the Constitution. <br> <br>In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin. <br> <br>It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the doctrine during the hearing of the respondents motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI and the petitioners motion for reconsideration. <br> <br>In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioners representative who was present at the time of the enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

[G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ AND ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, accused,ULYSSES GARCIA Y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ AND ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI,appellants. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-judicial confession.

The Case
[1]

Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia yTupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their co-accused -- Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados -- were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon at the [2] legal rate from the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid. In an Information dated November 9, 1992,
[3]

appellants and their co-accused were charged as follows:

That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 199 2, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due for shredding in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as represented by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum ofP194,190.00 Philippine currency; That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers, Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and [4] as such they had free access to the property stolen. Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992. Appellants, however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, [5] upon their filing of a cash bond to secure their appearance whenever required by the trial court. During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not [6] guilty. On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta were at large, because they had [7] failed to appear in court despite notice. After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed Decision.

The Facts Version of the Prosecution The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows: About 10:00 oclock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola. Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The

punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the abovenamed accused. On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation. On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the poli ce officers, Garcia gave three separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the participation of each and everyone of them. On the basis of Garcias sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning at the police [8] station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft together with Garcia. (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner: Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from 1978 to 1994. On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified himself as a police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Pias City. He was arrested without any warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accusedappellant Garcia dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride x x x a car. While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and h e was made to bend with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him and he heard some of the occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he would not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he told them that he does not know anything about those notes. After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and x x x up and down x x x the stairs. While being dragged out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket. At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told them that he does not know his co-accused x x x. Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused, somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accused-appellant Garcias nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that had been poured on his nose [at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he could not breath[e]. When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he decided to cooperate with the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down. Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, may nakikinig. Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s] x x x. As he was being brought down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accused-appellant Garcias personal belongings consisted of [his] drivers license, important papers and coin purse. He was forced to ride x x x the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were removed when he was at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila. SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latters name, age and addr ess. The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant Garcias wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcias wallet and the former insisted that they recovered the said perforated notes from accused-appellants wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of Mr. Labita. It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcias alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and x x x November 6, 1992. At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, acc used-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his co-accused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took x x x pictures while he was doing the said act.

Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorneys Office on No vember 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accusedappellant Garcia and told him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accusedappellant Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed x x x the alleged three (3) sworn statements. During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia, and that he signed x x x the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto. Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4 Coronels warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure. SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellant s De Leon, Loyola, [Flores] on the basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico. SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty I nquest Prosecutor assigned at [9] the WPDC Headquarters. (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned to the Security and Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores and Loyola were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their main task was to haul perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building for shredding. On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency notes placed in a coin sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that the coordinated acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP. The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused. The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcias wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused. Hence, this appeal.
[10]

Issues

In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues: 1 The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of Accused-appellant Garcia and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes 2 The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft.
[11]

In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors: 1 The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of Accused Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits I, J and K) and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes (Exhibits N to N2) over the objections of the accused-appellants. 2 The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon, Loyola and Flores; 3 The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the demurrer to evidence; 4

The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-appellants, consisting of exhibits 1, 2 to 2-B, 3 and 4 and the testimony of their witness, State Auditor Esmeralda Elli; 5 The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft.
[12]

Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants, including the admissibility of Garcias confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has merit. First Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.

Extrajudicial Confessions

Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus: Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the fre e will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public Attorneys Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation. It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word SAKSI. Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and [14] that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel. The lower courts action is manifest error. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the confession. Hence, the lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre -prepared [15] confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to [16] effective, vigilant and independent counsel. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the [17] assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. The Constitution states that [a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x. Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.
[13]

Perforated Currency Notes

Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits N to N -2) allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were fruits of the poisonous tree and, hence, inadmissible in evidence. The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court. The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present. Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and [19] frisk situations, and (6) consented search. Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary [21] rule. In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, untenable is the solicitor generals argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is [22] purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it. Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors of the crime. The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar access to the [23] shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault. Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to support his allegation. Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
[20] [18]

Second Issue: Demurrer to Evidence

Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the alleged qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed appellants participation in the commission of the crime. On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judges determination of the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting t o lack of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a [24] motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent until after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to submit his report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued detention within five (5) days from notice of this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.