You are on page 1of 22

No.

436 May 8, 2002

Pakistan in America’s War


against Terrorism
Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client?
by Leon T. Hadar

Executive Summary

The September 11 attacks on New York and and presided over a corrupt and mismanaged
Washington and the ensuing U.S.-led war on ter- economy. Despite that record, he is being hailed
rorism have given Pakistan’s military dictator, by the Bush administration as a “courageous” and
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity to “visionary” leader who is ready to reorient his
improve the relationship between Washington country toward a pro-American position and
and Islamabad. That relationship had experienced adopt major political and economic reforms. In
a steep decline in the 1990s, as the end of both the exchange for his belated support, Musharraf has
Cold War and the common struggle against the been rewarded with U.S. diplomatic backing and
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the per- substantial economic aid.
ception of shared strategic interests. Moreover, Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S. war on ter-
while it was losing its strategic significance to the rorism didn’t reflect a structural transformation in
United States, Pakistan was coming under the Pakistan’s policy. It was a result of tactical consider-
control of an assertive military-religious nexus ations aimed at limiting the losses that Islamabad
that promoted anti-American radical Islamic would suffer because of the collapse of the friendly
forces at home and abroad. Taliban regime in Kabul. Rejecting cooperation
Since September 11, General Musharraf, with Washington would have provoked American
whose regime had been the main source of diplo- wrath and placed at risk Pakistan’s strategic and
matic and military support for the terrorist economic interests in South Asia.
Taliban ruling neighboring Afghanistan, has por- Some cooperation between the United States
trayed his regime as an ally of Washington in its and Pakistan is necessary to wage the war against
counterterrorism campaign. Musharraf, though, terrorism, but that cooperation must not evolve
headed a military clique that brought an end to into a new long-term strategic alliance.
his nation’s short democratic experience, assisted Washington should view Pakistan, with its dicta-
radical Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistan torship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear arse-
and Kashmir, pressed for a war with India, nal, as a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals at best
advanced Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and as a potential long-term problem at worst.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author of Quagmire:
America in the Middle East.
Islamabad becoming an unreliable “failed state.” There
seemed to be Introduction: Allies Again? were signs of the country’s “Talibanization,”
that is, the growing strength of radical Islam.
emerging as a Two months after the terrorist attacks in Pakistan also seemed to be a source of insta-
promoter of ter- New York and Washington, President Bush bility in South Asia and to pose a challenge to
praised Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez America’s nuclear nonproliferation policy.
rorism, not Musharraf, for showing “ever greater courage, Worst of all, Islamabad seemed to be emerg-
unlike such vision and leadership” in supporting the U.S. ing as a promoter of terrorism, not unlike
“rogue states” as war against terrorism, including the military such “rogue states” as Iran and North Korea.5
campaign to oust the Taliban regime in That perception was partly transformed
Iran and North Afghanistan and capture the leaders of al- after September 11, when Pakistan became a
Korea. Qaeda. Musharraf’s “efforts against terror are critical theater in the U.S. effort to take the
benefiting the entire world,” Bush said at a fight to the terrorists. Musharraf did an
November 10 press conference with effective job of realigning Pakistan with
Musharraf at his side.1 His comment echoed a Washington’s policy. On the eve of the U.S.
statement made by British prime minister attack on Afghanistan, Islamabad offered
Tony Blair on October 5, during a visit to intelligence, air space, and ground facilities
Islamabad, in which he thanked the Pakistani for the U.S.-led operation to dislodge
leader for his “courage and leadership” in Afghanistan’s Taliban regime and capture
committing his country to support the war Osama bin Laden and his associates.
on terrorism.2 In a joint U.S.-Pakistani state- Pakistan not only allowed U.S. troops to
ment issued during the Pakistani leader’s visit be based in key airfields near the Afghan bor-
to the United States, Bush and Musharraf der; it agreed to freeze the bank accounts of
”reaffirmed the benefits of 50 years of friend- four Islamist organizations with ties to al-
ship and close cooperation between Pakistan Qaeda.6 Those moves were followed by the fir-
and the United States” and “welcomed the ing of Ahmed Mahmoud, director-general of
revival of this longstanding partnership” as a the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence;
“vital element” in the construction of region- Muzaffer Usmani, deputy chief of the army
al and global stability and peace.3 staff; and other senior generals who had been
The statements by Bush and other U.S. key players in Musharraf’s 1999 coup but
officials that followed the start of the U.S.-led who were known to have radical Islamic views
anti-terrorism campaign and the indications and were reputed to be staunch supporters of
that Pakistan was willing to join it marked a the Taliban regime. They were replaced by
sharp shift in the relationship between military officers whose thinking was more in
Washington and Islamabad, which had expe- line with Musharraf’s new policy toward
rienced a steep decline during the last years of Kabul. “The Taliban’s days are numbered,”
the administrations of George H. W. Bush declared Musharraf. 7
and Bill Clinton. The Cold War and the com- Indeed, in various statements, Musharraf
mon struggle against the Soviet occupation accentuated Pakistan’s role as an ally of the
of Afghanistan no longer cemented U.S.- United States and pledged to Washington his
Pakistani ties in the 1990s, leading a veteran nation’s “fullest cooperation in the fight
analyst to conclude that, in the absence of against terrorism.” In an official statement
other “significant shared national interests,” issued on September 13, Musharraf con-
tensions between the two nations were demned the terrorist attacks, saying that the
becoming all too apparent.4 “carnage in New York and Washington has
In fact, the growing consensus among raised this struggle to a new level.” And in a
American policymakers and lawmakers was meeting with U.S. Ambassador Wendy
that Pakistan was not only losing its strategic Chamberlain, the self-appointed president
importance to the United States; it was also (in June 2001 Musharraf added the presiden-

2
cy to the list of military and civilian positions to demonstrate strengthening U.S. ties with
he held) committed his government to sup- Islamabad, including pledges of military and
port the American-led antiterrorism cam- economic assistance. The Bush administra-
paign.8 In the October 10 press conference tion and Congress moved to lift the sanc-
with Bush, Musharraf stressed that his gov- tions that had been imposed after Pakistan
ernment had taken a decision “to be a part of (following in India’s footsteps) detonated
the coalition, to be with the United States, to nuclear devices in 1998 and after
fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it Musharraf’s 1999 coup suspended democra-
exists.” He expressed his confidence about cy. Washington also agreed to reschedule
the “dawn of a new era of a relationship Pakistan’s outstanding debt to the United
between Pakistan and the United States.”9 States of about $400 million and to support
Helping to advance the Musharraf-is-a loan rescheduling by various financial insti-
courageous-leader and Pakistan-is-our-ally tutions, including the World Bank, the
theses perpetuated by Islamabad and International Monetary Fund, and the Asian
Washington was the domestic backdrop Development Bank, thus helping to alleviate
against which Musharraf adopted the new Pakistan’s $38 billion foreign debt.
policy and made the statements advocating Finally, Washington offered Musharraf an
cooperation with the United States. The con- aid package of nearly $1 billion for border Washington
ventional wisdom in Washington was that control, refugee assistance, and poverty alle- offered
Pakistan’s current government could find viation. (Pakistan claimed that the war in Musharraf an aid
itself struggling for survival if it were seen Afghanistan was costing it more than $2.5
domestically as a lapdog of American infi- billion is lost trade, commerce, and tourism.) package of nearly
dels.10 Indeed, a Gallup poll of Pakistanis By the end of 2001, the IMF and the Paris $1 billion for bor-
published in October indicated that 83 per- Club of sovereign creditors pronounced
cent of them sympathized with the Taliban themselves pleased with Pakistan’s “econom-
der control,
rather than the United States, while 82 per- ic progress,” rescheduled much of the coun- refugee assis-
cent considered bin Laden a holy warrior, not try’s debt, and extended fresh credits. 13 tance, and pover-
a terrorist.11 To be sure, there were limits to U.S. conces-
The Pakistani press was saturated with sions. The Bush administration rejected ty alleviation.
conspiracy theories that suggested that Israel Pakistan’s request for delivery of 28 F-16s paid
was behind the September 11 attacks, while for in the 1980s but never delivered because of
thousands of Pakistanis demonstrated Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
against the United States in Islamabad, Islamabad’s nuclear program caused succes-
Karachi, and other major cities. U.S. media sive U.S. administrations to apply the Pressler
coverage during the first few days of the cam- Amendment (which required an annual certi-
paign against al-Qaeda depicted “rabid anti- fication by the White House that Pakistan did
Americanism in daily protests in Pakistan,” not posses nuclear weapons)14 and impose
contributing to the perception that sanctions against Islamabad. And, facing pres-
Musharraf’s pro-American tilt might cost sure from U.S. textile and apparel manufac-
him his power if not his life.12 turers, the administration was reluctant to
support the request by Pakistan, which
exported $1.9 billion in textile products to the
Washington Rewards United States in the year ending July 2001, to
Pakistan temporarily suspend textile and apparel tariffs
and quotas. Nevertheless, as one journalist
It was not surprising therefore that noted, “Pakistan has become the biggest bene-
Musharraf’s statements and actions were ficiary of economic aid in return for its sup-
rewarded not only by Washington’s official port of the U.S. antiterrorism campaign
praise but, more important, by concrete steps in Afghanistan.” 15

3
that, as a result of the no-war pacts, Islam was
A More Nuanced and “strengthened,” he emphasized that later on
Cynical Perspective from “when people saw enemies getting together,
they made a new war pact.”16
Islamabad What Musharraf was describing was not
While American officials were going out the basis for the new strategic alliance with
of their way to applaud the new, improved Washington, based on long-term interests and
friendship with Pakistan and portray shared values, that American officials and pun-
Musharraf as Pakistan’s version of Charles de dits seemed to be demanding of him. Instead,
Gaulle, taking major risks in joining the West he was proposing merely a tactical accord with
and standing up to radical forces threatening the United States, a nation whose interests and
to overrun his country and region, values were on many levels contrary to those
Musharraf adopted a more nuanced view. espoused by Pakistan as a state and as a repre-
The Pakistani leader took a more ambiguous sentative of Islamic aspirations. Such an agree-
and restrained approach toward Islamabad’s ment between Islamabad and Washington
ties with Washington and expressed only a would help advance Pakistan’s short-term
qualified backing for the U.S. position. strategic interests, or at least not harm them.
He did that in a lengthy televised address Conversely, rejecting cooperation with
to the Pakistani people on September 19, fol- Washington would provoke American wrath
lowing consultations with many of the coun- and place at risk Pakistan’s aid-dependent
try’s opinion leaders. Musharraf referred to economy, the country’s ability to stand up to
the dilemma Pakistan was facing as it had to India, and perhaps its nuclear installations. A
choose between “two adversities”—con- breach with the United States might allow
frontation or cooperation with the United India to exploit the situation to isolate and
States (and the West). He concluded that in hurt Pakistan and could lead to the installa-
such a case Islamic law requires that one tion of an anti-Pakistan regime in Kabul.
choose the lesser adversity (in this instance, “Bad results,” Musharraf stressed in his
cooperation with Washington). He com- address, “could put in danger our territorial
pared his move to the temporary cease-fires integrity and our solidarity.”
that Muslim leaders had signed with nonbe- Cooperation with Washington would
lievers in the early stages of Muslim history provide Pakistan with breathing space until
to provide the Muslims with an opportunity it was ready to secure its core national inter-
to gain strength and expand their influence. ests, which included, as Musharraf pointed
The Pakistani After a needed respite, those agreements were out, developing its nuclear weapons capabili-
repealed. The conclusion of such an agree- ty and defending the “Kashmir cause.” While
leader took an ment with the United States would likewise American leaders and commentators were
ambiguous and ensure that the interests of Islam would be hailing a metamorphosis in Pakistani poli-
restrained protected, explained Musharraf. cies, Musharraf was expressing his hope that
Although it is possible that his comments working with Washington would enable
approach toward were a cynical rationale purely for domestic Islamabad to maintain the status quo, albeit
Islamabad’s ties consumption, it is more likely that Musharraf modified, in Kabul by helping to put in place
was applying the lessons of Muslim history a friendly Islamic government. Much as the
with Washington and teachings to make an argument in favor of Taliban regime had done during the 1990s,
and expressed a short-term accommodation with the power- such a successor would help secure
only a qualified ful nonbelievers of the day, the Americans. The Pakistan’s twin policies: maintaining influ-
implication of his remarks was that such an ence in Central Asia and exerting pressure on
backing for the accord could be abrogated in the future when India to settle the dispute over Kashmir, a
U.S. position. the balance of power would shift in favor of Muslim-majority state divided between the
Pakistan and the Muslim community. Noting two countries.

4
Pakistani cooperation with Washington cial resources and military assistance and Musharraf, as
could also lead to an adjustment in what was training, as well as thousands of volunteers to head of
seen as the tilt toward India by the Bush the forces of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At the
administration. “It could even be, the wily same time, such radical forces were the Pakistan’s mili-
General Musharraf may be dreaming, a reprise domestic political and ideological backbone tary, used his
of Cold-War days, when an indulgent United of Musharraf’s military dictatorship, which
States backed Pakistan for the sake of defeat- was also committed to the development of
alliance with rad-
ing a common enemy in Afghanistan,” specu- the country’s nuclear military power. ical Muslim cler-
lated The Economist. In any case, if it proved Musharraf, as head of Pakistan’s military, ics to provide
impossible to prevent the fall of the Taliban, used his alliance with radical Muslim clerics
Pakistan was expecting to have a large say in to provide legitimacy to his dictatorship, legitimacy to his
whatever order succeeded that regime, and per- forming a powerful and destructive “mili- dictatorship.
haps even a less hostile U.S. attitude toward tary-mosque” nexus. With Musharraf as its
Islamabad’s efforts to develop a nuclear head, that political nexus helped transform
weapons capability.17 One Pakistani official Pakistan into a magnet for radical Islamic
argued that the Americans were now “aware of terrorists in the region and around the world.
their past mistakes” of maginalizing Pakistan. It was also the driving force behind the sup-
Pakistan, a “front line state” in the war against port for Islamic insurgents, many of whom
terrorism, was telling the Americans that “you had ties with Afghanistan-based guerrillas,
need us again” and was expecting that who penetrated the Indian-controlled Kargil
Washington would be willing to take into con- region of Kashmir in May 1999, a move that
sideration Pakistan’s interests, including the was a major blow to the budding détente
need to “engage” the Taliban regime in negoti- between Islamabad and New Delhi.19
ations before taking military action against it.18 That crisis, in turn, brought about Indian
military retaliation and U.S. diplomatic pres-
sure that resulted in the withdrawal of
Pakistan’s Flirtation with Pakistani forces from Kargil, weakening the
Radical Islam power of the democratically elected govern-
ment of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and cre-
Although Musharraf hoped to extract as ating the conditions for his overthrow by
much as he could from Washington in Musharraf’s military coup in October 1999.20
exchange for his support in the war against The proverbial man from Mars viewing
terrorism, he was bargaining with a very weak U.S. foreign policy after September 11 would
hand because his government was interna- probably be astonished at the inconsistency
tionally isolated and the Pakistani economy of the U.S. record. Washington attached the
was bankrupt. In fact, in the months before labels “anti-American” and “war criminal” to
the September 11 attacks, Pakistan was the the former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
most important diplomatic and political ally, Milosevic, a civilian politician elected in at
not of the United States, but of the Taliban least quasi-democratic elections and whose
regime that harbored the al-Qaeda terrorists. military had been at war in Kosovo and
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the only Bosnia with Muslim forces that had links to
governments that maintained formal diplo- Islamic radical movements.21 Yet Washington
matic relationship with the radical Islamic praised General Musharraf as “courageous”
leaders in Kabul. (Saudi Arabia, another sup- and a “visionary leader” even though he was a
posed “ally” of Washington, was the most military dictator in control of weapons of
important channel of funds for the Taliban). mass destruction, was backed by radical anti-
Leading Pakistani political, military, and reli- American forces, and was an ally of a regime
gious figures and radical Islamic groups were that helped inflict the worst terrorist attack
providing direct support in the form of finan- ever on the American territory and people.

5
having no choice but to abruptly end
Musharraf’s Self-Serving Pakistan’s support of both the Taliban and
Switch the militants seeking to “liberate” Kashmir.

It is hyperbole to portray Musharraf’s


decision to cooperate with the United States Pakistan and America:
after September 11 as a courageous, de The History of a Turbulent
Gaulle–like gesture. Instead, Musharraf can
be compared to another military dictator,
Relationship
Hungary’s Adm. Nikolaus Horthy de Most of Musharraf’s predecessors were
Nagybanya, a backer of Nazi Germany who aware that Islamabad’s ties with Washington
had come to power with support from a mil- were dictated by specific political-military
itary-fascist nexus. In 1944, sensing that the interests and lacked any deep historical and
balance of power was shifting against the ideological roots. As is Musharraf, those lead-
Axis powers, Horthy attempted to defect ers were always more candid than the
from his alliance with Adolf Hitler and Americans in evaluating their country’s ties
switch his support to the Allies. Like Admiral with Washington in realpolitik terms that
Almost two Horthy in 1944, General Musharraf in 2001 stressed the limitations of the relationship.
decades before recognized that his fanatical ally was Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War—
Musharraf, U.S. doomed and attempted to realign his coun- when U.S. officials, lawmakers, and commen-
try with the victorious West. Horthy failed in tators were hailing (and some conservatives
leaders embraced his gamble, whereas Musharraf has been suc- were even romanticizing) U.S.-Pakistani coop-
another Pakistani cessful (so far). But that success should not eration in providing support to the Muslim
diminish the significance of the historical “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan (including
military dictator, analogy. Horthy and Musharraf were simply one named Osama bin Laden) and Pakistan
Gen. Mohammed switching to the winning side, well aware that was the recipient of the third largest amount
Zia ul-Haq. the alternative would bring about their own U.S. aid (after Israel and Egypt)—Pakistani
political destruction.22 leaders seemed to have no illusions about their
There was no conversion to Western val- relationship with Washington. They recog-
ues in either case. New York Times columnist nized that the U.S.-Pakistani partnership in
Thomas Friedman invoked Samuel Afghanistan was a marriage of convenience, if
Johnson’s quip, “There is nothing like the not a diplomatic and military one-night stand,
prospect of being hanged in the morning to and that the two governments would eventual-
concentrate the mind,” to provide an expla- ly have to deal with the reality of their diverging
nation of Musharraf’s decision to abandon core national interests and values.
his alliance with the Taliban and support Almost two decades before Musharraf, U.S.
U.S. policy. Friedman suggested that leaders embraced another Pakistani military
Musharraf’s moves were motivated by dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. The
realpolitik considerations, the diplomatic general played a pivotal role, putting in place
and economic pressure from Washington, the policies of relying on the support of radi-
and the lurking military threat of India. cal Islamic groups at home. In late 1982 he
Because of the September 11 attacks, and the came to Washington to help coordinate sup-
subsequent attack on the Indian parliament port for the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan.
by pro-Pakistan Kashmiri terrorists, the The difference between the way the leaders of
United States and India “made clear that Pakistan and the United States have tended to
Pakistan’s foreign policy had to change—or depict their relationship was evident during a
America would destroy it economically and December 6, 1982, meeting in Washington
India [would do so] militarily.”23 Thus, between General Zia and Secretary of State
Musharraf found himself in the position of George Shultz.

6
After Shultz, reflecting the spin that dom- its position as a member of the U.S.-led anti-
inated Washington at that time, expressed communist bloc in the strategic region of
his hope that Washington and Islamabad South Asia and also as part of a “northern
would build a bilateral relationship that tier” of states helping to secure Western inter-
“grows over time and is strong enough to ests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.
survive disagreements and problems which With India taking the road toward social-
inevitably occur,” Zia replied that the two ism in domestic policy and neutralism in for-
countries were a “union of unequals” and eign policy during the Cold War, Pakistan
“incompatible” in terms of culture, geogra- could play for the United States a role similar
phy, and national power, even though they to the one that India once played in defend-
had strong common interests. 24 ing imperial Britain’s interests against czarist
The cautionary remarks Zia made proba- Russia. The fact that the members of
bly still apply to the current Islamabad- Pakistan’s political and military elite were
Washington relationship. On one level Zia Westernized and British educated helped to
was raising the first dilemma in the relation- strengthen its ties with American political
ship, the fact that the United States is a glob- leaders and military officials as well as opin-
al superpower and Pakistan is what political ion makers. But the continuing political
scientists refer to as a “client state.” The instability and economic problems that led
inequality of the relationship is highlighted to the weakening of its fragile democratic sys-
by the disparities in economic power, mili- tem, which was accelerated by (American-
tary capabilities, and diplomatic influence. induced) military spending, tarnished
That reality is often glossed over when Pakistan’s image in Washington and the
Washington and such client states as Israel, American media as a member of the
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan celebrate their Westernized pro-American club and con-
“alliances” or “partnerships.” Such talk cre- tributed to the volatility of the relationship
ates the misperception that those relation- between the two countries. 25
ships are products of “interdependence”
(meaning that each side is dependent on the Conflicting U.S. and Pakistani Interests
other for its survival). In reality, while On another level, Zia’s comments also
American interests might be adversely affect- highlight the fact that, when it came to their
ed by the destruction of one or all of those respective core national interests, the United
three states (and other client states), the States and Pakistan were to discover that,
United States would nevertheless continue to Cold War rhetoric aside, they not only lacked
survive as a leading world power. On the common historical and cultural ties, they The United
other hand, a decision by Washington to were not operating on the same strategic
withdraw support from such client states wavelength. For Pakistan, containing com- States and
would devastate their core national interests munism was a secondary national interest. Pakistan were to
and might threaten their long-term survival. Its core national security interest centered discover that they
A client state such as Pakistan, dependent on containing the perceived threat of India
as it is for diplomatic, economic, and military and India’s predominance of military not only lacked
support on a global superpower, can help strength and political influence, especially as common histori-
secure the support of its benefactor and it affected their dispute over the control of
increase its leverage over that benefactor by divided Kashmir.
cal and cultural
accentuating common strategic interests. The Washington never regarded India as a ties, they were
client state also tries to secure the backing of strategic threat to its interests and, if anything, not operating on
American interest groups and friends in the was interested in getting India, the world’s
bureaucracy and Congress. Pakistan, which largest democracy, into the anti-communist the same strate-
gained independence in the same year, 1947, camp. The United States has also always gic wavelength.
that the Cold War started, was able to advance backed a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir

7
The Pakistani conflict. The contrasting considerations of power in South Asia in which India remained
nuclear program U.S. and Pakistani national interests were the leading military player. In fact, during the
clearly demonstrated in the growing ties first three years of the Carter administration,
was a form of between Islamabad and communist China in the process of détente with the Soviet Union,
diplomatic black- the 1960s and by the disastrous decision by as well as the focus on human rights and
Pakistan to launch a war against India over nuclear proliferation by the White House and
mail in Kashmir in 1965, which led to Pakistan’s mil- Congress, meant that differences in national
Islamabad’s rela- itary defeat when the administration of interests and values significantly weakened
tionship with Lyndon Johnson refused to bail out U.S.-Pakistani ties. Evidence that Pakistan
Islamabad from the mess it had created. was accelerating the development of its
Washington. The tensions between Pakistan and the nuclear program, and Zia’s military coup that
United States were reflected in another devel- ousted the elected government of Zulfikar Ali
opment. Beginning in the 1970s Pakistan Bhutto, brought relations to a nadir.
moved to develop a nuclear weapons capabil-
ity to offset India’s advantage in conventional Pakistan’s Reemergence as a Useful
military power and as a response to India’s Client State in the 1980s
detonation of a nuclear device in 1974. The Even before Zia arrived in Washington in
Pakistani nuclear program was also a form of 1982, however, there were indications that
diplomatic blackmail in Islamabad’s relation- not only was Pakistan reasserting its position
ship with Washington. Pakistani officials as a useful client state for Washington but
insisted that only a sufficient supply of that the normal pattern of relations between
American conventional arms would prevent the global power, the United States, and the
Pakistan from going nuclear. But Pakistan’s client state, Pakistan, which had been evident
effort to become a nuclear power ran contrary during most of the Cold War, was beginning
to another core U.S. national security interest: to change in favor of the latter. The principal
working to block the proliferation of nuclear reason for that change was the Soviet inva-
weapons and creating a stable international sion of Afghanistan and the decision, first by
nuclear arms control regime (both during the Carter administration and then by
and after the Cold War). The divergent goals President Ronald Reagan and his advisers, to
of the two countries on the nuclear issue led use Pakistan as a base to support the
to numerous diplomatic showdowns (espe- mujahideen in Afghanistan as part of a strat-
cially under pressure from Congress). egy to oust the Soviets from that country.
When one analyzes the relationship That Pakistan was able to strengthen its
between Washington and Pakistan before the leverage over Washington was a result of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, what global and regional developments. One
emerges is the normal pattern of relationship development was increasing anti-Soviet
between a great power and a client state. Each cooperation between the United States and
side refrained from abandoning its commit- China. Pakistan could be integrated into that
ments to its respective core national interests, cooperation since it was a friend of both
but Pakistan was eventually forced to back countries. Another development was the
down from its aggressive pursuit of those expansion of ties between Pakistan and the
interests. Indeed, the limits of U.S. support Arab countries, led by oil-rich Saudi Arabia
led to the partition of Pakistan and the estab- and bolstered by the rising global economic
lishment of Bangladesh following India’s power of the oil cartel, OPEC, that was exert-
military victory in its 1971 war with Pakistan. ing enormous pressure on U.S. foreign poli-
In those and other cases, Washington was cy. Many of the Arab states regarded Pakistan
not willing to provide Pakistan with the mili- not only as a strategic ally (containing Soviet
tary and diplomatic support needed to expansionism toward the Middle East) but
change in any dramatic way the balance of also as a religious and cultural associate com-

8
mitted to the spread of Islam in its more tra- cooperation between the CIA and Pakistan’s
ditionally strict forms. Inter-Services Intelligence.29
Indeed, at the same time that the United
States was strengthening its ties with Pakistan’s Agenda in Supporting the
Pakistan, Zia was trying to enhance his polit- Afghan Mujahideen
ical legitimacy in the Muslim world through Beyond those common interests,
a policy of Islamization at home, including Islamabad had its own separate reason for
the substitution of traditional Islamic pun- supporting the anti-Soviet insurgency in
ishments for Western legal rules and the pro- Afghanistan: Pakistan’s traditional national
motion of religious schools (madrassas). interest in maintaining a supportive regime
Those changes, however, also gave rise to in Kabul to provide Pakistan with strategic
anti-American forces and sentiments as depth in its conflict with India. That interest
demonstrated in the burning of the U.S. was buttressed by the resentment of Zia’s
embassy in Islamabad in November 1979.26 Islamic supporters at home and in other
Muslim countries (led by the Saudis) at the
fact that the atheist Soviets had seized con-
Afghanistan: The Pakistani trol of a neighboring Muslim state. Even In Afghanistan,
Tail Wags the U.S. Dog under the Reagan Doctrine, which aimed at
reversing Soviet gains around the world, the Washington
It was in the context of transforming United States didn’t share those long-term found itself
domestic (the rise of the military-mosque Pakistani goals. However, Washington lacked
nexus), regional (the 1979 Soviet invasion of a coherent approach of its own to a post- falling into the
Afghanistan), and global circumstances (the Soviet Afghanistan. trap of permitting
emergence of OPEC and the changing trian- The result was that Pakistan, led by Zia’s
gular Washington-Moscow-Beijing relation- military-mosque nexus, with the ISI as one of
the Pakistani
ship) that the ties between Pakistan and the its manifestations, was able to advance its “tail” to wag the
United States (between a client state and its parochial interests through cooperation with American “dog.”
benefactor) seemed to evolve into what com- the United States, a power that was promoting
mentators began describing as a full-fledged a broader and somewhat blurry global agenda.
“strategic alliance.” 27 As Pakistani journalist While the two players could find a common
Rashid Ahmed said in his book, Taliban: strategic and ideological basis for cooperation
Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central in Afghanistan, Washington found itself
Asia, the United States used Zia’s Pakistan as a falling into the trap of permitting the Pakistani
conduit for close to $3 billion worth of covert “tail” to wag the American “dog.” (That sce-
aid to the mujahideen fighting to expel the nario has occurred in other client state–super-
Soviets from Afghanistan.28 power relationships, such as the ones between
There is no doubt that the two countries the United States and Israel and the Soviet
shared common interests in dealing with the Union and Cuba. The dangerous 1962 and
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, especially a 1973 showdowns between Washington and
concern that the invasion of Afghanistan Moscow occurred as a result.)30
reflected a major change in Soviet conduct In the case of the Pakistani-U.S. relation-
and was part of a Soviet grand strategy to take ship, however, there was a long interval
advantage of instability in Iran (following the between the peak of U.S.-Pakistani coopera-
collapse of the pro-American shah), gain tion and the manifestation of the dangerous
access to the Arabian Sea, and control the oil outcome of the tail-wags-the-dog scenario.
resources of the Middle East. That concern The latter transpired on September 11, 2001,
explained the Carter administration’s deci- 12 years after the Soviets had withdrawn from
sion to cooperate in a limited fashion with the Afghanistan and at a time when the relation-
Pakistanis in Afghanistan, including covert ship between Washington and Islamabad had

9
already waned. The outcome was not really a diplomat who served in Pakistan. Zia also
“blowback,” to use the term pundits fre- hoped that a new government in Kabul
quently use to describe unintended conse- would “reflect his own Islamic leanings far
quences of certain policies. The United States more than any previous regime had, and far
intentionally groomed Pakistan, despite more than the Pakistani president had been
being aware of its client’s increasing radical able to impose on his own country.”32
Islamic orientation, as the leading regional The pressure to advance that ambitious
power in Afghanistan. It was a myopic policy. agenda in Afghanistan, as well as to develop
The same militant anti-Western and anti- Pakistan’s nuclear military program, contin-
modern environment, nourished by the ued after Zia’s death and the Soviet with-
Saudi-backed military-mosque nexus in drawal from Afghanistan. The ISI and the
Islamabad and its satellites in Afghanistan military took the lead, aided by support from
and elsewhere, was responsible for such bar- radical Muslim groups. That trend persisted
baric acts as forcing religious minorities to despite frequent U.S. objections and some
wear distinctive badges and smashing resistance from the civilian governments of
ancient Buddhist monuments. It had already prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
promoted terrorism against American citi- Sharif. Islamabad’s efforts led, first, to the
zens around the world. U.S. leaders should temporary control of Kabul by the Islamic
have taken that record into consideration. radical leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and
The Reagan Doctrine, which relied on then to the 1994 victory of the Taliban, dom-
local military powers to counter the Soviets, inated by Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group
made it possible for the Pakistanis to become in Afghanistan, whose members also control
the dominant force in the anti-Soviet Islamic a large area across the border in Pakistan. The
insurgency in Afghanistan and allowed them Taliban defeated a coalition of Uzbek, Tajik,
to support their favorite guerrilla groups and Hazara opponents (the Northern
through the ISI. The ISI also coordinated the Alliance), which had ties to outside players,
flow of other foreign aid, including the including Russia and Iran (and, to some
recruitment of foreign Muslim volunteers extent, India and China). Alongside bin
and graduates of the local madrassas.31 All of Laden, Pakistan was the main sponsor of the
that, of course, was instrumental in achieving Taliban as it marched to Kabul.33
the American goal of bogging down the
The United States Soviets in Afghanistan. But it also helped to Pakistan Backs the Taliban
strengthen the power of the ISI and the other Some experts and journalists have suggest-
intentionally elements of the destructive military-mosque ed that the Taliban and the terrorism that
groomed nexus in Pakistan. arose in Afghanistan occurred because the
Pakistan, despite One can argue that the “tail” started to United States “neglected” and “turned its
wag the “dog” sometime in 1986 when there back” on Afghanistan at the end of the Cold
being aware of its were clear indications that the Soviets want- War, which supposedly led to the chaos in
client’s increasing ed a face-saving formula for withdrawal from that country. The fact is that the United
Afghanistan. It was then that Zia, whose orig- States did make an effort to cobble together a
radical Islamic inal stated goal was to reduce the threat of united front following the Soviet withdrawal
orientation, as Soviet expansionism, started advancing a and did consider helping with economic
the leading more ambitious agenda. “Victory by the resis- reconstruction. But that effort failed largely
tance, he believed, could produce for the first because of deliberate interference on the part
regional power in time an Afghan regime genuinely friendly to of the Pakistani intelligence establishment.
Afghanistan. Pakistan, which in turn could enable There was a “Pakistani-instigated chaos, but
Pakistan to gain ‘strategic depth’ against the U.S. contribution to it was not central,”
It was a myopic India, long a goal of Pakistani Islamic plan- argues Afghanistan watcher Robert Kaplan.
policy. ners,” according to Dennis Kux, a former U.S. Out of the Pakistani-instigated chaos came

10
the Taliban. “The problem has not been U.S. Afghanistan and its policy of turning the coun- Despite denials by
neglect but Pakistani interference, under both try into the center of international terrorism Musharraf and
democratic and military regimes.” Why did could have occurred without the support of
the Pakistanis interfere in Afghanistan? Pakistan. “We are fighting a jihad and this is his aides,
“Because they require an Afghan puppet state the first Islamic international brigade in the Pakistan’s ISI
to supply them with strategic depth for their modern era,” bragged Gen. Hamid Gul, the
conflict against India,” explains Kaplan.34 former head of the ISI, to a journalist in 1999.
continued to pro-
In retrospect, one can raise serious ques- “The communists have their international vide military and
tions about aspects of the U.S. involvement in brigades, the West has NATO, why can’t the financial assis-
Afghanistan, especially the willingness to per- Muslims unite and form a common cause?”37
mit the Pakistani military and the ISI to con- Two years later, members of that Pakistani- tance to the
trol the assistance to the insurgents and the backed jihad international hit the World Trade Taliban in
decision, under the pressure of cold warriors Center and the Pentagon, killing thousands of
Afghanistan even
and a pro-mujahideen Congress, to continue Americans and others. On December 13 other
funneling arms to the mujahideen even after members of those brigades attacked India’s after September
the Soviet withdrawal. The American support parliament in a plot to kill its leadership. 11, 2001.
through Islamabad tipped the balance of
power in the Afghan civil war in favor of
Pakistan and its allies among the Pashtuns, Musharraf Pursues
while weakening the military and political “Talibanization”
influence of other ethnic groups allied mostly
with Iran, Russia, and some Muslim republics
with a Human Face
in Central Asia. But lack of support in In a January 12, 2002, televised address to
Washington and abroad would have made it the Pakistani people, a confident Musharraf
impossible for U.S. policymakers to work out a seemed to be taking more dramatic steps in the
compromise solution with Russia and Iran direction of once again aligning his country
and their allies in Afghanistan, and with with the United States and the West, rejecting
Pakistan, to form perhaps a decentralized terrorism and theocracy, and criticizing those
political structure with spheres of influence for who “pervert” Islam to advance their interests.
each outside power. The only other alternatives He announced the banning of five of the most
would have been direct military intervention radical Islamic groups and ordered hundreds
by the United States or permitting the of their members rounded up. Many of the
Pakistanis to establish control over most of the madrassas were to be closed down or brought
country. The latter alternative, a Pax Pakistana under government control, and other religious
in Afghanistan, became the policy by default.35 institutions, including mosques, would be
Despite denials by Musharraf and his aides, monitored and warned not to promote terror-
Pakistan’s ISI continued to provide military ism. “The day of reckoning has come,” he
and financial assistance to the Taliban in announced. “Do we want Pakistan to become a
Afghanistan even after September 11, 2001.36 theocratic state? Do we believe that religious
Islamabad still regarded Afghanistan as a education is enough for governance? Or do we
strategic ally and ideological associate. Afghan want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and
training camps and Afghan recruits helped to dynamic Islamic state?” He added that radical
prepare the next Pakistani-instigated insur- Islamists “did nothing but contribute to
gency against the Indians in Kashmir and to bloodshed in Afghanistan,” leading to “disrup-
spread radical Islamic ideas and institutions tion and sowing seeds of hatred.” And he
around the world, through “jihad-internation- asked, “Does Islam preach this?”38
al” brigades, some of which were tied to the al- This much-analyzed address was hailed by
Qaeda network. officials and commentators as an indication
It is doubtful that the Taliban’s control of that, after reorienting his foreign policy

11
Musharraf can be toward the United States, Musharraf was now nuclear nonproliferation regime spurred new
described as a going to take dramatic steps to Westernize moves to punish Pakistan for developing
and secularize Pakistan à la Turkey. Indeed, nuclear weapons (as well as purchasing relat-
new and several analysts went so far as to compare ed technology from China). Pakistan’s sup-
improved Zia Musharraf to modern Turkey’s founder, port for the Muslim insurgents that attacked
Kemal Ataturk,39 and to argue that his address the town of Kargil in Kashmir in May 1999;
adapting an “set a new course for the Muslim world.”40 Islamabad’s backing of the despicable
ambitious agenda But Musharraf is no Ataturk dedicated to Taliban regime, which Washington accused
to changing cir- demolishing the religious and expansionist even then of harboring bin Laden’s terrorist
foundations of the ancient regime and estab- network;41 and Islamabad’s decision to deto-
cumstances. lishing a new nationalist and secular identity nate a nuclear bomb in May 1998 led to enor-
for his country. If anything, one can compare mous U.S. pressure (in form of diplomatic
Musharraf to some of Turkey’s last Ottoman and economic sanctions) on Pakistan. That,
rulers, who tried to accommodate domestic in turn, led to a reaction by Pakistan’s mili-
and outside forces that aimed either to change tary-mosque nexus.
the status quo or to secure the ambitious The October 1999 military coup by
intertwining of the nationalist and religious Musharraf brought an end to the fragile
goals of the empire. Indeed, Musharraf’s rise democracy in Pakistan and strengthened the
to power marked what can be regarded as the hands of the Taliban’s allies in Islamabad,
most recent attempt by members of the mili- including the ISI, the radical religious groups,
tary-mosque nexus to preserve the achieve- and forces pushing for the expansion of ties
ments of Zia and his successors: veto power of with the jihad international, the “liberation”
the military, ideological supremacy of the rad- of Kashmir, and the acceleration of the
ical Islamic groups, control of Afghanistan nation’s nuclear program. The latter goal was
through the Taliban, mounting pressure on the development of an “Islamic bomb” that
India in Kashmir, and development of a would not only enhance Pakistan’s position
nuclear weapons capability. vis-à-vis India and the United States but would
In that context, Musharraf can be also provide the Muslim world with an answer
described as a new and improved Zia adapt- to the Western, Hindu, and Jewish (Israeli)
ing an ambitious agenda to changing cir- bombs.42 According to U.S. sources, one of the
cumstances. Starting in the early 1990s, there major reasons Musharraf and the military
were indications that changes in the regional decided to oust Sharif was “the fear that he
and global balance of power were threatening might buckle to American policy and reverse
the achievements gained by the military- Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban.”43
mosque nexus. The power of OPEC had been Musharraf and his allies were not calling
eroded, weakening the economic and diplo- for the “Talibanization” of Pakistan, but the
matic status of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s bene- policies they were advancing (either directly
factor and its top lobbyist in Washington. or through the use of political and military
Worsening relations between Beijing and subsidiaries and “rogue” operations) were
Washington made it difficult for Islamabad based on using the Taliban’s Afghanistan as
to accentuate Pakistan-China ties in bargain- both a strategic and an Islamic backyard,
ing with the United States. The strengthen- where training camps and arms depots could
ing of the human rights lobby in Congress be used to promote the Pakistani-Islamic
produced growing criticism in Washington cause in Kashmir and around the world.
of the rising influence of anti-democratic According to recent news reports, that effort
and radical Islamic forces in Pakistan and, of included cooperation between Pakistani
course, its fundamentalist ally in Kabul. nuclear scientists and the al-Qaeda network—
The preoccupation of the Clinton admin- although it is not certain whether Musharraf
istration and Congress with enhancing the knew personally of that collaboration.44

12
There were no signs that Musharraf’s pol- “constructively disengaging” from Pakistan,
icy was strengthening Pakistan’s position in while trying to advance in South Asia a new
Washington in the months preceding strategic agenda based on strengthening
September 11. President Clinton gave America’s ties with India.
Musharraf’s regime a diplomatic cold shoul- In that context, Pakistan, as a client state,
der; during a South Asia tour, Clinton spent should have been presented with a clear
five days in India and only five hours in choice: adapt your policy to the goals of your
Pakistan.45 The new Bush administration American benefactor or end up paying the
continued the process of marginalizing costs of your refusal—being truly “ditched”
Pakistan and establishing more solid ties with by Washington. Instead, Washington’s inter-
India, as part of a strategy to contain China ests were sabotaged by an uncontrollable
and expand ties with India’s huge democracy client state, ruled by a military dictatorship
and emerging market. All this occurred in the process of establishing a theocracy and
against the backdrop of growing U.S. ten- mismanaging its corrupt economic system.
sions with radical Islam and Washington’s That client state was spreading terror to
strengthening of ties with Israel and secular Kashmir; strengthening the Taliban, the
Turkey, which only helped to highlight world’s most anti-Western regime; and
Pakistan’s pariah status. There was no indica- acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan was
tion—strategic considerations, economic ties, Such developments pointed to a major spreading terror
ideological commitment, cultural bonds— dilemma that the United States faces when it to Kashmir;
that Washington needed to continue to main- has to manage its relationship with a client
tain Pakistan as a client state. Conversely, state in a unipolar international system. strengthening the
Pakistan seemed to be losing its leverage over During the Cold War, the bipolar system pro- Taliban, the
U.S. policy, a clear reversal of what occurred duced systemic pressures on the two super-
during Zia’s years. The relationship between powers to restrain their respective client
world’s most
America and Pakistan was being normalized. states. The United States and the Soviet anti-Western
The dog was in control. In fact, the dog was Union sent signals to each other that helped regime; and
discovering that it had no need to regularly to set diplomatic and military “red lines,”
wag that particular tail. which forced each superpower to place acquiring
restrictions on its client states. For example, weapons of mass
the United States, facing Soviet pressure,
destruction.
The Pakistani Tail Tries to stopped Israeli military advances in Egypt in
Wag the American Dog 1973. Similarly, the Soviets, during the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962, acceded to the
Again pressure of the Kennedy administration.
Following September 11 and If the Soviet Union hadn’t collapsed in
Washington’s pressure on Pakistan to back 1991, it is quite conceivable that it would
the United States in the war against al-Qaeda have set similar “red lines” on U.S. support
and the Taliban, Musharraf and other for the Pakistani-backed insurgents in
Pakistani officials complained that the Afghanistan, leading perhaps to the creation
United States had “abandoned” them after of a neutral regime in Kabul or to the divi-
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from sion of the country into spheres of influence,
Afghanistan in 1989. “We were left high and which would have given Islamabad no choice
dry, and it started to settle on the people that but to abandon its grand strategic designs. In
we were ditched,” Musharraf told an short, in a unipolar system, a client state may
American group. That was an exaggeration. A be able to exert more influence on its global
clear U.S. realpolitik position, based on an benefactor in the short term and the
accurate reading of U.S. interests at the time, midterm, as Pakistan did for a while, creating
should have led to adoption of a policy of conditions for the Taliban victory in Kabul.

13
From this perspective, September 11 have at his disposal any assets that would
should have accelerated a process of margin- help him to strengthen his leverage on U.S.
alizing Pakistan. The Bush administration policy, and he certainly had no military
decided, not only to target Pakistan’s strate- power to prevent the United States from
gic and ideological ally in Kabul, but to attacking Afghanistan and using Pakistan’s
destroy the entire jihad-international net- airspace and territory to do so. His only
work that Pakistan’s military-mosque nexus remaining option was to warn the Americans
(in cooperation with its allies in Saudi that their interests could be damaged if they
Arabia) was nourishing. At the same time, the refused to accept his demands.
U.S. offensive against terrorism should have He demonstrated his ability to advance
strengthened the hands of regional players that strategy by using various signals to
that opposed Pakistan’s strategic goals and threaten the Americans that unless they
religious mission, including the Northern modified their goals in the war on terrorism,
Alliance (fighting the Taliban) and Russia, including the attack on Afghanistan, they
the Central Asian republics, India, and Iran. would have to deal with two nightmare sce-
Washington’s goal turned out to be the narios: (a) a political backlash from the angry
ouster of the Pakistan-backed government in “street” in Pakistan (and across the entire
Kabul and its replacement by a broad-based Muslim world) that would lead to the col-
government that would be acceptable to lapse of the “moderate” and “pro-Western”
those other powers as well as the United Musharraf and his replacement by a radical
States. Ironically, that outcome was more or Islamic regime and (b) a Pakistani version of
less what the Soviets had been pushing for Israel’s “Samson Option,”46 in which a
after their withdrawal from Afghanistan— Pakistani regime, facing unacceptable pres-
and the United States and its “ally,” Pakistan, sures from the United States and India that
had resisted. (Bin Laden and his associates threatened its core national interests and sur-
would not have found a refuge in such a vival, would have no choice but to flex its
“neutral” Afghanistan.) After September 11, nuclear military power, even if that led to a
Pakistan seemed to be the big loser with no nuclear confrontation in South Asia. The lat-
other choice but to accept that outcome. ter nightmare scenario also suggested that if
The alternative would have been to irrevo- Musharraf resisted the pressure to threaten
cably alienate the United States, thus to use nuclear weapons, he would be ousted
enabling India to formalize its position as the by in a coup by more radical Islamic elements
dominant power in the region and perhaps in the military who would do so, or the coun-
Musharraf even provoking the Americans to give New try might collapse into a civil war with vari-
Delhi a green or yellow light to unleash its ous competing warlords getting access to the
proved to be an military power on Pakistan (with only China nuclear arsenal. Some of it might even fall
opportunistic balancing India). From a systemic perspective, into the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 47
politician advanc- September 11 helped to form a new balance At a minimum, Musharraf proved to be
of power, reestablishing the “red lines” that an opportunistic politician advancing his
ing his interests had disappeared after the collapse of the interests vis-à-vis the Americans as they took
vis-à-vis the Soviet superpower and impelling Washington the first steps in their war on terrorism. He
to restrain its Pakistani client state. succeeded in exploiting the unrest in
Americans as they Pakistan and the terrorist acts by anti-Indian
took the first Pakistan Invokes Frightening Specters Muslim groups. The latter probably had
steps in their war Hence, it is not surprising that some assistance from elements in the
Musharraf’s policies since September 11 Pakistani military and political establish-
on terrorism. have been aimed at resisting those pressures ment (with some level of “deniability,”
and at trying to maintain the status quo that although the spin advanced by Musharraf
had benefited Pakistan. Musharraf didn’t and his supporters was that the ISI and some

14
“cells” in the military were out of control and Ramadan and devise restrictive war aims in Islamabad advo-
acting like “rogue” institutions).48 Afghanistan based on Pakistan’s insistence cated only weak-
Moreover, the nuclear scenario seemed to on not eliminating the Taliban presence.
be an outgrowth of the new Pakistani nuclear Islamabad advocated only weakening the ening the regime
doctrine toward India that was adopted by regime and destroying al-Qaeda while leaving and destroying
Pakistan’s military-political leadership and in place “moderate” Taliban forces, consist-
based on pressuring Washington to tilt the ing of “defectors” from the movement, that
al-Qaeda while
regional balance of power back in favor of would play a role in a new postwar govern- leaving in place
Pakistan. The Pakistanis needed to persuade ment in Kabul.52 It seemed as though U.S. “moderate”
Washington that any Indian attack, even a officials were once again permitting the
limited one, on Pakistan could turn into a Pakistani tail to wag the American dog. Taliban forces.
major war, a notion that “intends to keep the Washington flirted with permitting a govern-
Indians off balance and to keep the United ment that was indirectly responsible for the
States worrying that there will be a major war terrorism inflicted on America to impose a
between the two nuclear-armed adversaries veto power on U.S. decisions, thereby ensur-
in South Asia if Washington does not stay ing that Pakistan would not end up with a
India’s hand.”49 regime in Kabul dominated by the unfriend-
The Indians clearly have an advantage over ly Northern Alliance.
Pakistan in conventional weapons; India has But the Bush administration decided to
more than 1.3 million active-duty soldiers continue pursuing the war during Ramadan
compared to barely 600,000 in Pakistan, and and gave a green light to Northern Alliance
India also has more than a two-to-one advan- forces to move toward Kabul. Musharraf
tage in combat aircraft as well as more tanks, again tried to reduce his losses by demanding
artillery, and ships.50 Since India could defeat that Kabul be “demilitarized” and that the
Pakistan in any conventional war, Pakistan’s Northern Alliance forces “must not” hold
threat to use nuclear weapons (again, similar it.53 Moreover, as revealed in reports in the
to some extent to the Israeli “Samson Option”) New York Times and elsewhere (including
was intended to send the message to the Seymour Hersh’s exposé in the New Yorker),
Indians and the Americans that once a conflict Islamabad continued to provide help to the
starts it is difficult to confine it. Moreover, Taliban forces fighting against the United
while the Indians might try to confine the con- States and its allies in Afghanistan.
flict to a conventional war, “it is the other side’s U.S. officials admitted that “one month
decision about how to respond” that will after the Pakistan government agreed to end
determine the final outcome.51 its support of the Taliban, its intelligence
agency was still providing safe passage for
Musharraf Fails to Achieve His Goal weapons and ammunition to arm them.”54
Muharraf’s strategy of resisting the U.S. According to those reports, hundreds of
policy (backed by Russia and India) aimed at Pakistani military officers and ISI agents pro-
bringing an end to the Pakistani-supported vided support to the Taliban forces and
power arrangements in Afghanistan seemed helped to evacuate 5,000 Taliban and al-
to be producing some results in the early Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to
stages of the U.S. military effort. The Bush Pakistan. Many of them were airlifted out of
administration initially responded positively the northern Afghan city of Kunduz just
to Islamabad’s calls for using diplomatic before it fell to the Northern Alliance.55 At
means to capture bin Laden and his associ- the same time, contrary to the nightmare sce-
ates. Even after the United States attacked narios floated by Musharraf, the Pakistani
Afghanistan, reports from Washington “street” did not erupt following the defeat of
reflected a willingness to suspend military the Taliban, and there were no indications
operations during the holy month of that Musharraf’s hold on power was in dan-

15
ger. So much for his implied threats of a tary superiority, coupled with the fact that
potential “radical implosion” of Pakistan. India could survive a nuclear first strike
After failing in that rearguard effort to pre- (Pakistan might not survive such an attack)
serve Pakistan’s dominant influence in would permit them to fight a limited war
Afghanistan and prevent the elimination of with Pakistan while deterring that country
Islamabad’s Taliban ally, the Pakistanis next from launching a nuclear attack on India.57 It
turned to securing their interests vis-à-vis was that demonstration of India’s military
India. Even if one doesn’t accept Indian allega- might, aimed at deterring Pakistan from
tions that some of the al-Qaeda fighters evac- launching a nuclear strike while India
uated from Afghanistan by the Pakistanis exploited its conventional advantage, not
were infiltrated into Kashmir, or that Musharraf’s sudden conversion to an
Pakistani agents assisted the December 13 Ataturk-like reformist agenda, that persuad-
attack on the Indian parliament, there is no ed Pakistan’s military dictator to pledge that
doubt that a lack of response by India to the his country would not be used as a base for
continued terrorism in Kashmir and the terrorism and to announce a broad ban on
attack in New Delhi would have been per- militant groups accused of fomenting vio-
ceived as a major blow to Indian national secu- lence in Indian-held Kashmir.58 India’s hard-
By threatening a rity interests and as a victory for Pakistan. It line position may have also persuaded the
nuclear escala- certainly would have created the impression Bush administration to toughen its position
tion, Islamabad that U.S. diplomatic pressure, driven by con- on Pakistan-based terrorist groups, includ-
siderations of Pakistani concerns, had made it ing those operating against Indian rule in
was pressing impossible for the Indians to react to a terror- Kashmir.59
Washington to ist attack in New Delhi in the same way that
the United States responded to similar attacks The Dispute with India and Pakistan’s
veto possible in New York and Washington. In short, by Decline
Indian military threatening a nuclear escalation, Islamabad The outcome of the Indian-Pakistani
action against was pressing Washington to veto possible standoff, highlighting Islamabad’s precari-
Indian military action against Pakistan. ous position, was the last stage in a process
Pakistan. that had been accelerating since September
11, during which time Pakistan had seen its
Pakistan: A Diminished strategic position badly erode. Also, with the
Client State Taliban gone, Pakistan has lost a key surro-
gate in its covert support for Islamic funda-
But India’s powerful reaction to the terror- mentalist guerrillas in Kashmir. These devel-
ist attack in New Delhi, including moving its opments took place against the backdrop of
aircraft and nuclear-capable short-range bal- a major U.S. assault against the jihad-inter-
listic missiles toward its border with Pakistan, national terrorism network, which included
shifting infantry divisions from the border many groups with close ties to Pakistan and
with China to the western frontier with its financial benefactor, Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan, and activating more than 1,000 More generally, the counterterrorism
tanks and armored vehicles, sent a clear mes- offensive against radical Islamic terrorist
sage to the world. India was promising, not groups and the growing hostility toward mil-
bluffing, and calling Pakistan’s bluff on its itant Islam in the United States and the West,
assumption that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal coupled with growing cooperation between
acts as a strategic “equalizer” that ensured that three leading foes of Pakistan—India, Israel,
Islamabad’s support for terrorism against and Turkey—have been major strategic blows
India would not escalate into an all-out war.56 to Pakistan. Add to that the political instabil-
But India’s military strategists are confi- ity and the economic and social problems
dent that their country’s conventional mili- that continue to beset Pakistan, and that

16
country has to be regarded as one of the Pakistan, in February 1999 and again in
strategic and economic losers in the interna- Agra, India, last year.
tional system that has evolved since The response from Musharraf’s military-
September 11. mosque nexus in Pakistan has been hostile
Yet the Bush administration and its and violent. After the Lahore summit, the
Western allies have continued to portray Pakistanis provided support to the insurgents
Islamabad as a “friend” and a “partner” of the that crossed the line of control in Kashmir
United States, have hailed Musharraf as a and attacked the Kargil region inside Indian-
“courageous” leader and a “reformist,” and controlled territory. And last October
have provided Islamabad with economic and Pakistani-backed insurgents attacked the
military assistance on the basis of the promises Jammu and Kashmir state legislature, an
by Pakistan to back the American anti-terror- attack that was followed by several more ter-
ism efforts and to take the road toward politi- rorist incidents in Indian-held Kashmir as
cal reform. “In the 1980s, Pakistan got a blank well as inside India itself. Moreover,
check from the U.S. to combat the Russians, Musharraf’s insistence on placing Kashmir at
and spent much of the check in building up the center of the negotiations between New
the Taliban,” argues journalist Christopher Delhi and Islamabad led to the collapse of the
Hitchens. “Now it is getting another check and Agra talks last summer. Hence, while both
brand-new interest-free mortgage in order to sides have legitimate interests in Kashmir, it is
pretend that the Taliban is its enemy. It doesn’t Pakistan’s military-mosque nexus, in cooper-
get any better than this.”60 ation with radical Islamic groups trained by
As noted, American policymakers, by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, that has been try-
assigning the role of strategic ally to Pakistan ing to destabilize the status quo and prevent a
during the Cold War (and especially during resolution based on direct negotiations
the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan), between India and Pakistan.
provided incentives to Pakistan through mil- Musharraf, who in a major address to the
itary assistance and economic subsidies to nation stressed that “Kashmir runs in our
abuse its position as a client state of the blood,” is interested in internationalizing the
United States and to adopt policies that ran dispute and getting the United States and
contrary to core U.S. national interests. With other countries, including other Muslim
the collapse of the Taliban regime and its ter- states and China, involved in the negotia-
rorist allies, the conflicting national interests tions over Kashmir.61 Indeed, internationaliz-
of Washington and Islamabad should ing the Kashmir conflict is supposed to serve
become more obvious. as an “equalizer” for Pakistan, helping to Internationalizing
Although a full-blown war between India counter India’s enormous diplomatic power.
and Pakistan may have been avoided (at least Pakistani leaders and intellectuals, even the Kashmir con-
for the moment), Kashmir remains a flash- moderate ones, regard the future of Kashmir flict is supposed
point. Pakistan argues that Kashmir, with its as a core national interest of Pakistan. “For to serve as an
Muslim majority, should become part of Pakistan, the belief that the province should
Muslim Pakistan, while India stresses that a have been part of Pakistan at the time of par- “equalizer” for
Muslim Kashmir can and should remain tition is as forcefully felt as the Palestinian Pakistan, helping
part of a secular and multiethnic India. belief in its rightful ownership of Jerusalem,”
Although both countries have supported a explained analyst David Rieff. “From the
to counter India’s
negotiated solution to the conflict, the Pakistani perspective, the Kashmiri fighters enormous diplo-
Indian government under Prime Minister are not terrorists, they are freedom fighters matic power.
Atal Behari Vajpayee, resisting opposition (echoes, again, of the Arab-Israeli conflict)
from the more nationalist forces in his coun- whose cause is sacrosanct.”62
try and party, initiated efforts to engage Although that is the way many Pakistanis
Pakistan, first, during talks in Lahore, relate to Kashmir, Pakistan’s political, intel-

17
The perception lectual, and military leaders should consider nothing to do with any need to placate India
that America has the current balance of power in South Asia or pander to its domestic lobby in the United
and the world, including Pakistan’s relation- States. Nor would it stem from “anti-
embraced ship with Washington. They need to realize Pakistani” or “anti-Muslim” sentiments. It
Musharraf since that continuing support by their country’s would reflect consideration of genuine
military-mosque nexus for anti-Indian ter- American national interests at the end of the
September 11 has rorism in Kashmir and elsewhere is going to Cold War and in the aftermath of September
emboldened weaken Pakistan’s national security and 11. The United States has a clear interest in
Pakistani hawks economy and isolate it internationally and establishing strong ties with India, one of the
might even result in another military defeat rising political, economic, and military pow-
to step up their by India. Islamabad would be making a mis- ers in Asia and a strategic counterbalance to
pressure in take were it to count on its nuclear capability China.64 India also happens to be the world’s
or its ties with Washington to change such largest democracy as well as an important
Kashmir. calculations. To put it differently, the emerging economy and an expanding market
Pakistanis have to realize that supporting the for U.S. goods and investment.
so-called freedom fighters of Kashmir could Moreover, secular and Westernized India
threaten their own survival as a nation. is a reliable and important partner in the war
against terrorism. Pakistan, with its dictator-
The Right U.S. Response ship, a failed economy, and an insecure
It is in this context that American policy nuclear arsenal, is at best a reluctant sup-
toward Pakistan can make a difference. porter of U.S. goals and at worst a potential
Indeed, the post–September 11 efforts by the long-term adversary. It remains under the
Bush administration to get Pakistan to aban- influence of radical Islamic forces hostile to
don its alliance with the Taliban should be the United States. Although the United
regarded as nothing more than a play-it-by- States should remain committed to a peace-
ear damage-control operation aimed at ful, negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dis-
reversing U.S. policies (including support for pute, and should not take steps that would
Pax Pakistana in Afghanistan) adopted dur- be construed as support for the more hawk-
ing the 1980s and early 1990s. But if those ish nationalist Hindu forces in New Delhi, it
efforts are understood as the beginning of should recognize that triumph by radical
some sort of new, long-term strategic alliance Muslim terrorists in Kashmir would amount
between Washington and Islamabad, to a defeat in the global war against terror-
Washington is sending the wrong signals to ism. Hence, pressing the Indians to not
both Pakistan and India. Such a policy would respond to terrorist acts and resisting Indian
strengthen the hands of the military-mosque calls for America to condemn anti-Indian ter-
nexus in Pakistan by suggesting that rorism in Kashmir reflect more than morally
Islamabad can count on the United States to dubious “double standards.” Such a policy
tilt the balance of power in its favor in its rela- runs contrary to U.S. national interests and is
tionship with India. just the latest demonstration of the way the
The perception that America has Pakistani tail can wag the American dog.
embraced Musharraf since September 11 has
emboldened Pakistani hawks to step up their
pressure in Kashmir, according to a veteran Conclusion
South Asia watcher, Selig Harrison. He sug-
gests that the United States should make it The United States should take the oppor-
clear now that Washington regards India, tunity offered by the changing international
some seven times bigger than Pakistan, “as realities and the developments in Asia not
the focus of U.S. interests in South Asia.”63 only to strengthen its ties with India but also
Such a statement of U.S. policy would have to study the idea of “constructive disengage-

18
ment” from Pakistan, now that that nation world’s most anti-American states. Even U.S. policymak-
has lost its strategic value to Washington and worse, Pakistan’s status as an unruly client ers should reject
has become more of a burden than an asset as state has fostered anti-American sentiment.
far as long-term U.S. interests (and values) are Indeed, as Hitchens suggests, the pervasive any idea of estab-
concerned. U.S. policymakers should certain- anti-Americanism that he found in Pakistan lishing perma-
ly reject any idea of establishing permanent “springs exactly from this mendicant’s-beg-
American military bases in the hostile politi- ging-bowl arrangement. Pakistanis know that
nent American
cal environment of Pakistan.65 Washington they are bought and paid for, and so the way to military bases in
should also recognize that any effort to prop assert pride is to spit in the face of those who the hostile politi-
up the Pakistani military involves a major have owned and used them.”68 It’s time for
long-term risk—that the powerful military Americans and Pakistanis to bring a sense of cal environment
machine of Pakistan will fall one day into the normalcy and dignity into their relationship. of Pakistan.
hands of a radical Islamic regime bent on That means cutting Pakistan loose from its
going to war with India and exporting its ide- status as a U.S. client.
ology to other parts of the world.
Direct U.S. economic assistance to the
government of Pakistan only helps to sustain Notes
a corrupt, statist economic system and 1. Quoted in Carolyn Lochhead, “Bush Insists on
diverts funds to support the military U.S. Resolve; U.S. Pledges Boost in Aid to Pakistan,”
buildup. That is not to say that the United San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 2001.
States should isolate Pakistan. To the con-
2. Quoted in Christopher de Bellaigue, “The
trary, the Bush administration and Congress Perils of Pakistan,” New York Review of Books,
should stress a commitment to integrating November 15, 2001, p. 44.
Pakistan into the global economy, including
elimination of U.S. tariffs on Pakistani textile 3. U.S. Department of State, “Joint U.S.-Pakistan
Statement for President Musharraf’s Visit to New
exports and encouragement of economic York, November 10, 2001,” www.state.gov/p/sa/
cooperation between India and Pakistan.66 rt/index.cfm?docid+6060.
Americans and Westerners should
applaud a course leading to the moderniza- 4. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-
2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: Johns
tion of Pakistan and its transformation into a Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 320.
secular and open society, but there isn’t much
that Washington can do to promote such a 5. See Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan Is Facing Terrorist
change. Americans should not be required to Listing,” New York Times, April 25, 1993.
“reward” Pakistan for taking steps that are in 6. Richard Beeston, “Pakistan Will Let US Forces Use
its own interest, such as reforming its political Border Airbases,” Times (London), September 20, 2001.
and economic system, ending anti-American
and anti-Semitic propaganda, arresting ter- 7. Quoted in “Pakistan and the Taliban: About
Turn,” The Economist, October 6, 2001.
rorists, or reducing tensions with India.67
Pakistan’s “rewards” for doing all of that 8. Quoted in “U.S. Relations with Pakistan
would be considerable: growing diplomatic, Revived,” Stratfor Commentary, September 13,
economic, and cultural ties with the United 2001, www.startfor.com/home/010912310.htm.
States; integration into the global economy; 9. U.S. Department of State, “President of
and peace and prosperity. American taxpayers Pakistan Reaffirms Commitment to Fight
certainly should not “reward” a nation that Terrorism,” November 10, 2001, www.gov/p/sa/
allies itself with regimes and groups that rt/index.cfm?docid=6056.
encourage terrorists to kill Americans. 10. Michael Cabbage, “Pakistan’s Leaders Risk
By permitting Islamabad to “wag” Strife by Backing US,” Orlando Sentinel, October 4,
Washington and squeeze rewards from it, 2001. See also Pamela Constable, “Attacks on US
Washington has helped to prop up one of the Drive Pakistan to a Crossroads,” Washington Post,
October 8, 2001.

19
11. Bellaigue, p. 44. 24. Quoted in Kux, p. 268. The quotes are taken
from a State Department memorandum and
12. Hugh Clifton, “Coverage Varies on Scope of talking points for Secretary Shultz’s meeting with
Anti-US Sentiment in Pakistan,” PR Week, Zia that Kux obtained through the Freedom of
October 29, 2001, p. 14. Information Act.

13. “The Saving of Pakistan?” The Economist, 25. See ibid. Other interesting analyses include Diego
January 19, 2002, p. 11. Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Paula R.
14. Paul Leventhal, “Cut Off Aid to Pakistan,” Newberg, Double Betrayal, Repression and Insurgency in
Washington Post, October 8, 1990; R. Jeffrey Smith, Kashmir (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
“Administration Unable to Win Support for International Peace, 1995).
Continued Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post,
October 10, 1990; and Robin Wright and William 26. See Michael Kaufman, “Body of Second
Orme, “Bush Vows $900 Million for Pakistan,” Los American Is Found in Islamabad Embassy,” New
Angeles Times, November 11, 2001, p. 1. For more York Times, November 23, 1979.
details, see Barbara Leitch LePoer, “Pakistan-U.S.
Relations,” CRS Issue Brief, IB94041, updated 27. That was certainly the impression given by for-
November 1, 2001. mer CIA director Robert Gates in his book, From
the Shadows (New York: Simon and Schuster,
15. Evelyn Iritani, “Aid Plan May Displease 1996). See also Bernard Weinraub, “Zia Says U.S.-
Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times,November 10, 2001, p. 1. Pakistani Ties Based on Strategic Concerns,”
Washington Post, December 3, 1982.
16. “Remarks by Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf to the Pakistani People,” Major Leader 28. Most of this paper’s account of the coopera-
Special Transcripts, Federal News Service, tion between Pakistan and the United States in
September 19, 2001. the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan is
based on Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil
17. “Pakistan and the United States: Caught in and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven,
the Middle,” The Economist, September 22, 2001. Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

18. Pakistan‘s interior minister Moinuddin 29. Terrence Smith, “Carter Embargoes Technology
Haidar, quoted in Jamal Halaby, “Pakistan-U.S. for Soviets and Curtails Fishing and Grain,” New
Relations Had Their Ups and Downs, But York Times, January 5, 1980; Stuart Auerbach,
Washington Had Learned from Past Mistakes, “Pakistan Is Reluctant to Accept Limited U.S. Arms
Interior Minister Says,” Associated Press, Pledge,” Washington Post, January 6, 1980; and
November 22, 2001. William Branigan, “Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S.
Aid, Washington Post, January 23, 1980.
19. Stephen Kinzer, “The World Takes Notice:
Kashmir Gets Scarier,” New York Times, June 29, 1999. 30. Those two crises are analyzed in Richard Ned
Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War
20. Constable, “Attacks on US Drive Pakistan to a (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Crossroads.”
31. See, in addition to Rashid, Steve Coll, “The
21. On post–September 11 revelations of links Anatomy of Victory: CIA’s Overt War in
between Balkan Muslims and bin Laden, see Ian Afghanistan,” Washington Post, July 20, 1992.
Fisher, “Al-Qaeda Suspect’s Bosnian Wife Says
He’s No Terrorist,” New York Times, January 28, 32. Kux, p. 282.
2002; Nikolaos A. Stavrou, “Balkan Branches of
the Terror Network,” Washington Times, October 33. See Rashid, who provides an overview of the
21, 2001; and Maria Christoff Kurop,”Al Qaeda’s relationship between Pakistan, the Taliban, and
Balkan Links,” Wall Street Journal, Europe, bin Laden.
November 1, 2001.
34. “The War on Terror, Exchange between
22. For a historical analysis of Horthy’s strategy, Robert Kaplan and Robert Wright,” Slate.com,
see Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1936–45): Nemesis (New posted January 16, 2002, slate.msn.com/?id=
York: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 734–35. 2060741&entry=2060748&device=.

23. Thomas L. Friedman, “Pakistan’s 35. Barbara Crossette, “Kabul Falls to Islamic
Constitution Avenue,” New York Times, January Militias; Afghans Accuse Pakistan,” New York
20, 2002, p. WK13. Times, September 27, 1996.

20
36. According to Human Rights Watch, “Crisis in 52. “Steadying Nerves,” The Economist, November
Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran 3, 2001, p. 22.
in Fueling the Civil War,” Special Report 13, no. 3
(July 2001), quoted in ibid. 53. “Now for an Equally Hard Part,” The Economist,
November 17, 2001, p. 15.
37. Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, “On the Frontier
of Apocalypse,” Vanity Fair,January 2002, p. 86. 54. Frantz, “Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban Only
Hesitantly.”
38. Quoted in Eric Eckholm, “Pakistan Pledges to
Bar Any Groups Linked to Terror,” New York 55. See Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway,” New
Times, January 13, 2002. Yorker, January 28, 2002, pp. 36–40.

39. “The Saving of Pakistan?” 56. Celia W. Dugger, “Behind India’s


Brinkmanship: Ominous Preparations to Follow
40. Rod Norldland and Zahid Husain, “Pakistan’s Through,” New York Times, January 12, 2002.
Striving Son,” Newsweek, January 28, 2002, p. 18.
57. See Hersh, “The Getaway.”
41. Pamela Constable, “U.S. Strike Is Blow to
Pakistan’s Rulers,” Washington Post, August 26, 1998. 58. Eckholm.

42. On the concept of an “Islamic bomb,” see 59. David Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, “Reacting to
Steve Weisman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Attack in India, U.S. Aims at Pakistan Groups’
Bomb (New York: Times Books, 1981). Assets,” New York Times, December 21, 2001; and
Peter Slevin, “Pakistan Groups Called Terrorist
43. Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan Ended Aid to Organizations,” Washington Post, December 27, 2001.
Taliban Only Hesitantly,” New York Times,
December 8, 2001. 60. Hitchens, p. 153.

44. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 Nuclear 61. Quoted in John F. Burns, “Pakistani Trying to
Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Redefine the Nation,” New York Times, January 13,
Washington Post, December 12, 2001; and Douglas 2002.
Frantz, James Risen, and David Sanger, “Nuclear
Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al Qaeda,” 62. David Rieff, “Pakistani President Musharraf
New York Times, December 9, 2001. Caught in Political Quagmire,” San Francisco
Chronicle, January 6, 2002.
45. Celia W. Dugger, “In Charmed India, Clinton
Wooed, and Maybe Won,” New York Times, March 63. Selig S. Harrison, “If Pakistan Is an Ally of the
31, 2000; and Barry Bearak, “A Little Shop in United States of America, Good Luck to the
Pakistan Tunes in to Clinton on TV,” New York United States of America,” Los Angeles Times,
Times, March 26, 2000. January 27, 2001.

46. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: 64. As analyst Victor M. Gorbarev argued in a
Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy recent policy paper, “India could become a strate-
(New York: Random House, 1999). gic counterweight to China and a crucial part of a
stable balance of power in both East Asia and
47. See Seymour M. Hersh, “Watching the South Asia.” Victor M. Gobarev, “India as a World
Warheads,” New Yorker, November 5, 2001, pp. 48–54. Power: Changing Washington’s Myopic Policy,”
Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, September
48. See, for example, Douglas Frantz, “The Rogue 11, 2000, p. 2.
to Fear Most Is the One Following Orders,” New
York Times, January 13, 2002, p. WK1. 65. Kamran Khan and Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S.
Military Begins Shift from Bases in Pakistan,”
49. Michael R. Gordon, “Kashmir Threat Eases, Washington Post, January 11, 2002.
But U.S. Still Sees Dangers,” New York Times,
January 29, 2002. 66. See Lael Brainard, “Textiles and Terrorism,”
New York Times, December 27, 2001.
50. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “For India,
Deterrence May Not Prevent War,” Washington 67. Jim Hoagland, “No Rewards for Pakistan,”
Post, January 17, 2002. Washington Post, January 17, 2002.

51. Pakistani official quoted in Gordon. 68. Hitchens, p. 153.

21
Published by the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis is a regular series evaluating government policies and offer-
ing proposals for reform. Nothing in Policy Analysis should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views
of the Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before congress. Contact the
Cato Institute for reprint permission. Additional copies of Policy Analysis are $6.00 each ($3.00 each for five
or more). To order, or for a complete listing of available studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts
Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001, call toll free 1-800-767-1241 (noon - 9 p.m. eastern time), fax (202) 842-
3490, or visit our website at www.cato.org.

22

You might also like