A dialogue between Descartes and a chimpanzee on the ethics of animal experiment ation.

This dialogue is based on the writings of the seventeenth century French philoso pher Ren Descartes, and specifically his views on non human animals as expressed m ostly through correspondence. CHIMPANZEE: Good day to you Monsieur Descartes. DESCARTES: Hello. What are you? You appear to be a chimpanzee yet you appear to be talking. CHIMPANZEE: I am indeed a chimpanzee, but why should it surprise you that I can talk? I am fully aware of your ideas but, as far as I can tell, you have conclud ed that I cannot use language only because you have never before observed an ani mal speaking a human language. DESCARTES: I believe that I did give more of an explanation to my theory than th at. The main reason being that while you beasts posses the physical ability to s peak, as parrots show with their mimicking of humans, you show no use of languag e. Yet even those humans born deaf or dumb always manage to find some way of com municating. Having such similar speech organs it is hard for me to believe that the most superior of beasts would not be able to speak as well as the most stupi d child if they had any intelligence. And it is not only human languages which I claim beasts do not speak, for should they be able to speak to each other, rath er than just give signs and signals from instinct, than they could easily make t hemselves understood by humans. CHIMPANZEE: While your arguments do make sense it is still possible that we, and I am speaking for all non-human species, only choose not to speak. I am sure to some this would seem to be a rational choice. For all the misery that we see hu mans suffer, it is something we do not endure in our more 'simple' lives. DESCARTES: But you are incapable of making a rational choice as you lack a soul. This is why it is acceptable for humans to make use of brutes, for experimentat ion and for food. CHIMPANZEE: That is a point worthy of discussion but you must first show that we have no consciousness, or soul as you call it. DESCARTES: Beasts must have no intelligence because while I have seen beasts sho w more skill than humans in some areas, in others they show none at all. From th is it can be concluded that beasts have no intelligence, for if they did then th ey would be more intelligent than humans in all areas. CHIMPANZEE: I'm afraid that argument does not follow as the same can be said of you. If what you say is true then humans must also show more skill in some areas but not in others, but you do not conclude from this that humans lack intellige nce. For you to claim that humans do have intelligence this must mean, following your logic, that they are superior to us animals in all areas, something you ha ve admitted is not the case. Besides I am not sure that the structure of your ar gument is valid as you have modified your premise, in claiming that animals must be more intelligent in all areas, in order to arrive at your conclusion. DESCARTES: I fear that maybe I could have made that point better, but this is no t the only line of reasoning I have supplied in order to support my position. It remains the case that we all, humans and brutes alike, have bodies which I have observed to operate in accordance with mechanistic principles. The difference b etween us, which has been shown to me by reason, being that only humans have bee n given a soul.

CHIMPANZEE: Please then explain to me how this is shown by reason. DESCARTES: Well you must agree that as the behaviour of brutes can be explained by a mechanical principle, and that being as there is no other sign of intellige nce that has been observed, it is impossible for me to be able to prove that bru tes have a soul. CHIMPANZEE: I do agree that you appear to be unable to show conclusively that we have consciousness. Conversely, though, you have not offered any such proof tha t we lack consciousness or a soul. DESCARTES: I admit I must concede on that point as I cannot show, beyond any dou bt, that brutes lack any thought as I do not have access to their innermost live s. Though if we look at what is most probable then you will see that I am right. It is only that your internal organs are similar to those of humans that would suggest you could feel sensations as we do. And because thought is central to ha ving sensation then this could suggest brutes would have intelligence. But to th is idea there are counter arguments of which the question of language skills, wh ich I mentioned earlier, I see as showing that there are genuine differences bet ween humans and brutes. It is this difference which shows that it would be fooli sh to use our biological similarities as evidence of any intelligence. CHIMPANZEE: You still have not proven your assertion and have, as far as I ell, only jumped to a conclusion that best suits your own ends. As someone erforms vivisection it is to your benefit to believe that we are unable to sensations and as you cannot prove that we do have that ability you choose lieve we lack consciousness. can t who p feel to be

DESCARTES: That is a strong accusation to make and one that I wholeheartedly rej ect. To me it seems reasonable, since art imitates nature, that nature would be able to build machines much more elegantly than we humans are capable. This is m ost likely the case when we consider that there is no reason why intelligence sh ould be present just because of a particular structure of organs. Brutes therefo re are the machines of nature. In fact it is far more surprising that there shou ld be consciousness in every human than there being none in brutes. CHIMPANZEE: Why would you conclude that something 'far more surprising' is the c ase, whether or not you can prove it, while rejecting the possibility of somethi ng less surprising, which you admit you are unable to prove? DESCARTES: You do seem to keep posing me with difficulties. CHIMPANZEE: For that I make no apologies. Your doctrine would allow people to tr eat animals in the same way they would a rock. As you believe that only beings w ith a soul, namely humans, can feel sensations then no matter how you act toward s them there is no need to feel as though you have done wrong. DESCARTES: I can understand why you would be concerned but as I have shown elsew here the world is comprised of both matter and spirit. It is only in humans that I have observed spirit so in that way it would not be unfair to compare brutes to rocks. They are both material creations, only that one is of far more complex ity than the other is. CHIMPANZEE: But humans are also animals and so have more in common with them tha n with rocks. DESCARTES: You but as I have es are able to of exhibiting are drawing that comparison based on the similarity of our organs already demonstrated this is not enough reason to claim that brut feel sensations. I know you wish to argue that brutes are capable behavioural characteristics as do humans. I am not surprised at t

he cleverness and cunning of dogs and foxes, nor anything else that is done out of fear, or for food or sexual pleasure. These are all only the results of the s tructuring of the organs. CHIMPANZEE: Do you not find the claim that we can experience sexual pleasure to be contradictory if we are incapable of sensations? It could very well be argued , as has been the case by behavioural psychologist, that human beings are only s imilar physical responses to different stimuli. Once more you seem only to have raised doubts and offered no definite facts. DESCARTES: To argue that that humans can perform all their operations by mechani cal means does not prove anything. We cannot fail to experience within ourselves that we are thinking. It may be shown that animate brutes can perform all their operations without any thought, but this does not entitle anyone to infer that the does not himself think. Such an inference would be made only by someone who has been previously convinced that he operates in exactly the same way as the br utes, simply because he has attributed thought to them. CHIMPANZEE: My intention was not to prove that humans are also mechanical but to highlight your inability to prove there was a difference. For if the difference is only that a human cannot fail to experience his own thought, then surely the same could be said of an animal. You cannot tell for yourself that another pers on thinks yet you do not doubt this to be the case, yet for animals you feel cer tain you are able to make that judgement. Quite clearly if a person is able to u nderstand human behaviour in the same manner in which he observes animal behavio ur then he would be right, if not doubting his own ability to think, to infer th at animals have this same ability. DESCARTES: Once more than I will refer you to the argument of language which is the principal reason for convincing us that there is a difference between humans and brutes, and it is one which cannot be explained by mechanical means. CHIMPANZEE: I am happy to discuss this issue with you as there are points I woul d like to raise here. You claim that "even those who are most stupid and mentall y defective" are able to use language. DESCARTES: Yes, I did say that. CHIMPANZEE: Is this not an exaggerated claim? You acknowledge that animals are c apable of communicating but dismiss this as being caused by natural impulses. Wh en we notice an impending danger and warn our fellows you account for this as be ing an automated response. Unless you wish to claim that each animal is born wit h an innate awareness of what constitutes food or danger, and so on, then we mus t have learned to interpret different stimuli and respond accordingly. How is th is different to a human's use of language, which you distinguish on the grounds that, rather than being a natural response, is exhibiting some kind of thought a nd interpretation. DESCARTES: My response to that is to say that human language expresses thought r ather than just learned behaviours. I do not discount the fact that brutes can b e trained, with some showing much better skill than others show, but that they a re not consciously aware of what they are doing and why. I would like to point o ut that I am speaking of thought, not about life or sensation. For I do not deny that you have life, which I claim to consists in the heart or sensation insofar as it derives from a bodily organ. CHIMPANZEE: As you acknowledge that we experience sensations, albeit in a limite d manner, would you say that when a human is in pain they experience an unpleasa nt feeling that causes them to cry out in agony, or that it is only upon reflect ion of the sensation, and subsequent decision that it is of a negative kind, do

you cry out? DESCARTES: Anyone who has experienced pain must say that it is of the former sor t. CHIMPANZEE: So you are saying that the feeling of pain is something that can be reflected upon, rather than being the outcome of reflection. Then this being the case, and regardless of the degree of consciousness an animal posses, what is i t that makes the cries of an animal in pain any different to those of a human?