Charles De Koninck NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. I. A.

IX, AD 1
(Notes on Prima Pars Q. 1, art. 9, ad. 1)

(Unpublished manuscript, Charles De Koninck Papers)

Translated by Michael Augros (1994) With minor revisions by Bart A. Mazzetti (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

Notes on Prima Pars Q. 1, art. 9, ad. 1

_______________________________________________________________ To manifest this response one must note that poetry is in the genus of the arts of imitating, whose other species are painting, music, sculpture, etc. Now the definition of the whole genus is the art of imitating delightfully. And the difference of poetry is in speech, of music in rhythmical sound, etc. The terms of this definition must be manifested: Art: right reason about makeable things. Of Imitating: what it is is to be seen in St. Thomas, Ia, q. 35, a. 1; likewise in I Sent. d. 28, q. 2, a. 1, -- In these [places] it is to be noted that there are three things that belong to the notion of an image: - likeness - in the species of the thing or in some sign of its species - origin Whence for something truly to be an image, it is required that it proceed from another like to it in species, or at least in a sign of the species. Therefore origin and procession expressive of an original is that in which the notion of image is completed. And in the passage in the Sentences, St. Thomas distinguishes a threefold grade of imitation, insofar as each attains to the notion of an image, so far does it attain to the notion of indifference: for according as it differs it is not an image: (1) The first is [that] in which is found something similar to another in quality which designates and expresses the nature of the other, although that nature is not found in it: as a stone is said to be the image of a man inasmuch as it has a similar shape, in which there does not subsist that nature whose image it is. (And so the image of God is in creatures, as the image of a king on a coin.) And so this is an imperfect way of being an image. (2) But the notion [of an image] is found more perfectly when there is, under that quality which designates the similar nature, the same nature in species, as the image of a man in the father is found in his son: because he has a likeness in shape, and in the nature which the shape signifies. (3) But the most perfect notion of an image is when we find the very same form and nature in number in the one imitating in that which is imitated; and so the Son is the most perfect image of the Father: because all divine attributes which are signified by way of quality, together with the nature itself are in the Son, not only according to species, but also according to a unity in number.

Delightfully: That there are some imitations naturally delightful to man is shown thus by Aristotle: But the poetic art in general appears to have been begotten by two kinds of causes, and both of them natural. For to imitate is connatural to men from childhood, (and in this they differ from other animals, because [man] is the most imitative [of animals] and makes his first learnings through imitation); and because all men delight in imitations. But a sign of this is what happens in works. For we delight in considering the most express images of things which themselves we view with pain, for example, the forms of the most dishonorable beasts, and of the dead. But the cause of this is that learning is most delightful, not only for philosophers, but similarly for all other men, though they communicate in it but slightly. For this reason they enjoy looking at images, because it happens that in considering them then learn and syllogize what each one is, for instance, that this is that man, since, if one happens not to have seen [the thing imitated] before [the image] would make delight not as an imitation, but on account of the workmanship, or the coloring, or on account of some other such cause. [Poetics, ch. 4, 1448b 419] Therefore the art of imitating delightfully is an art of producing works or images or representations whose very consideration or inspection is delightful. But the delight is due to the imitation or representation, and not due to the thing imitated or the original because as Aristotle notes, even an ugly thing can be imitated. Whence murder in a tragedy can be delightful, not as murder, for that would be perverse, but as an imitation of murder. Therefore, although it would be necessary for us to know the original of the imitation so that the imitation as imitation is reached, still the original itself is outside the imitations notion insofar as it delights. Nor does anything prevent that knowledge of an imitation sometimes presupposes a knowledge of some bad or base original. For the act of understanding is perfected according as understandable things are in the understanding after the manner of the understanding itself; and so the understanding is not infected by them, but rather is perfected. But the act of the will consists in a motion toward things, so that the lover joins his soul to the thing loved. (I-II q. 86, art. 1 ad. 2) And so, although visible beauty makes for the perfection of vision, yet visible ugliness can be in vision without imperfection; for the forms of things in the soul, through which [their] contraries are known, are not contrary. Whence also God, who has most perfect knowledge, sees all beautiful and ugly things. [III Suppl., q. 94, art. 1 ad. 2] Therefore delight is due to the imitation formally, insofar as it stands in the line of pure objectivity and intelligibility. And this brings with it three things: First that an imitation of such things will be imperfect in the notion of delightful imitation insofar as it is lacking in pure objectivity or insofar as it has something of the subject as distinguished against the object. And this happens when the original is not
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expressed imitatively, so that the imitation by itself is not enough but it is necessary for it to be completed by some subject, or by the original, or with matter, as is manifest in comedies which are imperfect because of a poet or performer. For it happens that the representation by a mediocre performer cannot be made delightful unless first the person of the performer is loved; and the same happens with poems [which cannot be delightful] unless the original or the poet himself is loved beforehand. (And therefore works of the art of imitating can be morally bad, insofar as they are lacking in the notion of the art of imitating, or insofar as by themselves they are not enough in the line of pure objective imitation, but require as a condition of delight the love of what is imitated, or of the one who makes the imitation, or of the matter in which it is made. And this defect happens for the most part. And [sometimes1] we are delighted about the work of some art of imitating, not knowing it happens more often to delight us because of some subject, and not because of the object absolutely. In which danger stands the whole of the art.) Second that as the understanding can remain in the very representation as in the object by which it is delighted, it is necessary that the object as object be more perfect than the original, greater in the respect of having understandability, and a certain universality. (And because of this Aristotle says that poetry is more philosophic than is history.) So if some painter makes a portrait of some individual, which is a material likeness carrying the illusion of reality, then it is not a work of the art of imitating delightfully, nor has it properly the notion of origination, but rather is like a second egg. 2 And in this way many people have quite crudely understood the mind of Aristotle.3 Third that insofar as the imitation of the original is more understandable, and because the imitation bespeaks a relation to that which is imitated, i.e. to the original, the art of delightfully imitating has the notion of instrumentality, since the original is made more understandable by the imitation. Whence the goodness of the work is judged from the [resulting] greater understandability of that which is imitated. And so St. Thomas says, that poetic science is about things which, because of a defect of truth, cannot be grasped by reason; whence it is necessary that, as it were, reason be seduced by certain likenesses. [I Sent., Prol., q. 1 art. 5 ad. 3] And in this respect the art of imitating delightfully has the notion of teaching, as [leading us] from one thing into another, namely from the imitation itself the original is elevated and is manifested more. In this the art has a likeness with the agent intellect. But that to which the imitation or representation conduces in itself lacks the clarity of the representation. One should note the difference between the scientific universal and the quasiuniversal of such an art of imitation. For its images are rather singular things. And in this respect the universal of the arts of imitating or the imitation has itself midway between the singular and the universal proper, whence it has a notion midway between the universal and the singular. Therefore to have poetic knowledge of things is much removed from the
1 2

Reading aliquando for quando. (B.A.M.) If an artist were to make a sculpture so like a man that it could even move itself etc., so that it was outwardly indistinguishable from a true man, then it would be a likeness of another man not so much as an image of him, but as one egg is like another egg. Since neither egg is the origin of the other, the two being so alike in every way, neither one is the image of the other. (M.A.) 3 Many have understood Aristotle to mean by imitation making one thing to look in all ways indistinguishable from another, as one egg is like another. The image would then in no way add to the understandability of the original. (M.A.)

perfection of science but also from the imperfection of the singular or of ignorance. But such middleness or instrumentality is somehow hidden inasmuch as the imitation seduces reason. And reason is said to be seduced by imitations because imitation is naturally delightful to man. Therefore delight has the notion of a mover. Therefore reason is inclined by something in itself extrinsic to cognitive reason, namely the delightfulness of imitation. Whence in this respect poetic knowledge does not wholly exceed the sensibility according to which operations in animals are sought because of delight. But neither the understanding nor the will, insofar as each is such, seeks knowledge or the good because of delight, but because of the operations. For delight in itself does not have the notion of an end, but of something concomitant [to the end]: And so it is that the divine understanding, which is the institutor of nature, includes delight on account of the operations [I-II q. 4 art. 2 ad. 2]. Therefore poetic knowledge in itself is a road and it is imperfect, although it is better than some other things. And so St. Thomas lays it down as the lowest teaching, as is clear from I Post. An., the first reading, where after having spoken about demonstrative science, he lists dialectic first, then rhetoric, and finally poetics: But sometimes a mere conjecture inclines to some part of a contradiction on account of some representation, the way in which there comes to be disgust in a man for some food if it be represented to him under the likeness of something disgusting. And to this poetics is ordered; for it belongs to the poet to lead to something virtuous through some fitting representation. But all these things pertain to rational philosophy, for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing into another. But this is displeasing to many because of the joy of poetic knowledge and because of its heated impulse. And so poetic knowledge is laid down by many as if in the highest place of all knowledge. But this is by accident, namely because of the weakness of most peoples understanding, as poetic knowledge is easier, having a middle place between the singular and the universal and so is more proportioned to most men. For there are few who attain to the first principles as to the principles of science and attain to true science. And so many having nothing but a certain appearance of science do not understand the true excellence of science, although it is true that about many things we cannot have [anything] except poetic knowledge, and that the poet has an excellent talent because he teaches us about such things. So it is true that among natural knowledges the poetic, to most men, has a certain superiority. These thing having been laid down, the response of St. Thomas is evident: that the poet uses metaphors on account of representation: for representation is naturally delightful to man. But sacred teaching uses metaphors because of their necessity and utility, as was said. Therefore it is to be noted that Sacred Scripture and theology do not intend representations in themselves delightful to man, but [rather they intend] the things which exceed the grasp of our understanding which without metaphors cannot be signified, or less fittingly because of the reasons mentioned in the body of the article. Poetry uses metaphors for representations on account of which we take delight, as when the lion is called the king of animals, from which there follows a representation in which is attributed to the lion more of understandability than he would have, and that which is considered is the imitation of
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the lion, namely the lion-king, and not the lion itself, except materially. Whence we rest in that to which the lion is compared, yet as that to which it is an imitation.4 But Sacred Scripture uses metaphors not for delightful representations, but for the things themselves, as when Christ is called a lion, his courage is signified by the sensible courage of the lion. But in that example we do not rest in that to which he is compared, nor in the thing which is constituted from the two, but in the courage of Christ. Whence St. Thomas says that poetic science is about things which because of a defect of truth cannot be grasped by reason; whence it is necessary that reason be seduced, as it were, by certain likenesses: but theology is about things which are above reason; and so the symbolic mode is common to both, since neither is proportioned to reason. [I Sent,. loc. cit.] So the proper reason [or notion] from both sides is wholly opposed. Therefore it would be ridiculous to say Scripture or sacred doctrine proceeds poetically. For insofar as poetic knowledge leads to representations in themselves, we turn from that which is intended, which namely, exceeds the representation. And when it has a poetic appearance, this is accidental, and not as Scripture or theology. Now these things follow from the proper definition of the art of imitating about which St. Thomas speaks in this text. But from this interpretation follow many unfitting things. First about the very definition of the genus of the arts which here are called arts of imitating delightfully. First it is unfitting that the whole is laid down to representation and imitation as if it were that on account of which one is delighted. For such arts are opposed to knowledge of the universal rather through this, that they have something of experience, and we delight in imitation insofar as it makes us to experience. Second it is unfitting in this, that imitation as objective is opposed to the subject. For against this is one species of poetry, namely lyric, in which the poet speaks in the first person; and certain species of painting, namely self-portraits, in which the very person of the artist expresses himself. Whence it is said that art is expressive of itself. Third is that in all the arts there is a certain imitation, an original and an image, as is clear in the art of making a hammer or a saw. Moreover, all art is called imitative of nature. Fourth [it is unfittingly said] that poetics is about things which because of a defect in truth cannot be grasped by reason, or about things of which the imitation is better than the original. For in comedy as opposed to tragedy, man is represented as worse than he is.

E.g., in our experience of an imitation, what we rest in is the likeness of a thing (that to which the lion is compared), and not the thing itself; but we do so as if we were resting in the thing itself. This object, which is constituted of the two, as Dr. De Koninck says below, is formally the imitation, but materially, the reality itself. (B.A.M)

Responses: To the first I answer that in these arts a twofold experience can be considered. The first [experience] is about the very work inasmuch as it has singularity, such as this picture, or this poem. But in this singularity as such is not completed the work of an art of imitating delightfully because the work would be as a second egg, or different [from the original] only numerically, adding nothing in the line of understandability. But together with that singularity stands a certain universality in which is properly completed the imitation about which we now speak. Yet it can be added that in the works of the arts of imitating delightfully we find a likeness of the spiritual thing which is the universal, containing under itself only one individual. But this likeness is possible on the side of the work because of its imperfection, as it were imperfectly perfect, perfectly imperfect. The second is found on the side of that which is imitated, inasmuch as many things are imitated before they are to be known by experience, as is clear especially in music by which the motions of the passions are imitated. But in that which is thus known by experience is not found that which is proper to art, but in the experience by which it is understandably and delightfully imitated. Whence because experience is reached indistinctly, imitation is more perfectly expressed. Whence imitation has the notion of freeing and purging. But the delight of which we now speak is not due to that which is known by experience inasmuch as it is of this kind, but due to the imitation, as is clear in the imitation of sorrow or sadness, unless there is understood the very inspection or hearing of a delightful imitation. To the second I answer that even lyric poetry is simply objective. The first person is not the individual person of the poet, but is already an imitation of the first person, in which an individual person has himself wholly materially. And likewise with the image of the painter himself which does not have the notion of an art of imitating delightfully except insofar as it has something of universality. And when from the image the individual person of the painter is better known, this is accidental; and if it makes us to know nothing else, or only imperfectly, it is inept. To the saying art is expressive of itself I shall make answer below. To the third I answer that in any art there is some imitation, as also [there is] an exemplar and an exemplared, whence the exemplar sometimes is called an original and the exemplared an image. But the difference of the arts about which we now speak is found in the delightfully. And therefore it must be considered that in these arts there is a twofold exemplar or original: first, namely, the making idea in the mind of the artist, which is common to all arts, and already expresses the what of the thing to be made; but in the art of imitating delightfully, one ought to mark that the exemplar already is an exemplared or image, as is clear in the picture conceived by the painter before execution, or in the conceived poem, not yet written out. But that concept or image has a more radical original the concept or image of which is a likeness in form with the origination, as a lion, anger, a cloud, a king, and all things which can be imitated thus. But the reason that art imitates nature is that the principle of artificial operation is knowledge; but all our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible and natural things; whence in artificial things we work toward a likeness of natural things. And therefore natural things are imitable by art, because by an intellective principle the whole of nature is ordained to its end, so thus the work of nature seems to be the work of intelligence, when by determinate means it proceeds to certain ends; which also art imitates in operating. [In II Physic. Lectio 4, n. 6.]
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And so the art of imitating delightfully as such and inasmuch as it is of this sort is not said to be imitated, as is clear from this that [all] artificial things equally can be imitated. And when art is called expressive of itself, this also can be understood in many ways. But by the moderns it is understood to mean art is expressive of the subject of the artist as subject. But this happens either because the term subject is abused, as was said above about the first person, or because the work is lacking in the notion of delightful imitation, signifying rather some passion or thought which pleases the speaker, onlooker, or hearer, as is clear in those [works] which are called daring. Whence one is delighted, not because of an imitation, but because of that which is imitated, as the onlooker loving an imitation of vile things because he loves vile things. Yet it is to be conceded that delightful imitation carries something of the subject as subject, as we hinted above. For delightfulness is part of the notion of such imitation not merely as a concomitant, as happens in happiness. Whence the one who adheres to objects only inasmuch as they have the notion of being delightful, desiring knowledge on account of the delight, adheres inordinately. But this naturally happens in the young who do not yet seek knowledge except under the form of the delightful, and because of this they are more naturally instructed by poetics; it also happens in many cases on account of excess sensibility that they do not attain to purely understandable things, or because of an inordinate appetite for delight, as happens even in those who seek dialectical knowledge because they themselves are too content with mere likelihood. But in these cases, as was already said, instrumental knowledge is not exceeded. Whence the pragmatist proceeds logically when he exalts the eminence of the arts of imitating delightfully. And with regard to the imitations he reaches, John Dewey speaks rightly about enjoyed meanings or delightful significations (Experience and Nature, 1925, ch. 9), and he lays down the experience of art as the highest happiness (Art as Experience, 1935). And about the danger of the arts of imitating, Plato seems wholly divine (Republic, II, III, X). To which last can be added that since in some work of the art of imitating delightfully, two things can be considered, one the very imitation and the other its execution, there is also a twofold admiration, one of the imitation itself, and the other the talent of the artist. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief, and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure, and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness, and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way. [Republic, X, 605d] But talent can be understood in two ways. Either as that which is had by generation or by nature, as in the saying a born poet; or for that which is ungenerated, or which is not from any principle, but is itself as a first and a root and a simple origin, and because of this someone is called original. Now the good poet has these two things. The first inasmuch as by nature one is well disposed to conceiving and executing imitations, which one has partly from an innate sensibility for objects under the form of the delightful (indeed, most artists are very concupiscible, living inordinately). The second, because imitations of this sort ought to be likely at the same time as unexpected, an example of which Aristotle gives from tragedy: Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. Such incidents have the very greatest effect
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on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another; there is more of the marvellous in them than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is an appearance of design as it were in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. A plot, therefore, of this sort is necessarily finer than others. [Poetics, ch. 9, 1451a 1-10] Therefore the ability of conceiving and of resolving well causes admiration. And in this way one is carried to the subject of the artist, and sometimes his very person becomes as it were the exemplar of the whole life of the admirers. And this is impure. To the fourth I answer that in comedies man is represented as worse and more laughable than he is in reality. But from this it does not follow that a comedys imitation is not better. For it is more intelligible inasmuch as it has more of the notion of the laughable than the thing itself. But when the imitation falls away from the original, then there is no art of imitating delightfully as such. And the defect itself can happen from many causes, an example of which is given among the ancient writers and sculptors making imitations of the gods. Either the very imitation has the notion of a term as that because of which one is delighted, whence the original has itself wholly materially: in which case the imitation comes from the art of imitating delightfully as such. And then those originals or imitated gods, are considered imperfect in themselves by the poet: whence related to these imitations are its imperfections, which can happen because of ignorance, and in this consists the humanism of the ancients as man is considered as it were a liberator of gods and creative and an exemplar. Or the imitation does not have the notion of a term, but of a middle more proportioned to our way of grasping by which higher things are known. And in this last case the imitation is not by the art of imitating delightfully as such, as will be clear from things to be said below about religious art. Still, in fact, we cannot draw the ancient poets or even those who are called theologizers wholly to one side or to the other, because their works are a mixture of poetry and dialectic. Second, many unfitting things follow especially about religious art. First it is manifest that many works either poetic or musical, sculpted or painted, are made by Catholic artists to be beautiful, and therefore delightful, and therefore are made by an art of imitating delightfully. Therefore the things which were cited and deduced from St. Thomas above are too narrow and must be corrected. Second it would follow that the images of Christ and of the saints are not to be honored, except improperly and abusively, but in the face of the image only the exemplar is to be honored, so as an image in no way is it the term of worship, but only a sign or condition by which we are moved to honoring the prototype, which opinion is commonly rejected by theologians, as can be seen in Billuart, T. IV, dissert. 23, a. 3 v. Third Sacred Scripture itself incites us to praising God in song, with drums, and in a choir, with strings and with instruments and in well-sounding cymbals. But such are beautiful works of art. Fourth it would follow that even the images of the saints whose very own looks are not delightful, by awkward images would be more perfect[ly represented]. Responses:
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To the first [I answer] that the property of the art of imitating delightfully is not preserved in a beautiful work of art as such, but in a delightful imitation. And so arts of imitating delightfully are abusively equated with those which are called fine arts. It is therefore to be considered that the beautiful is defined as that which pleases when seen, and so it is defined through the satisfaction following vision, but not by delight. And although from this satisfaction follows delight, it is not intrinsic to the notion of the beautiful. Whence if beauty is defined by rest of the appetite or delight in the very aspect of that which is called beautiful, the definition would be common and dialectical. Therefore the works spoken about in the objection can proceed from the most perfect art and can be beautiful, yet they do not proceed from an art of imitating as such. For it is necessary that a work of religious art have the original as its beginning and as its end, whence the notion of delight comes principally from the original and secondarily from the imitation. And thus the art of imitating delightfully and religious art have themselves in an opposite way. Yet it is greatly to be noted that religious art is in itself more perfect in the very notion of imitating inasmuch as it expresses better things conducive to better things, the first and last by which it is measured. But the very perfection of its work is a participated perfection. For religious art is wholly subject to the original and the work refers to the original and its work is perfect inasmuch as it is tending to another. Therefore although one has dominion over the form and matter of the work, yet the matter and the form have themselves materially related to that which is imitated. But in the art which is defined by delightful imitation, the artist is wholly the master; and the original, although in a way a principle, has itself materially to the imitation; and itself is the first measure simply. Therefore humanism in these things is nothing other than the extension of that dominion to originals which are better in themselves, especially divine things. Humanism: in general any system of thought or action which assigns a predominant interest to the affairs of men as compared with the supernatural or abstract. The term is especially applied to that movement of thought which in western Europe in the 15th century broke through the mediaeval traditions of scholastic theology and philosophy, and devoted itself to the rediscovery and direct study of the ancient classics. This movement was essentially a revolt against intellectual, and especially ecclesiastical authority, and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual, scientific, or social. [Encycl. Britann.] Humanism, a word which will often recur in the ensuing paragraphs, denotes a specific bias which the forces liberated in the Renaissance took from contact with the ancient world the particular form assumed by human self-esteem at that epoch the ideal of life and civilization evolved by the modern nations. It indicates the endeavor of man to reconstitute himself as a free being, not as the thrall of theological despotism, and the peculiar assistance he derived in this effort from Greek and Roman literature, the litterae humaniores, letters leaning rather to the side of man than of divinity. In this article the Renaissance will be considered as implying a comprehensive movement of the European intellect and will toward self-emancipation, toward reassertion of the natural rights of the reason and the senses, toward the conquest of this planet as a place of human occupation, and toward the formation of regulative theories both for states and individuals differing from those of mediaeval times. [Encycl. Britann., Renaissance]
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To the second, I answer from the same author [e.g., Billuart t. iii diss xxiii art. iii. v (p. 142)]: that the same worship is owed to the image and to the exemplar, yet in diverse ways; to the exemplar because of itself, to the image because of the exemplar, that is, absolute worship of the exemplar, relative to the image; thus from the image and exemplar is put together one whole object of adoration, the exemplar principal and primary, the image secondary and by reason of the exemplar: whence, according to this opinion, the images of God and of Christ are adored by latria, the image of the Blessed Virgin by hyperdulia, and the images of the saints by dulia. (ibid.) But if one were to rest in the very image in an absolute way as in that because of which, then it would not have the notion of a holy image. Clement of Alexandria condemns as thieves the painters and sculptors who glorify themselves as the inventors and first authors of painted animals and plants, as if God did not work in a hidden way in all things, which is a form of thievery with respect to the divine omnipotence, for he adds: Therefore he who, of impious and wicked origin, will have said of himself to have thought out or to have made anything in things which pertain to creation, will pay penalties: for, by the general and universal providence of God, through those things which are moved more immediately by it, efficacious operation is transmitted to all other things through submission. (Ibid.) Whence all the more so artists imitating holy things, but not subjecting themselves to the original in the way that was said, are, so to speak, to be held as thieves. To the third I answer, beyond those things which were said above, that praise does not have the notion of delightful imitation except in plays, but not in itself. For praise extols someone as good and virtuous. And though the form be well proportioned and clear as happens in hymns, still it is speech in which what is said is wholly ordained to another. Therefore it does not have a term within itself, so the inspection or hearing of it is not in itself and on its own account delightful. One praising someone would be perverse to rest in his own praise. (This is seen with music and instruments in church; Billuart, T. IV, disser. 5, a. 11). Yet in praise there is a special difficulty, because on the one hand it is the most perfect speech of the creature, and on the other it has many things in common with the art of imitating delightfully, such as admiration, delight, and purging. For praise proceeds from admiration, which follows upon the grasp of something, exceeding the power [to grasp] such as is the sublime (as Gregory says about angels who speak to God, since because they look to what is above themselves, they rise in the motion of admiration). But the delight which follows admiration is not a delight having itself concomitantly, since it is not from something seen perfectly, but because of contemplation which ends in affection. Praise is called purgative of the one praising inasmuch as from praise the soul is freed from an exceeding weight inasmuch as it has curbed the soul. Therefore, beyond the things which were said there remains the greatest difference between praise and the delightful imitation, because praise itself as a certain work is not the cause of those things [admiration, delight, purging] but rather the effect.

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To the fourth it is to be considered that images are not all ordained to the same thing formally in the original to be expressed. But what they have in common is the efficacy of representation and of expression. Whence it happens that the metaphor of something less noble more efficaciously expresses what is intended than the metaphor of something nobler, as when the courage of Christ is expressed in the sensible figure of a lion, and this is better for us than under the figure of the bravest man or of Michael the heavenly soldier, because of the reasons given in the body and in the reply to the third objection of q. 1, art. 9. But it happens otherwise when the thing to be expressed is the splendor and beauty of the original, where the efficacy of the expression is judged from the very beauty of the image. And if it be objected that a work of religious art is [therefore] wanting in the perfection of the art of imitating delightfully inasmuch as it does not suffice to proceed from the original, but it is necessary to revert from the [imitation] back to the original for it to be completed; whence what is a defect in the art of imitating delightfully would be a perfection in religious art, I answer that the perfection of either is to be judged from the end. Now the end of the art of imitating delightfully is a delightful imitation in the manner determined above; but the end of religious art is efficaciously to make us know the original as in itself something more perfect than the mediating representation. Whence if an imitation made by religious art does not make us to know the original as the measure of the imitation simply, and as an imitation would not be to the prototype as subordinate to the nobler and exceeding, it would not be by religious art as such, but with respect to this art would be simply imperfect. But the same work might happen to have great perfection in the notion of the art of imitating delightfully, inasmuch as it is compared to some inferior original. Which often happens in some images of the saints made by painters with great talent; if the image be compared to the original intended by the artist, it is a complete abomination; but if it is compared to more common things, it happens to be a delightful imitation. And this can happen either from an artist unable according to the notion of religious art, from his ignorance, or from a disordered appetite. To which nevertheless it can be added that a good work of religious art has the perfection of an art of imitating delightfully and more besides, since in it the ability of the artist is elevated to eminence, and in his very work is the perfection of delightful imitation, not formally but eminently.

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NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. I. A. IX, AD 1 _____________________ Charles De Koninck

Ad hanc responsionem declarandum notetur quod poetica est in genere artium imitandi, cujus aliae sunt species pictura, musica, sculptura, etc. Totius autem generis definitio est ars delectabiliter imitandi. Differentia autem poetica est sermo, musicae sonus rythmicus, etc. Declarentur hujus definitionis termini: Ars: recta ratio factibilium. Imitandi: quid sit videndum est apud D. Thomam, Ia, q. 35, a. 1; item I Sent., d. 28, q. 2, a. 1, - In his notandum quod tria sunt de ratione imaginis: - similitudo - in specie rei vel in aliquo signo specei - origo Unde "ad hoc quod vere aliquid sit imago, requiritur quod ex alio procedat simile ei in specie, vel saltem in signo speciei." Origo igitur et processio expressiva originalis est illud in quo ratio imaginis completur. Et in loco Sent. distinguit D. Thomas triplicem gradum imitationis, quatenus unumquodque quantum attingit ad rationem imaginis, tantum attingit ad rationem indifferentiae: secundum enim quod differt non est imago: (1) Primus est in quo invenitur aliquid simile qualitati alterius, quae designat et exprimat naturam alterius, quamvis illa natura in ea non inveniatur: sicut lapis dicitur esse imago hominis in quantum habet similem figuram, cui non subsistit natura illa cujus est imago. (Et sic imago Dei est in creatura, sicut imago regis in denario). Et sic est imperfectus modus imaginis. (2) Sed perfectior ratio invenitur quando illi qualitati quae designat naturam similem subest eadem natura in specie, sicut est imago hominis patris in filio suo: quia habet similitudinem in figura, et in natura quam figura significat. (3) Sed perfectissima ratio imaginis est quando eamdem numero formam et naturam invenimus in imitante cum eo quem imitatur; et sic est Filius perfectissima imago patris: quia omnia attributa divina quae sunt modum qualitatis significata, simul cum ipsa natura sunt in Filio, non solum secundum speciem, sed secundum unitatem in numero. Delectabiliter: Quod quaedam sint imitationes naturaliter homini delectabilites, ab Aristotele sic ostenditur: Poetica, c. 4, 1448b 4-19:

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La poesie semble bien devoir en general son origine a deux causas, et deux causes natuelles. Imiter est naturel aux hommes et se manifeste des leur enfance (l'homme differe des autres animaux en ce qu'il acquiert ses premieres connaisances) et, en second lieu, tous les hommes prennent plaisir aux imitations. --Un indice est ce qui se passe dans la realite: des etres dont l'original fait peine a la vue, nous aimons a en contempler l'image executee avec la plus grande exactitude; par example les formes des animaux les plus vils et des cadavres.-- Une raison en est encore qu'apprendre est tres agreable non seulement aux philosophes mais paraeillement aussi aux autres hommes; seulement ceux-ci n'y ont qu'on apprend en les regardant et on deduit ce que represente chaque chose, par example que cette figure c'est un tel. Si on n'a pas vu auparavant l'objet represente, ce n'est plus comme imitation que l'oeuvre pourra plaire, mais a raison de l'execution, de la couleur ou d'une autre cause de ce genre. (Poetics, ch. 4, 1448b 4-19) Ars ergo delectabiliter imitandi est ars producendi opera seu imagines vel repraesentationes quorum ipsa consideratio vel inspectio delectabilis est. Delectatio vero ista est propter imitationem seu repraesentationem, non autem ust sic propter rem imitatem seu originalem, quia ut notat Aristoteles, res etiam vilis potest delectabiliter imitari. Unde homicidium in tragoeia delectabile esse potest, non ut homicidium, hoc enim esset perversum, sed ut homicidii imitatio. Quamvis igitur oporteat nos imitationis originala cognoscere ut imitatio qua imitatio attingatur, ipsum origniale est tamen extra rationem ejus propter quod delectatur. Nec obstat quod cognitio imitationis aliquando supponat cognitionem alicujus mali vel turpis originalis. Nam "actio iintellectus perficitur secundum quod res intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus; et ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad res, ita quod amor rei amatae animam conglutinat." (Ia IIae, . 86, a. 1, ad 2) Unde "quamvis turpitudo sine visionis imperfectione esse potest; species enim rerum in naima, per quas contraria cognoscuntur, non sunt contrariae. Unde etiam Deus, qui perfectissimam cognitionem habet, omnia pulchra et turpia videt." (IIIa, Suppl., q. 94, a. 1, ad 2) Delectatio ergo ista est formaliter propter imitationem quatenus haec tenet se in linea purae objectivitatis et intelligibilitatis. Et hoc tria importat: Primo quod talis imitatio imperfecta erit in ratione imitationis delectabilis quatenus deficit in pura objectiviate seu quatenus habet de subjecto ut contraponitur objecto. Et hoc contingit quando originale non est imitative expressum, ita ut ipsa imitatio de se non sufficiat sed oportet eam compleri ex aliquo subjecto, sive originale, sive materia, ut manifestum est in comeodia imperfecta poetae causa vel histrionis. Contingit enim quod repraesentatio ab aliquo mediocri histrione effecta delectabilis esse non possit nisi primo ametur persona histrionis; et de idem de ipse poemate, nisi prius ametur ipsum originale vel ipse poeta. (Et ideo opera artis imitandi possunt moraliter malla esse, quatenus definciunt in ratione artis imitandi, seu quatenus sibimetipsis in linea purae imitationis objectivae non sufficiunt, sed requirunt ut conditio delectationis amorem ejus quod imitatur, vel ejus qui imitationem facit, vel materia in qua fit. Et defectus iste accidit ut in pluribus. Et aliquando5 de aliquo artis imitandi opere delectamur nobis nescientibus
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Reading aliquando for quando.

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frequentius contingit delectari propter aliuod subjectum, et non propter objectum absolute. in quo stat totum artis periculum. Secundo quod ut intellectus possit in ipsa repraesentatione morari ut in objecto propter quod delectatur, oportet quod illud objectum ut objectum perfectius sit originali, majorem sub hoc respectu intelligibilitatem habens, et quamdam universalitatem. (Et propter hoc dicit Aristoteles quod poesis magis philosophica est quam historia). Unde si aliquis pictor faciat alicujus individui picturam quae sit materialis similitudo illusionem realitatis conferens, tunc nonest opus artis delectabiliter imitandi, nec habet proprie rationem originationis, sed est potius sicut secundum ovum. Et sic multi mente grossiores Aristotelem intellexerunt. Tertio quod in quantum imitatio originale intelligibilior est, et quia imitatio dicit relationem ad id quod imitatur, i.e., ad originale, ipsa ars delectabiliter imitandi habet rationem instrumentalitatis, quatenus originale secundum imitationem intelligibilius fit. Unde bonitas operis dijudicatur ex majori intelligibilitate ejus quod imitatur. Et ideo dicit D. Thomas "quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur". (I Sent., Prol., q. 1, a. 5, ad 3) Et secundum hance respectum ars delectabiliter imitandi habet rationem doctrinae, quatenus de uno in aliud, scil. ex imitatione ipsum originale elevatur et magis manifestatur. In quo ars ista similitudinem habet cum intellectu agente. Illud autem ad quod conducit imitatio vel repraesentatio secundum sde deficit a claritate repraesentationis. Notetur differentia universalis scientifici ab isto artium imitandi quasi univerali. Res enim singulares sunt potius imagines illius. Et secndum hunc respectum universale artis imitandi seu imitatio medio modo se habet inter singulare et universale proprium, unde habet rationem medii et ad universale et ad singulare. Ergo de rebus habere poeticum cognitionem longe distat a perfectione scientiae sed etiam imperfectione singularis vel ignorantiae. Sed ista medieta et instrumentalitas quodammodo occultantur quatenus imitatio rationem seducit. Dicitur autem ratio imitationibus seduci, quia imitatio naturaliter homini delectibilis est. Ergo delectatio habet rationem motivi. Ergo ratio inclinatur ex aliquo rationi cognitivi secundum se extrinsico, scil. imitationis delectabilitate. Unde sub hoc respectu poetica ognitio non excedit omnino sensibilitatem secundum quam in animalibus quarenetur operationes propter delectationem. Sed nec intellectus nec voluntas, quantum de se est, quaerunt cognitionem vel bonum propter delectationem, sed propter operationes. Delectatio enim secundum se non habet rationem finis, sed concomitantis. "Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes." (Ia IIae, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2) Ergo poetica cognitio secundum se vialis est et imperfecta, quamvis melior quibusdam aliis. Et ideo ponit eam Divus Thomas infimam doctrinam ut patet ex I Post. Anal lectione prima, ubi postquam locutus sit de scientia demonstrativa, prius enumerat dialecticam, deinde rhetoricam, et ultimo poeticam: Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradicitionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicujus cibi si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicujus abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad
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aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem. Omnia autem haec ad Rationalem Philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est. Hoc autem multis disiplicet propter jucunditatem cognitionis poeticae et ejus impetum ardoris. Et ideo a multis ponitur cognitio poetica quasi in acie totius cognitionis. Sed hoc est per accidens, scil. propter plurium intellectus imbeccilitatem, ut cognitio poetica facilior sit medietatem quamdam habens inter singulare et universale hominibus ut in pluribus magis proportionatam. Nam pauci sunt qui ad prima principia ut ad principia scientiae et ad veram scientiam attingunt. Et sic multi non habentes nisi quamdam scientiae apparentiam, non intelligunt verae scientiae excellentiam, quamvis verum sit quod de multis non possumus nos habere nisi cognitionem poeticam, et quod poetae ingenium excellentium habeat ex hoc quod de istis nos doceat. Itaque verum est quod inter naturales cognitiones poetica hominibus ut in pluribus quamdam melioritatem habeat. His positis declaratur D. Thomae respondio: quod poeta utitur metaphoris propter repraesentationem: repraesentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem, ut dictum est. Est igitur notandum quod Sacra Scriptura vel theologia non intendunt repraesentationes homini secundum se delectbiles, sed res quae excedunt captum intellectus nostri quae sine mtephoris non possunt significari, vel minus convenienter propter rationes in corpore dictas. Poetica utitur metaphoris ad repraesentationes propter quas delectamur, ut quando leo dicitur animalium res, ex quo sequitur repraesentatio in qua leoni plus attribuitur quam habeat de intelligibilitate, et id quod consideratr est imitatio leonis, scil. leo-rex, non ipse leo nisi materialiter. Under moramur in eo cui leo comparatur, quatenus tamen illud cui est imitatio. Sacra Scriptura vero utitur metaphoris, non ad repraesentationes delectabiles, sed ad ipsas res, ut quando Christus dicitur leo, significatur fortitudo ejus ex sensibili fortitudine leonis. Sed in isto exemplo non moramur in eo cui comparatur, nec in hoc quod ex istis duobus constituitur, sed in fortitudine Christi. Unde dicit D. Thomas: "quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinisbus ratio seducatur: theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus utrique communis est, cum netra rationi proportionetur." (I Sent., loc. cit.) Ratio ergo utrique propria omnino opposita est. Esset igitur ridiculum dicere Scripturam vel sacram doctrinam poetice procedere. Quatenus enim poetica cognitio per se ad repraesentationes attendita verteremur ab eo quod intenditur, quod scil. repraesentationem excedit. Et quando habet apparentiam poeticam, hoc est per accidens, et non ut Scriptura vel theologia. [remainder of the text not yet scanned]

NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. I. A. IX, AD 1

(Notes on Prima Pars Q. 1, art. 9, ad. 1)

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(Unpublished manuscript, Charles De Koninck Papers)

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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