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Discuss Wilsons 14 points. How were these points a departure from previous peace negotiations? Were they significant in the World War I peace agreement, and/or beyond? Critically evaluate the agreements you discuss.

Of President Wilsons twenty three conditions, only four can, with any accuracy, be said to have been incorporated in the Treaties of Peace (Nicolson, 1933) The statement above made by Harold Nicolson, a member of the British delegation to Versailles in 1919, and gives a fairly damning verdict on Wilsons vision for a lasting peace. This contrasts markedly with the hopeful optimism when Wilson

arrived in France in December 1918. Here, he was met with rapturous applause on the streets of Paris and hailed as the champion of the peace with his idealistic vision of a new Europe free from conflict (Macmillan, 2003). This new vision, which he had outlined during his Fourteen Points address to Congress in January of the same year, was his template to managing future international relations. However, just how far these fourteen points were a departure from previous peace negotiations is a matter of debate and indeed they were not gladly received by all parties involved in the peace process, with Clemenceau declaring that the good Lord himself only required ten points (cited in Sharp, 1991, p 14). To this end, this essay will look at Wilsons fourteen points and compare them to previous peace agreements to assess whether the ideas behind them had been deliberated before 1919. In addition, the significance of the fourteen points will be considered to see if and why any were included in the Versailles settlement and whether their influence extended beyond the end of the First World War. Prior to the peace meeting in Paris in 1919, the world had only limited experience of peace diplomacy, firstly at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years War and secondly, just over a hundred and fifty years later, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 which settled the Napoleonic Wars. In order to make a judgement on the significance and originality of the Fourteen Points, this essay will also look back at these previous peace discussions to see if any comparisons can be made. Wilsons first point of his fourteen was to ensure that open covenants of peace, openly arrived at (Sharp, 1991, p 14) show that he saw the secret diplomacy, as

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employed at the Congress of Vienna, as contributing to the failure of these previous peace agreements and he was determined that this would not happen at future conferences. Yet, it should be noted that the participants at the Congress of Vienna did not fear public opinion. Communications were limited, much of the general population was illiterate and Schlesinger (1994) notes, the word jingoism did not even enter the public vocabulary until the 1870s. In essence secret diplomacy was the norm because there was no need to have the transparency that the public demand today. However, this first point was certainly already violated by Versailles, as Sharp (1991) notes that the Allies and Italy had already decided how to divide up Europe at the secret treaty of London in 1914 much to Wilsons disgust. It was also Wilsons belief that secret diplomacy had been one of the fundamental reasons why a civil conflict in the Balkans had escalated to become a Europe wide war. However, in some situations, fully open diplomacy can have adverse consequences as Shroeder (2010) suggests. He maintains that without a degree of secrecy,

discussions between nations, such as those over the reunification of Germany between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl would never have been agreed if public opinion had been taken into account as well. It is also worth remembering that Versailles gathered huge public attention. Much back room negotiating went on, which violated Wilsons first point that diplomacy shall always proceed fairly and in the public view. Wilsons opinion was that Vienna had failed because it had been conducted behind closed doors and the Government there was in the hands of a small coterie of autocrats; at Versailles the League Covenant was drawn up by the great democracies, so that the autocracies of the world would never again enslave the peoples of the world for their own purposes (The Manchester Guardian, 1919). Whereas Vienna involved a few aristocrats from the major European powers, Versailles represented a huge departure from this, involving large numbers of delegates and advisors. However, Wilsons open diplomacy did not extend to the inclusion of the defeated powers, or to the Soviet Union, who as Sharp (1991) notes were deprived of territory under the peace agreement. Kissinger (1994) notes that the exclusion of both Germany and Russia, the two largest nations in terms of population and military capacity, would on its own have doomed Versailles. Both

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Westphalia and Vienna, despite being conducted by a few powerful men, did at least recognise the possible advantages of fairly involving all protagonists. Points six through to thirteen of Wilsons points concern states rights to self determination. Whereas the Congress of Vienna made no provision for the stateless nations such as the Poles, Italians or Germany instead carving up Europe according to pre-war boundaries with apparent disregard for ethnic sentiments, Wilson attempted to introduce self-determination clauses into Versailles. The provision for the rights of nations as distinct from rulers was not a new idea as Zamoyski (2008) notes that it was exactly these principles that the American settlers had decided upon in 1776 and had been widely supported in Europe at the time. Indeed

Kissinger (1956) believes that this cannot be seen as a failing of Vienna as the diplomats of the time could not have been aware of any budding nationalist feeling. Seaman (1964) concurs with this view and highlights Belgium as an example where although they were the first nation to be liberated after the Napoleonic Wars, an independent Belgium would have been impossible due to its proximity to France and in addition, not all Belgians actually desired independence. However, it is Wilson himself had possibly underestimated the strength of national feeling that was to emerge at the Versailles conference as Holsti (1996, p53) observes that the principles of self determination let loose a blizzard of appeals that Wilson and his French, British, Italian and Japanese colleagues had never heard of. Wilsons

utopian view of self-determination appears to have had little significance in the aftermath of Versailles as Macmillan (2003) has highlighted that conflict between Poland and its neighbours continued throughout the peace conference and cites Tasker Bliss, an American military advisors belief that the plethora of emerging national identities did not bode well for future peace. Moreover, even before the end of the war, Serb, Croat and Slovene delegates had issued the Corfu Declaration, pushing for a Yugoslav state (Mazower, 1999). However, it could also be argued that Versailles failed to apply a fair system of self-determination as Germany, if applying Wilsons rule, should have been allocated the areas of the Austro Hungarian Empire with principally German speakers. This obviously had serious repercussions twenty years later when Adolf Hitler abandoned the League and regained this lost land (ibid). With these circumstances in mind, it is difficult to see how Wilsons principles could have been incorporated into Versailles and have
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successfully implemented a policy of self-determination that would please all parties. In addition, it should be noted that in the case of the former Yugoslav states, this issue would not finally be resolved until after a particularly bloody conflict at the end of the twentieth century. As Schlesinger (1994) states nationalism remains the most potent political emotion in the contemporary world highlighting that self determination continues to be a contentious issue and one that has still not been resolved nearly one hundred years after Wilsons idealistic attempt to do so. The last, and in Wilsons opinion the most important of his points for peace, was the establishment of a League of Nations (Knock, 1992). However, it can be argued that even this does not represent a completely new concept in international co-operation if one considers that the Concert of Europe, essentially strove to resolve issues on a multilateral basis (Kissinger, 1994). It is possible to look back even further to the Peace of Westphalia, which as Meerts (2005) observes was the turning point in recognising that peaceful methods were the rule for the future in conflict resolution. Moving forward, Zamoyski (2008) notes that this idea of a supranational system of control (p 221) had been suggested during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the argument had been given weight by the pan-European conflicts of the early 1800s. In addition, Wilsons idea of a league of all nations is somewhat at odds with the eventual incarnation of The League of Nations. As Germany was excluded, remaining a pariah in the post-war landscape and the United States failed to join, it can hardly be seen to have been a truly global tool in international relations. Moreover, as Mazower (1999) highlights, The League of Nations proved to be both reluctant and ineffective on the question of promoting minority nations rights as most countries were still uneasy in abolishing the idea that a state was sovereign within its own borders. Indeed, its ineffectiveness in resolving conflict was highlighted when Hitler ignored the League and proceeded with his infamous land grab in the 1930s. Despite this, point fourteen is perhaps the only point that was wholly recognised within the eventual Treaty of Versailles and did serve as a starting point for the evolution of the United Nations after the Second World War although Wilsons concept of international cooperation was not a new idea. Taken as a whole, Wilsons fourteen points seem to outline a plan for a fair and just peace, and indeed Wilson himself declared that a settlement could be achieved that would prevent a renewal of hostilities by Germany, yet which will be as moderate
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and reasonable as possible (cited in Knock, 1992, p 170).

However, many

historians agree that the eventual outcome of the Treaty of Versailles was hardly moderate or reasonable. The particularly controversial reparations levelled at

Germany serve to highlight how unfair this was seen by some. Keynes, the British economist present at Versailles and whose subsequent book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920) presented his views on the harshness and potential pitfalls of the reparations clause, was especially abhorred calling it a Carthaginian peace. As Kissinger (1994) points out whereas the Congress of

Vienna had realised that the imposition of huge reparations would be damaging to France and could cause a potential flashpoint if a resentful nation became aggrieved, the Treaty of Versailles, contrary to Wilsons idea of reasonableness, imposed punitive reparations which would have a devastating effect on a lasting peace. When considering the significance of Wilsons Fourteen Points as a

departure from previous peace agreements, it is also necessary to highlight the differences in the context between them. Whereas the Big Three at Versailles,

coming from democratic nations, would have had to have considered public opinion and been aware of a need to keep the electorate on side, at both Westphalia and Vienna this would not have been a consideration of any of the delegates. As

Macmillan (2003) points out, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau had to contend with public opinion and it could be argued that to implement all of the liberal ideas in Wilsons Fourteen Points would have gone against both Britain and Frances desire for a peace which would both protect their interests and punish Germany. However, that is not to say that previous peace conferences did not arouse any public opinion at all as Zamoyski (2008) notes that both French and English publicists expressed their hopes for a brighter future. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to imagine that prior to the early twentieth century, when many ordinary people were illiterate and newspapers did not reach the masses, that either Westphalia or Vienna aroused as much interest and expectation as Versailles did. In conclusion, Wilsons Fourteen Points were not altogether significant in the eventual Treaty of Versailles. Perhaps the most noteworthy would be the formation of the League of Nations and although it failed to make much of an impact on international relations in the years following World War One, its fundamental ideas and the mistakes that were learned from it, helped shape the future United Nations.
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The points relating to self-determination did represent a move forward from previous peace treaties but in practise proved very difficult to implement in a way that would please all nationalities and consequently could be seen to have contributed to the breakdown of peace in 1939. Wilsons desire for open and honest diplomacy, whilst a marked change from previous peace negotiations, can only be seen to have been partially included at Versailles. Looking at Wilsons Fourteen Points as a whole and the suggestion that they would give a fairer and less harsh peace, it would appear that the differing aims of all the main powers meant that this was unlikely to be the result. However it is possible to see that this idea would eventually end up being put into practice during the evolution of the European Union. In essence, Wilsons

Fourteen Points failed to have a major impact on the Treaty of Versailles and many of his ideas had their roots in past peace negotiations, but with the passage of time it has become apparent that many of his ideas have been implemented in subsequent treaties. This agrees with Nicolsons 1933 assertion, but rather than to consider Wilson as naive, perhaps it would be better to think of him as ahead of his time? Word count 2280

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References Holsti, K. J. (1996). The state, war, and the state of war. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keynes, J. M. (1920). The Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and How Kissinger, H., (1994) Diplomacy New York: Simon and Schuster Kissinger, H., (1956). The Congress of Vienna: A reappraisal. World Politics, vol 8 (no.2) pp 264-280. [Online] Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008974 [Accessed 02/02/12]. Knock, T., J., (1992). To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Macmillan, M., (2003). Peacemakers Six Months That Changed The World. London: John Murray (Publishers) Ltd. Mazower, M. (1999). Two cheers for Versailles. History Today, vol.49 (no.7), pp 8 14. [Online] Available at: http://www.historytoday.com/mark-mazower/two-cheers-versailles [Accessed 03/02/12]. Meerts, P., W., (2005). Turning Point Westphalia: Negotiation Processes Establishing a New Political and Legal Order in Europe. In Zartman, I., W., & Kremeniuk, V., A., (eds.) Peace versus justice: negotiating forward- and backwardlooking outcomes. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Mr. Wilsons Advocacy of the Treaty. 1919. The Manchester Guardian (1901-1959), pp. 8. Nicolson, H., (1933) Peacemaking, 1919. London: Faber and Faber. Seaman, L., C., B., (1964) From Vienna to Versailles Cambridge: University Press.

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Schlesinger, A., M., (1994) The Measure of Diplomacy. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50118/arthur-m-schlesinger-jr/the-measure-ofdiplomacy [Accessed 03/03/12] Sharp, A., (1991) The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Shroeder, P. W., (2010) The Secret Lives of Nations, New York Times, 2 December [Online]. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/opinion/03Schroeder.html [Accessed 03/02/12]. Zamoyski, A., (2008) Rites of Peace The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna. Hammersmith: Harper Perennial.