Normative Judgement *

Scott Sturgeon Wadham College, Oxford 1. Introduction. Normative judgement is some kind of psychological commitmenton that we all can agreebut it is seriously unclear what kind of commitment such judgement turns out to be. 1 Some take it to be belief in distinctive normative content, others take it to be a certain kind of desire; still others take it to be a conjunction of belief and desire, while others yet again say that normative judgement is a sui generis kind of state, something belief- and desire-like while different from each au fond. The nature of normative judgement is wildly disputed. This paper defends a new view of normative judgement. I argue that normative concepts are realised by desires in a certain kind of thought, and, as a result, that beliefand desire-like elements of mind involved in normative judgement can be disentangled in exactly one direction. Specifically, it is possible to have the desire-like elements without the belief-like ones, but it is not possible to have the belief-like elements without the desire-like ones. The resulting position is affect conceptualism about normative judgement. Its shape and thrust will be unpacked as we proceed. 2. The landscape. Affect conceptualism is well introduced by appeal to our use of sentences. Note we utter all kinds of them in everyday life: commanding that people to do things, requesting that people do things, asserting that such-and-such is the case. Philosophers canvass the point by saying that sentences can be uttered with various kinds of force; and intuitively, at least, the force with which a sentence is canonically uttered is marked by its syntax. Commands take an exclamation mark, questions take a question mark, assertions take a period; and so on. So put all English sentences in a box and partition them by appeal to the force with which they are standardly uttered. The result will be something like Assertions Commands Questions Etc.

Now focus on sentences uttered with assertoric forcesentences standardly used to assert that such-and-such is the case. Divide those sentences into two groups: one populated by sentences manifesting distinctive vocabulary associated with normative

The ideas in this paper were first presented to my research seminar at Harvard in 2002. Special thanks to Tim Scanlon for useful feedback inside and outside that seminar. Later versions were presented in London, Sheffield and to a Kline Workshop at the University of Missouri, Columbia. Thanks to participants of that Workshop for useful feedback, especially Barron Reed for his insightful commentary and XXXX for helping me to set up my dialectic. Most of all thanks to Eli Kalderon and Maja Spener for terrific comments over a number of years. 1 For instance the judgement that one ought to be kind to children, that one should cross the street, that it's OK to shake hands with women, and so on.

judgement, the other populated by sentences failing to do so. The result will be a new partition: Normative Sentences Others

The topic of normative judgement is well structured by two questions about sentences in the left-most cell of this partition: * * Is their semantics factual? Is their canonical psychology belief-like?

Let me explain the questions. Suppose a competent speaker of English points to an animal and utters "That is a cat". In the event, it is natural to say that we have a canonical case assertion. The speaker is competent with the sentence in use, background conditions suggest no word play is happening, everything is perfectly normal. The speaker has canonically asserted of a given animal that it is a cat. This entails that the speaker's situation involves two prominent features. One has to do with the semantics of the sentence uttered. The other has to do with the psychology of the speaker. Specifically, the sentence involved in this thought experiment aims at the facts when canonically uttered; and more generally, sentences like it are used to assert how the world is, to describe things correctly, to state facts as they say. Sentences like this will be called 'factual' here. 2 We shall target with the term those sentences which have semantic content aimed at the facts in this way. Canonical utterance of factual sentences yields truth exactly when the world is as described by them. Otherwise it yields falsity. Further still, the sentence involved in this thought experiment is canonically uttered because a speaker believes the world to be as described by the sentence. Sentences like this are canonically used to express belief-like states of the speaker. They will be called 'cognitivist' here. We shall target with the term those sentences which are used to express belief-like states in this way. At this stage of discussion, it can be assumed that every belief-like element of mind is bona fide belief. That assumption will be relaxed in due course, at which point belief-like-ness will be further explained. Drawing all this together, then, suppose a speaker canonically utters a sentence which happens to enjoy both factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. In the event, the speaker attempts to express through her utterance something endorsed by one of her belief-like states, namely, that such-and-such is the case, where this such-and-such is the factual content of the sentence uttered. If everything goes to plan, moreover, the sentence uttered will turn out to be true because the world will contain facts which make it true, and the belief-like state of the speaker which prompts her utterance will itself be correct because it will involve the belief-like endorsement of factual content made true by
2

There is a certain amount of legislation in the labelling of positions in this paper. Terms like factual, cognitive, expressive and so onterms which do work in what followsare widely used in the metatheory of normativity. Unfortunately those labels are often used differently by different philosophers. We shall endeavour to be clear, consistent and recognisably motivated in our labelling, while striving to echo core labelling found in the literature.

the world itself. In cases like this, canonical assertion of factual sentences involves public expression of accurate cognitive takes on the world. Not all sentences work this way. When someone canonically utters a question, for instance, there is no sense in which they are trying to express a cognitive take on the world. Nor does one do so when canonically uttering a command. The explanatorily basic use of sentences can be done for a number of different reasons. Sometimes canonical production and consumption of sentences involves factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. Other times it does not. Our focal question is simple: is it like that for assertoric sentences with distinctive normative vocabulary? That is what much of the fuss is about in meta-ethics. To see this, consider a simple example: you hear me canonically utter "I ought to be kind to children". In doing so you hear me express a normative judgement. We face two pointed questions: (Q1) and (Q2) Does my utterance of it spring from cognitivist psychology? Does the sentence involved take factualist semantics?

The meta-theory of normativity contains a wide range of takes on normative judgement. That range is usefully bundled into four categories by the yes/no possibilities for (Q1) and (Q2). As follows: 1. Descriptivism is the general approach to normative judgement on which (Q1) and (Q2) take yes and yes respectively. The approach involves a conjunction of views. One of them is that sentences with normative vocabulary, canonically uttered with assertoric forcehenceforth normative sentences, for shorttake factualist semantics, that they portray the world as being a certain way, that they are correct or incorrect as a function of whether the world is as they describe. The other is that canonical utterance of normative sentences involves cognitivist psychology, that a belief-like element of mind aims at endorsing that the world is as described by them. Descriptivism is the general approach to normative judgement on which normative sentences take factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. Eventually we shall endorse the approach. 3 2. Fictionalism is the general approach to normative judgement on which (Q1) and (Q2) take yes and no respectively. The approach involves a different conjunction of views. One of them is that normative sentences take factualist semantics, that they portray the world as being a certain way. But the other denies that their canonical use involves cognitivist psychology. Rather, the approach has it that canonical utterance of normative sentences involves some kind of pretence or make-belief. The idea is that factual utterance of normative sentences involves a take-it-back clause somehow. This
For instance: (Boyd 1988), (Brandt 1979), (Brink 1989), (Harman 1977), (Jackson & Pettit 1995), (Lewis 1989), (Mackie 1975), (McDowell 1998), (Moore 1903), (Railton 1986), (Sayre-McCord 1988), (ShaferLandau 2003), (Smith 1995), (Sturgeon 1986, 1988), (Wiggins 1987), (Wright 1996). In this paper I shall take no stand on the semantic question. It is compatible with everything here that normative concepts are empty, that they function in thought like concepts such as SUPERMAN or BATMAN or GOD. On the other hand, it is compatible with the position of this paper that normative concepts have natural or even supernatural semantic values: properties concerned with utiles or some such, for instance, or metaphysically basic properties concerned with justice or ought-ness or to-be-done-ness or OK-ness.
3

might be done through convention surrounding purely factual discoursethink of sentences which begin with the phrase "Once upon a time in a galaxy far, far away...." or it might be done in some other way. That level of detail will not concern us, being internal to the fictionalist program and fictionalism being rejected in this paper. We shall note merely that fictionalism is the general approach to normative judgement on which normative sentences take factualist semantics and non-cognitivist psychology. Eventually well find a kernel of truth in the program. 4 3. Ersatzism is the general approach to normative judgement on which (Q1) and (Q2) take no and yes respectively. It claims that normative sentences do not take factualist semantics, do not portray the world as being a certain way, do not go true or false as a function of whether the world is as they describe. But ersatzism also maintains that normative sentences take cognitivist psychology, that canonical production of them involves the attitude of belief. On standard assumptions about that attitude, therefore, the view entails that canonical use of normative sentences involves misfiring of belief. After all, it is commonly assumed that belief aims at contents which accurately depict the world. Ersatzism maintains that normative sentences do not have such contents. For this reason, the view must insistif standard assumptions are correctthat canonical use of normative sentences involves misuse of belief. When you sincerely assert that one ought to be kind to children, on this view, it is as if you shoot an attitude of belief into propositional heaven without hitting anything. Ersatzism entails that in such a case you end up believing without there being a proposition believed; and while this can look initially puzzling it is actually a coherent position. To see this, make two quick assumptions: neither is entailed by ersatzism, but jointly they make for a tinker-toy model of the approach. First, assume that the computational theory of mind is correct. This will amount to a pair of claims for our purposes: one is that we think in a language of thought; and the other is that belief is a computational relation on sentences in that language. The approach sees believing that snow is white, for instance, as standing in a computational relation to a mental sentence which means that snow is white. On this view it makes literal sense to speak of semantics for sentences in our lingua mentis. This will hold true for normative sentences in that language as well as non-normative ones. Second, assume we computationally misfire with normative sentences in our language of thought. This will amount to a pair of claims for our purposes: one is the view that normative sentences in our lingua mentis do not take a factual semantics; the other is the view that we nevertheless stand in the computational belief relation to those sentences. If these two claims are correct, then your belief that one ought to be kind to children is your standing in a certain computational relation to a mental sentence which means that one ought to be kind to children; but that mental sentence, with that very meaning, does not express a proposition or take factualist semantics. If the computational theory of mind is correct, and we misfire with normative sentences in a lingua mentis, ersatzism is true for normative sentences in that language.
4

(Lewis 2005) argues that Blackburn's quasi-realism is a version of fictionalism. (Blackburn 2005) resists vigorously. (Joyce 2003) advises that we shift normative practice to bring it in line with fictionalism. (Kalderon 2005) argues forcefully that such practice is already fictionalist. See also (Nolan, Restall & West 2005).

In turn this means ersatzism is true full stop, that canonical production and consumption of normative sentences in English involves non-factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. Ersatzism entails neither the computational theory of mind, nor the claim that we misfire with normative sentences in a lingua mentis; but ersatzism is entailed by the coherent combination of those claims. The view is a coherent position in the metatheory of normativity. 5 4. Expressivism is the general approach to normative judgement on which (Q1) and (Q2) take no and no respectively. It claims that normative sentences take non-factualist semantics and non-cognitivist psychology. The idea is that canonical normative utterance is non-propositional expression of non-belief-like elements of mind. The classic example is emotivism, of course, on which canonical utterance of "Torture is wrong" is some kind of emoting of negative feeling or sentiment. Expressivism is a familiar approach to normative judgement in need of no serious gloss here. Eventually we shall find a kernel of truth in its program. 6 Drawing all this together, then, we find a familiar landscape in the meta-theory of normativity: Yes to Question 1 Descriptivism Fictionalism No to Question 1 Ersatzism Expressivism

Yes to Question 2 No to Question 2

There are non-trivial reasons to adopt each of these views. We shall be occupied in the defence of descriptivism. Reasons for that view shall be canvassed now. 7 In my view, the primary reason to adopt descriptivism is that it provides a unified semantics and psychology across a range of cases that seem to demand one. When we partition English sentences into categories, by appeal to the force with which they are canonically uttered, it is natural to put normative sentences in the same category as standard assertions. Close inspection of practice suggests that our overall production and consumption of normative sentences is like our overall production and consumption of standard assertions. The latter do involve factualist semantics and cognitivist psychologyor so well assume here. This generates strong reason to apply such semantics and psychology to normative sentences too, strong reason to be descriptivists about normative judgement. The case is built from a desire for three things: (a) (b) a unified semantics for sentences of a single syntactic category; a unified psychology for the states canonically responsible for the production and consumption of sentences in a single syntactic category;

5 6

See (Horgan & Timmons 2006a & 2006b). See (Ayer 1936), (Blackburn 1984, 1993, 1998), (Gibbard 1990), (Stevenson 1937, 1944). 7 Reasons for other views can be found in writings of their proponents. Helpful general discussion can be found in Kalderon 2005a and 2005b.

and (c) a simple way of explaining our practice with sentences in a single syntactic category by joint appeal to (a) and (b).

Sentences associated with normative judgement have a surface syntax and use in our practice which normally indicates factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. These theoretical tools do a very good job of explaining our use of sentences in that syntactic class as a whole. If normative sentences receive a different theoretical treatment than we give to other sentences within their syntactic category, that treatment will introduce unwanted complexity into our approach to the production and consumption of sentences within it. Such complexity will be ad hoc unless motivated; and for this reason, descriptivism is a sound default position within the meta-theory of normativity, a well motivated initial take on normative judgement. Any move away from it requires solid reason to think normative sentences are exceptional within their syntactic category, solid reason to think normative sentences take an unusual semantic or psychological treatment. Why should we think that? 3. A Puzzle about normative judgement. One influential reason to make an exception of normative sentences springs from a puzzle. In turn the puzzle springs from the fact that three claims seem individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent: (a) (b) (c) Cognitivism: normative sentences take cognitivist psychology. The Link Thesis: there's an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind. Humeanism: belief- and desire-like elements of mind can always be pulled apart.

The first of these claims is part of the backbone of descriptivism about normative judgement, the overall view to be defended here. The second two claims are in need of a gloss, so consider them in turn: (c) The link thesis maintains that there is an internal link between normative judgement and something desire-like. On the view as I shall understand it, there is a necessary (or constitutive) link between normative judgement and something desire-like. But what is it for a state to be desire-like in the requisite sense? This will take some explaining. Suppose you desire that your toddler wear socks. You believe she already does so, but you glance at her feet to make sure. You notice bare feet in surprise. In the event, your desire that she wears socks will not likely change; but your belief that she wears socks will almost certainly do so. After seeing her feet you are likely to change how you believe her feet to be sock-wise; but you are not likely to change how you desire her feet to be sock-wise. Moreover, your new belief that your toddler does not wear socks, together with your old desire that she do so, are likely to lead jointly to a change in the world. They are likely to produce a putting on of socks.

This is how everyday belief and desire seem to work. It is marked in the vernacular by the claim that belief and desire have opposite directions of fit. When things go to plan belief is brought into line with the world, while the world is brought into line with desire. When things go to plan, that is to say, belief is made to fit the world and the world is made to fit desire. This natural thought will be assumed in what follows. We'll use it to define an element's being belief- or desire-like respectively. For our purposes, an element of mind will be belief-like if it is the sort of thing that is made to fit with the world on the basis of evidence; and an element of mind will be desire-like if it is the sort of thing with which the world is made to fit through action. Belief- and desire-like elements of mind have differentindeed oppositedirections of fit. That is what it is for an element of mind to be belief- or desire-like respectively. In discussion of normative judgementand especially discussion of whether it involves belief- or desire-like elements of mindthe issue is usefully structured by appeal to direction of fit. 8 The key question is two-fold: does normative judgement involve anything with belief-like direction of fit? and does it involve anything with desire-like direction of fit? This way of carving things transforms the link thesis into the following claim: there is an internal link from normative judgement to something with desire-like direction of fit. If that is so, there is a necessary connection between judging that a given act is wrong, for instance, and enjoying a psychological state which functions like a desire that the act not happen. There is an internal link between normative judgement and desire to make the world a certain way. If such judgement is positivesay that ought to happenthen one will desire thereby to promote . If such judgement is negativesay that ought not happenthen one will desire thereby to prevent . On this understanding the link thesis entails that normative judgement is linked to something desire-like in the relevant sense, to something with desire-like direction of fit. (d) Humean psychology is built on a cluster of related thoughts. Key among them is the idea that belief- and desire-like elements of mind are metaphysically distinct. This can look obviously true, of course, since belief-like-ness is different from desire-likeness. The two features involve opposite directions of fit; and this can make it look trivial that nothing with a unitary nature could be belief- and desire-like at the same time. It can look trivial that no single kind of state could have mind-to-world and world-to-mind direction of fit. Any state with both directions of fit would thereby look to be of two kinds, not one, and would thus not look to enjoy a unitary nature. 9 Humean psychology is happy to admit that belief- and desire-like elements of mind can go together conjunctivelythere can be complexes of belief and desirebut the view insists that for any belief- and desire-like pair of elements, it is possible to have one without the other. This is a typically Humean edict against necessary connections between distinct existences. It has the ring of truth about it, to be sure; and eventually we'll find a kernel of truth in the view. 10
8 9

For classic discussion see (Humberstone 1992) along with (Smith 1987, 1995). We shall set aside the vexed question of whether it is possibleor even coherentfor a single kind of thing to have both directions of fit. See (Altham 1986), (Johnson 1999), (Lewis 1997), (Shafer-Landau 2004) and (Smith 1994). 10 For a defence of Humeanism about modality see (Lewis 1986).

There are strong reasons to endorse cognitivism about normative judgement. There are strong reasons to accept an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind. There are strong reasons to endorse Humeanism about psychology. Unfortunately it looks as if the three views cannot jointly be true, for they look to conflict with one another. To see this, note cognitivism entails that normative judgement is belief-like in nature. If this is so, the link thesis ensures that there is a necessary connection between the belief-like element of mind involved in normative judgement and something desirelike too, something with motivational force, world-to-mind direction of fit, and so on. In turn this conflicts with Humeanism, which itself rules out a necessary connection between belief- and desire-like elements of mind. Thus we face a puzzle: cognitivism, the link thesis and Humeanism look plausible individually; collectively they look inconsistent. What to do? A great deal of work in the meta-theory of normativity aims to resolve this puzzle, to sort out the fact that these claims look individually plausible yet jointly in conflict. Recall that descriptivism about normative judgement is the general view on which factualism about normative sentences goes with cognitivism about their canonical use. This means descriptivists have two minimal reactions to the puzzle: they can reject the link thesis or reject Humeanism. Both moves are famous in the literature.11 Sketching them will clarify how the view of normative judgement to be defended here is both new and promising. To begin, the most common descriptivists reaction to our puzzle rejects the link thesis. The resulting position involves a number of moving parts. Canonical production of normative sentences is said to be factual assertion of belief, something on all fours with canonical production of sentences like England will win the next Ashes. It is agreed that one normally is moved to act in normative judgementthe everyday phenomena stressed by proponents of the link thesis is acceptedbut it is denied that normative judgement necessitates desire-like elements of mind. Instead it is claimed that such judgement happens to go with such elements, that correlation between normative judgement and desire is a matter of psychological law, or natural tendency, or some such. Weakness of will and depression are stressed by descriptivists in this school of thought, along with the notional coherence of psychopathology, in order to buttress the thought that is possible to have normative judgement without desire-like elements of mind. On this view cognitivism and Humeanism are accepted; but the link thesis is rejected outright. This is garden-variety descriptivism. On the other hand, descriptivists can avoid our puzzle by rejecting Humeanism rather than the link thesis; and that is how McDowellian descriptivism gets the job done. It says that canonical production of normative sentences is factual assertion par excellence, and mental states expressed by such assertion are belief-like in character. But McDowellian descriptivism denies that those mental states are in fact ones of belief; for it claims that they are desire-like in addition to being belief-like. The famous idea is that canonical production of normative sentences expresses a sui generis kind of mental state, a unitary kind which is at once both belief- and desire-like in character. We shall
Descriptivists like Boyd and Sturgeon take the first option, for instance, while those like McDowell take the second.
11

take no stand on whether the idea is coherent, noting merely that this brand of descriptivism claims that normative psychology turns on a sui generis mental kind, a unitary kind at once belief- and desire-like in character. 12 The resulting view endorses cognitivism and the link thesis, but it rejects Humeanism outright. This is sui generis descriptivism. In a nutshell: there are two minimal moves descriptivists can make to avoid our puzzle. One is taken by garden-variety descriptivists in rejecting the link thesis. The other is taken by sui generis descriptivists in rejecting Humeanism. Another minimal moves will avoid the puzzle, of course, but it involves sacrificing descriptivism about normative sentences; for it involves rejecting the idea that normative judgement turns on a belief-like element of mind. 13 Since there are strong reasons to favour descriptivism if possible, and since there is a promising way of doing so despite our puzzle, the next section will lay out that way from scratch. The descriptivism to be defended will in fact be neither garden-variety nor sui generis. It will, though, endorse elements of truth in all four of our puzzle-generating claims. 4. A stab at the idea. My reaction to the puzzle turns on two theoretical moves. One is familiar to philosophy of mind as well as the meta-theory of normativity. The other is not so familiar to the latter area. The familiar move involves drawing a distinction between properties and concepts. This will be done here by simply assuming that there are such things as concepts, and that they function as mental names for properties. Just as there is an obvious difference between the English word 'red' and the property for which it stands namely rednesswe shall assume that there is a difference between the concept RED and the property for which it standsnamely redness. And just as there is an obvious difference between the English word 'water' and the stuff for which it standsnamely waterwe shall assume that there is a difference between the concept WATER and the stuff for which it standsnamely water. Our general assumption will be that thought latches onto properties through concepts, that the latter stand for the former in thought. In rough outline, at least, this assumption is perfectly ordinary. The distinction between concept and property is quotidian. Insisting on itin rough outline, anywayis no move away from common sense. But the distinction has proved useful in the treatment of philosophical puzzles; and so it shall prove here. 14 The puzzle brought on by cognitivism, the link thesis and Humeanism can be resolved by insisting on a distinction that is both pre-theoretically plausible and theoretically fecund, namely, the distinction between concept and property. Or so I shall now argue. The unfamiliar move (mentioned two paragraphs back) turns on the claim that normative concepts are instantiated by volitional elements of mind in normative judgement. The thought is that normative concepts are individuated not only by their
These mental states are often called 'besires' by opponents of the view. The poisoned honorific is meant to sound in like 'bizarre'. See (Altham 1986) and (Smith 1994). 13 Ersatzism takes one of them by rejecting factualist semantics for normative sentences. Fictionalism takes the other by rejecting cognitivist psychology for their canonical production and consumption. 14 The distinction between concept and property has proved helpful in the theoretical treatment of aposteriori necessity, contingent apriority, the explanatory gap and phenomenal consciousness, the Knowledge Argument for dualism about the mental, and much more besides.
12

semantic value but also by their realisation conditions in judgement; and that those realisation conditions involve the very volitional elements emphasised by proponents of the normative link thesis. As we shall see, the approach makes for a conceptual link from normative judgement to desire, seeing it as a conceptual truth that normative judgement is realised by desire. We can work up to this approach to normative concepts by appeal to a similar and well-known position in the philosophy of consciousness. After all, it is currently fashionable in that area to deal with the explanatory gap by distinguishing phenomenal concepts from phenomenal properties; and one prominent line on the former says that they are realised by the latter. On this approach, phenomenal concepts are realised in thought by the very phenomenal properties for which they stand. Proponents of the view insist that a number of vexing issues about consciousness fall into line once it is granted that phenomenal concepts stand to their semantic values as realizee to realizer. Philosophers as divergent in their underlying metaphysics of consciousness as Ned Block, David Chalmers and David Papineau plump for an approach like this to phenomenology and our canonical conception of it. 15 But consider a plausible Humean thesis about phenomenology and belief about it: (HPB) For any phenomenal type and belief type B about , one can manifest either type without manifesting the other.

If that is right, then for any such and B it is possible to be in without being in B and possible to be in B without being in . On the Block-Chalmers-Papineau view of phenomenal concepts, of course, there's a sense in which that turns out to be true; but there is also a sense in which it turns out to be false. It will all depend on the way that belief is individuated. Here's why. Once we distinguish concept and property there are two ways to individuate belief. One of them is coarse-grained and the other is fine-grained. They agree that belief involves a believer standing in some kind of belief relation to objective truthconditions. 16 But the fine-grained way of individuating belief appeals not only to such a relation and truth-conditions, it also appeals to elements of the conceptual repertoire used to latch onto them. In other words, fine-grained individuation of belief uses concepts as well as truth-conditions and the belief relation, whereas coarse-grained individuation of belief uses only a belief relation and objective truth-conditions. Since a single truthcondition can be latched onto by distinct concepts in thought, the latter approach to the individuation of belief turns out to be coarser than the former. 17 Distinguishing concept and property allows for two ways to individuate belief. This generates two readings of the Humean thesis about phenomenology and belief. One individuates belief coarsely, the other does so finely. We shall mark them with two types of font, using bold-face to indicate course belief and italics to indicate fine belief:

15 16

See (Block 2006), (Chalmers 2003) and (Papineau 2002). Or coarse-grained propositions, or sets of objective worlds, or whatever. 17 See (Laurence & Margolis 1999), (Peacocke 1995) and (Schiffer 1987).

10

(HPB)

For any phenomenal type and belief type B about , one can manifest either type without manifesting the other. For any phenomenal type and belief type B about , one can manifest either type without manifesting the other.

(HPB)

The coarse Humean phenomenal principle entails that phenomenal types can be two-way disentangled from coarse belief types about them. This seems entirely right. After all, it comes to the pair of ideas that for any phenomenal type and coarse belief type about it: one can be in without manifesting a concept in belief about ; and one can manifest some concept or other in belief about without being in . Nothing in the BlockChalmers-Papineau approach to phenomenal concepts calls either of these plausible claims into question. On the other hand: the fine Humean phenomenal principle says that phenomenal types are two-way disentangle-able from fine belief types about them. That is explicitly denied by the Block-Chalmers-Papineau approach to phenomenal concepts; for that approach individuates such concepts not only by appeal to objective phenomenal properties named by them, but also by their realisation conditions in thought. Specifically, the approach says that phenomenal concepts are individuated so that they appear in thought only when they are realised by the very phenomenal states for which they stand. This allows for one-way disentanglement of phenomenal properties and fine beliefs about themspecifically, it allows for the former to occur without the latter but the view does not permit two-way disentanglement of phenomenal properties and fine beliefs about them. It is constructed precisely to insist that entanglement occur in one direction. Phenomenal concepts are said to be tokened in thought only if thinker is in phenomenal states for which they stand. If that is right, though, it is not possible to be in a phenomenal-concept-involving fine belief about phenomenal type unless one is also in phenomenal type . The Block-Chalmers-Papineau view of phenomenal concepts conflicts with the fine Humean phenomenal principle. Now, I do not favour the Block-Chalmers-Papineau approach to phenomenal concepts. 18 But I do favour a similar approach to normative concepts. Specifically, I favour an approach on which such concepts are individuated by their semantic values and their realisation conditions in base-case normative judgement, with those realisation conditions being precisely the volitional elements of mind emphasized by proponents of the normative link thesis. For instance, suppose you vocalize a normative judgement by uttering "I ought to be kind to children". In the event, proponents of the normative link thesis will see your judgement as internally linked to a desire to be kind to children, claiming that there is a constitutive link of some kind between your judgement and such a desire. I want to defend this idea by proposing that normative concepts are themselves individuated not only by their semantic values but also by volitional elements which manifest conceptual content in base-case judgement like this. On such an affect conceptualist approach to normative judgement, the concept OUGHT used in your judgement requires for its
I do think phenomenal concepts are central to an understanding of phenomenal consciousness and its theoretical recalcitrance. But I do not think phenomenal concepts are realised by their semantic values in thought. See (Sturgeon 2001).
18

11

manifestation (in such judgement) a bona fide desire concerning its non-normative content. If that is so, however, your judgement turns out to be de se belief with normative conceptual content realized by desire to be kind to children. Moreover, affect conceptualism entails that such realisation is conceptually necessary when belief is individuated finely. The view sees it as a conceptual truth that fine belief like yours is accompanied by desire to be kind to children. But recall the Humean idea that belief- and desire-like elements of mind are metaphysically distinct. This prompts the thought that for any belief- and desire-like types it is always possible to manifest one without manifesting the other. It prompts a Humean thesis about belief and desire: (HBD) For any belief type B and desire type D, one can manifest either without manifesting the other.

If that is right, then for any such B and D it is possible to be in B without being in D and also possible to be in D without being in B. On the affect conceptualist approach to normative judgement, of course, there is a sense in which that turns out to be true; but there is also a sense in which it turns out to be false. It will all depend on the individuation of belief. Recall that both coarse- and a fine-grained approaches to belief say that it involves a believer standing in a belief relation to objective truth-conditions. The finegrained approach goes on to use individuating conditions for concepts as well as truthconditions in the individuation of belief types. The coarse-grained approach uses only the latter resource to get the job done. This generates two readings of the Humean beliefdesire principle. Our convention with fonts permits their crisp expression: (HBD) For any belief type B and desire type D, one can manifest either without manifesting the other. For any belief type B and desire type D, one can manifest either without manifesting the other.

(HBD)

The coarse Humean belief-desire principle says that coarse belief types are two-way disentangle-able from types of desire. And that seems obviously right. After all, it comes to the pair of ideas that for any coarse belief type and type of desire: one can manifest the belief type without manifesting the desire; and vice versa. Nothing in the affect conceptualist approach to normative judgement calls this plausible view into question. On the other hand: the fine Humean belief-desire principle says that fine belief types are two-way disentangle-able from types of desire. That is precisely what the affect-conceptualist denies; for she individuates normative concepts not only by appeal to their objective truth-conditions, if any, but also by their realisation conditions in basecase normative judgement; and she insists that those realization conditions involve desire itself. The view thus entails that it is impossible to have fine normative belief without desire. The other direction of disentanglement is still possibleaffect conceptualism

12

allows for desire without fine normative beliefbut fine normative belief without desire is said to be conceptual impossibility . For instance, affect conceptualism, says that a concept like OUGHT is individuated so that its appearance in base-case normative judgement requires realisation by desire. And while this permits one-way disentanglement of the relevant fine beliefs and desire in particular, it allows the latter to occur without the formerthe view does not permit two-way disentanglement of such beliefs and desire. It is constructed precisely to insist that entanglement occur in one direction, that fine normative belief like this requires believer to desire the world be a certain way. If that is right, however, it is not possible to be in a normative-concept-involving base-case fine belief without having a desire. Affect conceptualism is inconsistent with Humeanism about such belief and desire. This makes for a solution to our puzzle. Recall it grows from these three claims: (a) (b) (c) Cognitivism: normative sentences take cognitivist psychology. Link: there's an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind. Humeanism: belief- and desire-like elements always pull apart.

There are two motivated ways to understand belief-like elements of mind. A pair of the puzzle-generating claims make explicit use of such elements: cognitivism does so by appeal to the idea that canonical normative utterance is driven by them; and Humeanism does so by appeal to the idea that belief- and desire-like elements of mind are two-way disentangle-able. Even the link thesis is naturally understood to concern belief-like elements of mind; for it's natural to hear it as saying that such elements are internally liked to desire. There is play in the steering wheel when it comes to our understanding of puzzle-generating claims. They are quite naturally heard in a coarse- or fine-grained way. Descriptivists should take advantage of this flexibility. They should disambiguate each of the three claims in a coarse- and a fine-grained way. They should cherry-pick from the result as necessary to construct a consistent troika of claims; and they should argue that the ring of truth in the build up to our puzzle is fully distilled in that troika. This will be my strategy, implemented by appeal to our font convention as before. To begin, recall that cognitivism entails the view that canonical production and consumption of normative sentences springs from belief-like elements of mind. Are those elements meant to be coarse- or fine-grained in nature? There are two ways to hear the idea. Taken coarsely we have (b) Cognitivism: normative sentences take cognitivist psychology;

and taken finely we have (b) Cognitivism: normative sentences take cognitivist psychology.

The first claim is that canonical production and consumption of normative sentences is driven by coarse belief. The second is that such practice is driven by fine belief. We're assuming here, though, that one manages to have coarse belief by having fine belief.

13

That might be taken to show that fine-grained cognitivism entails its coarse cousin; and that, in turn, might be taken to show that the perspective developed here is committed to the fine-grained principle. This would be a mistake. After all, the heart and soul of cognitivism is the claim that belief-like elements of mind drive canonical production and consumption of normative sentences. There are two ways to hear the idea. One of them says coarse elements drive the relevant portions of practice. The other says fine elements do so. Just because one manages to have course belief by having fine belief, however, nothing follows about which kind of element is causally or normatively responsible for practice. Nothing follows about which kind of belief drives canonical production or consumption of normative sentences. One kind might be relevant to all bits of practice; or the situation might be more complex. Fine belief might be relevant to the canonical production of normative sentences, while coarse belief might be relevant to their consumption. Or perhaps its the other way around. Nothing here turns on how this plays out; so we take no stand on the difference between coarse- and fine-grained cognitivism. We just insist that some form of the view is correct. 19 But we shall take a stand on the ambiguity found in our second puzzle-generating claim. Recall it posits an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind; and recall the view has it that such judgement is belief-like in character. Should we understand the view in a coarse- or fine-grained way? There are two ways to hear the idea. Taken coarsely we have ( c) Link: there's an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind;

and taken finely we have ( c) Link: there's an internal link between normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind.

The first claim is that coarse-grained belief in normative content is internally linked to desire-like elements of mind. The second is that fine-grained belief in normative content is so linked to such elements. The distinction between concept and property makes it clear that the first of these claims should be rejected. Whatever normative contents turn out to be, there is no reason to think theres a necessary connection between latching onto them with some concepts or other, on the one hand, and desire-like elements of mind on the other. The coarse understanding of Link is mistaken. But if normative concepts work as they are said to by affect conceptualism, then the fine-grained reading of Link is correct. After all, the proposal entails that such concepts are essentially realized by desire-like elements of mind in base-case normative judgement. In turn this ensures that the fine-grained reading of Link is correct. That is the reading endorsed here.
On the perspective assumed here coarse- and fine-grained belief stand to one another as determinable and determinate. For classic discussion of the causal independence of determinable and determinate see (Yablo 1994a and 1994b). For further discussion see (Sturgeon 1994a). For discussion of the normative independence of determinable and determinate see (Sturgeon Forthcoming).
19

14

Further, we also take a stand on the ambiguity found in our third puzzlegenerating claim. Recall its the view that belief- and desire-like elements of mind always pull apart. But are the belief-like elements meant to be coarse- or fine-grained? There are two ways to hear the idea. Taken coarsely we have (d) Humeanism: belief- and desire-like elements always pull apart;

and taken finely we have (d) Humeanism: belief- and desire-like elements always pull apart.

For our purposes the first claim is that coarse belief and desire are two-way disentangleable; and the second is that fine belief and desire are so disentangle-able. Since coarse belief requires only that some concept or other be used to get at objective truth-conditions in thought, and since concepts are not generally linked to desire-like elements of mind, the coarse Humean principle turns out to be true. Coarse belief does pull apart from desire. On the other hand: if normative concepts work as they are said to by affect conceptualism, the fine Humean principle is false. After all, the proposal entails that such concepts are essentially linked to desires in base-case normative judgement. In turn that means there is no way to pull apart such fine-grained normative belief and desire. Affect conceptualism is incompatible with the fine Humean principle. Drawing all this together, then, the position of this paper is that normative sentences take factualist semantics and cognitivist psychology. Its also that normative concepts are essentially realised by desires in base-case normative judgement. For these reasons: a coarse-grained reading of Link is rejected while a fine-grained reading of that principle is accepted; and a fine-grained reading of Humeanism is rejected while a coarse-grained reading of that principle is accepted. These four claims are endorsed: (a) (b) ( c) (d) Factualism: normative sentences take factualist semantics. Cognitivism: normative sentences take cognitivist psychology. Link: there's an internal link between normative belief and desire-like elements of mind. Humeanism: belief and desire always pull apart.

There are non-trivial reasons to endorse each of these claims. Together they form into a consistent picture of things. That picture sees our normative practice as straightforwardly descriptivist. Canonical production and consumption of normative sentences is viewed as ordinary assertion that the world is thus-and-so. Canonical production and consumption of normative sentences is viewed as ordinary expression of belief. Moreover, the picture agrees with the root motivation behind fictionalism and expressivism; for it endorses an internal link between fine-grained normative judgement and desire-like elements of mind. Yet the picture does not manage this by rejecting Humeanism outrightit does not beat a path to sui generis descriptivism. Instead it distinguishes coarse- and fine-grained Humeanism by appeal to the difference between coarse- and fine-grained belief. In turn Humeanism as such is endorsed in its coarse guise and rejected in its fine guise. Affect

15

conceptualism insists that belief and desire can always pull apart, so long as belief is individuated coarsely. The key move in all this is drawing a distinction between concept and property. That move generates a difference between coarse and fine belief; and that, in turn, leads directly to the take on normative judgement defended here. According to that take, descriptivism is true of normative judgement along with psychological entanglements which motivate its opponents. This combination of facts looks initially puzzling. But the puzzle is resolved once its seen that normative concepts are special, once its seen that they are realised by volitional elements of mind in canonical normative judgement. That makes it look as if descriptivism is at odds with Humean psychology. But looks are deceptive. Descriptivism about normative judgement is both true and compatible with Humeanism about our psychology. The key to their compatibility is the special nature of normative concepts, the fact that such concepts are individuated by volitional realisation in normative judgement.

16

References
Altham, J. 1986. The Legacy of Emotivism, in McDonald and Wright. Ayer, A. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz. Blackburn, S. 1884. Spreading the Word. Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Descriptivism. Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. 2005. Quasi-Descriptivism No Fictionalism, in Kalderon 2005a. Block, N. 2006. Max Blacks Objection to Mind-Body Identity, in Alter and Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge Oxford University Press. Boyd, R. 1988. 'How to be a Moral Descriptivist', in Sayre-McCord. Brandt, R. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford University Press. Brink, D. 1989. Moral Descriptivism and the Foundations of Ethics Cambridge University Press. Chalmers, D. 2003. The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Smith & Jokic (eds.), Oxford University Press. Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Oxford University Press. Gibbard, A. 2003. Thinking How To Live. Harvard University Press. Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press. Hooker, B. 1996. Truth in Ethics. Blackwell. Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006a. Morality without Moral Facts, in Dreier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Blackwell. Horgan, T. & M. Timmons. 2006b. Cognitivist Expressivism, in their (eds.) Metaethics after Moore Oxford University Press. Humberstone, L. 1992. Direction of Fit, Mind. Jackson, F. & P. Pettit. 1995. Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation, Philosophical Quarterly. Johnson, R. 1999. Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy, Philosophical Quarterly. Joyce, R. 2004. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press. Kalderon, M. 2005a. Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. Kalderon, M. 2005b. Moral Fictionalism. Oxford University Press. Laurence, S. & E. Margolis. 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell. Lewis, D. 1989. Dispositional Theories of Value, Proc. of the Aristotelian Society. Lewis, D. 1997. Finkish Dispositions, Philosophical Quarterly. Lewis, D. 2005. Quasi-descriptivism is Fictionalism, in Kalderon 2005a. Mackie, J. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Penguin. McDonald, G. & C. Wright. (eds.). 1986. Fact, Science and Morality. Blackwell. McDowell, J. 1998. Mind, Value and Reality. Harvard University Press. Moore, G. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press. Nolan, D., G. Restall & C. West. 2005. Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford University Press.

17

Peacocke, C. 1995. A Study of Concepts. MIT Press. Railton, P. 1986. Moral Descriptivism, Philosophical Review. Sayre-McCord, G. 1988. (ed.) Essays on Moral Descriptivism Cornell University Press. Schiffer, S. 1987. Remnants of Meaning. MIT Press. Shafer-Landau, R. 2003. Moral Descriptivism: a Defence. Oxford University Press. Smith, M. 1987. The Humean Theory of Motivation, Mind. Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Blackwell Press. Stevenson, C. 1937. The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, Mind. Stevenson, C. 1944. Ethics and Language. Yale University Press. Sturgeon, N. 1986. What Difference Does It Make If Moral Descriptivism is True?, Southern Journal of Philosophy. Sturgeon, N. 1988. Moral Explanation, in Sayre-McCord. Sturgeon, S. 1994a. Good Reasoning & Cognitive Architecture, Mind & Language. Sturgeon, S. 1994b. The Epistemic View of Subjectivity, Journal of Philosophy. Sturgeon, S. 2001. Matters of Mind. Routledge. Sturgeon, S. Forthcoming. Reason & the Grain of Belief, Nos. Wiggins, D. 1987. Needs, Values and Truth. Blackwell. Wright, C. 1996. Truth in Ethics, in Hooker. Yablo, S. 1994a. Cause & Essence, Synthese. Yablo, S. 1994b. Mental Causation, Philosophical Review.

18