Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique-1994-Gerhardt-74-126

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The Use of Weberian Ideal-Type Methodology in Qualitative Data Interpretation: an Outline for Ideal-Type Analysis
Uta Gerhardt Bulletin de Mthodologie Sociologique 1994 45: 74 DOI: 10.1177/075910639404500105 The online version of this article can be found at: http://bms.sagepub.com/content/45/1/74
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What is This?
74-
THE USE OF WEBERIAN IDEAL-TYPE METHODOLOGY IN QUALITATIVE DATA INTERPRETATION: AN OUTLINE FOR IDEAL-TYPE ANALYSIS
by
Uta Gerhardt
(Institut für Soziologie, Ruprecht-Karls-Universitât Heidelberg,
Sandgasse 9.
D 69117
Heidelberg)
méthodologie des types-idéaux wéberiens dans linterprétations guide pour lanalyse par types-idéaux. Cet article donne une vue densemble de lanalyse par types-idéaux, telle quelle ressort des travaux de Weber et telle quelle peut être utilisée dans linterprétation qualitative des données. Larticle comporte quatre parties. En premier lieu, la conception des types-idéaux de Weber est reconstruite à partir de ses écrits. En second, les idées de Weber sont ré-examinées pour dégager une méthodologie en trois étapes qui est, dans une troisième partie, présentée en détail. Les trois étapes de lanalyse par types-idéaux sont décrites et représentent une adaptation aussi bien quune application de la pensée de Weber, tout en respectant les besoins de lanalyse Interprétative des données. Enfin, lauteur utilise une de ses deux études longitudinales menées antérleurement pour montrer comment linterprétation formelle des
Résumé.
qualitative
Lutilisation de la des données - un
données qualitative peut utiliser une méthodologie de types-idéaux et fournir des résultats probants. Max Weber, Méthodologie et analyse par types-idéaux. Analyse longitudinale. Analyse qualitative des données.
Abstract. This article gives a short overview of what ideal-type analysis is, how lt is gounded in Webers works and how it may be used in qualitative data interpretation. It has four main parts. First,
Webers conception of
ideal-types is reconstructed from his writings. Second, Webers ideas are reinterpreted such that a three-step methodology emerges, which is. third, depicted in more detall. The three steps of ideal-type analysis are outlined which is an adaptation as well as an application of
thought while fitting the needs of interpretive data analysis. Fourth, from one of two longitudinal studies the author has conducted, evidence is given to clarify how systematic qualitative data interpretation may use ideal-type methodology and yield insightful findings. Max Weber. IdealType Methodology and Analysis, Longitudinal Analysis, Qualitative Data Analysis.
Webers
INTRODUCTION
Qualitative studies usually concentrate on the description of settings as well as the definition of the situation described by actors. They frequently adopt carefully selected methods of data collection
documentation but rarely engage in interpretation. Various well-known approaches and
elaborate
data
- among them, Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013
75
&dquo;
zu
I.
researcher
supposedly manages portrayed in the data.
to understand the social
reality
The reason given for this merger between data processing and data elicitation is that &dquo;naturalistic&dquo; research, as it is frequently called, allows for direct access to respondents understanding of their lifeworlds. Since &dquo;grounded theory&dquo; sees itself extracting from its respondents only the reality which subjects consciously experience, and sociologys task is to portray the reality of societys members, &dquo;grounded theory&dquo; based research presupposes that data processing and data analysis are one and the same thing. In a recent guide to &dquo;grounded theory&dquo;s research procedures, Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin insist that the researcher has a direct grasp to the respondents &dquo;definition of the situation&dquo; and that such direct grasp uncovers the social phenomenon in a way which can immediately open up social theory. They state that &dquo;the research findings constitute a theoretical formulation of the reality under investigation...build(ingJ theory that is faithful to and illuminates the area under study&dquo; (1990:23). This methodological position neglects the distinction between social life and sociological thought. Whereas actors subjective &dquo;definition of the situation&dquo; allows for social action in the everyday world, sociological thought (social research inasmuch as it is systematic empirical elicitation of knowledge about actors reality) has a knowledge function distinct from the level of actors actions. Like all scientific knowledge, social research analyses the structure of subjective actions and orientations in an effort to place it into a framework of objective understanding of social phenomena. From the perspective of epistemology, however, it cannot be presupposed that objective knowledge can be generated through eliciting without
~
lOntrihl1tion from thp rp~p~rlhpr thp ~l1hipltivp &dquo;rtpfjnitinn~ of thp
76 -
77
78
and
supply through
laws of economic motivation
(e.g. Eugen
von
Boehm-Bawerk, Carl Menger): the latter showed, for instance, how
capitalism had developed over the centuries as a succession of phases related to the emergence of the nation state, particularly in Europe (e.g. Wilhelm Roscher, Gustav Schmoller). Weber addressed the two approaches as nomothetic versus idiographic: they either explained events through laws that governed reality or they explained events through describing their development as parts of
with this
transient social-historical contexts. Weber, indeed, was not satisfied duplicity. He felt that there should be a single approach to reality in social science. So he wanted to &dquo;understand on the one
hand the
causes
relationships
their
and the cultural
significance
on
of individual
events in their
contemporary manifestations and
of
being
historically
so
and
the other the not otherwise&dquo;
(1904/1949:72).
His criticism was directed against two sides. He rejected positivism, and he could not accept intuitionism (Oakes 1975:24). He searched for a solution that could overcome the quest for generalization at the same time as it transcended the need for individualization - reconciling them in an attempt to explain individual social phenomena as an outcome of historical process
and also
as
manifestation of wider institutional structural
patterns.
How could this be done? Using economics as an example, he made it clear that synthetic constructs - introduced as heuristic devices, i.e. concepts for the sake of understanding - allowed for social-science explanation that at once was general and capable of elucidating particular features of individual social phenomena. He
wrote: We have in abstract economic theory an illustration of those constructs which have been designated as ideas of historical phenomena. It o,, ffers us an ideal picture of events on the
synthetic
commodity-market under conditions of a society organized on the principles of an exchange economy, free competition and rigorously rational conduct. This conceptual pattern brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantiuely, this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuatton of certain elements of reality. Its relationship to the empirical data consists solely in the fact that where marketcondiaoned relationships of the type referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or suspected to exist in reality to some extent, we can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal-type.
(1904/1949:89/90)
79
of hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but WlambigUOUS means of expression to such a description...An ideal type isfonned by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to tlwse one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a Wlied analYtical construct (Gedankenbild)...It is possible or rather must be accepted as certain that numerous, indeed a very great many, utopias of t1s sort can be worked out, of which none is like another, and none of w_hich can be observed in empirical realy as an actually existing economic system. but each of which however claims that is a representation of the idea of a capalist culture...Those phenomena
the construction aims to give which interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us wh respect to very different kinds oj evaluative ideas to which we relate them. Inasmuch as the points of view from which they can become significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be applied to the selection of the tras which are to enter into the construction of an ideal-typical view of a particular culture.
(1904/1949:90-91)
Empirical phenomena was
research
attempting
to
understand
social
to locate observed events or actions with one or more ideal types. That is, not as a specimen of a category of phenomena was an event or action understood, but in terms of its deviating from one or several idealized pure pattems(s) to which it
could
meaningfully be
related. Weber gave
vivid
example
how ideal
(&dquo;facts&dquo;) understandable - using the problem whether medieval society was based on &dquo;handicrafi&dquo; types
economy. He
in research made social events
explained:
One can, for example, anive at the theoretical conclusion that in on strict handicraft principles, the only source of capal acCWTlLation can be growtd. rent. From t1s perhaps, one can - for the correctness of the construct is not in question here construct a pwe ideal picture of the sruft, conditioned by certain specific factors - e.g., limited land, increasing population, i.njlux of precious metals, rationalization of the conduct of life - from a handicraft to a capalist economic organization. Whether the
a
society which is organized
empirical-1storical course oj development was actuaUy identical wh Downloaded fromcan bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013 t1s the constructed be investigated one, construct only by using
80
as a heuristic device for the comparison of the ideal type and the facts. If the ideal type were correctly constructed and the actual course of events did not correspond to that predicted by the ideal type, the hypothesis that medieval society was not in certain respects a strictly ha,n.dicraft type of society would be proved. And f the ideal
were constructed in a hewisticaUy ideal way - whether and in what way this could occur in our example wiU be entirely disregarded here - it wi.LL guide the inuestigation into a path leading to more precise understanding of the non-handicraft components of medieval society in their peculiar characteristics and their historical signficance.
type
( 1904 / 1949:101-2)
Nine years later, after he had completed most first-draft versions of his voluminous studies on how systematic religious conduct of life was related to the emergence of capitalism as epitomy of rationalization in the Western world, Weber returned to the problem of sociologys Verstehen as an interpretive method. In the
meantime, he had published a number of essays dealing with criticism of specific economic or psychological theories of his time (e.g. Karl Knies, Eduard Meyer). But now he focused on the
sociological inquiry as such. Possibly spurred by Simmels Georg attempt in 1908 to determine categories (aprioris) of social life as well as knowledge in society, he engaged in a discussion of categories of interpretive sociology.
now reckoned, had a delimited topic and its methodological principle was to understand action with reference to rationality. Means-end rationality of action, he realized, represented an idealized standard against which, in an intersubjectively plausible way, empirical phenomena could be held when they were judged and explicated in terms of their more or less deviating therefrom. Verstehen sociology, he stated (anticipating his Basic Terms of Sociology (1920)) dealt with meaningful action of individuals in society, but also with institutions patterned normative frameworks for collective and individual action. Meaning, to be sure, could best be communicated and understood - if a common principle of orientation was shared by all concerned; this was why rationality, epitomized in the &dquo;pure&dquo; type of means-end rationality, was the frame of reference for scientific Verstehen. He clarified:
armamentarium of
Interpretive sociology, he
area,
namely, action,
Action specificaUy significant for interpretive sociology is, in particular, behavior that: (1) in terms of the subjectiuely intended meaning of the actor, is related to the behavior of others, (2) is codetermined in its course through this relatedness, and thus (3) can be intelligibly explained in terms of this (subjectively) intended meaning...lnterpretiue sociology makes distinctions in ternis of the typical meaningful (above aLL- external) relationships of action; for that Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013
81
reason, as we
ideal type,
action.
shall see, instmmentaUy rational action serves as an enabling us to assess the signiftcance of the irrational ( 1913 / 1981:152-153)
However, he went on to distinguish between two types of rationality that could sociologically explain a phenomenon. One was subjectiue means-end rationality, that is, rational meaning orientation of actors investigated by the sociologist who wished to understand their motives as well as doings. The other was objectiuely correct rationality, that is, rational action based on collectively valid experience established over extended periods of history or proved by scientific research or other reliable evidence that safeguarded the objective correctness of certain action forms in
certain situations. Weber made it clear that these two
types of
rationality were both important when a sociologist attempted to explain a social phenomenon. He also emphasized that they rarely
coincided: he wrote:
Though
the real
course
of
an
action may in
fact generally
approximate the objectively correct type, Lee. factually objective correct rationality, it does not necessarily coincide with subjectiue rational action, that is, action oriented toward clearly perceived ends and toward means consciously chosen as adequa.te...Objectiuely correct rationality serves sociology as an ideal- type in relation to empmcat action; instrumental rationality as an ideal type in relation to what is psychologically understandable; the meaningful as an ideal type in relation to meaningless action. Through comparison with the ideal type, the causaUy relevant irrationalities (different in each leveo can be established for the pwpose of causal attribution. (1913/ 1981:155157)
From this
vantage point, he clarified that Verstehen
was
closely related to and could be seen as one form of explanation,. Cautioning his reader against any simplistic view of causality in social life - thus repeating that his standpoint was neither nomothetic nor idiographic but incorporated and transcended both views - he emphasized that causality, of course, was what sociological explanation attempted to establish. This could be done, he explained, when ideal types were understood as hypotheses, that
is, &dquo;pure&dquo; models of the dynamics of events envisaging how a phenomenon or social issue would develop under &dquo;idealized&dquo;
circumstances
(1913/ 1981:157).
This related to the
rationality
of social action in the two
respects of subjectively perceived and objectively correct rationality. For both, Weber asserted, empirical research had to presuppose - in the guise of ideal types - certain hypothetical courses of events. On the basis of such presuppositions, it would then proceed to measure
82
the divergence between the ideal types (chosen by the researcher as heuristic device) and observed phenomena, or statistical data. He said about the use of ideal types to ascertain &dquo;rational validity&dquo; of
analysis: of the objectively correct type is, for the general concept of sociology at any rate, only one case of the construction of ideal types, even though it is often a case of the utmost importance. Logically, with no difference in principle, an expediently chosen incorrect type can also serve the purposes of the investigation, but for such a type the discrepancy from the valid remains decisive. It makes no differences logically whether an ideal type is constructed from relationships that are meaningful or from those devoid of meaning. In the first case, the valid norm is used to construct an ideal type; in the second case, empirical fact is refined to a pure type. Even in the first case, howeuer, the empirical material is not formed through categories of rational ualidity, but rather, the constructed ideal type is inferred from the latter. And throughout, to what degree an objectiuely correct type becomes useful as an ideal type depends on the ualue relationships&dquo; - of the researcher (1913/1981:157-8)
The
use
this line of thought, seven years later, he stated again the general principles of sociological inquiry. By 1920, a few months before his life ended prematurely when he died of pneumonia, he had completed most of his magnum opus under the working title of Economy and the Social Orders and Powers (one volume in a series entitled Outline of Social Economics). It was to be published after his death under the title of Economy and Society (1922). Its introductory parts, in the posthumously collated book, dealt with Basic Sociological Terms (the original headline in German was &dquo;Basic Concepts of Sociology&dquo;) followed by Sociological Categories of Economic Action (the headline in the original German was &dquo;Basic Sociological Categories of Economic Activity&dquo;). The former included a revision as well as an extension of the ideal-type approach outlined in his earlier writings. It was laid out under the title of Methodological Foundations and comprised nearly the entire subchapter devoted to The Definition of Sociology and Social Action.
Along
what
were
Initially, Basic Sociological Terms introduced the notion rationality and suggested its use for ideal types similarly to what
had
of he
in
explicated in the earlier essay on sociology. He now stated decisively:
the
categories of Verstehen
For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is conuenient to treat all irrationaL aflecmally determined elements of
behavior as factors of deuiation from a conceptu.a.lly pure type of rational action. For example a panic on the stock exchange can be most conueniently analysed by attempting to determmejtrst what the
83
of action would hale been if it had not been influenced by affects; it is then possible to introduce the irrational components as accounting for the observed deuiations from this hypothetical course...The construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity.
course
irrational
(1922/1968:6).
However, he now introduced a new aspect. His extensive studies on historical structures and processes of power and authority during the years after 1910 and particularly after 1916 and also his work on the sociology of the city, sociology of law, etcetera, had led him to differentiate between a substantive focus on rationality and a methodological one. On the substantive side, he between three (or, rather, four) types of now distinguished that could be understood through ideal social action of rationality types - means-end rationality, value rationality, traditional rationality, and emotional rationality (as translated by Talcott Parsons); to be sure, the original German used the term &dquo;rationality&dquo; only for the first two of these and separated traditional and affectual action as non-rational but intersubjectively understandable nonrational orientations. At the same time, on the methodological side, all these types of social action rendered intended meaning understandable, and they could therefore be subsumed under the rationality label. Because they allowed for Verstehert, all different action types facilitated an intersubjectively effective explanation by a persons motives, or plan of action. He phrased this idea as follows:
a science which is concerned with the subjectiue meaning of explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs. In aU such cases, even where the processes are largely aflectual, the subjectiue meaning of the action, incLuding that also of the relevant meaning complexes, will be called the intended meaning. (This involves a departure from ordinary usage, which speaks of intention in this sense only in the case of rationaUy purposiue action).
For
action, which
(1922/1968:9)
From there, the question was raised anew what sociological meant. He gave two answers. One was that he outlined three contexts in which an &dquo;interpretive grasp of the meaning&dquo; could be undertaken; they were (1) the individual actor in a historical context, (2) a collectivity accomplishing a &dquo;sociological mass phenomenon&dquo; that became understandable in terms of &dquo;the average of, or an approximation of, the actually intended meaning&dquo;, (3) the
explanation
formulated pure type (an ideal type) of a common phenomenon&dquo; (1922/1968:9). About the latter, he went on to say that it could be found in the &dquo;concepts and laws of pure economic
&dquo;scientifically
84
theory&dquo;. These, however, were not entirely beyond observable in social reality but could occasionally, approximation, be found in empirical cases. He wrote:
what was if only by
Ideal type(s) ... state what course a given type of human action would take if it were strictly rational, una&dquo;ffected by errors or emotional factors and if, furthermore, it were completely and unequivocally directed to a single end, the majdmtzatton of economic advantage. In reality, action takes exactly this course only in unusual cases, as sometimes on the stock exchange, and even then there is usually only an approximation to the ideal type. (1922/1968:9) The other answer outlined two stages or phases of adequacy of explanation .that both had to be attained. Apart from the criteria that an individual course of conduct had to be reconstructed in a way that was &dquo;subjectively adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning)&dquo;, one stage was causal adequacy. It meant that an explanation should contain no errors, confusions, or inconsistencies defying existing knowledge - the latter usually being represented by a probabilistic statement that linked two or more events together (1922/1968:11-12). The second and vastly more important stage was interpretive adequacy, that is, the linking together of subsequent events or actions by a rationale or an idea or a principle of orientation that could render the observed phenomena meaningful and therefore make them plausible to the observing
sociologist.
the term &dquo;correct causal interpretation of a concrete of action&dquo; the translated text refers as follows to the issue of interpretive adequacy (the German term is Sinnadaquanz):
Using
course
A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of action is arriued at when the overt action and the motives have both been correctly apprehended and at the same time their relation has become meaning fully comprehensible. A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both adequately grasped on the level of meaning and at the same time the interpretation is to some degree causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible statistical probability, whether we deal with overt or subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most perfect adequacy on the level of meaning has causal significance from a sociological point of view only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the existence of a probability that action in fact nornially takes the course which has been held to be meaningfu1. ( 1922 / 1968:12)
85
social
To summarize: Mainly in three of his writings on the logic of science between 1904 and 1920, Weber outlined a
methodology of Verstehen through ideal types. Over this period, his concepts changed to a certain extent whereas his approach became
more focused. The basic idea was that ideal could epitomize rationality as a principle of intersubjective types knowledge in social research. This idea was reformulated twice until it reached a definitive formulation in the Basic Sociological Terms written after most, if not all, of the empirical work of Economy and Society had been completed. more
differentiated and
STEPS OF WEBERIAN METHODOLOGY
it is true that Weber, in his various empirical did not use ideal-type methodology, he made ample use of projects, it throughout his elaborate presentation of knowledge about society in his studies on the sociology of religion and in his major opus, Economy and Society. Introducing his reader to these findings, he detailed how ideal types were constructed. The authoritative description was given in 1920 - after he had all but completed the work of his lifetime. His empirical research projects preceded two of his three manuscripts on how ideal-type construction characterized sociological analysis. But his first essay on the topic focusing on &dquo;objectivity&dquo; in social science was written in the early 1900s and some ten years after he had done his first empirical work. In it, he demonstrated how ideal types were realized by economic research but generally showed how the social scientist makes sense of historical data while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of nomothetic as well as idiographic analysis.
Although
His ideas can be rephrased outlining a three-step procedure of ideal-type methodology: it may redirect interpretive methodology in contemporary qualitative research. When reconstructing his threestep analytical procedure, secondary literature proves resourceful to some extent. In particular, two philosophical works are of benefit, namely, that of Wemer Bienfait on Webers Theory of Historical Knowledge (1930), and that of Dieter Henrich on The Unity of Webers Methodology of Social Science (1952) which focuses on Webers image of rational man as an anthropological foundation of his thought.
Reconstructing Webers methodology as a procedure of data analysis means to rearrange it as a sequence of three analytical steps. They are:
86
87
(1) Comprehensiveness of knowledge grounds

In 1920, Weber sees ideal types as setting hypotheses of potential courses of events. What goes into these, inasmuch as sociology answers to the rules of &dquo;Science as a Vocation&dquo; (1917) demanding serious pursuit of knowledge, must be based on comprehensive efforts to obtain every evidence available in the literature. In this vein, Henrich insists that knowledge in itself limits
the arbitrariness of the formation of ideal types. He writes:
Although ideal-type
construction is
transfomuuion of reality,
this does not allow for arbitrary possibilities. Like any other approach to historical insight, ideal-type construction relies on real events. You may form many, but not an infinite number of, ideal types of a given phenomenon. The number of possible ideal types is set by the
phenomenon itself. (1952:85).

The first criterion for ideal-type construct validity is, therefore, that no available knowledge (preferably scientific knowledge) contradicts the hypothetical assumption about a phenomenon contained in its conceptual representation as an ideal-type.
(2) Identifying indispensable elements and eliminating others

In general, Weber asserts, verifying a hypothetical course of events stated in an ideal type through its comparison with a concrete course of events that happens over time would be desirable. Indeed, it would be best if ideal types could be used to understand the history of society as it unfolds itself in the present and future (see below on his views on the topic of verification). But in the overwhelming majority of research endeavours the social scientist has no opportunity to observe over a long period of time events and processes actually happening in social life, and explain them using ideal types that were formed prior to the longitudinal observation. This means that the researcher cannot observe in actual historical life whether or not concrete events match
anticipations derived from his ideal-type conjectures. So the

researcher has to find a viable alternative to the optimal proof which frequently cannot be attained. In any event, Weber concedes, some social-science topics would make it difficult anyway to produce explanatory evidence through observation of historical process. For instance, researchers are frequently unable to make systematic comparisons between mass phenomena. Furthermore, the psychological experimentation on the sources of subjective meaning formation, which Weber found indispensable for the connection
88
between subjective and objective meaning construction, he had to admit did not yet exist and was therefore not yet available. Such experimentaly proven evidence, however, would be the optimal knowledge basis on the links between subjective meaning formation and objective institutionalized reality structures. It would represent the society in its authentic logic of concatenated institutional facts as they were linked with individual free will.
In this situation, availing himself of a second-best opportunity to test the validity of his ideal-type notion(s), the researcher takes to
the mental experiment (the translation reads &dquo;imaginary experiment&dquo;, 1922/ 1968:10). To be sure, its aim is to test the quality of an idealtype process notion of a particular phenomenon for the purpose of satisfying a special knowledge interest. The mental experiment &dquo;consists in thinking away certain elements- of a chain of motivation and working out the course of action which would then possibly ensue&dquo; (1922/1968:10). To be sure, this mental exercise involves each element of an ideal-typical process-notion. Each is to be tested separately with a view on whether or not it is indispensable for the development of the phenomenon under investigation. Bienfait clarifies that if any of the presumably causal antecedents of an outcome of the hypothesized social process - epitomized in the ideal type - is revealed to be not necessary, it must be left out. He writes (taking the perspective - as did Weber - from the effect or outcome backwards to its causal antecedents in the cause-effect chain):
In a historical causal chain no cause belongs there f it can be omitted or changed in (the sociologists) imagination without elect on the outcome; such cause is elective merely by chance. (Once such chance causes have been eliminated), confrontation of the remaining causes with the factua.l historical effects can determine for a particular histori.cal sequence of events what were the deviating causes that produced the individual outcome under consi,deration.
(1930:33)
criterion for ideal-type construct validity, its composition, i.e. its elements. The mental sure that the ideal-type notion contains only elements proved to be indispensable. This testing is done by the separate &dquo;thinking away&dquo; of each element. Redundant elements, i.e. those which when &dquo;thought away&dquo; do not in their absence change the imagined developmental nature of the phenomenon, are eliminated from the ideal-type notion. Only those elements are left
The
second
therefore, concerns experiment makes
as defining elements of the type concept which are vital for phenomenon (as is found through the &dquo;thinking away&dquo; test).
the
89
(3) Verification in social-historical reality

Weber leaves no doubt that verification of the process contained in the ideal-type construct of a course of social action is most desirable. Particularly if it could avail itself of psychological proof experimentally linking meaning and structures on a micro as well as a macro level, verification were the best criterion for ideal-type validity. Unfortunately, he admits, such verification is rare if at all possible.
hypothesis
However,
are
possible.
some less satisfactory tests safeguarding verification For instance, there is &dquo;verification in the limited
number of cases of mass phenomena which can be statistically described and unambiguously interpreted&dquo; (1922/1968:10). Such verification depends on the nature of the phenomenon in question but also on the availability of statistical data. In any case, verification occurs through the historical-social process bearing out the ideal-type based predictions of potential development of social or
mass
phenomena.
Whereas Weber
is
self-conscious about broader view than Weber apparently does. Henrich allows for verification of ideal-types not only by historical experience which requires longterm observation but also by research which investigates whether observational data match the hypothetical image of a course of events or process phenomenon. Henrich writes:
conspicuously
verification, Henrich takes
The ideal type is a means to understand the given reality of culture. If it gives a construction under perspectives, this does not suggest that it intends to take the reality thought in this construction as the given reality. But it wants to see whether and to what degree the imagined relationships are also present in the given reality. Abstraction as it exists in the ideal type denotes the expectation of potential uerification. As knowledge about reality it depends on the degree in which imagined relationships can be found in the reality. When choosing from the given multiplicity, the ideal type will proceed in a way that it is probable to find relationships in reality which pursue tendencies equal or similar to the abstracted analytical perspectives. Tbe abstraction of the ideal type is indeed grounded in a selection from given reality but this selection will not be arbitrary.
(1952:92)
was
accounting for the necessary as well as the sufficient antecedents explaining the features of a given social phenomenon. Henrich proposes to see the ideal type as a
Webers intention was to to be done by retrospective
causally explain
social
reality.
This
90
hypothetical or model conceptualization of a relationship or phenomenon, representing the relationship or phenomenon in its &dquo;pure&dquo; form which can be held against the empirical relationships from which it originally was abstracted. Through such juxtaposition,
the ideal type can be verified, that is, it serves as a viable tool to understand reality. As such it is tied to the knowledge interest of the researcher, which Weber and Henrich address as perspective or perspectivist (and the researcher needs continuously to reflect his or her own perspectivism). Perspectivism does not jeopardize the verification and potential validity of an ideal type if the researcher is conscious of the cultural relativity cum significance of his or her
conceptual approach.
The third criterion for ideal-type validity, therefore, is its verisimilitude against reality which Weber addresses as verification.
To summarize: The three criteria for ideal-type validity, then, historicity or empirical relevance as proven through the knowledge basis, composition made up of indispensable elements as proven through the think-away test (mental experiment), and verification as proven through juxtaposition between the formulated ideal type and the reality as shown in social-science data, statistical or otherwise (ideally the reality is real life in history constituting, so to speak, an experience test in the guise of what Weber calls Erfal~uungsprobe) .
are
Step
3:
Corifronting
the ideal
type with observed
individual cultural events
Through steps 1 and 2, concepts have been formed which are capable of explaining an observed reality of social life. Testing ideal types to secure their validity has partly involved to hold them against empirically based facts. But the aim of ideal-type understanding is not just to render plausible the typical (i.g., the most rational) phenomena. Its aim is to explain the cultural phenomena in society which are individual and/or unique. That is,
now
Weber is not content to ascertain what is typical in society, but he wishes to use the notion of the &dquo;pure&dquo; type to understand the individuality of each and every particular cultural event or
phenomenon.
which Social
In his writings, he addresses the problem at two points in time are sixteen years apart. In Objectiuity in Social Science and Policy (the original German title is The Objectivity of Social-
Policy
and
Social-Science
Knowledge&dquo;),
he
describes
the
juxtaposition of ideal types and social life as confrontation (1904/ 1949:110). Through confrontation, he asserts, individual
socio-cultural
phenomena
are
understood with the
means
of social
91
science. In the analytical step of confrontation, the conceptual construct (ideal type) is held against the experience or observed reality, but it may also be applied to empirical data under the
auspices of &dquo;the category of objective possibility&dquo; (1904/1949:93). The outcome is that &dquo;historically unique configurations or their individual components&dquo; can be analysed when certain phenomena are under investigation. Such analysis proceeds &dquo;by means of genetic concepts&dquo; (1904/1949:93). In other words, the procedure of explanation is that genetic reconstructions is done which avails itself of ideal-type constructs (which, in turn, are conceptualized as &dquo;historical individualities&dquo;, i.e. full-fledged representations of the investigated phenomenon somewhere along the line of historical process development (s)) (Weber 1904/ 1949:100-102; see also Burger 1976, Huff 1984, Gerhardt 1986b). By &dquo;relating the empirical data to an ideal limiting case&dquo; (1904/1949:94), Weber asserts, genetic reconstruction can explain a particular cultural phenomenon as a specific event or course of action. The explanation is based on the observation whether and to what degree and in what way a particular phenomenon deviates from the &dquo;pure&dquo; typical course of action. When the latter is depicted in the &dquo;pure&dquo; representation of the phenomenon type which is postulated in the ideal-type notion, the individual event can be grasped in its individuality through such confrontation (see also Gerhardt 1983:
184-212).
In Economy and Society (published 1922), he introduced a second type of confrontation. In his analysis of historical material there, he adopts a method of confrontation that may be called the
use of contrasting variations of social forms (Gerhardt 1986b:58-62). This presupposes that various forms of a social structure are copresent. For instance, structures of the law, or structures of the political authority of the state which co-exist at a given point in time or in a given era, may have to be explained by their belonging to different basic structural types. To understand a particular historical-empirical phenomenon means, then, that it is explained by comparing it with others which may belong to opposite types.
With some phenomena, explanation may even suggest that they would not exist were the reality all-pervasive that is being subsumed under the dominant-type reality. To take an example, Buddhism in Europe would have to be explained in relation to its &dquo;opposite&dquo;, Christianity in Europe whose dominant existence is nevertheless not all-pervasive, leaving niches of &dquo;anachronistic&dquo; or &dquo;exotic&dquo; particular individual phenomena. Weber proceeds in this way to deal with the forms of law and also the forms of state authority - chapters in Economy and Society. In this type of confrontation, he holds the dominant structure constant, so to speak, and uses it as a reference point (epitomized in an ideal-type notion) to explain the particular process of a subdominant or minor structure which has its own logic of type orientation accounting for its development.
92
THE METHODOLOGY OF IDEAL-TYPE ANALYSIS
How
can
these Weberian ideas enter into and be useful for
modern-type qualitative research?

Webers methodology into one of intermediate thoughts should be introduced. One concerns the focal importance of the case as elementary unit of data material and its interpretation, and the other concerns the time-flow nature of the data elicited in qualitative research and represented in their interpretation.
In
order to translate
qualitative
research,
two
The use which qualitative research usually makes of case material is problematic. This use is such that, on the one hand, subjective meaning construction is proposed as the singly legitimate access to analysing social structures. But, on the other hand, none of the approaches which are customary in contemporary qualitative research actually manage to establish a systematically valid connection between their case material and their findings concerning social structures. The reason which I see is that these approaches either underestimate or overestimate the value of individual case evidence. They either &dquo;lose&dquo; the caseness of their data in the process of data processing and analysis, or they satisfy their interest in objective structure in single-case interpretation which finds that the one case &dquo;means everything&dquo;. Two of the bestknown approaches, &dquo;grounded theory&dquo; and ethnography (&dquo;objective hermeneutics&dquo;) are discussed briefly to document the importance of systematic multi-case material in qualitative research. That multicase generalizations are needed for a valid study of case patterns will be argued below in this part of this paper devoted to an outline of ideal-type analysis.
Research endeavours are often geared toward structural entities which are presumed to determine individual action. Given this knowledge interest, structures are usually defined and found in
the
guise of,
for
instance,
mass
the
unambiguously interpreted
&dquo;statistically described and phenomena&dquo; which Weber invoked.
But if the research aims at individuals &dquo;definition of the situation&dquo;, or at their subjectively experienced meanings or action patterns emanating therefrom, the individual case is of pivotal importance. If the researchers explanatory interest is directed at individual members of society, the case epitomizing individual actions and experiences must be at the center of interpretive procedures.
93
From
this vantage point,

is not
case
&dquo;grounded theory&dquo;
orientation to
the methodology proposed by satisfactory. It starts with a clear
material but then drifts into a generalizing individual action level. &dquo;Grounded are a give-and-take between case selection and case-material coding, yielding an increasingly informative view on a range of cases whose similarity and dissimilarity can be seen. But then a leap is made when the researcher strives to discover so-called Basic Social Processes (BSPs, Glaser 1978), also addressed as patterned trajectories (Strauss 1987). They are taken to represent in a wholesale manner the essential features of a social phenomenon (social process) or a course-of-action (trajectory pattern). They are what is usually portrayed in the research report, while the individual cases are not envisaged or referred to as systematic reference material. Rather, individual case material is used only as illustrative evidence documenting various types or aspects of the BSPs or trajectory patterns. In this way, &dquo;grounded theory&dquo; loses touch with the comprehensive range of meaning diversity of the case material which it originally collects and on which it presumably bases its generalizations. The reader (research recipient) becomes unable to follow himself of herself the process of abstraction leading from the case evidence to the more inclusive event patterns which eventually constitute the findings. Moreover, no intersubjective check of the validity of the findings is possible (except for intuitive plausibility). Since the material on which the results are based is presented not in systematic richness but only in the truncated and haphazard form of text excerpts, the procedure of data interpretation remains unsatisfactory. The way out would be to fully document and systematically rely on the case material during all stages of data
procedure which obscures the theorys&dquo; first analytical steps
analysis.
It may be added that the methodology of ethnography is no way out of the dilemma in which &dquo;grounded theory&dquo; finds itself. Ethnography referring to Clifford Geertzs &dquo;thick description&dquo; frequently attempts to depict social reality through individual-case evidence, or using a very small number of intensively interpreted case-texts. Whereas this often yields striking findings documenting how richly connected the various items in case-texts are, the problem of explanatory scope in sociology remains widely open (Emerson 1983, Atkinson 1990). A similar problem besets &dquo;objective hermeneutics&dquo;, an interpretive approach which has recently become fashionable in Germany (Oevermann et al. 1979, Garz and Kraimer 1991). It detects &dquo;deep structures&dquo; of meaning in interview texts from individual cases analysed line by line (word episode by word episode) by a research team who ascertain and evaluate the totality of available and potentially adequate textual meanings before they settle down with an authoritative version. The latter is also deemed
94
authentic inasmuch as the majority of members of the research team perceive in their discussion what a textual item &dquo;really&dquo; means. In this endeavour, only one case is usually used, and a single case is taken as epitomy of a structure which can be made visible through the &dquo;objective hermeneutics&dquo; of group interpretation. No systematic follow-up is conducted which could corroborate the evidence extracted from the single case, and no opportunity exists for rejecting the results arrived at through single-case exegesis. Therefore, while the individual case is clearly visible here, what is lacking is a basis for relating it systematically to the multiplicity of cases; but, to be sure, it is the latter which make up society as it is the topic of sociology.
To sum up my first intermediate thought connecting Weberian Verstehen with ideal-type methodology in social research: To appreciate Webers principle that sociology aims at systematically understanding culturally individual events or courses of action means that it is necessary to recognize the importance of case material. This suggests that two mistakes be avoided. One is that the case material is &dquo;lost&dquo; in the process of generalization whereupon case material deteriorates into illustrative excerpts. The other is that cases are overinterpreted into representations of objective structures, which sanctifies single cases into quasi absolute evidence of covert meaning spheres. If both these mistakes are avoided, but if the lessons contained therein are learned, the answer for social research is twofold. For one, it should be based on case material that is presented in full as the foundation for abstractions and generalizations. And, in addition, caseness of research evidence must mean that mu.ltiplicity of cases is essential. Only that a wide range of cases is investigated enables the researcher to draw comparisons, and also to safeguard that they allow for the necessary scope of variation of concrete individualities in his or her data base.
The other
thought
which needs to be introduced in order to
appreciate the value of Webers work for modem qualitative research

concerns the nature of the data elicited through empirical studies. What needs to be understood is the essential historicity of all sociological data inasmuch as they portray social reality. Weber &dquo;invented&dquo; the ideal type because he needed a sociological conceptual tool to deal with what essentially are historical data: they may be ordered as nomothetic or idiographic evidence in economics (both were unsatisfactory to him), but in sociology a third approach is needed to make sense of these data, he found. Temporality, or historicity, of social science data is a condition of social research that Weber takes seriously. To recollect how crucial this condition is means to learn from Webers solution by adopting his ideal-type analytical approach for modem qualitative research. Using his approach, some hitherto intractable problems of explanation in qualitative research may be solved.
95
To be sure, so-called quantitative research has taken seriously the ideal of the historicity of sociological data some two decades ago. In the wake of Glen Elders &dquo;Children of the Great Depression&dquo; (1974) followed a host of studies documenting three types of temporal effects impinging simultaneously upon the reality that is represented in sociological data. They are age effects, cohort effects. and period effects. Two analytical approaches have emerged to honour this time-bound quality of social life as found in the data: they are Event-History-Analysis, and explanation through Lifecourse Dynamics (Blossfeld et al. 1983, Elder 1985). But qualitative research, it appears, has so far refrained from adapting its analytical perspective to that of these approaches. The time-flow presupposition which is customary in Event-History-Analysis and Lifecourse-Dynamics Analysis, is implicit in biographical research and explicit in &dquo;grounded theory&dquo;s notion of trajectory. But timeflow or historicity is not systematically explored in these qualitative approaches. They refer to the flow of time but they do not analyse their material in terms of the dynamics of what preceeds and what succeeds a certain event or stage as an individual or as a typical experience. For example, trajectory patterns are not operationalized as differential combinations of effects emanating from ageing (the individuals moving through the stages of the life cycle), cohort participation (the individuals belonging to a cohort of similarly socialized individuals moving through the history of a society), and period experience (all individuals simultaneously being exposed to similar effects of, for instance, hardship in times of war or affluence in times of economic boom). To sum up my second intermediate thought connecting Weberian Verstehen with ideal-type methodology in case pattern analysis: Biographical data on which qualitative research is frequently based are of the nature which Weber states for all sociological data. They are historical inasmuch as they picture lifehistory dynamics, and as such they are placed in the triple context of history (age, cohort, and period effects). Biographical or lifehistory data epitomize the historical quality of social process by documenting individuals participation in time-bound patterns of social life. Weber proposed the ideal type to take care precisely of this historicity of the data. Through ideal-type knowledge, he suggested, sociology could take seriously its interest in the structure of social institutions and also remain aware of the fact that knowledge is essentially perspectivist and therefore constructive. If these insights are honoured, a qualitative data collection can elicit life-course sequentiality, and data analysis can proceed to explain it in terms of structural contexts and pattern dynamics. Such explanation can fulfill the requirements of causal adequacy while it satisfies the conditions of interpretive adequacy. The connecting
96
point between the objective and the subjective worlds, and also between social reality and research evidence, are ideal types which
serve as orientation for action in social life but also - as typified constructs - help the researcher to understand systematically the
rationale of his
In
historical-sociological
data
data.
two
qualitative
analysis, therefore,
requirements
should be met. One should be that temporality and historicity of data should be recognized when picturing the individual case(s). Understanding a case should be based on the researchers interest in the time-flow and the phase structure of the biographical process portrayed in the data. The respondents individual life-course dynamics should be made visible in data processing and should not be &dquo;lost&dquo; in data analysis.
Linking the two main methodological requirements for qualitative research, the question should be asked how the historical-social time flow impinges upon the individual case(s). Presupposing that social structures are temporal in that they constitute social process and that social process equals structures that become effective in socio-historial reality, the question is one of interpretive adequacy based on causal adequacy. The flow of dynamics in an individual case, producing event sequences, stage
should be related in the flow of social process characterizing life systematic in society. For instance, data on individuals participation in the class structure, the age structure, etc., should be related to the flow of the individuals life courses. Such relationship might be established through systematic comparison of case-flow dynamics between groups belonging to different social-class backgrounds, age cohorts, etc. Thus, qualitative research whose aim is to understand what is going on can avail itself of explanatory Verstehen as it was introduced by Weber. He showed how sociological Verstehen attains explanatory power by using concepts that denote an idealized typified image of a social process and by then using these concepts as reference units to account for what is special in ordinary cases of social life. His reflections on explanation in social science can thus be adopted for the methodology of qualitative research. successions,
a
or
generally biographical patterns
manner to
vantage point, the three steps may be outlined in detail of which ideal-type analysis consists. The three-step data analysis relies on extensive data processing but the latter is not discussed in the present paper (see, however, Gerhardt et al. 1993:216-276). In the last section of the paper will be reprocuced the main analytical steps of one of the two major studies which our research team has conducted using the methodology outlined here. Its three analytical steps, derived from Weberian Verstehen methodology, are now described briefly. This is to show how idealFrom this
some
97
type analysis
Weberian
is
closely
connected with but also
partly goes beyond
thoughts.
Step
1: Case Reconstruction
The first step of data analysis is case reconstruction. It consists of picturing every case in the research material as a flow of events and actions. These may be circumstances into which the individual(s) may be drawn, or which he or she (or they) may influence or structure himself of herself (or themselves). This generalized picture of the flow of events and actions over the entire observation period of each particular case may be broken down into one or more partial reconstructions. The latter are devoted to case
dynamics concerning development.
particular
dimension
of
the
case
To take an example: A study may investigate the link between educational and occupational achievement through qualitative data that are represented in the respondents narratives. The case reconstruction could consist of rendering into a time-bound order the data showing how the two biographical developments are intertwined in an individual biography. Alternatively, partial case reconstructions may be done by separately putting into sequential order the items of the educational and of the occupational biographies for each individual case. Which form of case reconstruction is chosen in a particular research project, depends on the studys knowledge interest.
What is important is that the entire flow of events and actions covering the full observation period is entered into the case reconstruction. It goes without saying that case reconstructions
should use the same format for each case in the study population (see Gerhardt 1983: 184-193, 1986a: 87-91, Gerhardt, Borgetto and Rockenbauch 1993: 236-252, 289-294).
To be sure, case reconstruction when done in detailed fashion become an end in itself. This is what frequently figures as ethnography of a social phenomenon. The case reconstruction(s) then is the qualitative data interpretation conducted in a particular study, and not just the first step in a more elaborate process of data analysis. Its result may then be a number of reconstructed biographies that are being retold under a given theme. (What should be avoided, however, is that from one or a few biographies is interferred a structure that is deemed objective; biographies, to be sure, epitomize the social worlds of those who tell them to a sociologist-interviewer). As a limiting instance of qualitative analysis
can
98
99
cases investigated might indeed prove that these cases are some kind of nucleus of patterns which are not represented in the given study material. However, such &dquo;odd&dquo; cases may also be subsumed under the pattem(s) to which they may appear to be clorest. In terms of meaning structures thus invoked, this would &dquo;mean&dquo; that these cases are seen as marginal to the respective pattems; they would be understood to deviate most from the cases which are most typical or most characteristic of the patterns.
The case patterns represent different ways how a particular social phenomenon exists. For instance, case clusters can show the two frequent sequences &dquo;elementary school - on-the-job-training low-prestige occupation&dquo; or &dquo;secondary school - formal and skilled occupational training - higher prestige occupation&dquo;. These two patterns would then represent empirical types. As such they would distinguish between two combinations of educational and occupational achievement which can be found in the data material.
Stage 2.2: Case abstraction (&dquo;pure&dquo; cases)

found.
and the construction
of
ideal types
In the next step of the data analysis, ideal types must be The case material has been ordered into clusters representing empirical types, and it is from there that analysis
proceeds.
starting point for ideal-type construction is that the implicitly postulated in the research objective for the conceivably best possible case, or an optimal relationship between the variables. In a study investigating educational and occupational achievement, for instance, the following two alternative postulates concerning the optimal case relationship may be formulated. Either
The conditions
are one
are
may hypothesize that ones ideas of education-occupation link best represented in a case where low-grade education leads to
1&dquo;___.:_1_1:--...,1-.__1 -- - ......--- -&dquo;~---~-~----_B
~..
,k!dJ......--....~~-- --_.....__.&...:_-
~-
. . :. : : - = =- r--- , - --
100
Criteria need to be formulated spelling out what is optimal a given research perspective. These criteria define what a case must be like that fulfills in optimal fashion the characteristics postulated as indicators of the relationship under investigation. Such optimal case, to be sure, epitomizes in &dquo;pure&dquo; form the relationship contained in or meant by the research objective. under Case abstraction consists, first, of reformulating the case dynamics in terms of the few variables relevant for the core hypothesis contained in the research objective. Second, these abstracted case images, separately for those belonging to a pattern
of similar cases, are looked at. The researcher looks for the one case that fits best the criteria of optimal or &dquo;pure&dquo; representation of the relationship which is being investigated. The &dquo;pure&dquo; case must fulfill the criteria of optimal representation which are derived from the research objective or knowledge interest. The &dquo;pure&dquo; cases dynamics show the &dquo;pure&dquo; form hypothesized for the phenomenon whose explanation is sought. The &dquo;pure&dquo; case is typical in that it represents the relationship which the sociologist assumes is typical for the phenomenon. In comparison to the other cases whose case reconstructions are available, the &dquo;pure&dquo; case is more typical for the investigated phenomenon than the other cases contained in the case material. The other cases may also show the phenomenon (as concretized in the pattern), but in &dquo;lesser&dquo; or &dquo;less pure&dquo; form. The &dquo;pure&dquo; case is the most clearcut (if not slightly overdrawn) example for the type area concretizing the respective pattern. It may be remembered here that Weber called &dquo;ideal&dquo; not what was morally superior to or what would be a model for other actions, but what epitomized best a particular field. It is in the latter sense that the ideal type represents the idealized (&dquo;pure&dquo;) typicality within a range of like case dynamics.
When the criteria are worked out which inform the search for case, at least two of Webers three proofs for ideal-type construction are imperative. One is that the selection of the criteria defining the ideal-type case must be based on a broad range of scientific knowledge elucidating the subject area of the research (i.e. requiring what he calls knowledge test). Second, mental experiments should be conducted. They consist of thinking away each potential element of the ideal type until a combination is arrived at whose
the &dquo;pure&dquo;
elements
are
each
indispensable.
This means that case abstraction reduces the cases to a small number of relevant elements: the latter are selected under the perspective of the research objective (knowledge interest). Cases are then condensed into abstract images of the time flow concerning the elements that are analytically relevant in the light of the research objective. All cases within a pattern are compared with
relatively
101
each other; in this comparison, the abstracted versions of the cases are used. During the comparative stage of ideal-type construction, elements may be added or left out, and the think-away test may have to be repeated many times. Eventually, the elements are found whose &dquo;survival&dquo; in the think-away test signifies that they are what defines the &dquo;pure&dquo; case or ideal type.
Stage 2.3:
Pattern
explanation,
Pattern explanation can take two different forms. It may either look at how the case dynamics relate to the ideal-type dynamics, deriving from this a network of case explanations within a temporal pattern. This pattern is then submitted to explanatory inquiry directed by the question what it is in the cases which makes them &dquo;behave&dquo; in a more or less typical way (case pattern explanation). Alternatively, pattern explanation explores the process of pattern development over time. This longitudinal analysis uses a specially defined notion of rationality as an anchor concept. It takes an &dquo;operational&dquo; criterion type of rationality as a reference unit. This second form of pattern explanation carries out what Weber may have had in mind when he clarified that means-end rationality was &dquo;easiest&dquo; for sociological Verstehen of rational action. (Process-
pattern explanation).
which show
into
Case pattern explanation: The material used are the patterns parallel case dynamics over time. These are condensed
ideal-type
cases
characteristic
course
which show most clearly what of events of the particular pattern is.
the
Apart from the abstracted optimum-quality features, the idealhas also other characteristics. These are now taken into consideration. They may explain, for this particular case, how the case &dquo;arrived at&dquo; its particularly positive developmental dynamics. To be sure, were the ideal-type case chosen to represent the worst possible case development - under a given research perspective -, the explanation would look for the issues which, on a case basis as a first step, can explain why the case turned out as bad as it did, or &dquo;went awry&dquo; more than any other case investigated. The characteristics used to understand the dynamics of the ideal-type case may be such mundane sociologically relevant issues as socio-
type
case
economic status
(high vs. low), occupational

etc.
status
(employment vs.
unemployment),
The other cases are being &dquo;ordered&dquo; as relatively similar to, or relatively deviant from the ideal-type case. First, the cases relatively similar to the ideal-type case are looked at, posing the question: What are their &dquo;other&dquo; characteristics, such as, for instance, social
102
class position, income situation, etc. Then, the cases more and deviating from the ideal-type case are looked at likewise. The
same
more
procedure
is followed for each of the different
patterns. The results are antecedents (facilitating or aggravating contexts) that make understandable the typical or optimal process outcome for each of the various patterns analysed separately. They represent, in positive as well as negative forms, opportunity structures that facilitate or aggravate a cases chances to reach a certain idealized &dquo;pure&dquo; state. In this way, structural contexts such as social class, ethnic origin, or gender may turn out to be explanatory factors for the typical case dynamics, and also, in
differentiated
degrees, for less than typical case conditions.
These antecedents are then applied to the entire range of the pattern. Each pattern is analysed separately. Then, eventually, the antecedents are investigated for the entire range of patterns found in the data. The antecedents or opportunity structures render sensible and turn meaningful the process of case development. They explain the eventual process outcome for each of the various case patterns (that is, for the clusters of similar cases), and for the entire range of case material analysed in the study.
cases in
Process-pattern explanation: The analysis can be based on the longterm development of the range of cases studied. For this explanation, a notion of specific rationality is used that resembles Webers means-end rationality, which he found easiest as a
standard
of type Verstehen. The
criterion
of evaluation
and
rationality that is used may represent any &dquo;operational&dquo; definition. That is, biographical rationality can here be represented by any plausible and argueable standard of &dquo;understandability&dquo; that applies to how the case dynamics proceed over extended periods of the case history (case development).
Under a longterm perspective, using a specific type of rationality as a reference unit, the case dynamics in all patterns analysed can be looked at. The cases within the patterns, as they develop over time, may be postulated to resemble more and more or less and less - the idealized type case postulated as the closest
chosen &dquo;operational&dquo; definition of rationality. Either the longterm the shortterm dynamics of the cases (looked at over the whole range of cases in the study) or of the case patterns (looked at over the more or less limited number of process patterns analysed) can be investigated. Such dynamics can be found to emulate more and more, or less and less, the developmental process which is epitomized in the &dquo;operational&dquo; rationality. match of
a or
103
When it is clear what the process pattern is (and how it its antecedents are ascertained (opportunity structures). These are understood to be facilitation contexts bringing about the &dquo;operationally&dquo; rational dynamics. Likewise, aggravation contexts can be found which make it more difficult for a case or a pattern to develop in the direction of &dquo;operational&dquo; rationality.
&dquo;works&dquo;),
The outcome is that over the longterm period of case development, dynamic images of the process or the pattern structuring all the case-pattern dynamics are found. These, in turn, can be epitomized in an ideal-type case, and the antecedents (facilitating contexts, aggravating contexts) can be studied for the entire study populations longterm dynamics (opportunity
structures).
To summarize: Case-pattern explanation, and process-pattern explanation are two ways to adapt Webers idea of explanation to modem qualitative data interpretation. These two forms of interpretive explanation owe much to the third stage of ideal-type construction described by Weber and clarified by Henrich. Namely, pattern explanation sharpens its analytical tools through what Henrich explicates as verification in the Weberian approach. That is, to hold the ideal type against empirical reality is what explanation
means here. But one may go one step further. Inasmuch as verification also means reality testing (testing the ideal type by the &dquo;reality experiment&dquo; of waiting how the historical or social process turns Webers idea about out), &dquo;experimental proof (Erfahrungsprobe) may be applied here. It may be combined with Webers observation that means-end rationality is the best ideal type to render understandable social actions rational empirical
orientations. In this vein, the ideal
that
over
type is honored as a postulate how cases (or case patterns) will develop empirical anticipates time, and the longterm process of the development of the
Case
pattern is explained.
Step 3:
explanation
Weber emphasizes that what sociology eventually must achieve is to understand, and thereby explain, the individual case. It is the individual case which represents the cultural phenomenon whose explanation is what sociology must attain through ideal types. He writes: The goal of ideal-type concept-construction is always clearly explicit... the unique individual character of phenomena ( 1904 / 1949:101 )
to make cultural
104
Such explanation which is the eventual raison dlatre of Verstehen may be briefly described as feasible in an obvious way: It holds the ideal-typical case against any particular empirical case. The latter is explained in terms of why - considering, for instance, the absence of facilitating contexts and/or the presence of aggravating contexts - the particular case &dquo;could not&dquo; become idealtypical in its dynamics. At the same time, the circumstances of the particular case can be shown to be unique biographically and to produce solutions to more general problems which are truly individual. This latter may be done by positively concentrating on the particular case as distinct from the ideal-typical case.
To be sure, all
cases
study populations
can
within patterns but also within entire be submitted to case explanation.
HOW DOES IDEAL-TYPE ANALYSIS &dquo;WORK&dquo;?
Some Evidence from One of Our Two Studies
Using Ideal-Type
Analysis
The study investigating Patient Careers in End-Stage Renal Failure was funded by the Social Science Research Council, London, between 1977 and 1980 (project No. 5013), and subsequently by the German National Research Foundation, Bonn, between 1981 and 1982 (project No. Ge 313-3). Two reports, a book and various articles have described the research and its results (Gerhardt 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986a, 1986c, 1990, 1991 a, forthcoming, Gerhardt and Brieskorn-Zinke 1986).
The study was a two-point longitudinal investigation of the (nearly) entire patient population of 68 cases of married men of working age (20-50 years) who on January lst, 1978, were being treated for end-stage renal failure; they had been patients for up to three years at one of the five teaching hospitals which serve the South-East of England. The 234 tape-recorded interviews conducted with husband-patients and wives separately at two points in time
one
year
apart
approximately
to four
steps
were of an average 2-hour duration. The 600 hours of tape-recorded material were submitted of data processing. They were:
(1) Transcribing the full text

in its text
or,
alternatively, paraphrasing
episodes such that biographical information
it could be
easily extracted by the researchers:

105
(2) Coding the transcripts and paraphrases by marking the information which belonged to each of the following biographical dimensions: Medical cum treatment, occupational for husband and wife, family life and marital status, finances, identity (including changes of bodily status which allowed for or barred such identityrelevant issues as sports, holidays, etc.), and disability;
were compiled: they contained the case each of the biographical dimensions in chronological order (for the four main dimensions):
(3) Thematic profiles

on
information
(4) Flow-charts were worked out; on a month-by-month basis show the statuses for the four main biographical dimensions for husband and wife in a parallel design. They make visible the status biographies over the entire early observation period of up to five years of coping with end-stage renal failure (to-t2).
they
Subsequent to the interview stage of the research (which covered the time period 1975-1979), four follow-ups were conducted. They obtained information on the patients treatment mode(s) as well as their survival one, four, six, and eight years after their last interviews (1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, representing tg-tg of the
longitudinal study design).
Case reconstruction
Case reconstructions covered the information on the period up to the last interviews. This was a time period of up to 5 years (60 months). Two reconstructions of entire case biographies may illustrate what Case No. 36: 36 (social class II), the patient (aged 31) as well as his are shattered when end-stage renal failure occurs. 29) wife (aged They both expect the patient to die soon, and they drag themselves
In
case was
done:
from day
children
to day while the wme dialyses her husband at home and he continues to work as a salesman as best he can. They have 3 small
personal
(aged 7, 5, 3). The patient develops a food addiction as his way of coping with his machine treatment, and his wife becomes estranged from him because she finds her husband more and more repulsiue. The patients brother decides that he no longer wants to be in business with him (pushing him out of the jointly owned ftmi); this brings the familys income down to what the patient
earns as a
salesman which
means a
drastic reduction
of available
are
funds. (It
is unclear whether at this time mortgage payments Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013
106
threatened.) At
mother-lir-law
point of desperation, the wife complains

the
to her
telephone that she cannot understand why nobody in the family helps out with a kidney donation. Why do they have to bear the brunt aU alone? After the successful live-donor transplantation from his mother (month I 8), the patient is off work for 5 months and then goes back to work full-time (month 23), soon being made an honorary director by his brother and later also setting up his own business on the side additionaUy to his salesman job (month 36). The family moves to a larger house and the spouses feel that they make a fresh start. The quality of the marriage improves notably which is partly due to the return of the husbands sexual
on
attractiveness and drive
(53 months documented).
Case No. 35:
35 (social class Ill), the patient is a sheet metal worker and his wife is a legal secretary (aged 38); their 3 sons are between I4 and 17 years old. They are highly in debt since they bought their house shortly before the husband/fathers end-stage renal failure occurred (with the family hauing known about the diagnosis for a long time but having expected that dialysis would not be due for another year). While the husband dialyses in the hospital (months 1-4), he is off work, but later goes back to work and is paid on a day basis. The wifes salary is doubled by her employer (month 2), and she has herself declared main breadwinner for tax purposes. Between month 9 and 17, the husband dialyses at home with little help from his wife while marriage tensions rise. After a cadaver-donor transplant fails (month 19), and the wife has a nervous breakdown due to a crisis which she brought on by publicly criticizing the social security system, the husband is urged by his wife to stay away from work altogether such that he receives full disability benefit. But when a second attempt at home dialysis fails completely because of the wifes wlwillingness to share the work, the patient decides that he no longer wants to comply with his wifes wishes regarding his employment. He goes on night dialysis at the hospital and resumes work full-time (his job has been kept for him, if only on paper, but he insists on being given a chance and he can fill it again). Soon afterwards, he goes on the transplants list, and he receives a second cadaver-donor transplant which is successful. Less than 2 months later, he goes back to work but also decides that he wants to separate from his wife. In the meantime, she has become friendly with her employer. The spouses continue to share the cost of mortgage, and each of them decides to look after 1 or 2 of the children. They file for a divorce (39 months documented). In
case
(aged 43)
Additional to entire-case reconstructions, partial reconstruccompiled. They concentrated on the phases of combined treatment and the phases as occupational biographies: theyonlisted Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL March 11, 2013
tions were
107
biographies.
combinations of statuses between the two most important partial As an example, the partial reconstruction of case No. 36 may illustrate what was done: Reconstruction of treatment-occupational
biography (Case 36):
PATTERN ANALYSIS
Empirical patterns (Empirical type documentation).

Case comparisons and the construction of patterns (leading to empirical types) were carried out for the two main partial biographies , namely, treatment and occupation (husbands and wife occupational statuses defining what was called the couples family rehabilitation).
108
Treatment biographies turned out to be fraught with frequent of treatment modes. During the first two years of end-stage renal replacement therapy alone, up to seven changes of treatment mode were found in the case reconstructions. Table 1 gives an overview over the percentages of patients in our study population on each of the four treatment modes for the interview period (t 1 - t2)
changes
and the subsequent eight-year follow-up period (t3 - t6). Incidentally, table 1 shows a serendipitous issue: Although the study population represented only a tiny fraction of the total patient population in the United Kingdom at the time (over 14,000 cases), the proportion on each of the four treatment modes for 1976 (U.K.) and 1978 (study population, tl) is rather similar - which may be an unanticipated side-effect of using the entirety of cases of a highly distinct group as
a
study population.
The sequence of treatment modes shown for each case in the reconstructions was condensed into an overall picture of patterns of sequences of treatment modes. What emerged were three
(partial)
empirical patterns:
Pattern A:
These patients oscillated between the two

as a
modes, frequently tending to obtain home dialysis
option but often returning

time
to
(mostly with the wife
as
the
hospital dialysis for short dialysis helper at home);
dialysis longterm periods of
Pattern B: These patients obtained a transplant after initial hospital dialysis, and upon its eventual failure exchanged it for a subsequent transplant; between transplant phases, only hospital dialysis was considered and obtained; Pattern C: The patients started out with pattern A, expecting to retain dialysis treatment possibly until the end of their lives. But eventually they changed to pattern B. From then on, the pattern was sequential transplantation with interspersed hospital dialysis.
investigated in the study fit into these three be shown for the over twelve years observation period of the study including its follow-ups. No other pattern is adopted. This is striking since nephrology textbooks mention that a sizable proportion of patients after their failure of transplants that have functioned for some time, opt for home dialysis; in our study population, nobody did that: Patients whose transplants failed after a period of success, either went back on hospital dialysis expecting their next transplant (even if this meant a decade of &dquo;waiting&dquo;), or they would die.
All 68
cases
patterns. This
can
109
Patterns A-C may be condensed into two

treatment
empirical types of
dynamics:
Pattern of exclusive
Pattern of
D-Type:
T ~lype:
dialysis treatment
hospital dialysis adopted treatment biography.
sequential transplantation and intermittent in the early period or at a later date of the
Table 2 shows how D-type and T-type treatment patterns are distributed among social classes I-IV at three points in time (tl, t3, t6). The total number of cases analysed is N=63 since class-V cases and military cases are omitted.
Family rehabilitation (marital structure in terms of husbands occupational status) was found to fit into two empirical patterns comprising four types.They were:
and wifes
(A) One pattern was male-dominated in that the husband had been the main or sole breadwinner prior to treatment, and he either continued to fulfill this role (traditional type), or the familys husband/father-oriented structure remained unchanged although he (had) lost his job (unemployment type): among the two types, a small number of cases changed from the latter to the former over time, no case in opposite direction.
(B) The second pattern was a companionship relationship between the spouses where either both spouses were employed fulltime (dual-career type), or the wife became the breadwinner while the husband (sometimes) took over the housework (wife-centered type); over time, a considerable number of surviving cases changed from the latter to the former while none went in the opposite direction. Between patterns (A) and (B), little overlap occured.
Table 3 gives details who survived until t3.
on
family rehabilitation patterns
for those
Ideal-type
Construction
The next step of pattern analysis is case abstraction and idealconstruction. The ideal types (&dquo;pure&dquo; cases) which are sought in the material were to epitomize careers. The research project aimed to study &dquo;Patient Careers in End-Stage Renal Failure&dquo;. Now it was necessary to identify such patient careers and to find out where they were &dquo;situated&dquo; in the various patterns of case dynamics and what their facilitating contexts etc. were.
type
110
Four criteria
were
formulated which
were
to characterize
(a) job promotion, (b) improvement of financial circumstances over onset situation, (c) absence of negative effects on marriage (marital satisfaction of both spouses), (d) absence of negative effects on children (such as becoming truant or criminal, or being treated for psychological disturbance). patient
career.
They
were:
The criteria had to be met over time, leading to a state of was at least not worse compared with the onset situation on all observed dimensions, and better for the occupational position of husband or of wife (or both) as compared with the onset period. A &dquo;pure&dquo; case had to match all four criteria of patient career. It turned out that two types of -patient career had to be distinguished, according to whether a marriage was male-dominated or
affairs that
companionship.
The cases No. 27 and No. 60 represent patient careers which met all four criteria of &dquo;careemess&dquo;. These cases may be described by their full case reconstructions.
In case 27 (social class I), the patient (aged 46) is an architect and his wife (aged 33) has always been a housewife; their children are 6 and 3 years old. Three months before the patients acute renal failure and diagnosis, they bought a home. Now mortgage payments appear enormous, and the annual rate bill means disaster since they are Ii.teraUy unable to pay. A social workers advice to approach a Benevolent Architects Society solves the crisis: the society pays the rate bill and gives the family a small amount euery month. The patient decides to dialyse at home (after 3 months hospdal dialysis). He works 4 days per week in order not to exhaust himself. He even finds
himself a better job as a principal architect for a localfinn (month 16). top of this, 3 months later, he takes on a private commission (month 19) after having begun a 3-year Open University course to improve himself regarding engineering knowledge. One month later, his wife begins part-time work because she does not want to sit at
On
home now as the second child has started schooL She uses the money to pay for her own car with which she drives the children to their ballet lessons, or games. All this time, she dialyses her husband, usually in late afternoons/evenings three times per week. Thus. the children and parents now feel comfortable in their new home, the financial situation is excellent, and the patient, according to his w fe, goes form strength to strength. The wifes opinion is that they by now have returned to norma.l (29 months documented).
dealer at
(aged 32) is a wholesale wife (aged 31) has two minor partchildren are 7 and 5 years old. The couple is filing for time jobs. Their Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013
In
case
a
60 (social class TV), the patient
meat market, and his
111
divorce (on wifes demand) when the patients kidney fail unexpectedly; the divorce is discontinued, they decide to have home dialysis for reasons of the husbands job which he practically keeps uninterrupted, not even going off work when he starts dialysing (2 months at the hospital, then at home). At the patients request and to his satisfaction, his wife successfully applies for a full-time job (as a traueUing saleswoman) 8 months after his end-stage renal failure. Their marriage improves, partly because they buy shire horses as a family hobby and take them to exhibitions where they win prizes. When the patient unexpectedly is offered a cadaver-donor transplant, he accepts while his wife is out of town (month 17). The graft is successful, and he is back to work after 2 weeks. The only workrelated interruption which he allows himself is that, for a short period, he stalls his self-employed retail business which he otherwise manages on the side of his regular job. In this case, too, the husband feels that he has all the strength which he needs, and his wife is convinced that they are back to normal, that the illness phase is over. Negative e&dquo;ffects on the children are not reported (19 months
a
documented).
Cases No. 27 and No. 60 represent ideal types or &dquo;pure&dquo; opposite versions of patient career. This may be learned from the following overview contrasting their analytically relevant characteristics.
The other
at all. Case 27
reason
cases
contain these elements in lesser
epitomizes how the husbands
secure
degree or not job is the
why the couple chooses home dialysis, and how this, in turn, him to improve his occupational position. The choice of main treatment type (D-pattern), therefore, occurs as an outflow of his occupational orientation. This ideal-type case shows a career where occupational choice is primary and treatment choice is secondary. The family rehabilitation is male-dominated (M), which facilitates that the longterm treatment pattern chosen is the dialysis pattern (D). The resultant career type may be called the M-D-career. Other cases are more or less similar to case No. 27: most of these who initially adopt a D-type treatment also have M-type family rehabilitation; but none manages a veritable occupational
helps
promotion.
Case No. 60, on the other hand, epitomizes a different kind of orientation. Although the couple dialyses at home until month 17, the wife starts full-time employment in month 8. Eventually, the patient successfully receives a transplant, and they retain their
companionship (dual-career) - transplant - career ever after. Here, kept constant but is improved in its own right. Consequently, the patients ability to work is improved subsequent to his transplant whereupon he adds two realms of activities to his occupational work.
treatment choice is not
112
Case 60 is
cases are
C-T-case that also manages
a career.
Other C-T-
not
transplant as therapy in order

(whether
or
necessarily career cases. Mostly these patients seek a early as possible after their onset of renal replacement
to not
improve their chances
on
the labour market
they are unemployed). Upon successful transplantation they frequently become more successful in their occupations, either finding a better job or doing better in their previous jobs (however, by far not every transplant is successful). The couples in these cases are frequently companionship marriages.
A is No. 35 whose full case reconstruction was shown fraction of (eventual) C-T-cases, wives are breadwinners initially, often until their husbands obtain a transplant, and
case
in
point
a
above. In
subsequently
the patients join their wives on the labour market (which renders the couples family rehabilitation dual-career).
Case-pattern explanation
Now the
question
emerge? The
which these
are
answer
is asked, how do these biographical patterns must be sought in conditions or contexts out of
biographical patterns develop. That is, the antecedents sought which in these cases facilitate or jeopardize the development of a certain case in the direction of one of the two main
(M-D-Career, and C-T-Career).
careers
Our hypotheses derive from the ideal-type cases No. 27 and No. 60. One of these hypotheses will be discussed here in some detail. It ventures that the facilitating context for D-careers is upperclass socio-economic status and the facilitating condition is age at onset of over 35 years, whereas the facilitating context for T-careers is lower-class status and the facilitating condition is age not over 35 years.
Tables 4 and 5 offer some evidence which clarifies the These tables show the case numbers which cases mentioned in the case reconstructions above.
relationship further. help to identify the
Table 4 shows that first-choice D-pattem treatment is not particularly facilitated by social class, but it is helped by age. Patients who are aged over 35 years are three times as likely than those aged under 35 years to be offered longterm dialysis. Table 5 shows, however, that class is antecedent for eventual transplantation. Patients in classes III/IV aged under 35 years are three times as likely than patients in classes 1/11 to have been transplanted by t4 (2nd follow-up). For those aged over 35 years, the
113
chance is lower but it still is
nearly
twice that of
upper-class
patients.
Cases in D-pattems and T-pattems can be understood their likelihood to belong to a certain occupational (socialclass) context, and through their (age) characteristic which is a facilitating condition &dquo;triggering off a certain course of events or experiences. Case-pattern explanation is based on ideal-type case construction. In our study, it focuses on the idea of career, and ideal types are identified as patient-career cases. On an explanatory plane, the case pattern analysis shows that D-pattems are typical for the upper age groups, and T-patterns are reached more easily in lower-class cases.
through
Process-pattern explanation
explanation organizes the evidence in our study epitomized by two career versions), process-pattern explanation uses another principle of
Whereas case-pattern
to
regard
ideal-type
cases
(in
Verstehen. It refers to Webers idea that the reference level of explanation is a notion of rationality. Process-pattem explanation &dquo;constructs&dquo; an &dquo;operational&dquo; notion of rationality and uses it as a &dquo;measure&dquo; to understand case dynamics on a comparative basis.
In our study, we hypothesized that the most rational combination of statuses for a patient was also the one which allowed for his optimal survival - that is, not only his physical longevity but also his survival as a social being appeared optimal when he combined being alive with full-time employment and a functioning transplant. Such rationality was termed &dquo;survival rationality&dquo;, and it was operationalized through three criteria for the cases. They were (a) alive after 9-12 years of end-stage renal disease treatment, (b) successfully transplanted (i.e. at least six months posttransplant after which time rejection of the graft becomes somewhat less likely), and (c) patients full-time employment (as measured at t2). Four groups were formed among survivors, namely, (A) those who never were transplanted (until t6) and never (until t2) managed the patients employment, (B) those who never were transplanted where the latter was achieved, (C) those (eventually) attaining a transplant but not (until t2) the patients full-time return to work, and (D) those achieving both. Among these four subgroups, group D represents the survival-optimal type of patient biography. For each of the four subgroups, devided by survivors and non-survivors, the average length of time of post-onset survival was calculated. Table 6 shows that survival-rationality of case characteristics means more longevity even for those who eventually died.
114
case
Another striking fact could also be found when looking at the dynamics of subgroups A-C as compared with subgroup D. Not
did patients with (eventual) survival-rational case characteristics attain improved longevity (Table 6): but over time more and more patients among the survivors managed to also obtain a survival-rational employment-treatment combination. Figure 1 shows, in terms of number of patients, that the ratio between group D and groups A-C was 1:2.5 at tl, it was 1:1.1 at t3, and eventually it was 1:0.7 at t5.
only
In other words, the process pattern of longterm coping with end-stage renal failure (up to twelve years of renal-replacement therapy) shows attainment of both full-time employment and functioning transplant for a growing proportion of those who live that long. The analytical design was such that employment as elicited at t2 was used as a predictor on a case basis of eventual attainment of a transplant as a biographical perspective for t6, or t5 respectively. More and more patients managed to reach the goal. The criteria for optimal-survival rationality were best met by a case which also near-optimized the criteria of employment, fmancial situation, marital accord, and childrens lack of problems. The case that met these criteria was case No. 53. Its use as an explanatory device to understand the longterm process pattern of survival under an analytical perspective of &dquo;survival rationality&dquo; is here not
demonstrated further.
To sumnarize: Process-pattern explanation wishes to identify process patterns which can be found in the entire range of cases as they develop over time. These patterns may be visible at the point of onset, or they may develop over time as a longterm perspective. An &dquo;operational&dquo; definition of &dquo;survival rationality&dquo; helped to set the
frame for the case explanation focusing on the longterm coping pattern process. It was found that more and more cases developed in the direction of the rational optimal solution. In this way, the empirical biographies moved in the direction of the rational process
pattern.
Case
explanation
A short word may be said about how case explanation functions. To be sure, case explanation that is directed at a particular case may be what Weber had in mind when he suggested that cultural phenomena (Kutturerschetnungen) were the true object of ideal-type sociological explanation.
115
In contradistinction to this focus on the individual, it may be remarked that modem sociology is more interested in the typical than in the individual phenomenon. Indeed, individual observations or cases are often rejected as pre-scientific evidence. They are said not to be explicable in terms of the representative pattern relationship between factors usually found in social research. In contrast, ideal-type analysis suggests that individual case explanation should be an element of, and compatible with, pattern explanation. At least, case explanation should be generalizable into, but at the same time distinguishable from, explanation of the pattern to which the case(s) belong(s). This has not been done so far, but an effort might be made here to envisage how one can understand the specifity of individual case dynamics as a deviation from what is typical in the patterns which are being analysed. A brief documentation may illustrate what a case explanation be like when conducted as a part of an ideal-type analysis.
can
The case which I wish to explain is case No. 35; its case reconstruction was given above. It is here held against case No. 53 which is the ideal-type case for &dquo;survival-optimal rationality&dquo; (in our data material it is even the only case combining upper-class socioeconomic status (class 1/11) with dual-career marital set-up
(companionship family rehabilitation), and an eventual successful transplant subsequent to uneventful home dialysis). This is the only upper-class case with a C-T-pattern: It combines the typical strength of the working-class cases (i.e., companionship marriage) with the typical strength of the upper-class cases (i.e., financial affluence and high security of employment).
Case
no.
53s
case
reconstruction shows the
following:
Case 53 (social class 11) is a 42-year-old office manager who his job a few months prior to discovering that he was in renal fai.lure and soon would have to go on dialysis. One month before he goes on hospital dialysis, he finds a new job as office manager in a different industrial branch, which he reduces to part-time work for 3 months and resumes full-time after hauing gone on night dialysis. After 8 months, he begins to dialyse at home with his wife who does not intem.~pt her work as a fuU-time secretary to the president of a merchant bank. They decide to fi.t the home dialysis in with the housework which they have done together for nearly 20 years after lost work and on weekends. Their son who has been educated at a Public School finishes school in the first year of his fathers treatment and goes on to University (with the patient being disappointed that he is not accepted for Cambridge). In order to house the dialysis room, they build an extension to the house for which the bank where the wife works gives them a mortgage on very low interest. Both spouses
116
find home dialysis
than the national average salary each. They burden because they have incorporated it into their joint domestic chores on 3 days of the week (29 months documented). In month 62, the patient receives a cadaver-donor transplant which has been successful until the lastfoUow-up at month
continue to
earn more
no
132).
To compare the cases No. 53 and No. 35 can, first, be directed the question whether (and, if yes, why) No. 35 is less survivalprone than No. 53. The answer requires that the criteria for survivalrationality are recollected; they are: (a) alive at t6, (b) successfully transplanted at t6, and (c) fully employed at t2. A comparison between cases No. 53 and No. 35 reveals that all three criteria are met by both cases. Indeed, case No. 35 meets these criteria already at 37 months after onset. This suggests that the peculiarity of case No. 35 is primarily not related to its survival rationality: Case No. 35 is far from survival-irrational.
by
The four criteria which define the ideal-type case of patient are a second basis for a case explanation which yields interesting results. As criteria were stated: (a) job promotion of at least one spouse, (b) financial improvement and security, (c) marital satisfaction, and (d) absence of childrens problems. In case No. 53, criteria (b) - (d) are met, and regarding the occupational situation (criterion a), the patient solves a crisis prior to onset by finding a
career
job that equals the one which he lost shortly before. (This case disqualifies as one of ideal type for patient career only because none of the spouses is, in fact, promoted). In case No. 35, however, the patients job situation is threatened most of the time throughout the
new
first three years after treatment onset, and he can at best work parttime. The marriage is severely jeopardized, and it eventually ends in separation at the end of the observation period (therefore, criteria (a) and (c) for a patient career are not met at all). As regards the two other criteria, there are vast differences between the cases. Criterion (b) refers to income. The financial situation in case No. 53 is such that each spouse alone earns more than the average British income, whereas in case No. 35 both spouses together earn less than the average family income which often is earned by one wage earner alone. Therefore, criterion (b) is only occasionally and poorly met in case No. 35 although the couple manages to avoid serious debt. They continuously are in financial trouble but they scrape through somehow. With regard to the children (criterion d), the wife in case No. 35 begins to fear that one of the children has inherited her husbands (the patients) disease - which is not unlikely, and she resents this tremendously. The
point where
something
case No. 35 is unique, however, concerns else. The wife experiences a serious psychological crisis.
117
It happens after she complains to a national tabloid newspaper about the local social security offices stubborn refusal to help out with a loan when clients wish to avoid going on supplementary benefit. She ends up being targeted in a nationwide press campaign. After a period of harassment from various sources, she has a nervous breakdown while her husband refuses to stand by her. This crisis period is possibly the turning point when the marriage deteriorates sharply, or the crisis reveals that the spouses are unable to cope together with the dire consequences of the patients disease and treatment.
What makes case No. 35 tragic is that the crisis is selfinflicted which develops into the marital breakdown. What makes case No. 35 admirable is that after their separation, subsequent to the patients eventual second transplant which is successful, both spouses find new partners and &dquo;live better ever after&dquo;. This case explanation may serve as an example of how the individual case often represents chance and unforeseen hazards. These emerge as specific when the case is held against the ideal-type case. Such irrational elements, to be sure, explain the case by just as Weber making understandable its unique dynamics
---
suggested.
CONCLUDING REMARK
This long article was meant to give a short overview over what ideal-type analysis is, how it is grounded in Webers works and how it may be used in qualitative data interpretation.
Maybe I should have written a book about the topic instead of compelling the reader to find his or her way through the meanders of this long articles argument. But since Karl van Meter (whom I owe profound thanks for it) encouraged me to write a long article instead of the book which might be more comprehensive, but, alas,
so
far has not been written, the choice
was
between silence and this
long and at the same time short text. It tries to account as clearly as possible for the steps of the methodology before it describes the
method and its
use.
The article starts out with Webers thoughts on &dquo;objectivity&dquo; and his triple original presentation of the ideal-type idea, then it progresses to how Webers methodology implies three steps of a method of concept construction for historical data, and from there it continues with an outline of ideal-type analysis as a method of qualitative data interpretation. Then, after this more or less abstract
118
over the method and its background has been given, the article goes on to illustrate the merits of the method. Empirical data were here re-interpreted which were part of my study on Patient Careers in End-Stage Renal Failure conducted in England in the 1970s-1980s. My second study (conducted 1987-1993 in Germany) which also used the ideal-type method for data analysis would have been fruitful to use as a further example of how the different kinds of explanation &dquo;work&dquo;. But, alas, it appeared that the article was already rather long as it is. So the reader may have to wait for the book on the study which should be compiled in the not too distant future (in German).
overview
of Weberian
&dquo;naive
Ideal-type analysis, I hope, is now visible as a useful extension methodology into a method for qualitative data
is
one promising way to both avoid the trap of (Adomo 1957) and nevertheless &dquo;learn from empiricism&dquo; strangers&dquo; (Weiss 1994).
interpretation. It
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to thank Ralf Kramer for his
our
helpful
discussions and
thoughtful suggestions.
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(1983):
in
Gerhardt, Uta (1984): Typenkonstruktion bei Patientenkarrieren. In: Martin Kohli and Gûnter Roberts (eds): Biographie und Soziale Wirklichkeit. Stuttgart: Metzler, 55-77.
Gerhardt,
Uta
(1985):
Erzâhldaten
und
Hypothesenkonstruktion: überlegungen zum Gûltigkeitsproblem in der biographischen Sozialforschung. Kôlner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 43, 230-256.
Gerhardt, Uta (1986a):
Patientenkarrieren.
Eine
medizin-
soziologische
Konstruktion
Studie. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Gerhardt, Uta (1986b): Verstehende Strukturanalyse: Die

von Idealtypen als Analyseschritt bei der Auswertung qualitativer Forschungsmaterialien. In: Hans-Georg Soeffner (ed): Sozialstruktur und soziale Typik. Frankfurt: Campus, 31-83.
Gerhardt, Uta (1986c): Treatment Careers and Long-Term

Survival in End-Stage Renal Failure. Vol. 15 (No. 4), 189-194.
Dialysis
and
Transplantation,
120
Gerhardt, Uta (1988): Qualitative Sociology in the Federal Republic of Germany. Qualitative Sociology , Vol. 11, 29-43.
Gerhardt, Uta (1990): Patient Careers in End-Stage Renal Failure. Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 30, 1211-1224.
Gerhardt, Uta (1991a): Idealtypische Analyse von Statusbiographien bei chronisch Kranken. In: Gerhardt, Uta: Gesellschaft und Gesundheit, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 9-60. Gerhardt,
Uta
(1991b):
Handlungsrationalitât und das Problem Gesellschaft und Gesundheit, 61-87.

Survival in
Chronische der sozialen
Erkrankung:
Pathologie.
In:
Gerhardt, Uta (1991c): Family Rehabilitation and Longterm
End-Stage
Renal Failure. In:
Gary Albrecht and
Judith
Levy (eds): Advances in Medical Sociology, Vol. 2: Chronic Illness. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 205-244.
Gerhardt, Uta (1992a): Frûhberentung und Handlungsrationalität. Zur Statusdynamik der Rehabilitation der Arbeiter nach koronarer Bypassoperation. Soziale Welt, Vol. 43, 422-448.
nach koronarer 243-254.
Gerhardt, Uta (1992b): Alternsdynamik und Rehabilitation Bypassoperation. Zeitschrift für Gerontologie, Vol. 25, Gerhardt, Uta (1992c): The relationship between medical and
occupational
patients
ten years
Open-Heart
rehabilitation in two cohorts of coronary artery bypass apart. In: Paul J. Walter (ed): Quality of Life After Surgery. Dordrecht: Klüwer, 215-226.
(forthcoming): Narratives of Normality: EndFailure Patients Experience Their Transplant Option. In: Simon Williams and Michael Calnan (eds): Modem Medicine: Lay Perspectives and Experiences. London: UCL Press.
Gerhardt, Uta
Stage Renal
Gerhardt, Uta, and Marianne Brieskorn-Zinke (1986): The Normalization of Hemodialysis at Home. In: Julius A. Roth and Sheryl B. Ruzek (eds): Research in the Sociology of Health Care, Vol. 4: The Adoption and Social Consequences of Medical Technologies. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 271-317.
Gerhardt, Uta, Bernhard Borgetto, and Beate Rockenbauch
(1993): Aortokoronarer Venenbypass und Rûckkehr zur Arbeit. Endof-Grant report, German National Research Foundation, project No.
Ge 313/5 (1035 pp.,
unpublished).
121
Gerhardt, Uta, and Klaus Kirchgâssler (1986): Validity in Qualitative Research. Paper presented Congress of Sociology, New Delhi (unpublished). Gerhardt, Uta,
and
The Problem of at XIth World
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de carrières de
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the
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in
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Fragestellung. Tûbingen:
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of the
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Berkeley: University
Oevermann, Ulrich, Tilman Allert, Elisabeth Konau, and
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Schmidt, Gert (1980): Max Webers Beitrag
Industrieforschung.
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für
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

122
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in Social Science and Social In: Max Weber: The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Policy. Translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: Free Press 1949, 50-112.
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Sociology.
Weber, Max (1917): Science as a Vocation. In: Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds): From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press. Weber, Max (1922): Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.
New York: Bedminster Press 1968.
Weiss, Robert S. (1994): Learning from Strangers. The Art and Method of Qualitative Interview Studies. New York: Free Press.
Table 1:
Proportion
of
patients
on
four
types
and
of treatment
(total patient
at
population points
in
in the United
Kingdom
study population
various
tiae)
* Data
received Downloaded four out of five treatment from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on Marchhospitals. 11, 2013 only from
p. 123
Table
2:
Number
of
cases
in
biographies
class
among survivors at
empirical types of treatment three points in time, by social
(N=63)
124 Bulletin de MEthodobgie Sociologiqru (59 rue Pouchet, F 75017 Paris), December 1994, N. 45
125
Table
4:
Social class and age at onset for

case
cases
with initial
D-patfiern treatment, by
numbers
(N=45)
Social class and age at onset for cases with eventual T-pattern treatment, until t4, by case numbers (N=33)
Table 5:
126 -
Table 6:
Average
Survival
Status
Follow-up Survival
(N
Length 68)
(Months)
by Subgroup and
Figure
1:
Number of
cases
with
Optimal-Survival
and All Other
Outcomes Over
7-year Follow-up Period

Bulletin de Méthodologie Sociologique-1994-Gerhardt-74-126

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>> Version of Record - Dec 1, 1994

Lutilisation de la des donn&eacute;es - un

supposedly manages portrayed in the data.

to understand the social

lOntrihl1tion from thp rp~p~rlhpr thp ~l1hipltivp &dquo;rtpfjnitinn~ of thp

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Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

laws of economic motivation

Boehm-Bawerk, Carl Menger): the latter showed, for instance, how

and the cultural

contemporary manifestations and

the other the not otherwise&dquo;

manifestation of wider institutional structural

Empirical phenomena was

related. Weber gave

in research made social events

society which is organized

vantage point, he clarified that Verstehen

This related to the

of social action in the two

explicated in the earlier essay on sociology. He now stated decisively:

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

what was if only by

STEPS OF WEBERIAN METHODOLOGY

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

(1) Comprehensiveness of knowledge grounds

the arbitrariness of the formation of ideal types. He writes:

phenomenon itself. (1952:85).

(2) Identifying indispensable elements and eliminating others

anticipations derived from his ideal-type conjectures. So the

therefore, concerns experiment makes

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

(3) Verification in social-historical reality

verification, Henrich takes

Webers intention was to to be done by retrospective

type with observed

individual cultural events

understood with the

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

THE METHODOLOGY OF IDEAL-TYPE ANALYSIS

these Weberian ideas enter into and be useful for

modern-type qualitative research?

&dquo;statistically described and phenomena&dquo; which Weber invoked.

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this vantage point,

the methodology proposed by satisfactory. It starts with a clear

procedure which obscures the theorys&dquo; first analytical steps

which needs to be introduced in order to

appreciate the value of Webers work for modem qualitative research

generally biographical patterns

connected with but also

partly goes beyond

dynamics concerning development.

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

Stage 2.2: Case abstraction (&dquo;pure&dquo; cases)

and the construction

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

Downloaded from bms.sagepub.com at UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL on March 11, 2013

(high vs. low), occupational

is followed for each of the different

degrees, for less than typical case conditions.

of type Verstehen. The

Lutilisation de la des données - un

Idealtypus für die Geschichtswissenschaft.

Handlungsrationalitât und das Problem Gesellschaft und Gesundheit, 61-87.

Klaus Kirchgâssler (1987): Analyse patients. Sciences Sociales et Santé, Vol.

Kölner Zeitschrift Vol. 32, 76-92.