Interwar Fascist Popularity in Europe and the Default of the Left Author(s): William Brustein and Marit Berntson

Reviewed work(s): Source: European Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 159-178 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/522498 . Accessed: 01/02/2012 06:25
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Vol. 15 No. 2, 159-178 Review, European Soctiological

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Interwar

Fascist

Popularity
Left

in

Europe

and

the

Default

of

the

William Brustein andMaritBerntson

More than fifty years have passed since the end of World War II and the collapse of interwar fascist regimes. Yet many questions persist regarding the allure that interwar fascism had for millions of Europeans. Why fascism succeeded in attracting a sizeable following in Italy and Germany but not in England and France is one question that has received considerable scholarly attention. Explanations for national variation in interwar fascist popularity abound. However, while each thesis may explain the success or failure of interwar fascism in one or two countries, each proves unsatisfactory when extended beyond a few cases. Of the five general explanations of fascist popularity, the 'red menace' theory has the greatest potential to become generalizable. The failure of the 'red menace' argument to offer a more systematic explanation of fascist popularity derives from scholars' restrictive interpretation of that argument. Scholars have tended to place the emphasis on the 'fear of socialism' interpretation while neglecting the fact that fascism grew where leftist parties refused to abandon their maximalist revolutionary rhetoric. In particular, what was critical to interwar fascist popularity were the positions the political left held on property rights.

Introduction
More than fifty years have passed since the end of World War II and the collapse of interwar fascist regimes. Yet many questions persist regarding the allure that interwar fascism had for millions of Europeans.Why fascism or national socialism succeeded to attract a sizeable following in Italy and Germany but not in England and France is one question that has received considerable scholarly attention. For instance, between 1919 and 1939 fascist movements and parties varied significantly in terms of their popular support. Take the cases of Germany and France. The Nazi Party of Germany became the largest mass party in Weimar Germany, capturing nearly 38 per cent of the popular vote in the Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932, whereas the notably fascist French Popular Party of Jacques Doriot in its two electoral competitions won a meagre 2.7 per cent and 1.6 per cent of the vote in the two partial legislative elections of August 1936 and April 1938,
? Oxford University Press 1999

respectively.1 Explanations for national variation in interwar fascist popularity abound. However, while each thesis may explain the success or failure of interwar fascism in one or two countries, each proves unsatisfactory when extended beyond a few cases. One of the prevailing explanations for the rise of interwar fascism emphasizes outcomes of WorldWar I. According to this argument, fascism emerged earliest and made its greatest gains in countries which had lost territory or had their territorial ambitions thwarted or had been disappointed by the peace terms at the end of World War I (Collins, 1995; Linz, 1976; Macherer, 1974; Milza, 1987). While the revenge factor can help to explain fascism's success in Italy and Germany and fascism's failure in France and England, territorial revendications fail to enhance our understanding of fascism's prominence in Belgium. In the 1936 Belgian legislative elections, Belgian fascism (Rexists and Flemish nationalists) stunned the Belgian electorate by winning 37 of 202 parliamentary seats. This feat

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was remarkable since the newly founded Rexist movement (which won 31 parliamentary seats) had no party organization or prior legislative experience (Hojer, 1946: 248). However, Belgium emerged as one of the victors in World War I and escaped the deprivation and humiliation associated with the post-war period. Another widely-held explanation for the rise of interwar fascism in western Europe is that fascism gained a stronghold in countries suffering massive economic dislocations between the two World Wars. Linz (1976: 97) observes that Italy's postWorld War I economic crises of high unemployment, labour unrest, and inflation played a huge part in the Italian Fascist Party's success, especially in northern Italy. Relatedly, much has been written about the role the Great Depression performed in the rise of the German Nazi Party from an obscure political movement to become the leading political party in Germany. In the 1928 German national legislative elections, the Nazis garnered less than 3 per cent of the vote, while by the July 1932 national legislative elections, the party's share had risen to nearly 38 per cent. But why did the economic crisis spur the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy but not elsewhere? Italy and Germany were not alone in terms of suffering major economic dislocations. The national economies of England and the USA were especially hard hit. For instance, during the depths of the worldwide depression there were 13 million unemployed in the USA. However, sizeable fascist movements did not develop in either the USA or England (Berstein, 1984: 93). Also, why should an economic crisis be more helpful to the fascists than to leftists? The economic crises occurred in a number of industrial societies without producing the rise to power of fascism. In fact, the effects of the economic depression may have contributed to the leftist Popular Front's rise to power in France in 1936. The absence of a democratic tradition is often cited as a major contributor to the rise of fascism. One of the better known theories of the rise of Nazism is the 'Sonderweg' theory or Germany's particular path toward modernization (Moore Jr., 1966). The 'Sonderweg' explanation emphasizes Germany's failed bourgeois revolution and the continuity of German anti-democratic features throughout the period of the Second Reich (1871-

1918) and the Weimar Republic (1919-33). In other words, Nazism was a logical outcome of German history. Like Germany, Italy came to democracy relatively late, and like Germany, a major fascist movement emerged after World War I. Milza (1987: 224-5) claims that a principal obstacle to the success of French fascism resided in the institutions and culture of the republican model. The great majority of French citizens were wedded to the value system and institutions of a republic. In France, both the conservative right and the radical left had a tradition of holding to a parliamentary republic. Berstein (1984: 93) supports Milza's premise. According to Berstein, the key to explaining the rise and success of interwar fascist movements is the degree to which a democratic regime is rooted or institutionalized in the political culture. In societies such as Italy and Germany, democratic institutions were a recent facade without firm foundation, while in France democracy was well established and could withstand the shocks of the interwar period. While the lack of democratic traditions as an explanation may account for fascism's popularity in Italy and Germany it appears less convincing when applied to other countries where democracy had no long tradition and fascism never emerged. In Romania the fascist Iron Guard obtained less than 3 per cent of the vote in the national elections of 1927, 1931, and 1932. Only in 1937 did the Iron Guard gain a sizeable share of the vote with 15.6 per cent (Linz, 1976: 89). In Spain's 1936 national elections, the clearly fascist Falange Espafiola received less than 1 per cent of the popular vote (Linz, 1976: 91). Equally, it is certainly accurate to characterize French and British institutions as democratic, but what of Belgium's democratic institutions? Democracy had a long and rich history in Belgium, yet a major fascist movement emerged in that country in the mid-1930s. An additional explanation purports that a key to fascist popularity was the presence of a charismatic leader whose personal dynamism and magnetism could arouse the masses to follow (Carsten, 1982: 231) or a leader's special organizing genius (Berstein, 1984: 92-3). Much has been written of Mussolini's and Hitler's powers to mesmerize audiences and their superb organizing skills. But other interwar fascist leaders seem to have possessed similar

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characteristics and traits but their movements never attained the popularity of Mussolini's and Hitler's. Berstein (1984: 92-3) aptly notes that if charisma and organizational prowess were so instrumental to fascist success why didn't France have a great movement? La Rocque was a remarkable organizer and Doriot was a most charismatic and dynamic speaker. The theory of fascist popularity which appears to have garnered substantial support is the 'red menace' theory of fascism. The 'red menace' theory attributes the rise of European fascism between the two world wars as a reaction to the rise of socialism. Linz (1976: 26) observed: While it is historically falsethatCommunistrevolutions weredefeatedby fascism,it is truethatfascism was more successfulin those societies in which the bourgeoisiehad been deeply scaredby revolutionaryattempts,howeverunsuccessful,and wherethe labour movement held on to a maximalistrevolutionary rhetoric, even when it was unable to mobilize for revolution.The Raterepublik and the the occupationof Spartakist attemptsin Germany, factoriesand the Red domination of the countryside in the Po Valleyin Italy,the Bela Kun regime in Hungary, the revolutionary attemptsof the working classin Finland,certainlyleft such a heritage. The connection between socialism and fascism has been most forcefully articulated in studies of Italy. Snowden (1972), Lyttelton (1973), Szymanski (1973), Corner (1975), Demers (1979), Farneti (1979), and Cardoza (1982) argued that between 1918 and 1922 fascism's greatest successes occurred in areas that had previously voted overwhelmingly for the Italian Socialist Party. Between 1919 and 1921, Italy seemed on the verge of following Soviet Russia and Hungary, where the Socialist left had gained power. In July 1919 the Italian Socialist Party called for a general strike in support of the Russian and Hungarian Soviets (Demers, 1979:135).The national legislative elections of 1919 clearly demonstrated the left's growing popular support in Italy.Whereas the Socialists had won 18 per cent of the popular vote and 10 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1913 election, by 1919 Socialist strength had climbed to 31 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Salvemini, 1973: 232). No other Italian political party could match the Socialists in popular support or elected deputies. Fearing an eventual Socialist takeover, as had

occurred in Russia and Hungary, much of the Italian urban and rural middle class turned to Mussolini's Fascists as a last defence. Fascism received substantial support in the socialist strongholds of Lombardy, Emilia, Tuscany, and Apulia, while it made few inroads in such regions as Abruzzi, Molise, Sicily, Basilicata, and Calabria. Similarly the scholarship on the rise of the German Nazi Party before 1933 highlights the crucial role of the fear of the 'red menace' Nazi speeches and writings were frequently peppered with references to the threat of communism. The 'fear of Bolshevism in Germany' theme was dramatized in conjunction with the growth of communist support in Germany: 1.7 million votes in 1925, 4 million votes in September 1930, and 7 to 8 million votes in February and March 1932 (Carsten, 1982: 127; Stokes, 184: 276). Much like the Italian Fascist Party, the NSDAP presented itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism. Proponents of the 'red menace' explanation of fascism emphasize how the fear of socialism fuelled the reaction of the propertied middle classes that eventually culminated in large-scale support for fascism. Though fascist popularity as a reaction to socialism may be particularly applicable to the cases of Italy and Germany (where both strong fascist and strong socialist movements arose) and Great Britain and the USA (where weak fascist and weak socialist movements coincided), it cannot explain the failure of a major Fascist movement to emerge in France. The French interwar socialist movement could in many ways rival the Italian and German movements in terms of popular support. In fact the socialist-led Popular Front gained power in June 1936 through its electoral victory. But unlike what occurred in Italy and Germany, in France the fear of the rising Left failed to encourage the rise of a major fascist movement. Certainly, French fascist movements like Georges Valois's Faisceau, FranFoisCoty's Solidarite Franpaise, Marcel Bucard's Francistes, and Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Franpais went to great lengths to play the 'red menace' card. However, fear of the left failed to mobilize significant popular support for them (Milza, 1993:171-79; Griffin, 1995:10). The principal explanations of variation in interwar fascist popularity are certainly theoretically plausible and are able to muster empirical

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verification from a limited number of cases.Yet none whileTreptow (1996: 200-1) notes that, in Romania, of the general explanations appears to provide that the agrarian reform law of 1921resulted in 1.4million single common denominator to explain why fascist peasant families receiving 3.7 million hectares of movements attracted large-scale mass support in arable land. The combination of a sudden increase some countries and not in others. Of the five in the population of small property-owners and the explanations of fascist popularity presented here, expansion of the voting franchise to the lower the 'red menace' theory has the greatest potential to classes throughout post-World War I Europe made become generalizable.We propose that the failure of the class of small property-holders increasingly the 'red menace'argument to offer a more systematic attractive to the competing political parties. The explanation of fascist popularity derives from or political left and the fascists were not the only resides in, scholars' restrictive interpretation of that competitors for these new voters. Parties across the argument. Scholars have tended to place the political spectrum tried to woo the small propertyemphasis on Linz's 'fear of socialism' interpretation holders to their ranks. However, as the political, while neglecting Linz's observation that fascism social, and economic turmoil of the interwar period grew where leftist parties refused to abandon their intensified and smallholders experienced an erosion maximalist revolutionary rhetoric. It is this short- of their livelihood, they steadily abandoned the coming that this paper proposes to address. In more moderate traditional parties for the parties at both ends of the political spectrum. particular, what was critical to interwar fascist popuIt is certainly the case that the more successful interlarity were the positions the political left held on property rights. We suggest that where the political war fascist parties gained sizeable followings from left championed the maximalist or revolutionary across the social spectrum, including the blue-collar stance on property-ownership, calling for collective labour force. However, no fascist movementbecame a ownership of property, the opportunity for fascist major political party without having mobilized the parties to mobilize the large class of small class of small property-owners. This suggests that an property-holders rose. In contrast, where the essential ingredient in fascist success was the support of small property- owners.Where fascist parties failed political left stood for the minimalist or nonin their efforts to mobilize these small property-ownrevolutionary stance on property-ownership, advocating a defence of small property-ownership, ers, fascist parties never built a national and massthe opportunity for fascist parties to garner a size- based following. able following among small property-holders If mobilization of small property-owners was so decreased. important to fascist success, why didn't all fascist The class of small property-owners in interwar parties pursue the effort? This paper contends that Europe constituted one of the two principal classes while all fascist parties tried to win over the small along with the class of blue-collar labour. Both property-owners many failed because they were classes increased in size dramatically in the after- unable to develop and disseminate a coherent promath of World War I. While the blue-collar gramme addressing the material interests of small working class grew by virtue of European property-holders and/or the fascist parties found the path to mobilizing the class of small propertyindustrialization, the class of small property-owners experienced a massive expansion from huge govern- owners blocked by other political parties perceived ment-imposed transfers of land into peasant by this class to be the defenders of their interests. ownership (Pfenning, 1933: 18-22; Cardoza, 1982: Interestingly, the political left played a crucial role 232; Treptow, 1996: 200-1). Governments were ful- in determining the outcome of fascist mobilization filling promises made to the lower classes during efforts. That is, where the left abandoned small World War I of land reform and voting rights in property-holders by taking a maximalist stand on exchange for active participation in the war effort. defence of small property, an opening occurred for In Italy, Snowden (1972: 280-1) reports that another party to defend small property rights (e.g. approximately one million hectares of land were fascist parties). By contrast, where the left took up acquired by five hundred thousand first-time the defence of small property, new parties could peasant property-owners between 1918 and 1921, not establish a foothold.

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Our explanation of the popularity of interwar including fascist parties. Second, for each case we fascism in Europe may appear somewhat similar to have been able to locate aggregate empirical data the provocative thesis advanced by Luebbert (1991). on key variables, thus enabling a partial test of our For Luebbert, the composition of class coalitions hypothesis. In future research we plan to extend rather than ideological intransigence - that is the our analysis to include North America, eastern left's positions on property-ownership - dictated Europe, and the United Kingdom.3 fascism's fate in the European countryside. Luebbert We shall see that within these four countries, only asserts that where socialist parties were able to build in France did the left erect a solid barricade against coalitions comprising the family peasantry and the fascism's efforts to build a popular movement among urban working class, fascism failed to establish a small-property-owners (Linz, 1976: 29). The left in rural foundation (e.g. Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, Italy, and Belgium failed to fashion a proNorway). On the other hand, according to Luebbert, gramme that addressed the material interests of a fascism gained a rural constituency where socialist large part of the class of small-property-holders. In parties failed to build a coalition between the family particular, the left in Germany, Italy, and Belgium peasants and the urban working class (e.g. in Spain, never saw fit to abandon a call for land collectivizaItaly, and Germany).The critical factor in Luebbert's tion and public ownership of the means of argument is who organized the agrarian proletariat. production, while the left in France supported land In Germany, Spain, and Italy the socialists took the redistribution and private property. As a result, lead in organizing the agrarian proletariat while in millions of small property-owners in Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark the socialists had Italy, and Belgium who might have been attracted no choice but to ignore the rural proletariat because by the left's attack on large property and leftist pleas they had already been organized by other parties. In for greater social equality abhored the left's rejection Luebbert's view, where the socialists took the of private property. We will support with empirical initiative to organize the agrarian proletariat, they evidence our principal argument that where the invariably made commitments to that class which political left failed to mobilize the class of small alienated them from the family peasants. A fascist property-owners, fascist parties succeeded in social order, according to Luebbert, depended attracting a sizeable popular following. a coalition between the urban middle classes upon and the family peasantry (Luebbert, 1991). The empirical evidence for Germany appears to support Luebbert's claim that the family peasantry (self-employed farmers) rather than the agrarian proletariat formed the backbone of the Nazi Party's rural constituency (Brustein, 1996). But Luebbert Italy never convincingly explains why the family Though the Italian left had amassed a considerable peasantry turned to the Nazi Party rather than following among poor agricultural labourers and another political party.What is missing in Luebbert's sharecroppers in the aftermath of World War I by explanation of the popular support of fascism is an advocating wage increases, a programme to alleviate examination of the programmes of the competing rural unemployment, and a programme of agrarian did so farmers collectivization with the purpose of eliminating political parties. Why many family support the Nazi Party rather than another political private property, it alienated potential adherents party? Between 1925 and 1933 German farmers had who aspired to own property or expand their holdseveral political choices. ings (Vaini, 1961: 55-6; Cardoza, 1982: 277). The Fascist and leftist party efforts to mobilize small Italian Socialist Party forcefully argued against the property-holders in Italy, Germany, Belgium, and cultivation of land for personal profit or advanceFrance is the focus of this paper.2 Our rationale for ment (Corner, 1975: 162; Maier, 1975: 310). The selecting these four countries is twofold: First, Socialist programme considered it reactionary to during the interwar period each had democratic create small private properties through land redistrielections contested by multiple political parties bution (Zangheri, 1960: 401; Luebbert, 1991: 243). At

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the 17th Party Congress in January 1921, Nino Mazzoni, a Socialist Party leader, argued that Italian Socialists should not repeat the mistake of Robespierre who created a small-holding class of peasants during the French Revolution. Land should be given to the peasant collective, not to individual peasants (Magno, 1984: 253). The Italian Socialist Party aimed to transform tenants and owners into proletarian members of the agricultural co-operative (Tasca, 1966: 94). The Italian Socialist Party opposed individual ownership and strongly advocated land collectivization, a policy that cost it the support of many sharecroppers and agricultural labourers who had supported the party in 1919-1920, when it forced landlords to provide higher wages and better contracts. In no small measure could Italian fascism have succeeded without first securing a foothold in the farming regions of north-central Italy (Snowden, 1972; Lyttelton, 1973; Szymanski, 1973; Corner, 1975; Demers, 1979; Farneti, 1979; Cardoza, 1982). The Fascists did not come to power as the result of an electoral victory - they received only one-tenth of the national vote in 1921. However, the party's political impact was quite dramatic, given that it was a political newcomer. It gained nearly onequarter of the popular vote in several provinces. The provinces in which fascism had the greatest electoral success were all primarily agricultural. By 1921, the Italian sharecroppers and labourers wanted to climb the social ladder towards land ownership, and they began to search for a political party that would allow them to achieve this longrange goal. The Italian Fascist party had made clear its opposition to agrarian socialism and land collectivization. The Italian Fascist party first offered an agrarian programme in early 1921. During the first half of 1921, articles appeared in the fascist press proclaiming 'land to the peasants','to every peasant the entire fruit of his sacred labour', and 'we want the land to belong not to the state but to the cultivator' (Snowden, 1986: 180-2; Lyttelton, 1973: 64). The Fascist party proposed to transform agricultural labourers into sharecroppers, sharecroppers into tenant farmers, and eventually all three into landowners (IlPopolo d'Italia, 1 April 1921: 1; Cardoza, 1982: 336). To accomplish these transformations, the Fascists promised to reopen the land market. They would

convince large landowners to transfer land to the Fascist land office (UffcoTerre),which would then allocate or sell the land to interested cultivators who would have a specified time period to pay off their debts (Corner, 1975;146-7, 163; Cardoza, 1982: 316). Unlike the Socialists, the Italian Fascists addressed the aspirations of those who wanted land as well as landowners who wanted more land. The Fascists' major hurdle was to convince large landowners to place their land on the market or agree to lease it. The Fascists won over many large landholders by defending the economic importance of large commercial farming, and by convincing the owners of large farms that a larger and stronger class of sharecroppers, tenants, and small owners would provide a buffer between the large landowners and the Socialist labour unions, and would greatly reduce the socialist threat of class revolution (Corner, 1975: 147-55). However, the Fascists did not treat all landlords alike. They defended largescale commercial farms whose owners directly supervised their estates, but vigorously opposed the system of latifundiacharacterized by absentee landlords, which the Fascists considered contrary to farming's social purpose of direct involvement of the cultivator, economic profitability, and strengthening the national community (I1 Popolo d'Italia,11May 1921;Cardoza, 1982: 326-7). By 1921 the Fascists had made clear their opposition to agrarian socialism. They promised to liberate sharecroppers, tenants, and owners from the economic restrictions imposed by the Socialist Federterra.The party vehemently opposed land collectivization, Socialist strikes and boycotts, and the forced hiring of additional labourers (IlPopolod'Italia, 2 June 1921:1, I/Popolod'Italia, 10 June 1921:1).4 the Comparing agrarian programmes of the Socialist and Fascist parties, we would not expect owner-cultivators to vote Socialist given the Left's stand against privately owned property. The Fascists should receive their greatest support from farmers expecting to benefit from opportunities to own property and from farmers wishing to enlarge their existing holdings. Germany An examination of the political programmes of the various Weimar parties raises a question that should

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Not until the 1927 Kiel party congress did the have tremendous relevance for the study of the rise of interwar European fascism. Given the aversion of SPD develop a comprehensive agrarian programme. many farmers, artisans, and small shopkeepers Dropping its call for the appropriation of smalltowards big business, and the central antipathy for holdings, the SPD proposed to confiscate large big business held by the left, could the German left holdings (with compensation) to be redistributed to have mounted a viable challenge to the Nazi Party in small-holders for intensive cultivation. The SPD the German countryside and maybe have thwarted legitimized small private property, proposed the the Nazi rise to power (Gourevitch, 1986: 145)? We regulation of grain prices and imports through the should not forget that the Nazi Party's initial creation of a government monopoly, and promised electoral breakthrough occurred in the German free legal aid and technical advice to German countryside, which may have contributed substan- peasants (Hunt, 1964: 138-40; Schumacher, 1978: tially to the party's ultimate electoral successes in 351-3; James, 1986; 260) in an attempt to gain the 1932. The NSDAP's ability to establish a foothold support of rural Germany. However, Schumacher German farmers was enhanced among greatly by (1978: 351-3), Gessner (1981: 146), and Linz (1976: the left's ideological dogmatism. The German left 29) contend that the Kiel programme came too late forfeited the potential backing of many farmers to help the SPD among small farmers and that the who could never feel comfortable in a party which party failed to follow up with specific legislation attacked private property and, thus, rejected the assisting farmers. farmer's dream of social advancement. The SPD The KPD (German Communist Party), on the Democratic had strikes other (Social hand, held steadfast to its opposition to private Party) many against it as a prospective choice of Germany's rural property. Although the KPD's attention centred on community. Not least among the albatrosses that attracting the industrial working class, the party hung around the party's neck were its Marxist tried to attract peasants by promising a Soviet legacy of antagonism towards private property, Germany controlled by a government of both its favouritism of the industrial working class, and workers and peasants. To gain the support of small its consistent attacks on protective tariffs for and middle-sized farm-owners, the KPD promised that it would request (not demand) that they agree to agriculture. The efforts of party moderates in 1895, 1920, and combine their holdings into larger units more suit1921 to get the SPD to abandon its traditionalist able for the use of modern agricultural equipment Marxist moorings on agriculture were unsuccessful. (Die RoteFahne,22 August 1930). SPD leaders argued that independent small farmers, There is obvious agreement that the German rural like the rest of the petty bourgeoisie, constituted a community was a mainstay of the Nazi constituency. doomed social class and would eventually be Kaschuba (1986: 235) has referred to rural Germany gobbled up by more efficient large-scale estates. as the fountainhead of Nazism. The literature on the Moreover, the benefit of such a transition would be Nazi party's rural programme highlights a disjuncthat farm labourers left landless, along with their ture between the pre-1928 period and the post-1928 urban counterparts, could be more easily mobilized period, leaving the impression that the Nazis, to take by the SPD (Hunt, 1964: 138-40). Prior to 1927, the advantage of the agrarian crisis, did not discover the SPD applied an industrial model to agriculture in rural community until 1928. This literature, we which agrarianworkers would be collectively organ- believe, has overstressed the degree to which 1928 ized and share the same labour-market and social- signals a shift or a turnaround in the NSDAP's rural policy rights available to industrial workers programme. Rather, we argue that farming issues (Luebbert, 1991: 299). The SPD argued that an preoccupied the NSDAP since the party's inception increase in wages and taxes would weaken the in 1920, and that the party's post-1928 pronounceJunkers (former-noble owners of large estates in ments on these matters were generally consistent eastern Germany), preserve large units of produc- with the party's earlier positions (Brustein, 1996). tion, prevent food shortages, and stop the increase The NSDAP's long-standing attention to the conin the number of peasant families - goals consis- cerns of the rural community - the redistribution tent with traditional Marxist ideology. of vacant land, idle estates, and state-owned land to

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the landless; support of productive (profit from one's own labour) capitalism; and protection against unproductive or loan capitalism - allowed it to gradually and successfully stake out its space between the parties of the left, centre, and right. The 1930 NSDAP Agrarian Programme stands as the party's major pronouncement on agricultural matters before 1933. The Agrarian Programme der NSDAP iberdie Stellung (Parteiamtliche Kundgebung uwm Landvolkund.ur Landwirtschaft) appeared in the on 6 March 1930. The proBeobachter gl1kischer gramme embodied both specific proposals to improve the agricultural situation in Germany and an ideological statement praising the virtues of the Nordic or Aryan race (Pridham, 1973:124; Lane and Rupp, 1978: 117-18). Many of the proposals contained in the Agrarian Programme were not new: the NSDAP, the DNVP (German Nationalist People's Party), and various agricultural regional groups had voiced them earlier (Pridham, 1973: 125: Lipset, 1981: 143; James, 1986: 261). However, the NSDAP displayed innovation in the manner in which these proposals were combined into a single coherent programme and were linked to the party's general economic and social strategy (Farquharson, 1976: 57). Furthermore, the programme contained some novel and politically savvy suggestions on inheritance and resettlement. In Germany's predominantly Catholic Rhineland and South-west, partible inheritance (division of the land among the heirs) had progressed further than elsewhere in Germany. The Nazis argued that this made the farmer susceptible to the threat of the world market and capitalistic speculation. The NSDAP proposed a Law of Hereditary Entailment allowing only the eldest child to inherit land. This legislation was designed to prevent the fragmentation of the farm; to ensure that Germany's farmland remained in the hands of pure Germans and to guarantee that farms specified as hereditaryentailed continued in the same family in perpetuity; and to limit the bank foreclosures that had driven thousands of farmers from their hearth (Sering, 1934: 82, Tracy, 1964: 200; Farquharson, 1976: 1315; Lane and Rupp, 1978). Closely linked to the NSDAP's inheritance proposals were the party's pronouncements on resettlement. Realizing that the elimination of partible inheritance would produce a sea of dis-

inherited heirs, the party sought to entice them with new land in the east. The NSDAP resettlement policy called for the establishment of large-scale settlements along the eastern frontier, comprising primarily disinherited farmers' sons and aspiring landowners. Here the Nazis claimed that the state has the obligation to seize land that large estateowners fail to farm themselves and the recipients of these farms would receive hereditary leaseholds. Arguing that the creation of farms alone was insufficient for economic viability, the Nazis called for the establishment of rural cities alongside the new farms to provide farmers with local markets for their produce, as well as easy access to required non-agricultural commodities (Farquharson, 1976: 143-45; Lane and Rupp, 1978:120-21). We find throughout the 1930 Agrarian Programme the promise of a better economic future. The programme discussed the need to improve the lot of the agricultural labourers by raising them to the status of farmer. This becomes possible through the resettlement programme, whose objective was also to stem the flight of these labourers from the land and to reduce the demand for imported agricultural labour (Farquharson, 1976: 13-15; Lane and Rupp, 1978: 121-2). Additionally, the resettlement programme offered the hope of a brighter future to the non-inheriting sons of farmers. In many of the economically depressed farming regions, older farmers did not have sufficient cash to pay off their younger, non-inheriting sons, which was the tradition in Germany's impartible inheritance regions. By promising to set aside land in Eastern Germany for the disinherited, the Nazi programme offered both parents and children an appealing exit from their dilemma (Noakes, 1971:127;Farquharson, 1976:240). We expect the Nazi Party support should be high among Protestant owner-cultivators. In particular we would expect that farmers residing in Protestant areas more than those residing in Catholic areas would have voted for the Nazi Party. Farmers in Catholic farming communities, whose interests were consistent with the NSDAP's positions on private property, tariffs, credit, foreclosures, and governmental subsidies, nevertheless objected to the party's inheritance proposals which would force them to abandon the practice of partible inheritance. Moreover, farmers residing in Catholic communities had a viable alternative to the Nazi

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Party. The agricultural positions of the Catholic Centre Party and its ally, the Bavarian People's Party, mirrored the NSDAP's positions and, what is more, the Centre Party promoted the interests of the Catholic Church in Germany, making it a better choice than the Nazi Party for many Catholic Germans. On the other hand, voting support within the farming community for the German Left (Social Democrats and Communists) should have been low by virtue of the Left's opposition to private property. Belgium The left in Belgium during the interwar period consisted of both a Socialist left and a Communist left. The Communist Party failed to amass substantial popular support during the interwar period. For most of the interwar period the party won no more than 2.8 per cent of the national vote. The party reached its interwar high point in the 1936 National legislative elections with 6 per cent of the vote (Hojer, 1946: 54). The principal leftist party in Belgium between 1919 and 1940 was the Socialist Party or POB (BelgianWorkers Party),which consistently garnered between 30 and 40 per cent of the national vote. The Belgian Socialists pursued a policy in the interwar period of participating in coalition cabinets (1918-21, 1925-7, 1935-9, and 1939-40). The POB believed that it could come to power through the legislative process (Hojer, 1946: 50-1). Emile Vandervelde, a long-time president of the International, influenced the policy of the POB from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1936-7 period. He maintained the party's unity and strict adherence to its Marxist programme (Hojer, 1946: 51-2). After 1936 an opposition group to Vandervelde, and the parliamentary majority, emerged under the direction of H. de Man and P. H. Spaak. This group opposed the socialism of Vandervelde and proposed a version that emphasized socialism
in a national context (n socialisme national) which

would abandon the party's anticlericalism and its exclusive focus on class struggle while promoting a collaboration of workers, peasants, and middle classes against big business (Hojer, 1946: 52-3). The Socialists advocated a reformist rather than revolutionary strategy to achieve workers' goals. According to party leaders, power could be attained through the electoral process. On religious issues,

the Socialists, like the Liberals, advocated reducing the Catholic Church's influence over educational matters. On economic matters, the Socialists were the principal advocates of lower indirect taxes, social insurance, an eight-hour workday, a minimum salary, affordable housing, and restrictions on the free-enterprise system. Importantly for the purposes of this paper, the Socialists opposed the legitimacy of the right to own private property and supported collective ownership (Hojer, 1946: 43). In the 1936 Belgian legislative elections fascists (Rexists and Flemish nationalists) stunned the Belgian electorate by winning 37 of 202 parliamentary seats. This feat was remarkable since the newly founded Rexist movement (which won 31 parliamentary seats) had no party organization or prior legislative experience (Hojer, 1946: 248). Belgium seemed so unsuitable for fascism. Linz (1976: 7) has noted that fascism is usually seen as a novel response to crises brought on by such post-war dislocations as defeat, ambivalence about a nation's entry into the war, disappointment with the peace terms, or unsuccessful revolutionary attempts. But Belgium emerged as one of the victors in World War I and escaped the deprivation and humiliation associated with the post-war period. Moreover, Belgium had a stable and well-established parliamentary system, no tradition of indigenous right-wing groups, and minerally rich central African colonies (Chertok, 1975: 1). Weber (1964: 122) has described this apparent mismatch: '[Belgium], a country whose problems were in no way dramatic and whose people, solid and often stolid, inclined neither to excesses nor to histrionics.' The relative stability of Belgium's tripartite political landscape was severely shaken in 1936 with the unprecedented electoral success of the Rexist party The Rexists emerged from the ranks of the Catholic Union. Accusing the Catholic Union of weakness and inactivity in the face of a corruptionridden society, Rexist founder Leon Degrelle and his followers promised bold measures to restore order. At the heart of the Rexist programme was a call for a corporate state modelled on fascist Italy (Chertok, 1975: 77-8). According to Leon Degrelle, corporatism was the best means to overcome the chaos of class struggle. The Rexist corporate state would be authoritarian and fully imbued with Christian values. As its first political act, the Rexist state

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WILLIAM BRUSTEIN AND MARIT BERNTSON

would carry out a physical and moral reform of the Belgian nation (Denis, 1936: 106; Etienne, 1968: 90-5; Scheppens, 1980: 507). The Rexists opposed the parliamentary system and called for the complete elimination of political parties. Rexists felt that political parties had sown national discord and their leaders were to blame for the numerous politico-financial scandals that had riddled the country during the 1930s (Etienne, 1968: 45-9; Chertok, 1975: 86-8). On economic issues, the Rexists were decidedly anti-communist, seeing communism as the chief destructive force in the world (Denis, 1936: 106; Weber, 1964: 125; Schepens, 1980: 507). They were equally opposed to big business: they blamed the major financial institutions for the worldwide economic depression and the impoverishment of small- and medium-scale family-run businesses (Etienne, 1968: 90-5; Chertok, 1975: 86-8). But they were not opposed to private property or to capitalism, and they demanded that the state aid small- and medium-sized business and farms (Etienne, 1968: 90-5; Carpinelli, 1973: 78; Wallef, 1980: 520-1). In particular, they called for more accessible agricultural credit and restrictions on large agro-businesses (Daye, 1937; Degrelle, 1938: 107-9; Chertok, 1975;103). Among the competing political parties, the Rexists most strongly favoured the family-owned farm. Since the Rexists presented themselves as the saviours of the family-owned farm, we should expect to find considerable support for the Rexist party among farm owners. By contrast, the small tenant farmers and salaried agricultural labourers should have been more inclined to favour the Socialist Party because the Socialists advocated an improvement in tenant leases and a minimum wage for labourers. Moreover, the Belgian Left should have done poorly among farm owners. France It may seem paradoxical that a leftist policy supports private property, but it has been the case in France. French Marxists have frequently advocated one policy for industry - nationalization of the means of production - and another policy for agriculture - championship of small private property (Fabra, 1958: 85; Barral, 1968:154). Since the French

Revolution, when the Montagnards implemented the Code rural, the French left has increasingly supported the rights of small peasant cultivators (Lefebvre, 1954: 115;Barral, 1968: 155-6). Over one hundred years ago, Ledru Rollin, a notable Democratic Socialist, eloquently stated the French Left's position on property: 'Property is liberty. We will therefore respect property, but on condition that it will be infinitely multiplied. We do not want it for some; we want it for all' (Price, 1972: 202). The French Left continued to hold to the defence of small private property throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. In 1921 the new French Communist party joined the Socialist party in making the defence of small property part of its own agrarian programme (Price, 1972: 202; Gervais, Jollivet, and Tavernier, 1976: 404-5). During the 1930s, in response to the concern of many small-scale independent farmers about their vulnerability to falling grain prices, the French Socialists promised to establish a national wheat office to monitor price fluctuations (Passmore, 1995: 88). Moreover, the Socialist-led French Popular Front government initiated a number of specific measures to aid small farm-owners including the approval of protectionist agricultural legislation, the funding of rural electrification projects, and the provision of government-subsidized farm credits (Soucy, 1995: 63-4). It should come as little surprise that Colonel La Rocque, leader of the far right Croix de Feu, commented that one of his principal reasons for not launching a major offensive against the French government on 6 February 1934 was the inability of his movement to recruit followers in France's rural areas (Machefer, 1974: 22). There is considerable debate among scholars regarding interwar fascism in France. Some scholars (Irvine, 1991;Passmore, 1995; Soucy, 1995) claim that France had at least two mass-based fascist movements or parties during the interwar period while most (Remond, 1968; Sternhell, 1983; Milza, 1987; Jackson, 1988; Griffin, 1995; Payne, 1995) assert that La Rocque's Croix de Feu/Parti Social Frangais was never fascist but rather a social-christian and a traditional nationalistic movement. However, there is consensus among scholars that Jacques Doriot's PPF (Parti Populaire Francais) constituted a major French fascist movement. We do not want to enter the debate about which French interwar movements

FASCIST INTERWAR POPULARITY IN EUROPE ANDTHEDEFAULT OF THE LEFT

169

were truly fascist. What is certainly clear is that none of these movements (George Valois's Le Faisceau, Bucards's Francisme, Deat's Rassemblement National Populaire, Coty's Solidarite Francaise, d'Halluin's (or Dorgeres) Defense Paysanne, La Rocque's Croix de Feu, and Doriot's Parti Populaire Francais) ever managed to win a significant proportion of the popular vote. Even if we include the PPF and the PSF (formerly the Croix de Feu) as fascist parties, the extent of popular electoral support for these movements was minimal. In Goguel's (1977:46-52) study of the partial legislative election results of August 1936 (16 circonscriptions) and 1938 neither the PPF or the (18 circonscriptions) April PSF did very well. On the first ballot in the August 1936 elections, the PPF gained 2.71 per cent of the vote and the PSF gained 3.57 per cent. In the April 1938 elections the PPF garnered 1.6 per cent and the PSF gained 9.3 per cent of the vote during the first round. Many of France's far right movements tried to mobilize France's farming community but ran into the formidable presence of the French left. Henri d'Halluin (or Dorgeres) called for a dictatorship with the peasantry on top (Machefer, 1974: 29). Dorgeres's programme was limited to attacks on government bureaucrats, communism, fiscal controls on small indebted tenants farmers, and the promotion of strong family values and fascist corporatism (Hazo, 1975: 59; Milza, 1993: 162-3). By Hazo's (1975: 55-57) account, the movement found its greatest backing in the areas of Chateaubriant, Redon, and Presqui'le Guerandaise (parts of the departements of Loire-Inferieure and Ille-etThese areas are, not surprisingly, strongVilaine). holds of medium-scale tenant farming. Founded in 1928, the Croix de Feu had the largest popular following during the interwar period. In autumn 1935 the movement launched a campaign to penetrate France's rural constituencies in which it promised to restore to the land the spiritual value which had been corrupted by international capital, parasitic political committees, and revolutionaries. In spite of these efforts the movement's leader, Colonel La Rocque, was well aware of his movement's difficulty in attracting rural adherents (Machefer, 1974: 2). Doriot's PPF (Parti Populaire Fran~ais) attempted to attract French farming support in 1937 and 1938 (Burrin, 1986: 292). Doriot

stressed a rebirth of a strong peasantry, denounced the decline in French fertility levels and excessive urbanization, and called for a return to the provinces. Doriot appealed to the landowning peasantry for support by attacking agricultural labourers'claims for higher wages and by promising that the PPF favoured the creation of new credit facilities for smallholders and assistance to smallholders to enable them to specialize in products of quality and to expand their markets in France'scolonies (Soucy, 1995: 251). Was the PPF's failure to mobilize widespread farming support a consequence of the paucity of its agrarian programme or the result of an inability to make inroads into the French Left's hold on the French small peasant proprietors? While both factors may have played a role in fascism's difficulties in building a mass rural base in France, it appears that fascist parties in Belgium, Italy, and Germany succeeded in establishing substantial popular support from smallholding farmers. Unlike the political Left in France, the Left in Italy, Germany, and Belgium refused to defend the right of private property.

Propositions
The conventions of social science research dictate that the hypotheses developed from a theoretical argument should be tested along with the hypotheses of alternative theories. In a perfect world, we would systematically apply tests of alternative theories of interwar fascism to France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy. However, we do not because we are restricted by the kinds of historical data available. It is for this reason that we devote so much attention in the early part of the paper to the weaknesses of the fear of socialism, lack of democratic traditions, influence of charismatic leaders, and the outcomes of World War I theses to explain fascism's large-scale popular support. As it is, we perform only partial tests of our theory.We are unable to incorporate variables such as gender, religion, and age into our analyses. The measures we devise are the best, given the limited (census and electoral) data gathered in the early twentieth century, before more sophisticated and thorough surveys of populations were performed or even technologically possible.

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WILLIAM ANDMARIT BRUSTEIN BERNTSON

Below we list the specific hypotheses to be tested: 1. We should expect to find a low Left vote among Italian farm-owners due to the Left's support for land collectivization. 2. A high fascist vote in Italian agrarian provinces is related to the presence of a large proportion of owner-cultivation due to the fascists' proposal to 3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8. A study of the failure of the Left in Italy, Germany, and Belgium to appeal to the interests of property-owners during the interwar period requires a standardized comparison of the data. We argue that the French left did appeal to property-owners' material interests, thereby securing substantial electoral support. The Italian, German, and Belgian left, however, in refusing to abandon the maximalist position on property rights, failed to attract substantial support from property-owners.

electoralresultsand agricultural censuses gathered at the community or regional level - the Italian German Kreis,Belgian canton, and French provincia, The size of the departement. aggregateunit in each case best meets the criterionof systematicanalyses that the unit be small enough to reduce internal variation of key variables, but large enough to constitute a whole. Inferring the individual-level expand property-ownership.5 for the in NSDAP ProtesHigh support heavily relationship between any two variables requires tant German agricultural counties (Kreise) is several strong assumptions about the statistical related to the presence of a large proportion of properties of their joint distribution to avoid agricultural property-owners because of the committing an ecological fallacy.Nevertheless,we Nazi Party's defence of private property and the will suggest individual-level interpretationsfrom party's provisions for property-owners. group databecausethese dataare the best available We expect German Catholic farmers, on the covering the interwarperiod. In any case, ecologiother hand, to support the Catholic Centre cally based inferences, although risky, are more Party, for it had long served the interests of Ger- likely to be correctthan false (Brustein,1991:659). man Catholic farmers and continued to support Since our theory concerns the agricultural inheritance. partible programmes of political parties, we focus on A high Rexist vote in Belgian agrarian cantons is regions in which at least 33 per cent of the popularelated to the presence of a large proportion of tion in Italy,6 and France,8 and25 per cent Germany,7 agricultural property-owners, due to Rexist sup- of the populationin Belgium9is engagedin agriculture. We measure popular support for the major port for ownership of private property. Conversely, a low Left vote in Belgium is related political parties using election data from the 1921 to the presence of a large proportion of agricul- Italian national election,10the July 1932 Reichstag tural property-owners, due to the Belgian Left's election in Germany,11 the 1936 Belgian national adherence to Marxist principles on property elections,12and the 1936 French legislative elections.13 The measure of agricultural propertyrights. A high Left vote in French agrarian departenents owners is the ratio of the surface of owneris related to the presence of a large proportion of cultivator land or the number of owner-cultivator to the total land surfaceor number agricultural property-owners because of the farmsor farmers Left's long-standing support of private property. of farmsor farmersin Italianprovinces,'4German
and French departements.7 Kreise,15 Belgian cantons,16

To test these propositions, the proportion of votes for each party is correlatedwith the proportion of agricultural in agricultural property-owners the comparison regions.In addition, to standardize of the effect the level of local property-ownership has on support for Leftist parties in each country, we perform a dummy-variable regression analysis with interactionterms.

Data and Measures

In each of the cases, individual-level data on voting behaviour and farm ownership are not available. Therefore, analyses must be based on aggregate

Results
Tablela shows the results for the Italian case. As proposed,the higher the proportionof owner cultivators, the lower the support for the left (-0.05). However, this relationshipis not significant. Our

Table la. Voting in Italianagrarianprovinces, 1921 (N=62) andproperty ownership Communists/ Socialists - 0.05 31 31 Liberal Democrats 0.04 13 13

Variable Owner-cultivators (correlation) % vote in agrarian provinces % vote in all provinces (N=71) < 0.001. *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p

Communists 0.15 4 4

Socialists -0.10 27 27

Popular 0.33* 23 23

Republicans -0.19 3 3

Sources: della Popolazione,1921, 1927; Censimento Generale Brustein, 1991; Censimento Agricoltura, 1930; Statisticadellaelegioni, 1921.

in Italianagrarian central, andsouthern 1921 (correlations) northern, Table Ib. ot ing andproperty ownership provinces, Communists/ ocialists - 0.12 (28) -0.31 (11) - 0.41** (23) Liberal Democrats 0.39** 0.53* (11) -0.12 (21)

Variable Northern owner-cultivators Central owner-cultivators Southern owner-cultivators

Communists 0.21 (28) - .09 (11) -.26 (23)

Soci alist Socialists - 0.24 (28) - 0.33 (11) - 0.39* (23)

Popular 0.29 (27) - 0.12 (6) 0.49 (8)

Republicans - 0.24 (28) 0.11 (11) -0.28 (23)

Note: numbers in the sample are given in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05. Sources: dellaPopolaEione, Brustein, 1991; Censimento 1921,1927; Censimento GeneraleAgricoltura,1930; StatisticadellaeleEioni,1921.

172

ANDMARIT BERNTSON WILLIAM BRUSTEIN

1932 (N=246) in Protestantagrarian Kreise in Germany, Table 2a. /otingandproperty ownership

Variable Farmowners (correlation) Kreis %vote for Protestant,agrarian

*p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p< 0.001.

KPD -0.36*** 9.5

SPD -0.37*** 21.3

KPD/SPD -0.21*** 30.8

ZX 0.11 1.4

DNVP --0.34*** 9.1

Nazi 0.34*** 52.7

bources: J. Falter, Weimar Republic County Data Collection; StatisticdesDeutchenReichs, 1925; 1933.

1932(N= 139) Table 2b. Voting in Catholic Kreise in Germany, agrarian andproperty ownership

Variable
Farm owners (correlation)

KPD
--0.23**

SPD
--0.08

KPD/SPD
--0.02

ZX
0.25**

DNVP
-0.48***

Nazi
-0.30***

%vote for Catholic,agrarian Kreis

*p < 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p< 0.001.

7.8

14.8

53.2

2.6

21.1

Sources: J. Falter, Weimar Republic County Data Collection; Statisticdes DeutchenReichs, 1925; 1933.

proposition that the proportion of owner-cultivators will be positively related to support for the Fascists is not supported. Instead, we find an insigThe Italian nificant, negative relationship (- 0.01).18 fascists concentrated their organizing efforts on the northern Italian regions. Thus, a regional breakdown on the correlation between the level of property-ownership and electoral support would show the effect of Fascist organizing efforts on support for the Italian left and the Fascists. The results show that in the north, property-ownership was negatively correlated with the socialist vote. This is consistent with our hypothesis (though statistically insignificant). However, the correlation between property-ownership and fascist support in the north is also negative (and not significant). In the central provinces, we find a similar result for the socialist vote, but a positive correlation between fascist support and property-ownership. The results are both insignificant. The hypothesis about the default of the left is supported only in the southern regions. As property-ownership increased, support for the left decreased (r=-0.41) and support for the Fascists increased (r = 0.37). The results for the German case are found in Tables 2a and 2b. As hypothesized, in Protestant agricultural regions, we find a strong positive correlation between electoral support for the NSDAP and farm-owners (0.34). Likewise, farm-owners in Catholic agricultural regions did not support the

NSDAP (- 0.30), but instead turned to the Catholic Centre Party (ZX) (0.25). Moreover, in Protestant areas the relationship between farm owners and votes for the Social Democratic (- 0.37) and Communist (-0.36) parties is negative, as predicted. Also, the relationship between farm-owners and votes for the combined left (-0.21) is negative. In Catholic counties, the relationship between farmowners and votes for the Social Democratic (-0.08) and Communist (-0.23) parties is negative, as predicted. But the relationship is not significant for farm-owners and votes for the Social Democratic Party or for farm-owners and votes for the combined left in Catholic counties.19 Table 3 contains the results for the Belgian case. Our propositions that the presence of a large proportion of property-owners will be positively correlated with support for the Rexist party (0.51) and negatively correlated with support for the Left (-0.67) are supported.20 The results for the French case are found in Table 4. As expected, we find that the higher the proportion of owner cultivators in agrarian departements, the higher the support for the Left (0.23).21 The results of dummy-variable regression analysis with interaction terms22 support the proposition that the French left succeeded in attracting property-owners whereas the German,23 Italian, and Belgian left did not. We find that property-ownership explains 41 per cent of the variance in support

LEFT ANDTHE DEFAULT OFTHE POPULARITY INEUROPE FASCIST INTERWAR

173

1936 (N=41) in Wallonian cantons in Belgium, Table 3. Voting agrarian ownership andproperty

Variable Owner-cultivator (corr.) cantons %vote for agrarian

% vote in all cantons
*p < 0.05;**p< 0.01;***p < 0.001.

Communist - 0.31 2.1

9.4

Socialist - 0.23 25.1

41.3

Communists/ Socialists - 0.67*** 27.2

50.7

Liberal -0.17 15.1 12.3

Rex

Catholic Union 0.10 31.6

17.5

0.51**
22.3 15.2

de lAgriculturede 1929 (1937); Statistiquede dela Belgique,Recensement la Belgique1947 (1949). Sources: de Smet etal., 1958; Statistique Generate

in French Table 4. V/iting agrarian ownership d6partements, 1936 (N= 72) andproperty

Variable Owner-cultivator (corr.) %vote in all agrarian depts. %vote in all depts. (N=90)
*p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p< 0.001.

Communist 0.16 10.3 11.6

Socialist 0.21 20.7 20.2

Communists/ Socialists 0.23* 31.0 31.8

Moderate left 0.23* 25.7 25.4

Moderate right -0.22 25.7 25.4

Far right - 0.24* 17.6 17.5

Sources:Electionslegislatives 26 avril et 3 mai 1936: resultats offciels (1936); Enquiteagricole(1929).

Table 5. Prediction withinteraction andItalj, showing the France, dummy-variable equationsfrom regressions termssfor Germany, Belgium, onsupportfor theleft effect oftheproportion ofproperty-owners

Independent Intercept
Proportion of property-owners (b)

Germany 0.70***
- 0.81***

Belgium 0.79**
- 0.53** 52.5% 26%

France 0.35*** 0.30***

50% 65%

Italy 0.59**
--0.06*** 56% 53%

Predictedleft vote if 50%propertyownership

if 100% property ownership

29.5%
- 11%

Note:b is the regressioncoefficient. *p < 0.05;**p < 0.01;***p < 0.001. Sources: See the precedingtablesfor sourcesfor each country.

for the left (R2-0.41, p< 0.001). The effect of property-ownership on support for the left is positive only in France, as predicted. Using the prediction equations in Table 5,24 we find that the French Left receives increasingly more support in agrarian regions as the level of propertyownership increases. By comparison, as property ownership increases, support for the left decreases in German, Belgian, and Italian agrarian regions. As property-ownership in France increases from 50 per cent to 100 per cent in counties, support for the left jumps from 50 per cent to 65 per cent. In the other countries, support for the left drops as property ownership increases. The effect is the weak-

est in Italy and the strongest in Germany. Leftist parties that advocated property rights received substantial support from property-owners who might normally have supported other parties, while leftist parties that held to the maximalist position on property rights attracted much less support from property-owners.

Discussion
The interwar left in Italy, Germany, and Belgium advocated communal property whereas the French left held to its traditional position of supporting

174

WILLIAM BRUSTEIN ANDMARIT BERNTSON

private farms. Our argument has been that leftist parties that took a maximalist stand on property rights will have failed to win the support of property-owners in agrarian regions. Because they championed private farms, support for the Fascist parties would have been high in these regions. However, when the Left supported property rights, as was the case in France, it attracted property-owners. Our results support this argument. As predicted, in Italy, Germany, and Belgium the relationship between private property and votes for the left was negative, though in Italy this relationship was significant only in the southern region. The absence of a significant relationship in northern and southern Italy may be due to a number of factors including the small number of cases and the level of political violence surrounding the 1921 election. In France, the relationship between private property and votes for the left was, by contrast, positive and significant, as predicted. These results suggest that farm ownership or private property is a key factor in explaining variation in support for the left and interwar fascism's popularity in Western Europe. Additionally, our preliminary results suggest that the default of the traditional right may also explain interwar fascism's popular support. Fascist parties denounced the right's economic conservatism. The right championed large landowners, business and agricultural monopolies, and finance capitalism, all of which fascist parties viewed as threats to the small property-owner. Like the left, the right's failure to attract small property-owners may have led to fascism's popular support in the agrarian regions of Italy, Germany, and Belgium. This thesis merits further consideration.

financecapitalism, monopolies, andlargelandowners as a threatto smallproperty-owners. Although fascist and leftist party efforts to mobilize small propertyholdersin each countryis the focus of this paper,we of the trarecognize that the economic conservatism
ditional right may also be responsible for fascism's electoral support. The right traditionally supported the interests of large property-owners over small property-owners. For an in-depth study of the positions of the French right on small and large property-ownership between 1849 and 1981 see

Brustein(1988). We do not test propositionsconcerning the default of the right in this paper. However, preliminary results (see nn. 18 to 21) indicate that this thesis merits further attention.

3. Wearepresentlylooking at the politicalmobilization of interwar Finnish smallholders.Alapuro's(1988:

217) and Karvonen's (1988: 38, 54) research on Finnish interwar party politics suggest that the failure of the fascist Lapua Movement and the Finnish IKL (Patrio-

tic People'sMovement)to mobilize significantrural support during the interwarperiod may be directly
related to the minimalist orientation of the Finnish Social Democratic Party,a party which enjoyed strong support in the farming regions of Southern and South-western Finland. In many respects the Fascist agrarian programme mirrored the Popular Party'spositions on agriculture: It called for an agrarian democracy, the elimination of agricultural wage labour, better conditions for tenants and sharecroppers, the development of a landowning peasant class, and the creation of rural credit institutions (Il Popolo d'Italia,1 April 1921: 1;Tasca, 1966: 1334). The major differences between the Popular and Fascist Parties were that the Fascists favoured the creation and maintenance of large-scale holdings, claiming that redistribution of large estates into small holdings would reduce Italian agricultural productivity; and the Fascists more strongly encouraged unfettered private initiative (Piva, 1977: 197-9, 254; Cardoza, 1982: 321-2). Because we are conducting a systematic comparative analysis, here we test the hypothesis that owner-cultivators will be more likely to support the Fascists in Italy. However, we are aware that many aspiring landowners among Italian agricultural labourers, sharecroppers, and tenants should have also been attracted to the fascist party's call to help transform them into landowners by reopening the land market and by the fascist party's promises to liberate them from the economic restrictions imposed by the Socialist Federterra (Cardoza, 1982: 31-2, 336; 11 Popolo d'Italia,1 April 1921:1).

4.

Notes
1. By successwe arenot attemptingto offeran explanation of why some fascistpartiessucceededin taking control of the state while others failed to come to
power. Rather our intent is to explain why some fascist

5.

partiesmobilized millions of followerswhile others

2. attracted relatively few supporters. Fascism, in protecting the rights of the small property-holder, challenges the left and the right. Fascist

ideology, in criticizingcommunalpropertyand land

collectivization, depicts the left as a threat to private property. Fascism views the right's advocacy of

INTERWAR FASCIST POPULARITY IN EUROPE ANDTHEDEFAULTOF THE LEFT

175

6. We collectedprovincia-level data on Italian provinces delRegno dellaPopola?ione d'Italiaal using the Censimento 1921 (1927). 1Dicembre 7. Kreis-level data comes from J. W. Falter's Weimar Republic County Data Collection (WRCD). The WRCD consists of demographic, economic, social, and political information on 865 German counties for the period 1924 to 1933.The raw data for the WRCD were taken from volumes of the StatistikdesDeutschen Reichs(Berlin, 1920-34) and various printed sources like unemployment statistics and fiscal reports. 8. We gathered departement-level data from the 1929 agricultural census (Enqieteagricole, 1929). 9. We examined data on all Wallonian cantons using the Recensementdela de 1947. Statistiquedela Belgique, Population 10. See Brustein (1991) for the method by which election results were tallied and confirmed using provincial newspapers and the official Statistica della eleZioni generale politicheper la XXVI legislatura(1921). In 11 cases, the voting results of the 1921election were published for Italian collegesrather than for individual provinces. A collegeusually comprises two or three small neighbouring provinces. For this study, each college was separated into its constituent provinces. Each resulting province was assigned its college's values on the variables. The provinces of Trento, Trieste, and Caserta are not included because of missing data. Votes for the Socialist and Communist Parties were combined because: the Communists did not get on the ballot in many provinces in 1921; the Communists received only 2.8 per cent of the national vote in 1921;and the Socialists and Communists held similar positions on agriculture in the 1921 election. 11. Our data on the German 1932 Reichstag election comes from J. W Falter's Weimar Republic County Data Collection (WRCD). 12. Data were gathered on support for the Communist, Socialist, Liberal, Rex, and Catholic Union parties from Roger E. de Smet, Rene Evalenko, and William Fraeys, Atlas des ElectionsBelges191-1954 (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1958). 13. The parties were clustered into six groups (Communists, Socialists, two moderate left groups, the moderate right, and the far right) when presented in the official election results. For the names of those 26 avril et 3 mai 1936: parties, see Electionslegislatives Resultats offciels(Le Temps, Paris, 1936): 328. Because of their ideological similarity with respect to their agricultural programmes, we combined the Communist and Socialist candidates into one left group, and the two moderate left groups into one moderate left group.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

These ratios were computed in the 1921Italian census using the occupations of household heads in communities of 15,000 or more inhabitants. This is a ratio of self-employed farmers to the total employed in agriculture, using data from the 1925 StatistikdesDeutschen Reichs. This is a ratio of owner-cultivators to all employed in agriculture, using the 1929 Belgian census. This is a ratio of owner-cultivator farmers to all farmers using the 1929 French agricultural census. Although statistically insignificant, there is a negative relationship between support for the rightist National Bloc and the proportion of farm owners in Italy (-0.10), thus suggesting the right's failure to attract farm-owners. In Germany, we find strong, statistically significant correlations that lend support to the default of the right thesis. In both Protestant (-0.35) and Catholic (-0.47) agricultural regions, voters turned away from the rightist DNVP. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and France, there is a positive relationship between support for the rightist Catholic Union party and the proportion of property-owners in Belgian agrarian regions (0.10). The positive relationship may result from the prominence of the Catholic Union's liberal wing (Ligue Nationale des Travailleurs Chretiens), which appealed more to an anti-big business

constituency. As expected, due to the left's minimalist position on property rights, the far right failed to attract French voters in agricultural regions (- 0.24). This is a statistically significant correlation. 22. In order to meet the assumption of linearity in regression analysis, we performed an arcsine transformation of the dependent variable, support for the Left. The census and electoral data we have are binomial so the arcsine transformation is appropriate, given the non-linear nature of the relationship between the variables, in the analysis, in each country. 23. In the German case, the left is the SPD. 24. These prediction equations are derived from the dummy-variable regression analysis using interaction terms. The full equation is Proportion of Vote for the Left = 0.70 - 0.81 PropOwn -0.09 Belgium -0.35 France -0.11 Italy + 0.28 Belgian PropOwn + 1.11 French PropOwn + 0.75 Italian PropOwn. The measure for the proportion of private property (PropOwn) is constructed in the same way in this model as measures found in Tables la through 4. As is explained in the methods section, this measure is computed differently in each country. See nn. 14-17. 21.

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Acknowledgements
Presented at the Joint Conference of the Rational Choice Section of the American Sociological Association and the Research Committee on Rational Choice of the International Sociological Association, 15 August 1996, New York. We would like to thank Julia Adams, Risto Alapuro, Brian Ault, Siegwart Lindenberg, Stanley Payne, and the anonymous reviewers of ESR for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. This research was supported by a Fulbright Western European Regional Research award, an Andrew W. Mellon award, two University of Minnesota Graduate School Grant-inAid of Research awards, and two National Science Foundation grants (SES-9009715 and SES-9270211).

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Authors' Address
University of Minnesota, Department of Sociology, 909 Social Sciences, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

Manuscript received: February 1999.