Prospects for Democratization in Myanmar: Impact on India

By David I Steinberg Issue Vol 24.4 Oct-Dec 2009 | Date : 27 Nov , 2010

According to the military junta that rules Myanmar,1 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is on the cusp of the completion in 2010 of its selfordained roadmap to a form of democracy in the country an election, the inauguration of a bicameral representative national legislature, local legislatures, and the operational stage of the new constitution that was approved by a questionable referendum in May 2008. These series of events will introduce a new disciplineflourishing democracy, as the Senior General (and Head of State) Than Shwe has so proclaimed. On Discipline-Flourishing Democracy How democratic will this new discipline-flourishing democracy be, and what are its prospects for changing the orientation of Myanmars domestic and foreign policy in both the near term and into the future? In spite of protestations to the contrary by the Burmese expatriate community, human rights advocates, and the United States (among other nations), Myanmar is at present a strong state both in its exclusive monopoly on coercive power, and in its capacity to limit any significant element of political pluralism that could alter state control or even effect, in any major sense, a reorientation of foreign policy. policy level officials have maintained that they can withstand the isolation imposed by sanctions, which are, in any case, incomplete because of the wealth of Burma/Myanmars natural resources Over its score of years in command, its power, capacity, and resources have grown. The foreign and domestic policies of Myanmar are solely in the hands of the SPDC, and the new constitution will ensure the autonomy of the tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) not only in its internal operations but also in its international activities. Its multiple roles will not be compromised by the new multi-party elected legislature at least over the next half-decade. As the Senior General, quoting a Burmese proverb, indicated in an Armed Forces Day speech on March 27, 2009, democracy is like a newly dug well it does not yield clear water for some time. The military will filter that water for the foreseeable future.

It is ironic that the strengths of the regime are also its vulnerabilities. Concepts of finite power and authority lead to its personalization, and thus entourage politics that are complicated by factionalism, and is further supported by a hierarchical society strengthened by a military command system that brooks no dissent. Loyalty is valued over competence, and orthodoxy is required not only among the tatmadaw, but in other institutions, such as opposition political parties. These reinforcements of the strong state are also its weaknesses. Hierarchy leads to a Potemkin-village-like shielding of some of the top leadership from the realities of current multiple crises, and thus timely responses. Rigidity discourages innovative solutions to problems. Entourage systems virtually require corruption to grease social and economic skids. Strident responses to perceived foreign insults or threats prevent arbitration and discourage compromise. Dirigiste policies inhibit economic growth. Stifling of managed dissent forces it into the streets. Yet in the near term the strong state will prevail. Although discipline-flourishing democracy may be internationally challenged, the prospects for successful internal challenges seem remote. Although the human rights abuses of the military regimes in all of their incarnations under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962-88), under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC-1988-97), and now under the present SPDC (1997 onwards), are all internationally well known and deplored, and an embarrassment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United Nations, and other groups, this international lack of legitimacy penetrates only partly into that semi-obscured state, in which legitimacy is defined by the regime in alternative, indigenous terms. Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards the control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other state, in the Burmese economy as subversive of its interests These terms, stridently repeated and the basis of a military ideology that is required to be printed in all locally published volumes, which are subject to censorship, and are taught in all schools, form the core, both of its internal concept of power and its international relations. These evolve around the ideology of national sovereignty and the unity of the state, both of which the tatmadaw believes can only be maintained by the military in its predominant role. The military has moved from legitimation previously defined (1962-88) in now defunct socialist terms (although the administration is still highly dirigiste) to one related to Buddhism but more focused on the historic, inevitable, and paramount role of the military in Burma/Myanmars past, present, and future, to

which end history has been rewritten. The military explicitly will guide the state, as the new constitution expressly stipulates. The policy implications of these attitudes, which predate military rule, are that Burma/ Myanmar has and will continue to be guided by a strong sense of nationalism that is too little appreciated abroad. Attempts at external pressure, calls for regime change, characterization as an outpost of tyranny or a rogue or pariah state, introduction and strengthening of various forms of sanctions (four US tranches from 1988 to 2008), all are denigrated as efforts by imperialists or neo-imperialists and their lackeys and minions as demeaning to national sovereignty.2 Under the Burmese concept of the discipline-flourishing democracy, the tatmadaw will retain effective power through two forces: legislatures at both the national and at all local levels that will have 25 percent active-duty military personnel appointed by the Minister of Defense, plus an unknown but likely to be significant number of pro-military civilian or retired military who will win elections under the auspices of either the military-mandated Union Solidarity and Development Association (some 24.6 million members) or one or more of the parties it will foster. The Burmese authorities will maintain that a representative, multi-party political system is in force, as it promised years ago, and thus that government should be considered both as legitimate by the Burmese peoples, but also by the international community. They are likely to cite the lack of opposition parties in internationally accepted regimes such as China, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, and claim unfair discrimination by the industrialized world. On The Foreign Equation As the military fear for the unity and vitality of the country under civilian control, they also fear foreign interventions. Although history may not repeat itself, past patterns affect present attitudes, often profoundly if inaccurately. Various Burmese regimes in past years have been justified in fearing their neighbors and the major powers. Yet the present junta is caught in a time warp; they do not recognize that relations have changed in half a century, and no state wants the balkanization of Burma/Myanmar. Both India and China will continue to view Myanmar as an important, although not pivotal, factor in eachs strategic equation. All of Burma/Myanmars neighbors have directly or indirectly supported rebellions or insurrections and have called for either the overthrow of the national

government or autonomy for peripheral regions. Some, such as India and Thailand, have shielded dissidents and refugees of various ethnicities. If the Peoples Republic of China supported the Burma Communist Party (Deng Xiao Ping claiming that relations among states were different from relations among political parties) as well as some northern minorities and trained rebels, the United States supported the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) troops that fled into Burma following the establishment of the Communist state, and has supplied assistance to dissident groups on the Thai side of the border. The unarticulated Thai policy until 1988 was to create buffer zones by supporting rebellious groups along the border between the conservative regime in Bangkok and what was viewed as radical governments in Rangoon. Bangladesh (and before it, East Pakistan) harboured Muslim rebels. The multi-ethnic tribal societies that straddle the Burma/Myanmar-Indian border in Indias Northeast and Manipur have protected rebels and refugees from Myanmar. They have moved back and forth and created sanctuaries in the uncontrolled areas on both sides of the border. Burman isolation was further exacerbated by minority Christian and Muslim external contacts with co-religionist organizations. However misguided and incongruous, there is a real fear of a US invasion, dramatically illustrated in the response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 by preventing the US Navy from delivering supplies directly to the stricken area. These fears are ever present. All these factors have reinforced the garrison state concept the tatmadaw claiming that only it can protect the state from its predatory neighbors and the imperialist powers. This sense of nationalism is reinforced by the isolation of the socialist period (1962-1988), and policy level officials have maintained that they can withstand the isolation imposed by sanctions, which are, in any case, incomplete because of the wealth of Burma/Myanmars natural resources, which are coveted by many states and not only those within the region. Nationalism is not only the driving force of Burmese international relations, it is the basis of internal policy and even administrative structure the two are wedded with the primacy of internal control taking precedence over external relations. The Tatmadaw may justify its expanded size (approximately 186,000 in 1988 to perhaps 400,000 in 2009) and power because of foreign threats, noting regime claims of occasional Thai incursions and provocations and the palpable but misguided fear of a

US invasion, but its real requirement is because of its need for internal control of potential strife, and its ideology and image of its central role in the society. But external relations have been important, and so the move towards China. There has been a mutuality of interests. Chinese access to the Bay of Bengal has been one motivation, but there are others. Myanmars natural resources (especially gas and hydro-electric power), a potential market of over 50 million people especially for businesses in southwest China that cannot compete with east coast Chinese firms in Western markets. It is a means to ensure a strategic advantage over India (and part of the China-India border in the Northeast remains unresolved), and mitigating Chinese dependence on transporting energy through the Straits of Malacca. All these contributed to Chinese penetration of Myanmar, beginning in 1988, but which older PRC, Nationalist, and even imperial maps regarded as either Chinese territory or within Chinas hegemonic influence. China has supplied some US$3 billion in arms and equipment, has or is building 30 hydro-electric dams, has provided major economic assistance, and is the site of much of Myanmars overseas training.3 Yet Myanmar is not a Chinese client state, as witness its opening to India, and Indias supply of naval vessels, aircraft, military hardware, and economic aid, and indeed to Russia as well (MIG-29 sales, extensive training, and an experimental, small nuclear reactor). Myanmar, however, is not insensitive to Chinese penetration. It regards the control or even the extensive Chinese presence, or that of any other state, in the Burmese economy as subversive of its interests internationally and its internal control over the economy. It was, after all, this foreign economic exploitation that prompted the Burmese to introduce the socialist system. Anti-Chinese riots took place in 1967 reflecting this antagonism and the export of the Chinese cultural revolution to Rangoon; many were killed and Chinese shops looted. On Indian Relations Indias response to the Burmese coup of 1988 was virulently negative. India was probably the most vociferous critic of the SLORC until the early 1990s. India even employed U Nus daughter as the head of all India Radios Burma service. This changed in the early 1990s when the Indians recognized the strategic role that China was beginning to play in Myanmar, and Indias policy was reversed to attempt to compete with Chinas growing influence that extends to even illegal immigration, now informally said to approximate two million people.4

The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region, together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the movement of all groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also prompted agreements for the development of those regions. Although there were rumors that India was providing support to Kachin and Karen insurgents after 1988, this was never confirmed. India has, however, provided a refuge for Burmese dissidents and refugees, supposedly some 50,000, not including Rohingyas.5 Dissident Burmese organizations still operate from Indian territory. Burmese domestic policy and its ideology of not being dependent on any one foreign influence also prompted the Burmese to encourage Indian assistance and support. There has been an array of higher level military delegations in both directions. The first visit by a Burmese head of state since independence in 1948 occurred in October 2004. Transportation road links between India and Myanmar have been upgraded and supported by an Indian aid program, and increased trade has been on both states agendas, although the target of US$ one billion in two-way trade has yet to be realized. India has bid for access to the off-shore gas reserves in western Myanmar off the Rakhine coast near the Bangladesh border, but China has succeeded in obtaining the rights to much of that area and will construct a gas pipeline across Myanmar to Yunnan Province, as well as a separate pipeline to bring in crude oil from the Middle East, thus easing its strategic dependence on the Straits of Malacca. The insurgencies that have plagued India in its remote Northeast Region, together with the Burmese rebellions on its side of the border, and the movement of all groups back and forth to effective sanctuaries has also prompted agreements for the development of those regions. Both India and Myanmar are using each other for their own national interests. India has developed a Kaladan River Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that would begin at the port of Sittwe (Akyab-modernized with Indian support) through the Chin State of Myanmar, and allow more intensive economic development of the Northeast, and help mitigate ethnic revolts there. Myanmar wants to control Naga and Chin unrest in the region as well. At present, there is considerable smuggling taking place between India and Myanmar. Chemicals used in the preparation of heroin and metamphetamines are said to be imported from India, and heroin exported to India, some of which has been confiscated by the Indian government. Intravenous drug use has produced 70 percent HIV rate among users in the region. All the borders of Myanmar are smugglers havens, for local officials also benefit. Under the military government, and even with

borders porous to smuggling, Myanmar is able militarily to manage its border areas. It has increased the size of its military forces in these regions. Administrative changes in Myanmar are planned. Under the disciplined system of the new constitution that is to come into effect following the elections of 2010, a special self-governing Naga area will be created out of the present Sagaing Division (to be known as a Region under the new constitution) on the Indian border that will give a modest degree of local government to those peoples. The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is possible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules The Chin (Mizo) people just to the south of the Naga area now have, and will have, a special State. All these will have local legislatures. Because active duty Burmese military will occupy 25 percent of the Naga local legislature and the local Chin legislature, these administrative changes should not greatly affect the capacity of the tatmadaw to control its borders. Antagonisms among the Chin against the Burmans run high because about 90 percent of the Chin are Christians, and many feel discriminated against by the Buddhist Burman military. The newly elected legislature in 2010 will have a five-year term, and it is possible that during that period some space may develop between the state and its citizens that would allow greater freedom and a relaxation of the stringent rules of enforcement and censorship that are an aspect of life in contemporary Myanmar. Over the medium term, it may be possible to see a more balanced approach to foreign policy as the internal tensions between the military and civilian Burmese are assuaged, and perhaps even the constitution amended. This might allow more civilian influence on foreign policy. This is a slight and somewhat distant ray of hope for positive change. One must note, however, that amending the constitution requires a 75 percent approval of the legislature, which means that the military would have to agree to any limitations of its powers, which seems unlikely during the first term, and slightly less unlikely later.6 ASEAN, the UN, and the Japanese are likely to maintain that progress has been apparent after the 2010 elections, but more needs to be done to implement to human rights provisions of the new constitution. India will accept the new government, and will continue to work with it to counter Chinese influence. The US and the EU are unlikely to accept unambiguously the results of the elections even though they may

begin the process of dealing with the new government with a certain degree of skepticism, and in part motivated and justified by humanitarian concerns. A possible but highly unlikely alternative result before the elections of 2010, could be a revolution in the streets that could bring the National League for Democracy (NLD), an emasculated but existing opposition group whose most famous figure is Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, to some sort of power-sharing with elements of the military. Such a scenario is as unlikely as it would be unstable, for the NLD is held together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power. the NLD is held together by its essential criterion of getting the military out of power, rather than by an accepted set of shared premises beyond that goal. Coalitions are exceedingly fragile because of the personalization of power. Aung San Suu Kyi, who was partly brought up in India when her mother was Burmese ambassador there, would in all likelihood have a more favorable attitude towards India, but this may not result in any profound shift of policy. The NLD is effectively a Burman party, and claims it would deal with minority issues after achieving political control. It has called for some sort of federalism for the state. Should, however, real representative government take place under a democratic system, and the military retire to the barracks (although one must stress this scenario is highly unlikely), there could be significant developments that could affect Indian security in its Northeast. No such democratic Burmese government would be able to exist without some form of federal system, a system that has been anathema to the military since at least 1962. But in the unlikely event of it happening, it is instructive to examine what the Chin have wanted in a draft constitution they prepared illegally outside of Myanmar. It is the most autonomous and radical of such drafts that various minorities have formulated.7 Among other provisions, Union troops could not be stationed on Chin territory without the expressed approval of a Chin legislature, which would have extensive powers. Although the central government would make foreign policy, the Chin would have jurisdiction over the stationing of foreign troops on its soil, and all powers not expressly designated to the center would be the province of the periphery. Under such an extreme version of federalism, one could easily imagine Myanmar Chin and Naga support for their co-ethnic brethren on the India side of the border (and the reverse as

well), and even for the possibility of a pan-Mizo (Chin) and pan-Naga homeland that could create extensive instability in the area. The 2010 Burmese constitution expressly prohibits any and all secessions from the Union of Myanmar. However, the lessons of previous irredentist movements and the past possibility of a Pashtunistan model (Afghan-Pakistan Pashtun tribal homeland) should not be completely dismissed. This might have repercussions for other parts of India as well. Domestic factors would also affect how any democratization in Myanmar would alter policies towards India. It should not be assumed that a democratic or civilian Burma/Myanmar would be any the less nationalistic (although perhaps less strident) than the military, for a review of the civilian period (1948-58, 1960-62) would indicate the opposite. First, are the residual attitudes toward Indians (all those from the subcontinent) in Myanmar. Having been ruled until 1937 in the colonial era as a province of India, Burma was subject to massive Indian migration. Indian control of credit, and following the great depression of 1929-32, the foreclosure of land to the Indian Chettyar moneylending caste produced strong antipathies towards Indians that is still part of the residual memory of the Burmese. Rangoon was an Indian city before World War II, and the movement of the capital to Naypyidaw is in part an attempt to eliminate this shameful heritage. Some 200,000 people from the subcontinent were expelled from the country following the coup of 1962. Under the Citizenship Act of 1982, which was directed against the Indians and Chinese, all those not a member of one of Burma/Myanmars indigenous races (ethno-linguistic groups), and who cannot prove that their ancestors resided in Burma before 1823 (the first Anglo-Burmese War was 1824-26) are associate citizens and have significantly truncated rights.8 These negative attitudes, possibly reinforced by an increasingly politicized sangha, could become more manifest if there were political space for debate in Myanmar. Now, they are held in check by authoritarian rule. Conclusion The prospects for a functioning and deepened democracy through attrition rather than through revolution, by any internationally acceptable standard in Myanmar over the near term, are remote. Even should that happen, changes in Burmese policy toward the Indian Northeast, access to gas reserves, or improved transportation links are unlikely to alter significantly should that eventuality come about.

The international globalized economic system will play little role in influencing Myanmars internal politics. Although the states natural resources are attractive to multinational corporations Although there have been cries among expatriate Burmese for blacklisting of those firms that have collaborated with the military junta, economic and foreign policy issues are likely to prevail. Both India and China will continue to view Myanmar as an important, although not pivotal, factor in eachs strategic equation. Under these circumstances, democracy by any definition is likely to play a minor role. India, on the one hand, might wish to see a democratic Burma/Myanmar as Aung San Suu Kyi might be closer emotionally to India, having grown up there, written on India, and been strongly influenced by Gandhis philosophy; thus, she might be less influenced by China. On the other hand, such a desire could easily backfire. It is difficult to envision a democratic Burma/Myanmar by any international standard without some form of greater ethnic autonomy or federalism. Under the 2008 constitution, the Chin and Naga have areas with a degree of local governance. Under a democratic system, local governance (such as it is) would be most unlikely to recede from that high water mark. Probably greater autonomy would occur, and this would put local pressures on these groups to deal with their ethnic cousins across the border in India, and could prompt reactions from these Indiabased groups for greater autonomy from centralized Indian control. In summary, the international globalized economic system will play little role in influencing Myanmars internal politics. Although the states natural resources are attractive to multinational corporations, Myanmars decentralized economy would allow the state to continue even if these resources were to erode. Myanmars orientation is not a product of its participation in the international economy, but rather is a product of its history its colonial past and the perceived dangers and insults of that period, the past predatory roles of its neighbors, ethnic strife, and the glorification of the Burmese military tradition to which the present tatmadaw lays claim. The regime is able to force compliance while titularly espousing a particularistic brand of democracy (akin to Suhartos Indonesia) in which multiple political parties affect only the periphery of power and policy, but under strong, iron bands formed by the Burmese military. Notes 1. Although the United Nations and most of the world has accepted the Burmese militarys change of name from Burma to Myanmar, an old written form, in July

1989 , the opposition in that country has not done so because they consider that government illegitimate. The United States has followed the opposition, thus making the use of either a political statement. In this essay, Burma is used for the period before 1989. Myanmar thereafter, and both to indicate continuity. No political connotations should be attached to the use of either term.

2. As the designated Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, said to the author, while shaking in his hand a picture of President Bush signing the sanctions bill of 2003, We will stand up to you Americans. 3. Although there were early reports of Chinese bases in Myanmar, these have been discredited. The new Burmese constitution prohibits foreign troops quartered on Burmese territory. Two-thirds of the officers sent overseas for training in the 1990-99 period went to China. David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009 (forthcoming). 4. In the early 1990s, India approached the U.S. Embassy in Delhi to discuss Burma/Myanmar policies, but was rebuffed. 5. Personal communication, Andrew Selth, 5-2009. 6. National League for Democracy calls for reconsideration of the constitution before the elections of 2010, a factor in whether it might participate in those elections, will be ignored by the junta. Whether the NLD would be allowed to participate, and if allowed whether it would, is still unclear in May 2009. Personal interview, NLD Executive Committee members, Yangon, March 2009. The most careful review of the constitution of 2008 is the International Crisis Group Report, Myanmar: Towards the Election. Forthcoming 2009. 7. See David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006, pp. 229-231. Questioning the proposed

constitution or preparing alternative versions was declared illegal in Myanmar. 8. An inquiry in May 2009 to the Ministry of Information in Naypyidaw as to whether associate citizens could run for office or even vote in the 2010 elections was unanswered, as even higher level officials were unclear in the lack of the election law.