NATCHER vs.

COURT OFAPPEALS FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esgeurra were registered owners of a parcel of land located in Manila and covered by TCT No. 11889. Upon the death of Gracianain 1951, Graciano together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children. Further, on February 9, 1954 said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several slots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land leaving only a portion registered under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained the ownership over the second lot.On March 20, 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued in the latters name. On October 7, 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife and six children by his first marriage as heirs. In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the RTC of Manila, Br. 55, herein private respondent alleged that upon Gracianos death, Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated June 25, 1987 in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired. In her answer, Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, he already distributed in advance, properties to his children hence, herein private respondent may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property. After trial, RTC Manila rendered a decision holding the Deed of Sale as prohibited by law and thus, a complete nullity. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the lower courts decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/annulment of title with damages, may adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.

HELD: No. there lays a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or a right of a party or a particular fact. Usually, in a special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceases person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the natures of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rule as provided for in the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive proving of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The RTC in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of the title with damages is not the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

Rodriguez v. De Borja FACTS: The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case HELD: The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is

deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.

Ilustre v. Alaras FACTS: From the record it appears that Franciso Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903. It also appears from the record that at the time of his death he was the owner of certain property, some of which was described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. The plaintiff alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed. On the 31st of July, 1909, nearly six years after the death of the said Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to recover the property described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. The defendant demurred to the complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the administrator was validly appointed HELD: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (Arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

Vda. De Lopez v. Lopez FACTS: On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased (Sp. Proc No. 3740), filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, 1 represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributees. ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to reopen was filed on time. HELD: A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in intestate proceedings) does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

Estate of Olave v. Reyes FACTS: The petition alleged that the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters, situated in sitio Tibambam, barrio Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy (now Governor Generoso), province of Davao, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-27 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Province; that in April 1965 herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 with the respondent Court of First Instance of Davao against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02; that on May 8, 1965, defendants Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute in said Civil Case No. 4623, filed an answer denying their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of SAMCO; that on October 25, 1966 in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, issued an order directing the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate, of which the property described in OCT No. 0-27 is one of them; that on October 20, 1967, the parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim; that the said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings; that on November 10, 1967, respondent court, despite the opposition of the other parties who sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 4623 and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property covered by OCT No. 0-27, containing an area of 293,578 square meters and with an assessed value of P31,700.00 to SAMCO in payment of its claim for only P19,952.11; and, that if the said Order of respondent dated November 10, 1967 is not set aside, the same will operate as a judgment that "conveys illegally and unfairly, the property of petitioner-estate without the requisite approval of the probate court of Manila, which has the sole jurisdiction to convey this property in custodia legis of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the administrator can enter into any transaction involving the estate of the deceased person without prior approval of the probate court. HELD: Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the

claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

Mang-oy v. Court of Appeals FACTS: On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" the dispositive portion of which declared: Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after departing from this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what I have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will affix my right thumbmark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are present and have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet, 4th September, 1937. The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as follows: We who are named children and who will inherit from our father TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in truth after swearing under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also acknowledge or recognize the lands as included in the area of said land as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by him concerning our right to the land which we will inherit and also to those whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416 because we were all called be present and hear his wilt We heard and agreed to his will as appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit. We also recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will also be the one, to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will demand the partition in accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the Testament which we saw and have heard by all. It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our brother BANDO who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm in this instrument that will answer for all the expenses when it shag be surveyed so the share of each will be segregated so also with the approval of the title, which shall appear the name of each of us and that we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall pertain to us as embodied in the said win of our father TUMPAO. We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary Public here in Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also with the wig of our father so that they be one to be followed as regard upon by all and we affix our right thumbmark at the end of our written name because we do not know how to read and write this 7th day of September, 1937 in the City of Baguio. Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the other abovequoted instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later, that brought this matter to the courts. On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. By virtue of this

partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of the three respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the reconveyance of their shares over the property of the deceased. HELD: The will alone, would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not probated, However, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them. Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought ten years from the time the right of action accrues: 1) upon a written contract; 2) Upon an obligation created by law; 3) Upon a judgment. Any formal defect of the deed was cured by the lapse of time. What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the land of Old Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total area was more than 35,000 square meters, Under the old Civil Code, it was within the free disposable portion of ones' estate despite the existence of any forced heirs. In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas respectively owned and occupied by them and to pay the costs. We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of NonChristian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of properties or property right. It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

Maninang v. Court of Appeals FACTS: On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder: "x x x "It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. x x x I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will." "x x x" On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig. On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge. Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid HELD: We find that the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. "x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated x x x" "Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."

Castro v. Martinez FACTS: Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz, city of Cebu, valued at 200 pesos, not including the ground whereon the same is erected, which although belonging to her, was, according to the title of ownership held by her and recorded in the registry of property was only worth 100 pesos. On the 17th of October, 1896, before a notary and the proper number of witnesses she executed a nuncupative will under which she died and wherein she disposed of the house in which she lived, being the one referred to in the foregoing paragraph, and of some furniture and credits of small importance. By one of its clauses she bequeathed 10 pesos to each one of her nephews, the children of her brother Valentin, named Godofredo, Mateo, Quitin, Romana, Salud, and Constancia, all of the surname of Cuico y Rodis. Of these, Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and another of the name of Ignacio, together with Teopista Castro challenged the will, after Mateo and Quintin had on the 19th of January, 1897, received their legacies filing their complaints on the 15th of October, 1902, against certain persons, and on the 22nd of September, 1903, against others. Under the will Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed executors, and in compliance with clause 4 of the same they sold the house and ground for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut on the 22nd of January, 1897, and afterwards Ferragut on the 10th of February following, sold it for the same price to Tomas Osmea; the later in turn on the 18th of January, 1902, sold it to Martinez Gallegos, and the latter finally on the 28th of May, 1903, sold it to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2,500 pesos. The statement contained in the brief of the appellees, namely, "that Gallegos sold or pretended to sell the house on the 22nd of January, 1897, and to buy the same in his own name nineteen days later, that is, on the 10th of February of the same year" (p. 3), does not appear to be true. ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid HELD: As the will in question was executed in 1896 under the laws then in force, the provisions of a law now in force but which did not exist can not be invoked. At that time the notary who authorized the will had to abide by the provisions of article 64 of the Notarial Law of the 11th of April, 1890: If the party, or parties executing a will are unable to sign the same, the notary shall so state, and a witness shall sign for him without the necessity of previously stating that he does so as a witness and on behalf of the testator, or testators, who are not able to do so, because it is the duty of the notary to make such statement in the instrument itself" as was stated by the notary who authorized the will in question, saying that the testatrix ratified the contents of the will, and that she did not sign the same because she was prevented by her illness, "the witness Casals doing so at her reguest . . . ." Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able to sign, one of the attesting witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his request, the notary certifying thereto. (Civil Code, art. 695.) It is a legal doctrine established by repeated decisions in cassation, among others those of April 26, 1861, October 28, 1867, and March 17 and December 17, 1873, that nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity; and the plaintiffs have

limited themselves to asking that they be declared the owners of the property of the late Marcelina Cuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity of the will whereby Marcelina transmitted said property to others. In the event that the will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons. Should such a procedure be followed, the present plaintiffs would not be declared to have the same rights to the inheritance of Marcelina Cuico, if, as Teopista Castro pretends, she is but a sister to Marcelina Cuico, while the others are nephews, the children of a full brother to the said testatrix. Therefore, neither directly nor indirectly could it have been declared in this action that "Teopista Castro, Ignacio Mateo (Ignacio Cuico and Mateo Cuico seem to be two different persons), Quintino Cuico, and Constancia Cuico were at the time of the death of the said Marcelina Cuico y Rodis, and even now are, the legal heirs of the said Marcelina Cuico y Rodis."

Fernandez v. Tantoco FACTS: On September 9, 1925, Basilia Tantoco, aged 62 years, executed an instrument purporting to be her will, she being at the time a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital in the City of Manila. Her death occurred a few days after the will executed, and application for probate was made by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to probate was made by three brothers and a nephew of the deceased. At the time set for the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, the proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument, namely, Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay, and Placido Suarez, as well as Aurea Gaspar, sister-in-law of the deceased who had been in attendance upon her at the hospital. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial judge refused to allow it to be probated, for the reason that the three attesting witnesses are not in harmony upon the point whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when the testatrix and the witnesses affixed their signatures to the document. No testimony was submitted by the opposition, and the criticisms made by the trial judge with respect to the sufficiency of the proof of execution arise exclusively upon the testimony of the witnesses for the proponent. ISSUE: Whether or not the instrument is indeed the last will and testament of Basilia Tantoco HELD: In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the instrument, even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of them. With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment of the document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And such irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can be denied.

Ocampo v. Ocampo FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.[5] The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents. Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004,[6] contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents estate. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima. ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of special administrators was valid. HELD: It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.[36] The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondents insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004[46] discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property situated in Bian, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of

the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed stipulated for a payment of P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease between the vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported Deed of Absolute Sale over the same realty between respondents, and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already had the signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount of P500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been distant from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts.

Estate of Hilario Ruiz v. Court of Appeals FACTS: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will. On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. ISSUE: Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. HELD: It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.

Echaus v. Blanco FACTS: Petitioner Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased father Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, Rene Echaus filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary damages The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6628 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. On July 20, 1962, C. N. Hodges, through counsel, filed his Answer. Trial on the merits commenced on December 7, 1962, with the testimony of Angelina Echaus. Sometime thereafter, counsel for C. N. Hodges manifested that defendant C. N. Hodges died on December 25, 1962. No motion to dismiss was filed by C. N. Hodges' counsel. On February 14, 1964, the trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party defendant. No objection to the order was interposed by PCIB. A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the date of which does not appear in the records, and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation in its issues of March 13, 20 and 27, 1963. ISSUE: Whether or not the claims against the estate were validly filed. HELD: The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The rule provides: Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Rule 86) It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule 86]) that the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. At the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of the judgement credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. Also, it is worthy to cite herein a situation, similar to the case at bar. which was considered by this court as a good excuse for the late filing of a claim against the decedent. Here the claim filed in the probate court on February 25,1959, while the defendants in the civil case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded, to say is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim.

Quasha Ancheta Pena v. LCN Construction FACTS: Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. M1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. LCN, as the only remaining claimant4 against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special Proceedings Case No. M-1678, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate as required by the court. LCN also averred that the administrators and the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere had earlier agreed to fix the former's fees at only 5% of the gross estate, based on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even overpaid P55,000.00. LCN further asserted that contrary to what was stated in the second Motion for Payment. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may enforce its claims for payment of attorneys fees against the estate of the deceased. HELD: Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same. The records of the case are wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-administrator of the estate. None of the documents attached pertain to the issuance of letters of administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty. Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give credence to petitioner's contention that while it rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters of administration.

The attorney's fees, therefore, cannot be covered by the prohibition in the third paragraph of Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court against an attorney, to charge against the estate professional fees for legal services rendered by them. However, while petitioner Quasha Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC in its 12 June 2003 Order, the same may be collected from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel (not anymore as co-administrator), representing and performing legal services for the Triviere children in the settlement of the estate of their deceased father.

Tirso T.Reyes v. Barreto-Datu FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew an nieces The usufruct o the fishpon situate i barrio Sa Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name. Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.1 Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the partition is valid HELD: Independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. We hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a

possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due course.

Lim v. Continental Development Corporation FACTS: In the books of the plaintiff, there appears the name of the defendant Benito Gervasio Tan as one of its stockholders initially sometime in 1975 with fifty (50) common shares covered by of stock Nos. 12 and 13, and subsequently credited with (75) shares by way of dividends covered by certificates of stock Nos. 20 and 25, or an outstanding total stockholding of one hundred twenty five (125) common shares of the par value of Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00) each. That said defendant Benito Gervasio Tan, personally or through his lawyer, has since December, 1972, been demanding from by letters and telegrams, the release to him of the certificates stock aforesaid but which the plaintiff has not done so far and is prevented from doing so because of the vehement and adverse claim thereto by the other defendant, Zoila Co Lim. That the defendant Zoila Co Lim, by letters sent to the plaintiff through her counsel, has laid claim and persists in claiming the very same shares of stock being demanded by the other defendant alleging that said stocks really belonged to her mother So now already deceased, and strongly denying her proclaim to the same. ISSUE: Whether or not interpleader is the proper remedy. HELD: Rule 63, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court tells us when a cause of action exists to support a complaint in interpleader: Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the complainants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. This provision only requires as an indispensable requisite: that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Indeed, petitioner corporation is placed in the same situation as a lessee who does not know the person to whom he will pay the rentals due to the conflicting claims over the property leased, or a sheriff who finds himself puzzled by conflicting claims to a property seized by him. In these examples, the lessee were each allowed to file a complaint in interpleader to determine the respective rights of the claimants.

Dy Poco v. Commissioner of Immigration FACTS: The petition for declaratory judgment was based on the allegations that petitionerappellant is a Filipino, having been born in 1910 in Cebu City, out of wedlock, of a Filipino mother, Susana Apura, who died in 1928, and a Chinese father, Dy Poco, who died in 1915; that believing himself at first to be a Chinese, petitioner secured alien certificates of registration in 1947 and 1951; that in 1952, petitioner-appellant, realizing his mistake, petitioned the Commissioner of Immigration for cancellation of his name from the list of aliens, which petition was denied. On petitioners request for reconsideration of said ruling, the Secretary of Justice, to whom the matter was referred, rendered an opinion (Op. No. 72, s-1965) sustaining the stand of the Commissioner, for the reason that the nationality of the mother and the illegitimate status of petitioner had not been satisfactorily established. Upon being required, subsequently, by the immigration authorities to secure an immigrant certificate of residence, petitioner instituted the present declaratory relief proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. As heretofore stated, in its decision of April 10, 1957, the court dismissed the petition, on the ground that the declaration of citizenship is not a proper subject of a proceeding for declaratory judgment. Petitioner has appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not declaratory relief is the proper remedy. HELD: Even in the United States, where the law on declaratory judgment permits, in certain specific instances, inquiry on questions of fact during the proceedings, the prevailing rule is that where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment.And, here, the material issues are the citizenship of the mother and the illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and status of the latter which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues. It may be observed further that our Rules contain no similar provision. Taking into consideration the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights, and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason for us to adhere to the rule that a declaratory relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts.

Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel FACTS: On June 30, 1960, respondent Herminio G. Teves entered into an agreement with the National Rice and Corn Corporation. By virtue thereof, Teves was authorized "to act as Agent" of the Naric "in exporting" rice "as well as in importing the collateral goods" that will be brought in "thru barter under the NARIC Chapter and the arrangements with other government agencies, as presently authorized and to buy the aforementioned collateral goods." Shortly after the execution of the contract, allegedly because of the acute shortage of staple products that cropped up in the country, the President of the Philippines suspended all projected rice exportations including that of Teves. But Teves, representing that he already had contractual commitments here to supply third parties with the goods he intended to import, and likewise abroad for the barter of local rice with foreign products, sought authority from the President and his cabinet to import ahead of the exportation the collateral commodities supposed to have been bartered under his agreement with the NARIC namely, 40% essentials, 20% semiessentials and 40% non-essentials. On October 26, 1960, the President and his cabinet granted the authority requested. The license of Teves to import was revalidated "for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days" from October 26, 1960, "Provided the importation of such collateral commodities shall be limited only to the extent of [his] contractual commitments with foreign suppliers as of September 14, 1960" and that "the existence of such contractual commitments shall be verified by the Administrator of Economic Coordination." In accordance therewith, Teves imported within the period from April 17, 1961 to January 12, 1962, twenty two (22) shipments or more of merchandise consisting largely of 84 cases (70) units of Toyopet cars, several bags of synthetic rubber and resin, medicinal preparations, and radio and electronic parts and motors, and other items. Customs duties and taxes therefor were paid. On January 12, 1962, the Economic Coordinator wrote Commissioner of Customs[both positions were then concurrently held by Cesar C. Climaco] stating "[a]s per agreement with the Chairman-General Manager of the NARIC we are requesting that you hold goods coming in as importations, using the name of NARIC and same should only be released after clearance by the NARIC, through the Office of Economic Coordination. Because of this, the shipments of Teves just mentioned were withheld by the Commissioner, pending compliance by Teves of said directive of January 12, 1962. On March 7, 1962, the Executive Secretary wrote the Commissioner saying that "the President, at the Cabinet meeting today, decided that action on this matter be taken upon consultation and/or collaboration with the Secretary of Justice." The matter of the legality of the shipments was, therefore, referred to the Secretary of Justice. Teves asked the justice secretary and the Commissioner to have the imported goods delivered to him, because of the deteriorating nature of some of them, upon the filing of surety bonds. To this request of Teves, the Secretary of Justice acceded. In the latter's 3rd indorsement dated April 25, 1962, addressed to the Commissioner, he wrote that " [s]ince the question concerning the legality of the importations of Mr. Herminio G. Teves

has been brought to court in Civil Case No. 49977 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled 'Herminio G. Teves, Petitioner, vs. Teotimo A. Roja ... and Cesar C. Climaco, Respondents,' [this case was not heard and was subsequently withdrawn on motion of Teves after the shipments were released under bond3 and is now sub judice, this Department cannot with propriety give its views on the matter, as requested." The Secretary added that "[h]owever, in line with our 1st indorsement of April 2, 1962, regarding the release of perishable food products, this Office will interpose no objection to the release to the recorded consignee or his duly authorized representative of the seventy units of Toyopet cars and other shipments which are not banned, subject to the conditions stated in the within 1st indorsement dated March 15, 1962 i.e., 'upon filing of special time deposit required by Central Bank Circular 137 and/or filing of sufficient bond to protect the interests of the government' pending judicial determination of the legality of the importations of Mr. Teves under the 'NARIC Rice Barter'". Teves then posted surety bonds, accepted by the Commissioner, in the total amount of P294,620.25: some issued by Meridian Assurance Corporation amounting to P169,784.64, the rest by Fieldmen's Insurance Company for P124,835.61. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge abuse his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. HELD: By Section 1, Rule 58, 1964 Rules of Court, it is now expressly provided though already long generally recognized that a court, at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, may "require the performance of a particular act, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction." But, stock must be taken of the truism that, like preventive injunctions, it is but a provisional remedy to which parties may resort "for the preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action."7 More than this, as a mandatory injunction "usually tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing."8 Per contra, it may issue "in cases of extreme urgency, where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation.9 Indeed, "the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.

PCGG v. Polygon Investors and Managers FACTS: Silangan and Polygon owned 25,429 (39.999%) and 12,700 (19.977%) shares of stock, respectively, in Oceanic. On 11 April 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) issued a writ of sequestration against Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto), Jose L. Africa (Jose), Victor A. Africa (Victor), and Alfredo L. Africa. On 27 July 1987, PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint[10] for reconveyance, accounting and damages against Jose, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. (Nieto, Jr.), Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0009. On 15 June 1988, PCGG issued writs of sequestration against Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (Aerocom) and Polygon, stating, By virtue of the authority vested in the Commission, the above-named [companies are] hereby placed under sequestration, together with all of the shares of stock, office premises, records, documents, assets and other properties thereof. By virtue of the writs of sequestration, PCGG sequestered majority of Oceanics shares of stock and took over its management. PCGG voted the shares of stock registered in the names of Silangan and Polygon, reorganized the board of directors, elected its own set of officers, and declared cash dividends. On 3 November 1990, Benedicto and PCGG entered into a compromise agreement. On 1 August 1991, Jose, Nieto, Jr., Andres L. Africa, Aerocom, Polygon, Belgor Investment, Inc., and Silangan filed before the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against PCGG. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the release of the cash dividends, with interest, to Silangan and Polygon because (1) the cash dividends were under custodia legis, and (2) the acts of PCGG in managing Oceanic including the declaration of cash dividends were void. HELD: PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Resolutions ordering the release to Silangan and Polygon of their Oceanic cash dividends, with interest, were grounded on sound legal and factual bases: (1) PCGG agreed to the release to Silangan of 49% of its cash dividends, with interest; (2) Benedictoceded to the government his 51% equity in Silangan, not Oceanic; (3) Silangan, being a stockholder of Oceanic, was entitled to the cash dividends declared by the company; (4) Silangan engaged the services of M.M. Lazaro & Associates and agreed to pay 15% of the total amount it may recover as contingent fee; (5) in its 25 April 1994 Decision, theSandiganbayan declared void PCGGs sequestration of the Oceanic shares of stock in the names of Polygon, Aerocom, Silangan, Belgor, Jose and Victor Silanan and Polygon were not sequestered; (6) In Presidential Commission, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayans 25 April 1994 Decision; (7) Presidential Commission became final andexecutory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments; (8) the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of execution, dated 30 September

2003, to implement the 25 April 1994 Decision; and (9) the 30 September 2003 writ of execution was implemented. Silangan and Polygon are entitled to their Oceanic cash dividends, with interest, because they are not sequestered or impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009.

Philippine National Bank v. Florendo FACTS: Plaintiffs are tenants of four (4) parcels of land located in the municipality of Mabinay, Negros Oriental, whose previous owner Ricardo Valeroso, mortgaged the same to the Philippine National Bank (PNB, for short). In 1971, said parcels of land were bought by spouses Agripino and Soledad Viloria who assumed the mortgage with PNB. In 1974, defendant PNB requested defendant Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental to foreclose the mortgage on the aforesaid parcels of land after the failure of the owners thereof to pay certain amortization and the same was sold at public auction to the defendant bank as the highest bidder. Notwithstanding the fact that said lands were already brought under the Land Reform Program of the government, the PNB caused the titles to said parcels of land transferred in its name to the prejudice of plaintiffs. On September 8, 1981, plaintiffs Vivienne B. Viloria, et al. filed a complaint for "Declaration of Nullity of the Foreclosure Proceedings in Violation of P.D. Nos. 27 and 946" against the defendants PNB, et al. in the Court of Agrarian Relations, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Dumaguete City. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. HELD: The order of the respondent Judge admitting the First Amended Complaint including therein said questioned Lot 787-B-2-A which is a residential lot not falling within the ambit of PD 27, hence, beyond CAR's jurisdiction, was issued in excess of jurisdiction. The term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board or officer has jurisdiction over a case but oversteps such jurisdiction while acting thereon (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Caleda., et al., 122 Phil. 355 [1965]). Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction . . ." (Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205.[1970]. It is the proper remedy "where it clearly appears that the trial court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction . . ." (Baloria v. Abalos, 32 SCRA 368 [1970]; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 303 [1971]; Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, 41 SCRA 213 [1971]). Since the "office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be legally used for any other purpose" (Albert v. CFI of Manila, Br. VI, 23 SCRA 948 [1968]), said remedy is available in the instant case to keep the trial court from proceeding in the case in excess of its jurisdiction. The private respondents Viloria, et al.'s contention that the petition for certiorari is premature since the order of the respondent judge could have simply been assigned as an error in the appeal by the petitioner in case of adverse judgment is not persuasive. Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction.

Yan v. Manila Banking Corporation FACTS: Esteban Yau is the judgment creditor of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. by virtue of a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 dated March 27, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-2058, entitled Esteban Yau v. Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, et al., which included Silverio as one of the defendants. The decision became final and executory and, accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. Despite service of the writ and demand by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment, the defendants therein, including Silverio, failed to pay said judgment. The only asset of Silverio that could be found for the satisfaction of the judgment was his proprietary membership share in the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Manila Golf). Accordingly, the sheriff levied upon the Silverio share on December 7, 1992. At the public auction sale on December 29, 1992, Yau emerged as the highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at P2 Million and the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his name. However, at the time of the execution sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to separate writs of preliminary attachment dated March 27, 1990 and October 17, 1990 obtained by the Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank) from Branches 62 and 64 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City before which complaints for sums of money, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 90-513 and 90-271, respectively, were pending, in which Silverio is also one of the defendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Thus, the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competency of the RTC Cebu City to entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Silverio share which is under the custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Clearly, Yau, being the judgment creditor of Silverio in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 and the purchaser at the public auction sale of the Silverio share, would be adversely affected by the disposition of the Silverio share, subject of the writ of attachment issued by Branch 64 of RTC Makati City, should a decision be rendered in favor of Manilabank and, as such, has standing to intervene to protect his interest. Besides, no purpose will be served by not allowing Yau to protect his interests before Branch 64 where the Silverio share is under custodia legis. If we follow the contention of Manilabank, this would result in a violation of the aforementioned principle of judicial stability or noninterference.

Vera v. Avelino FACTS: Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will. During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election. Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. ISSUES: Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid. HELD The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Co. v. The National Telecommunications and Cellcom, Inc. FACTS: Petitioner assails two (2) orders of public respondent National Telecommunications Commission granting private respondent Express Telecommunications (ETCI) provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro Manila now ETCI in accordance with specific conditions on the following grounds;1.ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its legislative franchise to operate a system-wide telephone or network of telephone service such as the one proposed in its application;2.ETCI lacks the facilities needed and indispensable to the successful operation of the proposed cellular mobile telephone system; 3.PLDT has its pending application with NTC Case No 86-86, to install and operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service not only in Manila but also in the provinces and that under the prior operator or protection of investment doctrine, PLDT has the priority preference in the operation of such service; and4.the provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless, uneconomical, and harmful duplication, among others. After evaluating the consideration sought by the PLDT, the NTC, maintain edits ruling that liberally construed, applicants franchise carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain a cellular mobile telephone service. Subsequently, PLDT alleged essentially that the interconnection ordered was in violation of due process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. However, NTC denied their consideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of PLDT is tenable. HELD: A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise"(Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court),the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of the Government.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge FACTS: In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry by lease or otherwise from Charlestown to Boston, passing over Charles River. The right to set up a ferry between these places had been given by the governor under the authority of the Court of Assistance, by an order dated November 9, 1636, to a particular individual, and was afterwards leased successively to others, they having the privilege of taking tolls regulated in the grant; and when, in 1650, the franchise of this ferry was granted to the college, the rights of the lessees in the same had expired. Under the grant, the college continued to hold the ferry by its lessees and receive the profits therefrom until 1785, when the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company to build a bridge over Charles River where the ferry stood, granting them tolls, the company to pay to Harvard College two hundred pounds a year during the charter, for forty years, which was afterwards extended to seventy years, after which the bridge was to become the property of the Commonwealth. The bridge was built under this charter, and the corporation received the tolls allowed by the law, always keeping the bridge in order and performing all that was enjoined on them to do. In 1828, the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated another company for the erection of another bridge, the Warren Bridge, over Charles River from Charlestown to Boston, allowing the company to take tolls, commencing in Charlestown, near where the Charles River Bridge commenced, and terminating in Boston about eight hundred feet from the termination of the Charles River Bridge. The bridge was to become free after a few years, and has actually become free. Travelers who formerly passed over the Charles River Bridge from Charlestown square now pass over the Warren Bridge, and thus the Charles River Bridge Company are deprived of the tolls they would have otherwise received. The value of the franchise granted by the Act of 1783 is now entirely destroyed. The proprietors of the Charles River Bridge filed a bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts against the proprietors of the Warren Bridge, first for an injunction to prevent the erection of the bridge and afterwards for general relief, stating that the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts authorizing the building of the Warren Bridge was an act impairing the obligations of a contract, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill of the complainants, and the case was brought by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of the 25th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissing the bill of the plaintiffs in error was affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid expropriation. HELD: The case now before the Court is, in principle, precisely the same. It is a charter from a state; the act of incorporation is silent in relation to the contested power. The argument in favor of the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge is the same, almost in words, with that used by the Providence Bank -- that is, that the power claimed by the state, if it exists, may be so used as to destroy the value of the franchise they have granted to the corporation. The argument must receive the same answer, and the fact that the power has been already exercised so as to destroy the value of the franchise cannot in any degree affect the principle. The existence of the power does not, and cannot, depend upon the circumstance of its having been exercised or not. It may, perhaps, be said that, in the case of the Providence Bank, this Court were speaking of the taxing power, which is of vital importance to the very existence of every government. But the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established, and it can never be assumed that

the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created. And in a country like ours, free, active and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new channels of communication are daily found necessary, both for travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience and prosperity of the people. A State ought never to be presumed to surrender this power, because, like the taxing power, the whole community have an interest in preserving it undiminished. And when a corporation alleges that a State has surrendered, for seventy years, its power of improvement and public accommodation in a great and important line of travel, along which a vast number of its citizens must daily pass, the community have a right to insist, in the language of this Court, above quoted, "that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear." The continued existence of a government would be of no great value if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the functions it was designed to perform transferred to the hands of privileged corporations. The rule of construction announced by the Court was not confined to the taxing power, nor is it so limited in the opinion delivered. On the contrary, it was distinctly placed on the ground that the interests of the community were concerned in preserving undiminished the power then in question, and whenever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or diminished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting the public interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of construction must be the same. No one will question that the interests of the great body of the people of the state would, in this instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to a single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude competition for seventy years. While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.

Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified. Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution). ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the property. HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law (RA No. 8974).

De Villa v. Fabricante FACTS: Plaintiff filed this action before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to foreclose the mortgage executed by defendants covering two parcels of land situated in the same province. Defendants, after having been duly served with summons, filed a motion to dismiss, which was sustained, but, on appeal, this Court set aside the sustaining order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. As defendants failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, they were declared in default, and forthwith, plaintiff presented his evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are necessary parties. HELD: With regard to the expenses incurred be appellant in securing the reconstitution of the certificates of title covering the properties mortgaged which were lost during the liberation, we agree with the trial court that said expenses are not within the purview of the contract for the right thereto merely refers to any suit or judicial proceeding that may affect the title or ownership of said properties. The reconstitution of title is not of the nature therein contemplated. It appears that the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15 in the name of Maria G. Fabricante had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof a new one was issued in the name of Jose Jacob and Cecilia Baduria because the property was sold to the latter during the period of the mortgage. The encumbrance was however annotated on the back of the new certificate of title. Nevertheless, when this foreclosure case was instituted, only the mortgagor was included, while the subsequent purchasers were not made parties defendants. For this reason, the trial court found that the foreclosure of the mortgage insofar as said parcel is concerned cannot be decreed in view of the noninclusion of said purchasers. This is now assigned as error. This contention must be overruled, for we agree with the trial court that said purchasers are necessary parties to this action. This is clear from Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of the Court which provides that All persons having or claiming an interest in the premises subordinate in the right to that of the holder of the mortgage . . . shall be made defendants in the action. And this Court has held that if the mortgaged property is sold to another person, the mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants.

El Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca FACTS: This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906, the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands. As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the case by the trial court was valid. HELD: There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority of a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the same cause. This is as follows: SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal representative from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken. An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows: When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside. . . . It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.

The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of such proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once concluded. The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions; and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the motion was proper.

Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: Spouses Antonio Regondola and Dominga Zabat obtained a loan from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the loan, the Regondolas and the respondent bank entered into a contract of real estate mortgage. For failure of the Regondolas to fulful the terms of the contract, the respondent bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. The mortgaged property covered by TCT No. 57677 (495811, Caloocan Register of Deeds) was then sold at a public auction sale conducted by the Assistant City Sheriff of Caloocan City. The respondent bank was declared the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was registered on October 7, 1980. The Regondola spouses failed to redeem the property within the one-year period of redemption. Hence, the title to the property was consolidated in the name of the respondent bank. The transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the mortgagorspouses was later annulled and a new one (TCT No. 117068) was issued in favor of the private respondent. On October 28, 1984, the respondent bank sold the property to Nicanor Reyes. On October 5, 1985, the bank filed with the lower court a petition for issuance of a writ of possession. On October 7, 1985, the lower court issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of possession over the foreclosed property including the buildings and improvements therein in favor of the respondent bank. However, before the writ of possession could be implemented, petitioner-spouses Rafael Barican and Araceli Alejo filed a petition to stay its implementation. They opposed the writ of possession claiming that they are the real owners and actual possessors of the foreclosed property as evidenced by a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage they executed with spouses Regondolas. ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11232 for ownership of the foreclosed property is a bar or legal impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent bank, the highest bidder in the auction sale of the said foreclosed property. HELD: There is no question that "it is ministerial upon the Court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property ... But under the circumstances in the instant case, the Court cannot just ignore the claims of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11232 who are in possession that they are the owners of the property in question without first ventilating this issue in a proper hearing of the case on its merits. Likewise, the mind of the Court cannot rest at ease after finding that why did the DBP take five years, after the property mortgaged was foreclosed on October 10, 1980, to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession only on August 16, 1985? When Nicanor Reyes bought the property on October 28, 1984, why did the DBP not place Reyes in physical possession of the property? And why did Reyes not take possession of the property? And considering further that the DBP knew that Rafael Barican and his wife are in possession of the property, which is deduced from the argument of counsel for DBP that the Baricans are possessors in bad faith, why then did the DBP not file a complaint of ejectment against them?

Drilon v. Gaurana FACTS: A parcel of agricultural land known as Lot 1672, Nueva Valencia Cadastre, located in Sitio Dasan, Barrio Sto. Domingo, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo, is covered by Free Patent No. 455943 in the name of Manuel Drilon who was issued Original Certificate of Title No. F-10242 by the Register of Deeds of Iloilo. On September 4, 1970, herein respondent Luis Gaurana filed Civil Case No. 8323 entitled "LUIS GAURANA v. MANUEL DRILON, et al.," before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for "Annulment of Free Patent and/or Reconveyance" involving the above-described land. Petitioner filed his answer on September 29, 1970, with the special defense, among other things, that Lot 1673 was duly purchased by him from Evangeline Gaurana, wife of respondent Luis Gaurana, sometime in November, 1962, which sale was the basis of his application for free patent. On September 14, 1970, respondent filed another civil case, MC Civil Case No. 126, before the Municipal Court of Nueva Valencia, Sub-Province of Guimaras, Iloilo, also against herein petitioner, this time for "Forcible Entry" involving the same parcel of land as in CFI-Civil Case No. 8323, alleging that herein petitioner Manuel Drilon, "by means of stealth, force and strategy," took possession of the South-East portion of said land on July 14, 1970 and since then has retained possession of the premises notwithstanding demands upon him to vacate the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to try the case. HELD: The petition is without merit. It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the firing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4. Revised Rules of Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in a forcible entry case entirely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor wdl it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto.

Lim Si v. Lim FACTS: Plaintiff occupies two doors of an accessoria situated on Misericordia Street belonging to the Defendant. Plaintiff was an old lessee, and upon the reconstruction of the building Defendant allowed him to occupy two doors beginning July 15, 1953, without fixing any definite amount of rent, except that it was to be the same as what other lessees have been paying. In the month of January, 1954, Plaintiff proposed to pay P300 for each door, or P600 for both, which is the rent paid by another lessee occupying better quarters, but as Defendant could not make up his mind as to the amount of rent, it was agreed upon between them that Plaintiff should deposit the sum of P1,000, which shall be applied for the payment of the rents from the month of January, 1954. From that time on, Plaintiff had been offering a monthly rental of P600 for both doors, but Defendant refused to accept this offer. On April 2, 1954, Defendant demanded the payment of P700 as monthly rental from January 1, 1954. As the Plaintiff is not willing to pay his rent and he fears that Defendant would bring an action of unlawful detainer to eject him and to recover said rents for the premises Plaintiff had been depositing the monthly sum of P600 a month as rentals, first with the Defendant, later with the court. On the basis of the above facts, Plaintiff prays that the court fix a monthly rent of the premises at P600 beginning January 1, 1954, and that he be authorized to continue occupying said premises. ISSUE: Whether or not consignation was proper HELD: Consignation in court under Art. 1176, is not the proper proceedings to determine the relation between landlord and tenant, the period of life of the lease or tenancy, the reasonableness of the amount of rental, the right of tenant to keep the premise against the will of the landlord, etc. These questions should be decided in a case of ejectment or detainer cralaw under the provisions of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. In a case of ejectment, the landlord claims either that the lease has ended or been terminated or that the lessee has forfeited his right as such because of his failure to pay the rents as agreed upon or because he failed or refused to pay the new rentals fixed and demanded by the lessor. The lessee in his turn may put up the defense that according to law, the rental fixed and demanded of him is unreasonable, exorbitant and illegal law. We repeat that all these questions should be submitted and decided in a case of ejectment and cannot be decided in a case of consignation.

Pue v. Gonzales FACTS: Respondent and appellee Benito Gonzales is the owner of the building and the premises occupied by the eleven petitioners in these consignation cases. The premises are situated at Muelle de Binondo, San Nicolas, and Fundidor Streets, district of Binondo, Manila, about 150 meters away from Divisoria Market. Said petitioners were all tenants of respondent, occupying separate and distinct lots. With the exception of petitioner Pablo Ong alias Ong Kim Pan who began leasing his premises from respondent in 1945, all the rest or lessees of long standing, even before the war. Gonzales claims that the premises are commercial properties and are used as such by his tenants while the latter, not flatly denying the commercial nature of the property therein occupied, affirm that they are using them essentially for residential purposes. In none of these eleven leases has there been any written contract of lease, much less, for any long period of tenancy. The rentals were paid monthly and so, according to law it is to be understood that the leases were from month to month. The assessed value of the premises was P36,500 in the year 1941. Effective 1947, however, it has been raised by the City to P150,000. In February, 1947, the owner Benito Gonzales notified each and everyone of the eleven tenant-petitioners that effective that month, they were to pay the increased rents specified by him, presumably, deemed by him to be reasonable and commensurate with the increase in the assessment of his property and the corresponding taxes. The notice included a warning and advice that if they did not agree or were unwilling to pay the increased rentals, they (tenants) should vacate their respective premises. Despite the notice and the warning, all the eleven tenant-petitioners refused to vacate their places; they also refused to pay the new schedule of rents. So, on April 12, 1947, Gonzales filed in the Municipal Court of Manila ejectment proceedings, civil cases Nos. 3172 and 3173 against two of the tenants, Pablo Ong alias Ong Kim Pan and Ong Wa, presumably to serve as test cases, alleging that he (Gonzales) had terminated their leases, and asking that the said two defendants be ordered to vacate the premises and that they be directed to pay the increased rents fixed by the owner, effective April 1, 1947, until they left the places leased by them. The eleven tenants, including the two defendants in the ejectment cases, quite alert if not clever, however, must have foreseen and anticipated the legal steps that the owner would or was bound to take in view of their adamant refusal to either vacate the premises they were occupying or pay the rentals fixed and demanded of them, and using a familiar expression, they, as it were, beat him to the draw by filing in the lower court on March 31, 1947, that is, about twelve days before the filing of the ejectment cases, these eleven separate petitions for consignation, one for each tenant. Each petition alleged that the tenant-petitioner had made a formal tender of the rentals at the old rate observed previous to February, 1947, that is, rentals for the months of February and March of that year, but that the owner Gonzales without valid reason refused to accept and so each tenant-petitioner after having duly notified Gonzales, deposited on court the said rentals for two months by way of consignation, at the same time asking the court to allow him to continue depositing the monthly rental as they fell due, which he would appear to have done up to the time when the decision of the lower court was rendered. ISSUE: Whether or not consignation was proper. HELD: Consignation in court under article 1176 of the Civil Code,, is not the proper proceedings to determine the relation between landlord and tenant, the period or life of

the lease or tenancy, the reasonableness of the rental, the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of the landlord, etc. These questions should be decided in a case of ejectment or detainer like those two cases brought by Gonzales against two of the petitioners under the provisions of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. In a case of ejectment, the landlord claims either that the lease has ended or been terminated or that the lessee has forfeited his right as such because of his failure to pay the rents as agreed upon or because he failed or refused to pay the new rentals fixed and demanded by the lessor. The lessee in his turn may put up the defense that according to law, the rental demanded of him is unreasonable, exorbitant and illegal, or that the period of the lease has not yet expired, or that if the rental law (Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66) is applicable, and that the premises are destined solely for dwelling, he may not be ousted therefrom because the owner does not need them for his own use, etc. We repeat that all these questions should be submitted and decided in a case of ejectment and cannot be decided in a case of consignation. We find that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing these cases of consignation for the reason that the article 1176 of the Civil Code on the basis of which they were filed is not applicable, and because the questions involved in said cases properly belong to a case of ejectment where the relation between landlord and tenant, the nature of the leased premises involved, the reasonableness of the rentals demanded, the right or lack of tenant to continue occupying the premises against the will of the landlord, the applicability of the rental law, etc. will be determined.

Planas v. Madrigal FACTS: This petition stems from a case of forcible entry and detainer instituted by Madrigal & Co., Inc., against Concepcion L. Planas and Iluminado L. Planas in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 954), which culminated in a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, whereby the latter were ordered to vacate the property in litigation and to pay to the former the corresponding rentals for their occupancy of the property until it is vacated. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals and became final and executory. On November 28, 1952, upon petition of plaintiff, a writ of execution was issued by the court and was given course by the clerk of court by virtue of which the defendants were given 15 days within which to vacate the land. Defendants having failed to do so, plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a special order of demolition of the buildings constructed thereon. On December 16, 1952, Juan Planas filed an action in the same court claiming to be the owner of two of the buildings, plus two other adjacent buildings marked as annexes, contemplated to be demolished and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The writ prayed for was denied. Instead, the court granted the motion of plaintiff for the demolition of the buildings belonging to the defendants. On January 23, 1953, the provincial sheriff commenced the demolition of the buildings, whereupon Juan Planas filed on January 28, 1953 with said sheriff a third-party claim alleging to be the owner of the four buildings which were ordered to be demolished as belonging to defendants, and on the same date, January 28, 1953, Sofia Verdon filed likewise a third-party claim alleging to be the owner of the personal property found in said buildings. At the same time, Juan Planas wrote to the sheriff requesting him to stop the demolition of the buildings and to require the judgment creditor to file an indemnity bond as required by the rules. This request was transmitted by the sheriff to counsel of the plaintiff requesting appropriate action, but instead of heeding the request counsel filed an urgent motion to quash the third-party claims filed by Juan Planas and Sofia Verdon. A timely objection was interposed to this motion by the third-party claimants. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the sheriff was valid. HELD: In the present case, the provincial sheriff departed from the regular procedure prescribed by the rules. He chose to succeed with the levy even without the indemnity bond in view of the urgent motion to quash filed by the judgment creditor in the main case. It should be remembered that the court, after proper hearing, wherein the parties were allowed to submit documentary evidence, found the third party claims to be without merit and ordered that they be discarded and quashed. Indeed, the court found that Juan Planas, the third party claimant, is the son of defendants Concepcion L. Planas and Iluminado L. Planas, and a stockholder of a firm of which Concepcion L. Planas was the principal stockholder. It also found that since the filing of the ejectment case against the spouses Planas up to December 29, 1952, the four houses claimed by Juan Planas were registered in the name of his mother, Concepcion L. Planas, in the assessment rolls of Pasay City, were transferred to Juan Planas. On the other hand, the answer submitted by spouses Planas in the ejectment case contains a clear averment that the four houses now in dispute were constructed and were the property of said spouses. Likewise, the letter of Atty. Arcadio Ejercito, counsel of Concepcion J. Planas sent to the provincial sheriff in connection with the demolition of the four buildings in

question, contains an averment which indicates that said buildings belonged to said defendant. This circumstantial evidence must have engendered in the mind of the court the conviction that the claim of ownership put up by Juan Planas at so late an hour is but an eleventh hour attempt to thwart and frustrate the execution of the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. We hold that the action taken by the respondent Judge on this matter is justified. At any rate the right of Juan Planas to the property is not completely lost, for the rule reserves to him the right to vindicate his claim in a proper action (Section 15, Rule 39). This he did by bringing an action in court asserting his ownership over the property. This action is still pending and will be decided in due time (Civil Case No. 1961).

Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS: On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that despite the expiration of the written contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail. During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila or on August 27, 1982, petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent. On May 17, 1984, the inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative value to the three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive. The court held that since none of the demand letters was served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. If none was made, the case came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial Court. Whereupon, it ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay petitioner P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and another P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case in its order of October 9, 1985. A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision dated July 3, 1988 the Appellate Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served by registered mail. HELD: The notice to vacate the leased premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action can be commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Uy v. Court of Appeals FACTS: On October 12, 1979, the private respondent, as owner of the building consisting of 14 doors, filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Bella S.D. Uy in the then City Court of Manila, alleging that the latter failed to pay her monthly rental of P150.00 from September 5, 1978. On November 19, 1979, the petitioner filed her answer denying the material allegations stated in the complaint and by way of affirmative allegations alleged, among others, that sometime in the early part of 1961 the private respondent entered into a verbal contract of lease with the petitioner covering one (1) door (down) of the building otherwise known as No. 1782-B Alvarez Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, owned by the private respondent, at the agreed monthly rental of P60.00, which was subsequently increased to P65.00, then to P70.00 and finally to P80.00 rental a month; that sometime in the first week of September 1978, the petitioner tendered to private respondent's collector the sum of P80.00 by way of payment of the rental for the month of September, 1978, but the latter refused to accept the same claiming that the monthly rental has already been increased to P150.00 a month; that all the proffered payments made by the petitioner for the months of October 1978, November 1978, December 1978, January 1979, February 1979, March 1979, April 1979 and May 1979 were refused by the private respondent's collector based on the same ground that the sum of P80.00 as payment for the monthly rental cannot be accepted because the same was already increased to P150.00 a month. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of ejectment was valid. HELD: The records reveal that the new rentals demanded since 1979 (P150.00 per month) exceed that allowed by law so refusal on the part of the lessor to accept was justified. However, what the lessee should have done was to deposit in 1979 the previous rent. This deposit in the Bank was made only in 1984 indicating a delay of more than four years. From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the lessor was correct in asking for the ejectment of the delinquent lessee. Moreover, he should be granted not only the current rentals but also all the rentals in arrears. This is so even if the lessor himself did not appeal because as ruled by this Court, there have been instances when substantial justice demands the giving of the proper reliefs.

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company v. Valdez FACTS: Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio B. Lapid, one of Tokio Marines consultants. Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit Management Contract entered into between them on August 16, 1977. On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms of the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his commissions, and bonuses. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed contempt of court through his deposition. HELD: We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking of respondents deposition is not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their contempt powers sparingly.

Villavicencio v. Lukban FACTS: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus should be issued. HELD: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Delima v. Gallardo FACTS: Nenita Dacillo was a former high school teacher of the Capoocan Community High School, who during her incumbency was assigned by District Supervisor Mabini Madriaga as teacher-collector to collect dues from students of the Capoocan High School. Sometime in 1973, Barrio Council of Zone I, Poblacion, Capoocan, Leyte, promulgated Resolution No. 6, requiring District Supervisor Mabini Madriaga and his wife, Elementary School Principal Angeles Madriaga, both of the Capoocan Elementary School, to deposit all collections and funds pertaining to the Capoocan Community High School, and to render an accounting of all collections, funds and expenditures, purchases and disbursements made by said spouses. Because of the failure of the Madriaga couple to comply with Resolution No. 6, the Barrio Council of Zone I, through its Barrio Captain, Jesus Near, filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte a complaint against them for malversation of public funds. Edilberto Delima testified against them. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against the Madriaga couple and against petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo. (Criminal Cases Nos. 500 and 501, originally filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VI, Carigara). On February 4, 1975, Executive Judge Jesus N. Borromeo issued an order transferring said Criminal Cases Nos. 500 and 501 to the Circuit Criminal Court of the 13th Judicial District (Tacloban, Leyte), presided by respondent Judge Pedro P. Gallardo. Criminal Case No. 500 was designated CCC-XIII-12-L s. '75 and Criminal Case No. 501 as CCCXIII-13-L s. '75. Accused spouses Mabini Madriaga and Angeles Madriaga were arraigned on March 7, 1975, while petitioners, Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo were arraigned on March 10, 1975. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Without much ado, the respondent Judge dismiss the criminal cases for malversation of public funds against Mabini Madriaga and Angeles Madriaga but not against petitioners Edilberto Delima and Nenita Dacillo. After the cases against the Madriaga couple were dismissed Barrio Captain Jesus Near, upon being assured by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte that the two criminal cases against the Madriaga couple could no longer be revived because of double jeopardy, filed a complaint action against respondent Judge for knowingly rendering an unjust decision. Said complaint was given due course by the Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (1st Indorsement, dated June 20, 1975). The Provincial Fiscal of Leyte was instructed by the Chief Prosecutor to endorse the case to the Fiscal of Tacloban City who has jurisdiction over the case. Barrio Captain Jesus Near also filed an administrative complaint for "partiality" against respondent Judge before this Court on July 7,1975, which complaint was given due course. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for direct contempt. HELD: There is nothing in the motion for inhibition of the respondent Judge that will cast disrepute, disrespect or contempt against the respondent Judge. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel in a respectful manner, simply stated in his motion for inhibition that the accused Edilberto Delima being a principal witness of Jesus Near in the criminal case

filed against respondent Judge pending appropriate action by the City Fiscal of Tacloban he honestly believed that respondent Judge would be prejudiced against him and therefore cannot be expected to decide the case with "objectivity and dispassion." Contempt of court may be either direct or constructive. It is direct when committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt proceedings before the same (Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court) and constructive or indirect contempt is one committed out or not in the presence of court (Narcida vs. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365). It is an act done in a distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the court and justice (70 C.J.S. 6) It is tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of Justice (De Joya vs. CFI, 52 O.G. 6150). In the motion for inhibition filed by petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel, We find no disrespectful language or phase containing offensive personalities against the respondent Judge. What is stated in the motion is simply a motion of the petitioner for the judge to inhibit himself from further trying the aforementioned criminal cases because he believed that the judge could no longer decide the case with impartiality because of a criminal complaint Jesus Near filed against respondent Judge. In the case of Austria vs. Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536, August 31, 1967, the Supreme Court ruled that when a person impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, is not guilty of contempt. Petitioner Atty. Quirino N. Oriel is similarly situated.