[p. 1] I. GODS AND MEN.

To a modern reader the most striking characteristic of the Homeric gods is their humanity ; but this cannot possibly have been their chief attribute. What constitutes their divinity is not their likeness to man but the quality that distinguishes them from him. From our point of view the most important criterion for the distinction between gods and men is the fact that the gods only existed in the belief of their worshippers. Such a view, however, necessarily implies that one has ceased to believe in the gods in question ; for a living religious faith the gods are just as real as anything else. If they are conceived anthropomorphically they must consequently possess some other quality which renders them divine and distinct from man. It thus follows that if Homers description of the gods embodied a living religious faith, if it was genuinely felt to represent reality, the gods cannot have been regarded as wholly human and their human attributes must have been of secondary importance. If on the other hand the gods are human throughout it is definitely improbable that they were the objects of faith. Wides definition of the Homeric gods expresses the current view1. They are, he says, wholly human, they have human form, human feelings and passions and even share the moral imperfections of mankind ; yet they are immortal, possessed of superhuman power and superior to man in strength, beauty, and intelligence2. From this view it follows that the only clear distinction between gods and men is furnished by the immortality of the gods. This is accordingly their chief attribute3. The other qualities of the gods [p. 2] are entirely human, though brought to greater perfection and more highly developed than in the average man. But this intensification of human characteristics at most amounts to a difference in degree, not to a difference in kind1. It may, however, be doubted whether immortality alone was held to constitute divine status. As a mere prolongation of life, which is in itself no quality, immortality ought to be due to some specific characteristic of the gods that exempts them from old age and death. In fact, it was held to result from the special nourishment of the gods2. It would thus seem more satisfactory to regard immortality as a symptom or a function of the power of the gods3. For the believer the immortality of the gods cannot have been of very great importance. It mattered very little whether the god was immortal or not, whereas his power often manifested itself in a very tangible way4. Further, it seems probable that if the idea of immortality really formed the essential element of the conception of the god, words with the signification divine or holy, like dios, theios and hieros would be synonymous with immortal . This is however not the case. They are on the contrary used in the sense of excellent , marvellous , awful , and powerful 5. Thus power seems to be the essential attribute of the gods ; but if this power is of the same nature as man s, only greater, no specific distinction between gods and men can be based on it. In that case we are concerned with a difference in degree only, for the observation that the gods in general are superior to man does not enable us [p. 3] to draw any clear line of demarcation between the two categories. The superiority of the gods is indeed far from absolute. 1. WIDE in Gercke-Norden, Einl. in die Altertumswissenschaft ll : 2, p. 1 2. Cf. e. g. NGELSBACH I. 13 sq. ; NILSSON, History 142 sq., 157; id. Minoan-Mycenaean Religion 542 ; WILAMOWITZ, Glaube I. 333 ; NESTLE, Griechische Religiositat I. 17 ; PFISTER, Griechische und romische Religion 191 ; SEYMOUR, Life in the Homeric Age 414 ; BOWRA, Tradition and Design 222.

3. NILSSON, History 157 : The immortality of the gods drew a clear line of demarcation which man could not pass. In other respects no such line exists. Cf. NGELSBACH I. 38 sq. 1. Cf. NILSSON, I. c. 2. Ngelsbach I. 16 sq., 42 sq. ; ROSCHER, Nektar und Ambrosia 51 sq. Cf. also BUTTMANN, Lexil. I. 133 ; FINSLER, Homer 161. For the connection of this idea with the practice of enbalming see ROSCHER, op. cit. ; id. in Roschers Lex. s. v. Ambrosia ; HELBIG, Das Homerische Epos 56. 3. Menelaus did not become a god when he was exempted from death (Od. 4.561 sq. ; cf. NGELSBACH I. 40, whose argument is, however, not convincing). Cf. the story about Tithonus, who was granted immortality but not youth (Hymn. Hom. in Ven. 219 sq. ; cf. d. Col., 607 sq.). ROSE, Prim. Cult., 91. 4. WIDE, op. cit. 24. Cf. also OTTO, Die Gtter Griechenlands 310. 5. According to CURTIUS (Etymol. No. 614) the original sense of is strong. Cf. ButcherLang, note on Od. 1.2 ; BOISACQ, Dictionnaire tymologique s. v. ; WILAMOWITZ, Glaube I.21 sq. ; KRETSCHMER, Glotta 11 (1921). p. 278 sq. ; LIDDELL and SCOTT, Greek-English Lexicon s. v. , , and . ERLAND Ehnmark, The Idea of God in Homer, trad. Olof von Feilitzen, Uppsala : Almqvist et Wiksells Boktryckeri-A.-B., 1935.