ASSESSING THE 2012 UN GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT ON THE DRC

An Analysis of Methodology, Cooperation and Implications

April 1, 2013

Table of Contents
Introduction by the Howard G. Buffett Foundation................... 3 Scope Note.......................................................................... 4 Key Findings........................................................................ 5 Background ........................................................................ 6 Analysis of Methodology........................................................ 9 Diplomacy and Cooperation................................................. 14 Rebuttals and Responses to Criticism .................................. 17 Implications for Achieving Peace ......................................... 20

COMMISSIONED BY:

The Howard G. Buffett Foundation makes no warranty (express or implied) as to the accuracy or completeness of the information provided or to information published by third parties referenced within its assessments. All information and material is believed to be correct. No liability is assumed for errors in substance or form of any of the materials provided. The Foundation shall not be liable for any loss of profits or contracts or any direct, indirect or consequential loss, business interruption, or death or personal injury arising out of or in connection with the use of the information contained herein.

INTRODUCTION BY THE HOWARD G. BUFFETT FOUNDATION

The Howard G. Buffett Foundation is a private family foundation working to improve the standard of living and quality of life for the worlds most impoverished and marginalized populations. Today, there are few populations more impoverished and marginalized than the people of the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Two decades of conflict have created a crisis where a significant portion of the population lives under conditions that deprive them of basic human needs. We believe a change is long overdue and must take place. The world, and especially the United States, must take a bolder and more courageous stand against the main contributors of conflict in this region. Like many donors with interests in eastern DRC, we were very anxious to read the 2012 UN Group of Experts (GoE) Final Report. We fully appreciate how complex it is to conduct field research in the midst of conflict. We also understand how difficult it is to gain a complete and accurate picture of all of the dynamics at play in this chaotic region. We therefore wanted to understand if and how the GoEs recommendations should inform our future grantmaking and commissioned an independent review of the reports process and findings. The results of that review, contained herein, leave us frustrated with the deterioration of cooperation and diplomacy reflected in this most recent GoE process. We are disappointed by much of the resulting media coverage which has oversimplified the source of conflict and its solutions. We fundamentally disagree with the punitive response by bilateral donors. We do not feel holding back the development of countries in the region helps achieve what we all want for the people of eastern DRC: lasting peace and economic prosperity. Our Foundation is not interested in apportioning blame for what we view is a fundamental failure in the GoE process in 2012; we will leave the pointcounterpoint on questions of fact to others. Instead, we urge the current GoE to ensure future reports meet the high standards of cooperation previously set. Our Foundation will, as part of our Africa Great Lakes Peace Initiative, work to support such efforts. In the absence of constructive cooperation, we will also look to our own independent sources to inform our grantmaking decisions. The Howard G. Buffett Foundation is a non-political entity working to support lasting peace and promote economic prosperity in Africas Great Lakes region, particularly in eastern DRC. We welcome collaboration with any individual or organization looking to do the same.

The world, and especially the United States, must take a bolder and more courageous stand against the main contributors of conflict in this region.

Scope Note
The Howard G. Buffett Foundation commissioned an open-source evaluation of the UN Group of Experts (GoE)s special reports on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2021. We did not attempt to assess the validity of any specific content in the reports, but sought to answer the following questions: Did the GoE employ a sound methodology and adhere to its UN mandate? Did the GoEs 2012 Final Report adequately respond to criticisms and rebuttals of its 2012 Interim Report and Addendum? Did the most recent reports content accurately represent the broad range of factors contributing to conflict in the DRC? This report was prepared by independent, third-party organizations with no affiliation with any of the state and/or non-state actors or organizations cited herein. The Foundation engaged Lake Partners Strategy Consultants and the Crumpton Group LLC, as well as other individuals and institutions with deep experience in the region, to review the GoE findings and provide feedback. The Foundation also provided input to this analysis based on our 14-year history working in the region and our frequent field visits to the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, particularly over the last year.

The dialogue on how to resolve the Congo crisis has become unhelpful and polarizing. It has dissolved into emotional grandstanding and finger pointing.
Johnnie Carson Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
11 December 2012

Key Findings
The UNs search for the sources of instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is both timely and commendable. However, throughout 2012, cooperation and diplomacy between the Group of Experts (GoE) and the Governments of Rwanda (GoR) and Uganda (GoU), elements required by the GoEs UN mandate, broke down. This fatally undermines the value of the GoEs important work and increases risk in the region. It is not significant who was first to withdraw cooperation. The failure in process undermines the credibility of the findings, limiting potential policy prescriptions that could reduce violence in the Great Lakes region. The lack of required cooperation between the GoE, the UN Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), the GoR and to a lesser extent, the GoU, limited first-person, in-country data gathering on the issues of statesponsored support for M23 and recruitment of ex-combatants. This lack of cooperation appeared to prompt an unproductive digging in of heels by the GoE, the GoR and the GoU, casting doubt on material questions of fact. While prior GoE reports focused on a broader range of interactions, the 2012 Final Report reads as a prosecution of Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, largely ignoring the other significant factors contributing to unrest in the DRC. Again, the breakdown in diplomacy combined with the GoEs legitimate desire to focus on findings of highest impact appears to have led to this skew. The report prompted threats by Uganda to pull back their counterLRA efforts and reduce their military contributions to peacekeeping and stability efforts in Somalia and other parts of Africa. The breakdown in this years process has already led to significant, punitive actions against Rwanda, which serve only to undermine that countrys positive development trajectory while making it more difficult for the region to work together to find a lasting solution to achieve peace.

The failure in process undermines the credibility of the findings, limiting potential policy prescriptions that could reduce violence in the Great Lakes region.

Background
History of the GoE
In July 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1493 which, among other things, imposed an embargo on military support to armed groups involved in the latest fighting in the DRCs Kivu and Ituri regions. The following year, on 12 March 2004, the Council passed Resolution 1533 which created a Group of Experts (GoE) and mandated they work cooperatively with other UN agencies and States in the region to gather information about the flow of arms in potential violation of Resolution 1493. The GoE mandate also instructed the GoE to make recommendations to help States in the region comply with the embargo and identify potential violators of the embargo. For several years, the GoE reported back to the Council annually with interim and final reports. A series of Security Council Resolutions extended the GoEs mandate and expanded it to include human rights abuses, child soldiers, recycling of excombatants, and mining and minerals smuggling in the DRC. The GoE has historically taken a comprehensive and diplomatic approach, gathering data and making constructive recommendations in this complex, war-torn region. On 29 November 2011, Resolution 2021 again reauthorized the GoE. The subject of this analysis is the work performed under this Resolution. On 28 November 2012, Resolution 2078 extended the GoEs mandate through 2013.

The GoE has historically taken a comprehensive and diplomatic approach, gathering data and making constructive recommendations in this complex, war-torn region.

History of M23
On 23 March 2009, the Government of the DRC and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), an armed militia group in eastern DRC formed primarily to protect the security interests of the Tutsi population against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), signed a peace treaty wherein the CNDP became a political party. As part of this agreement, CNDP soldiers were integrated into the DRC military (FARDC). In April 2012, a group of soldiers from the original CNDP faction, citing poor treatment and a breach of the 2009 treaty, mutinied against the DRC government and formed a new group called M23. It is important to note that the creation of M23 and the escalation of conflict in eastern DRC began during the research phase of the GoE work mandated by Resolution 2021.

Controversy Surrounding the 2012 GoE Reports

The emergence of M23, and practical considerations including a fixed reporting deadline and restricted word count, prompted the GoE to narrow the focus of its 2012 reports to violations of the arms embargo as it related specifically to M23. This narrow focus therefore requires readers of the 2012 reports to also rely on the GoEs prior reports for broader context. The contents of the 2012 GoE Interim Report Addendum and the Final Report (i.e., that Rwanda and Uganda were systematically supporting M23), in addition to several media leaks of the reports findings, created a frenzy of negative sentiment toward Rwandas and Ugandas purported roles in the conflict, as well as counter-charges of bias against the UN and GoE.

Timeline of Events
18 May 2012: GoE submits its Interim Report (S/2012/348) to the Security Council Sanctions Committee. 28 May 2012: The BBC breaks a story headlined Rwanda supporting DR Congo mutineers that cites an internal UN report seen by the BBC. The story makes no mention of Uganda.1 30 May 2012: UN spokesman, Penangnini Toure, denies the GoE report contains such claims and dismisses accusations that the UN tried to cover up these findings. Speaking to Voice of America, Toure states, the UN did not produce a report saying that Rwanda is directly involved in what is happening in eastern Congo.2 13 June 2012: The GoE orally briefs the Security Council Sanctions Committee on its initial findings regarding Rwandas alleged support of M23.3 18 June 2012: Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Louise Mushikiwabo, publishes an Op-Ed stating that Rwanda plays no role in internal disputes within the Congolese military.4 20 June 2012: Human Rights Watch and Congos Ambassador to France both accuse the UN of suppressing an Addendum to the GoEs Interim Report.5 21 June 2012: The GoEs Interim Report is submitted to the President of the Security Council. As with prior reports, it is broad-reaching in identifying sources of unrest in the region. There is no accusation of Rwandan or Ugandan support for M23. 26 June 2012: The Chair of the Security Council Sanctions Committee submits to the President of the Security Council a 47-page Addendum to the GoEs Interim Report (S/2012/348/Add.1). This Addendum accuses Rwanda of directly supporting M23. Uganda is not mentioned. 26 June 2012: Foreign Policy blog (a division of the Washington Post) publishes an exclusive article claiming that the GoE report, distributed to Security Council members but not made public, alleges Rwanda is in violation of UN resolutions banning weapons to armed groups in the DRC.6

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18231128 http://www.voanews.com/content/us_condemns_upsurge_massacres_violence_eastern_congo_drc/1145322.html 3 S/2012/348/Addendum 1 4 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-truth-about-rwanda 5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18538997 and http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/20/is_the_us_blocking_a_controversial_un_report_to_shield_rwanda 6 http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/26/exclusive_un_panel_says_rwanda_behind_congolese_mutiny

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 30 July 2012: An anonymous Congolese diplomat at the DRC embassy in London, in response to an inquiry about Ugandas role in the conflict, tells the Ugandan Correspondent, our preliminary intelligence reportssuggest that there may indeed be some Ugandan soldiers who entered our territory for reasons that are not known to us.7 30 July 2012: Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) denies the Congolese diplomats claims, and [Uganda Military Chief] General Aronda called on the Congolese government to prevail over those who are passing on such idiotic rumours against the government of Uganda and the UPDF.8 17 October 2012: Reuters publishes an exclusive article claiming to have seen a confidential 44-page GoE report that states both Rwanda and Uganda have been supporting M23 and that Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga receive direct military orders from RDF (Rwandan Army) Chief of Defense Staff General Charles Kayonga, who in turn acts on instructions from Minister of Defense General James Kabarebe.9 An almost verbatim quote is contained in the GoE Final Report, though neither the report nor annex is 44 pages.10 17 October 2012: Okello Oryem, Ugandas Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, categorically denies the findings, calling them rubbish and absurd.11 1 November 2012: In response to the allegations of their support for M23, Ugandas Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi announces to the countrys parliament that the UPDF should withdraw from regional peacekeeping operations in Somalia and elsewhere so they may protect the countrys western border with the DRC.12 12 November 2012: The GoEs Final Report (S/2012/843) is submitted to the Security Council Sanctions Committee. The Final Report accuses Rwanda and Uganda of direct support of M23 and makes several strongly worded recommendations regarding foreign aid. 13 November 2012: Uganda closes the Bunagana border with the DRC at the request of the DRC government, jeopardizing hundreds of millions of dollars in trade, after reports surface of M23 rebels taxing trucks crossing between the countries.13 17 November 2012: The GoEs Final Report is submitted to the President of the Security Council.

http://www.ugandacorrespondent.com/articles/2012/07/uganda-accused-of-supporting-m23-rebels/ http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/30/uganda-war-idAFL6E8IUILH20120730 9 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-congo-democratic-rwanda-uganda-idUSBRE89F1RQ20121017 10 S/2012/843/Paragraph 32 11 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012101714443887755.html 12 http://lesleyannewarner.wordpress.com/2012/11/02/playing-chicken-with-the-un-uganda-threatens-to-withdraw-from-peacekeeping-operations/ 13 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-closes-border-with-DR-Congo/-/2558/1619802/-/4ddska/-/index.html

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Analysis of Methodology
The GoEs Final Report failed to fully adhere to the UNs established investigative guidelines, the GoEs own methodology as prescribed in Annex 2 of the report, and the GoEs UN mandate.

UN Investigative Guidelines and the GoEs Prescribed Methodologies

Much controversy has surrounded the pedigree of specific GoE claims and supporting data points. At the core of these point-counterpoint analyses is the argument that the GoE were overly reliant on unnamed sources, without explanation of these sources motives or impartiality. Annex 2 states: The Group conducts exhaustive and in-depth field research in zones controlled by armed groups,seeking at all times to rely on authentic documents and, wherever possible, first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves, including photographs. and, the Group systematically assesses the credibility of each of its sources and remains wary of deliberate efforts to influence its findings. While the lack of first-party Rwandan and Ugandan official sources is disappointing, the GoE guidelines clearly state such input is required wherever possible. Similarly, while the data points presented are almost entirely one-sided, there is no evidence that the GoE did not assess the credibility of its sources, though it remains unclear what specific steps the GoE took to verify that each data point was supported by impartial sources. Therefore, this analysis cannot conclude that the GoE systematically violated its guidelines or methodology with respect to source verification, though neither can this analysis put to rest questions about the credibility of GoE sources. While the sourcing in this Final Report appears more rigorous than similar reports for Cote dIvoire and Liberia, it is equal to or less than the sourcing in prior GoE reports on DRC. This, combined with the public reaction to the quality of data sources, suggests that future GoE reports should focus more on the credibility of data points as opposed to the volume of data points. It is worth noting that the GoE stated they found it extremely challenging to conduct research in Rwanda where the authorities have routinely followed the groupconfirm[ing] the Group fears for the potential negative consequences of even short interactions with individuals within Rwanda. (S/2012/843/Annex3/paragraph 36) This stands in contrast to prior GoE reports on equally dangerous issues like child trafficking and mineral smuggling. In addition, both the GoR and the GoU, as well as private organizations who spoke directly with key figures cited in the GoE reports, claim that opportunities for direct research were available to the GoE but not acted upon.

The GoEs Final Report failed to fully adhere to the UNs established investigative guidelines, the GoEs own methodology as prescribed in Annex 2 of the report, and the GoEs UN mandate.

UN Mandate
The GoEs mandate, as set forth in paragraph 18 of resolution 1807 (2008) and updated in paragraph 4 of resolution 2021 (2011) includes the following: 18. Requests the Group of Experts to fulfil the following mandate: a) To examine and analyse information gathered by MONUC in the context of its monitoring mandate and share with MONUC, as appropriate, information that might be of use in the fulfilment of the Missions monitoring mandate; b) To gather and analyse all relevant information in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, countries of the region and, as necessary, in other countries, in cooperation with the governments of those countries, on flows of arms and related materiel, as well as networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above; c) To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of States interested, in particular those of the region, to ensure the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above [preventing the flow of arms to nongovernmental entities or individuals operating in DRC] are effectively implemented;

Cooperation with MONUSCO

Despite the mandate to examine and analyse information gathered by [MONUSCO], the November 2012 report only makes three references to MONUSCO data or sources (there are seven other mentions where MONUSCO is an actor in the narrative, not a source): paragraph 97 refers to the number of FDLR deserters returning to Rwanda; paragraph 104 refers to the increase in ADF combatants; and Annex 57 refers to the Raia Mutomboki use of child soldiers. The June 2012 Interim Report specifically cites difficulties securing MONUSCOs cooperation: the Council requested, in particular, that MONUC [sic] share all relevant information with the Group. However, as of the drafting of the present report, during its current mandate, the Group has not received through formal channels any documents and/or reports issued by MONUSCO. Contrast this with over 20 specific references to MONUSCO data or sources in the 2011 Final Report and 48 references in the 2010 Final Report.

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Cooperation with Governments

There can be little question that the mandate of paragraph 18(b), To gather and analyse all relevant information in cooperation with the governments of those countries was not met. In the 389 pages of the June 2012 Interim Report, Addendum and November 2012 Final Report, the following are the only concrete examples of GoE and GoR cooperating on data gathering or analysis: Congolese export statistics and Rwandan customs documents show that after dropping to about a fifth of pre-suspension levels in 2011, 29 mineral exports from the Kivus and Maniema in the first trimester of 2012 reached a third of pre-suspension levels. (June 2012 #141) Apart from APT and Semico, two Rwandan mining companies had been suspended because of their involvement in illegal tagging of 500 kg of tin ore seized in Gisenyi, according to Rwandan authorities with whom the Group consulted during industry conferences. (June 2012 #149) During the Groups visit to Kigali from 23 to 25 July 2012, the Minister of Defence of Rwanda, Gen. James Kabarebe, confirmed that Rwandan units could be easily distinguished from M23 or other troops for all the above reasons. (November 2012 #9) The Chief of Staff of the Rwandan armed forces, Gen. Charles Kayonga, confirmed to the Group that in July 2012 the 305th brigade had been deployed at Kinigi. (November 2012 #10) In an official communication with the Committee, lawyers hired by the Government of Rwanda have also cited support for M23 from Ugandan territory (November 2012 #35) Representatives of Rwandan mining companies and mining authorities confirmed that many concessions in western Rwanda were inactive but had received tags nevertheless. (November 2012 #173) None of these data points provide meaningful support or context for the core charges leveled against Rwanda. This is in stark contrast to the 2011 Final Report, which had 13 meaningful cooperative data points, with the most concrete collaboration coming on the issue of minerals and mining. Research into minerals and mining appears to be the one topic where there was cooperation. Perhaps this can be a model for a more productive collaboration on other topics in the future. Interactions with GoU sources appeared consistent in number with prior reports. However, they appear to have been made with a smaller group of individuals and, as characterized by the GoE, did not include sufficient time with or cooperation by senior GoU officials. The 2012 Final Report contained 16 data points compared to 12 in the 2011 Final Report.
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Recommendations To Improve Capabilities

The GoE says of itself, the Group is not a judicial mechanism or an intelligence service (Annex 2). That is why paragraph 18 (c) defining its mandate is written to be collaborative and diplomatic: To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of States interested, in particular those of the region There is no mandate to accuse or to recommend punitive action. Yet of the 13 recommendations in the 2012 Final Report, only six appear to fit this collaborative, diplomatic framework, suggesting that the GoE was inconsistent at delivering against this mandate: (c) Installation of motion sensors and night-vision cameras on the footpaths allegedly used by M23 to cross between Rwanda and DRC; (f) Marking of weapons by DRC, Rwanda and Uganda using the Nairobi Protocol; (g) Call to donors to support innovative civilian disarmament strategies; (i) Leveraging DRCs commercial interest in tin, tantalum and tungsten minerals for socioeconomic development; (j) Investments in mineral traceability and due diligence to preserve the Rwandan tagging scheme; and (l) Increased reporting by Burundi, DRC, Uganda and UAE on efforts to halt gold smuggling. The other recommendations take prosecutorial aim at specific nations and armed groups, asking the Committee to call upon: (a) The Governments of Rwanda and Uganda to cease all violations of the arms embargo and to submit regular reports to the Committee on measures taken to halt all activities of M23 and its allies in their territories; (e) All armed groups, including FDLR and M23, to immediately release all child soldiers and cease any future recruitment of minors; (h) The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to suspend unnecessary military operational zones and redirect funds to accelerate representative and inclusive integration processes for armed groups, taking into account lessons learned from past experience; (k) The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda to deter smuggling and tagging fraud and allow those carrying out supply chain risk assessment and audits unhindered access to relevant sources and data.

There is no mandate to accuse or to recommend punitive action.

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Finally, recommendations (b), (d) and (m) explicitly call on member states and donors to more closely evaluate their financial assistance. These recommendations are counter to the notion of improving capabilities of States like Rwanda and Uganda. These recommendations are judicial in nature and explicitly and implicitly call for punitive action by donor governments: (b) Member States to review and reconsider future military assistance to Rwanda and Uganda; (d) International donors to provide the Joint Verification Mechanism and Fusion Intelligence Cell with unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor border crossings between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda and regularly report to the Committee; (m) Donors to the Rwandan demobilization programme to more closely monitor the reintegration of former FDLR combatants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By contrast, not a single recommendation in the GoEs 2009, 2010 or 2011 report takes the accusatory tone of these seven statements. Every recommendation, even those that call for a specific response, is written in the language of diplomacy and cooperation. The overwhelming majority of the GoEs recommendations prior to the 2012 Final Report is constructive and calls on States and donors to support improved capabilities in the region.

The overwhelming majority of the GoEs recommendations prior to the 2012 Final Report is constructive and calls on States and donors to support improved capabilities in the region.

This analysis concludes that the 2012 GoE reports did not fulfill the GoEs UN mandate and this breakdown in cooperation and diplomacy was part of a longer-term degradation of the process (discussed later). This appears to have led to a set of recommendations that was counter to both the UN mandate and prior, constructive precedent. The GoE asserts that neither MONUSCO, nor the GoR, nor the GoU were forthcoming with cooperation. Both the GoR and GoU assert that they had little opportunity for involvement in the process. Again, the goal of this analysis is not to apportion blame. The simple fact is that cooperation did not occur. In the UNs mandate for the GoE, cooperation with regional governments and other UN agencies is not qualified with the words when possible, it is a basic requirement of the mandate.

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DIPLOMACY AND COOPERATION

Up until 2012, the history of the GoE and the GoR working together appeared exemplary. Then, in 2012, interaction slowed to an unworkable level. The drop-off in cooperation between the GoE and GoU appeared to happen more gradually.

Reported Public and Private Sector Interactions by GoE in Rwanda

2008
Government Office of the President Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Finance Directorate of External Security Ministry of Internal Affairs Rwandan Defence Force Rwanda Demobilization & Reintegration Comm. Rwanda National Police National Bank Rwanda Revenue Authority Diplomatic representations Embassy of Belgium Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

2009
Government Rwandan Defence Forces Rwanda Demobilization & Reintegration Comm. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2010
Government Ministry of Forestry and Mines Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Justice National Revenue Authority National Prosecutors Office Rwanda Demobilization & Reintegration Comm.

2011
Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Ministry of Defence Ministry of Internal Security Ministry of Forestry and Mines National Revenue Authority Rwanda National Police National Bank

2012
Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Ministry of Defence Geology and Mines Department

Diplomatic representations Embassy of Belgium Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Diplomatic representations British Embassy Embassy of Belgium Embassy of France

Private sector Phoenix Metals Rutongo Mines Minerals Supply Africa NRD Rwanda

Private sector Phoenix Metals Minerals Supply Africa

Reported Public and Private Sector Interactions by GoE in Uganda

2008
Government Bank of Uganda Civil Aviation Authority External Security Organization Internal Security Organization, Bunagana Kisoro District Local Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uganda Immigration Department Ugandan Peoples Defence Force Uganda Revenue Authority Private Sector/Other Uganda Chamber of Commerce & Industries Machanga Limited Uganda Commercial Impex (UCI) Crane Bank DFCU

2009
Government Chieftancy of Military Intelligence (CMI) External Security Organisation (ESO) Internal Security Organisation (ISO) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uganda Bureau of Statistics Ugandan Civil Aviation Authority Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Uganda Revenues Authority Diplomatic representations Embassy of Belgium Embassy of France Embassy of Italy Embassy of the United States of America Liaison Office of the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

2010
Government Ministry of Mines and Energy Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Military Intelligence External Security Organization

2011
Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Energy and Mines Civil Aviation Authority

2012
Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Energy and Mines Civil Aviation Authority Interpol Uganda Office of the President Uganda Police Force

Diplomatic representations British Embassy Embassy of Belgium Embassy of France Representation of South Sudan Private Sector/Other Victoria Star Gold Refinery Rhino Exploration

Private sector Uganda Commercial Impex Limited Machanga Ltd.

Private sector Uganda Commercial Impex Limited

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This prior cooperation is confirmed by the tone in the 2008-2011 reports: The Group of Experts wishes to express its thanks, in particular, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the staff of MONUC for their support and continued collaboration. The Group also wishes to acknowledge, with appreciation, the cooperation of the national authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda during the Groups missions to those countries. (Dec. 2008 #8) The Group of Experts worked in close collaboration with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and relevant United Nations organizations. The Group consulted broadly and met with a number of different interlocutors during its fieldwork, including the civilian and military authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other States in the region, national civil aviation authorities, mineral traders, representatives of business entities, air and land transport companies and nongovernmental organizations, as well as former and current militia members, and representatives of the local and international press. (Nov. 2009 #8) The Group met with a broad range of interlocutors during its fieldwork, including the civilian and military authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, regional organizations, Interpol, non-governmental organizations, businesspeople, researchers and former and current leaders and members of armed groups. (Nov. 2010 #11) The Group wishes to thank those Member States that responded in writing to requests for information, notably Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. The Group also wishes to express gratitude to those Member States that hosted the Groups fact-finding missions: Belgium, Burundi, France, Kenya, Malaysia, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States. Finally, the Group wishes to express its thanks to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its extensive cooperation. (Nov. 2011 #8) The Group gratefully acknowledges the enhanced information-sharing and logistical and administrative support that it received from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in the course of this mandate, pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 17 of resolution 1952 (2010). (Nov. 2011 #9)

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Again, this stands in stark contrast to comments in the 2012 reports: The Group conducted seven investigative missions to Rwanda, including two official visits with the Government of Rwanda. The Group traveled to zones in western Rwanda where recruitment for M23 has been taking place, in particular to the towns of Ruhengeri and Kinigi. For further information regarding the Groups engagement with the Government of Rwanda prior to the publication of the Addendum to the interim report, see paragraphs 6-17 of Annex 3 regarding the Government of Rwandas claims that the Group did not provide it with a right of reply. Following the Groups second official visit to Kigali on 25-27 July 2012, the Government of Rwanda has subsequently refused on five separate occasions to meet and cooperate with the Group of Experts including during the Minister of Foreign Affairs visit to New York in August 2012. Moreover, the Group was willing to delay the submission of its final report, scheduled for 12 October 2012 (though Security Resolution 2021 required submission by 19 October 2012) in order to provide the Government of Rwanda with one last opportunity to discuss with the Group on 13 October 2012 in Rwanda. However, the Government of Rwanda once again refused to participate in any meeting with the Groups Coordinator. (Nov. 2012, Annex 2) MONUSCO should share with the Group of Experts documents and information gathered and produced by the Mission which are relevant to the Groups mandate, without further delay; (June 2012, Recommendations #186) The Group conducted a total of ten investigative missions to Uganda, including an unprecedented three official visits to discuss the situation in the eastern DRC with government representatives designated by the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations. During the Groups first visit from 23-25 May 2012, the Ugandan Foreign Ministry arranged only one roundtable discussion with some senior security officials. During that meeting, the Group posed several questions about the M23 rebellions deployments near the Ugandan border but did not receive any response. Though the Group requested a follow-up meeting with the heads of external and military intelligence to discuss M23, the Ugandan officials told the Group that any discussion on this subject would need to pass through official channels. In early June 2012, the Group orally expressed its disappointment to representatives of the Ugandan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, who instructed the Group to conduct a follow-up visit to Kampala and explicitly request in writing to meet with the heads of external and military intelligence to discuss M23. The Group communicated accordingly in a letter dated 9 August 2012. However, during the subsequent second official visit to Uganda from 17-18 September 2012 (extended to 22 September 2012), the Ugandan representatives only organized a one-hour meeting for the Group with junior security officials (Nov. 2012, Annex 2) The pattern could not be more clear. When there is cooperation and diplomacy in the research and analysis process, there is cooperation and diplomacy in the result.

When there is cooperation and diplomacy in the research and analysis process, there is cooperation and diplomacy in the result.

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REBUTTALS AND RESPONSES TO CRITICISM

The tone and substance of rebuttals and responses to criticism from all sides have ranged from diplomatic and constructive to adversarial and counterproductive. For example, the World Banks response to the GoEs call for closer donor monitoring of Rwandas demobilization program is a model for respectful cooperation, even when there is disagreement: Nevertheless, the World Bank takes the allegations outlined in the GoEs report very seriously. For that reason, after the report was made available, the World Bank conducted a supplementary mission to investigate the GoE allegations in detail with representatives of our GoR and donor partnersThis mission also found no evidence of systematic re-recruitment of project-assisted excombatantsFinally the mission suggested some improvementswhich the RDRC is now implementing the World Bank remains committed to making this project a success, while also ensuring that funding is used for the purposes intended. My team would be happy to provide further details regarding the Banks work in this area if you so desire. On the issue of mineral smuggling, the industry trade group International Tin Research Institute, Ltd (ITRI) respectfully pointed out that the GoE report was inconclusive and raised some concerns about specific data points. However they did so in the spirit of diplomacy and collaboration, and in accordance with a history of working together: I can confirm that ITRI staff, members and partners are fully aware of the recent report, and pay close attention to the relevant recommendations contained within as has been the case for GoEs reports released in previous years We note your comment regarding cross-border smuggling, and of course while recognizing that this will always be an issue, believe that it may not be as significant as sometimes implied We retain some concerns over the validity of both the individual incidents described in previous paragraphs of the report, which refer to companies that do not exist and sites that are known to be inactive It would be possible to achieve our shared goals more effectively if there was to be a greater level of direct cooperation between UN experts and [ITRI Supply Chain Initiative] staff

The tone and substance of rebuttals and responses to criticism from all sides have ranged from diplomatic and constructive to adversarial and counterproductive.

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The GoR, however, took a different approach, releasing a 28-page rebuttal then engaging its lawyers to argue the validity of process, methods, data points and personal bias (GoR Response and Akin, Gump Letter): Indeed, the release of the addendum served as the latest act of a carefully orchestrated media and political strategy to cast Rwanda as the villain in this new wave of tensions in Eastern DRC. In effect, the addendum only added a UN stamp of approval to a narrative that had been actively and deliberately propagated since the beginning of this latest crisis Thus, Rwanda is rendered guilty from the outset, as reflected most obviously by the lack of interest shown by the GoE in Rwandas perspective and response It is in this way that evidence is retrofit to suit a predetermined narrative. Inconvenient or contradictory facts are ignored or, most often, never sought in the first place Given the deeply flawed and illegitimate nature of the process described above, the GoEs interim report, addendum and anything that builds on it should be treated publicly and privately as biased and devoid of integrity. It is clear that [Mr. Heges] views (which were available on his website until they began to be disseminated to a wider audience, at which point they disappeared from the Internet) not only inform the analysis in the interim report but also thoroughly infuse the conclusions of the first addendum as well as parts of the second addendumThe policy implication of these views is quite alarming, and they have no place in a report issued under the imprimatur of the United Nations. The GoR response prompted an equally forceful, point-by-point rebuttal by the GoE (Annex 3): the GoRs rebuttal is characterized by a tone of general disdain for the Groups work and its methodology The GoRs rebuttal seeks to distort the conclusions of the Groups investigations so as to portray them as if they hinge on specific minor details As per its previous commitments, the Group has made clear its willingness to correct and/or clarify any information within the categories which may be required following additional research Nevertheless, the Group does not share the view that any of the arguments in the GoRs rebuttal would convince it to alter any particular elements or overall categories of the Addendum. the GoR has orchestrated an extensive attack campaign against the members of the Group through multiple traditional and social media channels

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The GoU also responded to leaked allegations through the media, and later via a statement delivered to its Parliament and letters delivered to the UN Security Council and Secretary General. The latter communications questioned the GoEs process, facts and conclusions: Wheres the evidence for their claims? Some of those so-called experts came here and did not interview anyoneWheres their authentic facts to back those claims? Those accusations are absolute rubbish, hogwash. (Ugandan military spokesman Felix Kulayigye, 17 October 2012)14 They are making up these rubbish allegations because on the ground in the eastern DRC there is the biggest number of UN peacekeeping operations in the whole world with the largest budget in the whole world, and [yet] they have failed to do anything in the past five to ten yearsThey are blaming their shortcomings on Uganda and Rwanda. They should get on with their job of what they are there to do in the eastern DRC instead of blaming others. (Ugandan State Minister for Foreign Affairs Okello Oryem, 17 October 2012)15 We were disappointed not only by the content of the report but more so by the manner in which the so-called UN Group of Experts conducted themselves during and after their research.Uganda categorically denies the allegations against her because they are totally false.Our recent involvement in the issues of DRC was at the express request of the UN Secretary General and that of President Kabila when they both, separately, rang President Museveni in July 2012, requesting him to intervene when the M23 rebels were threatening to attack Goma.In order for Uganda to continue contributing to Regional efforts, we need understanding, respect and fairness from the UN or the Region itself or both. (Ugandan Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi, 1 November 2012)16

Continuing to debate motives, biases and questions of fact does nothing to rebuild the kind of collaborative working relationship needed to foster stability in the region.

The zero-compromise positions call into serious question the arguments on all sides. Continuing to debate motives, biases and questions of fact does nothing to rebuild the kind of collaborative working relationship needed to foster stability in the region.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012101714443887755.html http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012101714443887755.html 16 http://www.scribd.com/doc/111983097/Prime-Minister-s-Statement-on-Uganda-s-Stand-and-Response-on-Allegations-by-the-UN

14 15

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IMPLICATIONS FOR ACHIEVING PEACE

Policymakers and donors depend on independent assessments to make important funding, engagement and intervention decisions, and the breakdown in cooperation between the GoE and the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda has already led to implementation of punitive and counterproductive sanctions, withdrawal of critical foreign aid, and a narrow focus in the media and the international community on the sources of regional instability.

Impact Of Sanctions
After the release of the Final Report, the Sanctions Committee announced in November and December 2012 that certain M23 leaders would be added to its consolidated travel ban and assetfreeze list. This ban effectively barred key M23 representatives from participating in bilateral peace talks being moderated in Kampala by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. M23 had already announced a unilateral ceasefire in advance of negotiations, and was faced with either violating the UN sanctions to continue the peace process with the participation of its leadership or withdrawing from talks and increasing the risk of further conflict. Barring key individuals from participating in ongoing peace talks is not helpful to achieving success at these talks.

Impact Of Foreign Aid Withdrawal

Following the release of the Addendum to the Interim Report, the United States announced in July it would not provide $200,000 in foreign military aid to Rwanda for the remainder of 2012. Several weeks after the release of the Final Report, the United Kingdom announced a suspension of aid to Rwanda, citing a breach in agreements. The UK had initially planned to provide $33 million in aid in December 2012. The UK reinstated the majority of this aid in March 2013. The World Bank delayed Board consideration of $125 million in funding. In March 2013, it voted to release $50 million to support social welfare programs. The Board of the African Development Bank has suspended a budget support payment of $38 million. The European Union initially suspended all aid to Rwanda in September 2012 before reinstating some support in February 2013; however, $90 million in direct budgetary support remains suspended. Germany initially suspended a 3-year, $28 million commitment before reversing the decision in February 2013 after meeting with Rwandan leadership. Sweden suspended $14.7 million and the Netherlands suspended $6.2 million in development support. The Belgium government announced in September 2012 it would end its military partnership with Rwanda based on the GoE report, an action publicly criticized by Belgiums own Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Impact of a Narrow Focus on Sources of Regional Instability

It is not clear if policymakers who relied on the GoE report to suspend aid to Rwanda recognized that the November 2012 report, unlike prior years, was focused on demonstrating Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in M23 and not the multiple, broader contributing factors to instability in the region. It is also not clear if these same policymakers recognized the deterioration of cooperation and diplomacy that preceded the 2012 Final Report. The net effect of the international communitys response has been that the Government of Rwanda is now likely reticent to use whatever influence it may have in the region to help keep M23 at the negotiating table, since such an intervention could be viewed as tantamount to confirming the GoEs accusations. It is unclear how this dynamic helps the long-term efforts at peace that require regional cooperation among all key stakeholders. Multilateral cooperation, diplomacy and international aid have also helped Rwanda prosper and bring stability to a country less than two decades removed from genocide. These gains are now also at risk of being reversed. Further, the Government of Uganda has threatened removal of peacekeeping troops from Somalia and other nations. Uganda has considerably more leverage with the UN because of its regional military strength and the evolving need for support in fragile States where other militaries are more reluctant to commit resources. Uganda withdrawing from or limiting further commitments to a peacekeeping and security role risks the stability of peace in other States besides the DRC. It is critical that policymakers read the 2012 GoE reports in the context of the GoEs prior reports and data on other key topics when it comes to understanding the sources and solutions to conflict in DRC. Prior reports highlight other key factors contributing to conflict in the region including: FDLR: Large segments of FDLR leadership played a central role in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and its continued presence in the region complicates the security environment and strains relations between Kigali and Kinshasa; the group, however, received little attention in the 2012 GoE report despite the following: - There are credible allegations that the FDLR partnered with elements of the FARDC to fight M23. - Multiple media reports have described FDLRs blocking of refugees from returning to Rwanda. - A recent Oxfam investigation and assessment of the DRC entitled Commodities of War (20 November 2012) revealed that some of the population in South Kivu now have the perception that the UN is providing support to the FDLR.

It is critical that policymakers read the 2012 GoE reports in the context of the GoEs prior reports and data on other key topics when it comes to understanding the sources and solutions to conflict in DRC.

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 FARDC: The role of the FARDC in the crisis should also be taken into account, especially widespread claims that elements of the military engaged in theft and extortion in areas of eastern DRC: - Oxfams 20 November 2012 report stated that, respondents generally associated the presence of FARDC soldiers with their involvement of extortive activities such as forced labor, illegal checkpoints, arbitrary arrests, and illegal detentions. - In his prepared statements to the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs (11 December 2012), Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs in the US Department of State, commented on the abuses committed by the Congolese military, including recent reports of rapes and looting in North Kivu. - Understanding these abuses is precisely the goal of UN Resolution 1952 paragraph 6 (2010), focusing on serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including those within the national armed forces, operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Government of the DRC: The lack of effective governance in eastern DRC is an essential component of regional instability and has played a significant role in the ongoing conflict: - President Kabila is operating under certain intractable conditions which make strong governance of the state and accountability in the eastern DRC elusive. These challenges include: a weak and dis-unified army; lack of institutional capacity; a weak state structure; a lack of government services equitably and reliably delivered to its citizens; and the lack of territorial sovereignty by the DRC over large stretches of its country given the geographic realities. - One example of the practical implications of the DRCs institutional weaknesses is its inability to implement its February 2006 constitutional mandate to convert the number of provinces from 11 to 26. The decentralization process was to be completed in 2009, yet the country has made no progress to date. - The region is now open to disinformation campaigns mounted by the Congolese security services to deflect the mounting international criticism over governance and human rights abuses. - The current narrative fueled by the 2012 GoE reports has now also reduced focus on how to best support the Government of the DRC to build a stronger stateto strengthen the core functions, organs and institutions of government.

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Years of GoE reports have demonstrated the complexity of relationships, causes and effects in the region. These important reports have real world impacts. Yet the 2012 reports were the result of a fundamentally uncooperative and unproductive process that violated the UN mandate specifically designed to foster constructive diplomacy. Hopefully, future GoEs can build on points of common agreement and rebuild trust with all of the key stakeholders in the region who will be critical to achieving peace and stability. Issues such as mineral smuggling, child soldiers, ex-combatant recycling, border security and upholding international standards have proven in the past to be common ground on which to build cooperation. Peace and stability in the region require a return to diplomacy.

Peace and stability in the region require a return to diplomacy.

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