Presidential Commission on Good Government v. The Hon.

Sandiganbayan February 23, 2000 Piercing Veil of Corporate Fiction to recover Ill-Gotten Wealth Facts: World Universal Trading & Investment Co., S.A. *WUTIC( was a sociedad anonima registered in Panama but not licensed to do business in the Philippines. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, now known as Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC) is duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. PCGG ordered the sequestration and provisional takeovers against assets and records of Rodolfo Cuenca, Universal Holdings, Cuenca Investment, PNCC and San Mariano Milling Corporation. In 1987 PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Cuenca for illegally acquiring assets in the Cuenca owned corporations of CDCP/PNCC, Asia International Hardwood Limited (AHL), a Hongkong based company and Construction Development Corporation International Limited, Hongkong, a wholly owned subsidiary or alter ego of CDCP/PNCC. In 1991, claiming to be an assignee of AHL, WUTIC filed with the RTC against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgement which WUTIC had obtained in Hongkong against CDCPI, which is wholly owned by CDCP/PNCC. After trial, the RTC found in favor of WUTIC, it considered CDCP/PNCC and CDCPI as one corporate entity and liable to pay WUTIC. CDCP/PNCC appealed, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and the Supreme Court denied it on petition for review. Upon motion of WUTIC, the RTC issued a writ of execution and Sheriff Harina issued notices of garnishment against the accounts, shares of stocks and income of CDCP/PNCC with various banks and corporations. In October 197, PCGG Commissioner Mendoza attended the PNCC board meeting and discovered the writ and notices of garnishment. After realizing that WUTIC/AHLs claim could be Cuencas in disguise, PCGG enjoined ONCC and/or any person acting in its behalf from taking any action which would dissipate or affect the assets of CDCP/PNCC. PCGG filed for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan to annul the RTC decision, writ and garnishment. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition ruling that it had not jurisdiction to annul the judgement of the RTC. It claimed to have only appellate

jurisdiction over decisions of the RTC in criminal cases involving offenses relating to public office. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari despite the possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation or an alter ego of Rodolfo Cuenca. Held: The 3 corporations involved in this petition, PNCC/CDCP, AHL and CDCPI, Hongkong are under sequestration are defendants in the sequestration case pending before the Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims against CDCPI and assigned the same to WUTIC. Eventually WUTIC obtained a favorable judgement in a Hongkong court. Due to the closure of CDCPI in Hongkong, WUTIC filed a case with RTC against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign judgement obtained against CDCPI. Both corporations are Cuenca-owned and under sequestration. Hence there is valid ground for PCGG to evaluate the validity of WUTICs claim as a legitimate assignee or merely a dummy corporation set up to circumvent the sequestration case. As per the Court, it should be noted that despite the initial sequestration orders and the case filed with the Sandiganbayan against stockholdings of Rodolfo Cuenca and th so-called Cuenca-owned corporations, AHL, ONCC/CDCP and CDCPI, the PCGG was not made a party in the civil case in Hongkong and the case to enforce the foreign judgement filled with the trial court. Considering the interconnections between the participating corporations in the said transactions and the existence of the sequestration case, the PCGG should have been informed of the above cases to question and verify the veracity of the claim. The Court stated that it is aware of various schemes employed to circumvent sequestration orders, dissipate sequestered assets and thwart PCGGs efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth. That there is a possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation formed by Rodolfo Cuenca, or his alter ego, the reach the sequestered assets, there is a need to vigorously guard these assets and preserve them pending resolution of the sequestration case before the Sandiganbayan. TTY. GOROSPE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ONGOOD GOVERNMENT andMAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, inhis capacity as CHAIRMAN thereof vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICECOHOLDINGS, N.V.

FACTS:On 7 April 1986, in connection with criminalproceedings initiated in the Philippines tolocate, sequester and seek restitution of alleged illgotten wealt h amassed by theMarcoses and other accused from the Philippine Government,1the Office of theSolicitor Gener al (OSG) wrote the FederalOffice for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting assistance for the latter office to:(a) ascertain and provide the OSG withinformation as to where and in which cantonsthe ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and otheraccused are located, the names of thedepositors a nd the banks and the amountsinvolved; and (b) take necessary precautionarymeasures, such as sequestration, to freeze theassets in order to preserve their existing valueand prevent any further transfer thereof (herein referred to as the IMAC request). TheOffice of the District Attorney in Zurich,pursuant to the OSGs request, issued an Orderdirecting the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freezethe accounts of the accused.

government of another country." We disagree.The parameters of the use of the act of state doctrine were clarified in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.

There, the U.S. SupremeCourt held that international law does notrequi re the application of this doctrine nor doesit forbid the application of the rule even if it isclaimed that the act of state in questionviolated international law. Moreover, due to thedoctrines peculiar nation-to-nation character,in practice the usual method for an individualto seek relief is to exhaust local remedies andthen repair to the executive authorities of hisown state to persuade them to champion hisclaim in diplomacy or before an internationaltribunal.

G.R. No. 152318 April 16,2009DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FRTECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT,ET. AL. vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL. FACTS:The governments of the FederalRepublic of Germany and the Republic of thePhilippines ratified an Agreement called SocialHealth Insurance Networking andEmpowerment (SHINE which was designed to"enable Philippine families especially poorones to maintain their health and securehealth care of sustai nable quality." Privaterespondents were engaged as con tractemployees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE.Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumedthe post of S HINE Project Manager.Disagreements eventually arose betweenNicolay and private respondents in matterssuc h as proposed salary adjustments, and thecourse Nicolay was taking in theimplementation of S HINE different from herpredecessors.The dispute culminated in a signed bythe private respondents, addressed to Nicolay,and copies furnished officials of the DOH,Philhe ath, and the director of the Manila officeof GTZ. The letter raised several issues whichprivate respondents claim had been brought upseveral times in the past, but have not beengiven appropriate response.In response, Nicolay wrote each of theprivate respondents a letter, all similarlyworded except for their respective addressees.She informed private respondents that theycould no longer find any

ISSUE: WON the Swiss officials can invokestate immunity from suit.

HELD: NO.The act of state doctrine is one of themethods by which States prevent their nationalcourts from deciding disputes which relate tothe internal affairs of another State, the othertwo being immunity and non-justiciability. It isan avoidance technique that is directly relatedto a States obligation to respect theindependen ce and equality of other States bynot requiring them to submit to adjudication ina national court or to settlement of theirdisputes without their consent. It requires theforum court to exercise restraint in theadjudication of disputes relating to legislativeor other governmental acts which a foreignSta te has performed within its territorial limits.It is petitioners contention that theSandiganbaya n "could not grant or deny theprayers in *Officecos+ complaint without firstexamining and scrutinizing the freeze order of the Swiss officials in the light of the evidence,which however is in the possession of saidofficials" and that it would therefore "sit in judgment on the acts of the

reason to stay withthe project unless ALL of these issues beaddressed immediately and appropriately.Under the foregoing premises andcircumstances, it is now imperative that I amto accept your resignation, which I expect toreceive as soon as possible.Negotiations ensued between privaterespon dents and Nicolay, but for naught. Eachof the private respondents received a letterfrom Nicolay, informing them of the pretermination of their contracts of employmenton the grounds of "serious and grossinsubordination, among others, resulting toloss of confidence and trust."HELD: NO.This self-description of GTZ in its ownofficial website gives further cause for pause inadopting petitioners argument that GTZ isentitled to immunity from suit because it is "animplementing agency." The abovequotedstatement does not dispute thecharacterization of GTZ as an "implementingagency of the Federal Republic of Germany,"yet it bolsters the notion that as a companyorganized under private law, it has a legalpersonality independent of that of the FederalRepublic of Germany.The Court is thus holds and so rulesthat GTZ consistently has been unable toestablish with satisfaction that it enjoys theimmunity from suit generally enjoyed by itsparent country, the Federal Republic of Germany.

the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by a As of the filing of the instantpetition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrenceprocess. The Philippines is not among the 92.Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are eitherimmoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement

Bayan Muna Vs. Romulo Facts:

be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/orbeing at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement from responsibility forunimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering anAmerican ch, asalready discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statuteestablishing the International Criminal Court (ICC

Agreement , virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.The Court isnot persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x . Theagreement is a recognition of to try offenses under its nationalcriminal laws and dispense justice believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americanscommitting high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestlyincorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished inthe Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all theformalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, whatthe Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like theICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With theview we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by bothPhilippine laws and the Rome Statute. CASE DIGEST - AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO Facts: The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).

JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO. The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns. Issues: 1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress 2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition. 3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto. Rulings: The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments

and annexes thereto.

G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary

ROME STATUTE Signing of Treaty vs. Ratification Significance of Ratification Who has power to ratify FACTS: The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The Philippines, through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec. 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners now file this petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate for its concurrence. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute HELD: We rule in the negative. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority inexternal relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The participation of the legislative branch in the treatymaking process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.

constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. ISSUE : Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA. RULING : Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC Case Digest FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002 July 25, 2009 at 12:11 pm (1) FACTS : Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival

against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.

HELD: Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. Facts: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. US 2. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the Attempt to evade or defeat tax Fraud by wire, radio, or television False statement or entries Election contribution in name of another

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. ISSUE: Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively?

3. 4. 5.

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by

the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. Finally, country is bound to Vienna convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Issues: 1. WON private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing Yes. 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, theres an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In

essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to A3 14(1) & (2), as well as A3 7the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent isnt prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summary distraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.

2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec. 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON theres any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights & provisions of RP-US Extradition treaty No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage. Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.

Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007 This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition 1 proceeding.On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kongsigned an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,1997. The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative region, represented bythePhilippineDepartment of Justice The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given theforegoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not aflight risk and should be granted bail.

allowing PCGG to vote 23.9% of the total subscription in ETPI, and (c) directing the amendment of the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of ETPI providing for the minimum safeguards for the conservation of assets prior to the calling of a stockholders meeting. By the assailed Resolution of 13 November 1992, the Sandiganbayan resolved Africa's motion, ordering the conduct of an annual stockholders meeting of ETPI, for 1992. Assailing the foregoing resolution, the PCGG filed before the Supreme Court a petition (GR 107789) for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan Case Digest Republic of the Philippines (Presidential Commission on Good Government) vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: On 7 August 1991, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) stockholders meeting during which a PCGG controlled board of directors was elected. A special stockholders meeting was later convened by the registered ETPI stockholders wherein another set of board of directors was elected, as a result of which two sets of such board and officers were elected. Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI, alleging that the PCGG had since 29 January 1988 been "illegally 'exercising' the rights of stockholders of ETPI," especially in the election of the members of the board of directors, filed a motion before the Sandiganbayan, prayed that said court order the "calling and holding of the Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt's control and supervision and prescribed guidelines." The PCGG did not object to Africa's motion provided that "(1) An Order be issued upholding the right of PCGG to vote all the Class "A" shares of ETPI; (2) In the alternative, in the remote event that PCGG's right to vote the sequestered shares be not upheld, an Order be issued (a) disregarding the Stock and Transfer Book and Booklet of Stock Certificates of ETPI in determining who can vote the shares in an Annual Stockholders Meeting of ETPI, (b)

By Resolution of 26 November 1992, the Supreme Court enjoined the Sandiganbayan from (a) implementing its Resolution of 13 November 1992, and (b) holding the stockholders' meeting of ETPI scheduled on 27 November 1992. On 7 December 1992, Aerocom Investors and Managers, Inc. (AEROCOM), Benito Nieto, Carlos Nieto, Manuel Nieto III, Ramon Nieto, Rosario Arellano, Victoria Legarda, Angela Lobregat, Ma. Rita de los Reyes, Carmen Tuazon and Rafael Valdez, all stockholders of record of ETPI, filed a motion to intervene in GR 107789. Their motion was granted by the Supreme Court by Resolution of 14 January 1993. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the PCGG, in early 1995, filed a "VERY URGENT PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO HOLD SPECIAL STOCKHOLDERS' MEETING FOR [THE] SOLE PURPOSE OF INCREASING [ETPI's] AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK," it claiming that the increase in authorized capital stock was necessary in light of the requirements laid down by Executive Order 109 and Republic Act 7975. By Resolution of 7 May 1996, the Supreme Court resolved to refer the PCGG's very urgent petition to hold the special stockholders' meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution. In compliance therewith, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution of 13 December 1996, granting the PCGG "authority to cause the holding of a special stockholders' meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of increasing ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class 'A' shares of stock." The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors thus authorized the ETPI Chair and Corporate Secretary to call the special stockholders meeting. Notices were sent to those entitled to vote for a meeting on 17 March 1997. The meeting was held as scheduled and the increase in ETPI's authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was

"unanimously approved." On 1 April 1997, Africa filed before the Supreme Court a motion to cite the PCGG "and its accomplices" in contempt and "to nullify the 'stockholders meeting' called/conducted by PCGG and its accomplices," he contending that only this Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. Africa went on to contend that, assuming that the Sandiganbayan had such power, its Resolution of 13 December 1996 authorizing the PCGG to hold the stockholders meeting had not yet become final because the motions for reconsideration of said resolution were still pending. Further, Africa alleged that he was not given notice of the meeting, and the PCGG had no right to vote the sequestered Class "A" shares. A motion for leave to intervene relative to Africa's "Motion to Cite the PCGG and its Accomplices in Contempt" was filed by ETPI. The Supreme Court granted the motion for leave but ETPI never filed any pleading relative to Africa's motion to cite the PCGG in contempt. By Resolution of 16 February 2001, the Sandiganbayan finally resolved to deny the motions for reconsideration of its Resolution of 13 December 1996, prompting Africa to file on 6 April 2001 before the Supreme Court a petition for Review on Certiorari (GR 147214), challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions of 13 December 1996 (authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting to increase ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote therein the sequestered Class "A" shares of stock) and 16 February 2001 (denying reconsideration of the December 13, 1996 Resolution). The petitions were consolidated. Issue: Whether the PCGG can vote the sequestered ETPI Class "A" shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of the board of directors. Whether the Sandiganbayan can order the Division Clerk of Court to call the stockholders meeting and in appointing then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Sabino de Leon, Jr. to control and supervise the same. Held: 1. When sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are shown,

prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public character exception in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares.

2. The Clerk of Court, who is already saddled with judicial responsibilities, need not be burdened with the additional duties of a corporate secretary. Moreover, the Clerk of Court may not have the requisite knowledge and expertise to discharge the functions of a corporate secretary. The case of Board of Directors and Election Committee of SMB Workers Savings and Loan Asso., Inc. v. Tan, etc., et al. (105 Phil. 426 (1959). Vide also 5 Fletcher Cyc Corp (Perm Ed) 2074; 18A Am Jur 2d ) provides a solution to the Sandiganbayan's dilemma of calling a meeting when ETPI had two sets of officers. There, the Supreme Court upheld the creation of a committee empowered to call, conduct and supervise the election of the board of directors. Such a committee composed of impartial persons knowledgeable in corporate proceedings would provide the needed expertise and objectivity in the calling and the holding of the meeting without compromising the Sandiganbayan or its officers. The appointment of the committee members and the delineation of the scope of the duties of the committee may be made pursuant to an agreement by the parties or in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 (Management Committee) of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies insofar as they are applicable. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO, vs. JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Departmentof Finance and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenues.PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., MIGHTY CORPORATION, and JT INTERNATIONAL [G.R. No. 163583. April 15, 2009.] (Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 case)Facts: To implement RA 8240, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, 2 whichclassified the existing brands of cigarettes as those duly registered or active brands prior to January 1, 1997. New brands,or those registered after January 1,

1997, shall be initially assessed at their suggested retail price until such time that theappropriate survey to determine their current net retail price is conducted. In June 2001 British American Tobaccointroduced into the market Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with asuggested retail price of P9.90 per pack. 3 Pursuant to Sec. 145 (c) quoted above, the Lucky Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at P8.96 per pack.On February 17, 2003, Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003, amended Revenue Regulations No. 1-97 by providing, among others, a periodic review every two years or earlier of the current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof forthe purpose of establishing and updating their tax classification. Pursuant thereto, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 5 was issued on March 11, 2003, prescribing the guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail pricesof new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products. Subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003 6 was issued on August 8, 2003 to implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997, based on the survey of their current net retail price. The survey revealed that Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky StrikeLights, and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights, are sold at the current net retail price of P22.54, P22.61 and P21.23, per pack,respectively. Respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue thus recommended the applicable tax rate of P13.44 per pack inasmuch as Lucky Strike's average net retail price is above P10.00 per pack. Thus filed before theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 61, a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1032. Said petition soughtto enjoin the implementation of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 andRevenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and uniformity provi sions of the Constitution. The trial court rendered a deci sionupholding the constitutionality of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 andRevenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 Issue/ Held:

W/N the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution.- NO Ratio: In the instant case, there is no question that the classification freeze provision meets the geographical uniformity requirement because the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in the Philippines. And, for reasons already advertedto in our August 20, 2008 Decision, the four-fold test has been met in the present case. As held in the assailed Decision,the instant case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a fundamental right. Consequently, the rationalbasis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protectionchallenge. It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neitherproceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if thereis any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Under the rationalbasis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving some legitimate State interest.Petitioner's reliance on Ormoc Sugar Co. is misplaced. In said case, the controverted municipal ordinance specifically named and taxed only the Ormoc Sugar Company, and excluded any subsequently established sugar central from itscoverage. Thus, the ordinance was found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because its terms do not apply tofuture conditions as well. This is not the case here. The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all cigarettebrands whether existing or to be introduced in the market at some future time. It does not purport to exempt any brandfrom its operation nor single out a brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes. G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the

Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application. Issue: Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list. Ruling: Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted. Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a violation of the nonestablishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws or by any international laws by which we adhere. VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered withthe SEC for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in thePhilippines during the WWII. They claim that they were comfort women at that time and have greatlysuffered because of that. In 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,and OSG and requested assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers whoordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, the officials declined on that ground that the individual claims had already been satisfied by Japans compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty

of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956 between Japan and the Philippines. The petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. The same was prohibited under the jus cogens normsfrom which no derogation is possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach against the governments obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. In addition, they claim that the Philippine governments acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds for the AWF were contrary to internationallaw. ISSUES: Was the refusal of the Executive Department to espouse petitioners claims against Japan valid? RULING Yes, it was valid. It has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. So much so, the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claim. Given the extraordinary length of time that has lapsed between the treatys conclusion, the Executive Department had the ample time to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. Under international law, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. When this happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the State is the soleclaimant. Therefore, the State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those petitioners will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It is a discretionary power and the exercise of which may be determined by consideration of a political or other nature. Moreover, in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligation of the Philippines, the petitioners failed to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jis cogens prohibitionsat the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo February 18, 2010

already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

FACTS: Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency. Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain G.R. No. 1833591, October 14, 2008 Decision: CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a longstanding armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was

the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Held: The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the nonsigning of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD

can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.