Much effort is devoted by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to attempt to develop plans that wiI1prove succes.

wld in the event of war in Europe. The Sowet opera fional maneuver group is seen as a concept for countering NATO defense plans. In this article, one of the Western Worlds leading analysts of the Sowet army examines the development of this concept, how it could be employed and its role in Soviet strategy for the 1980s.

The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NAT@

C. N. Donnelly
from Internahonal Defense Rewew

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MILITARYREVIEW

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OR the past few years, it has been evident that the Soviet armed forces have entered a period of significant change. Soviet writings and public rrtterances have referred to major developments in Soviet strategy, and debates and exercise reports in the mditary press have shown concern over the details and problems of tactical change, Until recently, however, it has not been possible to say with certa]nty what changes are occurring at tbe all-important operational level, It is by means of the operatron, defined as mihtary action at front (army group) or army level, that the aims of.the strategy are to be achieved. Recent Soviet and Warsaw Pact analyses have now demonstrated the development of their new operational concepts, and It M one of these, the concept of the operational maneuver group IO%IG ), which is the subject of this article, While, In principle, the OMG 1s completely accepted in its modern form by Soviet operational planners, and It is clearly In an advanced state of development, the details of the concept (which is derived from that of the World War 11 mobile group) are by no means fully resolved yet. There M still a good deal of room for per. fecting -and, therefore, changingthe concept, and there is clearly doubt in some areas that the prmclples estabhshed can actually be Implemented. To put this operational development in a loglcal and credible context, some strategic background and a r&um@ of the discussion of the concept as It has developed m the Soviet press have been included in this article. In this way, the concept of the OMG will be understood and its significance appreciated. For It is a concept of the

tiery greatest importance, designed specifically to defeat present NATO defensive plans.

Soviet Strategy in the Event of War

Soviet military doctrine holds that, if war breaks out in Europe, it must be won very quickly by the Soviet Union Ifit is to be won at all If the war drags on, there is a h]gh risk that it will develop into a catastrophic strategic nuclear exchange and/ or that the strains of war wIII destroy the Soviet bloc from the mslde. Either way, the social system estahIished by the Communist Party will probably perish, and the present leadership WIII be killed. No objective of policy could possibly be worth this price to the Soviet leadership. Therefore, ]f the Soviet leaders choose to start a war in Europe (or China), they must be absolutely certain of a very quick and complete victory. Alternatively, ]f war IS forced upon them, then they will do their utmost to achieve such a qmck victorythis being the only way yet perce]ved by the So\riets to avoid disaster If a war ]s to be won qu]ckly, some considerable degree of surprise M essential This is not to suggest that a bolt from the blue IS the most likely scenario for war breaking outsuch a suggestion appears to be unreal ]st]c. There must be a reason for the war and probably a crvsrs to precipitate it. Even in the most adverse circumstances, however, surprise is possible-for example, the Middle East in October 1973, Czechoslovakia In 1968 and Poland in 198 land it seems that the Soviets consider lt to be an &sentiaI p;erequislte for a
S A, Geneva

;,
Reprm[ed from lnternat!onal Swltrerland Defense Rewew,

Volume15,Number9,1982 Copyright.C1982 by Interawa

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MANEUVER GROUP
q The pursual of a foreign policy designed to exacerbate rifts in the Western Alllance. q Thesupport (welcome ornot)~ivento polit]cal and social movements which undermine Western military s~rength or national infrastructures such as the campalgns aga]nst the neutron bomb and cruise missdesor in support of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the antinuclear energy lobby, and so on, q Subversion, espionage &rd the mflltratmn of key trade unions. q The application of polltical and economic pressure, designed to weaken the influence of economic groupings such as the European Economic Community, aid engaging m fierce economic competition to weaken Western states. Throughout this stage, the primary a]m will betoweaken the Western capacity to wage nuclear war either by preventing the development or deployment of new

successful campaign. However, the surprise is equally unlikely to be complete, and some degree of NATO preparation and deployment is to be expected. The first task facing the Warsaw Pact will be to mimm]ze the extent of NATO preparations. In this writers opimon, the first two phases of war will, therefore, be the phases preceding the outbreak of hostihties-the preparatory phase and the crisis phase, In both phases, the Sowet aim is to employ all measures to exploit NATOs weaknesses and reduce NATO combat potent] al.

Preparatory Phase

In the preparatory phasethe phase In wh]ch we are presently Ii\,ingthe efforts are mainly of a polmcal or economic nature. For example.

Soviet 1

T72s on the move I

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weapon systems or by sapping the pohtical will, to use them. From the Soviet point of view, it is most desirable that this stage should not escalate to war but that Soviet influence and power should gradually grow in Europe and US power decline until the states of Europe are effectively Flnlandized and the Lnited States M Molated. In the Soviet deflnitlon, detente is a reduction of international tens]on that would enable a gradual development toward Sowet-style world communism to be accomplished witbout triggering a disastrous war In the process. The stronger the Soviet mlhtary might is in relatlon to AATOs, the less likelihood there is, the Soviets beheve, of war breaking out. Detente, therefore, does not require a balance of forces but a significant and growvng imbalance ]n the Sowet favor, which should not be prejudmed by Western reaction and rearmament, The doctrinal developments wh]ch are the subject of this article are, therefore, m no way contradictory to the spmt of detente as the LII?U] lt. HlA5SIClnS pr&sure of every type, active subversion and sabotage and a massive program of deception. Of particular Importance, at this stage, Mthe neutralization of NATOs nuclear weapons. Crisis management WIII be very important ]n achieving surprise Preparations for war are bound to give indications to NATO analysts, and so these indications must be made ambiguous. For example, mobilization and reinforcement can become commonplace as repeated exercises (as happened prior to the 1973 ArabIsrael] War). Troop movements can be explained as being necessary for internal economic reqsons (as was the case in Poland in 1981), Western countermobilizatlon can be discouraged as provocative and rendered ludicrous in the eyes of the Western publlc by sudden, If temporary, demobilization of Warsaw Pact forces. . In any event, ]t 1s clear to the Soviets that some considerable degree of surprise ISpossible. Since Soi,let doctrine rates surprise as absolutely essential, NATO would be unwise to rely on war plans which require long and easy preparation time. NATOS preparauon t]me for a war started by tbe So\Iet Union will, by detin]tlon, be very limited. NATOS defenses are, therefore, unhkely (given present plans) to be either heavdy fortified and dug In, eche. loned IZI depth or possessed of a strong operational reserve.

,.

Crisis Phase

The crisis phase IS only iikely to corn. mence if some aspect of So\~ie~ POIICY fails and It becomes apparent to the Soviet Union that a war M either inevitable or is the only way by which the leadership can achieve a POIICYobjective that is absolutely vital to the countrys surv]val. .More immediate steps must now be taken to create favorable politlcal and military circumstances for a successful campaign. The actual deployment and reinforcement of NATO forces must be prevented or at least hindered, and this is to be accompllsbed by all possible meansincreased polltical

Open Hostilities

The third phase of the war WIII be open bosti llt ]es It M essential to Soviet success that they br]ng the war to a rapid conclusion while tbe enemy IS still trying to mobillze. if INATO IS g]ven a long period for preparation and deployment, then the Western forces will be so strong and well

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MANEUVERGROUP
&ntrenched that a quick Soviet victory is unlikely, and, at best, the war is likely to end m a tactical nuclear stalemate. Therefore, a certain, even a high, degree of surprwe is essentiat to Soviet success. Some NATO troops will undoubtedly, however, have time to deploy. In adverse circumstances, the Soviets recognize that they might underestimate the number of NATO troops that have deployed. If these troops can contain the Soviet forces and prevent a breakthrough, then NATO commanders may still be able to make effec. tlve use of their nuclear weapons If nuclear release is obta]ned in time. The Soviets accept that an early and effective use by NATO of tactical nuclear weapons will certainly cause disastrous disruption af their offensive. This is of the utmost Importance when considering the remons for the current changes ]n Soviet operational doctrine. The Soviet General Staff was clearly faced with the need to develop a strategic and operational plan which would make It very difficult for NATO to implement its tact]cal nuclear opt]on and would accom. plish a rapid collapse of the NATO military and pohtlcal system. Th]s strategy . Requires the achievement of surprise and assumes a NATO defense caught, In some measure, off balance. e Will impose the maximum amount of shock on the defender in the first hours of war * Must paralyze the enemys command and control systems and restrict hts abi Ilty to react. s IS designed to achieve a rapid rate of advance on several important axes, deep mto the enemy territory, to shatter his defensive structure. q Should reduce the risk posed by NATO tactical nuclear weapons. It would achieve this by destroying as many NATO nuclear weapons as possible during the conventional phase: by adopting tactics which make it particularly difficult for the defender to use his nuclear weapons effectively and, if NATO initiates the use of tactical nuclear weapona, by deatrwying the remainder of NATOs nuclear delivery systems in a masaive retaliatory tactical strike. Such a strategy offers, in Soviet eyes, th@ only real chance of victory should a war ]n Europe occur. The Soviet armed forces would have been guilty of a grave dereliction of duty had they not been actively seeking ways to Implement such a . strategy to cope with the eventuahty of war.

Warsaw Pact Studies of NATO Plans

As a first step to implementing such a strategy, the Soviet General Staff has naturally spent a great deal of time studying the strategic, operational and tactical features of NATOS defenses. The Warsaw Pact spends just as much time studying NATO as NATO does atudymg the Warsaw Pact, Just as NATO mainly studies the Soviet army, sa the Warsaw Pact mainly studies the US Army and the Bundeswehr. An excellent example of such a study of NATOS operational plans appeared in the Polish Ground FW-ce~ Reuzew, Number 12, 1981, written by a retired Colonel Won truck]. Tbe author of that article described the US (and Bundeswehrl concept of active defense as combining the characteristics of positional and mobile defense. Its essence, he sa]d, hes in a continuous, uniform resistance, both actwe and passive, to the attacker which will maintain a constant and invariable ratio of troops in front of the attacking forces of l-to-2 or 3 .(instead of the l-to-6 to 9 which Warsaw

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Pact sources usually detlne.as necessary for rapid breakthrough). Active defense M intended to compel the attacker to make repeated and systematic attempts to break Into the defended line so that the attacker should expend forces and time without gaining momentum. The defender deploys strong covering forces to identify breakthrough sectors and the axis of the main thrust. Once this axis M identified, subunits can be moved from passive sectors, from flanks and from positions in depth to aceomplisb a counterconcentration where and when this 1s needed to block the main thrust. Active defense, Wontrucki continued, does not surrender the mltlatlve as passive defense does, nor R+It as risky as the counterblow tactics on which mobile defense depends, Wontruckl went on to define advantages and disadvantages of this form of defense in Warsaw Pact eyes. He defined the advantages as follows: . Active defense can achieve early detection of the attacking forces, slow down their approach and channel them into killing zones . Even deployment makes it possible to conceal the main defensive positions and rapidly achieve counterconcentrations once tbe main attacking thrust has been identified. . The attacker will be forced to engage constantly m battle (includ]ng on foot) by the creation ofa semicircular barrier with a high density of forces around h]s shock group. . The attacker can be forced to commit his reserves very early on. q . Active defense provides for a very flexible employment of antitank reserves, especially the use of helicopters and minefield. 6 It creates favorable conditions for launching tactical counterattack so that the defender can seize the initiative. These advantages hsted by Wontrucki demonstrate what a very effective form of defense the Warsaw Pact cons]ders active defense to be. There is no doubt that Eastern bloc analysts considered it to be an effective counter to their conventional tactics. This IS particularly true in that, by ma]ntaininga stable battlefield, it made It possible for NATO to plan, with reasonable certainty, on being able to fall back on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to halt the advance. Wontruckls study is reinforced by the work of no less a figure than Colonel General Gr]nkevich, chief of the main staff of the ground forces In an article on the sigmficance of the battle for Moscow in the Soutet Mtlztary Hlstorlcal Journal, December 1981, he demonstrated just how it ,.vas possible to conduct an effective strategic defense against a blitzkrieg by an attacker who M superior in numbers. Wontrucki concluded by exploring the weaknesses of active defense with a view to adopting tactics designed to exploit them, He Identified the weaknesses of NATOs active defense as follows: e It provides for only weak engineer preparation of defensive positions, especially by way of earthworks. o It necessitates a decentral]zat}on of forces, making for a diffusion of effort with no clear defimtlon of the main defensive effort. The main defensive area only develops during the battle q Reserves are committed piecemeal by the defender, giving no opportunity to eliminate a break-in to the defensive zone. q Activeness is 1imited to maintaining a dense grouping in the tact]cal defensive zone, after which the defense becomes paaaive, at least until the senior commander orders a counterattack. The lack of operational reserves, the need to weaken one part of the line to strengthen another and the reliance on

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early identification of the main thrust can be exploited. When NATO reserves are committed, concludes Wontrueki, and counterconcentration (NATO term counterpenetration) IS complete, then, if the NATO commanders not conducting counterattack, the attacker can effectively exploit the lull in the operat}on, and, ]f he possesses adequate reserves, he can effect a breakthrough. From the foregoing, the value of possessing an extra, highly mobile, operational force that is uncommitted when the defender has just comm]tted his own reserves is obvious. That mobile formation can be effectively committed to hit the NATO defense where it has just been weakened by relocation to provide for effective counterconcentration To defeat NATOs active defense, Wontrucki continues, it isessentlal to be sure that the defender m actually employing active defense and to avoid being channeled, during the covering force battle, into hitting the main defenswe hne where the defender wants to be hit. It is also essential to conduct reconnaissance so as to know when the defender regroups his reserves and to push on rapidly, avo]d strongpoints and outposts and hit the ma]n defensive l]ne quickly. It isessential to prevent them-derly withdrawal of the defenders covering forces and to disorgamze h]s defensive fortdlcatlons. Au- and artillery support and tactical assaults behind the Iines should be used to hinder the deployment of reserves and ensure the suppression of the defenders artillery. The defense should be breached on several axes and second echelone committed only where the enemy hascomm]tted his reserves. When second echelons are corn. mitted just before the defender commits his reserves so as to achieve surprise and prevent effective Counterconcentration, they should be committed on two separate axes. The features of active defense are emphasized by a further and most important consideration. During the 1970s, NATO adopted a strategy of forward defense m which, in a per]od of tension or crisis, the bulk of NATO troops will take up defensive positions in a 20 to 40-kdometer-wide belt relatively close to the inner German border (IGB). The troops wIII thus be able to meet the aggressor as soon as poss]ble and give up as 1Ittle territory as possible. This puts the main defensive positions of NATO formations, in many instances, a Iong way from the]r garrison areas and entails long deployment times Furthermore, the covering force action, essential to the identlficat]on of the mam thrusts, cannot take place in any depth, and the zig zag path of tbe ICZBbr]ngs that frontier very close indeed to the front and flanks of some of NATOs mam defensive areas. Dffkrences within NATO have resulted In the respective nat]onal formations employing different operational concepts and may wel 1 result In varying states of readiness in the event of a crisis. Moreover, we should remember that NATO leaders have staLed categorically that: . In the event of a Sov]et attack, NATO WI1l initially tight a conventional battle. Flgwres of five or a few days are usually quoted for this phase. o NATO WIII eventually resort to tactical nuclear weapons when conventional defensive measures fall q Initial use of nuclear weapons will be on a Iimited, demonstrational scale. A careful study of the enemy and the formulation of strategic, operational and tactical plans tailored to exploit h]s weaknesses and neutralize his strengths is one of the fundamental principles guiding tbe development of the Sowet armed forces.

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It would be totally at var]ance with their doctrine and a breach of hlstorwal precedent If the Soviets were not ta have tal.en the features of NATOs defense Into account and were not, therefore, amefidlng them own strategic and operational plans so as to be able to defeat this type of defense In the event of war. chafiges in the type ofoperatton that can be tamed out th rma,ghout the enemy defenses. Th~re are far greater apportunrties nowa days than 1,1the past, especially because of the greater ranges at u,hlch rockets, long ra!ge artll[ery, aircraft anddesants[landlng forces] can be used. Ellen so, examples from the lobt uar hate ln no u,ay lost theuiY[@L>anCe, III tkeory or 117practrcc. Rather, the~> encaara,qe lcieczsand suggest salutzons to the modern prablern of hou, to get maJor /iwrm 1n the afftns[ 1e deq) tnto the opera. t[ona[ depths c)fthe defense, so as to ach leve dctls{tc alms at h(.gh speed. Krupchenku was dmcussmg the World t$sw 11concept of the mobile group m one of a series of articles on that concept, designed to examine and establish its valldlty on the modern battlefield. More speclflc reference to the concept was made by hlajor !~ojclech itIichalak who wrote: charm@rzstlc features of modThe most em u a rfa re are, (a) ~anfllrr tuklng place over a wide front 0? on wl?cted a.ws, Ib I Th<,h lg]l [c?,>! o} nzr)bdlty of fOrCeS, lc1 The al>udabt[lty Ofa COnStant Supp[y
()/re[?lforcc,r71{,rits,. (d] The orazlabtllt~ llvqpons, t} to exert pressure on the ofa large quanttty

The Perceived Need for Change in Warsaw Pact Operational Doctrine

Y,

By its very nature, Sov]et military dnctr]ne has developed gradually over the years and has very strong roots m hmtory Pact (To all intents and purposes, Liarsaw, doctrine and Sov]et mlllrary doctrine are ]denucal The Soviet Umon has Imposed the framework of Its doctr]ne on all of the and the LVarsaw tVar~aw Pact countries, Pact staff IS I]ttle more than an extension of the Sowet General Staff, ) Even revolutionary changes, such as that brought about by the ]ntroductlon of nuclear weapons oato the battlefield, leave a ~reat deal unchanged, The doctrine Is, on the \vhole, ewlutionary and leans heav]ly on historical operational analyem for the evaluation and re.evaluation ofprlnclples and operational models. Sowet mllttary speclahsts rely heavily on such analys]s whFn attempting to develop and d]rect the evolutlon of mllltary doctrine down the most appropriate paths. To quote General 1. E. Krupchenko: haw Introduced rzeu, Modern conditions
factors complete znto the formula for ~ucccw and [C,!th neu meehanzmtzon, armar

uf rzaclrar

( t. I ThL, capaci

weapons, all troops haue becorrze mobile Consequently great posslbL[ttles hucc emerged for deceloplng an operatton at hzgh speed and engaging zn ~jtaneul,er u,lth tank and combzned arms armzes. In this connection there hare heea

[chale depth of an ?nclnys operational fOrInlltlon Theretor+ the success of an offenstue opmat!on wtll largely depend on deprzulng the enemy 0[ the aboce-mentloned capabllz tzes and, abme a[[, on the ellmznation of n uc[mr m Isszles du rlag the con uentzonal pha.w oftke battle. This .Ltuattaa makes [t necessary to seek nea, methods of emp[oylng forces so as to breuk up tbe cokeszon of the complete enemy formutton ThLs might be accom plwked, for example. by destroying objec tt[,es or elements of the formations which are sw.wntzal to the ulabtlityand combat fit-

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MANEUVER GROUP

ness of the enemy forces. Based on the analysls ofexpertence of the last war, these requirements have led to the reappearance on the modern battlefield of detachments engaged in raiding actwztles and also of Operational Marching Groups [later designated by the same author as Operational Maneuuer Groups]. The latter originate from the so-called hzgh-speed groups formed from armored troops and widely used by the Souiet Army durzng World War 11. The feature common totheoperatlonal actzuztzes of both marchzng groups and raiding detachments, he contznu~d, is that they are detached from their own main forces to penetrate deep into the enemy rear to operate for a Itmltedperzod Conse -

quently they perform misszons at a considerable distance from the main forces, although zn close coordination with them, and always to their advantage. These troops are intended mainly for destroying nuclear missiles sites, command posts, electronic warfare equipment and antiaircraft defense weapons. They are also usfd, inter alia, to prevent the withdrawal of enemy troops; to hinder the advance o~his reserues from rear areas; to paralyze h~ system of logistic~; and to capture and hold zmportan t areas and ob]ectwes untd the approach of the main forces.z On the same theme, Colonel Lachiewicz and Colonel Rajmanski w~ote an article in which they said: The aim of deploying an armys OperaThe filI-24 IS a highlymobile antitank weapon

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tzoncd Maneuver Group IS to switch the focus of the fighting znto the rear of the enemy formatzon; to destroy important objectives whwh cannot be destroyed by other means; to achzeve chaos and dworganlzatzon; and to limit the freedom of maneuver and the effectiveness of enemy actzon. . The Ioglc, therefore, M clear. In active defense, NATO had found an effective answer to Warsaw Pact operational strategy. Therefore, that operational strategy has had to be changed. A new operational strategy has had to be dei,eloped which will ensure the rapid and total collapse of NATO defenses and hence ensure the rap]d conclusion of a war. It is neither an easy nor a quick task, especially In peacet]me, to change the operational concept of an entire army. Consequently, it ISobwous that we are not seeing a sudden or precipitous develop- ment in Soviet doctrine, It would appear equally true, from a perusal of the Warsaw Pact milltary press, that, wh]le moves toward the umplementat]on ala more flexible operational strategy were .lnltlated pfobably as early as 1976, there was not then, and still 1s not, any detailed blueprlnt for th]s change. Resolution of the detad and amendment of the very principles themselves must be expected only as the basic ideas are implemented, tactms and operational maneuvers are tried out In exercises and alternative mixes of forces and weapons systems are experimented with. ,Many of the changes and amendments of mmor principles have long been apparent in the Soviet army and have been taken as evidence of major changes. It is ~ only as the new concept of operations has come to maturity, and the weight of m]nor change has reached such large proportions, that it has been possible (certainly for this writer) to perceive the operational plan as a wholethe form of the restructuring of Soviet operational strategy in Europe and the reasons for it.

Postwar Developments in Strategy and Operational Arl

Two very significant developments in the 1950s and 1960s dld much to alter Soviet operational thinking, These were the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons together with the trip-wire response strategy of .NATO and the mass mechamzatlon of the So\,]et army. As a result of the latter, combined arms forces became capable of high speeds of advance, maneuver and exploitation. Consequently, the designation of tank formations as mobile groups came to be seen as rather anacbromstic. In a tactical nuclear war, the defense would be shattered by a nuclear strike, and the breakthrough and exploitation would mainly become a problem oftrafflc control. Moreover, Important targets could be neutralized or destroyed by tactl~ cal nuclear strikes, thereby freeing troops for other tasks Invulnerabdity to tactical nuclear strikes can only be obta]ned ]fthe Soviet forces can maintain a high rate of
advance ment and of clear can lines prevent dlvldlng the establish-

the two sides

by an early stage in the war, The 1970s, therefore, saw a return h the study of conventional tactics, operational art and strategy, with the added impetus of finding some way to neutralize NATOs nuclear trump card. It is not surprising that Sowet analysts turned to the experiences of World War If for an answer, and it was the experience of tank formations which was seen by the Soviets as most relevant to modern conditions. This is because the development of mechanlza-

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tion has succeeded In raising the level of mobility and protection of all arms to that enjoyed only by the tank troops in World War II. Tank formations were, therefore, most caref lystudled. This trend was no doubt enco$ aged bythelarge number of former commanders of tank formations occupying senior posltlons w]th]n the Soviet ground forcesa factor that M not to be underestimated, As tank formations were the must common subject of study and the most common component of World War 11 mobile groups, it is hardly surprising that awareness of the concept of the mobde group as a valuable means of raising the tempo of the advance and exploltmg success into the enemy rear areas should grow throughout the last decade. The similarities between NATOs intended form of defense and the style of defense adopted by the Germans la both the In]t]al and the later stases of the war serve to make the study of the mobile group even more appropriate Many contemporary Soviet strategwts are at pains to point out that, however much the mob]l]ty and protection of all arms formations is ra}sed, there can be no doubt that tank formations still remam more maneuverable. Tactical cons] deratlons, especially the widespread deployment of Ilghtwe]ght antitank weapons, have necessitated the mcluslon of some infantry ]n tank formations. Th]s has only affected the Issue to a sl]ght degree, ho\vever, and does not alter the basic pnncl pies. The attention given to the role, composltion and utdlty of the mobile group has been reflected ]n the Soviet mditary press, particularly since 1974. Interest has been steady and at a hgh level, with exceptional bursts of attention in 1976 and 1979. On the one hand, It can certainly be said that the activities of the wart]me mobile groups are providing examples for operational analysis which are applicable to all modern mechanized formations. On the other hand, what all contributors to discussions in the Soviet military press stress nowadays, when referring to the concept of the mublle group, is that a formation vnth a relatively h]gher speed and greater inherent flex] b]llty than other formatlans presents the best means of achlevmg a rapid penetration mto the rear areas of a modern defense based on the IInes of that proposed by NATO. \Vhen that defense, if hastll~ estabhshed, POSses~es llttle in the ~vay of operational reserves and bas no strong, second operational )Ine of defenses. the premium on a rapid breach and rapid ddvance Into the defenders rear area becomes Immediately abi Jous,

World War II Lessons Applied Today

To summarize the lessons now drawn from the historical development of the concept of the \iorld \tar 11mobile group, folIovmg are the mobile group characteristics considered most frequently bj Sowet authors as be]ng dppllcable to the modern OMG. e The mobile.group ~vas not so much an organization as a concept. It was a way of employlng an existing force to berter explo}t both the culnerabilltles of the enemy and the capab]lltles of the friendly format Ian. hloblle groups conferred genu]ne flexlbll]ty on the operational commanders and were employed for a wide variety oft asks. e Mob] le groups \vere the most successful means ofexploltation that the Soviets found to turn tact]cal success into operational success and achieve a high rate of advance to great depth. It 1s for this reason, above all else, that the concept has

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now been revived m the OMG. q Mobile groups were most important machieving tbe continuity of the offensive and avoiding disastrous pauses or lulls in the operation which would give the enemy time to recover (or, in modern terms, to use his nuclear weapons effectively). q Mobile groups were rarely used singly In an operation. Usually, several were employed on different axes. q There was always a great degree of flexibility in reorganization, echeloning and grouping of forces involved m mobile groups, and army commanders hatia lot of freedom to exercise their choice of options. In modern terms, this freedom of choice and greater degree of flexlbd]ty may well be found at a lower level, * Formations and units comprising mobile groups were often reinforced or tailored to enable them to meet specific requirements For example, considerable engineer assets were added when obstacle crossing was Important. The ideal basis for a mobde group was a tank or a mechanized (all arms) corps. In modern termF, this would equate to a tank or motor rifle division. e AS World War H progressed, the proliferation of antitank weapons made it essential to-make tank formations operat]ng as, or in, mobile groups more self-contained. Integral infantry, artillery and logist]c elements became the norm. This M reflected in the current reorganization and re-equipment of the Group nf Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG ) o Technical support to mobile groups was essential to their viability. As a rule, the capacity to repair armored fighting vehicles (AFVS) fell offrap]dly as the operation progressed until finally the corps sometimes lost virtually all of its repair assets and ground to a halt. This was one of the major causes of the Vzstula -(lb operation finally running out of steam. The lessons drawn out for the modern Soviet army stress The importance of repairing damaged AFVS in mobile groups (OMGS) in the field. The importance ofcommencing operations with reliable AFVS powered by new or low-mileage engines. The need for corps-sized mobile groups (equivalent to a modern division) to be self-contained and well-equipped in terms of repair assets. e Strong forward detachmentsusually from the first echelon of the forces in the mobile groupwere always deployed and were most important for assuring the speed of advance. Their primary function was to reconnoiter enemy positions and to pre-empt hie deployment into prepared positions or into towns and villages. The importance of this is even more heavily emphasized today. . The committal of mobile groups was the most crucial moment of the battle and was itself crucial to the success of the mobile groups: Committal was ]nvariably on two axes. It was essential that there was little oPPOsltlOn on committal, either from re. malnlng enemy defenses or from counterattack by land or an-, .Surprise was crucial and deception always practiced. For example, the main weight of supporting am strikes was put in normally about two to three hours after the start of committal so as not to betray the stratagem. Massive air and artillery support was always prov]dedthat is, 50 to 70 percent of the fronts aviation and 18 to 20 guns for each tank or infantry battalion in the mobile group. q Mobile groups often operated in conjunction with air assault forces and partisans. . Mobile groups often detached units to

,.

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MANEUVER GROUP I

The MiG23 Flogger

r-aid, and somet]mes the whole mobile group had a raiding function. In the modern concept of the OMG, the raiding function has become more important due to the Increased value of certain targets such as nuclear weapons or headquarters. e ,Moblle groups uery frequently engaged In encounter battles e]ther with withdrawing forces or with advancing enemy reserves wh]ch they attracted by virtue of the threat they posed to the stiabllity of the defense. These encounter battles varied In scale from those of the mobile groups forward detachment (rapid battalion or brigade actions) to encounter battles up to three days long involv]ng an entire army, with 500 tanks and 1,500 guns plus aircraft engaged on each side. Encounter battles were fought both by day and by night, oftena Iong way forward of the advancing combmed arms formation, and at up to350 kilometers beyond the ln]tial forward edge of the battle area. They were very demandmg of commanders skills, but them successful outcome often had a great bearing on the overall success of the operation. It must always be borne in mind that, as the OMG isa concept, or a new way of using existing formations, it does not

necessarily requ]re thecreation ofnewfor- mations. At the most, ]t will require minor tailoring and reshuffling. IfOMGs are specially formed, they are likely to be deployed by many of the armies in the offensive and even by the fronts. As a concept, the OMG M only a part of an overall strateg]c operation to defeat the Western Alliance. It is not an end in Itself but M a tool to assist the rapid, widespread advance of the Warsaw Pactmain forces and hence ach]eve a more rapid end to the war. As a concept, it appears to be well founded ]n v]ew of both NATOs present defensive posture and the numerous historical examples of a defensive concept being defeated because of the psychological Inability of the defenders to accept the need to yield ground, particularly home ground. The relevence of these recent Soviet studies of wartime operations, plus the apphcabihty of the prewously mentioned principles governing the deployment of mob]le groups to the modern OMGS, is well-supported in the East European militarYPress, Theemphasls onthe fact that . committal of this group was the most Important and tense moment of the battle emphasizes what an Important role this

1983

55

MILITARYREVIEW
new concept plays m the revised Soviet for the 1980s. lt IS belleved that there WII1 be one major point of difference between the OMG and the World War 11mobile group. This IS that, as the 1980s progress, the ONIG WI1l come to play a role relatively much more Important In the o~,erall operational plan of the Warsaw Pact than the mob]le ~roup played In the operations of the Red army in ttorld War 11. Thm IS due to the decreased scale of modern operations m terms of overall numbers of men, the Increased Importance of speed and a h~gh rate of ad~,ance, the certainty of strategic disaster In the event of operational fadure and the particular nature of ,NATO defense> We have to remember that this concept provides the all-lrnportant Ilnk between strategv and tactich lt is a means to an endthe end helng the rapid cullapse of NATO and the l]mltlng of the war ta the battlefield and the means be]ng by sur. prise attack, on a broad front, along sev. eral axes, The concept of the operation WIII be to Insert on each axis, as an OMG, a strong dlvlslon b[,hlnd the main NATO oftlw defense belt WL th( fir>t orswondcla} offensIre It may even prove feas]ble to deploy fnr this task the best part of a tank army, operating as a fro)tt.level O.MG The control of these ()\lGs WI1l at all times be subject to a centralized overall plan, They WIII not be operating independently but on tasks set by the commander m chl~f They WI]], however, have conslderahle Iat]tude as to howto ]mplement the plans they are given, and they will not be constrained by mct]cal boundaries. The only limlt to them action WVIIbe opera~lonal boundanes Once they have achieved penetration, the OLIGS WIII act as a consolidated force to assault or seize major targets or objectives, or they may break up as tactical
strategy

raiding units to hit such small but opera. tlonally Important targets as headquarters or nuclear weapons sites, The OM.G may operate alone or m concert with other OMGS. By definition, the OMG (and its constituent raldlng groups and forward detachments) will be three-dimensional. That m, an air element wIII be an essential part of the organization.

The Effect of the OMG on the Tactical Nuclear Battle

,.

AS long as NATO retains normal (not enhanced radiation or neutron) tactlca] weapons, w]th their high collateral damage, tbe]r long dwell time and with the polmcal Inhlbitlons about their use, the Western Alliance WIII only be able to use them effectively If the attacking forces can be slowed down and ]f friendly and enemy troops can be kept apart. It will be extremely difficult for NATO to consider the use of normal battlefield nuclear weaponson the first orsecondday of the attack, well ]nslde\Vest Germany, against Soviet forces in close contact with NATO troops. Furthermore, ]fthe offensive w, in one operational echelon, NATOs plans for Interdiction (with nuclear and conven. tional forces) against a second operational echelon WIII be In va]n. There may well be no such second echelon within East Germany for several days. If, asseemst]kely, ]tdoestake NATO several days to obtain nuclear release, by that time spec]al purpose forces, air str]kes, OhlGs, raids, sabotage, and the like WIII undoubtedly have eroded considerably the nuclear stocks and weapona available. They may also have ser]ously damaged the command and control system essential to their effect]ve use.

56

March

MANEUVER GROUP
A great deal of effort has gone into making the Soviet forces well able to survive tactically on a nuclear battlefield. This applies as much to Iogistlc elementi as to teeth arms. If NATO, on tbe other hand, puts most of its nuclear, biological and chemical effort Into fighting a chemical rather than a nuclear war, NTATO may well be at a serious disadvantage. This is not to mln]mize the need for INATO to be equipped and trained to fight in a chemical environment, nor to deny that NATOs possession of chemical weapons would be the greatest deterrent to a Soviet useoftbem. Rather, ]t is to point out that chemical weapons are very much secondary In Importance, m Soviet eyes, to nuclear weapons Addiuonally, It is the ability to surwve on a nuclear battlefield which the Soviets deem more Important Yet most NATO forces do far more tra]ning for chemical warfare than for nuclear warfare, If the war develops Into a nuclear-war, the OMC, WIII put the Sowets in a good position to explolt their own use of tact]cal nuclear weapons. At tbe same time, they will mmimize their own vulnerability to them. The OMG IS a h]gh-speed stratagem wh]ch ]sequally >,alid for both the nuclear and the conventions 1battlefield. make for abetter balanced force. Ideally, any well-equipped format]on should be capable ofoperating as an OMG, and the widespread reliance on battle drills even atdlvlslonal level will facilitate thelrrtroduct ion of this Idea. Targets The importance of destroying nuclear weapons (even in tbe conventional phase], electronic equipment and command and control elements constitutes the biggest difference here Otherwise, the principles of engaging targets rema]n virtually unchanged What modern equipment confers, ofcour~e, IS a greater~billty to carry out these prlnc]ples. Tb]s is perhaps no~vhere more marked than ]n the field otelectronic \varfare. The advantages of having a strong force deep In the enemys defens}ve zone are immediately obvious In terms of radio and radar location of targets, jamm]ng of radio relay communications and the implernentat}on ofdeceptlOn measures Tactics. The Increased emphas]s on raldlng actlvltles and for~vard detachments WI1l he very demanding Indeed of Inlt]atlve and competence on the part of young officers Although a great deal of progress bas been made In Improving the mental flex]blllty of thejunlor commander and mcreaslng hls overall competence and understanding of the battlefield, there M still a long wayto go Initiative isa very difficult concept for the Soviet military system to come to terms with. As a partial remedy, a lot of effort has recently been put into automatmg command and control procedures by the use of algorithms and drills and by the Introduction of computers. A great deal of effort has also gone Into improvurg command and controi systems, especial Iy communications Two changes of tactical empbas]s due to the nature of NATO defenses are also notable Lachlewlcz and RaJmanskl note that:

Comparisons Between Mobile Groups and OMGS

Composition. In the past, only tank formations were capable of filling the role of mobile groups. .Now, all-arms formations are also capable and may well be appOlnted tO act as OMGS. On balance, however, tank formations are stall seen as better in most circumstances although they require integral infantry and more artillery than they previously held to

1983

57

MILITARYREVIEW
flghtzng on the approaches to a water obstacle, and 1ts impact on the success of the forced crossing has recently become espemally important, because the enemy has come to rely on exploltzng water obsta cles as a means of establmhlng a permanent defense, A water-crossing capabihty has, as a consequence, become even more important for the OMG than It was for tbe mobile group. Second, the defense of minor bulltup areasvillages, small towns and strip developmentbas become an important feature of NATO defenses, This bas lead to a reassessment of tactics for fighting In btultup areas, wltb a blg swing away from the city siege tactics of 10 years ago to a basic drill of Iightnlng attacks on wllages. N]gbt. Special attention M being pa}d to operations at mght as a means of reducing the advantages of modern weapons in the defense. Over the last year, this, too, has been a topic of particular interest ]n tbe Soviet army. Lacbiewicz and Rajmanskl note: At ntght lt 1s mow dlfficuIt to zdentz~y u,here the OMG w, and what Its direction of march 1s, and It w not easy to argan[ze counter-measures to destroy zt. Therefore tt m cons~dered that nlghtpro~zdes fauorab[e condrtlons for the pcnetratton of the Armys OMG in the depth of the enemy grOuplng. Artillery support This was always of crucial Importance to the successful committal of a mobile group and bas not changed with the OMG. However, mob]le armored arti Hery on tbe enemy side and modern location techniques have made it necessary to move away from lengthy rolling barrages to short [four to five mmute), heavy, successive fire strikes as a means of neutralizing the enemy. In Soviet eyes, remote mining (especially by multiplerocket launcher) Roses one of the greatest threats to the successful commi~tal and operation of the OMG. Any means of remotely delivering mines wi 11be a particular target for Soviet artillery and aircraft. The style and volume of new gunnery practices have necessitated changes in the command and control of artillery and In the ammumtion Iogmtlcal supply system. New Soviet art]llery weapons, such as the BM27 multiple-rocket launcher, have made it poss]ble to provide artdlery sup. port at far greater ranges than in the past. The mechanization and armoring of artillery are clearly of great importance for the viabll]ty of artillery accompanying the OMG Tbe role of air power. This is of much greater Importance nowadays, particularly in view of the fact that 50 percent of NATOs firepower (Including, of course, nuclear firepower) IS vested in the air forces. Consequently, an an- operation has become an Integral part ofa strategic operation, and the air element is tbe third dimension of tbe ground battle. I{elicopters, particularly those Integral to cover formations, are best considered as flying artl 1lerythe Ml -8 providing heavy firepower support and the Lfl -24 providing speclahzed antitank capabi Iity. This requires alr support to be much more closely Integrated with Soviet lower formations than it was previously, It demands much closer support, greater versatility and, consequently, a ddTerent system of coordination and control. The greater importance of air support, the Sowets stress, bas made the weather a more Important consideration than ever before when planning OMG operations. Thm is not to say that OMGS cannot be committed in bad weather, However, their use WIII certainly be risk]er under such conditions if the defender pos-

58

MANEUVERGROUP .
sesses aircraft that are better equipped to fly in poor visibility, and/or if the defenders meteorological service is more reliable at predicting changes in the weather. Combat supportby air, by way of reconnaissance, fire support, minelaying, smoke-screen laying, desants, Ioglstlc sup. ply, and so onhas been revolutionized by the hehcopter, and air defense has been revolutionized by the tactical surface-toair missile. This has necessitated a complete reorganization of the Soviet am force and air defense and requires management of airspace on a more rational basis. Army aviation has returned as the formation commanders integral air arm, and th]s, mainly rotary-wing support, has come to be of positively crucial importance in the concept of the OMGto such an extent that there are numerous articles dealing solely with thm aspect of the operational strategy. The frontal and theater aviation will provide resources for the air operation for example, the air element of the strateg]c operation, Resource limitations may well dictate that the corridor of air superiority, established for the conduct of air operations, must be coordinated with the air-cover corridors created to protect the OMGS. Of tactical Interest is the great importance allotted to combating NATOs combat helicopters. After nuclear weapons, and together with remotely delivered mines and the multiple. rocket launcher, helicopters are said to present the greatest threat to the OMG. For this reason, the Soviets are expected shortly to deploy a new helicopter, the Mi-29, which has been designed to combat the helicopter threat. Link with special purp~se forces. The increased need for a rapid collapse of the enemy, plus the easily defined nature of crucial targets, the destruction of which will put the whole of NATOS defensive framework at risk, has increased the value of clandestine behind-the-lines operations. This, coupled with irhproved means of inserting special forces-by air, helicopter, in disgmse, and so forthhas led to a significant increase m the role played by special purpose forces. This is especially so for the reconnaissance and verification of targets to be engaged by air or long-range artillery. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the recent development of Soviet, operational doctrine is the most significant to occur since the changes wrought by the advent of nuclear weapons. It is nothing less than a complete operational. shakeup designed to produce an effective method of winning a war quickly and, if necessary, byconventlonal means. At the same time, its applicability to the nuclear battlefield 1s evident and impressive. However, It has, as might be expected, necessitated a serious rethink by the Sovietsonhow torun their formations. This]s especially true m terms of them philosophies on command and control and on allarms cooperation and coordination. At the tactical level, it is forcing a reorgamzation of logistics, air defense tactics, artillery practices, and repair and maintenance methods, to name but a few areas of interest. It isclear from thediscusslonin the specialized Soviet mdmary press that solutions to the problems generated by the change in operational strategy are only just being attempted. It will be a long time before the Soviet army can even identify all the associated problems, let alone answer them. There can be no doubt, however, that the Soviets are now irrevocably committed to a significant amendment to their operational strategy. Developing the potential capability to deploy OMGS will be evidence of the acquisition ofa very great

1983

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MILITARYREVIEW
degree of operational flexi~lllty. It WII1 give the Warsaw Pact an alternative means, and it 1sclearly an attractive alternative. Let us not forget that it envisages large So\let formations operat]ng behind NATOs main defens]ve belt by the end of the first dayofthe malnbattle. ThTswlll, if It M accomplished, present NATO w]th a problem at precisely that lcwel at ~hlch It Is, currently, least well organized to copethe operational level. If .NATO M to meet this challenge, It ~v)ll require an effort at the corresponding scale because, as the Soviets point out, no matter how good the tactics are. ]f the operational plans are no good. you lose The alm of deployln~ OMGS WII1 be to try to make NATO lose very quickly.

NOTES ,
s,, P w v W, T.. SO,<., Mew a,, of w., Pea,. 80 Ne.!raw

Roulledw & Keg,. 80ss. M,,, au,h.r t, 0 SOW,! M law Iheo+ commg.oo. BiMzkr,. gsJ,tef swe ,, ,,! of ,,!5 ..,.1, a, r, e, hew I@% 9 Len!n,sf m,l,taq 2 Gene,. .ow.ef . . Y 1q8, Iheov E Kr.whenw cm +3(1 Ml.hala A,, ,,,r. e.,cz a.o

1975 vf90r s the W,S[S Ioremos! readers are re+erred t. .S I..h

10 mwN,51md by Macro Ila Co The m go, s .,0,,s, m m, IIeld 01 So.ret M,r,kw H!s!orr.d

I. m an c,e - I..

3 Ma 0, Wio,,eC. ,, ,.e C,ou.d ,.,,,. 4 Coon.1 Lxt

Av,al,n. m Ra,6a.d WieuverODeratm$ e.nd A,, D,,..s, He.,e,v Few.ary ,982 Colone Rwnansk, L.., .el,c.mter N q, Recon.a$sJr Force OPeW,$O.$at

,..>., ,, F,,. M,,, 0, m S.tmo.d ..0 Ar Defense 8,,!,. June .981 5 1. ,escr b .g 1h,5 I mu,t V.)., Jot!. H>ne$ .5 Army

ac, CWleUge the Weal hen occ.soned by t. .Wm I em ,naemed 4.. 6,aW,g 1. my references, $heown me,, wtuch mo Lieve!omlents under , SCuss!o o tat

are ,!,0. man, d [he mc,e r,.,., Ham COwre!e CL,! !Tm,, o. of ,,. 6 .ect ..,,, 7 ,m,d ,0 % rra%k,

, -

to USAR Education Requirements. Ofhclals at the US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Admincstrat{on Center (RCPAC) warn that US Army Reserve (USAR) officers approaching mandatory promotion consideration must meet certain mandatory education requirements These standards must be achieved before promot!on, and there are no exceptions. In the past few years, thousands of USAR officers have not been selected for promotion solely because they d!d not meet the education requtremenfs In 1981 alone, 46 percent of the captains who had reached therr eliglbhty dates were not recommended for promotion to major because they d]d not meet mm!mum education standards. As of August 1982, boards have turned down more than 1,000 captains for promotion to major because they had not completed an officer advanced course RCPAC off[c!als recommend that mditary educat!on be planned far enough m advan~e to al~ow completion before promotton board cons[deratlon Selection boards consider USAR officers for promotion during the calendar year preceding that m which the required amount of service is completed. Education requirements must be completed no later than the date the board convenes. For more information, contact your nearest USAR school or your personnel management ofhcer at the RCPAC

No Exceptions

60

March