J. H. WALGRAVE O.P.

TERTIA VIA

The

difjiculty

When reading the text of the Third Way superficially, one might get the impression that this third way is not so problematic as some .'of the other ways, for instance, as the fourth or the fifth. This follows from the manner in which many authors speak about the five ways. For us, however, the third way remains, in a sense, the most difficult one, for there is a rather apparent gap in the argument. It says that in the succession in time of beings, which cease to exist by passing away and, therefore, by generation are the occasion for the coming-intobeing of other things, and these are the possibilia esse et non esse , one cannot infinitely go back, although the chain can go on indefinitely. The principie that in the succession of the possibilia one cannot infinitely go backward is logically necessary for the conclusin: Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus . However, this is affirmed, but not proven. Is it really so evident that the chain of generation and corruption cannot infinitely go back, as it can go forward indefinitely? For here there is no question of a series of causes per se, as in the prima and secunda va, but of a series of causes per accidens. In a series of causes per se the immediate or ultmate particular cause can only exercise hic et nunc its causality by virtue of the causality, which comes forth from the first universal cause. In case there is no first cause, or in case it does not work, the last one cannot work and there would be no effect, which, nevertheless, we observe with our own eyes. But this does not apply to a series per accidens: each particular cause in the series produces the next one in the succession of time. The concept of a series of causes, in which the hen produces the egg, and the egg a hen, does not imply there must have been a first lien as the starting point of the series. After having drawn attention to this gap in the logic of the argument, we must now reconstruct in its entirety the argument as it is presented by St. Thomas.

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The point of departure Tertia via sum tur ex possibili et necessario . Unlike the prima via, which starts from the concept of change, "prima et manifestior via sumitur ex motu" , now the point of departure is dual: ex possibili et necessario . The reason is that when something that is necessary has been shown to exist in reality, one has not yet proven that God exists. The conclusin that God exists follows formally from the affirmation that in the universe there are not only possibilia but also necessaria. Therefore there are two stages in the argument: a first preparatory stage, in which it is shown that the world of possibilia implies as a matter of fact the existence of necessaria; and a next, decisive stage in which it is shown that the existence of the necessaria among things implies of necessity the existence of God. Fundamental concepts In order to understand this argument first certain notions and distinctions must be made clear. In the first place a very general observation: the philosophy of St. Thornas, like that of Aristotle, is a philosophy of substances. Only substances exist. The term ens in its proper meaning can only be predicated of substances or subsisten! wholes of being. Esse, as St. Thomas repeatedly states, cannot be predicated of accidents in its proper sense, but only analogically. The esse of the accidents is an inesse. Accidents only exist in and by virtue of substance. It follows that the possibilia esse et non esse are substances which are such that they can also not exist. That there are substances of this first type becomes right away clear from the fact that there are substances which begin to exist by generation and cease to exist by corrruption. But that there are substances of the second type has to be shown by argument. The meaning of these notions must however be made even more precise. The substances of the first type are substances which by their very nature, by virtue o their ontological status are such that they can as well exist as not exist. Why? Because their status of being is deterinincd by two essential factors: the particular essential form which gives ilieir esse substantide and the materia prima, by which they are not uccessarily determined by that determnate form by which they are actually determined. The same matter which is first determined by this particular forma to constitute together with it this particular substance, can also be determined by another particular- form, to constitute together wih it snother substance. The change by which in the same matter two parti-

cular formas follow the one after the other, is a passing away which necessarily carries with it the coming-into-being of another substance. For the materia prima, because of its very nature, can never exist on itself without being determined by a forma, together with which it constitutes, by way of composition, one material substance. Once more, only substances exist. The materia prima cannot have any esse by itself because it does not have any determination by itself. The reason why certain substances may exist as well as not exist, is the materia prima, which, by its very nature, indifferently undergoes determination by whichever definite form which gives the compositum its esse substantiale: omnis forma dat suo subjecto esse secundum illamformam. The forma substantialis or the essential form (for instance, humanness ) gives the subject or the individual being its esse substantiale, that is, to be this man; a forma accidentalis (for instance, white ) gives the subject an esse accidntale, that is, to be this white thing. The transition from one substance to another is therefore called a mutatio substantialis. Now, when a substance is by its nature such that it can change into another substance, this will happen if things are allowed to follow their natural course. Henee: quod possibile est non esse aliquando non est. The addition when things are allowed to follow their natural course is important. For God could in a miraculous way, for ever keep in existence a possibile esse et non esse. But this assumption cannot be made in our argument, because our argument has precisely the purpose of demonstrating the existence of God. For that reason, we cannot consider the possibility of a miraculously keeping in existence in our present argument. The same holds true for the necessarium. Generally speaking the necessarium is a substance which by its nature is such that when it exists, it cannot cease to exist, because it does not carry within itself such a principie by which it is related indifferently to any possible forma substantialis: and this either, as in the case of an ngel, because it is pur form and has no material component, or, as is the case with the celestial bodies, at least according to the peculiar Aristotelico-Thomistic cosmology, because their matter is of a different kind, which does not allow it to be determined by another forma than this one which determines it actually. It is only in potentia ai unum. Now, on account of the same principie which we applied to the possibilia, we should say of the necessaria that a substance which in itself does not have a principie of being by which it would be able to cease to exist, will as a matter of fact exist for ever, if things are allowed to follow their natural course. That they could miraculously cease to

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cxist, is again an assumption, for which there is no place in our argument, because it already presupposes the conclusin. We said of the necessarium that it is a substance of which nonexistence is impossible, at least if it exists. For is is not impossible that some day it began to exist. But once it exists according to its own way of being, it has the power to continu to exist for ever. And because every being has as such a desiderium naturale essendi (a natural desire to exist), it will not out of itself cease to exist, when it has by itself the power to continu to exist. St. Thomas says it in this way: illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, ex quo habet illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est; sed antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae ponitur ab Aristotele, non concludit simpliciter quod incorruptibilia non inceperunt esse; sed quod non inceperunt esse per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt esse ( 1 ). The obciens here had concluded from Aristotle: everything which begins to exist, is at some time, and at some is not. Therefore no incorruptible being has a beginning in its existence . St. Thomas answers that from this argument only follows that the incorruptible substances do not begin to exist in the same way as the generabilia and corruptibilia. They can, therefore, begin to exist in a different way, viz. by creation. But for the latter possibility there is, again, no place in the argumentation of the tertia va, because it must precisely prove the existence of a Creator. For this reason St. Thomas here only upholds that frorn the fact that a substance is incorruptible it can philosophically neither be shown that it had no beginning or that it had a beginning. This conclusin is of great importance in the entire problematic de aeternitate mundi. It has now become clear that in the order of concepts a clistinction should be made between a conditional and an unconditional necessity. The condition is: if it exists. Conditional necessity properly belongs to those substances which by themselves cannot cease to exist once
( 1 ) Summa theologica, 1, 46, 1 ad 2. The objection, which is here answered luis been borrowed friri Aibtotle's De celo et mundo. In his commentary St. Thomas follov/ing in the footsteps of the philosopher declares that everything which oxists always, exists arways necessarily. This does howeyer not mean that whatever exists necessarily, exists alwoys. He explains the first statement with the followng v/ords: Illud quod sempcr est, scil, per infinitum tempus, haber potentiatn ut sit in infinito tempere: potentia autem existendi non est ad utrumque respectu tcmporis in quo quis potest esse; omnia enim appetunt esse, et unumquodque tanturn est quantum potest esse. Et hoc praecipue patet in his quae sunt a natura, quia natura est determnala ad unum. Et sic quidquid semper est, non contingentr semper est, sed ex necessitate. . . . Et sic patet, quod ornne quod est sernpiternurn, est ingenitum et incorruptibile. (Opera omnia, edit. leonina, 1886, p. 106).

they exist. Unconditional necessity would then belong to a substance, with regard to which the condition if it exists makes no sense, because its own being or essence includes existence, so that it has in its own essence the ground of its necessity. To demnstrate the existence of such a being is the proper purpose of the tertia va. The argument There are substances which cease to exist by natural corruption and begin to exist by natural generation. Henee they are possibilia esse et non esse. From their very nature it follows that they do not have the power to exist for ever. This is the fact. The principie then runs: it is impossible that substances of such a nature, when left to the natural course of things, would exist for ever. Because by themselves they do not have the power to exist for ever, they cannot exercise this power. Left to themselves they will in the natural course of things once cease to exist. This is the meaning of the important proposition already quoted: quod possible est non esse aliquando non est . But now comes the difficulty: Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia esse et non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus . Is that true, then all further conclusions follow. Has there once been absolutely nothing, then also now there is nothing. For somethitig can only begin to exist by something that exists. Ex nibilo nihil. From nothing nothing comes forth. Now, it is irrefutably wrong that now nothing exists. Henee it is impossible that at some moment there was not anything at all. That argument is nothing else but an application of the principie of causality at its deepest level. In the first proof of God's existence the principie was formulated in this way: omne quod. movetur ab alio movetur. This is the positive formulation of what, negatively formulated, runs like this: nihil potest mover seipsum. We can formlate this more elaborately as follows: every substance, which is subject to change, unclergoes this change by the causal influence of another substance. In the third proof " the principie runs: quod aliquando non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est or a substance can only begin to exist by the efficient causal influence of another substance which already exists before . And then, indeed , if once there was nothing, nothing could begin to exist. The difficulty lies therefore in the assertion that, if all substances or beings which make up the totality of being, were of such a nature that they come forth the one from the other in natural succession by corruption and generation, there once was nothing. This implies of course the logical assumption that the conveyor belt of possibilia backwards or toward the past cannot infinitely go on. For, if this would

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be possible, the conclusin aliquando nihil fuit in rebus would be logically wrong. But is a never ending succession of particular forms in an eternal matter logically really inconceivable? Does not St. Thomas himself say: non est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum ? ( 2 ). To get a clearer view of this problem we must bear in mind that there is question here of a temporal succession of substances in the same matter. These substances can as a matter o fact be counted. We must however make a distinction between counting toward the past and counting toward the future. Tf we count toward the future, we can say that we can infinitely continu, or, rather, go on without end: strictly speaking not in infinitum (the infinitum is never reached), but in indefinitum. With this I intend to say that we cannot hope to reach at some moment a point, where the infinite is reached. This would imply an intrinsic contradiction. By going on counting one can never reach the infinite, for what can be counted is by its very nature finite and at number 5 billion we are not yet any closer to the infinite trian at number five, But we can say that the succession of numerables will go on without end. Nothing in the nature of the progressive succession tells that it must at one moment come to a stand. If, on the other hand, from what now is we count backward to the past, the entire situation changes. For each unit in the past series did have a real existence When I say that the succession is already from all eternity going on. I ipso fact o state that a real infinite series has been realised at this moment. But this is obviously nonsensical. For if the infinite has now been reached, the next unit in the series will be: infinite + 1. And this involves a contradiction. For, because of its very nature one cannot add further units to what is infinite. No substance can therefore be the terminal point of an infinite series. Consequently the past series is finite and did have somewhere a beginning, even if the series were a billion times a billion times a billion. If everything that exists were of such a nature that it would only be once a link in a numerable series, then there would indeed be a beginning and before tliis beginning there was nothing. An infinitely progessive series is possible, but a realised infinite series is impossible. This is why St. Thomas says: Omnem multitudinem oportet esse n aliqa specie multitudinis. Species autem multitudinis sunt species m.imerorum. Nulla autem species multitulinis est infinita; quia quilibet numerus est multitudo mensrala per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem infinitam actu; sive per se, sive per accidens. Sed esse
( ;: ) Stwiiii,i th'd., , 46, 2 ad 7.

multitudinem infinitam in potentia possibile est (3). Whether there s question of a number of simultaneously existing units or of a number in succession, does not make the least difference. One cannot escape from the absutdity of the assertion that everything which is consists of possibilia, unless when one adds that among things there also are necessaria and then the sequence of the argument goes on with stern logic. Now, as we have already seen, necessary substances are either conditionally necessary, that is, if they exist, or unconditionally necessary, that is without more ado. This dilemma is given with the order of concepts and that by virtute of the principie of non-contradiction. Conditionally necessary substances cannot na.tura.uter cease to exist, if they exist. This condition lying in their very existence implies of course that even if they would in fact exist eternally and without a beginning, they would nevertheless be contingent. For a contingent substance means that its existence, regardless of whether it be sempiternum or limitecl in duration, does not have its ground or reason in the essence, in the quod quid est of that substance. For then it would have the ground of its existence in its own essence, and exist eternally or without beginning in such a way that the condition if it exists would no longer have any meaning whatsoever. The argument, however, is more intricate than it seems to be at a first glance. St. Thomas has obviously shown that not everything which exists, can belong to the order of the possibilia. Therefore, there must be among the existing substances necessary substances, or at least one necessary substance. Now St. Thomas admits not only the possibility but also the factual existence of necessary beings which do not have the ground o their necessity in themselves. It is with regard to these beings that he holds that philosophy cannot ascertain whether they exist eternally or not. Either did they begin to exist, or do they exist eternally. Which of these two propositions is correct, cannot be made out by the philosopher on the basis of philosophical arguments. There are, therefore, philosophically speaking two possibilities with regard to the necessary substances, which do not have the ground of their necessity within themselves or in their own being. There is, in the first place, the possibility that their existence had a beginning. But then the problem of the possibilia remains without solution. For, with regard to these necessaria we must say what we also say concerning the possibilia: If everything that is, would be of such
(3) Op. di., I, 7, 4 c.

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a nature, at some moment there was nothing in the order of things. And so the game starts all over again without our being any closer to the solution. We must, therefore, try the second solution: there are perhaps necessary substances which exist eternally. As we have seen, the philosopher cannot exclude this possibility. Has the problem been solved with the assumption that there are among things eternal necessary substances? As for the probelm of a beginning, the answer is affirmative, because if there are eternal necessary substances, it can no longer be concluded: aliquando nihil fuit in rebus . When -we consider the notion of an eternal necessary substance: a new metaphysical probleem looms up and even a crucial one. Does that eternal necessary substance have the ground of its eternal necessary existence in itself? Is it itself the caus of its eternal and necessary esse? We are always dealing with the same dilemma of causality: either by itself or by another. In the prima va this was stated in the terms: nothing can change itself. Henee everything that undergoes change, is changed by another. Here this is expressed at a deeper level: That which does not have the esse by itself, cannot give it to itself. Therefore, it must receive its esse from another substance. Once we have reached this point, the logical sequel is: if the second eternal necessary substance, which is supposed to give esse to the first, is itself such that it does not have its esse by its own essence, we must ask with regard to the cause of that esse the same question as the one we asked concerning the first eternal and necessary substance. And in this way v/e are again on the impossible road of the proceder in infinitum, This proceder in infinitum is nonsensical for the same fundamental reason why it was found to be so in the prima va. For it is a series per se. Obviously it cannot be a series per accidens, for the causal relationship between eternal substances does not take place in time. Henee the necessary substance, which does not have the ground of its necessary esse in itself, eternally receives its necessary existence from another and that means, in the last analysis, from an eternal substance which does not need any more to receive its eternal existence from another, because it has the esse by vrtue of its essence, or, in other words, it is itself the esse subsistens: the substance, the essence of which is the esse itself. And this is God. It is obvious that the third way, as the second and the fourth, goes deeper than the first. This had as its point of departure that certain substances are subject to change. Now, since in every thing which undergoes change,.this change must be caused by something else, we must, if we logically pursue the aurgment, conclude that there is a

first mover, which in the act, by which it actively changes others, is not itself subject to change: Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. The conclusin is therefore not formally the affirmation of a creator. But the tertia is not concerned with the changes substances undergo, but with the existence itself of substances.. The possibilia, of which .we know from experience the chain of coming-into-being, forc us to affirm the existence of necessaa or necessary substances. Regardless of whether these had a beginning or not this cannot be decided philosophically , at any rate they have the esse, be it with or without beginning , either per participationem, by partaking in the esse that is per essentiam, or per essentiam, by their own essence, because their essence is their being. This last metaphysical alternative is at the same time the fundamental intuition on the basis of which St. Thomas is going to clevelop bis doctrine of creation: Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter conven i t or E x hoc quod aliquid est ens per participationem, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio ("). As you all know, this is the argument, the only argument and it is a philosophical one with which St. Thomas in the very first article of his treatise on creation demontrates that all beings necessarily receive their being from God's creative activity: Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne ens quocumque modo est, a Deo esse . In writing this he only renders explicit, in a sequel of thought which goes from God to the existing things, what he already had reached in a sequel of thought which in the quinqu viae went from the things to God. In the secunda, tertia and quarta va God ad Creator already is the formal terminal point of the argumenta tion. For in the secunda via it is shown that in the order of causes there must be a a first cause which both in the final effect and in all intermedate causes causes being in every aspect of being, because being is the exclusive proper effect of that first cause. The latter causes therefore everything sub ralione entis. Now this is peculiar to creative causality. In the tertia via it is shown that there is an absolutely necessary being, a being for which it is impossible not to be because it has the cause of its necessary existence within itself, that is, in its own essence, and that for this reason grants being to all subs'.anees, even to such substances which might exist eternally and necessarily, if these do not carry within themselves the ground of their necessity. This means, in its most acute formulation, that every being, even an eternal necessary being, must come to existence by creation, if i: is not being per essentiam.
( 4 ) Op.cit., I, 44, 1 c and ad 1.

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In the quarta va it will be shown that in substances in wich the perfection of being s .only realised in a limited way, that is more or less, henee partially, that perfection which lies in them, is caused by a mximum, that is, a substance in which the perfection of being is realised without limit, in its pur fullness, henee in such a way that it cannot be placed in the series of more or less, but transcends without limit, that is infinitely, the en tire series. What I want to say with this is that the formal final conclusions, to which the second, thrd and fourth ways take us with logical necessity, can directly be stated in the terms of the principal characteristic of the relation of created being to its creator: From the fact that something possesses being in the manner of particpation follows that this being in it is caused by a being that by itself is pur and henee infinite being .