Zain KSA Financial Statement Analysis

ACCT501B, Financial Accounting

Ahmad Aldarrak, Ryan Rakestraw, Maria Surina 4/26/2012

Table of Contents
1. 2. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................... 2 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS.............................................................................................................................. 3 2.1. Saudi Mobile Industry SWOT analysis........................................................................................... 3 3. MOBILE OPERATORS ............................................................................................................................. 4 3.1. STC................................................................................................................................................. 4 3.2. Mobily (Etihad Etisalat) ................................................................................................................. 5 3.3. Zain (Subject company)................................................................................................................. 5 4. FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 6 4.1. Revenue Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 6 4.2. Expense Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 7 4.2.1. Cost of Sales: ......................................................................................................................... 7 4.2.2. Distribution and Marketing ................................................................................................... 8 4.2.3. Capital Expenditures ............................................................................................................. 8 4.2.4. Depreciation and Amortization........................................................................................... 10 4.2.5. Financial Charges ................................................................................................................ 10 4.2.6. Selling and General Administration .................................................................................... 10 4.2.7. Zakat and Tax Expenses ...................................................................................................... 10 5. CONCLUSIONS FROM FINANCIAL ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 10 5.1. Licensing Fees ............................................................................................................................. 10 5.2. Economies of Scale and Scope .................................................................................................... 11 5.3. Marketing Efficiency ................................................................................................................... 11 6. FUTURE OUTLOOK .............................................................................................................................. 12

List of Figures
Figure 1: Saudi Mobile Market Share ........................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2: STC Ownership Composition.......................................................................................................... 5 Figure 3: Monthly ARPU ($US) By Operator ................................................................................................. 7 Figure 4: Customer Acquisition Cost ($US) By Operator .............................................................................. 8

List of Tables
Table 1: Saudi Mobile Market Data .............................................................................................................. 4 Table 2: Operator Financial Comparison (000 SAR) ...................................................................................... 6 Table 3: Operator DuPont Analysis ............................................................................................................... 6 Table 4: Cash Flow from Operations to CAPEX Ratio .................................................................................... 9 Table 5: CAPEX By Operator.......................................................................................................................... 9 Table 6: Sales to PP&E Ratio ......................................................................................................................... 9 Table 7: Current Ratio Analysis ................................................................................................................... 11 Page 1 of 15

1. BACKGROUND
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) began the process of restructuring its telecommunications sector with the incorporation of the state-run Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC) in 1998. Responsibility for providing fixed-line and mobile services to the country was shifted from The Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone to STC, effectively creating a monopoly. This perfect monopoly caused comparatively high prices and poor service. Monopolistic structure of the industry meant there was no incentive to build a telecommunications network outside the metro regions. This, coupled with the relatively sparse population of the Kingdom, limited the quality and speed of the countrys telecommunications infrastructure roll-out. As a result, the Communication and Information Technology Commission (CITC), the regulator of the Saudi Arabian telecommunications market, was formed in 2001 to promote increased infrastructure investment. In 2002, CITC issued a second mobile services license, thus allowing Etisalat a telecommunication services company based in the United Arab Emirates to offer mobile services in the country through its subsidiary company, Mobily, that launched operations in 2005. No additional mobile licenses were issued until 2007 when Zain (formerly MTC, Kuwaits state-run telecom) won the rights to a 25 year license with a bid of $6.1B (USD). Zain KSA launched in 2008 and enrolled 2 million subscribers within 4 months of launch. Zain has not been profitable to date, but has been gaining market share (Ref. Figure 1). Both of these factors can likely be partially attributed to Zains lower price strategy. Our goal in this research is to investigate the reasons behind the losses of Zain and try to figure out how the company can start generating profits in the rapidly growing telecom industry. Figure 1: Saudi Mobile Market Share

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2. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
The Saudi Arabian mobile telecom sector continues to show good growth (Ref. Table 1). Four and a half million new subscribers were added in 2011 bringing the total mobile subscriber base to 56.1 mm. Saudi Arabia is one of a handful of countries worldwide, mostly in the Middle East, in which the number of mobile customers continues to expand despite having a penetration rate which has passed 200%. This is mostly driven by consumers using multiple short term pre-paid subscription. Despite these gains, this market is close to saturation; besides, some of these gains have been supported by temporary subscribers participating in the Hajj (an Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca). Additionally, mobile operators are facing declining average revenue per user (ARPU), a key industry metric. Overall decline in telecom ARPU can at least partially be attributed to increased competition from to Zains entrance.

2.1. Saudi Mobile Industry SWOT analysis

Strengths: Strong competition among the three main operators provides reasonably priced mobile access Advanced high-speed networks (3G/4G/GSM) Increased foreign investment Demographic shift towards younger population that demands the latest services and devices Weaknesses: Mobile sector close to saturation Large percentage of pre-paid subscriptions puts downward pressure on revenues Government involvement remains high (STC is 70% owned by Saudi government) Opportunities: Growing demand for high speed data (3G & 4G) Proliferation of smartphones Shift from pre-paid phones to post-paid tariffs Threats: Increased competition could lead to margin erosion The Saudi economy is reliant on the price of oil o Volatility could affect consumer sentiment and lower demand High unemployment with youth demographic could limit value of data services Political and social instability

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Table 1: Saudi Mobile Market Data

2009 No of Cellular Mobile Phone Subscribers ('000) No of Mobile Phones per 100 inhabitants No of Mobile Phones per 100 No of 3G Phone Subscribers 3G Market As % of Entire Mobile Market 2010 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f 2016f

44,800.0 51,600.0 58,308.0 60,277.0 62,352.0 64,460.0 66,964.0 68,638.0 167.1 1,074.0 5,490.0 12.30% 188.0 207.6 210.0 212.7 215.4 219.3 220.4 1,249.4 1,392.2 1,433.8 1,475.3 1,518.5 1,574.1 1,611.8 7,645.0 10,308.0 13,633.0 17,719.0 22,600.0 28,245.0 32,482.0 14.80% 17.70% 22.60% 28.40% 35.10% 42.20% 47.30%

3. MOBILE OPERATORS 3.1. STC

STC is the largest/dominant telecommunications service provider in Saudi Arabia that was established in 1998. The company was owned by government and remained the only provider of all telecom services in the country until 2004, when the WTO requested that Saudi Arabia liberalize its mobile and fixed-line telephony market. STC incorporates a number of subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures all involved in a variety of telecommunications services, including mobile, telephone and internet services, data transmission and leased lines. STC accounts for most of these companies using consolidation method with except for three firms where STC uses the Equity method. Refer to Figure 2 outlining the list of companies comprising STC. While STC remains the dominant player in the telecommunication services market (accounting for 42.3% of the market), its share has been significantly reduced by the two major competitors, Mobily and Zain. Both firm fight aggressively offering diversified telecom service packages at lower rates. It is important to note that while STC is private company the Saudi government controls the company with 70% of the companys equity stake. Twenty percent is held by the public and the remaining 10% is held by various institutional investors (mainly pension funds). The close relationship between STC the government and the regulating authority, CITC, in particular, suggests that the industry might not be as competitive or efficient as it could be if all players were fully private firms. For example, CITC can set price floor, preventing a price war in the industry, thus eliminating market efficiencies.

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Figure 2: STC Ownership Composition

3.2. Mobily (Etihad Etisalat)

Mobily is the second largest mobile operator in Saudi Arabia. It is owned by the Etihad Etisalat consortium, led by Etisalat of United Arabia Emirates with 27% ownership. Mobily was among the first independent providers in Saudi Arabia by acquiring a GSM license for $3.26B in August 2004. Later, Mobily paid another $201M for a 3G license. The company enjoys a 39.6% market share. Year over year, the companys profits have increased by 8%, but intense competition in the industry has driven profit margins down. The company fights aggressively with STC, trying to gain market share, but hasnt been able to establish a leadership position. Mobilys strategy focuses on expanding the quality and coverage of its mobile and fixed broadband networks. Mobily is the leader in deploying new mobile smart phones, promoting the usage of mobile data services, which will likely drive future revenue growth in the industry. Mobily has recently entered the WiMax/internet broadband segment after the acquisition of Bayanat Al-Oula, which expanded the companys customer pool.

3.3. Zain (Subject company)

Zain is the third mobile phone operator to enter the Saudi Arabian market. It started operating in 2008, and managed to attract 2 million users in the first 4 months. Since then, the company has been growing in number of subscribers; now, Zain sits at a 17% market share. Zain of Saudi Arabia (Zain KSA) is a subsidiary of the Zain of Kuwait. The company operates in multiple countries in the Middle East, and has Page 5 of 15

a One Network brand image where subscribers can enjoy local rates in all the countries that Zain operates in. Unlike its profitable parent company in Kuwait, Zain KSA has been generating losses every quarter since its inception. In addition, the company is burdened with a large debt that was issued to pay the $6.1 billion license fee, and to build the infrastructure needed for the service coverage. With the consecutive losses, the company is at a risk of defaulting on its interest expenses.

4. FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS

To analyze the reasons behind the consecutive losses, and see what the future of Zain will look like we have compared the three firms on different scales: profitability, efficiency and leverage. In addition, we examined some strategic steps that Zain can undertake in order to improve its performance. Table 2: 2011 Operator Financial Comparison (000 SAR)
Revenue and Expense of 2011 Sales Expenses Cost of Sales Distribution and Marketing General Admin. Depreciation and Amortization Financial Charges STC % of Sales 43.72% 13.34% 6.97% 15.91% 4.02% Mobily Zain 55,662,079 20,052,254 6,699,060 Absolute % of Sales Absolute % of Sales Absolute (24,333,827) 48.51% (9,727,832) 52.23% (3,498,893) (7,424,448) 5.42% (1,086,069) 29.44% (1,972,132) (3,878,940) 8.90% (1,784,031) 4.91% (329,185) (8,853,844) 10.72% (2,148,963) 25.53% (1,710,328) (2,237,858) 1.06% (213,320) 16.63% (1,113,856)

Table 3: 2011 Operator DuPont Analysis STC Profit Margin Asset Turnover Financial Leverage ROE (book) 13.88% 49.97% 237.49% 16.48% Mobily 25.35% 53.47% 203.94% 27.65% Zain -28.74% 25.05% 622.95% -44.84%

4.1. Revenue Analysis

Revenue in the telecom industry is generated from the three prime sources: usage charges, subscription fees and activation fees. Operators enroll most of their customers in pre-paid plans. While this strategy allows more control of bad debt (payment default of the mobile users), it significantly reduces the upside potential for revenues. In addition, operators need to find ways to incentivize their customers to Page 6 of 15

spend more on mobile services. This could possibly be achieved by launching promotions such as free text messages or offering discounted services. Hence, marketing becomes a significant expense for the operators as it accounts for between 20% and 50% of the total operating expenses. With pre-paid plans, an operator has less information on its current users because pre-paid subscribers can terminate their usage easily, contrary to the post-paid (contract) plan. This becomes especially apparent for the Saudi operators because the usage of phones increase significantly during the Hajjj pilgrimage that brings high number of temporal users. The profitability in the industry is a strong function of the Average Revenue per User (ARPU) (See Figure 3). Again, this number is reliable only to a certain extent because none of the mobile operators can track their user base precisely. STC remains the most profitable company in the industry with an ARPU of $24.38. We note that STC has multiple revenue streams where GSM (telecom) accounts for 63% of it. Our analysis adjusted the revenue numbers to ensure consistent comparison with other telecom companies: Zain and Mobily. Figure 3: Monthly ARPU ($US) By Operator

$32.58 $24.38 $20.06

STC 4.2. Expense Analysis

Mobily

Zain

One way to investigate the reasons behind Zains losses is to compare the expense level across the three companies. Table 2 shows the main five expenses of the three firms, and the ratios of these expenses to 2011 sales. 4.2.1. Cost of Sales: The largest expense is attributable to cost of sales, with STC having the lowest ratio at roughly 44%, and Zain the highest at 52%. The lower ratios of STC and Mobily could possibly be due to economies of scale

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given the size of these firms and the efficiencies that arise from their other services, such as DSL and other broadband services. 4.2.2. Distribution and Marketing Distribution and marketing expenses are significant across all three companies. In this category, Mobily is the most efficient is this respect as distribution and marketing accounts for only 5.4% of revenue. STC has a higher ratio at 13.3%, while Zain is much higher at almost 30%. Looking mainly at Zain and Mobily as they are more focused on the mobile phone segment, which makes a significant differenc. Even in absolute numbers, Zain spent almost twice what Mobily spent in 2011 (which amounts to roughly a billion Saudi Riyals). The footnotes dont detail the breakup of the expense very well for Mobily. Yet, Zains expenses are well above Mobilys numbers in advertising, promotions and sales commissions. Although the company is by far the least efficient marketer in terms of revenue generated, Zain is reasonably efficient in terms of customer acquisition cost, as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4: Customer Acquisition Cost ($US) By Operator

$461.53

$219.63

$262.95

STC

Mobily

Zain

From the chart above we can see that STC was the least efficient one, which might not be surprising given the overall state-owned mentality of the STC. Yet, Zain managed to spend 20% more than its major rival, Mobily. This suggests that either Zain is beyond its maximum return in terms of dollars of advertising over increase in sales; or it should review its marketing strategy all together, and perhaps investigate how Mobily spends its advertising dollars. 4.2.3. Capital Expenditures Consistent with the industry trend, all firms are constantly looking for ways to expand the capacities of their mobile broadband network; increase efficiency and meet the growing demand for internet services, data transfer and storage. In fact, competition in the industry is driven to a major extent by technological performance and innovation. The magnitude of capital expenditures in this industry suggests that only few big players can in fact remain profitable. Page 8 of 15

The recent announcement of the LTE launch (mobile technology which is sometimes referred to as 4G) was made by the three major operators in the market within days of each other in September 2011. This demonstrates the importance of innovation for this industry. One way to assess industrys ability to acquire long-term assets or invest in infrastructure would be to compare the ratio of Cash Flow from Operating Activities to Capital Expenditure. It becomes apparent that Zains current operations do not cover its capital expenditures. These are mainly financed through issuance of long-term debt Table 4: Cash Flow from Operations to CAPEX Ratio STC CFO/Capital Expenditures 2.24 Mobily 1.81 Zain 0.12

In absolute terms, STC spent twice that of what Mobily spent and ten times what Zain spent. Investment in telecommunications infrastructure and equipment represents 75% of the total PP&E account. This proportion is consistent among the three operators. Table 5: CAPEX By Operator STC Capital Expenditures (SAR) Capital Expenditures (USD) (in '000,000) -$7,837,438 $2,090 Mobily -$3,700,297 $987 Zain -$712,601 $190

Clearly, STC has the largest amount of investment capital available for its expansion. At the same time we should note that Zain utilizes its PP&E the best with each dollar in PP&E generating $1.65 in sales. Table 6: Sales to PP&E Ratio STC Sales / PP&E 1.010 Mobily 1.222 Zain 1.650

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4.2.4. Depreciation and Amortization The depreciation expense includes depreciation of tangible assets (such as PP&E) and amortization of intangible assets (such as GMS license). Although Zains depreciation expense was only 1.7 billion riyals, compared to 2.1 billion and 8.9 billion riyals for Mobily and STC respectively, Zains expense as a percentage of sales is much higher than that of the other two firms. We confirmed that all three companies depreciate their telecommunication equipment (PP&E contribution to depreciation) using useful lives of between 7 and 8 years. However, Zains depreciation is much higher due to the high underlying book value of its GMS license, which accounts for more than 50% of the depreciation expense for Zain and only 23% for Mobily. STC does not report its amortization for intangible assets. 4.2.5. Financial Charges This is a very critical expense as it amounts to 16% of Zains revenue, compared to only 4% and 1% for STC and Mobily. Due to the high debt that Zain had to incur to finance its license, Zain is paying more than a billion Saudi Riyals every year on interest expenses. With a very minimal tax rate (around 1%), there is virtually no tax shield advantage from this debt. 4.2.6. Selling and General Administration General administration expenses for all three firms are below 10%. Zain has lower spending in this category, which might be partially due to lower bonuses and profit sharing as a result of the losses. 4.2.7. Zakat and Tax Expenses Zakat is simply an Islamic Finance term for taxes in Saudi Arabia. Zakat expense is very low with an average effective rate of roughly 1% of pre-Zakat income, based on the earning statements of STC and Mobily. As a result, the value of the tax shield is very minimal. As for the tax expense in STCs financial statement, that is due to the companys operations in foreign countries, which is not relevant to Zain KSA.

5. CONCLUSIONS FROM FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 5.1. Licensing Fees

There are a number of reasons behind the losses of Zain. The first is the high license fee that Zain had to incur to operate in the Saudi market. Zain had to pay $6.1 billion for the license in 2008, which is almost twice what Mobily had to pay in 2005 ($3.45 billion). STC never even had to pay for its 2G license because of its public-private structure. All three operators paid approximately $200M for their 3G licenses.

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This initial high capital expenditure had various negative effects on Zain. First, due to the high license fee, the depreciation and amortization expense would be significantly higher compared to Mobily, resulting in bigger operating losses. Even though depreciation isnt an actual cash flow, the accumulated net losses of the firm can trigger a freeze on the stock of the firm to force a restructuring and recapitalization, which is likely to happen in the coming months. The high license fee has forced Zain to take on a lot of debt to finance the operating license. This raised the firms leverage (debt to value) to 66%, compared to 42% at STC and 31% at Mobily. High leverage increased the cost of equity and burdened the company with high interest expenses. The short-term liquidity of Zain is also worrisome when compared to its two counterparts. The current ratio indicates that the company barely has any liquid assets to meet its short term debt obligations. Table 7: Current Ratio Analysis STC
Current Ratio 0.870

Mobily
0.548

Zain
0.157

5.2. Economies of Scale and Scope

Aside from the initial high CAPEX, Zain is also operating under significant disadvantages from economies of scale. With only 17% market share, Zains fixed costs are distributed over a smaller number of users compared to the other two players. Since Zain operates with an underdeveloped infrastructure, it often has to pay additional network access fees to its competitors in order to have a fully operational coverage. In total, Zain pays 32% of its revenue for the network access, which is higher than the 20% and 17% that Mobily and STC pay for network access. Additionally, Zain operates in the mobile phone segment of the telecom industry only. It is at disadvantage in economies of scope. STC has also a landline segment of the market, in addition to the DSL and internet services. Mobily operates in WiMax/internet broadband segment. Both of the competitors are diversified into less competitive segments, and have the ability to attract the customers through promotions that package these services along with mobile services.

5.3. Marketing Efficiency

Another notable high expense is the marketing expense, which amounts to twice Mobilys spending. Although Zain has the most efficient marketing based on attracting new customers, Zain is much weaker when the efficiency is based on revenue generated as was discussed earlier in this report.

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6. FUTURE OUTLOOK
The most imminent threat to Zain is the $2.6 billion loan that is due in about two months. It appears, however, that the company will survive it and be able to refinance as it heads into the restructuring and recapitalization. It was announced that the restructuring plan will consist of a $1.6 billion cash infusion through a rights offering. This will help Zain to do both: pay a significant portion of the debt and to expand the coverage network. With lower debt and better coverage, Zain is expected to have lower interest expenses and lower access charges in its expected future cash flows. Although we are expecting that Zain will be able to pay a portion of the debt and refinance the rest, the debt to equity ratio remains relatively high and keeps the company under a notable default risk. So far, Zain has been able to keep rolling over and refinancing the debt because of the lenders trust in the rapidly growing telecom industry. With the high profits that STC and Mobily are generating, the banks believe that Zain is more valuable as a going concern and that it will eventually be able to become profitable and pay down its debt. However, Zain will have to maintain this trust by improving its operation efficiency to ensure its long-term presence in the Saudi telecom market. One way to do that is to improve its marketing efficiency. So far, Mobily has been the most efficient in marketing, with STC and Zain trailing. With roughly 2 billion Saudi Riyals spent on distribution and marketing, we think that there is a significant room for cost cutting before the company reaches Mobilys spending level of 1 billion Riyals. Although this can have negative effects on the market share growth, it would improve the companys ability to pay down its debt. Besides marketing efficiency, Zain might consider diversifying its revenue stream by entering other less competitive market segments, as Mobily did with the acquisition of Bayanat. This diversification would reduce the risk of future cash flows, and might improve the profit margins due to the less competition in the new segment. Moreover, Zain will have the ability to attract customers by combining the various services into promotion packages. One other action that Zain can take is to try and renegotiate the license fee, which is the prime cause behind the consecutive losses that the company had. There might be some room for renegotiation as the fee was almost twice what Mobily paid, even though the market was more saturated when Zain entered. In addition to that, Zain should keep pushing the communication and information technology commission to add more regulations and reduce the access charges that Zain has to incur as a new entrant with significant disadvantage in infrastructure.

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Zain Income Statement

Net Income Revenue Cost of revenue Gross profit Operating Expenses Distribution and marketing SG&A Depreciation Operating Expenses Operating Profit Other income/(expenses Financial Charges Commission income Net Income 2011 6,699,060 (3,498,893) 3,200,167 (1,972,132) (329,185) (1,710,328) (4,011,645) (811,478) (1,113,856) 138 (1,925,196) 2010 5,934,370 (3,403,922) 2,530,448 (1,848,666) (351,143) (1,494,220) (3,694,029) (1,163,581) (1,195,511) 665 (2,358,427) 2009 3,004,052 (2,127,026) 877,026 (1,573,741) (375,898) (1,394,310) (3,343,949) (2,466,923) (633,742) 1,316 (3,099,349)

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Zain Statement of Cash Flow

Net loss Adjustments Provision for bad debt Depreciation and amortization Provision for slow moving inventory items Finance Charges Provision for employees end of service benefits Operation income before changes in working capital changes in working capital accounts receivable inventories prepaid expenses and other assets accounts payable due to related parties deferred revenue accrued expenses and other liabilities cash generated from operations financial charges paid provision for employees end of service benefits, net Net cash (used in) from operating activities Investing Activities Purchase PP&E Additions to intangible assets Sale of PP&E Net cash used in investing acitivities Financing Acitivities Notes Payable Shory-term borrowing facility Proceeds from long-term borrowing Syndicated Murabaha Financing Advances from shareholders Net cash from financing activities Net change in cash position Beginning Cash Ending Cash 2011 (1,925,196) 76,461 1,710,328 750 1,113,856 7,415 983,614 380,131 (15,568) (193,179) (344,621) 90,254 (16,950) (786,365) 97,316 (183,530) (1,310) (87,524) (712,601) (8,815) 1,727 (719,689) 410,592 (2,193,750) 2,223,529 91,945 353,053 885,369 78,156 702,117 780,273 2010 (2,358,437) 159,889 1,494,220 2,250 1,195,511 6,981 500,414 (623,808) 8,373 (103,052) 289,711 139,720 200,083 622,474 1,033,915 (571,186) (285) 462,444 (284,633) (24,234) 1,217 (307,650) (2,152,219) 2,193,750 0 0 0 41,531 196,325 505,792 702,117

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Zain Balance Sheet

2011 Assets Current assets Cash Accounts Receivable Inventories Prepaid expenses and other assets Total Current Assets Non-current Assets PP&E Intangible assets Total non-current assets Total assets Liabilities Current Liabilities Notes payable Short-term borrowing facility Syndicated Murabaha Financing Accounts payable Due to related parties Deferred revenue Derivative financial instruments Accrued expenses and other liabilities Total Current Liabilities Non-current liabilities Notes payable Long-term borrowing facility Syndicated Murabaha financing Advances from shareholders Due to related parties Derivative financial instruments Provision for employee's end-of-service benefits Total non-current liabilities Total liabilities Shareholders' equity Share capital Hedging reserve Accumulated deficit Total shareholders' equity Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 2010 2009

780,273 1,006,574 43,617 601,706 2,432,170

702,117 1,463,166 28,799 408,527 2,602,609

505,792 1,007,247 39,422 297,475 1,849,936

4,058,813 20,252,778 24,311,591 26,743,761

4,298,200 21,154,628 25,452,828 28,055,437

3,846,700 22,133,477 25,980,177 27,830,113

915,876 0 9,747,638 1,609,284 26,673 434,392 45,781 2,731,184 15,510,828

0 2,193,750 0 2,104,503 117,294 451,342 0 2,587,223 7,454,112

2,152,219 0 0 1,814,792 51,365 251,259 0 1,964,749 6,234,384

153,937 2,223,529 0 4,018,550 520,651 0 23,201 6,939,868 22,450,696

659,221 0 9,655,693 3,665,497 339,776 134,630 17,096 14,471,913 21,926,025

0 0 9,494,023 3,468,827 0 0 10,400 12,973,250 19,207,634

14,000,000 (45,781) (9,661,154) 4,293,065 26,743,761

14,000,000 (134,630) (7,735,958) 6,129,412 28,055,437

14,000,000 0 (5,377,521) 8,622,479 27,830,113

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