Public Opinion and Political Parties in France Author(s): Maurice Duverger Source: The American Political Science Review,

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PUBLIC

OPINION

AND POLITICAL
MAURICE DUVERGER

PARTIES

IN FRANCE

University ofBordeaux

1947,to March, 1952; and if our hypothetical observerwill look back and analyze the political life of the Third Republic, he will findthe same tendency there,not so markedand not so strong, but always present. A dual tendencybehindmultiplepartiesand an effort this to break through dualism by forminga movement of the Center, casting the extremesinto the opposition: this patternis a fairlyaccurate descriptionof what remains constantin the French politicalscene. But withinthis frame,whichis practically intact, a profoundchange has taken place. That is to say, althoughthe containeris almost exactlythe same, the liquid it holds has changed considerably. In particular,withoutcausing what may properlybe called a rupture, WorldWar II abruptlybroughtto the surfacedivisionswhich,untilthen,had been secondaryand submerged.
I. MULTIPARTYISM AND ITS BASES

To any observer the French party system is bewildering. On the onehand, are officially in theNational he seesthattenparliamentary groups established the Overseas Assembly (notincluding Independents) ;' and,at thesametime, he notesthat onlyfiveofthemare reallyorganized throughout the country, to be considered and so entitled "parties"in the truesenseofthe word:the RPF, the Radicals,the MRP, the Socialists, On the and the Communists. inelectoral other heobserves thattheablest hand, French specialists sociologyAndr6 and his disciple, particularly Siegfried Goguel-consider that, Frangois of political the apparent behind two basic divisions are alprofusion groups, ofwhich waysfound, the continuing for opposition has supplied morethana ofFrench century theessential dynamics politics. Thesetwodivisions are,of theRight andtheLeft, and "Movement."2 course, traditionally called"Order" Nevertheless, the brief history ofthe FourthRepublic revealsan attempt to breakdownthesetwoblocs,and to builda "ThirdForce"from smaller units. sucha ThirdForcehas governed March, Undervariousnames, Francefrom

divisionsof public opinionin France cannot be considered The present-day separate fromthe European politicaldevelopmentsof the last hundredyears. French multipartyism today assuredly reveals many characteristics peculiar to the nation,but these have developed froma basis commonto all European
1 Communists,Progressive Republicans, Socialists (SFIO), Popular Republicans (MRP), Radical Socialists, Democratic and Social Union of the Resistance (UDSR), Rally of the FrenchPeople (RPF), IndependentRepublicans,IndependentRepublicans forPeasant Social Action,and Peasants' Party. 2 See Andr6Siegfried, Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisieme Republique (Paris, 1913) and Ggographie de l'Ardeche sousla Troisieme Republique electorale 1?publique (Paris, 1949); and FrangoisGoguel,La Politiquedes Partis sous la Troisibme des elections (Paris, 1946) and Geographie de 1870 d 1951 (Paris, 1952). frangaises

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of France in 1952 is compeoples. In otherwords,the politicaltemperament built upon a substructurecommon to all posed of a national superstructure nations in WesternEurope. was itselfbuilt firstof all upon the fundamentalconflict The substructure which dominated the nineteenthcentury,that between conservativesand was complex,born of many factors, in whichideas from liberals. This conflict on the one hand, and economic both the French and Americanrevolutions, changes, on the other,seem to have played an essential role. The principal actors were a land-owningaristocracy,bound to the monarchicalprinciples an industrial, of the old regime, and, opposed to this aristocracy, commercial, attractedby the principles of politicalliberty.' and intellectual bourgeoisie, The firstphase in the mouldingof the prevailingspiritin modernEurope ofthe socialistparties,at the end ended withthe appearance and development of the twentieth. of the nineteenth Industrialconcenturyand the beginning the developmentof trade centrationand the growthof an urban proletariat, unionsand the propagationofMarxian doctrines universalsuffrage and, finally, werefactorswhichpreceded and markedthe change. Between 1900 and 1914, the bipartisantendencywhich had dominatedthe precedingcenturywas replaced everywhereby a swing toward tripartisanism;the "conservativeliberal" duo now changed to a "conservative-liberal-socialist" trio. The Russian Revolutionof 1917 and the settingup ofthe Soviet regime were bound to provokeviolentreactionswithinthe socialistpartiesduringthe years 1920 to 1924. Oftenthe result was a split, a communistparty usually being formedfromone of the various pieces. The trio then gave way to a quartet: conservatives, liberals,socialists,and communists. Ten years later the advent whichfollowed on the heelsofthe Italian Fascist systemand ofthe Nazi regime, created some ferment various Balkan experiments, among the young generation ofanti-communists. They wereuneasybecause ofthe weaknessand powerand liberals(and socialistsas well); and it was lessnessofthe old conservatives then that in almost all European countriesvarious movementsmore or less fascistbegan to evolve (led by Mosley in England, Quislingin Norway,Mussert in Holland, Degrelle in Belgium,Doriot and La Rocque in France, etc.). The quartetbegan to turn into a quintet.A reversemovement was startedin 1945 by the destructionof these same fascistparties,which had played the columnsforthe Germanarmy.But the same causes begetting role of fifth the same effects, theycan be seen surging up once moreon the horizon underscarcely different guises.
Of course, this schema often became more complicated. In the Scandinavian countries, the presence of a small peasantry developed an agrarian liberalism; in the Catholic countries, the religious question superimposed itself on political and social oppositions; in Germany and Austria, national and local rivalries displaced the "conservative-liberal" rivalry. Then, too, in the second half of the nineteenth century, disagreements broke out between moderate and radical liberals, sometimes going so far as to result in a schismbut rarely. But in spite of all this, the fundamental opposition between the conservatives and the liberals is easily perceptible in leading European countries during the nineteenth century. The reader is referred,on this point, to Charles Seignobos' fundamental book, Histoire politique de l'Europe Contemporaine,2 vols., 3rd ed. (Paris, 1928).

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Thus the motifof the political developmentamong the European peoples of "spiritualfamihas been a trendtowarda multiplication forthe past century with the to a tripartisanship lies," evolving froman originalbipartisanship withthe developappearance ofthe socialistsand then to a quadripartisanship of fascismtends to add a fifth the rebirth Most recently ment of communism. by in each country party.But this commonweb has been moreor less modified a tendencycounterto the of national factors.In some countries the influence of parties; other directionof the general trend has limitedthe multiplication the a fertilization of tendencytowitnessed France, have including countries, This double phenomenonexplains why the line of ward multipartisanism. developmentin Europe as a whole has assumed such a complexcharacter. The presence or absence of "brakes" upon the tendencyto multiplyhas of the influence played an importantpart in this matter.In certaincountries the operation they workedthrough these brakes has been very great,whether ofthe partiesthemthe strongorganization ofthe electoralsystemor through by an absolute selves. It is a recognizedfact that singleelectionsdetermined whereasothersystems majoritytend to supportor reestablishbipartisanship, are inclinedto favormultirepresentation) electionsor proportional ("run-off" partisanship.In Great Britain,forexample,the trendto eliminatethe Liberal constituParty can clearly be seen by an examinationof the single-member systemofelectionsofthe periodfrom1919 to 1935,the final ency and plurality successorto the resultof whichwas the "Conservative-Labour"combination, "Conservative-Liberal" combination. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth-in New Zealand, and in Australia priorto 1914 as examples-the same electoral system also gave impetus to the fusion of Conservativesand Liberals. But France has not used the methodofthe singleballot since 1848,havingpreferred either "run-off" elections or P.R.-both systemswhich tend toward multiInstead ofthe brake,she has used the accelerator. partisanism.4 Stronglyorganizedparties as well as particularelectoralsystemsconstitute "machines" have been an effective When powerful obstacle to multiplication. new political tendenciesare apt to be operatingfora long time in a country, absorbed by them as they appear, eitherbecause the machinepreventsthem from expressing themselves or because the machine itself expresses them througha sort of internalrenovation.Thus the radical tendencyat the end of of a separate party only in the nineteenth centuryresultedin the formation those countrieswhere the liberal party was loosely organized,as it was in France. Elsewhere-in Great Britain and in Belgium,forexample-this tendency expresseditselfwithinthe liberalpartyitself.In the same way communist ofthe socialdeveloped as a part ofthe existingorganization partieshave often ist parties5;and in those countrieswheresocialist parties are well integrated, And, partieshave stayed weak and withoutpoliticalinfluence. the communist wherethe the growth offascistpartieshas takenplace in thosecountries finally,
4 Cf. on this point Maurice Duverger, Les partis politiques (Paris, 1951), pp. 236 ff., and L'Influence des systemeselectorauxsur la vie politique (Paris, 1950). 6 This was the case in France and in Italy. Germany, however, from 1919 to 1933 proved an exception.

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conservativeparties were poorly organized.In France the absence of a trade union basis has always giventhe socialist partiesthe parliamentary and electoral characterthat is in keepingwith an essentiallyloose organization;and conservatvepartyhas ever existed. no powerful The lack of restraintsupon the common tendency to multiplypolitical whichhave provokedsupdivisionshas in France been accompaniedby factors divisions.The most importantof these has been the internaldiviplementary sion ofthe Rightand the absence ofa unified conservative party.In the middle of the nineteenthcentury,the period when the fundamentalopposition of started in Europe, French conservativeswere conservativesand liberals first formedduringthe afteralready subdividedinto threeirreducible fragments, math ofthe Revolutionof 1789: the Legitimists(partisansof the "legitimate" monarchyof Louis XVI and Louis XViii), the Orleanists (partisans of the monarchyof Louis Philippe) and the Bonapartists (partisans of the Emperor Napoleon). There was no question ofintegrated parties,but only oftendencies limitsand no stable organization. withindeterminate Forty years later,at the ofthe Third Republic,the Rightshowedthe same rifts and the same beginning A tradition was born,whichhas remainedalive and strong: lack oforganization. the French conservatives,having rejected at the beginningboth a political framework and unification, normallyoperate as divided and inorganicunits. there does not exist in France-at least Except under unusual circumstances, ofthe name. This normal to the rightofthe Radicals-political partiesworthy ceases onlywhenthereis a seriousthreatto nationalsecurityor state ofaffairs when some other compellingconcern creates an ephemeral coalition around one man (as that around Louis Napoleon in 1848, General Boulangerin 18861889,and Colonel de la Rocque in 1937-1938). To a certainextent,de Gaulleism today is the same type of phenomenon. France has really never experiencedthe bipartisanshipof the nineteenth century,-notonly because the conservativeshave split internally,but also the liberalshas neverbeen very because the dividingline separatingthemfrom clear. This means that there are always intermediary groupswhich,trying to and establish contacts, are willingto serve the Right minimize differences both towardsthe Center. The existenceof as well as the Left and to influence is still another these "pivotal parties," oscillatingbetweenthe two extremes, traditionof Frenchpoliticallife.Afterthe Bonapartistsand the Orleanistsof 1830-1850,the "Opportunists"filledthis role between 1880 and 1914 and the Radicals between 1919 and 1939. It is the Radicals who share the role today with the MRP. Anothercause of the presentideologicaldivisionsin France stems fromthe actual politicalrole played by the Catholic Churchin the nineteenth century, the conceptionofthisrolewhichpeople have held in mind. and even morefrom the majorityof the clergywere favorableto the Revolution of 1789; At first but when an attempt was made to impose on them the famous "Civil Constitution,"they were throwninto the opposite camp. During the nineteenth the Church,as a matteroffact,was the basic linkamong all the parties century

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of the Right. In 1848 a change nearlytook place whenthe great movementof social catholicism, stirred by the miseryof the working classes, drewthe clergy toward the people. (Almost everywherethe revolutionariescalled on the prieststo bless the "libertytrees.") But then the bourgeoisie-Voltairean and atheist forthe most part at that time-began to returnto the Churchin fear of socialism; and the Church,as of old, took on the function of cementing the riftsbetween the various conservativetendencies.6 This historicalrole fired republicanhostility against "clericalism"at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginningof the twentieth, and it is this resentment whichexplains, in large measure,the passionate tone struckin France when questions arise aid to Catholic schools.The problemcould easily be resolvedifonly concerning it could be liftedout of its historicalcontextand separated from the reactions it provokesin the politicalsubconsciousof the citizens. The Catholicismofthe nineteenth in otherwords,can be considered century, to have been an agent of politicalunionamongall conservative tendencies rather than one of division. Today, however,this is not the case. In practice,the religiousquestionalone separatesthe Radicals from membersofthe Right,and the MRP (apart fromcertainconservativeelements)fromthe Socialists. It is less a presentreligiousquestion than the memoryof one, but that memoryis deep. In 1945 the dreamofcreatinga huge "French Labor Party" from a union ofSocialistsand the MRP failedbecause the anti-clericalism ofthe former could not exist side by side with the clericalismof the latter. The grants to nongovernment schools,approved by statute in October, 1951,have widenedthis breach. The general evolutionaryprocess of the past century,which has been influencedboth by national factorsand by factorscommon among European nations,makes it possible to describethe "political compass-card"of presentday France. The great "spiritualfamilies"of Europe providethe background for the French picture-i.e., conservatives,liberals, socialists, communists, and fascists. The firstfamilyis divided into multiplegroups on the Right; these are divided and unorganizedin keeping with the traditionalstate of Frenchconservatism. The secondfamily, the liberals,includesboththe Radical Party and the rightwing of the MRP. The left wing of the MRP and the SF107 are co-heirs to the socialistpatrimony.(As we have seen, this complication resultsfromthe religiousconflicts of 1900-1910. The Right of the MRP is composed of Catholics in the liberal traditionof the nineteenth century"Christian Radicals," so to speak; and the Left of the same partyis made up of Catholics more or less clearlysocialist.) The French CommunistParty (to whicha small numberof poorlyorganized"ChristianProgressives"should be added) incarnates purely and simply the European communistictendency,
Cf. Henri Guillemin, Histoire des Catholiques franCais au XIXeme siecle (Geneva, 1947), a passionate and partisan book by a "leftist" Catholic, but accurate on the whole. See also Adrien Dansette, Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine,2 vols. (Paris, 1950-1951). French Section of the Workers' International, officialname of the French Socialist Party since it was unifiedin 1905, afterthe International Socialist Congress in Amsterdam.

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whichthe weakness of the socialistshas to the presentallowed to develop in France. On the otherhand, the RFP cannotbe completely assimilatedwithina fascistparty; it corresponds morenearlyto the traditionalBonapartistmovement of French conservatives.And the personalityof its leader, whose moral integrity is unquestionable,gives it a quite distinctive character. This multiplicity of groupsand partiesresulting from the evolutionary process describedabove providesonlyone side ofthe pictureofcontemporary French public opinion; behindthem,still othertypes of groupings have been formed, resultingin more or less permanentcoalitions which play an importantpart in anotherside ofthe picture.
II. COALITIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN POLITICAL POWERS

In all countries withmultiparty systems,alliances have a basic importance. The numerous cellulesinto which public opinionis brokenup generally tend to reassembleintotwo or threeconformations. This phenomenon has always been verymarkedin France; and the best observersofthe politicalscene have been able to perceive,behind the numerousparties,the enduringcharacterof relaThe history tivelystable coalitionswhichcome to powermoreor less regularly. ofthe Third Republic can thus be describedas the struggle betweenthe "party of Order" and the "party of Movement"-the Right and the Left; and this duality in tendencieshas been retainedas a workingbase by the majorityof Frenchspecialistsin electoralsociology.8 However,the developmentof public opinionimmediately afterWorld War II made forsuch a reversalin alliances that it has broughta fundamental change in the traditionalequilibriumof the political powers. It was essentiallythe religiousquestion that caused the parties to regroup into two large oppositioncamps under the Third Republic. Against a Right in whichthe Catholic Churchwas the main bond, the various elementsof the Leftformed at the beginning ofthe twentieth century a coalitionwhichrejected the mythof the "clerical menace." It is true that afterthe War of 1914 this question was onlysecondaryto other,moreimmediateconcernsofthe public; but it continuedto serve as the dividingline betweenpoliticalcoalitionsand to hold an importantplace in the political subconscious.Especially in the small with townsand in the ruralareas, partisansand adversariesgroupedthemselves relationto the priest,as clericall" and "anticlericals."9 Laicism denoted the stamp of the Left,and Catholicismthat of the Right. It was impossibleto be a true Leftist,accordingto the prevailingopinion,and go to Mass. An effort on the part of a small groupof Catholicsto create a leftpartywhichwould not
The "clerical" problem played a certain role in the 1924 elections because of its introduction into the recovered Alsace-Lorraine, in which were still operative the laws voted at the beginning of the century. These laws provided for separation of church and state, lay teaching, regulation of religious congregations, etc. In addition, the members of the teaching profession, and especially those of the primary grades (who play a fairly important role in the frameworkof the Socialist Party), have remained very sensitive regarding the problem of private schools-which are virtually synonymous with denominational schools.
8 See above, n. 2.

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be anti-clerical (Popular DemocraticParty) was largelya failure;the memberon the national scene. ship was weak and had no real influence World War II produced a basic change with regardto the religiousissue. On the one hand, in the Resistance,the old traditionaldivision broke down. Left-contribWhile the Radical Party-the ancientpillarof the anti-clerical in the fightagainst the enemy occupant, militant uted only a small effort membersof the Popular Democratic Party and of the diviCatholics (former sions of the ACJF),1"played a very active role, along with the Socialists and Communists.On the otherhand, economictroublesbroughtto the foreproblems forsolutionswhichthe Third Republic had always triedto avoid. It was between methods, necessaryto choosebetween"liberal" and "State-controlled" social policy,etc.; and the same a conservativesocial policy and a progressive militantCatholics who took part in the Resistance did not hesitate to take the conservativeattirathera socialisticstand, whereasthe Radicals reflected tudes of the classical Right. Immediately followingthe Liberation there occurred a new groupingof political forces: the small Popular Democratic Party of the Third Republic became the powerful Popular Republican Movement,allied with the Communist and Socialist Parties in a majorityof the Left,whichadvocated both "the and and reforms of a socialistcharacter(nationalization purge" of collaborators social securitymeasures). The Radical Party, considerably weakened,adopted almostthe same politicalline as that ofthe Right,opposingthe purges' as well as most social changes and policies ofeconomiccontrolby the government. between "clerical'"and "nonclerical"has not It is true that the old conflict schools has altogetherdisappeared; the question of grantsto privately-owned broughtit to the surfaceagain several times. In 1945 it was the cause of the firstserious breach between the Popular Republicans and the Socialists, a and which, as we have breach whichhas been wellexploitedby the Communists noted, has put an end to all hope for a powerfulFrench WorkersParty throughthe fusionof the MRP and the SFIO. In October, 1951, the vote on the old coalitions of the the Barang6 Act"2resurrected, though temporarily, Third Republic. But the matterof grantsto privateschools remainsverysecondary; except in Vend6e and Lorraine,public opinionitselfdoes not attach much importantto this issue. The MRP's stand on economic and social problemshas remainedfundaIf it supportsthe Pinay experiment, it does so withthe visible mentallyleftist. the incapacityofthe Right.The last National hope ofseeingit fail,thus proving the progressive ofthe majorityof Congressofthe MRP13confirmed orientation
Catholic Associationfor French Youth, organizedon various social levels: The Christian WorkingYouth, the Christian Agricultural Youth, the Christian Student Youth, etc. "1Theirstand on the laws governing the presswhichabolishedthosenewspapers that appeared or continuedto appear underthe occupation, is verysymptomatic. It mustbe that manyof thesenewspapers remembered wereRadical. 12 This law grants, in an indirect and roundabout way, financial help from the state to privately-owned schools. 13 This Congress was held at Bordeaux,May 22-25, 1952.
10

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its members.In the new Left, based upon economicand social attitudes,this party plays about the same role as the Radicals did in the old anti-clerical Left.It is readyto establishcontactswiththe Right ifthe politicalopportunity withthe Right makes it desirable,ready,even, to participatein a government for a limited period,if externalor internaldanger makes it necessary;but it and therebyobligesthe forcesof and doctrinally, stays to the Leftemotionally the Right with whom it works to orienttheir basic programssomewhatto the Left. It is possible to describe the substitutionof the Fourth Republic forthe of partiesaround economicand social problemsinstead Third as a regrouping the conflict betweena of aroundthereligious question;oragain as a changefrom between a conservaCatholic Right and an anti-clericalLeft to the conflict tive Right and a socialist Left. These latter political groupingscould have the same (relative) stability as the ones under the Third Republic. The is about the same as the ratio betweenthe old clerical ratio of theirstrength coalitions.The old Lefthad a slightnumerical over superiority and anti-clerical eradicate but which, the old Right which particularevents could temporarily The centerof politicalgravin the longrun,always tended to be reestablished. was, on the whole,slightlyto the Left. It is the ity in the countrytherefore same today, forthe new social and economic Left is slightlylargerthan the new Right: in the electionsof June 17, 1951, the threeallies of 1945 (Popular Republicans, Socialists, and Communists)secured 53.3 per cent of the votes cast,'4even thoughthese electionsshowed an immenseincreasein conservative since 1945-46. strength the structureof French opinion: the dividing Still anotherfact is affecting of the worldinto two blocs, whichhas already destroyedthe unityof the new or any formaoftripartism Left and whichmakes impossibleany resurrection tion of a new Popular Front. Communistparticipation in a parliamentary and alliance is now out of the question,yet the Communistsrepregovernmental less than half of the economic sent 26.5 per cent of the electorate,or slightly and social Left. The Iron Curtain now stretchesthroughthe middle of this new FrenchLeft and paralyzesit. True, a coalitionis conceivableofall "Westfromthe ern" partiesagainst the CommunistParty, a vast alliance extending extreme Right to and includingthe Socialists. But these prospectiveallies policy would have nothingin common,aside fromtheirpositions on foreign would be of all shades, froma moderate (and even there their Westernism to a completesupportforthe NorthAtlanticPact). Such a regroupneutralism harnessthe MRP and the Socialiststo the Right,thoughin a ing would finally veryminorcapacity in such an alliance. The power of the CommunistParty coupled withits isolationresults,parain weakening the Left and paralyzingit. Because the hundredComdoxically, munistdeputiesin the National Assemblycan, in effect, neitherparticipatein
14 Undoubtedly a certain number of MRP deputies are nearer the Right than the Left. But some Radical deputies (Mr. Mendbs-France, for example) are definitelyto the Left, so that the one defection makes up for the other. Incidentally, among the Radicals under the Third Republic (at the time that party was considered Left), thete were also quite a few conservatives.

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the government norsupportit in any way, no majoritycoalitionofthe Leftcan be formed to supportthe government-yet,the Left continuesto show a small the country.Thus the centerof gravity majorityof the electoratethroughout in Parliamentand the centerof gravityin public opinion no longercoincide; has shifted the centerof gravityof the former to the Right in relationto the latter. This phenomenonproduces two fundamental consequences.First, beof the Left can stabilize itselfin a position of strength cause no government which permitsit to act in responseto the aspirationsof the masses of people (as, forexample, did the 1906 Bloc, the Cartel of 1924,and the'Popular Front of 1936), there is reason to fearthat the popular vote may be drawntowards of the bitternessengendered the CommunistParty, the natural beneficiary would slow down or arrestthe by this situation. (Ironically,this development gradual but continueddeclineofthe Partysince 1946.) The second consequence ofthe ministry, moreapparentthan real underthe Third is that the instability in will of be worse.Governments ofthe Right are danger becoming Republic,15 fromthe Left (MRP, for unable to survive withoutthe supportof a fraction example). But such a fractionwill always be inclined to withdrawfrom a ofthe Centerare concoalitionwhichdoes not please it; and the governments tinuallyplaced in essentiallycontradictory positionson all basic problems. General de Gaulle's Rally of the FrenchPeople is increasing this instability, to itself.To the extentthat the RPF refuses but not withoutprofit to ally itselfwith otherparties,it can be said that its existencedividesthe Rightin the same way that the Communistsdivide the Left,and that a sortofequilibrium is thus achieved by two positionsout ofbalance. But it is moreimportant that the refusalof the RPF to workwith otherpartiespreventsthe presentHouse fromachievingthat homogenousmajorityof the Right whichtheoretically is to an electoral possible-thanks systemwhichgives the Right morethan 320 deputies of 627, even thoughit receivedonly 46.7 per cent of the votes. This failureof the Right minimizesthe accomplishments of the RPF in the eyes of the moderate-minded public, which does not understandthe purpose of its opposition; but, in the long run, this very failurestrengthens the position of the partyby increasingand emphasizingthe powerlessness ofthe existingparliamentaryregime. not to pass a superficial Care should be taken,however, judgmentconcerning the RPF whichwould place it withina preestablished category.It is true that it has the classical Bonapartistgoal of rallying the scatteredelementsof a tradividedRightaroundone man,and itis also truethat it presents ditionally some traits of fascism,includinga willingness to oppose the communistdanger by authoritarianand non-democratic methods.But it must be -remembered that a large portion of the Right stays outside the ranks of the RPF; that the CommunistParty, now isolated and stabilized,is no longera real danger to
'5 Ministries changed, but the members were largely the same; they perpetuated themselves in office,and general policy was little affected by the changes. As a continuation to A. Soulier's L'Instabilit ministeriellesous la Troisieme Rpublique (Paris, 1938), another book could be written, paradoxically not in any way contradicting it, on "The Stability of the Ministers under the Third Republic." "The Stability of the Policy Followed by the Ministers of the Third Republic" is also an entirely appropriate title.

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fromHitler or Mussolini. France; and that de Gaulle, as a man, is fardifferent of the Pinay experiment the RPF has As a matterof fact,fromthe beginning been playing a subtle game-one which misleads many of its supportersas well as its adversariesand whichcould well alterthe positionit occupies on the political checkerboard.Breaking with those of its memberswho (in spite of back a government clearly directivesfromthe party's CommitteeChairman"6) to straddlethe moderatesand orientedtowardthe Right,it is now attempting the Radicals to finda Left-Center, alongsidethe MRP and the Socialists. At the last MRP Congressthe hope was clearlyexpressed-though in veiled terms ofthis dominantsection a majoritywhichcould resultfrom the grouping -for of the RPF with the MRP, the Socialists, and a factionof the Radicals. It is now uncertainwhetherthis "new Third Force" is feasible,but it is noteaftera seven-yearinterval, that the attemptto formit is resurrecting, worthy in some quartersin 1945 fora regrouping based upon Labor the hope cherished aroundthe General. problem These attemptsserve essentiallyto presentanew the fundamental from the governof the Fourth Republic since the evictionof the Communists isolation accompanyingthe intensificamentin 1947 and their parliamentary tion of the cold war. That problemis the old one of "concentration."Many people under the Third Republic (including such importantpersonages as Briand, forexample) have in vain harboredthis dream of a majorityof the Center,which could break the "Right-Left"struggle.However, in the past a incapable of majorityof the Center had no electoral base and was therefore at each stability.The religiousschism and local conditionsfavoredclustering centralistparties. But today these obstacles extremity, constantlyenfeebling built by concentrationno longerexist. And it is certainthat a government the onlyway to reconcile the parliaThird Force type or other-is technically withthat ofthe country at large; and it willcontinue centerofgravity mentary holds. Without to be the onlyway so long as the isolationof the communists no real government stabilitycan be assured,whatevermay this reconciliation reforms. The real problemlies not in juridicalregulations be the constitutional but in the equilibriumof politicalforces. There is, however,one obstacle on this road to concentration. This obstacle is thebody ofeconomicand social problems. For a majority ofthe Centerto have it is essentialthat a certainproportion ofthe middle adequate electoralsupport, weaned fromthe rathernarrowly classes and of the peasants be permanently that is now-theirs. This processis noteasy, yet it is not conservative mentality impossible.
16 Mr. Pinay's investiture as President of the Council was made possible because 27 RPF deputies (out of 114) voted for him, in spite of the group's decision to abstain. Since then, according to the balloting, this number has increased to between 40 and 44. Among the deputies are those who very reluctantly follow orders fromthe Executive Committee. But the RPF left flank,with the General's support, has reacted energetically. In a meeting held on the 6th of July, the Party's National Committee made the "vote discipline" compulsory forthe Parliamentary Group. In the future,party members are to vote as directed by the Executive Committee. As a result of this decision 26 RPF deputies withdrew from the Party, strengtheningthereby its left wing.

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