Partha P.

Choudhury MLINS 6354-N LEC

American Foreign Policy Process

1 April 8th 2013

Propositioning A Tentative Argument To Iran To Stop Further Nuclear-Proliferation

Executive Summary This is a communique dispatched to the Secretary of State, John Kerry, on ways to perceive the stand-off the US is having with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Approaching a time when it is the most formative to pursue peace in the inception of the 2nd term in office of President Obama, we as a nation and as a people are being forthcoming when it comes to engaging with the Iranians regarding their history of proliferation in a restive region known as the Middle East in order to pursue lasting peace for all posterities and to hopefully engage with the Iranians regarding the ramifications of what their becoming a possible nuclear state might do for this region and to effectively dissuade them from doing so using diplomatic tact and cooperation. Facts, Background and Analysis From the vantage point of anyone who keeps abreast of world affairs in any nation, approaching the issue of nuclear non-proliferation whenever Iran is considered cannot help but feel that future warfare with Iran over the matter of nuclear capability is also mutually reinforcing, since these two phenomena go hand in hand together. It is my objective to clearly and concisely to dedicate this paper to the topic of recommending to Secretary of State John Kerry a manifold policy that will efficaciously deter Iran from obtaining fissile capability in order to weaponize militarily and will have a deleterious effect on any sort of saber-rattling from the triad of states that are mobilizing for war: the US, Iran and the state of Israel. The beginning of the country of Iran having any sort of nuclear capability was incepted in the 1950s in a civil accord between the Iranian government and the US under the Atoms for Peace agreement started by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1957. At a time of the Cold War which was marked by an arms-race between the United States and the Soviet Union, this program ensured the viability of nuclear energy being harnessed for peaceful civilian purposes rather than to stockpile nuclear

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American Foreign Policy Process

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weapons that had fissile material in them that could be directed at an enemy opponent at a time of conflict. It is also worth noting that the Iranians have been a signatory of the Treaty On The NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the NPT Treaty, as of 1968. Even after the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s, Iran continues to state that it abides by the spirit of the treaty and that theyve allowed themselves to be privy to most of the protocols of the IAEA, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, and have let them tour many of the facilities that Iran contends are places where they conduct nuclear research for peaceful purposes. With that said, one has to keep in mind that after the Iranian Revolution in which the Shah was deposed, the American notion of the current Iranian theocratic regime being belligerent to America is well known. But approaching that sentiment has to come with a thorough and clear understanding of the history that the US has had Iran. There has been formidable resentment on the behalf of the Iranian civilian population who were suffering poverty and languishing under the rule of the Shah while he lived in leisure at the expense of the poor Iranian. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose autocratic rule ensured that a coterie of elites would be guaranteed patronage, had his grip on Iran bolstered by the Americans who had previously deposed a very popular Prime Minister Mosaddegh for nationalizing the oil industry. In a region that has seen its share of American influence being bandied about and is restive at that, Iran is a country thats very mindful of its ancient history ranging from the ancient Persians and wants to ascribe a greatness and esteem to their fatherland. Being anathema to the Americans by way of the sanctions regimen and the cessation of talks has not yet proved tentative results in getting a re-shuffling of the government to a democracy thats pro-American, and one has only to look at the history of sanctions being superimposed on other countries to see that they ultimately dont work. To begin, the Secretary has to look at a disclosure by Iranian dissidents in August of 2002 who had publicly stated in a conference in Washington, D. C. that the Iranian government had started to secretly proliferate nuclear enrichment at two undeclared facilities south of Tehran, namely Natanz and Arak1 during the presidency of Khatami. In tandem with its safeguards agreement that Iran has with the

http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran403/background.html

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IAEA, the IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei cited that Iran had legally breached this agreement2 and that they had to plausibly prove to the IAEA that their civilian nuclear energy program did not have a military component to it. This in turn made Iran duty-bound now to disclose all of its nuclear activities to the agency. Irans present failure to do this has led to the United Nations first enacting sanctions against Tehran in 20063 because of Irans breach of the IAEA board of governors agreement that Iran halt all of its uranium enrichment. In an IAEA report published in 2011, the board of governors concluded that Iran did indeed have a nuclear program that was seeking to enrich uranium to the point of it being fissile ready, or enabled to the point of it being weaponized for an arsenal. It is the IAEAs contention that Iran who was just in breach, is now openly flouting and defying several provisions of the NPT Treaty4, specifically Articles 2 and 3, thereby justifying the US, EU, and UN sanctions. The gist of Article 2 states that any non-nuclear weapon state agrees not to accept from any source whatsoever nuclear weaponry or explosive devices and adjures them not to acquire or manufacture such weaponry or receive any assistance in their quest to do so. The provisions of Article 3 state that each non-nuclear weapon state must be in accord with the IAEA for the safeguards agreement to all nuclear activities within their border which succinctly states theyre duty-bound to always and utterly be for peaceful uses, not towards facilitating weaponry via weapons-grade enrichment of any uranium, and Article 3 also has a provision of the banning of exporting such technology. This in turn presents a violation of Article 4 of the NPT Treaty, which enables nuclear-weapons-free states the right to have civilian nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes such as for medicine and energy. And in a turn for the worse, Iran has started installing advanced centrifuges at Natanz, according to a new report authored by the IAEA in February of 20135. Now lets get to the Iranian understanding of this dilemma. Iran doesnt particularly oppose the idea that it has breached the aforementioned protocols but contends that theyre currently in noncompliance. What Tehran asserts is that the obligation set forth by the board of governors of the IAEA
2 3

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3327065.stm http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm 4 http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml 5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21537206

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has been unwarranted hence theres not a necessity for the sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The safeguards agreement set forth by the IAEA, the very conduit of this organization which ensures Iran the right to pursue nuclear activities, has been complied with. Iran maintains its own view, the inalienable right of any sovereign nation to peaceably use nuclear technology, as being vouched for in Article 4 of the NPT Treaty. In addition to that, the second provision of Article 4 obligates that supplier states (or states that have a ready nuclear-capability) face an obligation to help non-nuclear states in assisting in their pursuit of peaceful civilian nuclear technology. Furthermore, in a bit of legalistic gymnastics, Iran concludes that the IAEA provisions and the NPT Treaty are mutually exclusive from each other and are alternate agreements and is in the spirit of both of these accords. A total and full-blown violation of these charters have not yet occurred by the Iranians, according to them. Citing history, the Iranians bring to mind the South Africa, which had voluntarily gotten rid of its nuclear arsenal, and South Korea who were found in breach of the NPT Treaty6. With both countries having good relations with the US, the impulse to sanction them utterly by the UN, US, or the EU wasnt the first precautionary measure. However with a country such as Iran that the US refuses to acknowledge diplomatically, the ready impulse to question motives as to why it is that the Iranians have actively sought to have a nuclear program in the first place and why theyre so secretive about their facilities isnt given the discretion that the Iranians feel that they deserve. They contend that its their inherent right to do so. Going by the analysis of a State Department Desk Officer who is able to see that the US and the Iranians are incrementally on the precipice of a dangerous war, I assert that warfare against the Iranians based upon the notion that they most likely are proliferating militarily would hearken to a future that none in the US would want, and assuredly that the Iranian regime or its people dont want either. If after all, Iran is ultimately successful in its quest for nuclear proliferation, the Mideast region of the world would see drastic changes that might not work in the favor of the US and would even offset a war from which there can be no retraction due to the fact that the world community as a whole is vehement when they say

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Goldschmidt

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American Foreign Policy Process

5 April 8th 2013

that they dont Iran to have a nuclear arsenal. But the process of ginning up a war is bolstered by a call to action in a nation and theyre mostly preceded by fervent nationalism. Secretary Kerry, youve got to make sure that there is a methodical calm with which you dictate this delicate business, as making a decision to go to war against a nation such as Iran should be deftly avoided at all costs. Truthfully, the American government can salvage peace with the Iranians and quite possibly procure a sort of guarantee that Iranian subsidization of terror groups internationally that the US consider unlawful combatants, can also not be a mainstay whenever Iranians have a stake outside of their territory. The perception and apprehension needed for this necessitates a cold and sobering fact that with volatility in a region beset by so many conflicts, the US cannot afford in its treasury coffers the financial capital to wage a war in the first place. As financial markets are veering steadily towards a serious emergency, the world community can scarcely afford to ameliorate their own situations and though the US is a country that is still understandably sustaining itself economically, the risk of dipping into the treasury for a war would squarely go against not only the domestic policies that the President has got in mind, but would offset newly recovered gains that the US has painstakingly secured for itself. Since the history of modern finance in a world economy having 34 bubbles, the 35th will most likely hinge upon a commodity that no one can live without: food. With there being a direct correlation between food prices and fuel prices7, upon an unnecessary war in which grand expanses of land will have been laid waste past the point of any sort of redemption due to warfare, humanity can scarcely go to war of this scale. Foreign Policy Recommendations I present to Secretary Kerry four manifold forward-leaning policy suggestions designed to maneuver around the impasse that the US is currently having with the Iranians that I earnestly hope will procure for the US as well as the Iranians a tentative peace plan that will offset any sort of prospective warfare between our nations. On the face of it, these four recommendations might be peace under the guise of an armistice, however that is not at all my objective. I understand that the ultimate peace and
7

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/ffpfaqs.htm

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American Foreign Policy Process

6 April 8th 2013

reconciliation between the US and the Iranians might very well have different ramifications and components to it, I believe these four policy recommendations might very well secure a peace that is bound by integrity, honesty as well as candor between our nations. I will also make it a point to gauge any sort of repercussions or blowback these policy suggestions might accrue. However I will be mindful of their far-reaching benefits and will convey these suggestions in this communique that Im dispatching to the Secretary. Policy #1 Policy 1 is meant to be an overture to the Iranians to mend their ways and ameliorate any sort of misconceptions that theyre conveying to the world community regarding their present nuclear capability. Due to the Iranians being a signatory of the NPT Treaty and being privy to the IAEA inspectors, theyve got to understand that theyve got an obligation not to proliferate. Under these contractually binding agreements, any non-nuclear-weapons state that is actively seeking to proliferate will promptly be faced with censure. I also understand that this is also an issue of national pride, integrity and prestige that Iran is cultivating, hence the readiness to insist that theyre taking these measures in conjunction with their inherent rights as a sovereign nation. However with their being bound contractually to the NPT Treaty, complying with the spirit of the IAEA protocols and provisions is an obligation that they cannot avoid. Though many policymakers in the US and around the world gripe at the fact that Iran has got any sort of nuclear capability to begin with, we should not deny the Iranians the right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities for the benefits of energy, science and medicine. What the Iranians should be doing is complying with the IAEA as a sort of reciprocity that ensures that theyll abide by the rules of the game, hence there should not at all be a reticence to make a full disclosure to the IAEA regarding the full capability of Tehrans nuclear facilities. That would allow for an accounting and abiding by the compact of the IAEA would ensure that spent fuel is not being diverted to a weapons-site and is properly disposed of.

Partha P. Choudhury MLINS 6354-N LEC Policy #2

American Foreign Policy Process

7 April 8th 2013

Hence, if theres compliance with Policy 1, Policy 2 would then ultimately defang any sort of war posturing by our countries and render it untenable and unnecessary. In regards to the diplomatic realm, we can at least pursue a tentative agreement to incept the normalization of relations between the US and Iran. The grievances the US has with Iran range from their clandestine terror advocacy and Israel. We have got to understand that no matter how much we might presently detest the notion of Iran being a formidable country in the Mideast and in the world, the Iranians are free to exercise their rights as a sovereign nation. In a world where there are so many cultural and anthropological differences between nations, Iran feels justification that its conducting its activities as a state that shouldnt face censure from the world community as well as the US. If we were to establish a dialogue between the Iranians, then that would be a formative first-step that would dispel the conceptualization of a war from the very beginning. I feel that the Secretary needs to keep that in mind and it is something that should be particularly conveyed to the Iranians in a meaningful way thats genuine. Policy #3 In an age of globalization, there can be many steps taken in order to reestablish ties with the Iranians not only between governmental bodies but civil groups such as student and professional groups that are the most open to a sort of glasnost and exchange of ideas whereas the host governments might have enmity between each other. International cultural exchanges meant to foster goodwill have often proven formative and fruitful whenever it comes to dispelling notions of hostility whenever rival powers are concerned. This in turn can exchange human capital allocation between our two countries for students as well as professionals.

Partha P. Choudhury MLINS 6354-N LEC Policy #4

American Foreign Policy Process

8 April 8th 2013

The world body including the US, the EU and the United Nations can start the easement of sanctions against Iran that has crippled their economy and devalued their currency, the rial. It is evident from history that sanctions superimposed upon countries meant to change their behavior have almost never proven to be successful. Iran, seemingly despotic as though we may vilify the government to be, is not a third-world nation and there is still a lot of affinity and loyalty that the Iranians have for their national government. Though a reason for the sanctions regimen is meant to be taken as a precautionary measure by the United Nations and the European Union to stop Iran from proliferating nuclear weapons, the US sanctions against Iran has got to do with a nationalistic rivalry that our nations have with each other. If we were to pursue the normalization of ties and make an overture of reciprocity of trade, this in turn can be a formative step to get a country to change its behavior. The likelihood of trading partners waging war against each other is not very likely as theyve both got trading interests that are mutually symbiotic, hence warfare would be deftly avoided in just a situation. It can also mean the influx of an influence that can usher in reforms in the country that not only the US would find beneficial but the Iranian civil population as well. This of course lends itself to the Iranian subsidization of terror groups such as Hezbollah and the war chattel that they send to Syrian government, which would be promptly curtailed once the notion of peace that is lasting and just can be achieved. Assessment of Possible Blowbacks From Aforementioned Policy Suggestions For each of the policy objectives that Ive outlined to the Secretary, there might be repercussions or blowbacks that could arise from implementing these policies. For Policy #1, a possible blowback could be hesitation from the Iranians regarding their being candid about their nuclear activities. Though under the specter of the world community, the government of Iran feels that it has an inherent right to pursue nuclear activities and could readily dismiss IAEA agents who seek to monitor these facilities where nuclear capability might be weaponized. But I feel that due to the Iranians being a signatory to the

Partha P. Choudhury MLINS 6354-N LEC

American Foreign Policy Process

9 April 8th 2013

NPT Treaty and being privy to the IAEA, Iran has no choice but to yield to this demand. For Policy #2, not everyone between our two countries have got the same mentality towards peace as others do. Both in the US, among conservatives and neoconservatives, and a little bellicose diatribe from President Ahmadinejad meant to save face and the dignity of the Iranians, can lead to a war in which a leader feels that theyve got no other choice but to wage warfare. Getting the Iranians to change their tune overnight regarding terror groups or Israel simply is not a possibility, but by establishing a dialogue with them can be a formative first step that can salvage peace from the onset. For Policy #4, the easement of sanctions on Iran between the world community with the US might be met with conflict from domestic groups in the US who have had it in their minds to vilify Iran and perpetuate the sanctions regimen. Another issue to grasp is that the biggest commodity that the Iranians have is oil, and due to issues regarding the environment and ecological groups in the US might very well want to normalize relations with the Iranians but dont want to incrementally aid to climate change by facilitating the oil industry. These are all possible blowbacks. Summation Secretary Kerry, I hope that youve been mindful of these possible solutions and alternatives and their ramifications that Ive presented to you. The primer on the history that Iran has had with the US is something that you are very well aware of. But Ive presented to you four forward-leaning policy suggestions that I feel that you often dont get to hear from associates in the State Department, the White House or your former Senate colleagues. Due to your background with the military while serving in Vietnam, youve seen atrocities being committed and have publicly testified to their veracity. And I know that due to your affiliation with the US government, theres no uniformity when it comes to ideologies presented to you on a daily basis. And like you, Im insistent that the Iranians shouldnt proliferate their nuclear capability to make an arsenal of weapons. But starting a war against a nation whose people have expatriates in our own country and whose youthful population have an affinity for the US, you should be able to distinguish that the belligerence of the Iranian government isnt emblematic of

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American Foreign Policy Process

10 April 8th 2013

its people. Case in point, the sham 2009 Iranian elections in which the majority of the Iranian population was reform-minded and voted for Mousavi however got Ahmadinejad for another term. The Iranian regime isnt wholly representative of the values of the people and I feel that youve got the diplomatic tact to convey clearly to the Iranians the incentives not to proliferate in their nuclear facilities. As methods of warfare are getting more refined and the amount of high casualties can be inflicted with a touch of a button, the institution of warfare is incrementally getting more methodical and sterile. And resolving the Iranian dilemma by means of warfare goes squarely against the assertions and conjectures that Ive presented to you. Although theres a plurality of opinion on this matter, I sincerely hope that youll take my advice and present the array of incentives to the Iranians and hopefully resolve it peaceably.

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American Foreign Policy Process

11 April 8th 2013

Works Cited (American Political Science Format)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. PBS. Background To A Crisis. 2005. http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran403/background.html. Johnson, Zachary K. BBC. Iran Signs Up To Nuclear Checks. 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3327065.stm. United Nations. Security Council Resolution 1696. 2006. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm United Nations. Treaty On The Nonproliferation Of Nuclear Weapons. 1968. http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml BBC. Iran installing new Natanz centrifuges, says IAEA. 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east21537206 Arms Control Association. Safeguards Noncompliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the UN Security Council. 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Goldschmidt IMF. Impact of High Food and Fuel Prices on Developing CountriesFrequently Asked Questions. 2012. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/ffpfaqs.htm