WHATS WITH THE ARMED FORCES?

by: Rene Jarque

July 25, 2005

Lately, I have been receiving a number of emails, text messages and phone calls asking about the sentiments in the military in relation to the present political crisis. An interesting question of course is how can the armed forces be influenced to intervene in the clamor for Arroyo to resign? Indeed, three major sectors will be crucial in making GMA step down: church, business and military. Of the three, the military is considered the tipping point. Once the armed forces intervenes, GMA will fall--so the argument goes. This lesson is not lost on the middle forces and to Arroyo herself who undermined her own boss in 2001 with the defection of the AFP. The pronouncement of the Chief of Staff that the AFP will stay neutral coupled with the relief of officers with political leanings show clearly where the AFP leadership stands--for the moment. But does the pronouncement actually reflect the sentiments of the soldiers? How long will it hold? What can be done to influence the soldiers to play a constructive role? Given the militarys stand, where is all this going to? Allow me to share some thoughts based on discussions with friends and former colleagues in the armed forces. What is the sentiment in the Armed Forces today? From what I gather, the sentiment among officers and soldiers is mixed, ranging from inis due to red alerts that inhibit their movement to indifference or walang pakialam to concern na sana maayos na ang gulo. Some are saying the armed forces should not intervene as the issue is political and some, the armed forces should intervene para matapos ang gulo. It is not a unanimous vote for intervention as some anti-GMA groups would probably like it. However, I believe there are underlying frustrations, particularly in the lower ranks that fuel a proactive role for the armed forces--frustrations not just of the corruption in government but in the Armed Forces. We can understand the varying reactions by looking at the personal motivation at different levels--generals, senior and junior officers and enlisted personnel. What about the generals? As a general rule, the higher you go up in rank, the more compromises you have to make, the more you become involved in unethical conduct and corrupted by the system. The generals who are supporting Arroyo, both active and retired, have much to lose if she goes. For one thing, those in the AFP leadership today owe their position to Arroyo. And many, if not all, of the generals and ex-generals have skeletons in their closets. Remember that the generals today, both active and retired, grew up in the martial law period where they wallowed in its unprofessionalism, abuse and corruption. All administrations after EDSA have not dared open up the closets and if a reform minded government takes over, these closets will be opened up and the generals will be subject to accountability for human rights abuses, criminal acts, corruption, etc. Thus, the status quo and neutrality (defending the constitution) is in the generals best interest. With so much to lose, it is unlikely that the generals will intervene. If they do, it will only be if victory is assured and their interests protected as was the case in 2001. What about the senior officers? The senior officers are the majors to colonels, basically those who are already in the battalion and brigade levels if they are in the Army. As they already have invested at least 12

years in the service, they have to protect their careers. They also have growing families and expenses. For some there is little taint of corruption (mostly by inaction or toleration) but there are those who are as rapacious as the corrupt generals especially those assigned in finance or supply jobs or as administrative officers of the generals or DND officials. For similar reasons as the generals, the status quo is in their best interest also. However, there are rare exceptions in this level, those who still possess a progressive attitude. These are the ones who should rise to lead AFP reform but the system does not allow such honest and straightforward officers to be placed in sensitive positions lest they disturb the present dynamics which cover-up and protect the generals, ex-generals and politicians. Honesty is not really a criteria to become Chief of Staff. Like the generals, the senior officers are generally siguristas whose inclination to intervene will generally follow the command line. But there are exceptions, those who may rise and lead the disgruntled junior officers and soldiers when the situation is ripe. How about the junior officers? These are the lieutenants and captains, from the new 2nd lieutenant to the senior captains with 7 or more years in the service. Since they are taking the brunt of the battles against the insurgents in the countryside, they are most aware of the inadequacies of the government and the inept leadership in the AFP. Barring some exceptions, this is the most idealistic group in the armed forces. This is where one would find the sentiment to be constructive or to intervene the strongest due to this groups youthful idealism and many of them still unburdened by the responsibilities of family life. However, they are too low in the chain of command to be able to lead a constructive group and will be closely watched by military intelligence. They will have to organize clandestinely under a credible leadership which may come from the senior ranks. And the enlisted personnel? These are the privates, corporals and sergeants that form the workhorse of the armed forces. The general sentiment is here seems to be mostly indifference and inis. Our soldiers are essentially economic soldiers who are afraid to lose their jobs and not be able to take care of their families or payoff their loans. They are more worried about day to day survival concerns. But if this group can be organized, they are very powerful bloc. They have their own separate chain of command headed by the group of sergeant majors. But some of these sergeant majors have already been co-opted into the system by lucrative assignments where they have their own budgets and also by directorships in AFP corporations such as RSBS, AFPSLAI, etc. What are the factors that can sway soldiers to support or hinder the GMA resign move? A major factor is population or people support (which is also one of the key elements for success in warfare). If there would be enough mass support for the call of resignation of GMA or a change in government, then the armed forces is within its constitutional duty to intervene. The only factor that is stopping the soldiers from joining the fray is the chain of command who, as explained earlier, will stick to their best interest which is the status quo. If the junior officers or enlisted personnel decide to break, they must be ready for a bloody confrontation with their comrades who stay with the chain of command. I am sure that GMA is using the many generals around her to control the military. And she has a lot of them in the cabinet. A crucial issue here is the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. If it can be proven that the GMA administration is illegitimate because of electoral fraud, then the duty of the armed forces becomes clear, even if to forcefully remove the President from Malacanang and even if the generals dont like it. Unfortunately, the Gloria-gate tapes have not proven it clearly and the

administration has done a good job in muddling the issue through a combination of lies and disinformation. Malacanang has used every counter-propaganda trick in the manual, from destroying the credibility of the source (a technique known as indirect refutation), to silence (they waited three weeks for GMA to answer), to diversion (using other issues such as fuel prices, economic problems, etc) to minimization (GMA has not violated any law). However, as a former Psychological Operations Operator myself, it bothers me that curiously enough they have not used the most effective of all counter-propaganda techniques which is direct refutation or refuting the enemys propaganda using facts and the truth. Of course, one does not use this technique if the enemys propaganda is irrefutably correct. Another issue is honor, no matter how corny that sounds. But this appeal will only work for the honorable segments of the military, a few senior officers and a number of junior officers and enlisted. The Commander in Chief has violated the Honor Code and the AFP Code of Ethics (Article III, Section 1.1): We believe in honor as our crowning value as it is more precious than life itself. It is the hallmark of military conduct which implies our clear consciousness of personal dignity and worth. We associate it with good reputation and is immortal, sacred part of our character, the violation of which should bring about shame in us and the dignity to impose on ourselves the requisite restitutionTo us honor means truthfulness, sincerity, honesty, uprightness, credibility and avoidance of deception .. We shall not lie, cheat, steal, violate moral and ethical codes nor tolerate violations of the same. Indeed, the issue goes beyond legality or the rule of law. It is a question of truth, fairness and justice and based on the soldiers code of honor, the conduct of the Commander in Chief to cover up and quibble with a clear intent to deceive is totally unacceptable and should not be tolerated. The Armed Forces should help in uncovering the truth and not in hiding it. The Officer Corps should call on all its members, including and especially those who have retired and in government, to stop lying and to speak the truth. If the President is suspected of committing a crime, in this case rigging the elections and her relatives accused of receiving jueteng payoffs, shouldnt the rule of law prevail with the PNP and NBI, which are headed by Peemayers, conducting an investigation rather than the NBI director appearing in the Senate to lie in defense of the perpetrator? Shouldnt the police mobilize its informants to provide evidence for the jueteng payoffs rather than deny and cover up and assist the corrupt to go scot free? So whats with the armed forces? Is it just going to stand there while all hell breaks lose? For all intents and purposes, yes. Given the varying sentiments, the armed forces right now is a confused organization. There is also an air of distrust as military intelligence is keeping a close watch on potential dissent from the ranks. This makes the organization of a constructive group within the AFP difficult. If the CSAFP pronouncement is any indication, intervention from the generals is not to be expected. But you never know who among the generals will break ranks given the right incentive by any group that wants to take power, whether its the opposition, the Aquino-Drilon faction, the Noli de Castro group, COPA and its allies, among others. If left to the generals, the status quo is in their best interest unless there is compelling reason that they withdraw support from the President. All this talk from the AFP leadership about professionalism and defending the Constitution is a bunch of crap. It is a veil on the real issues that concern the generals which is how to stay in power so they can further enrich themselves and/or protect themselves from any accountability for their abuses, crimes and corruption, especially during the martial law period. Perhaps, this is just as well because if the generals intervene, it will be business as usual and no real change in government can be expected. Such interventions will just reinforce the power of the generals which they will use to protect

themselves and cover their tracks. We can also pretty much eliminate the senior officers who are also protecting their careers and their savings. If there would be constructive intervention, it would and should come from the junior officers. Unseating Arroyo has become war of attrition, a siege as GMA holds on to power no matter what the cost. The battle lines though are not clear as it has presently many fronts with many warring parties and conflicting interests. There is no unity of command among the attacking forces. Its like attacking a fortified castle from many sides but the attacking forces are not coordinated. It will be a simple divide and conquer or confuse and conquer strategy on the part of the castles forces. The Queen holds the upperhand with the government, armed forces and police on her side. Like any siege in ancient warfare, the innocent victims and ultimate losers are the people, in the castle and outside, who helplessly suffer the horrors of the war. Besides unity of forces, the other question is sustainability -- who can hold out the longest, can keep the soldiers morale longer, supply the logistics and replenish forces longer. One big factor that might hold out the AFPs intervention is the involvement in the opposition of the leftist organizations, which to the soldiers mind is still the enemy of the state. The middle forces trying to recruit the progressive elements in the military should find a way to dispel this perception so that the progressive elements in the junior ranks of the Officer Corps can link up with the progressive elements in the left. This will not be too easy. Will they trust one another? Linking up might also be difficult because of intelligence monitoring and the soldiers have to be able to get out of the barracks amidst the blue or red alert status. There is indeed a dilemma. Military intervention can restore order but, as we have learned from 1986 and 2001, if the intervention is by the generals, no real change in politics and society will happen. In fact, it could be worse if a military or military controlled government takes over. The images of martial law come to mind and many of these generals were bred by martial law. If the young officers intervene without the blessing of the chain of command, it will be a bloody confrontation with the pro-government forces. I think the best combination for a military intervention, if ever it happens or when it becomes final solution or fait accompli, would be the younger generation of the Officer Corps supported by broad popular support, including the progressive elements of the left. Perhaps then, we can expect real change in government.

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About the Author: Rene N. Jarque is a former Philippine Army officer who served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of National Defense for defense policy and strategy. He was Chief of Strategic Research of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, AFP. In the Philippine Army, he served in various command and staff positions with the First Scout Ranger Regiment, 5th Infantry Division and Psychological Operations Group. He is Infantry, Scout Ranger, Airborne and PSY-OPS qualified and has received numerous awards and decorations for gallantry in combat, including for wounds in battle, and for effective leadership and unit management. He was a lecturer in AFP schools and was editor of the Army Journal, Cavalier, OSS Digest and OSS Research Series. His essays and commentaries have appeared in many publications notably, Politik, Newsbreak, The Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer, among others. He left the military service in 1998 as a Captain and has been working abroad as an executive since then. He briefly came back to the Philippines in 2003 and was involved with various cause-oriented works advocating AFP reform and good governance. He is a convenor of Actions Against Tyranny and Corruption Now (ACT NOW) and was involved in Initiatives for Peace-Mindanao. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, class of 1986 and has an MBA from the Ateneo Graduate School of Business.