Constructing "Us": Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False Consciousness Author(s): Kathleen Bawn Reviewed work(s): Source: American

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Coalition "Us": Ideology, Constructing Politics, and False Consciousness

Los Angeles Kathleen Bawn,University ofCalifornia,
they Ideologymatters in politics becauseitcauses peopleto careaboutissuesin which areoften decisive indemocratic dehaveno direct stake. Indeed, ideological preferences can easilyoverwhelm thosecaston cisionmaking, as votescaston thebasisofideology in theabsenceofinterest, ideolopreference thebasisofdirect self-interest. By creating that notexist.This papermodelsideologiesas gies createcoalitions otherwise might The variety ofequilibria is inin a repeated decision making. equilibria gameofpolitical in thepoliticalworld.The thevariety of ideologiesoperating as reflecting terpreted andto developa sequential choice modelallowsme to define thevalueof an ideology Themodelofmodelofbargaining tounderstand howelitesstrategically shapeideology. ofideologies canbe fers results about(1) thecircumstances under which particular types I showthat interest affects theformation of ideologies. sustained and (2) howcommon for be cemented Thatis,itis possible false common interest willnotalways byideology. rational self-interested behavior. consciousness to arisefrom

Ideology is critical topolitics becauseitcausespeopleto havepreferhaveno direct stake. encesandopinions about issuesin which they Many inhomogeneous English-speaking communities, peoplewholiveandwork Thetreatment for haveopinions about education. ofgays bilingual example, among many heterosexual civilians. in themilitary evokesstrong feelings abroad caredeeply about curbMany U.S. citizens whonever plantotravel inremote ofthe world. menstrongly Many inghuman rights abuses corners ifthey their even believe that ownwives support (oroppose)abortion rights, never anddaughters would havean abortion. intheabsence ofdirect interest havesignificant Theseopinions formed these"ideoBlocksofcitizens around organized political consequences.1 affect decisions bycasting votes, writing letters, logical" preferences policy
and I am grateful to This project beganwhenI was a NationalFellow at theHooverInstitution, many conversations that gotme started. Sincethen, Barry Weingast andDouglassNorth for helpful I wouldespecially liketo thank John Aldrich, others havegiven me comments andencouragement. Golden, Thrainn Eggertsson, Jeff Frieden, Miriam Dick Anderson, Len Binder, Rui de Figueiredo, Roland RonRogowski, Barbara Sinclair, Ken Shepsle, Jack Hirschleifer, ScottPage,John Petrocik, BrianWalker, and seminar at theUniWomall, John Zaller, participants Sturm, Sid Tarrow, Robyn ofIowa andMichigan andat UCLA. Research from theHooverInstitution andby support versities theUCLA Academic Senateis gratefully acknowledged. 1Seetheessaysin Mansbridge of whydirect self-interest aloneis un(1990) foran overview able toexplain much ofpolitical life. American Journalof PoliticalScience,Vol. 43, No. 2, April1999,Pp. 303-334 ?1999 Midwest Political ScienceAssociation

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demonstrating, andthrough other means ofpolitical participation. Indeed, thenumber ofpeoplesubstantively affected bya policydecision is often small compared tothenumber ofpeoplewhoholdopinions on it.Opinions based on something other thandirect self-interest are decisivein many decisions. policy we In talking aboutpreferences that do notderive from self-interest, thevictims ofhuman or identifimight speakofempathy for rights abuses, theplight an unplanned Or we cationwith ofa woman facing pregnancy. thepreferences arenotmotivated butby might simply saythat byinterest, While andideology arenot thesamething, they ideology. empathy, identity, in theabsence of(orin opposition an ability tocreate to) share preference I willusethe direct word as a catch-all self-interest. "ideology" torefer toall that other than andpreferences arisefrom a direct opinions anything perintheissue.2 I willuse "interest" inthenarrow sonalstake senseofa direct stake. Thisis notto saythat andinterest arenecessarily personal ideology is to showhowideological can arise opposites. Indeed, mypoint behavior inpolitical contexts. outofself-interested behavior Mycentral claim is that ideologies create preferences bydefining coalion onesideofissuesabout on tions. Ideologies placepeopleclearly which, In this thebasisofinterest alone, they would be indifferent. way, ideologies between those whoaresubstantively affected forge coalitions byan issue andthose whosepreferences arisein someother fashion. Someideologies Marxism arequite about thecoalitions create. Forexample, deexplicit they in terms fines ofclass ("Workers oftheworld andfemicoalitions unite") interms is powerful"). Other define nism ofgender ("Sisterhood ideologies for doesnotexplicitly Whilelibertarianism, coalitions implicitly. example, ofonegroup over a libertarian nonetheless theinterests emphasize another, inpublic, or finds herself an allyofthose whowant to smoke a gun, carry the distribute over internet. pornography ofideologies Whenwill What can we learn as coalitions? bythinking common interest? Arethe created by ideologies reflect underlying coalitions in thesenseofuniting a common ideologies "natural" those peoplewith in a more in important manner? stake issues?Or do they operate arbitrary Thatis,can ideologies from self-interested behavior nonearising rational, theless "false create consciousness"?
2Using theterm "ideology" totalkabout preferences that do notariseoutofdirect self-interest highlights thefeature that I wishto address, butdownplays other features associated with itsordinary usage.Mostnotable is that ideology can serveas an informational shortcut bywhich relatively uninformed masspublics evaluate theperformance andproposals ofelites. Thisideahas beendevela clearer ofthe opedin somedepth byHinichandMunger (1992, 1994). I hopethat understanding coalition politics ofideology willaid inunderstanding theseother aspects andeffects.

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I show that false consciousness is possible, subject tolimits. When common interest is clearandsignificant, prevailing ideologies willreflect it.But inlessextreme cases,ideologies cansplit what seem tobe natural coalitions. I make this argument with twogametheoretic models. Thefirst, the"Game ofPolitics," shows howdifferent patterns ofselective cooperation can arise as different in a repeated equilibria game.Theseequilibria giverisetobehavior that an observer might attribute toideology, identity, ormoral principles. Themain ofthe is tomake the point GameofPolitics precise analogy between coalitions andideology, butit also generates comparative statics In thesecond about when fail. ideologies might the"GameofIdeolmodel, ogy," is endogenous, as players overwhat ideology bargain to equilibrium playintheGameofPolitics. Thepoint oftheGameofIdeology is todetermine indifferent Inparticuwhat ofideologies sort willarise circumstances. lar, when willideologies reflect common interest, andwhen willthey create false consciousness? I willproceed In Section as follows. 1,I establish some basicdefinitions andbriefly review theliterature on which I build, thegametheoretic literature on culture andideas.Section 2 defines theGameofPolitics. Section 3 invarious shows that howbehavior lookslikeideology arises and equilibria offers thevalueofan ideology a natural to a particular indiwayto define 4 usesthe vidual. Section values ofideologies ofthe Game as the foundation ofIdeology, inwhich is endogenous. Thisgame the ideology addresses questions ofwhy oneideology is adopted andothers arenot. 5 discusses Section some with the 6 concludes. problems andSection framework,
1. DEFINITIONSANDBACKGROUND: IDEOLOGY, CULTURE,ANDGAME THEORY

In trying I will foto explainpreferences linkedto interest, notdirectly cus onlyon thosethat as expressgiveriseto some action-be it as minimal in front ing an opinionto an anonymous pollster or as dramatic as standing of a tankrollingacross TiananmenSquare. Preferences thatare neverexpressed through any action at all-if such thingsexist-are beyond the The focus on actions,thatis, on revealedpreferences, scope of thisstudy. thefollowing definition of ideology.Ideologyis an enduring suggests systemof beliefs, whataction to takein a variety prescribing ofpolitical cirFor example,if an abortion cumstances. clinic opens in myneighborhood,

I should tellsme whether theentrance, myideology a (a) picket (b) write

checkto support theclinic,or (c) do nothing.

theother terms mentioned above: identity, moralvalues,etc.I maychoose to picketbecause of myChristian a checkbecause ofmyfemivalues,to write nistidentity, to do nothing because of mylibertarian While there ideology.

It should be clearthat definition ofideology someof this encompasses

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aredifferences between theconcepts ofideology, identity, andvalues, my is notsufficiently theory tomake developed distinctions them. between Thisdefinition establishes a somewhat complicated relationship between interest andideology. arenotmutually They exclusive alternative explanations for behavior. Rather, interest is a potential component ofideolTo take theextreme ogy. an ideology itssubscribers example, that directs to actintheir direct self-interest fit In less always would theabovedefinition. extreme anideology examples, tells itssubscribers when toactintheir direct self-interest andwhen toacton someother basis. My theory proposes that all ideologies haveinterest at their core,but that interest is mediated bythesocialandpolitical environment. makes What given theactions ofothers. Thisrequirement that prescriptions be enduring constitutes likethe"constraints" something that Converse (1964) argues characterize belief that also seems toencompass systems both (a term ideolI agreewith ogyandrelated concepts). Indeed, Converse's claimthat "the sources ofconstraint aremuch less logicalin theclassicalsensethan they arepsychological-and lesspsychological than social"(1964,209).Mynotion ofhowsocialconstraints is more operate however.3 restrictive, Many readers willhavenoticed from key concepts gametheory lurking inthe ifthe abovediscussion. anonymously ofpolitical Specifically, "variety circumstances" canbe represented as a game, then ofideology mydefinition matches thestandard definition ofa strategy, that totakeatevis,an action node. Andthe anideology ery requirement that be "enduring" means simply that thestrategy must be part ofa Nashequilibrium. A notable property ofNashequilibria is that areoften In they not unique. when particular, interact over players anindefinite time repeatedly a horizon, widevariety ofbehavior canbe sustained as equilibria. Thisresult patterns was widely understood itwasformally derived longbefore and (Fudenberg Maskin is generally referred 1986)andhence toas the"folk theorem." Theinevitability ofmultiple inrepeated equilibria games is sometimes as evidence interpreted that game is not useful for theory socialscience, that is, that repeated gamesdo notproduce testable An alternative hypotheses. reaction is that, in Calvert's "the words, multiplicity ofequilibria is a basic andrealfeature ofhuman a deeptruth aboutsociallife, interaction, accurately represented bygametheoretic models" (1997,136). Bytreating multiple equilibria as a serious implication about human soas opposed to a methodological likeCalvert ciety scholars nuisance, have
3Mynotion ofhowpsychological constraints operate, on theother hand, is lessrestrictive than Converse's.

a system of beliefs"enduring" is thatits subscribers do better in thelong runbyfollowing theideology's thanthey prescriptions wouldbydeviating,

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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tousegame begun theory toaddress questions about the roles ofculture and ideasin political life.The seminal article in thisemerging literature is by Kreps (1990),whoargues that different cultures canbe understood as different equilibria. Thework donehere byculture is coordination, the creation of shared expectations about what sort ofactions aresocially acceptable and what merit actions punishment. Krepsbuildson Schelling's (1960) insight that coordination is easy whenthere is an obvious"focalpoint" on which to coordinate. Culture, then, canbe thought ofas a setoffocal onethat andevolves points, emerges in a decentralized way.Other focalpoints, are explicitly however, constructed and manipulated by goal-oriented elites.Garrett andWeingast (1993) showhowstrategic elites use ideastoconstruct focalpoints around specific issues,suchas theEuropean market. Garrett Community's single andWeingast's more general contribution is toshow ideascanbe treated as endogenous.4 Thisis animportant step-ifculture andideasmatter as coorthen tohavea theory ofhowthey dinating devices, we want comeabout. My goal hereis expand thisgametheoretic literature on culture and In doing ideastoincorporate a keyfeature ofpolitics: coalition formation. the focus from determines the nature ofcoopso,I shift away culture, which intheface-to-face eration interaction ofeveryday andtoward life, ideology, which inlarger In themodels coordinates behavior arenas.5 political below, I incorporate thekeypolitical feature ofcoalitions into a model ofrepeated I develop interaction. Thisallows metoadvance the ballinthree ways. First, andWeingast's thestrategic Garrett claim about ofideasinto a manipulation I generate formal model ofideology. about howsocial Second, predictions andpolitical circumstances affect theemergence anddisappearance ofdifferent I offer ofideology. an interest-based ofwhy types Third, explanation them careabout that don't affect people things directly.6 intheabsence that creates ofinMy"explanation" ideology preference in that I deliberately terest constructed is, ofcourse, tautological, mydefinition ofideology to answer thisquestion. is nottautological, howWhat inthe is thetheory remainder ofthis Itwilltake ever, developed discussion.
4See also Weingast 1995andBatesandWeingast 1995. 5I do notmeantoimply that culture andideology aremutually exclusive. Indeed, when we talk about"politicalculture" or the"American Ethos" (McCloskeyand Zaller 1984) we often mean hasthecharacteristics ofboth andculture intheeveryday something that ideology use ofthewords. I hopethat thisattempt to modelideology willbe a steptowards clarifying therelationship between itandculture. 61 am notarguing herethat interest is theonlyplausibleexplanatory mechanism in political I wantto showthat science, butitis theonlyone I willuse in this paper. we can understand ideolthat arisesfrom andthestructure ofpolitical We do nothave ogyas something interest interaction. totreat itas an external constraint, alongthelinesofRoemer (1985).

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nontautological positions on twoissues.First, whatmakesan ideology stable? itmust Myclaimis that be a Nashequilibrium. where do Second, ideologies comefrom? I claimthat they areproposed by strategic elites to maximize long-term gains. I willbe ableto derive From these positions, a resultthatclarifies the relationship betweenideologyand short-term interest.
2. KEY ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL DECISIONS: MODELING THE GAME OF POLITICS

Thissection develops an extremely basicmodel toexplore theanalogy between coalitions andideologies, four elements ofpolitiincorporating key cal interaction. First, political decisions create social conflict. The alternative that is oneperson A second better for is worse for someother. is costly element key The costsofpolitical participation. participation maybe as lowas theopcostof voting portunity on an issueaboutwhich one is already well-inor as highas publicdefiance formed, ofa regime to execute known dissidents. Third, there is repeated interaction, which means that decisions today take into account howothers inthefuture. willreact Theanticipation offuture rewards andpunishments drives inthe Gameof ideological cooperation inthe Politics, justas itcandrive cooperation repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, numbers matter. Consider twoexamples. we use First, suppose direct tomake andeverybody majority voting votes. policy decisions, Suppose that 95% ofthepopulation has a very slight for preference policy A, and5% hasa very for B. (Inthis itdoesn't strong preference policy example matter whether these from interest orsomething preferences arise else.)AlA willbe chosen ternative a greater because number ofpeople prefer it,even border ofindifference. Itis the though be onthe they may number ofpeople in favor ofthepolicy that nottheintensity matters, of(orthereasons for) their preference. A second example highlights myclaimabout the political roleofideol1 is 5% ofthe nowthat ogy. Suppose Group andis madesubstanpopulation better off 2 is 10% ofthepopulation A. Group tively byalternative andis madeworse off A. Theremaining byalternative 85% areunaffected bythe
choice butbelievenonetheless A is better that alternative thanalternative B.

In thisexample, thedecisive willbe motivated group other by something than direct self-interest. Theseexamples illustrate in thesetting hownumbers matter in which matter that they decisions aremadebyvoting. exclusively, is, when policy arequite similar tothe Indeed, they usedbyDahl(1956)inhisdisexamples cussion ofmajority as the A significant basisofdemocracy. feature of voting

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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ofindividual is that intensity voting as a socialchoicemechanism majority to whowants anyperson that no role.Thismeans playsalmost preference ofpreferhaveallies-herownintensity about change must a policy bring enceis insufficient. invoting because thesetofactions little matters ofpreference Intensity I may anissue careabout limited. Although is quite individuals cantake that In many votes. as many youdo,I don'tgettentimes tentimes more than thesetofpossible actions is much larger. contexts, however, other political ofpreference more orlessmoney Wecanexpress bycontributing intensity ina more fashion, bydeorlessdisruptive toa campaign, bydemonstrating the toourcause.Thatis, as we moveawayfrom more orlesseffort voting itceasestobe thecase that numbers matter excluscenario, abstract voting sometimes be as effective may group activity bya small Moreintense sively. never disapone.Butthe valueofnumbers as lessintense bya large activity through when intense preferences express Indeed, people completely.7 pears do (workon cammuchof whatthey besidesvoting, activities political a town mobilize for meeting, etc.)is aimedatrestrikes, organize paigns, allies. cruiting of beenthat theformation hassimply Thepoint brief digression ofthis ofall politics-not is a part increasing numbers) coalitions allies, (building obviously Ideology not ofvoting. justthepolitics politics, justdemocratic in both that to argue andI want matters democracies andnondemocracies, I inboth Thatsaid, settings. feature applies the ofideology coalition-forging I turn fotowhich reader the GameofPolitics, now, must nowwarn the that that is,the politics case inwhich matter, onlynumbers cusesonthesimplest thelogicofcoalition formation Thisis thecase inwhich ofmajority voting. applyas wellto more stands outmostclearly. Butthebasic conclusions matter other factors. alongwith casesinwhich numbers complicated each Persons 1,2, and3 meet as follows. is played TheGameofPolitics In eachpea public should be undertaken. todecide whether project period in question B to one ofthethree players, givesbenefits riodt,theproject playandimposes costsCton oneoftheother eachwith equalprobability, ineachperiod, Thismeans that oneperson eachwith equalprobability. ers, andoneperson willbe oneperson willpaycosts, willbe thebeneficiary, as aretobe construed canbe as direct unaffected. broadly: they "Projects" as theestabofincome from oneperson to another oras indirect transfers that work to ofproperty andother socialinstitutions lishment rights systems theadvantage ofonegroup over another.
butsimply marginal impact, allyalwayshas positive each additional 7Thisis notto say that in which thenumbers arecompletely irrelevant. arealmost no political decisions that there

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The benefits ofeach project remain constant from one period to the next, butthecostsvary, so that is the cost of period t's project. The Ct Ct's are independent and drawn from a uniform distribution on (0,2B). This inthebestcase,projects means that, entail no costs;intheworst, costsare twice on average, benefits, and, costs equalbenefits. Each player can takeone ofthree actions with regard to eachperiod's In order project: abstain, support oroppose. toparticipate (toeither support oroppose) the must player paycostv,which is small relative toB. Abstention is costless. Theplayers find outthe identity ofthe beneficiary andcost-payer andtherealized valueofCtbefore decidewhether andhowtoparticithey decisions aremadesimultaneously, pate.Participation so that Player 1,for cannot condition her decision onPlayer inthat example, 2's action period. If strictly more peoplesupport theproject than opposeit,theproject is itis rejected. ifnobody Otherwise Forexample, adopted. participates, supis equaltoopposition andthe fails.8 port project The gameis repeated overan infinite horizon, withthefuture discounted by0 < 3 < 1. Discount inrepeated factors canbe interpreted games as indicating true or as theprobability intertemporal that the preference thenext or(most into gamecontinues both. Either interround, commonly) touncertainty. Themore pretation boilsdown the uncertain the environment, is discounted more the future relative tothe is 3. Simiandthe lower present, larly, themore uncertain theenvironment, thelower theprobability that the GameofPolitics inthenext continues period. TheGameofPolitics is basedongame ofdistributive politics developed ofuniversalism inlegislature. norms byWeingast Schwartz (1979)to study toexplain (1989) andAldrich theemergence of (1995) useda closevariant thelogicthat I amsuggesting legislative parties with essentially here toexThe details plainideology. ofthese other reflect thelegislative games setthan oneproject ting: more canbe approved ata time (toaddress questions about costsarespread overall players logrolling), equally (toapproximate from taxrevenue), spending andvoting is costless. on thelatter Mychoices twoissuesaredifferent becauseI want to explore why peoplereveal on issuesin which preferences haveno direct they
8All ofthepaper'ssubstantive results wouldholdifthetie-rule was changed (e.g.,opposition must strictly exceedsupport fortheproject to failor a coinis flipped in cases ofties).Indeed, they wouldholdifthedecision rulewas changed (e.g.,support must exceedopposition bya certain marginfor theproject tobe adopted.) Thesesorts ofchanges would, however, affect theexactparameter values required to support different equilibria.Concretely, thismeansthatchangesin political institutions couldaffect whether a particular ideology is sustainable, giventhepolitical and social environment.

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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stake. To do so,I needplayers tobe inthesituation ofbeing neither a costI needparticipation nora beneficiary. payer costsso that I caninterpret actions as revealed preferences. Mychoiceto allowonlyoneproject perperiod,on the other hand,is made entirely forsimplicity in the initial In Section exposition. 4, I willgeneralize the incidence ofcostsandbenefits toallowfor multiple beneficiaries andcost-payers. the Using terminology of legislative politics, mygamelooksmore likeredistributive politics (taking from one to giveto another) and less like distributive politicsthen the models. Thishighlights thesocialconflict Weingast-Aldrich-Schwartz that makesforming coalitions advantageous. Finally, mygameis somewhat more complicated becausecostsvary acrossperiods. Thisadditional complexity buysme someinteresting results about forms ofideohierarchical logical cooperation.
3. IDEOLOGY
AS AN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GAME OF POLITICS

inthis Itis useful tofirst the discuss equilibrium as a single game played that Thiswillbe a stepping stone to shot, is,the"stage game"equilibrium. inthe Italsorepresents theoutcome of discussing equilibria repeated game. in a world in which thisstylized political interaction direct self-interest drives all political behavior. In thestagegameequilibrium, theplayer whois unaffected by the project willnever participate, ofparticipation because costs v.When realized project costs(Ct)arelessthan thebeneficiary's participation costs, equilibis tosupport rium strategy the andthe project is toabstain. cost-payer's inwhich When there is noNashequilibrium the benefiCt> v,however, there is a ciaryand thecost-payer playpurestrategies,9 but,as always, mixed Call theNashequilibrium inthestage strategy equilibrium. N. game N consists ofthe following strategies:
Beneficiary: WhenCt< v,support with one. Otherwise probability support - , abstain with with C probability probability Ct Ct
9Tosee this, observe that ifthebeneficiary thedecision supports and thecost-payer opposes, is no project (support does notexceedopposition). The beneficiary wouldhavedonebetter by abdoesn'tchangeandbeneficiary staining (outcome savesv). Ifthebeneficiary andthecostabstains payer opposes, thedecision is still no project, butthecost-payer wouldhavedonebetter byabstaining(outcome doesn't change andcost-payer savesv). Ifboth abstain, thebeneficiary woulddo better is adopted by supporting (project andbeneficiary ifthebeneficiary gainsB - v > 0). Finally, supports andthecost-payer abstains, thecost-payer wouldhavedonebetter is not byopposing (project andcost-payer adopted savesCt- v > 0).

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Kathleen Bawn Cost-payer: When with one.Otherwise, probability oppose with Ct< v,abstain B

B v, abstain vB probability with probability with Unaffected: Abstain one. probability

in theAppendix. These probabilities are derived of thestage At thestart to game,beforethenatureof theprojectis revealed,theexpectedpay-off each playeris + 12
,

whichis negative forthecases we are consider-

ing (v < B). Once the stagegame is repeated, we have manyequilibria, as thefolk theorem tellsus to expect.The folktheorem does notimply, in that however, repeated gamesanything can happen, anytime. Anyequilibrium willbe conon thediscount to B and v.This tingent factor beingsufficiently highrelative means thatan equilibrium can be destroyed by a small changein theenvironment ifthat acrossa critical changetakesa parameter value.10 Considerthefollowing strategy profile, R, fortherepeated game:
All Players: IfPlayers 1 and2 haveplayed round. past, play Ri inthe Ri inthis

toN (thestage Otherwise revert gameequilibrium strategy).

where that benefits toPlayer 1 orPlayer 2. Opany project gives Rl: andR2: Support that toPlayer 3. poseany project gives benefits R3:Abstain always. In equilibrium R, Players1 and 2 behaveas a coalition, each supporting other'sprojectsand opposing those of Player 3. All projectsbenefitting Players 1 and 2 are adopted and all projectsbenefitting Player 3 are defeated.Moreover, Player 1 and 2 always vote together, despitehavingno short-term commoninterest. Table 1 showstheworking of equilibrium R in a little moredetail. At thebeginning of each round, beforetheidentity of beneficiary and are known, theexpected from R are cost-payer pay-offs and 2 and
DB

B forPlayer3. GivenB > v, Player3 does worseunder R than 3 if all playersplayedN each period.Players1 and 2 do better, as long as the
10See Calvert (1998) foran elaboration ofthis point.

- v forPlayers1

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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R Table 1. Equilibrium
Condition Beneficiary Cost-Payer
1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 2

Action Cooperative 1
Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

Pay-off 3 1
B-v B-v -B-v -v -v -v

2
Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

2
-B-v -v B-v B-v -v -v

3
0 -B 0 -B 0 0

Abstain Abstain Abstain Abstain Abstain Abstain

to participalargerelative benefits from politicaldecisionsare sufficiently tioncosts (B > 5. lv). R is an equilibrium as long as 24B2
26B2 - 1OBv - v2

Otherthings equal, Equation 1 holds whenB and 6 are large and v is low. thebehavior in theAppendix.)Concretely, value of 6 is derived (The critical costs are low, by R is mostlikelyto persistwhen participation prescribed is important.'1 of projectsare high,and thefuture benefits makeone of the who observedR beingplayedmight A social scientist conclusions. following ofa cohesive social 1 and2 identify with eachother. Theyarepart "Persons decisions." their political identification drives Group group. eachother." 1 and2 feelempathy towards "Persons 1 and2 subscribe tothesameideology." "Persons that would observetwo behaviorpatterns the social scientist Specifically, care to interest. First,Player 1 would apparently could not be attributed Thatis, she would supon herown welfare. have no effect aboutissues that Second,Player1 wouldact againstherown interest portPlayer2's projects.
11Allexamples as punishtothestagegameequilibrium reversion inthis paperuse permanent ofpunishment other types Clearly, simple. Thisis donetokeepthings tocooperate. for failure ment ideological as in GreenandPorter 1984) couldalso support stagegamereversions (e.g. temporary behavior.

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in thecases wheretheprojectbenefited Player2 and imposedcosts on herself.Observing and Player3 Player 1 participating whenPlayer2 benefits pays costs, we mightconclude thatideology motivated Player 1 to care aboutsomething thatshe otherwise wouldnot.Observing Player1 supporting projectsforwhichshe paid thecosts,we might concludethatideology overcame interest. Of course,R is onlyone of manyequilibriathatcan occur.In general, in whichself-sacrificing is enforced anykindofequilibrium behavior bythe oflong-term that future expectation reciprocity requires gainsfrom cooperationloom largerelative to short-term Thatis, givena setof patemptations. rameter values (B, v, and 6), some long-term will be cooperation patterns available as equilibriaand otherswill not. Looking at the matter another arisedependson thefeatures oftheenway,thetypeof ideologythat might vironment thattheparameters of pocapture-potentialcosts and benefits liticaldecisions, costsof participation, and uncertainty aboutthefuture. Relative to otherequilibria,R is characterized by the followingfive It is inefficient, properties. highcommitment, individualistic, nonhierarchiI willbriefly cal, and exclusionary. discusseach property and giveexamples of other thatdo notdisplaytheproperty. equilibria R is inefficient because Players1 and 2 coulddo better ifthey Efficiency: economizedon participation costs.It is notnecessary forbothPlayers1 and 2 to oppose projectsbenefiting 3, forexample.Let R' consistof the same as R exceptthat Persons1 and 2 each abstainon projects that benstrategies efit 3 andimposecostson their as R, butwith ally.R' givesthesameoutcomes lowerparticipation costsand therefore higher netpay-offs. Thus,R'remains an equilibrium under less demanding conditions than R, as shownin Table 2. R is a highcommitment Commitment: in thesensethat the equilibrium, its subscribers cooperative strategy to do something other thanfolrequires 12 Again,thisis nota property low short-term in everysituation. self-interest of all equilibria. In EquilibriumS, Players 1 and 2 supporteach other's whenPlayer3 paysthecostsandrefrains projects from their supporting own projects whenthecostswouldbe borneby theother. Whena project benefits Player3, however, Players1 and 2 behaveas in thestagegame equilibrium. Ideology S thusrequiressubscribers to help theirallies whencosts fall on outsidersand to avoid imposingcosts on allies, but does not demandthat subscribers take any actionwhenoutsiders threaten to imposecosts on the ally.S demands behavior different from short-term self-interest in some situationsbutnotothers, thusinvolving less commitment thanR.
12Iamusing theword "commitment" todescribe a property oftheideology, namely howmuch itsprescribed actions depart from short-term self-interest (stagegameequilibrium). This is somewhatdifferent from theordinary use of thewordto describe a property of a person,namely how closelytheperson's ownbehavior matches theideological model.

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Table2. Parameters ValuesNecessary to Support GameofPolitics Equilibria

Individual Rationality Equilibrium R R' S T U U V: Person 1 Person2 Requirement B > 5.1v B > 3.15v B > 2.12v B > 2.56v B>v B > v B > 13.21vl B > 1.82V2
6 >

Equilibrium Requirement 26B2 24B2 1OBv- v2

Minimum B = 1, v = .01

.927
.925 .858 .831 .922 .982

24B2 3 > 26B2 - 18Bv- v2 > 24B 2 - 24Bv 28B _3B-2 28B2 -32Bv- V285 24B 2 12B22

>29B2 (5 > 61 >

452 >

13B2 -

- 2Bv ~~~~~~~12B2 2Bv - V2

48B2 49B2 - 13Bv - 2V2

2 - 52Bv - 2v2 127B2

96B2

It is useful to consider somerealworld similar ideologies that create inthedegree butthat differ ofcommitment as defined here. coalitions, One would be revolutionary versus socialism. example Consider "evolutionary" Lenin's on Kautsky. inrequirements (1917) attack Whilesimilar about who is tobe cooperated the a higher with, ideology espoused demanded byLenin commitment than that Another wouldbe espoused by Kautsky. example offeminism. Low commitment versions for varying degrees require support abortion leaveanddaycare, even rights, who equalpay, maternity bywomen themselves wouldnotbe affected. A higher-commitment feminist ideology also require someeffort to patronize businesses owned might expending An evenhigher-commitment version demand bywomen. might complete separatism. theprescribed actions ofthose and depended onlyon theidentities helped hurt In this theideologies areindividualistic. Thelink bytheproject. sense, between these andreal-world two equilibria ideologies mayseemweakfor ofrealworld reasons. thedemands are generally much First, ideologies more in different different ofcooperation complicated, demanding degrees in therealworld circumstances. Second, many ideologies explicitly reject
In theequilibriadiscussedso far, Individualversusgrouporientation:

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individualistic frameworks and emphasizegroupconsciousnessof various forms (class, race,gender). But consider Equilibrium T in which Players 1 and 2 supporteach to 1 and 2 as a groupexceed costs. others'projectsonlyif thenetbenefits each other's Thatis, Players1 and 2 alwayssupport projects whenPlayer3 at theexpenseofPlayer2 (or vice paysthecosts.But whenPlayer1 benefits theprojectif Ct < B. By requiring subscribers to versa) theyonly support T offers considergroupbenefits (rather thanindividualbenefits), its subscribers a higher thanR orR'. expected pay-off Exclusionaryversus universalcooperation:All of the equilibriadisin thesensethat the cussed so farareexclusionary Player3 is excludedfrom of cooperation. benefits Exclusionary ideologiescreatea sense of "Us" and to them.Exclusionis notinevitable, "Them" fortheplayerswho subscribe is foreach playerto however.In EquilibriumU, the cooperativestrategy whenever support projectsforwhichhe is thebeneficiary projectcosts are In all othercases, theplayersabstain.No playeris exless thanbenefits. cludedfrom thebenefits of cooperation. This equilibrium can be thought of as implementing the utilitarian ideology thatunderliesmost economic policyanalysis.13 Projectspass if social costs (added up across all members of society)are less thansocial benefits. Ideologies thatcreateuniversal coalitionswill necessarily offer lower from and will,therefore, be harder long-term benefits cooperation to sustain of cooperation butthatare exclusionary. thanthosethat createsimilar forms in Table 2 wouldbe to Equilibrium The relevant comparison T, whichlike U, behavior based on groupbenefits. The notion that universalist ideregulates withHardin's(1997) argument that is consistent ologies are hardto sustain norms ofexclusionaremorerobust thanuniversalist norms and withempirical results from social psychology thatsuggestthattheformation of excluto humannature sionary groupsis fundamental (Tajfel 1970). Hierarchical groups:Group-oriented ideologiesoften generate vigorous is defined. internal debatesoverhow groupinterest Who is theproletariat, Whataretheinterests of womenorAfrican-Americans? really? Whatdoes it meanto be a Zionist?In T, groupinterest was defined by comparing group benefits to groupcosts,withall groupmembers But receiving equal weight. ofgroupinterest arepossibleand,likeother alternative definitions aspectsof will workto theadvantage of some playersand thedisadvantage ideology, of others. For example,Equilibrium V givesPlayer2 twiceas muchweight
13Thisis notto imply that real worldideologiesthat use utilitarian rhetoric, suchas laissez faire capitalism, create universal coalitions. The realworld variants ofutilitarian ideologies tendto create exclude orgivelowweight toindividuals coalitions that whobearthecostsofmarket failures suchas externalities, nonconvexities, andincomplete information.

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1 so that as Player projects that benefit Player 1 attheexpense ofPlayer 2 aresupported bythecoalition ifthe only ratio ofbenefits tocostsis atleast 2. Projects that benefit Player 2 at theexpense ofPlayer 1,conversely, are ifthe supported benefit-cost ratio is atleast0.5. Thepoint here is that ideologies notonly define "us" and"them," they can also deemsomeof"us"more important than others. Ideology notonly determines whois in a coalition with whom, butalsowhobenefits themost from coalitional cooperation. theGameofPolitics So far, hasaccomplished Ithasgiven three things. us a theory ofhowideology canarise from short-term self-interest, given reinteraction peated andthevalueofallies.When numbers matter, itpaysto form anddifferent coalitions willbe advantageous to different coalitions, individuals. ithasshown thewidevariety ofoutcomes Second, that canresult from ideological behavior. Ideologies can entail highcommitments, regulating in all political actions orthey can be undemanding, encounters, allowing subscribers topursue ofthe short-term self-interest much time andrequiring canbe inclusive cooperation orexonlyspecialcircumstances. Ideologies cangivemore clusive. orlessweight tothewelfare ofdifferent They coalition members. themodel hasgiven Finally, us a theory ofwhen should fail. ideologies Anequilibrium ideology willbe self-enforcing unless keyparameter values so that theminimum change discount factor threshold is no longer met.14 That is likely is,anideology tofail ifthe benefits ofpolitical activity fall, the costsrise, thecostsofparticipation orifthefuture more uncerrise, grows tain.15 Forexample, of ideological is easierto sustain behavior anysort insociety is fairly among peoplewhose position since willhave secure, they discount factors. Thisprediction is roughly consistent with Marx's higher inthe ([1852] 1963)observations that thelumpenproletariat, most i.e.,those anduncertain be relieduponto behavein ways cannot desperate straits, other than topursue self-interest. immediate
141n onecouldinclude theprobability principle, that parameters change explicitly inthemodel. Thiswouldcomplicate matters a great deal,without adding much totheanalysis. I prefer toconsider abouta changing andsocialenvironment as built intothediscount uncertainty political rate. 150ne clearprediction is that from theGameofPolitics when thediscount factor falls, an ideologicalequilibrium becomes more fragile. In times ofextreme uncertainty andsocialupheaval, then, existing ideologies should be most likely tofail.Thisprediction mayat first seemat oddswith reality;socialupheaval often seemstobe associated with morerather than less ideological behavior. In theideologicalbehavior manycases, however, stands outbecauseit is "revolutionary"-novel in terms ofthecoalition itforges. Evenideological behavior that purports to defend a status quo often reflects quitedifferent codesofbehavior then weredisplayed before theupheaval. Thisframework's is that prediction socialunrest (and other forms ofuncertainty) should lead tothefailure ofold ideologiesand theappearance ofnewones.

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4. THE GAME OF IDEOLOGY

We arenowin a position to consider coalitions whysomeideological andothers form do not. Theprevious section showed that thenature ofthe determines GameofPolitics Perequilibrium society's bigwinners (here, sons 1 and2) andlosers(Person an 3). Becausetheprocess of selecting hashigh there is a strong for theplayers totry equilibrium stakes, incentive to promote that include The ideologies themselves among the beneficiaries. premise oftheGameofIdeology is that some members ofsociety canaffect the salience of different ideologies-by writing manifestoes, giving socialmovements, andso on.TheGameofIdeology is a speeches, leading model ofhowthis hownewideologies areputforth, andhowthey happens, succeed orfail. Theargument is that to strategiplayers propose ideologies maximize inthe tothe constraints of cally pay-offs GameofPolitics, subject coalition politics. I canusethe results ofthe GameofPolitics todefine the valueofan idebetweentheexpectedpay-offs ology as thedifference fromits associated equilibriumand thosefromplaying the stage game equilibriumin every round. Table 3 showstheper-round valuesofthesix ideologiesdiscussedso

far. There aretwopoints a widerange to note. ofvaluesis possible, First, theplayers' is greatly affected demonstrating againthat long-term welfare bywhich ideology operates. Second,at somepoint, thetotalgainsfrom arelimited resources ofsociety. ideological cooperation bythe Onceparticiandmonitoring costsareallocated theonlywayto inpation efficiently, crease the ofonecoalition is toincrease the that her member pay-off weight individual benefits andcosts toherally's. receive relative If we canunderstand as coalitions, we can also unideologies perhaps derstand theorigin ofideologies theories ofcoalition forbyusing existing mation. for here is thesequential choice Particularly promising mypurpose which usesnoncooperative topredict the outcome of approach, game theory
coalitional bargaining (Baron 1989, 1991, 1994; Baronand Ferejohn1989). Unlikeother to thestudy of coalitions(e.g., social choice theory approaches

andcooperative game theory), sequential choice theory gives precise predictions theoutcome about ofcoalitional andis thus conbargaining processes ducive togenerating comparative statics. Thefollowing sequential choice model oftheGameofIdeology builds onBaron andFerejohn's (1989)model oftheformation oflegislative coalitions. Three meet tomake a collective players decision about what ideology to adopt, that toplayin future rounds oftheGameof is, what equilibrium In eachround Politics.16 oftheGameofIdeology, oneplayer is chosen at

oftheGameofIdeology 16Myseparation from theGameofPolitics is artificial, butsimplifies theanalysis A similar considerably. oftheGameofLifeandtheGameofMoralsis used separation to goodeffect in Binmore (1994).

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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Table 3. Per-roundValue of Ideologies

Panel (a): Values as a functionof parameters Equilibrium R R' Player 1 2B2 2-lOBv 12B 2B2 -6Bv -v2 12B
_v2

Player 2 2B2 2-lOBv _v2 12B 2B2 -6Bv - v2 12B 4B2 _8Bv - v2 24B 5B2- 12Bv - 2v2 24B
B 2_V2

Player 3

- 4B2 + 2Bv -v2

12B - 4B2

+ 2Bv-v2
12B

4B2 _8Bv - v2
24B 5B2- 12Bv- 2v2 24B

_4B2 +4Bv - v2

12B - 4B2 + 2Bv-v2 12B

B 2_V2

U~~~~B

B 2_V2 -_

12B

12B 31B2 - 52Bv -8v2 96B

12B - 4B2 + 2Bv-v2 12B

4B2 - 13Bv- 2v2 24B

Panel (b) Numeric Example B = 1, v = .01 Equilibrium R R' S T U V Player 1 .158 .162 .164 .203 .083 .036 Player 2 .158 .162 .164 .203 .083 .317 Player 3 -.332 -.332 -.330 -.332 .083 -.332

valuesmultiplied per-round arethese valuesoftheideologies thelong-term panels, Note: Forboth -&. by 1/1

all ofthe containing setis large, Thechoice anideology. random topropose players evaluintheGameofPolitics. Eachoftheother available equilibria in the it willproduce in terms ofthepay-offs ideology atestheproposed whether to support itornot.Iftheproandthen decides GameofPolitics we go tothe Ifnot, itis implemented. ofa majority, thesupport posalgains atrandom is chosen a player again first: tothe is identical next round, which discount etc.Players itornot, to support tomakea proposal, others decide infuture by0 < 6 < 1. periods pay-offs an idecostsefficiently, participation oncewe allocate As noted above, benoffers lower tooneplayer necessarily that offers benefits higher ology

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efits to at leastone other This meansthat we can think aboutthetotal player. from as a pie offixedsize and can availablebenefits ideologicalcooperation aboutideologiessimply in terms of thefraction of thepie allocatedto think or notto support a proposedideeach player. Thus,whendecidingwhether ology,each playercomparesherproposedshareof theGame of Politicspie in theGame of Ideology.The player to herexpectedvalue from continuing theideologywantsto maximize his ownpie slice,butrealizesthat proposing he needsto giveat leastone other playera slice largeenoughto winhersupthe game will end in the first port.In equilibrium, round,withone of the a shareof thepie equal to theexpectedvalue of conother playersoffered thegame,or "continuation value." tinuing So far,the Game of Ideology is structurally identicalto the simplest game studied by Baron and Ferejohn(1989), in whichthree players bargain is thatherethe"dollar"represents overa dollar.The onlydifference thetoThe specific tal availablegainsfrom that ideologicalcooperation. questions Baron and Ferejohnpursue(e.g., size of coalition,effect of open rule) are forstudying mostappropriate formal coalitions.I will now alter legislative their basic model to shift thefocusto therelationship betweeninterest and theeffect ideologyby lookingthat of natural alliances. Definea natural allianceas follows. Persons] and 2 are naturalallies if thetotallong-term stream of benefits they gainfromcooperating witheach is greater thanwhateither other wouldgainfrom with Person3. cooperating In thebasic version oftheGame ofPoliticsdiscussedabove,there were no "natural" alliances,in partbecause there was no short-term commoninReal politicalinteraction terest. so symmetric, is rarely A morerehowever. of theGame of Politicswouldallow forpositiveand negative alisticversion thatis, forprojects to imposebenefits and costs on morethan externalities, one person.Once we allow forexternalities, itis reasonableto think inthat and costs maybe correlated. dividualbenefits If you and I live in thesame benefits me. If we buyand sell in the area,a roadthat you is likelyto benefit an exchange same markets, ratepolicythat benefits me. youwill also benefit If we are similarly endowedwithresources,a property rights system that benefits you will also benefit me. In theseexamples,naturalalliances resultfromhighprobabilities of positiveexternalities. Theycan also result from relatively low probabilities of negative externalities. That is, if projectsthatbenefit Person 1 are more likelyto imposecostson Person3 thanon Person2, 1 and 2 will be natural allies. Concretely, natural alliancescan arisebecause of commonenemies. thecoalitionforged in theearlytwentieth Arguably, by Progressivism cenwas based on a natural alliance of verydifferent tury groupsunitedby the commondesireforreforms thatwere opposed by theprevailing maparty chines(McCormick1986).

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Finally, natural alliances can arisefrom in monitoring. advantages A richer model oftheGameofPolitics would encompass the problem ofverifying that ideological behavior is adhered to.I willreturn tothis issuebelow inthediscussion ofsymbolic action. Forthemoment, itshould be clearthat thebenefits from ideological cooperation arehigher iftheideology's subscribers can cheaply verify that their co-ideologues arenottrying tocheat. Peoplewholivenear eachother, speakthesamelanguage, aremembers of thesameethnic group, and/or share a common cultural arelikely heritage to enjoynatural in monitoring advantages (Greif1989; FearonandLaitin 1996).Natural in monitoring advantages can also arisefrom institutions. Anderson (1991) argues that thecoalitions defined bynationalist ideologies inthe NewWorld often followed the borders ofcolonial administrative units this because structure madefor existing efficient monitoring. Thekeyfeature ofnatural is that alliances they reflect physical circumandeconomic stances fundamentals. on what Theydo notdepend equilibrium is played in theGameofPolitics. Natural alliances aredifferent from ideological alliances, which thegainsfrom a coalition reflect in forming GameofPolitics andareentirely onthe nature ofthe dependent equilibrium. Ifwehavenatural common interest, wefind ourselves benefitting from similarpolicies evenifwe areideological enemies. How does thepresence ofnatural alliancesaffect theoutcome ofthe Anideological GameofIdeology? coalition that a natural alliincorporates ancewillenjoy greater long-term benefits than onethat cutsacross natural Ifideologies alliances. areconstructed tomaximize intheGameof benefits it wouldseemthatthosebased on natural Politics, allianceswouldbe that advantaged. cutacross natural canbe thought Ideologies alliances ofas "falseconsciousness" in thesensesomesubscribers embodying woulddo iftheir better ina coalition ideologically-induced with preferences putthem their natural allies. to thesequential Returning choicemodel, we can nowexplore when andhowideologies basedon falseconsciousness can succeed. Forthepura natural alliance 1 and2 means between that posesofthemodel, Players the when inthedivision. pieis larger Letany only1 and2 areincluded ideothat logical coalition 3 (a coalition of 1 and3, or2 and3, or includes Player a universal a pie ofsize 1,andanycoalition coalition) split that doesnotinclude3 split a pieofsize p > 1. 17
17Calvert andDietz (1996) develop a sequential bargaining modelwith externalities could that be interpreted as common interest. Their formalization ofcommon interest is done,however, in the context ofspatial preferences rather than a divide-the-pie game.The spatialmodelis useful forthe question they address, theformation ofparties andvoting in legislatures. namely coalitions Butbecause itpresumes that preferences are already defined on all dimensions, thespatialmodelstrikes me as inappropriate fora modelin which ideology is endogenous.

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of a theeffect showsthat provedin theAppendix, result, The following it is, alliance in theGame of Ideologydependson just how natural natural witheach other bycooperating that is, on how muchPersons1 and 2 benefit insteadof Person3. 18 alliance of magnitude RESULT: Whena natural (pexistsbetweenPlayers1 to thedisdependson thesize of (prelative equilibrium and 2, thestationary cases. countrate.Thereare three CASE A: When the magnitude of the natural alliance is small

K18 -96 -282)

strategies.

< 18- 9 +82 ), the stationary consistsof thefollowing equilibrium

] and2: When the natuthat includes anideology propose recognized, Players

r= ralallywith probability

theally Io - - andoffer 26 YA

YA =-b + (b2 - 720(Qp- 1))

(2)

b = 9(1- 4) - 6(2 + 4). Propose an ideology that excludes thenatural where + 1. 3 y7 = 7probability 1 - r andoffer Player 3 with allyandincludes A which offers atleastYA* When not anyideology support recognized, 1 orPlayer 2 with equalprobabil3: When include Player recognized, Player at 2. Support that offers anyproposal byEquation YA as given ityandoffer leastYA* of thenatural alliance is in an intermediate CASE B: When themagnitude range 18 - 95 - 252 < < 6 -) thestationary is: equilibrium

1 and2: When includes that propose an ideology always recognized, Players 2 not any . When recognized, support the natural Offer the ally YB = 6 ally.

which offers atleastYB ideology

to stationary equiI willrestrict attention choicemodels, donein sequential 18As is generally choices in identicalsubgames.Baron and libria,thatis, thosein whichplayersmakeidentical equilibrium in somedetail. The uniquestationary thestationarity restriction Ferejohn (1989) discuss in thepreswillform coalition themodel'sempirical as to whatideological prediction constitutes enceofa natural alliance.

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

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1 orPlayer Player 2 with equalprobabilPlayer 3: When recognized, include

at least ityand offer YB Support anyproposalthatoffers
I-

the ofthe natural alliance is large( CASE C: When magnitude

thestationary is: equilibrium

6<

always propose an ideology that includes Players] and 2: When recognized, the theally y = 3 natural ally. Offer atleastyc. ideology which offers that make a proposal when recognized. Support any proposal Player3: Do not offers a positive pay-off. of thenatural alliancegrows, thelikeliSubstantively, as themagnitude thisalliancegrows.In Case A, hood thata successful ideologyincorporates themagnitude of theallianceis modest. Thatis, theadvantage to 1 and 2 of witheach other rather allying thanwith3 is small.In thiscase, themembers in their of thenatural includethenon-ally ideologialliancewill sometimes cal coalition.The factthatplayer1, forexample,includesnon-ally3 with value and allows 1 somepositive reducesplayer2's continuation probability to win2's support witha smallerslice ofthepie. As themagnitude allianceincreases(Case B), theadvanof thenatural toform a coaone's natural tageofkeeping allyon hertoes (by a willingness litionwiththenon-ally)diminishes relative a to the advantageof splitting the larger pie. When(pis in therangecoveredby Case B, ideologiescement allies is able to makea proposal. natural alliancewhenever one ofthenatural In bothCases A and B, whenPlayer3 (thenon-ally) has thechanceto he includeseither PlayerI or 2 in his ideologicalcoaproposean ideology, of thenatural alliance each withprobability lition, 0.5. Whenthemagnitude is no ideologythatPlayer3 can propose is extremely there large,however, Even if Player3 gave away thatPlayers1 or 2 would be willingto support. 2 theentire thelarger by splitting pie of pie of size 1, Players1 and do better size (p. in thata natural alliance is reflected Table 4 showshow theprobability themagnitude ofthealliance((p) and the an ideologicalcoalitionvarieswith two important of this discount factor implications (5). The Table highlights it showsthat allisection'sresult. to natural ideologiescan runcounter First, is nottoo overwhelming. commoninterest ances-provided thatthenatural . When not recognized, support any

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Table4. Likelihood ThatIdeology Reflects Common Interest

ofNatural Magnitude Alliance (p=1.01 1.05 1.1 1.5 2 5
10

Probability that Ideology reflects natural alliance (Conditional on discount factor 6) 6= 0.90 6 = 0.75 6 = 0.50 .340 .387 .442 .667 .667 1 .353 .427 .527 .667 .667 1
1

.387 .620 .667 .667 .667 .667

As thenatural common interest grows larger, itbecomes however, increasitwillbe reflected ingly likely that inideology. The second implication is theother sideofthestory. Ifthere is a very large natural alliance between twoplayers, ideologies willreflect thisalliancewith one.In such probability a case (Case C), the willbe comnon-ally pletely marginalized andunable toparticipate inideological debate. Wecaninterpret the result as defining thelimits offalse consciousness. If we believethat common (a) objective interest exists and(b) ideologies ariseoutofpolitical then theresult tellsus that interest is relbargaining, evant topredicting the of but that itis not composition ideological coalitions, thewholestory. Thepossibility offalse consciousness that we canimplies not predict onthe basisofcommon ideology entirely interest.
5. DisCUSSION: BACKTOWARD REALITY

Having stated the paper's main I nowdiscuss result, twopotential problems.First, doesn't theGameofIdeology that should alimply ideologies inthesenseofnever waysbe efficient, subscribers totake actions requiring that arenotdecisive in affecting outcomes? Second, byadapting models of institutions toexplain amI equating ideology, these twothings? 5.1 Efficiency and "Symbolic" Action I showed abovethat inefficient Although canbe sustained, the equilibria GameofIdeology that willnotbe proposed. Recallthat implies they inefficient arethose inwhich atleastoneperson ideologies is required to"waste" someparticipation effort actions that do notchange bytaking outcomes. In theGameofIdeology, thiswouldbe equivalent to a proposal that throws ofthe inefficient away part areonesthat pie.Inordinary language, ideologies require (or otherwise what we might motivate) call "symbolic" activities.

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clear lostcauses-a candle-light activities advocating Thiscategory includes inpresent-day example. It also thedeath Texas,for penalty vigiltoprotest as is quite weak, such policy change whose impact onany includes activities incontemporary touse)female pronouns useof(orrefusal the self-conscious prose. inefficient ideologies predicts that oftheGameofIdeology Myversion itis hard quite robust: is theoretically Theprediction willnever be proposed. would model that tothebasicbargaining change toimagine anyreasonable consider ideological hasthis weordinarily it.Butmuch behavior that change are is that these activities explanation kind ofsymbolic quality. Onepossible If so, these benefits couldbe integrated benefits. motivated byexpressive ofthe alongthelinesofChong's(1991) study intotheGameofPolitics, ofelectoral turn-out. movement orSchuessler's (1997) analysis civilrights close to my seemsparticularly voting Schuessler's modelof expressive ofgroup membership. ofideology, inthat both arebasedonnotions model oftheGameofPolitics could model is that a richer Another possibility While rationality. with instrumental symbolic activities reconcile seemingly ina significant arelinked wayto benefits clear that expressive itseems fairly ofas causeoreffect. thought itis lessclear they arebetter whether ideology, Schuessler uses) an exogto express one's "Being"(theterm Is thedesire toform and incentives ideological enousforce that interacts with theother from formaOrdoesitarise thelogicofcoalition coalitions? identity-based ofideology? Alongthelatter tionas part oftheendogenous phenomenon ofexclusion that behavior ofnorms argues Hardin's (1997) analysis lines, is a prominent ordestructive canbe example) seemssymbolic (dueling that membership. understood as waysof generating publicsignalsof group inbe valuable, membership might group Hardin offers several reasons why the decisions, the oneI havepursued here, valueofalliesinpolitical cluding inconsumption. I havenot, externalities that suchas positive andothers toincorporate Hardin's logicof couldbe enriched TheGameofPolitics and aboutgroupmembership uncertainty membership by adding group to an idesubscribe inmonitoring.'9 that youandI both Suppose problems further Butsuppose eachother's that us to support projects. ology requires I am in your coalition. (I claimto be that youarenotquitesurewhether
to an instrumentalist of theory 191f of symbolic activity thegoal is to clarify therelationship in the and cost-payer that thebeneficiary ideology, it wouldbe wise to allow forthepossibility those that arepart ofreligious arethesameperson. Someideologies-particularly GameofPolitics onlyone person(the wouldseemto affect aboutdecisionsthat identities-domakeprescriptions forexample.)The requirements wouldseem to fit restrictions, dietary decisionto followkosher mayserveas observable ofnorms ofexclusion. Thatis, theserequirements Hardin's interpretation ofthegroup. cues as to whois andwhois nota member

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folk ofthe elite?) Perhaps you I notbe a part privileged ordinary butmight inthe I havecooperated tohavesupported past.(I claim arenotsure whether ofparticipation that seemwastecausesbut haveI really?) Patterns feminist GameofPolitics outina richer mayturn fulinthesimple, full-information costs. monitoring model toincrease efficiency byreducing particular paper, but they arebeyond thescopeofthis Theseextensions model in a promising Thepoint here is simply that a richer direction. point different is what perspective oftheGameofPolitics might giveus a much It is what is andis notsymbolic activity.20 andis notan efficient ideology, from which natural togiveus a better toidentify also likely vantage point alliances. and Institutions TwoApplications: Ideologies 5.2 One Analogy, which is whether I can be skeptical A second readers might issueabout likeidetostudy something borrow so liberally from models ofinstitutions andinstitutions different things? Aren't very ology. ideology theinform therulesofpolitical interaction andstructure Institutions as I havedeIdeologies, centives ofindividuals. Theyarenotpreferences. we can interpret as revealed fined arepatterns ofbehavior that them here, two Itwould toblur thedistinction between these be a mistake preferences. soluButI do want to argue that aresolutions, perhaps partial they things. theuncertainty ofcoalition The to thesamebasicproblem: politics. tions, whowillbe included formation creates about uncertainty logicofcoalition inwinning Thisuncertainty, illustrated coalitions. andwhowillbe excluded intheinherent stems from directly ina simple wayintheGameofPolitics, of social choicemechanisms in which numbers matter (Arrow stability whoform a winindividuals ofsocialchoices means that Theinstability in time thechance havean incentive toincrease ning coalition at onepoint inthe future. Onewaytodo this is bycreating that thesamecoalition forms that institutions. (1989) argue McCubbins, Noll,andWeingast appropriate the the institutions ofpolicy areconstructed to"freeze" legimplementation (1989)arthat created them. Aldrich (1995)andSchwartz islative coalitions arecreated to"lengthen" the lives the institutions ofpolitical parties guethat inthis areidentical ofcoalitions. tothe various coopsense, Longcoalitions,
20Along similar lines,incorporating uncertainty intotheGame of Politicsmight changethe coalitions While current GameofIdeology's prediction that onlyminimum winning (MWC's) form. Riker'sseminal bookon coalition theory (1962) predicts onlyMWC's, thisprediction has notheld is notat all robust-sevup empirically (Laverand Schofield 1990).Thispaper'sMWC prediction totheGameofIdeology within thesequential choiceframework wouldpreeralreasonable changes dictoversized coalitions (Baronand Ferejohn1989). For thisreason,I do notmakemuchof the MWC prediction here.

1953).

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in theGameofPolitics. erative equilibria By emphasizing therequirement that longcoalitions result from self-reinforcing behavior, I reinterpret long coalitions as ideologies rather than parties. If I am right, areAldrich andSchwartz wrong? If longcoalitions are ideologies, doesthat mean they cannot be parties? Notnecessarily. It seems quite likely that both ideologies andparties perform the function offreezing coalitions. Butthewaythat they perform this function is different: ideology byspecifying a pattern ofself-reinforcing behavior andparties bycreating an institution with a valuable ongoing andwith theability torereputation ward itsmembers. ifweusethe andpunish Thismeans even that, samelogic tounderstand both andideologies, we willderive parties different empirical predictions aboutwheneachwillfail.An ideology willfailwhen thenet valueoffuture coalitional tothediscount cooperation falls relative factor of itssubscribers. A party willfailwhen itsreputation ceasestobe ofvalueor when itcannolonger offer rewards andpunishments.21 meaningful In reality, notall) political most (but parties areassociated with ideologiesandmost (but againnotall) ideologies giverisetosomesort ofinstituin many cases a party. A reasonable tion, is that conjecture and ideologies institutions areoften andWeingast complements (Garrett 1993).An advantageofinstitutions over as a wayoffreezing ideology is that coalition they areharder tochange in thefaceofchanging andthus more robust environment. Anadvantage ofideology itis lesslikely is that towork against those whoestablished it(see Horn andShepsle1989). Thepoint hereis that a single idea oranalogy can apply tomore than onerealworld phenomenon andThies1997).To make ananal(McCubbins consider ogyaboutanalogies, thevarious to which thesingle phenomena basicideaofnatural selection hasbeenapplied: behavior profit maximizing that don't maximize arecompeted outofthe andrebyfirms (firms market) election maximizing behavior whodon't maximize bypoliticians (those fail toreturn tooffice). Nottomention theorigin ofspecies! Thefact that competition andselection canform thebasisofa model ofinteraction ina marketdoesnotmeanthat form thebasisofa model cannot oflegislative they
21lfequilibrium coalitions in theGameofPolitics can be interpreted as parties as well as ideologies,can we think ofparties as arising thesort ofbargaining in theGameofIdefrom portrayed ology?Again,theanswer is likely to be yes.The samebasic logic maywell apply, butthewayin whichthemodelmaps intoreality and theways we wouldtestit wouldbe different. The set of whocanbe thought peopleintherealworld ofas playing theGameofIdeology is different (presumablylarger) than thesetofpeoplewhoparticipate inthestrategic that bargaining begets parties. The details oftherulesmaybe different of a reversion (e.g.,recognition probabilities, existence point). Mostimportantly, there inwhat maybe differences constitutes The nature ofeleca natural alliance. toral thenature ofthecoalitions systems clearly affects that constitute parties (Duverger 1953; Cox more 1997) much than itaffects form thecoalitions that ideologies

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Butneither behavior. does it meanthat thelogicofhowselection works tohowitworks through markets is identical elections. In thesame through thelogicofcoalition formation toboth way, can apply andideology, party but inwaysthat entail differences. meaningful
6. CONCLUSION:TOWARDA THEORY OF SALIENCE

Mygoalhere wastoadvance a theoretical for framework thinking about ideology and to offer somepreliminary results. I demonstrated that the framework is general to address enough a largesetofquestions aboutthe relationship between ideology andinterest. I emphasized theflexibility of theframework andthepotentially offree number to show large parameters that comparative in a widevariety statics canbe generated ofways. Atthis levelofdiscussion, thereader ifthemodel maywonder is toogeneral tobe falsified. But in anygivencontext, of comparative onlya smallnumber static makesense.An effective thought experiments test would empirical thus choosea context that wouldholdmany parameters constant andtest a small number ofcomparative static predictions. I havetried to understand ideology usingmodelsand analogies that havebeenpreviously toinstitutions. Thishasnotbeentoargue applied that ideologies areweakforms ofinstitution, but rather that theunderlying logic ofcoalition inways formation toboth that aresimilar, but not identiapplies cal. Inexploring ofcoalition impact Riker logiconinstitutions, (1980)made the remark often-quoted that institutions are"congealed" preferences. Along similar here is that andthepreferences lines, myargument ideologies, they induce, aresomething like"congealed I havetried interests." topush Riker's analogy further theprocess which thecongealing of bymodelling through interest occurs. The GameofPolitics showed that thesort ofbehavior that observers would attribute tothings likeideology, andmorals, but not identity, certainly to self-interest, can emerge as equilibrium in a modelwithno behavior causalforce other than self-interest. interaction andthevalueof Repeated alliesaresufficient tomake behavior arise outoflong-term ideological selfIn onesense, interest. then, ideology is notan independent causalforce, but theneteffect ofinterest andthestructure simply ofpolitical In interaction. thesamesense, thetask ofideology is equilibrium selection, more. nothing Butthestakes associated with this task arehigh indeed. Thesetofavailable in theGameofPolitics equilibria is so large that theforce that selects one haseverything todo with whowinsandwholosesfrom political decisions. Thesehigh stakes ofequilibrium bega theory selection, andtheGame ofIdeology offered one.Thebasicclaimdeveloped there is that thesuccess ofsmallnumber ofideologies andthefailure ofcountless others (i.e.,the salience ofsmall number ofequilibria andthenonsalience ofcountless othinterms ofstrategic elites whoconstruct ers)canbe explained mindthem,

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

329

fulofthegainsavailable in theGameofPolitics, andoftheconstraining logicofcoalition politics. I chosehere toderive a result about what ideologies succeed under what circumstances with natural alliances as myreference point. While this is not theonlywayto approach thequestion, itis a natural starting place,given that myframework is onein which interest is thedriving force. Theresult proved inSection 4 defines a middle ground between twocommon, butextreme, positions about ideology. One extreme position would be that ideology is just straightforward forinterest. window-dressing This position all ideologies would predict thestrongest reflect natural alliance available. Falseconsciousness couldnotexist, andexplanations ofpolitical outcomes couldsafely treat as epiphenomenal. ideology Theother extreme would be a thesocialconstruction ofideology purefocalpoints argument: is so arbiareno regularities in therelationship trary that there between ideology and interest. Anything canhappen. While this extreme position is perhaps closer to theone I havetaken I want to emphasize here, that mineis nota pure chaostheory ofideology. TheGameofIdeology is designed toderive testablepredictions about theshape ofideological coalitions. canbe understood Ideology as interest congealed bythelogicofongoingpolitical interaction. Theprocess ofcongealing is notso arbitrary tobe the ofsocialscience, beyond purview but neither is itso straightforward that we canignore it.In theshort is a powerful indeterminrun, ideology force ingpolitical outcomes. In thelongrun, itarises from thebasiclogicofpolitical life: thelogicofcoalition formation.
5 March 1998. submitted Manuscript Final manuscript received15 September 1998.

APPENDIX Stage Game Equilibriumin theGame ofPolitics

2 thebeneficiary, 3 is unafandPlayer SupposePlayer1 is thecost-payer, Player fected. Footnote is no stage-game 9 explains in which1 and2 whythere equilibrium playpurestrategies whenv < Ct.To find theprobabilities that define themixedstrategyequilibrium, observe that in equilibrium receive thesameexpected Player1 must from eachofthetwostrategies oroppose).Thatis pay-off sheplays(abstain or EUI(abstain)= EU1(oppose),
-(1 - P2A)Ct = -V, (A 1)

where 2 abstains. that Person Notethat thevalueof Ctis known P2A is theprobability at thetime theplayers maketheir decision. 2 must Person be indifferent beSimilarly, tween so that andsupporting abstaining

330 0 = plA(B
-

Kathleen Bawn
v) + (1 - P1A)(V), (A.2)

where that Person1 abstains. Solving(A. 1) for PlA is theprobability p2A and(A.2) for the mixed in the main strategy equilibrium probabilities given body. Projects PlA yields with probability B Ct> v pass with CtB Conditional on Ct> v,theexpected to thecost-payer is -v;theexpected pay-off payoff tothebeneficiary is 0. In theother case,whenCt< v,thebeneficiary getsB, andthe Before we know thevalueof Ctandthe 2 incidence ofbenefits andcosts, theexpected to thestagegameequilibrium is pay-off
- v. V2

to thecost-payer is expected pay-off V (B 2B 3 V _-_ 6

2B-v 2B +__ 2B

v , which reduces to --+

V2

12B

Cooperative Equilibria in theGame ofPolitics

In order for a setofstrategies toconstitute an equilibrium, itmust be thecase that thelong-run theshort-run deviation. In the gainsfrom cooperation outweigh gainsfrom case ofequilibrium occurs whenan insider, R, thebiggest temptation sayPlayer1,is to support a project for which shebearsthecosts,andfor which thecoststake required in is Ct = 2B. By opposing rather than their maximum possiblevalue,that abstaining this case,Player1 gains2B in thecurrent period. (She must payv in either case.) Her lossescomefrom thedifference between theexpected from future pay-offs cooperating 2 (on average, -with Player 6 from tothestage v) andtheexpected pay-offs reverting
-

game equilibrium(on average, -

V V2 + ). First,note thatPlayers 1 and 2 benefit 6 12B B 6

-

fromplayingR instead of the stage game equilibriumonly if - - v > -

V v + 6 12B'

which reduces toB > 5.1v. In addition, to sustain theequilibrium, theshort-term must be less gainsofdefecting than thelong-term so that gainsfrom cooperating,
2B <

E b

6 -6 24B2
26B2
-

12BI
. The conditions to support the necessary

which reduces to 8 >

lOBv -v2

arederived in thesameway. other equilibria

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS

331

Stationary Equilibriumin theGame ofIdeology

The proposer wants tokeepas much ofthepie for herself as possible, so shebuys thesupport ofonlyone other player. In order togetthesupport ofanother the player, offer proposer must that player at leasthiscontinuation value,hisdiscounted expected pay-off from letting thegamecontinue intothenext round. Continuation valuesfor the natural from thecontinuation allies(Players1 and2) willbe different valueofthe outsider andtheequilibrium (Player 3) becauseofdifferent expected pay-offs, proposals willreflect thedifferent continuation values.Define thefollowing: = fraction ofpie offered in proposal byone allytotheother YAA fraction ofpie offered in proposal byallyto outsider r = probability that one allyincludes theother inherproposal VA= valueofthegameto ally VO= valueofthegameto outsider
YAO =

ofpie offered in proposal to ally YOA = fraction byoutsider

is recognized, he willinclude whentheoutsider Because thetwoalliesareidentical, eachofthem in hisproposal with 0.50. So probability
VA = (r + (I1-r)(l - YAO)) + 3rO'YAA+ 6 YOA

y1]AA)

The twoalliesareidentical in their treatment oftheoutsider, so that 3 3 continuation shemust at leasttheir allyorto outsider, giveeachofthem values, imply= 6VA and ingthat yJAA
YAO =

VO = - (1 - r)YAO + - (1 - yOA). When one ally makes a proposal to eitherthe other

(A.3)

in thestationary theoutsider must equilibrium. Similarly, giveone ofthealliesatleast hercontinuation value,so thatyOA = 8VA. which an allysometime includes theoutsider I willfirst derive theconditions under r ? 1 (Case A). Thisis thecase in which theother (andexcludes ally)in herproposal. in thiscase,theallywhois making theproposal must be indifferent First notethat theoutsider, between theother so that including allyandincluding
1I-7AO =

o(1- YAA). 26
28,yA

(A.4)

The equilibrium whenr = 2_ conditions aresatisfied

and

332

Kathleen Bawn

YAA

-b +

(b2-

72&80(

i))

180

where b = 9(1 - o) - 8(2 + o). (The equilibrium

- (b2_ 2( -) -b i)) butthisexpression 728,( 180 never yieldsvaluesofr and yAA in thepermissible range.) 0 and 1 for lie between there tobe a stationary Thesevaluesofr and yAA must in which thealliessometimes include theoutsider. Thatoccurswhenever equilibrium conditions arealso metwhen yAA = 18-96+52 18 - 96 - 262

(A.5)

in themainbody,YA, YB, and yc refers to thevalueoftheoffer theproposer Notethat so that tothe ofthepie implied makes, whereasyAA refers fraction bytheoffer = yOA Thisestablishes Case A oftheResult. AYA= is whether there is a stationary A.5 does nothold,thequestion WhenEquation r = 1. If so, theother, that in which each allyalwaysincludes equilibrium is,in which, thevalueofthegameto each allywouldbe
VA = I0(1-YA)

+ IO]A4

+ IYOA

(A.6)

The remaining condiandconditions A.3 andA.4 areno longer necessary. equilibrium tionsandEquation A.6 imply thaty
= 65

26

In thiscase,we must also verify that

theoutsider valueis low dueto neither allycan gainbyincluding (whosecontinuation from theallymust be ofexclusion.) Thatis, theally'spay-off theexpectation including than theoutsider: herpay-off from greater including
?@(

6j

>

6-6 O,

which reduces to Equation A.5.

is notrequired to theoutsider To finish that Case B, we needto verify demonstrating offer an allymore than theentire pie,that is, that6 < 1. Whenthis does condition

theoutsider The valueofthe nothold,we arein Case C, in which alwaysabstains. gameto either allyis
VA =(1YAA) +- 3 ?)AA +5 VA

withOry which, together A

= 8VA,9 gives y AA

Whileitmayseemodd that

IDEOLOGY, COALITION POLITICS, ANDFALSECONSCIOUSNESS

333

theoutsider is excluded eventhough hissupport himany couldbe obtained bygiving ofthepie ofsize 1,notethat positive share theproposer than1 getsa pay-off greater from including hernatural ally.

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