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SAFETY

Complacency and poor working practices could lead to serious incidents in the Asia region, says Joe Eades

It couldnt happen here

HSL

HAVE, over the course of my career working in the process industries, seen evidence of growing complacency in safety culture and a general lack of understanding of process safety guidelines. This is exacerbated by ever-present financial pressures to reduce costs, resulting in decreased spending on safety and training. This has undoubtedly led to many incidents over the years throughout the world. Often these have happened within companies and countries previously thought to have excellent safety records and an effective approach to safety. But many of these incidents have a strangely familiar similarity to them. As an example, while working in Asia, Ive seen some routine work practices that are becoming commonplace in the region. If we ignore them, these practices will undoubtedly lead to more incidents and possibly major events. These practices include pneumatic testing of process systems, a copy-and-paste approach to design, and a vendor-knows-best mentality. These are sometimes done with little or no understanding of the underlying process and without due assessment of the risks. Any of them, and many more like it, could potentially lead to a significant incident in the Asia region. Just because it hasnt happened yet, it doesnt mean it wont.

Asias young workforce

The chemical and process industries have been booming in Asia over the past few decades. Its rapid growth has put a strain on the regions education system, which struggles to cope with industrys demands. This has resulted in a relatively young workforce, with rapid promotion to senior and responsible positions. Added to that, turnover is high, as people frequently move between employers. As safety guru Trevor Kletz said: Organisations do not learn from the past... individuals learn, but they leave the organisation taking their knowledge with them . So coupling the young workforce and the high turnover of personnel means that many organisations lack the experience and, more importantly, the judgement required for longterm safe operation. Lessons from the past are not being learnt, or are lost in the rapid expansion. There is also a large degree of complacency appearing in the region, along with a it couldnt happen here mindset. Poor work practices, such as those mentioned earlier, just add to the problem left untackled, they could lead to history repeating itself and ultimately people losing their lives or major environmental damage. There is a fundamental lack of awareness that certain work practices are unsafe, and only

could it?
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luck has so far prevented an event. Lets look at some simple examples of these practices and where they have led to failures elsewhere in the world. Could similar events happen in Asia? would you be that the design has been challenged adequately? Is there a continuity of personnel through the project? Is the direction from the project management team along the lines of: Its a copy process with minor modifications so why challenge it, it has been done before somewhere else , or Make sure the HAZOP does not take more than three days . Another example I have observed was for a company now subject to a takeover. A design error was made by the original engineering team where the vent system (combined breather/vacuum valve) was placed above a heat exchanger (using -15oC glycol) as part of the environmental abatement system for vapour emissions. The valve did not give any indication back to any control system since it was purely a mechanical device. During part of the routine maintenance and calibration exercise the nitrogen valve was closed to allow calibration of the instrumentation. After the calibration the manual valve was left closed (as a proper reinstatement check hadnt been carried out). Over time the tank then breathed through the heat exchanger. In a tropical environment with high humidity, over a number of weeks the heat exchanger became choked with ice and one day when one of the processes demanded solvent, the pump started and sucked the tank in. Luckily, the tank maintained its integrity. The site was shut down for a day while the emergency response team emptied its contents to a road tanker and to contain the toxic and flammable material. No one was hurt and the asset cost was limited to around US$100,000. This copyand-paste approach to design meant that all 80 tanks had the same design flaw (when the initial plant only had ten storage tanks). How many other sites have this design flaw? So, with energy and sustainability being the current direction, why are engineering companies still being allowed to submit old energy-inefficient designs, and just copy one they had earlier, rather than challenging the concept to make it more energy efficient and inherently safer? Again we have to question whether the value of engineers is really appreciated, or are they a hindrance to the construction team who just want to build it as quickly and cheaply as possible. Again, this copy-and-paste approach has been accepted in the region because there have been no significant incidents here... yet.

pneumatic testing
As a young engineer in Europe I was taught that hydro-testing is the preferred, safe practice for investigating leaks in piping networks. By contrast, the alternative pneumatic test (using compressed air) should only be used in exceptional circumstances, and only then with a detailed risk assessment to justify its use. However, when I started work in Asia I was shocked to discover that pneumatic testing is commonplace in construction in order to save time and money, with no regard for the hazard and potential consequences. Companies favour this method, but at what risk? Pneumatic testing is done at ambient conditions so does it really test the mechanical integrity of the system? It only tests to 110% of design pressure, compared with 150% for hydraulic testing (under BS5500). In hydraulic testing the weight of the water used is an additional load on the supports and system, which gives a higher degree of confidence that the main layer of protection from the hazard in the pipework prevents a loss of containment, both in normal operation and during any process deviation. In 2009, in Shanghai, a contractor was carrying out pneumatic testing for an LNG terminal, when a section of pipework blew out, nearly flattening the site due to the amount of stored energy in the system. This resulted in one worker being killed and injuries to a further 15. The asset loss was significant and the project was delayed by six months. Surely we should be using pneumatic testing by exception, not the norm? Just because few incidents have yet occurred, people are becoming increasingly complacent about its use. Long term, it also raises the issue of effects on the integrity of the plant that is meant to contain the hazards and prevent a loss of containment.

In many cases in Asia, many of the concept design and processes were performed in Europe or the US and the detailed design carried out locally. If thats the case, how confident would you be that the design has been challenged adequately?

design by copy-and-paste
How often have you heard the phrase we copied this design from one in... and therefore we dont need to do any new engineering design or risk assessment for it? Another example could be for a technical transfer of a process or a design but not taking into account the impact of the changes in base assumptions. In many cases in Asia, many of the concept design and processes were performed in Europe or the US and the detailed design carried out locally. If thats the case, how confident

the vendor knows best?

A big concern is a growing trend to reduce project costs by cutting engineers and consultants out of the loop. This approach may seem logical to a manager trying to do their bit for the business, but in many cases this is a false economy and can lead to long-term repercussions which could cost

(Pictured left) Reactor vessel failure at the UKs Stanlow oil refinery (1990) an example of why, in Asia, pneumatic testing should be the exception, not the rule november 2012 www.tcetoday.com 27

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SAFETY

As a profession each of us has a responsibility to build up a broad skill set, to voice our concerns and document them. If you dont it could be your reputation on the line if something does go wrong later.
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hundreds or thousands of times more than the initial saving or worse still, a fatality. Quite often, operational and commissioning personnel are not involved in the initial design process, and therefore the design team does not have a good grasp of the process and the hazards. In most cases equipment manufacturers are not process experts but experts in mechanical equipment fabrication, sometimes with a controls E&I (electrical and instrumentation) background. Users are happy to supply a vague or poorly-defined URS (user requirements specification), to put the onus on the equipment supplier to offer solutions (based on best practice) solutions. What the user fails to understand is that it is their responsibility to define the process and limitations of the process since the equipment supplier will offer as close to a standard design as possible. In many cases this design may not be fit for purpose or even suitable for the process. In Fayetteville, US in 1991, an operational team worked directly with a vendor to install and commission a thermal oxidiser, to abate vent emissions, from a process plant. On a hot day, the emissions from the plant were higher than the equipment was designed for and it exploded. There were lapses on both sides and the vendor had not previously tested its interlocks adequately. Something that never ceases to amaze me is how many vendors standard commissioning documentation today is still totally inadequate, quite often a 12 page checklist that does not actually test more than that the loops work rather than challenging the functionality, or the safety systems, trips and interlocks. Can a vendor prove that they really carried out their duty of care or is it a deliberate strategy to make

a profit by coming back (as a variation) to fix the non-functioning plant after a client signs it off as passed? Customers have a clear responsibility to monitor and approve the documentation any supplier offers before carrying out the work.

wake-up call for Asia

As a region, we have seen a massive rate of growth in both manufacturing, but also in engineering. There is tremendous pressure to develop a low cost, yet skilled workforce. This is leading to large shortages of experienced and especially chartered engineers, as well as an ever-transient workforce. In many cases companies are not giving their employees adequate breadth of exposure to the areas they need to have the experience to make the judgement calls expected of them. As a profession each of us has a responsibility to build up a broad skill set, to voice our concerns and document them. If you dont it could be your reputation on the line if something does go wrong later. Saying that you were ignored by your boss isnt enough in a court of law. If it wasnt documented, it wasnt done. There is a similarity in the prime factors to many of these incidents that through complacency or a lack of process safety understanding, or just copy-and-paste approach to design, there have been incidents and near misses. How long will it be before we have the big one that wakes everyone up? tce

Joe Eades (joe.eades@ispahan.com) is the managing director of Ispahan Group and vice chairman of the IChemE board in Singapore

www.tcetoday.com november 2012