"The Konoe Memorial" (Presented personally to the Emperor by Prince Konoe Fumimaro February 14, 1945) Regrettably, I think

that defeat is inevitable. What I shall say is based on this assumption. Defeat will be a blemish upon our kokutai1, but public opinion in Great Britain and the United States up to now has not gone so far as change in this kokutai (of course there are extremist opinions among some, and it is also difficult to gauge what sort of change may take place in the future). Thus, if it were only a matter of defeat, I think it would not be necessary to be so concerned about the kokutai. More than defeat itself, what we must be most concerned about from the standpoint of preserving the kokutai is the communist revolution which may accompany defeat. After careful deliberation, it is my belief that at the present time events both within and outside the country are moving rapidly toward a communist revolution. That is to say, outside the country there are extraordinary advances of the Soviet Union. Our people have failed to grasp accurately the intentions of the Soviet Union. Since the adoption of the people's-front tactic in 1935, that is, the tactic of two-stage revolution2, and particularly since the recent dissolution of the Comintern3, there has been a notable tendency to regard the danger of bolshevization4 lightly, but to my mind this is a superficial and frivolous view. That the Soviet Union has not abandoned its plan to ultimately bolshevize the world is gradually becoming clear by her recent obvious machinations toward various countries of Europe. In Europe the Soviet Unioin is trying to establish soviet-style governments in the countries on its borders, and at least pro-Soviet, pro-communist governments in the remaining countries. She is progressing steadily in this task, and at present is encountering success in most instances. The Tito government in Yugoslavia is the most typical concrete example of this. In Poland she has set up a new government centering around the Polish Exiles League prepared ahead of time in the Soviet Union, without considering the exile government in Great Britain.
1

Kokutai: Kokutai is a Japanese term that can be translated as the national polity, or as the national essence.It was a term that wartime ideologues used to refer to the idea that Japan was inherently a nation of people bound by their worship of a divine emperor. 2 People's-front tactic and Two-stage Revolution: 3 Comintern: The Communist International, an organization, headquartered in Moscow, that was meant to coordinate communist movements and communist parties throughout the globe toward the end of producing a world communist revolution. 4 Bolshevization: A reference to the most radical wing of the workers movement in Russia at the time of the October Revolution of 1917 which brought the Soviet Union into being. The movement was split between Mensheviks, who advocated a gradualist and reformist approach to expanding workers political power, and the Bolsheviks who advocated taking power in a violent revolution. Bolshevization refers to the radicalization of a leftist opposition, turning to the methods of revolutionary action to seize power.

When one examines the cease-fire conditions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland, although she stands on the principle of non-intervention in domestic politics, the Soviet Union demands the dissolution of organizatioins that supported Hitler and in practice makes it impossible for a non-soviet government to survive. In Iran she demanded the resignation of the cabinet on the grounds that it did not respond to her demands for oil rights. When Sweden proposed opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union opposed the Swedish government as being pro-Axis and this left no alternative but the resignation of the Swedish foreign minister. In France, Belgium, and Holland, which are under Anglo-American occupation, a severe struggle is continuing between the governments and the armed resistance groups which were used in the war against Germany; these countries have all met political crises, and those who are leading these armed groups mainly follow the communist line. In Germany as in Poland, she intends to establish a new government centering around the Committee for a Liberated Germany which has already been set up, and this has now created a headache for Great Britain and the United States. Despite the fact that on the surface her position is one of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the various European countries, the Soviet Union in this way is actually interfering extensively in domestic affairs and endeavoring to drag domestic politics in a pro-Soviet direction. Soviet intentions toward the Far East are the same. At the present time the Japan Emancipation League has been organized in Yenan under Okano, who came from Moscow, and is linking up with the Korean Independence Union, the Korean Volunteer Army, the Formosan Vanguard Army, and the like, and making overtures toward Japan. As I consider the situation in the light of such conditions, there is considerable danger that the Soviet Union will eventually intervene in Japan's domestic affairs (for example, recognition of the Communist Party; participation in the cabinet by communists as was demanded of the De Gaulle and Badoglio governments; abrogation of the Peace Preservation Law and the Anti-Comintern Pact; and so on). Turning to the domestic scene, I see all the conditions necessary to bring about a communist revolution being prepared day by day: the improverishment of daily life; an increase in the level of labor's voice; a proSoviet mood, which is the other side of a rise in hostile feelings toward Great Britain and the United States; the reform movements of a ring within the military; the movement of the so-called "new bureaucrats" who ride on this; and the secret maneuvers of leftist elements who are manipulating this from behind. Of these, that which warrants greatest concern is the reform movement of a ring within the military. Many young military men seem to believe that our kokutai and communism can coexist, and it is my belief that the basic tone of the reform theory within the military also reflects this. [I have heard indirectly that this view is even listened to within the imperial family.] The majority of professional military men come from families below the middle class, and many are in circumstances which make it easy to accept communist allegations; in addition, since they are thoroughly indoctrinated in the concept of kokutai through their

military education, the communist elements are trying to get hold of them through this theory of the coexistence of kokutai and communism. It has now become apparent that it was a deliberate plot within the military which gave rise to the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and, by expanding this, eventually led to the Great East Asian War. It is a well-known fact that at the time of the Manchurian Incident they publicly stated that the aim of the incident lay in domestic reform. At the time of the China Incident it was a central figure of this ring who publicly stated, "It is better for the incident to be prolonged, for if it is solved domestic reform will become impossible." Although the goal of the reform theory of this ring within the military is not necessarily a communist revolution, the intention of deliberately dragging this toward a communist revolution is held by a segment of the bureaucrats and civilian supporters involved (whether you call it right wing or left wing, the socalled right wing has become communism wearing the garments of kokutai), and in my opinion it is not far from wrong to regard the simple, ignorant military men as being manipulated by them. For the past ten years I have had associations in the several fields of the military, bureaucracy, right wing, and left wing, and this is the conclusion I have reached recently after calm reflection. And when I observe the events of the last ten years in the light of this conclusion, I now feel that there are a great many things that fall into place. During this period I have twice received the imperial order to form a cabinet, but in order to avoid conflict and dissension within the country I was impatient to achieve national unity by accomodating as much as possible the pronouncements of these reform advocates, as a result of which I failed adequately to perceive the intentions hidden behind their pronouncements. This was due entirely to my lack of insight and was indeed inexcusable; it is a matter for which I feel deep responsibility. Recently, as the war enters a stage of crisis, voices calling for "onehundred million fighting to the death" have gradually increased in strength. Those who make such pronouncements are the so-called right-wingers, but it is my estimation that the ones who are agitating them from behind are communist elements who ultimately are aiming at the goal of revolution by turning the country into chaos in this manner. On the one hand we advocate the complete destruction of the United States and Great Britain, while on the other hand the pro-Soviet atmosphere appears to be gradually becoming thicker. There are elements within the military who even preach holding hands with the Soviet Union no matter what sacrifice this entails, and others who are considering cooperation with Yenan.5 As I have stated above, both within and outside the country every condition favorable to the advancement of a communist revolution is growing day by day, and should the state of the war become even more disadvantageous hereafter, it is my opinion that these conditions will develop rapidly. It would be a different matter if there were even a slight hope of breaking free insofar as the future state of the war is concerned, but if we continue under
5

Yenan: The city/region where the Chinese Communist party based their insurgency after 1936. Yenan is in north China several hundred miles to the west of Peking.

the assumption that defeat is inevitable, to pursue the war further with no prospect of victory will place us completely in the hands of the Communist Party. Thus, from the standpoint of preserving the kokutai, I firmly believe that we must work out our method of concluding the war as soon as possible. The greatest obstacle to conclusion of the war is the existence within the military of that ring which ever since the Manchurian Incident has been pushing things forward until the situation of today. Although they have already lost confidence in their ability to carry out the war, they will nonetheless resist to the end in order to maintain face. Should we resolve to end the war quickly without wiping out this ring, then there is the danger that the civilian supporters of both the right wing and left wing, who are the counterpart of this ring, may well cause great confusion within the country and make it difficult to achieve this objective. Thus if we are to terminate the war, as an essential precondition to this we must first wipe out this ring. If only this ring is wiped out, then the bureaucrats as well as the civilian elements of the right wing and left wing who ride on its coattails will be subdued. They do no yet constitute a major force and are merely trying to realize their ambitions by utilizing the military, and thus, if we cut off the root, the branches and leaves will wither as a matter of course. Also, although it may be rather wishful thinking, once this ring is wiped out the features of the military will change greatly, and is it not possible that the atmosphere in the United States, Great Britain, and Chungking6 will then relax? From the beginning the goal of the United States, Great Britain, and Chungking has been the overthrow of the Japanese military clique, and so, if the character of the military changes and its policy altered, I wonder if they on their part would not reconsider the continuation of the war. Be that as it may, since wiping out this ring and carrying out the reconstruction of the military are the preconditions and prerequisites for saving Japan from a communist revolution, I entreat your extraordinary and courageous consideration. Postsript In response to the emperor's question about American attitudes toward the kokutai, Konoe responded as follows: "I think there is no alternative to making peace with the United States. Even if we surrender unconditionally, I feel that in America's case she would not go so far as to reform Japan's kokutai or abolish the imperial house. Japan's territory might decrease to half of what it is at present, but even so, if we can extricate the people from the miserable ravages of war, preserve the kokutai, and plan for the security of the imperial house, then we should not avoid unconditional surrender."

Chungking: The capital of Nationalist China after the Japanese took the previous capital, Nanking, in December 1937.

This document was transcribed from the following source: John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, Harvard University Press, 1979.