CSI Group

Crime Intelligence
Investigations of organised crime syndicates involved in illegal narcotic distribution and trade

2008

TOPIC An analytical view of the value of crime intelligence in intelligence-led investigations of organised crime syndicates involved in illegal narcotic distribution and trade.

THE PROBLEM Crime intelligence is an intense and complex process however, it has undeniably been successful in intelligence led investigations against specific crimes. Though, crime

intelligence takes place over a long period of time and it often depends on the patience of the crime intelligence client to allow it to perform and even when it does perform success can vary. This applied to the concept of organised crime activities which in itself suffers from a firm definition world wide and thus when applying crime intelligence to identity and individualise organised crime illegal activities, organised crime groups, individual members and modus operandi the complexity of the situation is increased. Only too often, organised crime suffers from the shifting sand phenomena, this is due to a lack of a firm globally accepted definition, which further enhances the difficulty for crime intelligence to formulate an attack strategy.

RESEARCH AIM Intelligence-led investigations have a specific objective whereas forensic investigations may be used in the investigation of every crime that is perpetrated and is not restricted to its scope or purpose. The aim of this research will be to analyse the value of crime intelligence and applicability of intelligence-led investigations into the illegal narcotic trade and distribution by organised crime syndicates in concert with embryonic crime mapping and analysis enhancing crime intelligence capabilities for forensic investigations and proactive police prevention strategies.

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1.

INTRODUCTION

A supporting means to forensic investigations is crime intelligence, which is, evaluated in this research as to its utilisation against organised crime syndicates in their illegal trade and distribution of narcotics. With most organised crime activities, forensic investigations ultimately investigate the result on their illegal activities whereas crime intelligence breaks the shackles of secrecy on which or should it be said within, on which it is so reliant for its progression. Therefore, crime intelligence is able lay the foundation to predict illegal activities, the locations of such and who will be involved. All things considered crime intelligence remains embryonic, as it has by no means reached its full potential. In

addition, organised crime has a capricious nature even though it portraits structure and a system of management, this nature it has to adopt in its continuous attempt to remain elusive. While this research is not a study of the history of either crime intelligence or organised crime, nevertheless for the purpose of this research the origins of crime intelligence seems to have taken some official starting point in United States of America (U.S.) in 1920s when a rudimentary crime intelligence system was established to investigate organised crime (Carter 2005:51). Where relevant historical references are made.

Research has been restricted to crime intelligence models of primarily of the USA and United Kingdom (UK) who have obtained leadership in this matter and secondary on Australia, Canada and European countries where relevant, drawstring with initiatives back to Southern Africa, primarily South Africa (SA). In addition, while organised crime syndicates (syndicate/group in this context viewed as the same) transact a number of criminal acts, in this context it has been limited to illegal trade and distribution of narcotics. Focus is on organised crime syndicates in Southern Africa, but drawing on reference and examples of the global phenomena. Gangs per se for the purpose of this discussion are viewed as a separate entity and referred to accordingly.

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2.

DEFINITIONS Forensic investigation is a systematic and scientific search method for facts in the form of direct or indirect evidence to deal with crime management and to individualise the suspected criminal. 2.1. Crime Intelligence

Maguire and John (1995:16) define it as follows: Criminal intelligence can be said to be the end product of a process often complex, sometimes physical, and always intellectual, derived from information which has been collated, analysed and evaluated in order to prevent crime or secure the apprehension of offenders. 2.2. Organised Crime

Peter Gastrow in his introduction to Penetrating state and business: Organised crime in Southern Africa (ISS 2003:3) cites the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (the Palermo Convention) the following definition was presented: Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit; Serious crime shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty; Structured group shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure

3.

ORGANISED CRIME, WHAT IS IT? 3.1. A hypothesis

The definition of organised crime amongst crime researchers and criminologists remains inconsistent (Morris 1998:1; Paoli 2001:14; Criminal Networks, Criminal Enterprises 2002; Cloete & Stevens 1990:161) and at best has obtained a sense of acceptance (Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Organised Crime in the SADC Region Police Perceptions monograph 60, 2001, chapter 2 Survey Methodology). Hobbs in Street Gangs and Organised Crime (2004:2, 3) essay for University of Cape Town (UCT), reports the numerous countries South Africa included, found the above

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definition ambiguous and vague. Services definition as:

Hobbs continues in citing the South African Police

Organised crime [is] the systematic commissioning of crimes motivated by a craving for profit and/or power (stated in Standing 2003). Modern organised crime groups are fluid and flexible and can quickly adapt themselves to meet new opportunities, challenges and risks. Levi and Maguire (2004:399 & 459) are of a similar opinion that definitional debate will continue, however add, based on the Translation Organised Crime Convention signatories, that organised crime is: two or more people are involved in continuing significant illegal activities, irrespective of national boundaries; such a group is capable of defending its members, enterprises or profits and to this end, may use violence, coercion or corruption; and than 1 million of criminal proceeds have been generated by a grouping which has both core and peripheral members

Three issues are noted in this definition which are fundamental in setting organised crime apart from other traditional crimes a) borders are not the limitation to the criminal activity b) there is an aspect of protection to the criminal activity and c) considerable financial revenue obtained from the criminal avenue. Cloete and Stevens (1990:161) define organised crime as: Organised crime includes any group of individuals whose primary activity involves violating criminal law to seek illegal profits and power by engaging in racketeering activities and, when appropriate, engaging in intricate financial manipulations. The authors allude to the word power and in their explanation of organised crime activities, the inference is there is a form of authority and intimidation in the protection of criminal activities within this context. Paoli (2001:14) cites Block and Chambliss definition of organised crime: Organized crime [should] be defined as (or perhaps better limited to) those illegal activities involving the management and co-ordination of racketeering and vice. Organised crime is thus considered a synonym of illegal enterprise. If this definition is accepted, it is obvious that illegal drug production and trafficking, in Russia as anywhere else, represents a form of organised crime. Another important aspect is illustrated the management and coordination as with the terminology organised this must go hand-in-hand. (own emphasis)

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Dowling (1974:206) also submits that a satisfactory definition for organised crime is lacking as to the broad scope of organised crime activity but however, considers the following operational description: Criminal Business: organised crime finds itself involved in a number of activities, structures and organisations, and people Continuing Conspiracy: seen as a primary feature of organised crime is the continued relationship between the perpetrators which sets itself apart form other criminal activities and therefore, perpetrators collect to act in concert and in support of the perpetration of crime forming an organised crime infrastructure Hierarchical Structure: within the organised crime structure there is a hierarchical structure of people arranged into a rank system, which allows for authority of selected persons by others and the rank system is either on a formal or informal basis. Nevala and Aromaa (2003:16) for research purposes make use of the following definition: Organised crime comprises of repeated (systematic) acts of purposefully coordinated criminal activities (and activities supporting these acts), where actors are criminal groups or organisations (largely with a multiple-level vertical organisational structure) whose main goal as to attain the maximum illegal profit while minimising the risk (ensured via contacts in decisive social structures).

In the Organised Crime Project (OCP) of the New Zealand Police (NZP) (1999:10) while completing its own research made use of the following definition: Organised crime constitutes two or more persons engaged in continuing illegal activities for some purpose, irrespective of national boundaries.

The authors above admit while the definition provided simplicity it fell short of identifying other criminal groupings, which should be included in a broader definition, and the complex nature of organised crime. Annette Hbschle in Unholy alliance? Assessing the links between organised criminals and terrorists in Southern Africa (2004) to the ISS defines organised crime as: Activities of organised criminal groups consisting of three or more persons who commit serious crimes over a period of time for profit.

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The above definition falls far short and is totally inadequate and while the context of the paper offers a chilling aspect of future crime through its association with terrorism, nonetheless, Hbschle continues in citing Gastrow: Organised crime consists of those serious criminal offences committed by a criminal organisation, which is based on a structured association of more than two persons acting in concert over a prolonged period of time in pursuit of both their criminal objectives and profits.

Therefore, for the purposes of this discussion and research organised crime is defined as: Organised crime is the proliferation of criminal commerce and racketeering maintained over a prolonged period of time through a continued membership of criminal associates with a configuration of vertical authority levels under leadership control with the primary objective of pursuing and protecting of illegal activities unrestricted by geographically boundaries.

This definition incorporates essential aspects thus distinguishing it from other crimes: a) Criminal commerce: repeated illegal sources of financial revenue or other reward, including investment in ventures or in procurement of illegal items. b) Prolonged period of time: eliminates any criminal transaction that is casual. c) Continued membership: the ongoing relationship even though as suited by certain criminal syndicates come together for a period of time of a criminal undertaking in a specific location, thereafter disseminating as John Grobler describes in his chapter entitled Namibia in Penetrating state and business: Organised crime in Southern Africa (2003:22), the issue at hand, the membership coming together is prearranged and reliant (even ad hoc) on a continued relationship, despite it being between one or more allied syndicates. This proposed relationship/membership negates the amount of members to a structure before it can be an organised crime syndicate as 1 person cannot have a membership to themselves and if a repeat offender of any sort they are considered a serial offender (Pistorius 2005). On the other hand as with the Richardson brothers (Nash 1992:334, 335) they were a two man criminal enterprise. d) Criminal associates: the infrastructure of criminal membership (Cloete & Stevens 1990:164).

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e) Vertical authority: a system of echelon, coordination and discipline applied to the individuals within the infrastructure f) Leadership: a leader or leaders in overall command (a board of directors) of the infrastructure (Cloete & Stevens 1990:164), which provide inter alia planning, set objectives and goals, determines regulation and authority (Paoli 2001:14), and methods of operation. One could even consider the word conspiracy appropriate here. g) Pursuing and protection: the development and repetition of criminal enterprises (Nevala & Aromaa 2003:16) that in turn feed the criminal commerce and protection (Levi & Maguire 2004:399) of the criminal commerce or racketeering through intimidation, violence, corruption and other means against law enforcement agencies, rival syndicates, non-cooperative communities or any other threat to the criminal enterprise. h) Geographical boundaries: organised crime syndicates forward their activities beyond provincial and national boundaries. While other crimes to some point have similar aspects what sets them apart is the continuation of activities through planning and the protection of activities and organised crime is not bound to one operational area. Organised crime, further out of protection and development of its activities, is prone to infiltrate legal businesses and government structures (Cloete & Stevens 1990:162), and a number of syndicates such as the Colombian cartels and Canadian groups employed highly trained individuals to conduct both intelligence and counter intelligence operations against law enforcement agencies (Levi & Maguire 2004:44, 459; Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada 2001). On the other hand commercial crimes are established out of existing legitimate business infrastructure organised crime in contrast develops new crime in demand of a market, commercial crimes further lack the type of protection that organised crime is reliant on even though corruption of public officials has occurred, it is not to the extent and means that organised crime will endeavour to perform.

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3.2. Organised crime has a global effect There is no doubt that organised crime is a global phenomena and a generalist statement would be to assume that every country of the world has been touched by organised crime in one way or another, may also be a matter for additional research. It is important to note that all organised crime syndicates venture to increase and develop their markets and will not stop at the point of origin. Furthermore, it is interesting that organised crime assume the identity, nationality or persona of their country of origin such as: American Mafia though originated out of Sicily, Italy and almost franchised itself in America, always maintained its ties back to its origins and the Mafia established itself in the U.S.A. based on its original Italian structures and traditions (Nash 1992:264-267 and Shelley 1994:665-667) with its members being mostly Italian of birth and the varying groups being family based. Chinese Triads in The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey (2004:60, 61) also operate Tongs, originate from the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, the most prominent of these secret societies is the 14K with a membership of in excess of 80000 members and claimed to be the most powerful Triad today (Nash 1992:462), the Great Circle Triad is Hong Kong based and responsible for heroin trade into Belgium and the Netherlands, the Taiwanese triad the United Bamboo of Taiwan with an apparent membership of between 10000 and 15000 members involved in drug smuggling and money laundering operations. In Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual

Report on Organized Crime in Canada 2001, reports on the Chinese Triads in Canada who are responsible for heroin smuggling operations. Stander

(2005:8) presents the existence of Chinese Triads involved in the illegal narcotic trade in South Africa and in particular with the gangs of the Cape flats, Steinberg (2005:4) concurs with this notion. The Colombian Cartels no less a significant feature of organised crime even after the much publicised law enforcement actions in the 1990s, however, the Cali cartel being one of the most powerful cartels under the previous

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leadership of the Rodriguez Orejuela bothers and the supreme Medellin cartel under the leadership of Pablo Escobar (Cadena 2003:48, 49; Nash 1992:280, 282-283). Cadena (2003:47) further submits that the Colombian cartels

modelled themselves on the Mafia structures and were predominantly family based, nevertheless they remain formidably today, U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Centre, National Drug Threat Assessment 2006 (2006:i) Nigerian syndicates are growing in prominence in Africa. They originally

established themselves when the oil price declined so in the 1970s the impact on Nigerian oil trade forced individuals to seek alternative sources of income with a number turning to crime. Levi and Maguire (2004:430, 439) report of incidents of Nigerian syndicates being involved in vehicle theft from the United Kingdom, Irish (2005:1) attributed the development of the illegal narcotics trade to inter alia Nigerian syndicates. Steinberg (2005:3, 6) agrees with this and their ever-increasing prominence in the illicit narcotic trade (Mashele 2005:3) together with the well reported incidences of so-called drug mauls, individuals who are recruited to smuggle narcotics from South Africa to other international destinations. The very reason the mauls or couriers are recruited is due to the fact there is a belief in the syndicates they will be able to bypass courier profilers of law enforcement agencies who monitor incoming foreign nationals who could be suspected of being involved in the illegal smuggling of narcotics. Japanese Yakuza were established in the 1600s (Nash 1992:410, 411) originally as Japans Robin Hoods however, over time they progressed into highly sophisticated organised crime syndicates (Evans 2002:10) with about 90000 members in Japan where it is legal to belong to a criminal organisation, in addition, the headquarters of the Yakuza is known to all and members wear lapels in public identifying themselves as such. It is however, their activities that are not legal and their criminal enterprise is based (Evans 2002:11) on extortion, prostitution, illegal narcotic dealings and gambling. Levi and

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Maguire (2004:459) refer to an instance when the Yakuza had a contract to sell flowers to Japanese airlines for a price well in excess of normal commercial prices. The above list is far from an all detailed list of international organised crime syndicates as there are numerous which could be the topic of alternative research in particular the differentiating modus operandi of each of the syndicates, however, the intention of the list is to provide the extent of diversity, international prominence and flavour, and enormity of their existence. One must by no means be caught in the simplicity that these organised syndicates are not highly efficient and ruthless operating forces with a continued threat of violence, with murder not being any less applied (Mir 2003:9; The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey (2004:41); Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada 2001; LeBeuf 2001:35; Lee 1991:6). 3.3. Crime participation Organised crime syndicates follow the money hence will partake in the primary crime of demand, and will commit crimes that feed and develop the criminal commerce seeking maximum profits, Gastrow (1998:40, 43, 44); Levi and Maguire (2004:400, 431), however it must be said that the illegal narcotic and drug trade is highly lucrative Mir (2003:5); Evans (2003:13); The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey (2004:29); Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada 2001. However, there seems to be some rival revenue through fraud networks and obtaining finances on false credit claims. Other crimes are additions and may assist the primary crime and assault, corruption, murder are often carried out in protection of the primary criminal activity and to enforce payment for services on the other hand extortion is used to both protect the criminal commerce but also to maximise profits from the local community which is then applied as a enforcement method to keep the community under control (Morris 1998:8; The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey 2004:31; Levi & Maguire 2004:400), it is no less frequent from South Africa and the SADC region, as reported by Goredema (2005:4) and Goredema in Zimbabwe (2003:4); Mashele

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(2005:5); Nkala (2003:67); Irish and Qhobosheane in South Africa (2003:87). Other crimes such as money laundering could be termed as a product of the primary crimes to lessen the quantities of cash in possession of the syndicates and its individual members, for this reason a number of syndicates attempt to legitimise their income by investing in legal businesses (Cloete and Stevens 1990:164). 3.4. The illegal trade and distribution of narcotics As Swanson et al. (1988:524) explains the reasons and substantiation for the explosive spread of illegal narcotic distribution would be the subject of additional research particularly focussed on the distribution factors. The distribution chain is largely dependent on the narcotic type and the distribution system, (Dowling 1979:202) narcotics will be brought into the country via a courier or smuggler and packages, (The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey 2004:34, 35) which is then sold to a number of distributors (Mir 2003:6) who forward it onto the clients/users etc. Naud and Stevens (1988:156, 157) propose the dealing in

narcotics operates the same way as any legal commercial enterprise there is a producer, wholesaler, the retailer and consumer with the only exception that the revenue of narcotic transactions are not subject to tax deductions thus, the government is deprived of an income source. In this process again dependent on the drug, it is further diluted (Swanson et al. 1988:535) i.e. divided and mixed with similar non-narcotic substances to increase its volume for increased sales and profit, this is also known as cutting, this further provides an identification opportunity due to methods and contents applied to the mix (Evans 2003:13). Therefore, in the ongoing investigation of organised crime syndicates, it is crucial the distribution system is identified with urgency (Swanson et al. 1988:550, 551) to trace it back to origin of the narcotics this applies to both to a narcotic appearing for the first time or ongoing illegal narcotic trade and its extent being monitored continuously. Often this is where the investigation or intelligence operation commences, as the previous existence of the narcotic was unknown making its appearance in a particular area, on other occasions, the courier is apprehended which exposes the activity.

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4. CRIME INTELLIGENCE 4.1. Describe Crime Intelligence in further detail The Devon & Cornwall Constabulary procedure guideline Handling Intelligence refers to a number of categories of intelligence; nominal intelligence, vehicle intelligence, modus operandi intelligence, business intelligence, crime intelligence and custody intelligence. The purpose of this discussion will focus on crime intelligence. The South African National Strategic Intelligence Act No. 39 of 1994 defines Crime Intelligence as: intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders. Read with paragraph (xiv) of the act: National Intelligence estimate: means the product of the process of considering and weighing the possibilities, probabilities and facts disclosed by national security intelligence with regard to any situation, and of drawing conclusions from such possibilities, probabilities and facts. According to Ratcliffe (2003:2) exact definitions of crime intelligence in intelligence-led investigations are rare however, make use of the following definition: Targeting offenders (especially the targeting of active criminals through overt and covert means) Management of crime and disorder hotspots Investigation of linked series of crimes or incidents The application of preventative measures, including working with local partnerships to reduce crime and disorder A South African Police (SAP) Crime Intelligence Services (CIS) training document Voorligting t.o.v. Navorsingingsmetodiek describes crime intelligence as: Intelligence research is the processing of information in an objective and scientific manner to serve to the client, forewarning to act proactively and to meet

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the objectives of the organisation. This process includes problem identification, evaluation, interpretation and prediction and distribution. These descriptions bring the element of forewarning or advanced warning into context and Zinn (2002:38) offers the description of crime intelligence based on the Directorate of Intelligence and Detection at Scotland Yard, London as: a continuous cycle, which consists of different steps with regard to information namely; Gathering, Evaluation, Development, Analysis, Further development,

Dissemination, Action and the recycling of information This description points to the elements of the crime intelligence cycle, however, Zinn continues to describe the process of crime intelligence is the collation of small fragments of information pieced together to form a solid depiction. International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy: Crime Intelligence (2003:1) define crime intelligence as: Criminal Intelligence. Information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. Cope (2004:190) simply puts it as: Intelligence can be understood as information developed to direct police action. 4.2. Crime intelligence typologies Strategic Intelligence and Tactical Intelligence must be provided for to offer a complete understanding of the intelligence process, International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy: Crime Intelligence (2003:1) present: Strategic Intelligence. Information concerning existing patterns or emerging trends of criminal activity designed to assist in criminal apprehension and crime control strategies, for both short- and long-term investigative goals. Tactical Intelligence. Information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations and provide for officer safety. A number of other authors also refer to the above, the essential component in the understanding of the differentiation is Tactical Intelligence (also known as Operational

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Intelligence) has a shorter time span of usefulness or shelf life and often utilised in entrapment operations, raids and arrests e.g. the location of a suspect on the run is tactical intelligence. Strategic Intelligence on the other hand has a longer life span and is used as an overall strategy when dealing with specific scenarios i.e. the arrest of a particular suspect will not be beneficial to overall investigation as it would only offer a warning to the main culprits who either have yet to be located or sufficient evidence compiled to bring them to court. In terms of intelligence led investigations a

combination of the two are utilised. However, Zinn (2002:44) cites Tonry and Morris that crime intelligence has three forms: Prospective intelligence (future directed): based on target selection crime intelligence is collected in response to a predicted crime or dilemma. The crime intelligence will include a hypothesis of the origin, appearance and tendency of the dilemma i.e. the perpetrators and crime typology is identified and a police response plan is formulated to counter the dilemma. Retrospective intelligence: this is background intelligence of arrested perpetrators regarding previous convictions or current similar cases against them and is based on fingerprint records, previous conviction records, traffic a violations etc. Applied intelligence: this is the linking of known perpetrators to known crimes through available evidence such forensic evidentiary material and deductive work supporting a link to the suspect based on time, place, opportunity and motive to crime. This is also known as forensic intelligence will be discussed below. Similarly Quarmby (2003:4) speaks of four intelligence product categories: Basic (background) intelligence: reference nature intelligence on issues that have already occurred, historical and similar to retrospective intelligence. Estimative intelligence: envisaged predictions setting out probable future scenarios based on analysis of the developed applied law enforcement strategies and their implications

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Current intelligence: the status of a current scenario of illicit activity, criminal threat, events, environmental conditions or indicated events. Warning intelligence: closes the gap between estimative and current intelligence by offering a warning of criminal threats against lawful interests and provides sufficient time to frame a response. While Quarmbys breakdown can be understood with warning intelligence and Tonry & Morris prospective intelligence being the same however, Quarmbys estimative intelligence is presumably based on analysis of situations rather than fact. 4.3. The difference between crime information and intelligence Information is gathered in various stages taken through a process to deliver an intelligence product, that being it has several packets of information of one issue, are glued together through an evaluation process similar to that of the intelligence cycle (will be discussed below) similar to that described by International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy: Crime Intelligence (2003:1), Cope (2003:16), Dowling (1979:208), Innes et al. (2005:42), Maguire and John (1995:24), Zinn (2002:38), therefore simply put; raw information collected goes through a process of analysis and evaluation which produces crime intelligence. 4.4. The crime intelligence cycle Crime intelligence process is a continued cycle (Innes et al. 2005:43, Zinn 2002:38) through which information is placed to ultimately produce intelligence and this process has been broken up. The following illustration on page16 of the crime intelligence cycle is described and based on SAP CIS training document Voorligting t.o.v. Navorsingsmetodiek:

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Crime Intelligence Cycle

Gathering/collection Relevance of information received Purpose of investigation Evaluation The reliability of the source i.e. a repeat source and accuracy of information delivered in the past or a new source reliability and accuracy is unknown Information is reliable based on the source and compared against other similar information and unknown new information Collation Integration Packaging of information with other items of similar information for processing New information in perspective with existing Forms a stable picture New trends established Relevance Development Valid conclusions Consequential Links to independent occurrences Direct and indirect reasons of events and activities Meaning to information Analysis Identify all facts separate facts from meanings, interpretations, threats, promises and subjective deductions etc. All facts of the situation described Are facts new, old or additional Source reliability and origin of information Complete information including who, when, what, why, with and how Identification of subjects, persons, trends, groups Language corrections Classification Re-development Dissemination Including predictions Security of information Timely for alerts Accurate and complete Relevant Action New reports generated as a result Feedback on intelligence supplied Planning, organisation, response and resource allocations Re-evaluation

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4.5. Crime analysis Swanson et al. (1988:163) claim that crime analysis was established in the early 1900s by New Scotland Yard, England police when they found that modus operandi linked similar perpetrated crimes together. The State Intelligence Branch (SIB) of the South Australia Police (SAPol) (Saywell & Bawden 2000:2; Read & Oldfield 1995:v) crime analysis includes: Crime Patterns: the nature and distribution of crime within an area. Crime Trends: significant changes, new clusters and emerging trends in a specific areas crime pattern. Crime Clusters: groups of crimes linked through similar characteristics, such as Modus Operandi, time, day and targets. Crime Series: crimes with common offenders. While some authors and researchers may argue that crime analysis is a modern development according to Read and Oldfield (1995:iii-v,1) it is not and as presented above, it covers a broad area of circumstances, information collection, interpretation and usability and a number of methods are a form of crime analysis for example case analysis established the events prior, during and after a serious offense and crime pattern analysis discover the scale of a particular type of crime within a designated area. Naud and Stevens (1988:21,22) further support this theory as it acts as crime prevention tool when the following is considered: Types of crimes committed The extent and the crime pattern in a specific environment Social and physical characteristics of the environment Methods to be applied to reduce opportunities for crime Therefore, with certain crime assuming a particular pattern in a particular area, and based on modus operandi, this information after analysis certain predictions can be made and crime countered (Naud & Stevens 1998:119). Cloete and Stevens (1990:137) concur that in specific environments crime may be predicted from analysed data and should the environment be changed it may lead to the reduction in crime, this obviously adds value

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to the intelligence process this leading to intelligence-led policing (Innes et al. 2005:41) and that effectively crime analysis utilises both open and closed sources of information whereas police intelligence makes use of informers and police database information which is confidential or covert operations (Botha Covert Gathering of Information 1996:89). Chainey and Smith (2006:1) in their study discuss Geographical Information Systems commonly known by its abbreviation GIS, which is based on shared information to reduce crime and social disorder. However, Read and Oldfield (1995:45, 46) point out the important Trevi definition of crime analysis which divides crime analysis into two components being strategic that includes the formation of a crime predicament image and a long term counter is developed to reduce the crime problem, and operational endeavours to present information collected during the course of a particular investigation such as identification between the event and the suspects, highlight additional information requirements and unsubstantiated or unverified. The Trevi definition divides this into 8 forms of analysis:
Strategic Analysis Crime Analysis: Pattern Attempts to form a picture of particular crimes in terms of typology, extent and area General Analysis: Profile This focuses on the particular Comparative Analysis: Case Operational Analysis Case Analysis: Establishes the events prior, during and after a serious offence, this includes all aspects of the offence. Focuses on similarities between

characteristics of the perpetrator of specific crimes.

offences to link a perpetrator or group of perpetrators.

Crime

Control

A review of previously utilised police methods in previous police actions and to assess their usefulness in future operations.

Offender Analysis:

Group

compilation

of

all an

available individual records to

Methods Analysis:

information perpetrator

about in

police

connect them to specific crimes Specific Analysis: Offender This is the hypothetical image of the perpetrator based on information

found at the crime scene, this is offender profiling Investigation Analysis: The study and evaluation to of an the

information investigation

pertaining to

complete

investigation and identify courses of action not utilised

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This in turn achieves; analysis of volume crime, violent crime, illicit drugs and organised crime and assists in identifying crime trends, clusters, series and patterns, hence a crime threat profile aiding operational police in areas such as targeting hot spots, geographical profiling and predictive assessments. In terms of investigating organised crime, incidents of illegal narcotic trade may be monitored and traced back to selected organised crime syndicates, thus, providing crime intelligence to the investigation process. 4.6. The objectives of crime intelligence The objectives may be associated with both strategic and operational intelligence. It must be understood the crime intelligence is utilised as there is no other methods to combat or terminate a particular criminal dilemma and is usually of covert nature, Botha Covert Gathering of Information (1996:89) terms it as: the employment of people (informers, infiltrators and police traps) and methods (observation and pursuit) under clandestine circumstances to obtain criminalistic information. Dowling (1979:208) refers to it as an investigative technique of organised crime, and due to the continuous conspiratorial nature of organised crime, it is important the intelligence files are maintained containing information of relationships between the individual perpetrators, their activities etc. The International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy: Crime Intelligence view the mission of crime intelligence as: to gather information from all sources in a manner consistent with the law and to analyze that information to provide tactical and/or strategic intelligence on the existence, identities, and capabilities of criminal suspects and enterprises generally and, in particular, to further crime prevention and enforcement objectives/priorities identified by this agency.

SAPCIS Orientation of Agents training document sets the objectives as: To determine if a crime is being planned or committed this is fundamental in reference to organised crime syndicates who are responsible for illegal narcotic trade To determine the infrastructure of the criminal syndicate i.e. the echelon of seniority and leadership

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Identify who is planning, organising and implementing the criminal act Locate contraband and stolen property To establish timing for raids, searches and arrests Remove contraband and stolen property from the illegal market Immobilise suspects Develop cooperation of individuals in the community or criminal network Locate and collect evidence for court. 4.7. Forensic intelligence Ribaux et al. (2006:172) provide a notable definition of Forensic Intelligence: forensic intelligence is the accurate, timely and useful product of logically processing (analysis of ) forensic case data (information) for investigation and/or intelligence purposes. And Ribaux et al. continues: This definition points to how the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of forensic case data can support investigation and broader intelligence programs. 4.8. Covert sources of information for crime intelligence Within the context of covert collection in combating illicit drug trade of organised crime syndicates, the following sources would be available to provide secreted information: 4.8.1. 4.8.2. 4.8.3. 4.8.4. 4.8.5. 4.8.6. Informers Infiltration agents and human intelligence sources Entrapment investigations Physical surveillance and observation Hidden cameras Hidden microphones in a room which transmit to a receiver and recorder; commonly known as room bugging 4.8.7. 4.8.8. 4.8.9. Recording of telephone conversations; known as telephone taps Cell phone monitoring and surveillance i.e. locating a subject Body taps i.e. an eavesdropping device is concealed on the body of a person which transmits discussions to a receiver and recorder or the recorder is hidden on the person

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4.8.10. Bank accounts monitoring of transactions in and out of the account 4.8.11. Financial records 4.8.12. Analysis of finances e.g. income versus expenditure does the subject not have the income to support high living standard 4.8.13. Garbology: searching or digging through a subject's refuse and rubbish they discard from which information may be collected about the subject 4.8.14. Fax interception 4.8.15. Computer hacking including e-mail interception and web surfing 4.8.16. Travel movement e.g. passport control or airline bookings 4.8.17. Published articles and press releases in terms of high profile subjects 4.8.18. Medical records It has to be said that the above is a formidable arsenal to provide the investigation team with options of primary information sources. 4.9. Open sources of information Numerous open sources are available to the intelligence operation and there is a greater shift towards utilising them, which consist of public and unclassified information obtained from government and corporate sources, publications, databases and all media, and the ever growing Internet resources. This information includes academic research and reports (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada 2001). It is however, important that any information obtained from open sources is evaluated against investigation and other intelligence information (intelligence cycle) to establish its relevancy and importance. 4.10. Databases information As most government, corporate and private institutes capture and retain information in computerised databanks, makes the searching and retrieving of information less problematic and quicker. Dienstein (1974:46-50) provides a list of databases similar as:

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Banks and credit companies: maintain databases of personal banking and credit transactions of individuals, this is particularly important with regard to money laundry investigations and falls under the Financial Intelligence Act. Department of Agriculture: licensed food packers are registered with them, import and export information regarding specific traders, permits and applications Civil Aviation Administration: registered aircraft and pilots, data of airports, permits issued Credit Information: maintain a financial profile on individuals and there financial credibility Crime Information Analysis Centre: maintains databases of all reported and investigated crime and utilisation of the Crime Administration System (CAS) Criminal Record Bureau: holds criminal records of all convicted persons Department of Home Affairs: birth and death registrations, passport issues, immigration, visas issued and resident permits etc. Licensing: information of liquor applications and registrations Medical practises and doctors: patient history and treatment information Hospitals: will hold information of all admissions and treatments Hotels: hold information on their databases of registered guests, date of check-in and departure, telephone calls to and from the room, credit information and residential information Public records: court records of civil litigation and other records, divorce, property ownerships, legal contracts Telkom: registered phone uses and directory, telephone usage, calls made and received etc. Traffic Department: National Road Traffic Institute Services (NARTIS) database which lists all licensed drivers and registered vehicles Richards (1999) offers a similar summary, the importance of the above databases is for verification of other information obtained i.e. a suspect may be selling liquor from a particular premise and it may be verified whether such an individual has a license

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for such, or when attempting to trace and link suspects or criminal associates various databases may provide residential information or other location details. Travel as recorded on passport databases may be used to question a suspect or obtain a statement, or plan pro-active counter enforcement measures. 4.11. Information from arrested or convicted suspects Both arrested and convicted suspects especially within any organised crime framework, must always be exploited for information, Fyfe and Sheptycki (2005:16,17,23) offer a breakdown of European countries who provide for some for leniency for suspects assist in investigations leading to the arrest of associates involved in criminal offences, they continue by referring to the Northern Ireland experience of suspects who supplied information in return for immunity from prosecution. Gastrow and Mosse (2002:21) also relate to the investigation of organised crime in Mozambique where arrested suspects led investigators to organised crime kingpins, Irish (2005:7) claims that it is standard procedure for any person arrested for attempting smuggle stolen vehicles out of South Africa to be handed over to SAPS crime intelligence for questioning, and it is not uncommon to turn an arrested suspect and use them as an informant, Maguire and John (1995:28) agree with this notion, however, caution that it is yet to become an accepted modus operandi, but that investigators did obtain pieces of information from arrested suspects. Zinn (2002:18,41) focuses on obtaining intelligence from convicted and imprisoned suspects of vehicle hi-jackings, further emphasises that, additional intelligence may be gleaned from arrested and convicted suspects.

5. CRIME INTELLIGENCE USED TO LEAD INVESTIGATIONS 5.1. Criminal Intelligence as prevention or cure While the answer of this particular question may lie in detail in further research, it is however, important to briefly understand the effectiveness and shortcomings of crime intelligence through its correct utilisation. In context, referring to crime analysis and in particular Read and Oldfield (1995:45) the Trevi definition provides for exposing crime by area, typology, modus operandi, frequency etc. which in turn allows for the development of policing strategies to counter high

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volume crime phenomena (Read & Oldfiled 1995:1, 2) and in addition, may be included in crime intelligence objectives to target specific perpetrators and/or criminal groups Botha Covert Gathering of Information (1996:89), Dowling (1979:208), International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policy: Crime Intelligence (2001:1) who further claim crime intelligence focuses on inter alia patterns and intentions of criminal groups, and in reference to definitions of organised crime, crime intelligence focuses on the perpetration of crimes by particular groups and individuals. Therefore, on its own it does not prevent crime, however, when taking the definitions organised crime it is ideally suited to focus on dealing with the symptoms of organised crime and the causes, once the organised crime dilemma including the illegal narcotic trade is dealt with, it obviously prevents consequential crime of the organised crime activities (Levi and Maguire 2004:399, 402). Nonetheless, crime intelligence is an important aspect to all policing functions (Quarmby 2003:2), but focusing on organised crime it has a tremendous success, as Cadena (2003: 46, 48-52) illustrates in the neutralisation of the Colombian Mendellin and Cali cartels. 5.2. Crime intelligence-led forensic investigations Crime intelligence can be used in support of a forensic investigation in most cases and would probably only be restricted by the resources available to the investigator. When observing the above definitions especially Forensic Intelligence by Ribaux et al. (2006:172) there is minimal restrictions on the uses of crime intelligence. Furthermore, when one considers house breaking which often leaves an investigator with no eye witness accounts, no fingerprints with a common modus operandi which does not individualise any one specific incident, the investigator has the alternative source of evidence as proposed by Maguire and John (1995:5): systematic records of targeted suspects movements financial dealings and associations with others indications from informants about the location of stolen property or the sites of planned offences

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direct police observation (sometimes photographed or video-recorded) of criminal acts and, though still relatively unusual statements from undercover police officers. Therefore, crime intelligence exposes the criminal activities, identity of associations, extent of operations and distribution, protection and corruption leading to evidence individualising perpetrators and linking them to offences once presented in a court of law completing the forensic investigation which either commenced or gave rise to an intelligence operation. 5.3. Crime intelligence a process to develop crime databases and subsequently link matrixes Crime databases retain crucial intelligence for the development of link matrixes based on link analysis a technique for evaluating, integrating and presenting complex information by taking information pieces collected from various sources and putting them together to show patterns and meanings. It provides a graphic picture of

associations and relationships among various individuals, groups and their activities. Link analysis presents links based on the following for example: Telephone numbers Vehicle, aircraft, boat registration numbers Financial transactions Property ownership Illegal trade Communication Warehousing and storing of contraband The link analysis converts intelligence into the link matrix, which in turn develops into a link diagram depicting relationships amongst people, groups and activities such as:

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Nemo Group

Razza Group

Quinton Petersen

Rettas Shipping

Willys Laundry

Eric Tong

James John

Cathy Simpson

Thailand

Brazil

The relationship above shows that Petersen identified as a main distributor of narcotics, who receives his shipments from Rettas shipping where Eric Tong is the contact person. The narcotics are supplied to the Razza Group who in turn cut the consignment between themselves and the Nemo group. Financial payments are laundered through Willys Laundry from Petersen and Cathy Simpson removes the funds from the country. James John through so-called legal contracts obtains

legitimate business for Willys Laundry to provide a cover for its high -income revenues. Link analysis and matrix can develop the communication network to identify the direction and frequency of telephone calls or in the case of banks accounts financial transactions between suspected parties (Xu & Chen 2004:474).

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021-7608905 3 7

3 3 2

09-44-567-8904

4 6

089-456-7890

021-987-4321

5 6

011-546-7890

The above illustrates the direction of calls between different identified suspect telephone numbers and the small circles report the number of calls. The communication network allows the intelligence analyst the ability to simplify and synthesize the relationships and suspected communications of people in the group involved in criminal activity. This technique can be used to present material during the intelligence gathering process and presented as evidence in subsequent criminal proceedings. The above is based on the researchers own experience and the objectives of crime intelligence in terms of depiction of the Link Matrix, in addition refer to the Trevi definition; Swanson et al. (1988:442, 443); Zinn (2003:13), either in consensus or contribute to the link matrix and diagram concept. This technique of intelligence

analysis is highly effective and is often the crux of the investigation into organised crime activities while fulfilling the elements of tactical intelligence. The National Drug

Intelligence Centre of the U.S. Justice Department, National Drug Threat Assessment 2005 Threat Matrix, provides an additional example of various organised crime syndicates involved in the illegal trade of narcotics and origins.

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6.

FINDINGS

Crime intelligence is no easy endeavour, however, it must be said that neither is combating organised crime and its tentacle crimes including the illegal narcotic trade. The most effective crime intelligence methods infiltration, electronic surveillance and physical surveillance to obtain sufficient probable cause and evidence in order to launch proactive investigations against organised crime to obtain search and arrest warrants against known suspects. Conversely, crime analysis has as an important role to play as it establishes a window of so-called product crime such as the selling of illegal narcotics on the streets and can then plot the majority of incidents and through arrests curtail them to specified areas while forming a base for future crime intelligence operations to trace the origins of the narcotics. However, while the definition of organised crime remains either too broad or too narrow, it will remain restrictive for law enforcement agencies to curb and combat organised crime in the true sense other than incidental or repeat offences i.e. the selling of drugs. In addition, research into the investigation of organised crime remains at odds even though it there are reports of considerable law enforcement successes against this criminal dilemma, it none the less remains ever present. Crime intelligence even though it dates back to early law enforcement measures, it remains a relatively embryonic method gradually growing in acceptance as a crime fighting technique.

7.

RECOMMENDATION

Crime intelligence is quite capable of loosing its effectiveness and importance if not utilised correctly and timeously, therefore, it is important that information is processed in terms of the intelligence cycle and stored on easily available retrievable databases. In addition, the processed intelligence must be have a comparable trend. This on the other does not mean that all and sundry should have access to it, continually it should be dealt with on a need to know basis. The utilisation of crime intelligence must in addition must be quadrupled as accurate intelligence not only lends itself to crime prevention strategies but also intelligence led investigations.

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8.

CONCLUSION

It remains evident that organised crime itself requires additional specialist research and will never remain consistent as organised crime syndicates will always endeavour to adapt their modus operandi as law enforcement agencies amend their strategies to combat them, while crime intelligence is a growing in its usefulness in breaking into the secret actions and structures of the syndicates. It is important the that all law

enforcement personnel are taught and trained in basic intelligence gathering techniques and more so, responsibilities, that crime intelligence is the responsibility of everyone and not restricted to a few individuals. A culture to be created that everyone has the

obligation to report any suspicious activity or person no matter how trivial. Many may argue this approach will result in so-called information overload, true and dedicated crime intelligence analysts will know how to focus and sift the important intelligence aspects.

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