Michael Bratman, Davidsons Theory of Intention Two Faces of Intention Davidson on intending and intentional action.

An intentional action = an action that is caused by, and hence explained by, a desire (pro-attitude), belief and (in many cases) an intention Desires (pro-attitudes) = prima-facie judgments - doing X is desirable insofar as it has characteristic Y - e.g. an act of listening to Pavarotti would be desirable insofar as it involves the auditory pleasure of listening to Pavarotti Beliefs = instrumental beliefs - e.g. I believe that by going to Davies Hall I can hear Pavarotti sing

2 cases: action without or with future intention Actions without future intentions: Pro-attitude + belief causes action = all-out judgment = intention

The concert is in an hour. An act of listening to Pavarotti would be desirable insofar as it involves the auditory pleasure of listening to Pavarotti. By going to Davies Hall I can listen to Pavarotti. Action: I go to Davies Hall = all-out judgment: going to Davies Hall is desirable. = intention (not distinct from action) to go to Davies Hall

Actions preceded by future intentions Pro-attitude + belief all-out judgment = future intention action

Its the day before the concert at Davies Hall. An act of listening to Pavarotti would be desirable insofar as it involves the auditory pleasure of listening to Pavarotti. By going to Davies Hall tomorrow I can listen to Pavarotti. Going to Davies Hall tomorrow is desirable. (future intention) Its now tomorrow. I go to Davies Hall. (action)

The action is caused by and explained by the pro-attitude, belief and future intention. Note: a future intention need not result in an action.
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Recall the problem for future intentions. In the first sort of case, when there is no future intention and the intention is realized in the action itself, the all-out judgment is directed at a particular, present action. -e.g. This going to Davies Hall right now is desirable. (full-stop) But in a case in which one forms a future intention, the all-out judgment is not directed at any particular action but rather a type or class of actions: - e.g. Going to Davies Hall tomorrow is desirable.

type or class of actions The problem is that it doesnt make sense to judge all-out that all the members of a class of actions are desirable (full-stop). There are many instances of going to Davies Hall tomorrow that are not all-out desirable, e.g. one in which I hijack a cab in order to get there. Solution: the actions are restricted to those that are consistent with my beliefs
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Future intention to X = all-out judgment that any Xing that is consistent with what I believe is desirable Note: this means that it is impossible to intend to do something you believe you cannot or will not do. - I believe that I cannot swim to the bottom of the ocean. Hence, I cannot intend to swim to the bottom of the ocean - since there is no swimming-to-the-bottom-of-the-ocean act which is consistent with what I believe - I believe that I will not get a lip piercing. Hence, I cannot intend to get a lip piercing - since there is no lip-piercing act with is consistent with what I believe. intending to X not believing you will not X not believing you cannot X
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On the other hand, as we saw before, for Davidson intending to X believing you will X

Bratman raises the question whether, for Davidson, intending to X requires believing that you are able to X:

intending to X

????

believing you are able to X

He argues that Davidson would deny this implication, i.e. Bratman argues that on Davidsons view, intending to X does not require believing you are able to X. - concert example: I believe might be in jail, so I do not believe that I am able to go to the concert, yet I still intend to go to the concert - carbon copies example: I do not believe that I am able to make 10 legible copies

Bratman: 2 problems for Davidsons theory of future intentions Both problems depend on Bratmans principle of Agglomerativity for intentions: Principle of Agglomerativity for intentions: If at one and the same time I rationally intend to A and rationally intend to B then it should be both possible and rational for me, at the same time, to intend to A and B. (22) Agglomerativity is a consequence of the coordinating role of intentions. You have plans that guide you from day to day and also over the long term. These plans lead you to form intentions, both on a day-to-day basis and for the longer term. You want to act in such a way as to achieve your goal and so you intend to act in various ways. Your intentions and actions are coordinated in such a way as to help you follow out your plan. Desires are not agglomerative. - Bratmans example: I want to drink a milk-shake this afternoon, and I want to go for a run. But I dont want to both drink a milk-shake and go for a run. (22)

First problem: Buridans Ass Bratman: Suppose I know I can stop at one of two bookstores after work, Keplers or Printers Inc., but not both. And suppose I find both options equally attractive. I judge all-out that any act of my stopping at Keplers would be just as desirable as any act of stopping at Printers Inc., given my beliefs.(22) Weak comparative all-out judgments vs. Strong comparative all-out judgments Weal comparative all-out judgment to do X: - doing X is as desirable as the alternatives Strong comparative all-out judgment to do X: - doing X is more desirable than the alternatives

In this case, what are my future intentions? Suppose I intend to go to Keplers and I intend to go to Printers. - this requires holding that all-out judgments are weak comparisons - going to Keplers / Printers is as desirable as the alternatives (Strong comparative all-out judgment: going to Keplers / Printers is more desirable than the alternatives) - Problem: since I believe that I cannot, and will not, go to both, I cannot rationally intend to go to Keplers and to Printers. - violation of Agglomerativity This shows that all-out judgments must be strong comparative judgments. If so, then I do not intend to go to Keplers and I do not intend to go to Printers - I have neither intention. But this leads to... - the Buridans Ass problem: It seems that I can just decide on which bookstore to go to, while continuing to see each option as equally desirable. Such a decision provides me with an intention which does not correspond to a strong comparative evaluation.(23) 9

Davidsons response (in Reply to Michael Bratman): He [Bratman] correctly points out that sometimes we have to decide even when we can find no obvious grounds for decision. But if there is reason to reach some decision, and there are no obvious or intrinsic grounds for decision, we find extrinsic grounds. Perhaps I flip a coin to decide. My need to choose has caused me to prefer the alternative indicated by the toss; a trivial ground for preference, but a good enough one in the absence of others.(200) If I have really decided that there are no reasons to prefer going to Keplers or Printers, then in order to decide I have to invent a reason to go to one or the other, e.g. a coin toss. Suppose the toss comes out in favor of Keplers. Then I can make the strong comparative all-out judgment in favor of going to Keplers.

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Bratmans second problem Bratman: I have for a long time wanted to buy copies of The White Hotel and The Fixer, and know I will be at a bookstore this afternoon. Further, I know the bookstore will have one or the other of these novels in stock, but not both. Unfortunately, I do not know which one will be in stock.(23) On Davidsons account of intentions, do I intend to buy The Fixer? - I do not believe that I will be able to buy The Fixer (since it may not be in stock) - that The Fixer is in stock is an enabling condition on buying the fixer. I do not have the belief that this enabling condition will be met. - So, of the future courses of events consistent with what I believe, some will involve The Fixer being in stock, and others wont. - Given that the enabling conditions are consistent with my beliefs, in deciding whether buying The Fixer is all-out desirable, I consider those futures that are consistent with my beliefs and in which the enabling conditions hold. - In all of these possible futures, buying The Fixer is more desirable than any alternative. Hence, I have the intention to buy The Fixer.
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Future intentions to X = all-out judgment that any Xing consistent with my beliefs is desirable. Enabling conditions for X = conditions that must obtain in order for it to possible to X Bratmans example: that there are tickets available is a necessary condition for going to the concert. I do not know whether there will be tickets available - I dont believe there will be, and I dont believe there wont be. So the enabling condition is consistent with what I believe, but is not entailed by what I believe. Would any concert-going, consistent with my beliefs, be desirable? - Bratman: In answering my question, then, I limit my attention to futures consistent with my beliefs and in which obtain all enabling conditions for going to the concert.(21)

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By an exactly parallel line of reasoning I also have the intention to buy The White Hotel. - I intend to buy The Fixer - I intend to buy The White Hotel - But, I believe that I cannot both buy The Fixer and buy The White Hotel -Violation of Agglomerativity: I cannot intend to both buy The Fixer and The White Hotel This is a violation of Agglomerativity even if future intentions = strong comparative all-out judgments.

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Davidsons reply: In this situation, he claims, buying The White Hotel is not an alternative to buying The Fixer since according to my analysis the latter [?] is not open to me in any future which is both consistent with my beliefs and in which I can buy The Fixer. The trouble lies in the last phrase: on my analysis it would not be included. Since each alternative is consistent with his beliefs, each purchase is an alternative to the other.(198) Prior to forming a future intention, you consider all of the alternatives open to you that are consistent with your beliefs. Whichever alternative you judge to be the most desirable is the one for which you form the future intention. The fact that two actions are incompatible does not mean that they are not alternatives. This amounts to denying that future intentions are conditioned by enabling conditions.

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Im thinking about what to do this weekend: - cross-country skiing (enabling condition = 1 foot of snow) - ice-skating (enabling conditions = 30 or colder, no snow) - picnic (enabling condition = 40 or warmer, no snow) I have no idea what the weather will be like - I have no beliefs about any of these enabling conditions. In considering whether to go cross-country skiing I still consider the other options even though they are ruled out if the enabling conditions for cross-country skiing obtain. Also, there is another option I left out: - do whatever the weather permits Davidson thinks that this is what I will make the all-out judgment for.

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Davidson: If Bratman believes only one of the books he wants will be available, among the relevant options he can consider are: buy the available book, buy The Fixer, buy The White Hotel, but The Fixer only, but The White Hotel only, and buy neither. Under the circumstances, the first option is the one Bratman will rank highest, and it will determine his intention.(199)

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Michael Bratman, Two Faces of Intention Bratmans target in this essay: The Simple View of intentional action and intention: ...for me intentionally to A I must intend to A; my mental states at the time of action must be such that A is among those things I intend. (179) Intentionally Xing intending to X

The Simple View is one form of a more general view that Bratman accepts: The Single Phenomenon View: ...intentional action and the state of intention both involve a certain common state, and it is the relation of an action to this state that makes the action intentional.(180) Simple View: common state = intention to X
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Before getting to his official counterexample to the Simple View, Bratman argues that it is easy to show that the Simple View is false if one accepts what he calls the strong belief requirement on intention: The Strong Belief Requirement on intention: intending to X believing you will X As we have seen, Davidson rejects this requirement, Davis accepts it. Bratman agrees with Davidson - he rejects the Strong Belief requirement. His point here, however, is to show that there are easy arguments against the Simple View if we accept this requirement. Example: I am playing a video game in which I guide a missile onto a target. It is hard to hit the target, and Im doubtful that I will hit it - I do not believe that I will hit it. Nevertheless, if I do hit the target I hit it intentionally. But since I didnt believe that I would hit it, I didnt intend to hit it. I intentionally hit the target + I did not intend to hit the target (see p.185)
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This is not Bratmans argument against the Simple View. Bratman rejects the Strong Belief Requirement. Bratman: For example, I might intend now to stop at the bookstore on the way home while knowing of my tendency towards absent-mindedness - especially once I get on my bike and to into automatic pilot. If I were to reflect on the matter I would be sceptical about my stopping there, for I know I may well forget. It is not that I believe I will not stop; I just do not believe I will. Still, my plan is to stop.(186) Bratman intends to stop at the bookstore but he does not believe that he will stop at the bookstore. - if so, then the Strong Belief Requirement is false

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Even though Bratman rejects the Strong Belief requirement, he does accept certain rationality constraints on intention. Weak Consistency: ...my intentions are weakly consistent if they could all be put together into an overall plan that is internally consistent.(182) - the intention to A and the intention to not-A are not weakly consistent Strong Consistency: My intentions are strongly consistent, relative to my beliefs if all my intentions could be put together into an overall plan that is consistent with those beliefs.(182) - I believe that I cannot both go to Europe in July and earn money in a summer job. Therefore, my intention to go to Europe in July and my intention to earn money in a summer job are not strongly consistent.

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These are constraints on rational intention. In order to be rational, ones intentions must be both weakly and strongly consistent. Why? Because of the coordinating role of intentions. Intentions serve to coordinate my own actions, and to coordinate my actions with the actions of others. They allow me to make plans. Bratman:Intentions aid co-ordination as elements in larger plans. The concern with co-ordination exerts pressure towards unification of our various intentions. So if our intentions are able to be well-suited to aid co-ordination, we should be able to put them together into a larger plan which can serve this co-ordinating role well. But to co-ordinate my activities over time a plan should be, other things being equal, internally consistent [weak consistency]. ... Further, a good co-ordinating plan is a plan for the world I find myself in [strong consistency].(182) Recall the principle of Agglomerativity: if I rationally intend to A and rationally intend to B then it should be possible for me to rationally intend to A and B Agglomerativity requires that ones intentions are both weakly and strongly consistent.
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Bratmans official argument against the Simple View. Video game example:

target 1

target 2

Im guiding missile 1 with my left hand, missile 2 with my right hand. I know that the video game is set-up so that if both targets are about to be hit simultaneously, the game shuts down and neither is hit. I know I cannot hit both targets. Nevertheless, I try to hit each one - there is a reward for hitting one of the targets.
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Bratman: Suppose I do hit target 1 in just the way I was trying to hit it, and in a way which depends heavily on my considerable skills at such games. It seems, again, that I hit target 1 intentionally. So, on the Simple View, I must intend to hit target 1. Given the symmetry of the case I must also intend to hit target 2. But given my knowledge that I cannot hit both targets, these two intentions fail to be strongly consistent.(185) Reductio ad absurdum: 1. Simple View. 2. Strong Consistency requirement 3. I hit target 1 intentionally. 4. I intended to hit target 1. 5. I intended to hit target 2. 6. I know I cannot hit targets 1 & 2. 7. I am not irrational. TILT - (4)-(7) conflict with (2)
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Assumption Assumption Assumption (1) & (3) symmetry of the case Assumption Assumption

Regarding (5) - I intended to hit target 2. Bratman - discussing a prior example in which the targets are not linked: But what about my intentions concerning target 2? I was trying equally hard, and with equal skill, as well as with equally weak confidence of success, to hit target 2. It seems clear from the symmetry of the case that if I intend to hit target 1 I also intend to hit target 2.(184) Bratman considers a number of objections to this argument against the Simple View (pp.187-9). 1. 2. Only future directed intentions are subject to the strong consistency requirement. I did not hit target 1 intentionally.

Lets skip these objections and proceed to Bratmans positive view. I will come back to them later on.

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Single Phenomenon view: ...intentional action and the state of intention both involve a certain common state, and it is the relation of an action to this state that makes the action intentional.(180)

Distinctive proattitude involved in intentionally Aing Simple View Volitional View Bratman intention to A volition to A (I will to A) intention to B (where it may be that B A) assumption of tight fit: intentionally Aing involves distinctive mental state directed at A

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Volitional View - 3 varieties: 1. Volitions = intentions - collapses into Simple View Volitions = distinctive kind of mental state unrelated to intentions - Bratman passes over this option Grice: intention to A = volition to A + belief that one will A - problem: entails strong belief requirement on intention, which Bratman has already rejected

2.

2.

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Bratmans View Intentionally Aing requires an intention, but not necessarily the intention to A. Video games example revisited: - I intentionally hit target 1, but I did not intend to hit target 1 - but, there was an intention on which I was acting when I intentionally hit target 1 What was my intention? Bratman suggests a number of possibilities: - I intended to try to hit target 1 - I intended to hit target 1 if I could - I intended to hit either one of the two targets Another possibility: - I intended to get the reward

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If intentionally Aing does not require the intention to A, but it does require an intention, what kind of intention is required? In hitting target 1 intentionally, why cant my intention be, e.g.: - I intended to get a haircut that afternoon or - I intended to go to the movies that night Suppose I really had these intentions when I was playing the video game - why cant these intentions be the ones that make my action intentional? On Bratmans view, intentionally Aing requires an intention that has Aing in its motivational potential. intending to get the reward has in its motivational potentional hitting target 1 intending to get a haircut does not have hitting target 1 in its motivational potential

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Heres a way of thinking about the motivational potential of an intention: motivational potential of an intention = function from contexts to actions Let C = context in which I am sitting in front of the video game MR = motivational potential of the intention to get the reward MH = motivational potential of the intention to a haircut MR(C) = {hitting target 1, hitting target 2, trying to hit target 1, trying to hit target 2, trying to hit either target} MH(C) = {brushing my hair, going to the barbershop, etc.}

Bratmans idea: intentionally Aing requires an intention which has Aing in its motivational potential

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Marathon example: Suppose I intend to run the marathon and believe that I will thereby wear down my sneakers. Now it seems to me that it does not follow that I intend to wear down my sneakers, and in a normal case I will not so intend. One sign of the absence of such an intention will be the fact that I am not at all disposed to engage in further reasoning aimed at settling on some means to wearing down my sneakers. ... Even so, if I proceed to run the marathon and actually do wear down my sneakers then I might well do so intentionally.(199) I intentionally wear down my sneakers, but I do not intend to wear down my sneakers. My intention is to run the marathon. MM = motivational potentional of intention to run the marathon MM(context of marathon) = {running for a long time, drinking water at aid stations, smiling for the cameras, wearing down my sneakers, etc.}

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Jump shot: I intend to shoot a jump shot. I know that my jump shot will have to contain certain sub-components, for example: stopping on my left foot. But as a skilled jump-shooter I need not intend all this, for my intentions and plans are typically at a level of abstraction appropriate to my skills.(200) I intentionally stop on my left foot, but I did not intend to stop on my left foot. My intention was to shoot a jump shot. This intention has in its motivational potential the action of stopping on my left foot.

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Recall the two objections to Bratmans argument against the Simple View: Only future directed intentions are subject to the strong consistency requirement. I did not hit target 1 intentionally.

Response to (1): suppose on the morning before I played the video game I had the future directed intention to hit target 1 and the future directed intention to hit target 2. When I sit down to play the video game in the afternoon, these become present directed intentions. If these intentions were subject to the strong consistency constraint in the morning, arent they still subject to that constraint in the afternoon? Variant on (1): strong consistency requirement can be lifted in certain cases, e.g. the video game example. There are strong pragmatic reasons for trying to hit both targets, and hence its rational to intend to hit both targets. - McCann pursues this line of objection Bratman: My response is to reject the contention that I must intend to hit each target in order best to pursue the reward. What I need to do is to try to hit each target. But this does not mean that I must intend to hit each target.(188)
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Second objection: I didnt hit target 1 intentionally - what I did intentionally was hit one of the two targets Bratmans response: there are variants on the example in which it is plausible to say that I only intentionally hit one of the two targets Variant 1:

label on the back Variant 2:

2
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Bratman: It is important to note, however, that my case is different from these. ... First, I want to hit target 1 and so am trying to do so. Second, my attempt to hit target 1 is guided specifically by my perception of that target, and not by my perception of other targets. Relevant adjustments in my behavior are dependent specifically on my perception of that target. Third, I actually hit target 1 in the way I was trying, and in a way that depends on my relevant skills. Fourth, it is my perception that I have hit target 1, and not merely my perception that I have hit a target, that terminates my attempt to hit it.(189) The point of this is that in the original video game example I did in fact hit target 1 intentionally. But since I didnt intend to hit target 1, the Simple View is false. What was my intention in intentionally hitting target 1? - lets suppose it was the intention to hit one of the two targets Let O = intention to hit one of the two targets MO = motivational potential of O
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MO (original video game context) = {hitting target 1, hitting target 2} MO (variant 1 context) = {hitting either one of the targets} MO (variant 2 context) = {hitting either one of the targets} I can have the very same intention, i.e. the intention to hit one of the two targets, in the original example and in the variant examples. The difference is that in the variant examples, the motivational potential of this intention does not include hitting target 1 or hitting target 2. See p.196.

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