Argues that reformist political theory and practice is incapable, by itself, of winning even modest reforms. Instead, Brenner shows how militant, non-reformist political movements are a essential condition of winning reforms. When militant mass movements wither, so do the prospects of reformists. Left to their own devices, reformists---committed, as they are, to "partnering with the boss" in bargaining as well as to the electoral road to social change---are incapable of winning reforms. Progressive reforms are only possible when there are militant, extra-electoral movements capable of wresting concessions from dominant groups.
Argues that reformist political theory and practice is incapable, by itself, of winning even modest reforms. Instead, Brenner shows how militant, non-reformist political movements are a essential condition of winning reforms. When militant mass movements wither, so do the prospects of reformists. Left to their own devices, reformists---committed, as they are, to "partnering with the boss" in bargaining as well as to the electoral road to social change---are incapable of winning reforms. Progressive reforms are only possible when there are militant, extra-electoral movements capable of wresting concessions from dominant groups.
Argues that reformist political theory and practice is incapable, by itself, of winning even modest reforms. Instead, Brenner shows how militant, non-reformist political movements are a essential condition of winning reforms. When militant mass movements wither, so do the prospects of reformists. Left to their own devices, reformists---committed, as they are, to "partnering with the boss" in bargaining as well as to the electoral road to social change---are incapable of winning reforms. Progressive reforms are only possible when there are militant, extra-electoral movements capable of wresting concessions from dominant groups.