Abortion Author(s): Joseph Margolis Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Oct., 1973), pp.

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ABORTION

JosephMargolis
Temple University

The defense of the practice of abortion taxes our moral sensibilities primarily because of the complexity of the ways in which our view of it is affected by other relatively independent social themes. For instance, if the world's population threatened to multiply dangerously within, say, a generation, then routinized abortion might well be required in the interest of racial survival; and that consideration might well be thought to take precedence over the saving of any random fetus-in any rationally defensible policy. Also, if women could practice abortion easily and effectively by themselves, say, by the use of a preparation available in the supermarket-possibly by a hair spray discovered to have abortive powers-then the very privacy and ease of commission of the act, the difficulty of effective legal constraints, and widespread practice typically without shame or a sense of guilt would probably conspire to make the issue a matter of a woman's right over her own body or a matter of conscience to be decided between herself and her family or loved ones. Or, if fetuses were produced by artificial insemination or even entirely outside the body of a woman, then the recognized planning entailed would probably persuade us both of the ease with which alternative fetuses could be provided and of the general irrelevance of the usual claims of the rights of the fetus in assessing whether the developing embryo is or is not intrinsically acceptable on any given scale; of course, abortion under such circumstances would not at all be open to discussion in terms of women's rights as currently construed by women's lib, that is, in terms of the use of a woman's body. Again, if abortion is seen as a problem because, on some religious view, the unborn fetus cannot be baptized and yet, at some critical point in its development (whether at conception, quickening, birth, or when it is viable), it is said to have an immortal soul and therefore to require baptism, then there is an end to the debate-in the double sense that the faithful have no recourse without a change in theology and those outside the faith can find no common ground for dispute. These considerations show that the currently heated debate about abortion is peculiarly affected by some comparatively temporary and highly change51

52

Ethics

able featuresof population density and growth, technology, and religious influence. This is not to say that it is any the less serious for those features, but rather that it must be faced as an issue for a population neither too large nor too small to affect the form of the question decisively, whose relevant technology and socially endorsed practices have significantly changed in recent years but have yet remained comparatively crude and not abruptly different from what obtained in an earlier age, and whose ethical and religious convictions remainrelevantly divided. Having said this, we may conveniently note that the question of abortion is hardly conceptuallyinterestingin its own right unless we admit that the fetus is a living human being, as yet unborn-redundantly, in this sense, an innocent creature,a creature that has a "right to life" in the sense that to take its life calls for defending reasons, not in the sense that defending reasons are altogether impossibleto provide. This is not to say that there is no morally relevant difference between an unborn fetus and a human infant or a human adult; nor that a fetus is humanin every fair sense of the term; nor that a fetus is a person human or not), that is, a sentient creature capable of using language.' It is only to say that, in taking the life of an unborn fetus, one must consider the Possibilityof defense in terms,minimally,of the fetus's belonging to the human species;that taking the life of another human being calls for ethical defense.2 a good deal of debate about Consequently,though it is obvious that there is~ when, in the developmentalcycle of the fetus, it is appropriateto speak of its being an unborn human being, the issue is not really interesting except insofar as deciding where to draw the line signifies the point at which the important conceptual issues obtain. If, for example, on some doctrinal grounds, it is conceded that the fertilized ovum during the first week following conception is not yet a human being, then abortion cannot be construed in terms of the possibly conflicting rights of a woman and of the human fetus she bears;it would then have to be subsumed,in whatever interestingway may obtain, under categories concerned exclusively with the well-being of the woman or family or race affected, without reference at all to the putative interests of the fetus. It is well known that the most incredible disputes have developed in religious circles-chiefly though not exclusively Roman Catholic, in fact now even among scientists in the biological disciplines-about when precisely we may say that the fetus is a humanbeing.3But, of course, there is no purely scientific
1. See Jonathan Bennett, "Whatever the Consequences,"Analysis 26 (1966): 83102; and Joseph Margolis, Knowledge and Existence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), chap. 8. 2. See Joseph Margolis, Values and Conduct (New York: Oxford University Press; Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1971), chap. 10. 3. See Joseph Fletcher, Medicine and Morals (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), chap. 3; also, Paul Ramsey, "The Morality of Abortion," in Life or Death: Ethics and Options, ed. Daniel H. Labby (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968); Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Norman St. John-Stevas, The Right to Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964).

53 Discussion
basis on which to determine when and when not the fetus is human-and religiously dictated decisions are not open to debate in the usual sense. The fertilized egg, after all, is a fertilized egg produced by two human beings (or, suitable surrogates, if we imagine our technology sufficiently advanced): any self-consistent demarcation line will necessarily be consistent with whatever scientific data we may obtain about such an egg, as long as we do not beg the question. There is no point to the biologist's pronouncing that the fertilized egg at this or that precise stage of development is an unborn human being; his definition is intended to have normative import, in the sense in which the questionof the defense of abortionthereuponobtains,and nothing that he may-discern could not be admitted by another biologist who chose to draw the line at a different point. We may concede that substantivefindings regarding the defensibility of abortion in particular cases will be affected by the admission that we are dealing with an unborn humanbeing, but that is simply to say that the range of relevant ethical reflections will be brought to bear on these or those cases but not, perhaps,on those. Let us agree, then, that the fetus is an unborn human being, in order to see what may be said about the ethically interestingfeaturesof the practice of abortion. One thing is perfectly plain: we cannot, as we now understandthe phenomenon, satisfactorily invoke the so-called Principle of Double Effect,4 that is, the distinction, relative to justifying deliberate acts, between intended and merely foreseen consequences. It cannot convincingly be maintained that, in abortion, the act is designed solely to promote the well-being or life of the mother, when it is merely noted that, in so doing, the life of the fetus will be ended. No, the causal connections are much too explicit and clear: one intends to favor the mother's health or life by taking the life of the fetus. We may still consider its defensibility, but there is no prospect of plausibly claiming that Double Effect relevantly bears on the issue.5It is, of course, conceivable that it could-for instance, if aborting the fetus at given stages of its unborn life might regularly be possible without endangering the fetus at such points (say, through some technological development), then, for the establishedpractice, actually losing the fetus because of complications might be defended on the basis of the Principle of Double Effect; but where it is merely a foregone conclusion and the causal linkage is well-known, it is hopeless to pretend that the death of the fetus is not intended. If, then, the defense of abortion is construed instrumentally, that is, in terms of the well-being or life of the affected mother (conceivably, also, in
4. See the article "Double Effect, Principle of," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1967), 4:1020-22. 5. See the discussion in G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19; Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5-15; Roger Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 67-95; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1971): 47-66; and Bennett.

avoid the questionof the ethical priority of the interestsor rights of the affected parties-say,of the motherand the fetus. It is in this connection that the most importantand the most strenuousclaimsare made about the defensibility of abortionitself. The centralthreadof all the adjustedarguor indefensibility mentsconcernsthe putativeinnocence of the fetus. On the most extreme antiabortionview, given the innocence of the fetus, the deliberateact of ending the life of the fetus is simply murder.6In a word, the argument is that the fetus is a humanbeing and cannot be killed qua innocent.As it stands,on our the argumentis impeccable.But if so, how can abortion possibly assumption, be defended?One considerationis that the principleof innocence is formally vacuous-ratherlike the presumptionof innocence in the law. One cannot, in an ethically defensibleway, take the life of an innocent human being insofar as that humanbeing is innocent and has not behaved in any way that would justify the act: the thesis is tautological.But since the fetus is, in the required other sense,innocent,the defenseof abortionmust be based on considerations than of innocencethat take precedenceover (and in spite of) innocence.The issue, of course, arises in other contexts. Imagine,for example,that a human infant or adult is affected with a deadly diseasethat threatensto wipe out an Surely, it is an eligible arguentirepopulationunlessthe creatureis dispatched. ment to hold that the infant or adult affected ought to be killed to save the lives of the community,without denying the innocenceof the victim: it is not importanthere that the argumentbe decisive,only that it be eligible. For, if it is eligible,then we recognizethe possibilityof defendingthe deliberatetaking of another'slife in spite of innocence, in the sense required.Hence, it is at defendedin spite of the admitted leastpossiblethat abortionbe instrumentally innocenceof the fetus. Second, apart from the act of abortionitself, it is not normallyrelevantto the debatethat the pregnantwoman involved be anything but innocent, in fact as innocent as the unborn fetus. So it may vervewell be that the woman'srights regardinglife and well-being are in some way threatened by the continuedexistenceof the fetus, in spite of the fact that both are innocent;here, the possibilityof a defense begins to take shape. Recently, in Pennsvlvaniaan abortion bill that sought to specify defensible abortionsolely in terms of the continued existence of the fetus's posing a medically confirmed danger to the very life of the mother was defeated. since the bill was vetoed by the governor The standinglaw in Pennsylvania, and not overridden,holds only that illegal abortionscannot be legally performed! It providesno specificationof what is legal or illegal in abortion:the result is that it has been construedin the most liberal terms possible.But the opponentsof existing Pennsylvaniapractice wished to reject rape and incest and the health,well-being, and mere desiresof the mother as possiblegrounds for justifiedabortion.They do not hold that there are absolutely no grounds for defensibleabortion;there is, in fact, hardly anyone today who would deny
6. SeeBennett; Thomson.

single case of ectopic pregnancy makes this quite clear. But very few disputants pay,attentionto the import of the concession.What it actually meansis that the question of innocence is largely irrelevantto the defense of abortion. For, for the usual cases, both the fetus and the mother are innocent and their respective interests or rights, legitimate;also, if abortion is justified or condemned, it will be, in terms of the comparativeranking and importance of those respective rights, without attention to innocence (which may be presupposed). This means that the admissionof a right to abortion where the mother'slife is in dangeraffects all seriousdispute,so that abortion cannot be construedas murder simply becausethe victim is an innocent human being. The thesis has larger implications.To hold that it is indefensibleto take the life of an innocent humanbeing-whether in war, in abortion, in securing public health, or the like-is open to an importantequivocation.Formulated sans phrase, it is, as we have seen, merely tautological;to deny it would be to contradictoneself, but to admitit would not be to precludethere being some justifying circumstancesin which innocent lives may be defensiblytaken-that is, precisely where some qualifying phrase may be supplied.Formulatedsans the thesis signifiesthat, whenever an phrase and disallowingall qualifications, innocent life is taken, the act is ethically indefensibleand, perhaps,tantamount to murder. In the second sense, but not the first, the judgmentof innocence is rather like an overriding verdict and is taken to be incapableof being set whatsoever;so construed,the asidefor reasonof any extenuatingcircumstance thesis would rule out even self-defense involving deliberate killing (where innocence may be preserved). In the first sense, the judgment of innocence marksa considerationbearing on an ulteriorverdict, what is sometimescharthat is, "all things being equal," acterized as ceteris paribus considerations; taking the lives of innocent humans is indefensible,but whether all things are relevantlyequal in this or that instanceneeds still to be decided.Now then, if, in abortioncases, innocence is admittedfor both the mother and the fetus, both the defense and conthen if innocence is a ceteris paribusconsideration, demnationof abortion will have to be undertakenin terms of the competing claimsand rights of the mother and fetus. In that sense,supposingthat it cannot be defensibly argued that there are never, in principle, any legitimate grounds for taking the life of an innocent human being, it is simply utterly irrelevantto charge that abortion is murder or the like because the fetus is innocent. What this means is that a good many-perhaps the preponderant shareof the-antiabortionistargumentsare themselvesirrelevantto the defense or condemnationof abortion. So, for instance, if the Pennsylvaniaantiabortionists admit that the fetus'slife may be ended to save the mother'slife, then arguethat endingthe fetus'slife because they cannot,on pain of contradiction, the pregnancy in question involved rape or incest or because the mother's health and well-being (but not her life) were endangeredis tantamountto murdersimply becausethe fetus was an innocent humanlife: they have already

conceded, in effect, there were no ulterior defending reasons (as in killing a child in cold blood in the street) could the act of abortion be construed as murder-but this is preciselywhat is in dispute. The argumenthere is a conditionalone, resting as it does on the admisof some grounds for taking the life of the fetus. It sion by the antiabortionist does not count at all against the seemingly categorical argument that there never are legitimategrounds for taking an innocent life-a view perhapsespousedby Pope Pius XII: "The baby in the maternalbreast has the right to life immediatelyfrom God. Hence there is no man, no human authority, no science, no medical,eugenic, social, economic or moral 'indication'which can establishor grant a valid juridicalground for a direct deliberatedisposition of an innocent humanlife, that is a dispositionwhich looks to its destruction either as an end or as a meansto anotherend perhapsin itself not illicit. The baby, still not born, is a man in the same degree and for the same reason as the mother."7 Even this formulation,however, may not be quite as extremeas it appearsto be. For one thing, it may (on the equivocationspecified) minimallysignify that, qua innocent,innocentpartiescannot be deliberatelykilledwhich is benignly tautological;for another, it claims that the "right to life" proceedsfrom God, which is simply a doctrinally favoredway of saying that we proceed, in ethical matters, from a presumptionof innocence, that acts directedto takinga life call for specific ethical defense;and finally, the Pope's be taken to signify that, with respectto abortion, view may (argumentativelv) appealto the mother'shealth or life cannot adequatelyoverride the right of life of the fetus,that the innocenceof the fetus is too powerful a consideration to be overriddenby such circumstances. None of these interpretivemaneuvers, singly or jointly, capturesthe categoricalview that the taking of an innocent indefensible-not in the vacuous sense that the innocent life is unconditionally sense that, with qua innocentcannotbe defensiblykilled but in the substantive respectto fetuses and perhapsother humanbeings, innocence alone overrides all putativedefenses for taking a life. The same equivocationinfects a wellknown chargeof ElizabethAnscombe's:"If someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration-I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind."8There is reason to think that Miss Anscombe simply does not believe that any overriding conor fantastic,but that is not equivasiderations would be more than implausible lent to saying that there could not, in principle, be any overriding grounds for taking the life of an innocent human being. The Pennsylvaniaantiabortionists (as well as antiabortionists [so-called] throughout the world) have
7. Address to the Italian Catholic Society of Midwives, quoted in John T. Noonan, Jr., ed., The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 8. See Anscombe. The point has been discussed in detail by Bennett.

reasonfor performingan abortion,and we have alreadynoted the plausibility of taking the life of a fetus (or of an infant or adult, for that matter) where the continued life of the innocent party constituteda grave medical danger to a given community. The reason these quarrelsare importantis just that they force would-be debatersto change their strategy. The consistent antiabortionist, who bases his argument on the innocence of the fetus, cannot admit endangeringthe mothers'slife as a justificationfor abortion;in fact, he cannot admit any instrumentaluse of abortion. And the antiabortionist who admits the dangerto-life argument cannot appeal to the innocence of the fetus as a decisive counterargument for any other case; it cannot,for him, be more than a ceteris paribusconsideration; also, he cannot precludethe possibilityof other instrumentalistdefenses of abortion-if he wishes, he may hold only that particular defenses fail for particularreasons. Here, we see the inescapabilityof competing moral convictions.For instance,if a humanlife is justifiablyended because a given creature has a disease that would destroy a given population, would such a life be justifiablyended if the diseasein question did not utterly destroy but "only" permanentlyand most seriously disabledthat population? Well, if the extension be allowed, is there or is there not a sufficientlyclose of a fetus, say, analogy between the diseasecase and that of the undesirability causally linked to incest or rape? Obviously, when we move on to mental health, personalwell-being, personaldesiresand convictions,and the like, the formal argumentsbecome increasinglytentativeand variablein force, simply becausethere is no agreed-uponformulaabout the importanceof humanhappiness, what form it takes, and what its prerogativesare in the scheme of things.9The only point worth pressing here-avoiding partisanviews-is that there are no conceptualconstraintscounting againstdefendingabortionwhere considerationsless strenuousthan that of endangeredlife are involved if endangeredlife is already admittedto provide a legitimatedefense.10 It is impossiblenot to take a partisanview on quarrelsof the sort indicated-which is not to deny the seriousnessof taking a view on such issues. But it is, also, extremely difficultto see that one is, after all, taking a partisan view in supporting this or that interpretationof the right of abortion. For instance,it is often argued that "the life of the mother always prevailsover the life of the unborn when both equals are in mortal conflict and she alone can be saved."11 But however persuasiveit may be in these restrictedcircumstances,the thesis does not seem to depend on the preferentialrankingof the mother over the fetus but rather on the exclusive prospectsof survival-even considerations. in the context of instrumental Certainly,we cannot comfortably
9. See Margolis, Values and Conduct. 10. See Thomson; also, Baruch Brody, "Thomson on Abortion," Pbilosopby and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 335-40. 11. Ramsey.

and where endangeredlife is not the issue, the question be saveddisjunctively; of ranking"the life of the mother"over "the life of the unborn"either does not arise at all or does so only to confirm some antecedently favored view about abortionitself; that is, the maneuveris simply question begging. Again, it is often argued that "the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house which has, by an unfortunatemistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house.... We should really ask what it is that says 'no one may choose' [between mother and fetus] in the face of the fact that the body that housesthe child is the mother'sbody."''2But againstthis, there are at least two fair objections: one, that we cannot speak of the fetus's body in quite the same way in which we can speak of the body of an infant deliveredin birth (being in the mother'sbody is the natural locus for a developing fetus and perhapseven some of the organs of the fetus are either sharedwith the mother or are to be located in the body of the mother); and two, that the conditionsunder which a woman intentionallycommits herself to havinga child (for instance,by contractingwith her husbandor the like) body" claim. may, arguably,take precedenceover the "right-to-one's In any case, it is an extraordinarythesis that holds that a woman's right to her body alone justifiesthe taking of the life of the fetus, for there is every reasonto think that, even if ending the life of the fetus is sometimesjustified (for instance, where the life of the mother is endangered), it need not be justified (for instance,where a mother arbitrarily always and unconditionally decides, perhapseven closer to term-assuming no danger to her own lifethat she does not want to bear her child). In short, the thesis, taken without authorizesa woman to decide in her own right whether or not qualification, or when or perhapseven how to dispose of the fetus "housed"in her body. The admissionthat the fetus has a "right to life" sets a constraint on the mother'sright to her body, as do also the rights of family, loved ones, and communityregardingthe expected new member of a given group. For, not only is the fetus-on our assumption- a human being, but also naturalpregnancy is at the presenttime (given a limited technology) the exclusive means by which the race provides for its survival.This is not to favor or disfavor the alleged right of a woman to her own body-understood as justifying at least within generouslimits her authorizingtaking the life of the fetus if her happiness,desires,interests,or the like are seriously thwarted by the fetus's continuedexistence.It is only to say that such a right can only be construed of contemporarylife; as, so to say, a delegatedright, under the circumstances and,that whethera proposedsuch delegationis a fair one or not itself depends on the shifting moral convictionsof the community affected-respectingboth the extent of such rights and who may authorizethem. Even if one held that a woman had a right to defend her life and a right to the use of her body, 12.Thomson.

the sense of these distincothers.13But if so, then no woman, understanding tions and supposingthe fetus to be a living humanbeing, could convincingly claim to have an undelegatedright to dispose of the fetus in the name of a right either of self-defenseor of the use of her body. And to admit that that right, so fashionablydefended nowadaysby women's lib, is a delegatedright, that is, a right that effectively promotesulterior moral values, simply obliges us to returnto the questionsthat have alreadybeen posed. We have considered the question of abortion instrumentally,in terms of the bearing of the life of the fetus on the life of the mother or on her health, well-being, happiness,and desires.And we have noted that, if an instrumentaldefense is allowed, then we must be preparedto considerthat the rights and interestsof the fetus or of other affected humanbeings (husbands, families,for instance) may well take precedenceover the rights and interests of the mother in the use and defense of her own body. For example,it may be arguedthat if the mother is to die shortly of causes other than her pregnancy, then perhapseven if the continued pregnancy poses an additionalor fatal danger, the right to life of the fetus or the rights of the father-to-be, may take precedenceover the woman'sunderstandunder the circumstances, able wish to abort. These complexities cannot be eliminatedand cannot be resolved in an exclusively correct way. But it is also conceivablethat, in certain cases at least, abortion may be defended on the grounds that the fetus is intrinsicallydefective or unacceptable.It is easy to see that the defense of such a practice would be simplified if, in all relevant cases, the fetus were judgednot to be a humanbeing. But for reasonsalreadygiven, such a maneuver would be less than interesting-however convenient. The most eligible cases defective embryos, are, clearly, those involving extraordinarymalformations, monsters,and-more controversially-fetusesdue to rape and incest, possibly fetuseswith geneticallydetermined criminaltraits,or the like. Here, the supportingargumentsare more difficultto provide;for, if the unborn fetus-admittedly human-is innocent, has a right to life, and poses no threat (not even the threat of inconvenienceor expense merely instrumental to a given community), it is hard to see what the defendinggroundsfor abortion could be. There are, in fact, no regularizedways of speakingof cases of these sorts. For instance,where the pregnancy is due to rape or incest, it is normallythe mother'sprerogativeto decide, in her own interests,whether to abort or not (assumingsuch considerationsto be admissibleat all). That is, all or nearlyall formsof abortionare defendedin dyadic terms,instrumentally, in terms of the effects of the fetus's continued life or of birth itself upon the rights and interests of other human beings. Where the putative defense is construedmonadically,so to say, in terms of the intrinsicdefects, deformities, 13. SeeThomson.

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Ethics

deficiencies,or taints of the fetus, we are obviously obliged (in order to formulate adequatelyour justifying reasons) to provide a governing theory of human nature itself in terms of norms of minimal physical gifts and the like and of culturally significantand admissibleconditions of conception and development. It is possible to hold, independently of the mother's wishes, that pregnancies due to incest are inherently unacceptable to the society and must be terminated. Similarly, one can imagine a fully planned society in which all pregnancies are authorizedin accord with public standardsfor mating or artificial insemination,by reference to which particular pregnancies are judged to be inadmissibleor defective and abortion required. It may well be that such a practice needs to be defended in terms of ulterior values, but particular acts of abortion could themselves be straightforwardly appraised in terms of a schedule of requirements. Alternatively, genetic and congenital freaks and monsters of extreme sorts may well be judged to be sufficiently defective, though human, to justify abortion. In fact, there is every evidence that such abortion is regularly and quietly practiced by the medical profession, without reference to the mother'swishes or to the doctrine of innocence. There is one other related strategy that should be mentioned. It may be argued that, in the interests of the fetus, it is better at times that abortion be practiced than that the fetus be allowed to live. For example, it may be known that a given fetus would, on birth, have permanent and crippling defects in its heart and lungs. (The argument does not depend at all on considerations of probability and certainty, though it may be affected-as far as the interestsof would-be parents are concerned-by the possibility of a subsequent,relatively normal pregnancy and by the alleged seriousnessof the defects in question.) It is thought to be a peculiar view simply because the fetus is not a rational agent and not yet born and because it is thought to be impossibleto be "in the interest" of the fetus not to be born. But it is not incoherent to attributeto the fetus interests thought to be normalor characteristicor rationalfor the ordinaryrun of menit is simply an applicationof the precept of fairness to concede, to the fetus, interests no poorer or weaker than what, independently, would be conceded to fully competent and responsibleadults. Hence, if suicide may be rationally undertaken and, in that sense, may be "in the interest" of a human agent (though of course it cannot serve any ulterior purpose of the agent that presupposes his continued survival), it would be entirely fair to entertain the possibility that it may 'be more rational to abort than to allow a seriously defective or monstrousbirth. So if it is construed in monadic terms, abortion may be seen as an analogue of euthanasiaand of suicide. The trouble with these monadic conceptions, however, is simply that there is no viable way by which straightforwardlyto discover the minimal conditions of acceptable fetal life-by way of analogy either with euthanasia or with suicide; every effort merely reflects the normativeconvictions of given populations.'4Hence,
14. See Margolis, Values and Conduct.

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Discussion

we can appreciatethe doctrinal convergence and divergence of views on abortion, in spite of the possibility that they be presentedin such logically different ways as are here sketched. For, this is only to say that, within the limits of rationaland responsibledebate, assuminga fair and nontendentiousknowledge of relevant circumstances,it is entirely possible for men and women of conscience to disagreeradically about the defensibility of the practice and of particular acts of abortion. And that fact is itself as important to the formation of public policy as the particularconvictions of partisanson every side.