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Q u a t e r n ar y D is c o u r s e in Nagar j una and D e r r ida
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Q u a t e r n ar y D is c o u r s e in Nagar j una and D e r r ida
That is: the text hides something; it implies but does not immedi-
ately disclose. And so Derrida’s text is, in a way, a Gnostic text,26 a
system of secret knowledge, but secret only in as much as the “laws
of its composition and the rules of its game” cannot be perceived
in the present, cannot be conceptualised as a presence. And so, for
Derrida, deconstructively reading a text means to uncover the “silent
complicity between the superstructural pressures of metaphysics and
an ambiguous innocence about a detail at the level of base.”27 That
is, reading is a process of presenting examples, small elements in texts
that can tell the reader something unexpected – and not entirely
intended – about a text, or about texts generally (e.g., the sponge in
St. Augustine’s Confessions, the pharmakon in the Phaedrus, the sup-
plément in Rousseau); examples that can illustrate part of the hidden
truth of the text.
This illumination is comparable to the enlightenment of nirvāna
in Buddhism; for nirvāna is “to see the state of things as they are,”28
to break out of ignorance about samsāra and into knowledge of it,
to know that all things are empty of intrinsic existence or original-
ity – to see, in other words, the hidden truth of the text of samsāra.29
And so the Buddhist practitioner “reads” samsāra for examples, small
objects within the weave of samsāra that, when properly considered,
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Derrida –that they are not two. Like the figure of Theuth, which “is
opposed to its other…as that which at once supplements and sup-
plants it,”44 Derrida sees (descriptively, negatively, as a problematic
symptom of Western Metaphysics) both writing and death as figures
opposed (here, in the passive voice) to their others (speech and life,
respectively), and as actions, karma, that must be performed in a
way that supplements their “others” (that is, is not coterminous with
them) and replaces them. Writing and death are the same, they are
the action that supplements and supplants.
And we see this relationship between writing, life, and death
mirrored in Buddhist thought on life, death, and karma. Let us read
the continuation of the quotation above from Rahula:
Before we go on to life after death, let us consider what this
life is, and how it continues now. What we call life…is the
combination of…physical and mental energies. These are
constantly changing; they do not remain the same for two con-
secutive moments. Every moment they are born and they die. 45
And now let us end this quotation and consider the following brief
quote from Derrida:
Traces thus produce the space of their inscription only by acced-
ing to the period of their erasure. From the beginning, in the
“present” of their first impression, they are constituted by
the double force of repetition and erasure.46
In the quote from Rahula, we see that life is a constant changing, a
vacillation from birth to death, from becoming to unbecoming. This
becoming and unbecoming is karma, action, and is dependent upon
karmavipāka, the effect of karma. In the quote from Derrida, we see
that traces, which are in a sense another kind of writing,47 follow the
same sort of existence that Rahula describes: they constantly become
and unbecome. And so writing participates in a vacillation between
life and death just as karma does. Derrida states later: “writing…
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is technē as the relation between life and death”;48 that is, writing is
a craft, art, or practice that works as the relation between life and
death, just as Theuth, the sign of writing, is a technician, a crafts-
man, an artisan, a practitioner at the ritual boundary between life
and death. Writing is action across life and death, but not action
that transcends it, as writing itself becomes and unbecomes, lives
and dies. Writing is karma that brings about the samsāra of the text,
constantly becoming and unbecoming, constantly dying.
I have attempted to produce a consideration of the affinities be-
tween Buddhism and Derrida, following a quaternary unfolding, a
PaRDeS, a tetralemmic argument: first, through an examination of
emptiness in Buddhism—specifically in Nāgārjuna—and in Der-
rida, including a consideration of Nāgārjuna’s tetralemma and Der-
rida’s own PaRDeS; then, by a consideration of samsāra and the text,
which work in analogous ways; then, by a consideration of the cor-
respondence between writing and karmavipāka; and finally by con-
sidering the similarity in the concepts of death in Buddhism and
Derrida. Our work here has been brief and, it must be admitted,
multa prætereo, quia multim festino.49 Certainly, it should be remem-
bered that Buddhism and Derrida’s ideas come from very different
geopolitical and historical loci (there is a spatial-temporal différance
between them), and so these similarities are just that: more properly
points of similarity in distinct discourses than “proofs” of philosoph-
ical or ideological convergence, Derrida not having been conversant
in Buddhism, and Nāgārjuna certainly not having been conversant
in twentieth-century discourses like Deconstruction. Their shared
use of quaternary discourse to oppose logocentric views of Being
and action may ultimately suggest, then, as Mabbett notes, “the op-
eration of common social or cultural forces in a way that transcends
the differences between civilizations,”50 specifically as regards ontol-
ogy and other systems of signification. In the end, then, this will
have been “the crossing between…two phantoms of witnesses who
will never come down to the same”:51 two examples of examples of
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Endnotes
1
cf., for example, Dorothy Figen, “Is Buddhism a Religion?” http://www.
buddhistinformation.com/is_buddhism_a_religion1.htm)and Narada Thera’s
“Buddhism in a Nutshell” http://www.buddhanet.net/nutshell03.htm.
2
The terms “Buddhism” and “Derrida” are of course not precise. Though their
functionality as labels is limited, I use them here as a sort of shorthand to sig-
nify the discourses they evoke.
3
This paper, originally written in a seminar on Derrida, mirrors in many ways
the idiosyncratic features of his discourse, with the intent that allowing Der-
rida’s discourse to govern the description of his ideas will give the reader a bet-
ter insight into his philosophy than a strictly descriptive, logical overview. For
such an overview, I recommend Geoffrey Bennington’s “Derridabase” in his
collaborative work with Derrida, Jacques Derrida. An example of Derridean-
ism:, the paper follows Derrida’s tendency to use examples rather than logo-
centric arguments to illustrate a thesis. The reader should note, too, that the
use of the first person plural functions rhetorically in Derrida’s writing to break
down the dichotomy between author and reader. I borrow it here in hopes of
giving the reader a sense of the commitment and work Derrida demands from
a reader. A final caveat: the reader should note that to begin with an idea and
return to it after a long discursion is another Derridean tactic, mirroring the
deferral inherent in writing and the organization of linguistic signs.
4
cf. Ian W. Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” Philosophy East and West
45 (1995): 211, note 39 on p. 223 of the same text, and Nathan Katz, “Pras-
añga and Deconstruction: Tibetan Hermeneutics and the yāna Controversy,”
Philosophy East and West 34 (1984): 187 for more discussion of the charge of
nihilism levelled against the Buddhist concept of emptiness.
Being, with a capital “B,” (G. Sein) is Heidegger’s term, as used in Sein und
5
Zeit, for absolute Being itself, as distinguished from any individual beings.
Heidegger claims in this seminal work that Being is directly intelligible;
Derrida opposes Heidegger’s ontological project. My objective in calling on
Heidegger here is simply to compare the usual conception of “apparently in-
dependent elements of being” that can be known directly – which Buddhism
refutes – to Heidegger’s Being. (cf. Bass’ note on Heidegger’s terms on pg. xvii
of his English translation of Writing and Difference.)
6
Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 211. My italics.
7
It is difficult (especially in the space of a footnote!) to explain these terms
without the addition of several pages of commentary. To be brief: différance is
a word Derrida coined (playing on the French for “difference,” différence, and
the French for “to defer,” différer) which signifies both a spatial and a temporal
difference between things; Derrida suggests that this différance characterizes
the effect of writing on the communicator and the communicated (cf. Bass’
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Q u a t e r n ar y D is c o u r s e in Nagar j una and D e r r ida
note on pg. xvi of Writing and Difference for more on différance). Brisure is
the French term for “hinge,” but can also mean “joint, crack, fold, breach,
fragment.” Derrida uses the term in Of Grammatology to denote the copulative
nature of writing (cf. 65-73). “Trace,” says Derrida, “is the différance which
opens appearance and signification” (Of Grammatology, 65. Emph. Orig.)—
that is (to an over-generalization), the trace is the evidence of a difference in
communication, which gives insight into apparent nature (we should recall
Heidegger’s Sein) and signification, the semiotic/linguistic concept that signs
and their signifieds have a direct relationship. Pharmakon is the Greek term
for “drug,” and can mean “poison, cure, medicine, amulet,” and “antidote,”
depending on its context. Derrida explores the concept of the pharmakon in
great depth in “Plato’s Pharmacy.” Cf. also Spivak’s Translator’s Preface to Of
Grammatology, p. lxxii.
8
Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 211.
9
Roger R. Jackson, “Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist
Tendencies in Buddhist Thought,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion
57 (1989): 568.
10
Tetralemma comes from the Greek for “four premises.”
11
I am indebted to Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 213 for this
elegantly simple explanation of the tetralemma.
12
Jackson, “Matching Concepts,” 573.
13
Derrida’s work on Saussure in Of Grammatology problematizes Saussure’s
direct relationship of the signified and the signifier. For more on this see Ben-
nington’s “Derridabase” in Jacques Derrida, 23-42.
14
Ibid., 574.
15
Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” in Jacques Derrida, tr. Geoffrey Bennington
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 110.
16
Ibid.
17
Phillip Culbertson, “Pee(k)ing into Derrida’s Underpants: Circumcision, Tex-
tual Multiplexity, and the Cannibalistic Mother,” The Journal for the Society of
Textual Reasoning 10 (2001) http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/tr/archive /
volume10/peeking.html (Accessed 6 Dec. 2007).
18
Derrida, “Circumfession,” 110.
19
Logocentricity for Derrida is a term with a wide range of possible meanings; in
this respect, it is itself an attack on logocentrism via the ambiguation of lin-
guistic concurrence, as it is a signifier with a range of signifieds. As used here,
it means more directly an adherence to hierarchical, Heideggerian conceptions
of Being.
20
Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974),
146.
21
Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 207.
22
That is, birth and death.
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23
Xiaoying Wang, “Derrida, Husserl, and the Structural Affinity between the
‘Text’ and the Market,” New Literary History 26 (no. 2, 1995): 261.
24
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 227.
25
Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 63.
26
Edward W. Said, “The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions,” Crit-
ical Inquiry 4 (no. 4, Summer 1978): 675: “to say that the text’s textual inten-
tion and integrity are invisible is to say that the text hides something, that the
text implies, perhaps also states, embodies, represents, but does not immediately
disclose something. At bottom, this is a gnostic [sic] doctrine of the text.” (his
emphasis).
27
Ibid., 678-79.
28
Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 40 n. 1. It is important to note that, despite
popular misconceptions to the contrary, samsāra and nirvāna are not different
things in Buddhism; samsāra is not equivalent to the world and nirvāna is not
equivalent to heaven. Cf. also Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārika XXV.19 in this
regard.
29
cf. also Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 208: “Deconstruction,
which employs a special type of contemplative thought—Denken, we might
call it—gives us the eye of insight to see that this is what is happening. It is
really like the Buddha eye, which sees all things, and the enlightenment it
promises is really like bodhi.”
30
Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 32.
31
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 224.
32
Hypomnesis comes from the Greek for “outside the memory.” In the Phaedrus,
Plato distinguishes between “true memory” (mneme) and “false” memory
(hypomnesis), the former being, for Plato, a form of access to the true forms
(eidos); the latter being equivalent to implements of reminding, such as writ-
ing and sophistic mnemonic devices (Phaedrus 274e-275b).
33
Sogyal Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, (San Francisco:
Harper, 1993), 96.
34
Arche-writing refers to the organization and spacing of language (its differenti-
ation) prior to speech and conventional writing. Cf. Of Grammatology 56, 61,
69, and the section from 44 quoted here in note 37.
35
Said, The Problem of Textuality,” 690.
36
cf. Of Grammatology, 44: “If ‘writing’ signifies inscription and especially the
durable institution of a sign… writing in general covers the entire field of lin-
guistic signs.”
37
Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 32-33.
38
Derrida, “Circumfession,” 208.
39
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 227.
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40
The attentive reader may already have noticed that many sentences in this
paper begin with “and.” This is not simply a neglect of stylistic advice to the
contrary; it mirrors Derrida’s tendency to do so, which itself exemplifies the
supplementary nature of writing as an addition to speech, esp. for Plato and
Saussure. (For more on writing and supplement, cf. “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 73-74,
76, 83, and 93 and “Freud and the Scene of Writing” 206 ff.)
41
Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 91.
42
Ibid., 92.
43
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 226: “Representation is death.
Which may be immediately transformed into the following proposition: death
is (only) representation.” For more on representation and death, cf. “Plato’s
Pharmacy,” 90-94.
44
Ibid. 92-93.
45
Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, 33. My italics.
46
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 226. My italics.
47
cf. Harold G. Coward, “‘Speech versus Writing’ in Derrida and Bhartrhari,”
Philosophy East and West 41 (no 2, April 1991): 146, and “Plato’s Pharmacy,”
p. 149.
48
Derrida, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” 228.
49
Lat. “I pass over many things, for I am in a great hurry.” Orig. from St. Augus-
tine’s Confessions, IX, viii, 17. Qtd. In Derrida, “Circumfession,” 147.
50
Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 218-19.
51
Ibid., 315.
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