G.R. No. 122256. October 30, 1996.

* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION, respondents. Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Reform; Eminent Domain; Administrative Law; Statutory Construction; The provision of 50 of R.A. 6657 must be construed in harmony with 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR.Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]. The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases.Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scotys Department Store v. Micaller we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies.Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the new rules provides: 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and

preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts. Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; It would subvert the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. It would subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question. Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine
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in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Dominguez, Paderna & Tan Law Offices, Co. for private respondent. MENDOZA, J.:

violation of the DARABs rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13, 1994. Private respondent there-fore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 5657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals which, in its decision1 of October 4, 1995, set aside the order of dismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform, filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under 57. Petitioners sustain the affirmative proposition. They cite 50 of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides: 50. Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR.The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . . and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a [matter] involving the implementation of agrarian reform within the contemplation of this provision. They invoke 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that any party who disagrees to the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation, as confirming their construction of 50. The contention has no merit. It is true that 50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however, that 57 provides:
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Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondents certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings (LISTASAKA) which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines valued private respondents lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be paid for the lands. Private respondent rejected the governments offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP. On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latters Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in

57. Special Jurisdiction.The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].2 The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus in EPZA v. Dulay3 and Sumulong v. Guerrero4 we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scotys Department Store v. Micaller5 we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act. Petitioners also cite Rule II, 5 and Rule XIII, 1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only be appealed to the DARAB. These rules provide: Rule II, 5. Appellate Jurisdiction.The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform adjudicators]. Rule XIII, 1. Appeal to the Board.a) An appeal may be taken from an order or decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is in writing. b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by

the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal. Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the new rules provides: 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.6 Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held7 and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.8 This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.9 It would subvert this original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
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Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

*************************************************************************** *************************************************************************** People vs. Bandula G.R. No. 89223. May 27, 1994. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accused-appellant. Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigation; When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present; These are blatant violations of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna,

the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III, that(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused.We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz that [t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.Custodial investigation is the stage where the
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police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Same; Same; Same; Same; Admissions obtained without benefit of counsel are flawed under the Constitution.Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus where we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitution requires that counsel be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic

services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Remedial Law; Evidence; Confessions; Where there is doubt as to the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the same must be rejected in toto.This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto. Same; Same; The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished.With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused-appellant Bandula beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. We have oftentimes said that while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. In this, the state has utterly failed. Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a statute which penalizes
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the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights.Indeed, it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put words into his mouth. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights. APPEAL from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Br. 42. Tabilon, J.

On 5 May 1989, after hearing twelve (12) prosecution and nine (9) defense witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime charged. However, his three (3) co-accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.1 As found by the court a quo,2 on 27 January 1986, at around ten oclock in the evening, six (6) armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore masks were simply referred to as Boy Tall and Boy Short. At gunpoint, the two (2) masked men held Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and divested him of his drivers license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the six (6) armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the Polo Coconut Plantation. Accused Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while accused Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into the house, the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Thereafter, the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside his house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano and
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Saleto J. Erames for accused-appellant. BELLOSILLO, J.:

After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked, JUANITO GARAY, a lawyer, was found dead with three (3) gunshot wounds. For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof, AURELIO BANDULA, PANTALEON SEDIGO, TEOFILO DIONANAO and VICTORIANO EJAN were haled to court for robbery with homicide.

Salva went to report the matter to the police. On their way, they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay. In arriving at its conclusions, the trial court considered the alleged confession of accused Bandula that after the incident he gave his .38 cal. revolver for safekeeping to Jovito Marimat, Jr.,from whom three handguns were recovered by the police, i.e., a .38 cal. revolver with four (4) live ammunitions and one (1) empty shell, a .22 cal. paltik revolver, and a revolver with M16 bullets. It likewise took into account the supposed admission of accused Victoriano Ejan that he kept a 12-gauge Winchester shotgun, a tape recorder, a bayonet and a pair of binoculars in the house of his relative Emilio Rendora who was found to have the goods in his possession. The court also noted that a sum of money suspected to be part of the loot was recovered from accused Pantaleon Sedigo. Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by Boy Tall and Boy Short. These extrajudicial confessions made by accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula extracted during custodial investigation, the trial court ruled, have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna).3 Thus the trial court disregarded the following defenses of the four (4) accused:

(a) Teofilo Dionanaothat he was arrested without a warrant and brought to the Tanjay Police Station on 28 January 1986 for no apparent reason; that there he was made to sit on a bench for about an hour when Cpl. Kagawasan Borromeo, Pat. Tomas Borromeo and Pat. El Moso arrived and took turns in mauling him until he spat blood, after which, he was locked up in the municipal jail; that his repeated requests to see a doctor were ignored; that the following morning, he was taken out of his cell and again mauled, after which, he was forced to sign a piece of paper without a counsel and the contents of which he did not know; that, prior to his detention, he did not know his three (3) co-accused as he met them for the first time only when they were detained together in the Municipal Jail of Tanjay.4 (b) Aurelio Bandulathat in the evening of 27 January 1986 he was in the house of Jovito Marimat, Sr., a quack doctor; that he was bedridden as he was undergoing treatment for an inflamed stomach which, at that time, was fully covered with herbs; that, the following morning, at around six oclock, he was awakened and dragged by Cpl. Borromeo and Pat. Moso from his sickbed into a waiting motorcycle and brought to the Municipal Hall where he was interrogated by Pat. Melvin Baldejera; that, later that afternoon, he was brought to a room where four (4) persons, including Antonio Salva, took turns in beating him up until he became unconscious; that that evening, he was made to sign a blank paper purportedly for his release; that he was then put behind bars; that because of the mauling, he felt extreme pain on his left rib; that he saw accused Dionanao for the first time only on 28 January 1986 in the Municipal Hall, and his two (2) other co-accused Sedigo and Ejan only the following day when they were locked up together with him
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in his cell; that his relatives were not allowed to see him; and, that he did not know nor ever met Atty. Ruben Zerna.5 (c) Victoriano Ejanthat the first met his three (3) co-accused only on 29 January 1986 when he was confined in the Municipal Hall; that after taking supper on 27 January 1986, he slept with his wife and four (4) children; that he was not aware of the incident that transpired that night until he was arrested at gunpoint by Pat. Moso, Pat. Gaste and Pat. Esparicia at around five oclock the following afternoon; that he was brought to the Municipal Hall and there mauled until he lost consciousness; that his relatives were barred from seeing him; that during his four-month detention in Tanjay, he was never investigated; that he has no relative by the name of Emilio Rendora.6 (d) Pantaleon Sedigothat on 29 January 1986, at around sixthirty in the morning, Pat. Esparicia and Cpl. Borromeo, with their guns drawn, just barged into his house, searched his belongings and arrested him without a warrant; that when he refused to go with them, he was hit on the chest and eye; that he had never met any of his co-accused prior to his detention, neither did he know the deceased Atty. Garay; and, that he did not know anything about the charges against him.7 On 6 June 1986, the four (4) accused were transferred from the Municipal Jail of Tanjay to the Negros Oriental Provincial Rehabilitation Center in Dumaguete City. It was there where accused Bandula asked to see a doctor; that, as a result of his request, he was brought to the provincial hospital where he was examined8 and diagnosed to have an [o]ld healed fracture with callous formation at the 6th and 7th rib along the mid-auxiliary line,

left;9 that when prosecution witness Pat. Baldejera was asked on 15 September 1987 in open court if he saw any contusions or bruises on any of the four (4) accused after their arrest, he admitted that he noticed accused Sedigo with a black eye.10 Although the respective alibis of all four (4) accused were disregarded considering their positive identification by Salva as the ones who raided Polo Coconut Plantation, the trial court nevertheless acquitted Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo on the ground that while these three accused were present at the scene of the crime x x x from the inception of the crime to its final termination, they were merely bystanders and did not participate in one way or another in the commission thereof x x x x The mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.11 Hence, the instant appeal by the lone convict. Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. The prosecution witnesses themselves disclosed that on 28 January 1986 accused Dionanao was picked-up for investigation and interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he implicated accused Sedigo.12 The following
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day, on 29 January 1986, he was brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter.13 On 4 February 1986, upon the suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the Supplementary Sworn Statement of Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna.14 In his Sworn Statement, Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with Bandula when the latter, together with Boy Short and Boy Tall, shot Atty. Garay. He added that he was going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also said that Sedigo and Ejan were with them that evening.15 Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he implicated three (3) more persons but they were not thereafter included in the Information.16 The prosecution likewise asseverated that accused Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986, at around six oclock in the morning, brought to the Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated.17 He was investigated by Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso and Pat. Baldejera.18 In that investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with two (2) others shot Atty. Garay with a .38 cal. revolver.19 At that time, there was no counsel present because that (investigation) was not yet in writing.20 Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In that statement, Bandula narrated that after Boy Short and Boy Tall shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot the latter which he did.21 From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately

after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III, that (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. In the twin cases of Morales, Jr., v. Enrile 22 and Moncupa, Jr. v. Enrile,23 and the subsequent case of People v. Galit,24 all promulgated even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
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we laid down the procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and conducting a custodial investigation x x x At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient meansby telephone if possibleor by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 25 that [t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the

offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.26 Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus 27 where we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running
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into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.28 What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they were mauled into owning the crime. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the accused. For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge before conducting any investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his black eye which even Pat. Baldejera admitted? How and why did accusedappellant Bandula suffer a fractured rib? We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.29 Consequently, the prosecution is left with nothing but the alleged positive identification of appellant Bandula by witness Salva. But this by itself does not measure up to the required standard of

moral certainty. We cannot give credence to the lone identification by witness Salva of all four (4) accused who were supposedly bold enough to bare their faces. For, Maria Paz Garay, widow of the victim, recounted that except for Pastrano and Salva whose hands were tied behind their backs, she could not recognize any of the men as all their faces were fully covered, although according to Salva only two (2) were hooded. She could only see their eyes.30 Thus, even Pastrano who witnessed the crime together with Salva was not able to recognize any of the armed men as they were hooded. In fact, even if there was light, he said he would not be able to recognize the malefactors.31 Contraposed with the testimonies of Garay and Pastrano, the alleged positive identification by Salva crumbles. With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accusedappellant Bandula beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. We have oftentimes said that while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence.32 The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. In this, the state has utterly failed. Indeed, it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put words
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into his mouth. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused,33 a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners34 and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights.35 WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the conviction of accusedappellant AURELIO BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur. Cruz (Chairman) and Kapunan, JJ., On leave. Conviction of accused-appellant reversed and set aside; Accused acquitted. Note.No in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it is in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person is his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone is his behalf (People vs. Vasquez, 196 SCRA 564). o0o

CORLA, accused-appellant. Criminal Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; Two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in Art III, 12 of the Constitution. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12. Same; Same; Same; Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession, other_______________

* SECOND DIVISION. 191

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 191 People vs. Obrero

G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000.* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY OBRERO y

wise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.
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Same; Same; Same; Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the defendant.The confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. Same; Same; Same; Miranda Warnings; Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement is presumed to be psychologically coerced.But what renders the confession of accused-appellant 192

People vs. Obrero inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Same; Same; Same; Rights of Suspects.Under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Same; Same; Same; Where there is only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him, is merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; A lawyer who is also a station commander of the WPD cannot be considered as an independent counsel.Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an independent counsel as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. 193
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192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant. VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 193 People vs. Obrero Same; Same; Same; A lawyer who is part of the police force could not be expected to effectively and scrupulously assist a suspect in the custodial investigation.As observed in People v. Bandula, the independent counsel required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It does not matter that accused failed to object to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidencethe lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution.And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person. APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 12. 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero MENDOZA, J.: 194

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00 each and to pay the sum of P4,000.00 representing the amount of money stolen. The information alleged That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the said accused take, rob and carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency; that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter. Contrary to law.
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Martial G. Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District investi_____________

but failed to find accused-appellant. They were told by the sister of accusedappellant, Merly Asuncion, that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. According to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila. Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August 11, 1989, one of which, he said, had been executed by Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera, and the other by Angie C. De los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said that upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employers nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. She told Pat. Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place. On the other hand, in her sworn statement given on August 14, 1989 and marked as Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on August 11, 1989, she had seen accused-appellant and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with 196

1 Per Judge Rosmari D. Carandang. 195

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 195 People vs. Obrero gated the robbery with homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect: Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling chickens to customers. Cabosass business was located in Blumentritt Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 CM. Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines testified that after receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. They were told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend the burial of his grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez went to Rosales, Pangasinan

196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero blood, coming out of the Gatlin Building on CM. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.2 Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received information from Pat: Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day, March 4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on CM. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands.3 Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and
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Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances of accused-appellants arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet.4 Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O.5 In it, accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latters business on Blumentritt Street, Manila three or four months before the incident. Cabosas and accused-appellants sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in Rosales, Pangasinan. Accused-appellants work was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of _______________

died. Thereafter, the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street, Ronnie went to La Union, while accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. De los Reyes. The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was asked by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used against him in court, but accusedappellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide.6 The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. After proper identification (Exh, D) by the victims employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr. Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died. Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death. Six of these wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention. He concluded that the assailant _______________

2 TSN (Pat. Benjamin Ines), pp. 2-4, Feb. 6, 1991; pp. 1-4, Feb. 26, 1991. 3 Id., pp. 5-6, Feb. 26, 1991. 4 Id., pp. 7-10. 5 RTC Records, pp. 179-181. 197

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 197 People vs. Obrero Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she 6 TSN (Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes), pp. 2-10, March 5, 1991. 198

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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People vs. Obrero and the victim could be facing each other when wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were inflicted and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim when he inflicted wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the victims back when assailant inflicted wound no. 16 (Exh. B-6). He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed weapon.7 Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died. Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-l, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant and the victim could be facing each other, while in wounds Nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6, and G-7, respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the victim. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed weapon.8 Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds.9 With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L), the prosecution rested its case. The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla. Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street _______________

9 Id., pp. 10-12, 199

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 199 People vs. Obrero for four (4) months before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister, Merly Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angies business was selling dressed chickens. Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he delivered dressed chickens to Emma Cabreras residence on CM. Recto Avenue. He came back from his errand at around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had been paid to him. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read.10 On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law. He is further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity for their death and the additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of money taken, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered. SO ORDERED.
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7 TSN, pp, 2-6, Aug. 29, 1990. 8 Id., pp. 7-9.

Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing _______________

such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same 12. Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it. To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed again as proof that after being 201

10 TSN, pp. 2-5, Dec. 8, 1993; pp. 3-22, March 2, 1994. 200

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero his confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him. Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 201 People vs. Obrero given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement. (Exh. 0-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the third page in which the jurat appears, (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O) We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times. Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and
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information sheet. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained. Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on 202

which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.13 In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accusedappellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:14 _______________

11 People v. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356 (1997). 12 People v. Elizaga, 23 SCRA 449 (1968).

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero which violence and torture have been applied.11 When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.12 But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from

13 People v. Duero, 104 SCRA 379 (1981); Cf. People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986). 14 TSN, pp. 6-7, Feb. 26, 1991. 203

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 203 People vs. Obrero Q What happened during the investigation of the accused?
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A He consented to give a written statement to me, sir. Q Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement, Patrolman, was he assisted by counsel? A Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer. Q And who was that lawyer that was provided by you? A Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir. Q And who personally took down the statement of the accused? A I was the one who personally took the statement of accused Obrero. Q Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to you, what was it all about? A Its all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome slaying of two househelps.

Q Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero, what investigative steps did you undertake relative to his constitutional right, patrolman? A I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to have an attorney; that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. He, however, consented to proceed with the written statement. Q Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional rights that you stated in this written statement of Jimmy Obrero? A Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave. Q And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy Obrero is it indicated, the consent which he gave after having pointed out to him his constitutional right? A This portion sir, this sagot-opo and then it was further affirmed by his signature over his typewritten name, sir. For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:15 _______________

15 TSN, pp. 3-4, March 5, 1991. 204

....
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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero Q: Were you able to confront the suspect at that time, herein accused? 1A: Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigationcustodial investigation I can render my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told him his rights under the law, sir. Q: What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the accused, in this case at that time you confronted Jimmy Obrero? A: He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted to secure my services, sir.

identification procedure in a police line up, and I told him that all the evidences he might give will be utilized against him in the court with respect to the caseand despite of that, he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence. Q Was he able to give statement to the police? A Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when he] gave statement voluntarily. Q Was that statement taken down into writing? A In a question and answer form, sir. Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads: MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS:

.... Q After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel for the investigation, Atty. De los Reyes, what happened next? A I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent, the right to secure lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to be placed in any

Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas: 1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag-sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo; 205

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000

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205 People vs. Obrero 2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo; 3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong Salaysay ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa bang magbigay ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na Salaysay? SAGOT: (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla) Opo. TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko? (Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions16 of this Court, has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in People v. Januario:17 Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to _______________

16 People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443 (1997); People v. Binamira, 277 SCRA 232 (1997); People v. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 (1993). 17 267 SCRA 608, 632 (1997). 206

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.18 Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an independent counsel as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point, he testified as follows: Q Now, whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of police to which you belong or working but could not solve the crime and then you were designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to a suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that conference with the suspect you may have inquired confidential inf ormation, what would you do, will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your co-policeman because you know that? A If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential right, I can divulge it even to my fellow officer.
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Q Now, by the way, do you have authority to practice the law profession, did you get approval or permit from the civil A Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are authorized verbally [as long as] it will not hamper our time, we will not work our time during the police duty, maam. Q According to you, you were extending legal assistance to your client who was charged of illegal recruitment, do you not consider that conflict of duty because no less than your organization was the one investigating that? A I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case because if it is true that he committed _______________

ATTY. ALISUAG:

That is all, Your Honor.19 The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled: As shown in Exhibit O, accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation, by affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit 0-3). And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds that the proceedings were regularly conducted. In fact, he testified that he first asked the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 4); that he informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite the warning, he decided to give his confession just the same; that he was at all time present when the accused was being interrogated with the accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid., p. 4); that he read to the accused the questions and answers before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid., p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police force, when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody interrogation.20 This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,21 the independent counsel required by Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. To allow such a hap______________

18 Citing People v. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626, 638 (1995). 207

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 207 People vs. Obrero

19 TSN (Atty. Bienvenido delos Reyes), p. 9, March 5, 1991 (emphasis added). the crime then I will back out, if I found suspicion and there is no proof at all, I go to the litigation. 20 Rollo, p. 21. 21 232 SCRA 566 (1994).
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208

ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. _______________

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Obrero penstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.22 For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accusedappellants guilt consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence, and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in front of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running down the stairs with blood in his hands. These statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay. Consequently, there is no identification of accused-appellant. And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person. WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby 22 People v. Matos-Viduya, 189 SCRA 403 (1990). 209

VOL. 332, MAY 17, 2000 209 People vs. Obrero The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accusedappellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. De Leon, Jr., J., On leave. Judgment reversed, accused-appellant acquitted. Notes.The signatures of the accused on the boxes and on the plastic bags are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights and are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence. (People vs. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 [1996]) Republic Act No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning. (People vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1 [1999]) Confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law. (People vs. Muleta, 309 SCRA 148 [1999])
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o0o

G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990.* SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EU_______________

210

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Toledano [People vs. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190(2000)] 218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents. Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits complexing of rebellion with any other offense.The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor, sufficient to determine probable cause.It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioners arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report
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* EN BANC. 218

Enrile vs. Salazar G.R. No. 92163. June 5, 1990.* IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has jurisdiction to deny or grant bail to petitioner.The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first apply219

orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail and, if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutors recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to change, but only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time.It is enough to give anyone pause and the Court is no exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province. 220

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 219 Enrile vs. Salazar ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to whom no bail is recommended, to claim the right to bail hearing to prove the reason or weakness of evidence against him.There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judgeindeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify bypassing established judicial processes designed to

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all

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embracing authority; Reasons.To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:

221

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 221 Enrile vs. Salazar enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [19741; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]). GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed.While litigants, should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writits capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazeshave always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours]. FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Statutes; Non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally; Expost facto law.The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts; Case at bar.The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up
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of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:

void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the informations validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court). BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

Rebellion; Complex yCrime; Crime of Rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was ground- breaking on 222

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio.And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lightsabsent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrinethe prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of the petitioners constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when the Supreme Court has been satisfied that petitioner is entitled to temporary 223

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 223 Enrile vs. Salazar freedom.I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6,
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1990, granted the petitioner provisional liberty upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him provisional liberty is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom. PETITION for Habeas Corpus.

People vs. Romagosa, 103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 (1960). 224

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. NARVASA, J.:

Enrile vs. Salazar Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3 On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been: (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books; (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; (c) denied his right to bail; and

Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases2 that took issue with the rulingall with a marked lack of successbut none, it would seem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question. The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 90-10941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of _______________

1 99 Phil. 515 (1956). 2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956);

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.4
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The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164,7 which had been _______________

and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (delito compuesto) arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply. The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two10 against granting bail to the Panlilios. The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enriles petition, G.R. No. 92163. The parties oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options: _______________

3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34. 4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq. 5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26. 6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359. 7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court, upon motion of the petitioners, resolved to treat as a petition 225

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 128-129. 225 8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411. Enrile vs. Salazar contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enriles co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because and this is putting it very simplythe information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime (delito complejo) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, 9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Corts and Grio-Aquino, JJ. 10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J. 226

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar

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(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in Ms written pleadings; (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or less grave character; (c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-exainined.10-a In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that (w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender.11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject ________________

10-a Two Members are on leave. 11 Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987. 227

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 227 Enrile vs. Salazar the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case: There is one other reasonand a fundamental one at thatwhy Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
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culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed toy Mm were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro: La unificacion de penas en los casos de eoncmrso de delitos a que hace referenda este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado franeamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.) We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading: 228

punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.12 The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioners guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Courts ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of ________________

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro. En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos. Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por sparado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163) and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a

12 People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543. 229

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 229 Enrile vs. Salazar other questions relevant to the petitioners complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
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The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said: In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means necessary (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.13 The plaint of petitioners counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the ques_______________

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar tioned information.14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation. It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioners arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution.15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation.17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Courts reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners case, and of the logical an.d necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? _______________

13 Id., at 551. 230

14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp, 78-79 and 73-76.

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15 Supra, footnote 4. 16 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394. 17 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47. 231

assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, irom deciding them; none, in short that would justify by-passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial _______________

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 231 Enrile vs. Salazar The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. Even acceptance of petitioners premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge.18 There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court. There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judgeindeed such an 18 Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court. 232

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no differ* ence that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutors recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court. Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present
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petition, but also because to wash the Courts hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief applied for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review. Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual _______________

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion. It is enough to give anyone pauseand the Court is no exceptionthat not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province. WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the _______________

19 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55. 233

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 233 Enrile vs. Salazar milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violationthey claimof their constitutional rights.

20 Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125. 234

234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Enrile vs. Salazar spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Courts earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED, Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion. Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., See separate opinion. Gutierrez, Jr., J., See concurring opinion. Paras, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Padilla. Padilla, J., See dissent. Bidin, J., See concurring and dissenting opinion. Sarmiento, J., See concurring and dissenting in part. Corts and Grio-Aquino, JJ., On leave. Medialdea, J., Concurring in G.R. No. 92164; No part in G.R. No. 92163. FERNAN, C.J., Dissenting and Concurring:

jurisprudence. To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the 235

VOL. 186 JUNE 5, 1990 235 Enrile vs. Salazar instant case that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion (p. 9, Decision). The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the allembracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification. With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision
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I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and

(Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof. The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely necessary but not indis236

The occurrence of a coup detat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup detat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup detat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950s. A coup detat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the 237

236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar pensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable, In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 237 Enrile vs. Salazar element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup detat, the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup detat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners. I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed,
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despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements. I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy. Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court. Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663). It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not lie when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court. 238

judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain ones liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Italics ours]. The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioners constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law. While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writits capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazeshave always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours]. The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner, 239

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioners liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available. The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 239 Enrile vs. Salazar

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If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D No. 942, were repealed, for being repressive, fey EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees. Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a creature unknown in lawthe complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose. FELICIANO, J., Concurring

for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender. 240

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives. At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.) sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: engaging in war against the forces of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated. Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection commit rebellion, or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection. The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
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I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court. I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: Rebellion or InsurrectionHow Committed), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines _______________

1 ART. 142-A. Cases where other offenses are committed.When by reason or on the occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty

The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 241

could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 242

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 241 Enrile vs. Salazar [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]). It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question in these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today. Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion

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I join the Courts decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress. I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated. I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us. First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is net such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crimerebellion pure and simple. Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even 243

187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights. Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself. And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only on the occasion of but not a necessary means for the commission of rebellion. This argument is puerile.

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 243 Enrile vs. Salazar law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. 244

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar

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Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-beenacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling. All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible, make it conform to the law. A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must 245

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 245 Enrile vs. Salazar follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower courts rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the SolicitorGeneral provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime. The principle bears repeating: Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit. (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
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I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non-existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of 246

planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food. The Court in Salonga stressed:

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar the prosecutors, not in the records of the case. I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court. The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion. The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown. In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 247

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 247 Enrile vs. Salazar 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 2S SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
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should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461-462) Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R, No, 92164 an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the principle in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, et al. (supra) has been violated. 248

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, is to be read as charging simple rebellion. The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was ground-breaking on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 249

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts. I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a nonexistent crime. PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 249 Enrile vs. Salazar 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lightsabsent
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when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrinethe prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the informations validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court}. I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or baptizing it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED. Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled. BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Salazar proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had feeen charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioners constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us in the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that the proceedings together with the bond shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102). Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioners) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case. SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner. I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the 250

I agree that People v. Hernandez1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine. As Hernandez put it, rebellion means engaging in war against the forces of the
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250

government,2 which implies resort to arms, _______________

moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom. Proceedings in both cases remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail.

1 99 Phil. 515 (1956). 2 Supra, 520. 251

Note.Amnesty granted by former President Marcos covers crimes for violation of subversion laws or those defined under crimes against public order. (Macaga-an vs. People, 152 SCRA 480.) o0o

VOL. 186, JUNE 5, 1990 251 Enrile vs. Salazar requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake....3 whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be completed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes. I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left fully described.4 At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance. I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner provisional liberty upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him provisional liberty is in my view, of no

_______________

3 Supra, 521. 4 US v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 793 (1917). 252

Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved [Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217(1990)]

Garcia vs. Domingo No. L-30104. July 25, 1973. HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.
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144

regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. x x x There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." Same; When hearings held inside judge's chambers not violative of right to public trial.What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the.city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? 145

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. Domingo Constitutional law; Legal history of right to a public trial.The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. x x x It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, in the leading case of In re Oliver: "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in (the) English common law heritage." He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure,"but it likely evolved long before the settlement of (the United States) as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." It was then noted by him that "there. "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776" Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. He then conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, that all requires criminal trials be open to the public." Same; What public trial means.The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with

VOL. 52, JULY 25, 1973 145 Garcia vs. Domingo The answer must be in the negative. There is now showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly in In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. Same; Criminal procedure; Lack of intervention by fiscal in trial of criminal case, effect of.No jurisdictional error was incurred by the city court judge where an assistant fiscal abdicated control over the prosecution. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected x x x but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to
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intervene x x x". ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for petitioners. Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al. Respondent Judge in his own behalf. FERNANDO, J.:

procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants, the hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence offered to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertainedthe unique aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force likewise being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above manner we rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant the petition. It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated January 16,1968, eight (8) criminal actions against respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) _______________

The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial.1 _______________

1 According to the 1935 Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the 146

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. Domingo More specifically, did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents2 inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as petitioner.3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit, although such a

contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right * * * to have a speedy and public trial, * * *." Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 17. The present Constitution, in its Art. IV, speaks of an accused in all criminal prosecutions enjoying the right "to have a speedy, impartial and public trial * * *." Sec. 19. 2 The other respondents are Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel of the City of Manila police force. 3 The real petitioner is Francisco Lorenzana. 147
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VOL. 52, JULY 25, 1973 147 Garcia vs. Domingo (1) Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for slander."4 The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4,1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20,1968, May 4,1968, May 11,1968, June 1,1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial datesexcept March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases."5 Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia."6 Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent crossexamined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, ________________

4 Petition, paragraph 3. 5 Ibid, paragraph 5. 6 Ibid, paragraph 7. 148

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. Domingo submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to thin late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected toor pointed outany supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases."8 It was stated next in the petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September 28,1968, at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings."9 Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction * * * [alleging jurisdictional defects]."10 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus
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causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated. adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the public." and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated _______________

constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for. 1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner."12 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law.13 Earlier, such a right ________________

8 Ibid, paragraphs 8-9. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid, paragraph 11. 149

VOL. 52, JULY 25, 1973 149 Garcia vs. Domingo

11 I d, paragraph 20. 12 III S. Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention [of 1934-1935] 665-666 (1966). 13 Section 3.

the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) * * * pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.' "11 A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petitioners on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents were required to answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As was to be expected the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11,1969 and that by the other respondents on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive showing of a violation of the

150

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. Domingo found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States.14
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Historically, as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:15 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage."16 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial."17 It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776."18 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791.19 He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public."20 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial. 2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further ________________

19 Ibid, 267. 20 Ibid, 267-268. 151

VOL. 52, JULY 25, 1973 151 Garcia vs. Domingo protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process.21 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."22 What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged."23 Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran
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14 Section 5. There was an express mention thereof in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900. 15 333 US 257 (1948). Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 US 32 (1965) and Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532 (1966). 16 Ibid, 266. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, 266-267. The State referred to is Pennsylvania.

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21 Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 (1968). 22 According to Rule 119, Sec. 14 of the Rules of Court: "The court may upon its own motion exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is of such a character as to be offensive to decency or public morals." Cf. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (1918). 23 In re Oliver, 333 US 257,272. 152

People of the Philippines for whom a fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero:26 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected * * * but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene * * *."27 4. There is much to be said of course for the concern _______________

24 4 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed 207-208 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. Domingo should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection now raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived."24 The decision referred to, United States v. Mercado,25 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905. It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable. 3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at war with the obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the 25 4 Phil. 304. 26 L-24494, June 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 1061 27 Ibid, 1065-1066. 153

VOL. 52, JULY 25, 1973 153 Garcia vs. Domingo displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in
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dispelling such misgivings. Te crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the airconditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo, dated November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Civil Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, except that of dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 26, 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against respondent policemen, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel. Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Teehankee. Makasiar, Antonio and 154

Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., are on leave. Writ of certiorari and prohibition granted. Notes.In the cited In re Oliver case (333 U.S. 257), it has been said that the "traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet. xxx In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial." LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 315 on Constitutional Law and page 615 on Criminal Procedure. See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 2, page 1114 on Jurisdiction. Fernando, E.M., The Bill of Rights, 1972 Edition with 1973 Supplement. Moran, M.V., Comments on the Rules of Court, vol. 4, 1970 Edition. Padilla, A., Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1971 Edition. Jacinto, G.V., Criminal Procedure, 1965 Edition. oOo

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Buendia vs. City of Baguio Esguerra, JJ., concur., Castro, J., did not take part.

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