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CARINO VS CHR Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power to investigate FACTS: Some 800 public

school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE:

Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. Investigate vs. Adjudicate "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to

discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

CATURA V COURT OF INDUSTRIALRELATIONS37 SCRA 303FERNANDO: January 30. 1971 NATURE: Petition for review FACTS: On December 27, 1966, a complaint againstPablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the Presidentand Treasurer, respectively, of the PhilippineVirginia Tobacco Administration E mployeesAssociation, a legitimate labor organization dulyregistered was filed by the prosecution divisiono f t h e r e s p o n d e n t C o u r t , t h e p r i n c i p a l complainants being now resp ondent Celestino T a b a n i a g a s w e l l a s o t h e r e m p l o y e e s constituting more than ten percent of the entiremembership of such labor organization. In the complaint, it was charged that during thetenure of office of petitioners before us as suchPresident and Treasurer, they were responsiblefor "unauthorized disbursement of union funds"with complainants on various occasions duringthe latter part of 1966 demanding from them "af u l l a n d d e t a i l e d r e p o r t o f a l l f i n a n c i a l transaction of the union and to make the book of a c c o u n t s a n d o t h e r r e c o r d s o f t h e f i n a n c i a l activities of the union open to inspection by themembers," only to be met with a refusal on theirpart to comply. It was further asserted that the executive boardof such labor organization passed a resolutioncalling for a general membership meeting sothat petitioners could be confronted about thestatus of union funds, but then, Pablo Catura, asPresident, cancelled such meeting. There was thereafter a general membershipresolution reiterating previous demands "for af u l l a n d d e t a i l e d r e p o r t o f a l l f i n a n c i a l transactions of the union," but again there wasno response, thus compelling the members torefer the matter to the Department of Laborw h i c h d u l y i s s u e d s u b p o e n a s f o r t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s u c

h b o o k o f a c c o u n t s t o petitioners without any success. After settingf o r t h t h a t c o m p l a i n a n t s h a d e x h a u s t e d a l l remedies provided in the union's constitutiona n d b y laws, which were all unavailing, thec o m p l a i n t s o u g h t , a f t e r d u e h e a r i n g a n d judgement, to declare present petitioners, asrespondents, guilty of unfair labor practice underthe above provision of the Industrial Peace Act,f o r t h e m t o c e a s e a n d d e s i s t f r o m f u r t h e r c o m m i t t i n g s u c h u n f a i r l a b o r p r a c t i c e complained of, and to render a full and detailedreport of all financial transactions of the union aswell as to make the book of accounts and otherr e c o r d s o f t h e s e f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t i e s o p e n t o inspection by the members On December 28, 1966, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members, as petitionersi n t h e a b o v e c o m p l a i n t b e f o r e r e s p o n d e n t s C o u r t , s o u g h t a n i n j u n c t i o n t o p r e v e n t n o w petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, wasagain elected as President in an election onNovember 15, 1966, from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged persistence in theabuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a fulland detailed report of all financial transactionsof the union Then came the order of December 29, 1966, byA s s o c i a t e J u d g e J o a q u i n M . S a l v a d o r w h i c h , instead of granting the injunction sought, limiteditself to requiring and directing "personally therespondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador,president and treasurer, respectively, of theP h i l i p p i n e V i r g i n i a T o b a c c o A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit tot h i s C o u r t a l l t h e s a i d A s s o c i a t i o n ' s b o o k o f accounts, bank accounts, pass books, unionfunds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union atthe hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967. T her e w as a mo t i o n f o r r e co nsi d er at i o n on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Caturaand Luz Salvador on the ground that they werenot heard before such order was issued, whichmoreover in their opinion was beyond the powerof r esp ond ent C ou r t . Wi t h Asso ci at e Ju d ge Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order wassustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. The petition was given due course by this Courti n a r e s o l u t i o n o f A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 6 7 w i t h a preliminary injunction ISSUE: W O N r esp on dent C our t , i n t he exer ci se of i t s power of investigation to assure compliance withthe internal labor organization procedures underSection 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can requirea labor organization's "books of accounts, bankacc ou nt s, p ass boo ks , uni o n f un ds, r e cei p t s, vouchers and other documents related to [its]finances" be delivered and deposited with it at theh e a r i n g t o c o n d u c t s u c h i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n accordance with a complaint duly filed without theofficials of such labor organization, therein namedas respondents and petitioners before us, beingheard prior to the issuance of such order. HELD: YES Reasoning The controlling provisions of law to the specificsituation before this Court concerning the powerof investigation of respondent Court to assurecompliance with internal labor organizationprocedures with

the corresponding authority toinvestigate to substantiate alleged violationsmay be found in paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. Thus:"The members shall be entitled to full anddetailed reports from their officers andrepresentatives of all financial transactions asprovided in the constitution and by-laws of theorganization." ... "The funds of the organizationshall not be applied for any purpose or objectother than those expressly stated in itsconstitution or by-laws or those expresslyauthorized by a resolution of the majority of themember." ... "The books of accounts and otherrecords of the financial activities of a legitimatelabor organization shall be open to inspection byany officer or member thereof." The complaint before respondent Court againstpetitioners as President and Treasurer of theunion, specifically recited an unauthorizeddisbursement of union funds as well as thefailure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to makethe book of accounts and other records of itsfinancial activities open to inspection by themembers. Clearly, the matter was deemedserious enough by the prosecutor of respondentCourt to call for the exercise of the statutorypower of investigation to substantiate thealleged violation so as to assure that the rightsand conditions of membership in a labororganization as specifically set forth in Section17 be respected. On its face, it cannot be saidthat such a requirement is beyond the statutorypower conferred. The power to investigate, to be conscientiousand rational at the very least, requires an inquiryinto existing facts and conditions. Thedocuments required to be produced constitutesevidence of the most solid character as towhether or not there was a failure to complywith the mandates of the law. It is not for thisCourt to whittle down the authority conferred onadministrative agencies to assure the effectiveadministration of a statute, in this case intendedto protect the rights of union members againstits officers. The matter was properly within itscognizance and the means necessary to give itforce and effectiveness should be deemedimplied unless the power sought to be exercisedis so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showinghas been made; no such showing can be made.

G.R. No. L-17778

November 30, 1962

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitioner-appellant, vs. ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee. City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. for petitioner-appellant. Armando Ramos for and in his own behalf as respondent-appellee. REGALA, J.: On February 3, 1960, the Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee. It appears that the committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it on June 3, 8, 9, 15 and 16 and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but that Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly served, refused to appear. Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It also held that to compel Ramos to testify would be to violate his right against self-incrimination. It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above. The trial court held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the

administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court. The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (People v. Mendoza; People v. Dizon, 49 O. G. No. 2, 541.) Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows: Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character. Saving the provisions of section one hundred and two of this Act, any one who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued under the authority of the preceding paragraph or who, appearing before any individual or body exercising the power therein defined, refuses to make oath, give testimony, or produce documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as in case of contempt of court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in question shall be dealt with by the judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the case in the manner provided by law. One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., 87 Phil. 100.) Now, what authority to take testimony does petitioner's committee have from which the power to cite witnesses may be implied, pursuant to section 580? To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials of employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition and We held so in the case of Pagkanlungan v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. No. 10, p. 4332. But We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus, in denying this power to an investigating body in the Office of the Mayor of Manila, We said in Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra: "Were do not think the mayor (of Manila) can delegate or confer the powers to administer oaths, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas." Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city officers and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute grants a right, it also confers by implication every particular power necessary for the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the argument. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here, We have seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner's committee. In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. (Francia v. Pecson, et al., supra.) Lastly, 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act

because necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for Us to pass upon the other error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly committed by the trial court. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99Topic under:IV. Investigatory PowersD. Importance of administrative investigationsE. Executive power to investigate, source Facts : Evalengista, petitioner, is head of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and GovernmentOperations (PARGO) created by Executive Order No. 4, which, among others, provides: The agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum , administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. Respondent Manalastas (Asst. City Public Service Officer of Manila) was issued a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness at the office of the PARGO to testify in a certaininvestigation pending therein. Instead of obeying it, he filed a petition with the CFI of Manila forprohibition, certiorari and restraining order assailing its legality. Judge Jarencio issued a restrainingorder. Hence, this action. Issue : WON the PARGO enjoys the authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of fact-finding investigation Held : YES(1) Agency is with authority to enforce subpoenas issued. Rightly, administrative agencies may enf orcesubpoenas issued in the course of investigations, WON adjudication is involved, and WON probablecause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is enough that the investigation be for alawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove apending charge, but upon which to make one if discovered evidence so justifies. Because judicial poweris reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations, itdoes not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry (2) Authority delegated by statute . The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case of controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicionthat the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigativeand accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it too may take steps toinform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.In sum, it may be stated that the subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is:(a) within the authority of the agency(b) the demand is not too indefinite (c) the information is reasonable relevant (3) Information sought reasonably relevant to the investigations . There is no doubt tha t the fact-findinginvestigations being conducted by the PARGO upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Govt of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the PARGOs sphere of authority and..

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners. Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3 b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandumcommanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt

proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6 As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoenaduces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15 Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22 There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination. A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35 Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result. Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring: The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion. 1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt

Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy. 2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers." 1 While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges", 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4 Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration." All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas

(and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.) Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of ablanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him. Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives shouldnot be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. "" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City. The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence. Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas. The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13 There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand. I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., concurring: The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion. 1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy. 2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers." 1 While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges", 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4 Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration." All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.) Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of ablanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him. Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives shouldnot be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. "" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment." That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City. The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence. Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to

take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas. The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13 There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand. I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000)


FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television 4. False statement or entries 5. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents.

The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein and present their side. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time (summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. 2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON there is any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake if our governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.