Appendix

A Proposal for the Evolution and Development of Free Will

Eddy Nahmias 1. Introduction This dissertation has argued that free will is constituted by a set of cognitive abilities, which allow us to introspect on our motivational states and evaluate themto know our own mindsand to act on this knowledge. Rather than requiring a unique metaphysical ability (such as contra-causal powers), this view sees free will as coming in various degrees. And in normal adult humans these abilities are particularly well-developed (in a way that supports reactive attitudes and moral responsibility, allowing for our social and legal practices). We want to know, then, how it is that these abilities have become relatively advanced in humans, and how they become more advanced as humans grow up. We should, therefore, look for naturalistic explanations for the existence of free will: How, as a species, did we evolve free will? And how, as individuals, do we develop free will? From our vantage point, it may seem obvious that possessing the sorts of knowledge about oneself and the world, which I have associated with free will, would provide a clear selective advantage. An animal with the ability to predict its own behavior by being aware of its various desires and their possible outcomes in the world would surely increase the animals rate of survival and reproduction relative to conspecifics that lacked this ability. The story would go like this: Most animals react differentially to their environment, moving towards what has helped their ancestors survive and reproduce, or what has positively reinforced them in the past, and moving away from what has killed their ancestors, or what has negatively reinforced them. These motivationsgenetically derived or behavioristically learnedare crucial to the animals survival and reproduction. However, they are based on mechanisms which drive the animal to act on whichever motivation is strongest at a given time (like Frankfurts wanton). But the strongest motivation is not always the most advantageous for the animal, given other factors in its environment and given its longer-term prospects (e.g. a subordinate monkey acting on his motivation to mate may never reproduce if the dominant kills him or expels him from the group). Hence, there should be selective pressures for the ability to inhibit ones immediate desires and allow for increased flexibility of behaviorjust as behavioristic learning allows more flexible responses to variable environments than genetic mechanisms. If only an animal could consider whether or not to act on its strongest motivation. One way this might occur is if the animal could represent itself in its environment, represent various actions (based on its various motivations), and represent likely outcomes of those actions. That is, an animal that could know its various motivations, imagine their likely outcomes in the world, and act accordingly would do well in comparison to an animal that just acted on its immediate desires. Basically, there should be selective pressures for the abilities I have associated with free will; persons should be able to survive and reproduce better than wantons. Thats a plausible story. But it leaves way too many questions unanswered. For instance, what particular environmental features (social and physical) would select for these representational cognitive abilities? And from what prior traits (e.g. cognitive structures) might these abilities arise? Not every potentially advantageous trait evolves (not even close); it takes the right mutations in the right selective environment. And you cant get something from nothing; complex traits do not evolve without precursors (any more than adult human beings arise from

swamps). To provide even the beginnings of a plausible evolutionary account for a particular trait, we need a lot more information.1 We need to know, for instance, which creatures have the trait in question and which of their nearest relatives dont, and which features of the environment in which they evolved might have made the difference. And we need to know what primitive traits might have served as the building blocks for the derived (evolved) trait. As with other traits, when dealing with cognitive abilities, there should be no inexplicable differences in kind between related species abilities. As Darwin stated: If no organic being excepting man had possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been gradually developed. But it can be shewn that there is no fundamental difference of this kind (1871: 445). Agent causation seems to attribute to humans a wholly different nature from any other animal (not surprising given its historical connection to immaterial souls). An evolutionary account of free will must locate it in abilities (or powers) that can be traced to ones possessed by other animals.2 But even the abilities to introspect on, identify with, and influence our motivations in the way I have described seem to involve significantly different powers than those possessed by other animals. Indeed, Darwin, recognizing the significance of such abilities, seems to contradict the claim I quote above when he writes: A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have this capacity (1871: 88-89). However, our apparent uniqueness can be explained, in part, because many human ancestors, which may have possessed intermediate cognitive abilities between those displayed by modern humans and by our nearest living relatives, are extinct. Hence, we will need to look for lower-level building blocks of the cognitive abilities required for full-fledged free will. I believe we will find them in more basic representational abilities, including perhaps the ability to recognize others as self-moving agents rather than objects, the ability to imitate others and respond to what they see, the ability to inhibit ones immediate impulses, and the ability to predict ones own and others behavior based on internal states. This last ability, to represent motivational and perceptual states, is sometimes referred to as theory of mind. Theory of mind, I will suggest, offers a foundation for the introspective abilities required for free will. By surveying theories and experiments from several fields, including developmental and comparative psychology, I offer a proposal for the evolution and development of these representational cognitive abilities. My proposal deals with the evolution of theory of mind in primates and its development in very young children. I leave it to others to advance proposals for how these foundational ablities develop into full-fledged free will as children grown up in an appropriate social setting. 2. The Basic Idea
See Brandon (1990: 165-176) for the criteria required for a complete adaptation explanation. In the proposal below, I will provide evidence for some elements of such an explanationprimarily for an evolutionary trend suggesting selection has occurred and a description of the selective environment in which the trait is adaptive. I will not offer evidence of heritability or patterns of gene flow in populations.
2 1

See Waller (1998). 2

My proposal seeks to link together ideas from several areas of recent research in primate social behavior and cognition and in child development. It begins with Robert Trivers model for reciprocal altruism, a system in which individuals exchange benefits over time. This model has been used to support theories about the evolution of human ethical systems and moral emotions. For instance, Frans de Waal writes, there can be no morality without reciprocity.3 However, few researchers have latched onto the final sentence of Trivers original paper, where he suggests that reciprocal altruism may have led to the evolution of cognitive abilities and increases in brain size: Given the psychological and cognitive complexity the system [of reciprocal altruism] rapidly acquires, one may wonder to what extent the importance of altruism in human evolution set up a selective pressure for psychological and cognitive powers which partly contributed to the large increase in hominid brain size during the Pleistocene. (1971: 223) While Trivers suggests that this may be the case, I want to suggest how it may have occurred. I propose that a complex social environment involving reciprocal altruism selects for deception and detection of deception, in turn, creating a sort of feedback loop selecting for increasingly advanced abilities to understand how ones own and others mental states are predictive of future behavior.4 Put simply: sharing selects for cheating, and cheating selects for catching cheats, and both of these select for mind-reading. Here, my proposal turns to the growing body of research on theory of mind and deception in animals and children. Robert Premack and Guy Woodruff introduced the concept of theory of mind to describe a chimpanzees ability to predict how another agent would behave, given his apparent goals: In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly called a theory, first, because such states are not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make predictions, specifically about the behavior of other organisms. (1978: 515) An animal that can ascribe to another agent mental states, which unify broad classes of behavior into patterns of beliefs and desires, can better predict the agents future behavior.5 While
de Waal (1996: 136). Sociobiology is largely based on kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, and evolutionary ethics and evolutionary psychology draw heavily on these theories. The evolution of these cognitive abilities may also account for at least some of the increase in hominid brain size that Trivers refers to: modern humans have brains that, relative to body size, have increased in size roughly threefold since we shared a common ancestor with chimpanzees about 5-6 million years ago. This is true regardless of whether we want to say that the other animal actually has these states, so that the philosophical question of eliminativism can be avoided. All that is necessary is that the theory actually serves to unify behaviors under unobservable mental attitudes, such as desires and beliefs, and is effective in making accurate predictions about those behaviors. See, for instance, Astington (1993, chap. 2). Furthermore, as Humphrey points out (1983, 36), an animals own mental states, its introspected conscious experience, do not need to be the same as anothers for introspection to be advantageous; it only needs to function to predict the others behavior. 3
5 4 3

cognitive ethologists continue theory of mind research on monkeys and apes, it has also blossomed in developmental psychology, where researchers such as Henry Wellman and Joseph Perner have shown that children develop the ability to represent others mental states in stages. Building on the abilities to imitate and make believe, children in their third year develop the ability to explain and predict others behavior based on their motivational states (desires). But not until their fourth year do children demonstrate an understanding of others informational states (beliefs) as well. Finally, children sometime after the age of four come to recognize that others beliefs (and their own) can be distinct from the way the world actually is and thus can be false. The development of increasingly complex deception parallels these stages, which should not be surprising, since the more complex forms of deception seem to require false-belief theory of mind, since they require understanding that others beliefs can be different than ones own and hence can be made different than what one knows to be the case. Four year olds, who pass falsebelief theory of mind tests, also begin to employ intentional deception, where an individual A tries to make B believe something to be true which A knows to be false. Such deception can be contrasted with younger childrens lies, which are based simply on what has (sometimes) worked in the past, such as a childs saying Im tired to avoid doing what she doesnt want to do (the simplicity of such misrepresentation becomes evident when the child says Im tired to avoid being put to bed).6 Researchers such as Richard Byrne and Andrew Whiten have gathered evidence of deception in primates, and have found that apes deceive in more complex ways than monkeys (while prosimians do not seem to deceive at all). They undertook this project to advance their theory that the complexities involved in manoeuvring in ones social environment (rather than just dealing with ones physical environment) created selection pressures for particular aspects of primate and human intelligence: It is suggested that it is the evolution of social intelligence which explains human brain power, and that this is a relatively recent step in the sequence of phylogenetic elaboration in social intellect which is reflected not only in human superiority over other contemporary apes, but in their superiority over monkeys, and in monkeys superiority over prosimians. (1988: 2) Nicholas Humphrey was one of the first researchers to suggest social complexity as the most significant factor driving increased primate intelligence. As he states: There are benefits to be gained for each individual member [of a social group] from preserving the overall structure of the group, and at the same time from exploiting and outmanoeuvring others within it. Thus, social primates are required by the very nature of the system they create and maintain to be calculating beings. (1976: 19) Humphrey believes social complexity will lead to cooperation, but it also creates opportunities to exploit conspecifics. One of the outcomes of this evolutionary trend is our ability to be (folk) psychologists, to introspect our own mental states so as to predict others behavior. Humphrey calls this introspective ability, which is essentially theory of mind, reflective consciousness.

See Perner (1991: 189-200). 4

My proposal for the evolution of human intelligence ends up in the same place as Humphreys. However, my goal is to explain more fully how we got therethat is, to explain why animals might be selected to be aware of their own and others mental statesto have a theory of mind. Specifically, animals in a complex social system which involves reciprocal altruism are poised between cooperation and competition. This leads to selective pressures for deceptive behavior, usually subtle cheating aimed at gaining more than one gives in a cooperative relationship. However, for reciprocal altruism to maintain itself, it requires a mechanism to detect these cheats and deny them reciprocity. Thus, detection of deception would be selected, along with the emotional motivations to withhold reciprocity from and perhaps punish cheats. These pressures to deceive and to detect deception create a feedback loop, leading to increasingly complex levels of theory of mind. The most basic level is desire theory of mind which allows an animal to be a sort of behavioral psychologist, predicting others behaviors according to their desires for rewardsand perhaps thwarting others desires when they conflict with ones own. The next level, belief theory of mind allows an animal, acting more like a cognitive psychologist, to predict specifically how another animal, given its beliefs (its perceptions and perhaps memories), may attempt to satisfy its desires. Finally, false-belief theory of mind allows an animal to manipulate anothers beliefs so that they misrepresent realityand perhaps to notice when ones own beliefs are being manipulated. Indeed, this purposeful misrepresentation is what we generally mean by deception, and this detection of deception is tied to our understanding of others intentions.7 Thus, my proposal attempts to bridge together several areas of research to come up with a possible explanation for why we are able to be represent mental states, including our own, in the way we are. I should stress, however, that this is a proposal, one based on substantial but probative research from a wide range of fields, especially comparative ethology and developmental psychology. I am following Bertrand Russells vision for philosophy: that it should be comprehensive, and should be bold in suggesting hypotheses as to the universe which science is not yet in a position to confirm or confute. But these should always be presented as hypotheses.8 As a hypothesis, my proposal for the evolution and development of free will requires a number of assumptions.

2. Assumptions Proposals for the evolution of cognitive abilities face several daunting problems. First of all, despite the genetic and anatomical similarities between modern humans and our nearest relatives (the common and bonobo chimps), humans have diverged significantly in certain
There is an important debate between theory theory of mind and simulation theory of mind (see Carruthers and Smith, 1996), which I will discuss in section 5 below. From Bertrand Russells Logical Atomism (879). Wilfrid Sellars (1956) offers a myth about the development of our abilities to understand others and our own mental states in terms of behavioral theories. His story might perhaps be seen as an evolutionary account of theory of mind, though he presents it more as a cultural invention. My account might be seen as offering the selective pressures that would lead our ancestors (like Sellars character Jones) to develop a folk psychology. 5
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cognitive abilities, such as language, and in the anatomical feature that underlies cognition, the brain. Numerous extinct ancestors in the Austrolopithicus and Homo lineages separate us from the apes, and since cognitive abilities dont fossilize and since selective environments have changed, we have limited resources to speculate about how our cognitive abilities evolved and why our brains got so big. But we do have some resources. One resource is the comparative method. This involves looking at the traits of groups of related living species and building common ancestors based on their shared traits, then assuming any divergent traits evolved since the living species diverged from this common ancestor.9 The traits that remain relatively unchanged in the living species (e.g. quadripedal locomotion in monkeys) represent the ancestral trait, and the traits that changed (e.g. bipedalism in humans) are the derived traits that evolved, perhaps by natural selection. This method provides a case for evolutionary trends and selection for particular traits. One particularly relevant evolutionary trend in primates is an increase in brain size (specifically encephalization quotient [EQ], which is a measure of brain size relative to body size).10 EQ, as well as brain complexity, increase from prosimians to monkeys to apes, with a nearly threefold increase from chimpanzees through the extinct homo ancestors to modern humans. And the comparative method suggests that the relations of ancestral to derived traits is generally represented by the above ordering of families (prosimians to monkeys to apes to humans); we can thus assume that higher EQ is a derived trait. Furthermore, given the significant costs of big brains (in terms of energy use,11 difficulty of childbearing, and incapacity of infants), there must have been a corresponding selective advantage to having relatively larger brains.12 Because big heads are not adaptive in themselves, primates increased brain size must allow for behaviors which are advantageous in the particular selective environment in which they evolved. These brain-based behaviors are cognitive abilities. The question, then, is which cognitive abilities were selected for and what features of the environment selected for them. It is highly unlikely that any single selective pressure drove increased EQ, because the increases occurred at different times in a variety of environments. Furthermore, different pressures may have been involved during speciation events than during more gradual changes during the evolution of a species. Often, however, theories for increases in primate brain size and cognition fall into two camps, one arguing that the increases were due to selective pressures from a complex ecological environment and the other arguing that they were due to pressures from a complex social environment. Drawing a sharp distinction between these two types of selective
See Byrne (1995, especially ch. 2). Fossil evidence may help to confirm this assumption about the traits of the ancestral common ancestors. Technically, encephalization quotient (EQ) is the ratio of an animals actual brain size to its expected brain size based on its body size as compared to other species. EQ may also be measured more specifically to indicate the relative size of the animals neocortex, thought to be the part of the brain most related to intelligence. Jerison (1973) presents the most detailed defense of the use of EQ as a measure of intelligence. He also argues that EQ corresponds to extra neurons, beyond those needed to control bodily functions. The human brain, for instance, makes up two percent of our body mass yet uses 18 percent of our energy. Only the liver and intestines are more costly. Presumably, energy costs translate to fitness costs.
12 11 10 9

See Byrne (1995, 227-234). 6

pressures surely oversimplifies the story, because, for instance, ecological and social environments cannot always be clearly distinguished. It may be that the selective pressures from different aspects of the environment were mutually reinforcing. For instance, selection for frugivorous foraging may have led to an initial increase in brain size (in this case, for mapping and remembering the locations of seasonal fruits), which in turn allowed for even larger brains (because of increased available energy in the form of fructose), and thus perhaps for increasingly complex (e.g. larger) social groups; this social complexity may then have selected for further increases in brain size.13 Nonetheless, my proposal generally sides with the social complexity theorists and focuses on describing the aspects of the social environment that would select for particular cognitive abilities. I will present arguments for why a particular type of environmenta complex social setting including reciprocal altruismmay have selected for particular cognitive abilities that presumably required larger (and more complex, interconnected) brains. However, this claim raises another problem for any explanation of the evolution of increased brain size and cognitive abilities. That is, which cognitive abilities were actually selected for, thus leading to larger, more complex brains, and which abilities were, in turn, simply allowed by larger, more complex brains? Which traits evolved because they increased relative reproductive success (and hence are adaptations), and which traits are spandrels, non-adaptive traits that arise as effects of adaptations?14 Humans use their big brains for all kinds of useful things, like reading and writing, composing music and computing quadradic equations, but these abilities are not adaptations; they do not exist because they increased reproductive success (in fact, literacy is currently predictive of decreased reproductive rates). Rather, they are spandrels; they are made possible by a large, flexible brain that was selected for other purposes. My proposal attempts to avoid the problem posed by spandrels by looking for relatively low-level cognitive abilities that are found, at least in rudimentary form, in primates, and that develop relatively early in humans and without significant variation across cultures.15 Indeed, there has been some cross-cultural research that shows similar trends in the order and timing of the onset of cognitive abilities associated with theory of mind.16 My proposal relies on another important assumption: that the evolution of these cognitive abilities parallels the development of the abilities in human children. I will discuss some of these
See Milton, Foraging Behaviour and the Evolution of Primate Intelligence, in Byrne and Whiten (1988), and for correlations between EQ and group size, see Dunbar (1988). See Gould and Lewontin (1978). These questions are problematic for any evolutionary explanation, but especially for those involving phenotypic plasticity, such as increased brain size and complexity. Indeed, if variable environments are what selects for phenotypic plasticity, then pinpointing the environmental factor becomes a moot point, except if environmental variation itself can be described as a selective pressure (these issues may apply to explanations for the evolution of sexual reproduction as well).
15
14 13

It would also help the proposal if these cognitive abilities evolved in distinct clades facing similar selective pressures, suggesting convergent evolution. Indeed, there is some evidence that marine mammals, such as dolphins, have evolved theory of mind abilities and exhibit reciprocal altruism. Dolphins also perform other behaviors discussed in Figure 3, such as mirror-self recognition, pretend play, and language use. 16 See, for instance, Astington (1993). 7

parallels in theory of mind and deception in the following sections. Other abilities precede and are perhaps necessary for theory of mind, such as imitation, pretend play, and mirror self-recognition. These abilities follow a similar progression in both phylogeny and ontogeny (see Figure 3 below). The argument, however, is not that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (in the sense suggested by Haeckel). Instead, (following Piagets reasoning) it may be that a certain order in the development of some cognitive abilities is logical and natural, so that evolution may have followed a similar course. As Andrew Whiten remarks, mindreading abilities are built up from simpler precursors. . . . there may simply be logical reasons why step B precedes step C.17 The basic idea is that the brain must be at a certain level of organization before it is able to demonstrate certain abilities. In child development this organization arises as the brain grows and increases in complexity (e.g. the development of folds, or gyri and sulci, in the cortex).18 In the evolution of primates, increases in EQ represent not only increases in overall brain size but also in neocortex size and in complexity, as measured by synaptic interconnectivity and folds in the cortex. The development and evolution of the brain may thus underlie the particular abilities leading up to theory of mind. Specifically, it appears that apes, which show more evidence of reciprocal altruism and deception than do other primates, also possess some levels of theory of mind, whereas monkeys do not. Furthermore, one point at which the development of human cognitive abilities diverges from those of apes is on tests for false-belief theory of mind. It may be that this improvement in theory of mind, which is especially significant in deception and detection, evolved in human ancestors and represents the key to our representational abilities. Let us turn, then, to the theories and evidence supporting this account for the evolution of free will. 4. Reciprocal Altruism Trivers defines altruism as behavior that benefits another organism, not closely related, while being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the behavior.19 To explain how such altruism between unrelated animals is possible, Trivers sets up the model for reciprocal altruism: one animal, A, suffers a cost (in terms of reproductive success) by behaving in a way that benefits another animal, B, but the cost to A is regained by a benefit received from B at some later time. Trivers definition has since been refined to differentiate it from byproduct beneficence, pseudoreciprocity, and mutualism (e.g. many types of cooperative hunting). Unlike these types of cooperative behavior, reciprocal altruism requires that the altruistic act is actually costly at the time of the act and that it is separated from the reciprocal benefit by a significant

17

Whiten (1991, 6). See also p. 277.

See, for example, Restak (1986). An apparent problem for my proposal (raised by Steve Geisz) is that EQ actually decreases in infants as they develop. This is because their body grows faster than their brains, which start off disproportionately big. However, adult EQ is the measure used to compare phylogenetic differences, and in development human brains do grow and become more complex (actually losing neurons while increasing synaptic connections).
19

18

Trivers (1971, 35). 8

period of time.20 Significant delay is of course vague, but without this temporal element and the absorption of cost by the altruist, reciprocal altruism would lose its significance for my proposal since it would not set up the intense selective pressures for cheating. The type of social structure that will most likely lead to deception and detection of deception involves long-term reciprocal relations involving an exchange of various kinds of benefits. Are there any such social structures? It is difficult to ascertain. To test for reciprocal altruism, ethologists must determine what counts as an altruistic act, assign to the act cost and benefit values measured in terms of fitness, and then attempt to observe when such acts are occurring, between whom, and with what values. This also requires knowing the relatedness of the participants to differentiate it from kin altruism. Trivers own examples of cleaning symbiosis and bird alarm calls do not seem to fit the refined model of reciprocal altruism. Cleaning symbiosis is better viewed as byproduct beneficence between two species which have co-evolved (like hosts and parasites). Bird alarm calls may not carry a cost to the caller, and even if they do, they may be accounted for by kin altruism. Trivers third example of humans is of course much more effective. He notes that all human societies have the features his model predicts, such as long-term relationships between unrelated members, high mutual dependence, and food sharing. Furthermore, humans have emotions that seem appropriate for maintaining reciprocity, such as trust, gratitude, and moralistic aggression.21 The question is whether he is right that our reciprocal relations and their underlying emotions are the result of natural selection, not simply a cultural invention. The similarities between the systems of reciprocity, and especially of the corresponding emotions, across every human society supports the claim that reciprocity has its roots in evolution. This claim would be strengthened if our primate relatives demonstrated reciprocal altruism, which would suggest it evolved in our common ancestors before the explosion of human culture. Only a few examples of reciprocal altruism in animals have been well documented. The best evidence so far is for vampire bats, some marine mammals, and some primates, especially baboons and apes.22 Many primate social groups show signs of reciprocal relationships, such as long-lasting relationships, many of which are between unrelated individuals, exchange of various
See Taylor and McGuire (1988) and Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin (1992). An analogy: byproduct beneficence is to reciprocal altruism as safe driving is to polite driving. I drive safely for my own benefit and other drivers gain the benefit of safety from my act, but if I let someone enter traffic at a busy intersection, I lose (a little) time perhaps hoping the favor will be returned by someone in the future. The larger the social group (e.g. city), the less likely drivers will be polite? As Robert Brandon points out, these emotions suggest that evolution played a role in human reciprocity, because, in order to maintain itself, a culturally developed system would not require irrationally strong emotions, which are sometimes disproportionate to the costs and benefits involved. See, for example, Taylor and McGuire (1988), de Waal and Luttrell (1988), and Rothstein (1988). Bats certainly do not seem to demonstrate theory of mind or deception, but my proposal does not claim that reciprocal altruism will necessarily select for these cognitive abilities; only that it is likely. With vampire bats, for instance, the difficulty of their type of foraging may allow for group selection of reciprocity, but may make it difficult to cheat, since the reciprocity involves regurgitating blood. Marine mammals may offer an example of convergent evolution following the same progression of cognitive abilities as I am describing in primates (see note 15). 9
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benefits, such as food, alarm calls, fighting coalitions, and grooming, and the ability to recognize individuals and their relationships to each other in familial and hierarchical groups. The complicated fighting coalitions of baboons and the food sharing of chimpanzees offer numerous and subtle opportunities for withholding reciprocity (fully or, more subtly, only in part). Thus, reciprocal altruism may be rare, but it is likely our nearest relatives demonstrate it. The rarity of reciprocal altruism results from the obstacles it must overcome to become stable in a population.23 Because of the time delay between altruistic acts, any population which evolves altruistic behavior among non-kin could be easily invaded by cheats who receive benefits while never returning them, at great cost to the sucker altruists. Thus, reciprocity would most likely become an evolutionary stable strategy only in populations which could avoid invasion by cheats, presumably by detecting them and withholding altruistic acts. But even if such detection evolved, benefits remain for subtle cheats who return favors but find ways to receive more than they give. Subtle cheating would not necessarily evolve in a society of reciprocal altruists (nothing necessarily evolves), but it would offer a significant selective advantage if it did evolve. Thus, as is the case with full-blooded cheats, subtle cheats could take over a population of naive altruists and altruism would dissipate. To maintain reciprocity, a population needs to be able to detect subtle cheats, deny them benefits, and perhaps even punish them. So long as the system of reciprocal exchange remains in place, however, there will be a selective advantage for increasing subtlety. An animal that can avoid getting a reputation for cheating but can still get more than it gives in a reciprocal exchange will reproduce more than its conspecifics. Thus, reciprocal altruism offers an evolutionary paradox: while it allows for extensive cooperation beyond spatially limited kin altruism and beyond temporally limited mutualism, reciprocity also selects for cheating, detection of cheating, and perhaps punishment for cheating. In anthropomorphic terms, reciprocity allows the evolution not only of a communal marketplace but also of embezzlement and castigation. It thereby provides selective pressure for a host of cognitive abilities, beginning with the ability to recognize individuals as altruists and cheats, to remember which is which, and to calculate costs and benefits given and received. Indeed, anthropologists often discuss the complicated reciprocal systems of human societies (e.g. economies) in terms of the intelligence they require, but I suggest turning the equation around to see whether reciprocal altruism selected for certain kinds of intelligence. In addition to selecting for the cognitive abilities mentioned above, reciprocal altruism may set up a feedback loop involving selective pressures for increasingly complicated deception and then for increasingly effective detection of deception. This arms race could lead to the evolution of the ability to recognize intentions, beginning with the abilities to associate certain movements with future behavior (an understanding of agency), to recognize that the direction of eye gaze indicates anothers perceptual information, and to inhibit acting on immediate motivations, and perhaps culminating with theory of mind. Thus, we should look for evidence of deception to see, first, whether such deception appears in primates, especially in their reciprocal exchanges, and then whether some forms of deception may involve theory of mind.

Significant theoretical problems are also involved in explaining how reciprocal altruism could be introduced into a population. Theories include group selection models and slow expansion of kin altruism to the larger group (see respectively, Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin [1992] and Rosthein [1988]). 10

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5. Deception One who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived. Machiavelli, The Prince Though Machiavellis political commentary seems true enough, when examining deception in evolutionary terms, it would seem that selection would weed out those who allow themselves to be deceived too often. Indeed, the selective advantage of deception seems pervasive; as Dawkins and Krebs note, in animal communication the actor is selected to manipulate the behavior of the reactor (1978: 383). But the pressure to counter this deception is equally pervasive. Deception, if defined simply as misrepresentation, may be completely hardwired (for example, camouflage) or learned solely through reinforcement (by transferring a normal behavior to a new, misleading context after being rewarded for performing the behavior in that context). Deception at these levels occurs often both between species, powerfully selected for in the arms race between predator and prey, and within species, for instance, during mating rituals. So, the pressure to deceive and detect is pervasive among all creatures that perceive and react to each other, but reciprocal altruism offers more numerous and more subtle opportunities to deceive.24 The difficulty in determining how much of deceptive behavior is genetic and how much is learned simply marks one example of a problem posed by most complex animal behavior. But differentiating behavioristic deception from the next level, call it creative deception, is even more difficult. Creative deception can be defined as acts by an agent deployed so that the target is likely to misrepresent what the acts signify, to the advantage of the agent.25 Thus, creative deception involves deliberate misrepresentation; while the goals sought may be due to behavioristic reinforcement, the deceptive means used to attain these goals are the result not simply of past reinforcement but of prediction about others behavior. Testing for such creative deception is notoriously difficult. Most significantly, the researcher must try to determine that the deceptive tactic is not the result of prior reinforcement, a behavior learned by trial and error (even if only one trial). Furthermore, if the deception is creative, its goal is to be difficult to detect, so, even a higher primatethe primatologistmay miss it.26 Creative deception is difficult to test for in experimental set-ups, and examples in the wild will appear anecdotal. Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne (1988) attempted to overcome these problems by gathering anecdotal and experimental evidence of deception from a wide variety of researchers. They then tried to determine whether the reports of deception involved a target acting on a false belief and also whether the agent intentionally caused that false belief. The latter, of course, is the hardest evidence to ascertain (especially without language) and also the most significant aspect for my proposal; determining whether an animal can differentiate
Since reciprocity occurs between conspecifics (creatures that behave in similar ways), it also encourages inferring others behavior from your own, perhaps even simulating how you would behave given a particular situation. Rather than conflicting, simulation theory of mind may be a precursor for theory theory of mind. 25 This definition is only slightly modified from Whiten and Byrnes definition of tactical deception (1988). See also Guzeldere, Nahmias, and Deaner (forthcoming in The Cognitive Animal, MIT Press).
26 24

Creative deception should also be relatively rare, since targets will try to detect and avoid it. As Samuel Butler wrote, The best liar is he who makes the smallest amount of lying go the longest way. 11

between knowing that a deceptive act works and knowing how it works is the key to determining if the animal is representing mental states in a way that suggests theory of mind. While there has been no conclusive evidence for such high-level intentionality, involving the agents knowing how it is manipulating the targets beliefs, Whiten suggests that chimpanzees offer the strongest indications that an agent entertains some concept of deception itself, distinguishing between overt behavior and the deceptive intentions that sometimes underlie it (1991: 276). Indeed, Whiten and Byrne received the most submissions for creative deception in chimpanzees and other apes and few submissions for prosimians and non-primates. They classify most monkey deception as less creative than apes, except for baboons, which, consistent with this proposal, also have high EQ and whose fighting alliances seem to involve reciprocal altruism. Whiten and Byrnes findings have been questioned both because they often rely on anecdotal evidence (as one critic said, the plural of anecdote is not data) and because, some critics claim, most of the examples still fall to Lloyd Morgans canon and can be explained with a behaviorist interpretation, albeit a complicated one.27 Nonetheless, their survey, as well as more recent experiments, indicate that apes are able to inhibit their normal behavior (e.g. their motivation to move towards food) because they recognize how a conspecific (or sometimes a human trainer) will behave based on their current behavior. They recognize that certain animals are agents in the world which, unlike objects, act based on their perceptions and desires, and in light of that understanding, they control their normal behavior (e.g. to move towards food). A commonly cited example of such deception involves a subordinate chimp, Belle, who has been shown the location of some hidden fruit which the dominant chimp, Rock, would takes from her if he had access to it. When released with Rock, Belle either avoids the hidden fruit until Rock is preoccupied or leads the group away from the food. The situation escalates to the point where Belle leads the group to the wrong site or the site of a smaller food cache, but Rock then counters by pretending to be preoccupied, only to follow Belle to the right location. Belle inhibits her normal behavior of moving immediately to the food source; Rock inhibits his behavior of attending to anothers movement towards food. And both apes seem to recognize how their own and the others behavior (e.g. body orientation and eye gaze) indicate future behavior.28 Other examples of deception cited by Whiten and Byrne include apes and baboons (1) pretending to be injured to avoid confrontations, (2) covering up sexually induced outbursts to avoid angering a dominant, (3) hiding fear grins in conflicts, and (4) pretending to see predators to escape pursuit.29 If specific past reinforcement can be ruled out, these examples indicate that the agent recognizes that the target has a desire and will act on it, but that certain behavior (often the inhibition of normal behavior) may prevent the target from acting. This behavior often includes the agents concealing (as in 2 and 3 above), distracting (as in 1 and Belles false leads), or creating a false image (as in 4). Furthermore, apes offer the best evidence for detection of deception, as in the cases where the target pretends be preoccupied and also in cases where apes become angry when they have
27

See Commentary on Whiten and Byrne (1988). The quotation is from Irwin Bernstein, 247.

This experiment was run by Charles Menzel (see Byrne, 1995: 132). A similar experiment was run on ring-tailed lemurs (prosimians) by Rob Deaner at Duke University. He found no evidence of intentional deception.
29

28

See Whiten and Byrne (1988) for more examples of deception. 12

been tricked (sometimes by their human trainers). Indeed, my proposal calls for trying to determine whether deception is sometimes accompanied by detection of deception as well as punishment of deceivers, as is suggested by reciprocal altruism. So far, the best evidence for such punishment has also been found in chimpanzees. Frans de Waal proposes that chimpanzees demonstrate reciprocity in their grooming alliances, fighting coalitions, and food sharing, and also what he calls moralistic aggression in their punishment of nonreciprocators and enemies.30 This evidence suggests a correlation between primate species that engage in reciprocal altruism and those that have demonstrated creative deception (notably baboons and the great apes, especially the common and bonobo chimps). The case for creative deception would be strengthened if there were further tests for whether an animal understands the relationship between mental states, such as intentions, and behavior. This is where theory of mind research is helpful. 5. Theory of mind One thing I learned from pop was to try to think as other people around you think. Don Corleone, Mario Puzos The Godfather The term theory of mind was introduced by Premack and Woodruff (1978) who studied whether a chimpanzee, Sarah, could predict the appropriate behavior for a human subject trying to achieve a goal, such as using a key to escape from a locked cage or plugging in a record player to make it work. While Sarah surely cannot think as others think to the extent of a mob boss, she was able to predict what a human would do based on his desiresthat is, how he would solve the problem in way specifically related to his apparent goal. This indicated to Premack and Woodruff that Sarah has a desire theory of mind, because she can understand how others desires motivate their future behavior. Individuals are said to have a theory of mind when they make inferences based on unobservable mental states that provide a coherent, explanatory framework (like scientific theories). A wealth of research has since occurred, both on primates and human children, to see which animals have various levels of theory of mind, as well as when children develop these levels.31 Definitive results are elusive, especially when working with apes and infants who lack language and hence cannot be asked about what they think or what they think others think (indeed, as I will discuss below, some argue that theory of mind is impossible without language). Nonetheless, the research so far indicates that our nearest primate relatives can pass some theory of mind taskstasks that human children begin passing in their third year. Monkeys fail both desire tasks and belief tasks, while most apes pass at least the desire tasks as well as some tests for taking on the perspective of another animal and perhaps even understanding anothers intentions. These tests include (1) showing another animal, whose vision is obscured, the correct lever to pull to obtain food, (2) choosing a human helper who can see where food is located as opposed to one who cannot see the food, and (3) choosing on later trials a human who earlier accidentally spilled

30

See de Waal (1996, 150-162). See Perner (1991). 13

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juice as opposed to one who intentionally spilled it.32 Apes, however, have not shown evidence of false-belief theory of mind. Children pass desire theory of mind tasks beginning around age two. These tasks often involve asking the child what a character will do next given his prior behavior towards a goal (like the tests on the chimp, Sarah), or whether a character in a story will be happy if he finds a desired object. However, children do not pass belief tasks until age three. For example, some tests ask a child where a character will look for an object, given what the child and the character know about a situation (e.g. the child is told there are bananas in the cupboard and in the refrigerator; Joe knows there are bananas in the refrigerator; where will Joe look for bananas?). False-belief theory of mind, however, is not acquired until around age four. It indicates an ability to represent a situation which does not correlate with reality and to represent anothers beliefs as distinct from ones own. For example, if the child sees Joe find bananas in the refrigerator, but then sees Joes mom move them to the cupboard while Joe is gone, where will the child say Joe will look for the bananas when he returns? Most three years olds will say Joe will look in the cupboard, because they assume others beliefs are the same as their own. But four year olds can representas distinct from the actual situation and their own beliefsJoes false belief about the items location, so they say Joe will look where he believes the bananas are, not where they actually are. Another test involves asking a child what she thinks will be in a pack of M&Ms. After she responds, M&Ms, she is shown that the pack actually contains coins. When she is asked what another child (new to the scene) will say when asked what the pack of M&Ms contains, most three year olds will answer coins, demonstrating their inability to distinguish their own knowledge about the world from others knowledge of the world. Four year olds pass the test.33 They recognize that they have a point of view that is distinct from others view of the world, developing an understanding of subjectivity, an understanding that perhaps begins with the infants distinction between the part of the world she controls (e.g. her limbs) and the rest of the world.34 Josef Perner also offers evidence that children at age four begin to perform what he calls genuine deception, manipulating others in order to induce in them false beliefs about reality. In addition to experiments that test for such deception, the well-worn intuitions of mothers and teachers confirms it: most of them report that children begin telling deliberate lies around the age of four.35 Indeed, Perner and some other developmental psychologists believe that such deception

32

These tests were devised by Daniel Povinelli (reported in Byrne 1995).

Surprisingly, when asked what they had earlier believed was in the pack of M&Ms, the children will also answer coins (and they are not lying to cover up for their mistake). See, for example, Wellman (1990) and Perner (1991) for descriptions of these experiments. Piaget recognized the significance of the limits of the infants will in the development of their understanding of subjectivity and objectivity.
35 34

33

Perner (1991, 189-202). 14

requires the representational abilities involved in false-belief theory of mind. Increasingly complex theory of mind certainly seems to allow for more complex types of deception. For instance, desire theory of mind allows an individual A to predict Bs behavior based on his desires or goals. So, for instance, if A knows B wants her bananas and will try to take them, she may inhibit her own desire to take them out and eat them while he is around. But belief theory of mind would allow A to predict Bs behavior based on what he has seen (an important aspect of understanding belief is connecting seeing with knowing). So, for instance, A could turn her back from B while she eats her bananas. Such behavior is similar to the concealment involved in some primate deception. But false-belief theory of mind seems to exponentially increase the possibilities for creative deception. It allows A to recognize when B is ignorant, to try to keep him ignorant, and to try to change his beliefs to her advantage. For instance, A might give a false alarm call to make B leave so she can eat her bananas in peace. Children with language and falsebelief theory of mind can tell lies in order to make their targets believe what is not the case. Children become better liars as they recognize the many factors that may influence others beliefs (e.g. they learn that saying they did not eat the cookies may not work if they have crumbs on their face). Thus, there seems to be distinctions between desire, belief, and false-belief theory of mind which underlie varying competencies in deception. However, delineating sharply between the three levels of theory of mind may be painting too simplistic a picture. For instance, some researchers believe it is impossible to have belief theory of mind without some understanding of false belief.36 A more substantial debate involves delineating between theory of mind and simulation. Theory theory suggests that our mind-reading abilities rest on our ability to recognize patterns of behavior and organize them under theoretical mental constructs (like beliefs and desires), which we then apply to our own mental states (notice the similarities between this view and the view of social psychologists discussed in Chapter 3). Simulation theory suggests that we understand others mental states by imagining how we would feel and how we would behave in a situation like the one they are ini.e. simulating anothers point of view.37 I am not convinced the difference between these two views is as significant as the debate implies. In fact, I believe simulation likely provides a building block for theory of mind, and even adults seem to use both inferential methods depending on the type and complexity of the situation (we may simulate to understand another persons emotional statefor instance, we feel sad when we see bad things happen to movie charactersbut we likely use theory of mind to predict others complex behaviorfor instance, we try to get in the head of the Godfather to figure out what he will do next). In any case, I will not try to adjudicate these particular debates, as I do not believe their outcome substantially affects my proposal. Some researchers have also questioned whether theory of mind requires language. As P.K. Smith writes, Only if chimpanzees could talk to each other about mental states would they have evolved mind reading, and only if they could talk to us about mental states would we believe

36

See, for instance, Harris chapter in Carruthers and Smith (1996). Carruthers and Smith (1996) contains several chapters dealing with this controversy. 15

37

them.38 And Donald Davidson offers a priori arguments for a related point in Rational Animals (1982): First, I argue that in order to have a belief, it is necessary to have the concept of belief. Second, I argue that in order to have the concept of belief one must have language (478).39 Indeed, there is a long tradition in philosophy, going back to Descartes, that views language as uniquely human and as necessary for rational thinking, perhaps even consciousness. While language certainly makes it easier to test for theory of mind and surely increases the breadth of our mental states, I am inclined to agree with those researchers who turn the equation around to suggest that representational abilities like those involved in theory of mind underlie the evolution and development of language. Merlin Donald, for instance, writes that prior to the evolution of a system as revolutionary as human language, the cognitive stage had to be set (1991: 164), and this stage involved mimetic and representational abilities found in apes and prelinguistic human ancestors. Richard Byrne claims with even more vigor: The ability to imagine other mental viewpoints is a necessary precursor to language, and it certainly evolved first (1995: 233). This controversy will require much more research, but my proposal suggests that theory of mind is possible without language (e.g. in apes) and may even be a step in the evolution of linguistic abilities. It seems that the ability to represent states of affairs that do not exist is crucial to the symbolic aspect of languagedistinguishing symbols from the objects they representand that the ability to represent others mental states is crucial to the conversational aspect of language understanding, for instance, that you do not know what I know when I inform you of what I know. Some researchers (such as Donald) have further suggested that mimetic culture, teaching, and even some human technology could not develop without these representational abilities. The idea behind these suggestions is that theory of mind involves representing ones own and others mental states. This ability may have been the adaptation which in turn underlies many exaptations and spandrels that require a similar sort of representational ability.40 This includes, I believe, the cognitive abilities I have identified with free will. In introspecting on our conflicting motivational states, we must be able to represent them as motivational states and understand their relation to actions and the world. Furthermore, the ability to distinguish between belief and reality allows us to imagine various possible futures and consider how our motivations may influence which of them occurs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the activity of deliberation would be possible without representing at least two possible alternatives for the future. More generally, theory of mind seems to underlie selfconscious knowledge, and as I have suggested, such knowledge is the basis of free will.
38

In Carruthers and Smith (1996, 354).

Davidsons argument faces a possible counterexample from autistics. Autistics lack theory of mind abilities but they possess language and the concept of belief.
40

39

There is a significant debate about whether theory of mind is a modular (domain-specific) ability or a general (central) processing ability, the main evidence for the former coming from autistics who seem to have a specific deficit in theory of mind which might be caused by damage to a specific part of the brain. It may seem that if theory of mind is a module, it more likely evolved by natural selection, as evolutionary psychologists would suggest. However, if theory of mind represents an advancement of already-present general processing abilities, it may still have evolved by natural selection. So, I am not concerned about the effect of this debate on my proposal. 16

6. Conclusion: Do Chimps Have Free Will? Though the precise interpretation of theory of mind still needs refinement, the evidence so far supports differences between desire, belief, and false-belief theory of mind based on age of onset in children. These differences correlate not only with a developmental sequence in children but also with the phylogenetic sequence from monkeys to apes to humans, suggesting a particular ordering of cognitive skills in both evolution and development. I have suggested that this progression was driven by the social complexity involved in some primate societies, especially those that include reciprocal altruism, and by the resulting selective pressures to deceive and detect deception. The great apes, especially chimps, have shown evidence of reciprocity and intentional deception. In addition, they have demonstrated the abilities to follow others eye gaze, imitate others, predict others behavior based on their desires, and take account of others ignorance (e.g. in deception and teaching). They also pass mirror self-recognition tests and can be taught symbolic language and self-reference.41 In sum, apes appear to have at least the rudiments of an understanding of their own and others mental states. Does this mean that they can introspect on their motivational states, identify which of them they prefer to move them, and influence their motivations accordingly? Do chimps have free will? Probably not, but this question need not be answered with a resounding no. Since an agent possesses free will to the degree that she possesses the requisite cognitive abilities to know herself, we can say that chimps may possess some degree of free willthey may at least be able to inhibit immediate (first-order) motivations in order to achieve goal they recognize as more important. To many, it may sound counterintuitive to suggest that any animal has any degree of free willwe generally consider free will unique to humans. But consider how we would answer the question of whether a 4-year-old child has free willor perhaps an 8-year-old or a 13-yearold. We accept that children have varying degrees of free will and responsibility according to the degree to which they can know what they are doing and control themselves accordingly. Despite most cultures coming-of-age ceremonies, we do not believe children go from lacking free will to having it overnight, nor do we treat them that way. However, an important difference between chimps and children is that children not only develop their self-knowledge and self-control as they mature, they also grow up learning the moral values of their culture. So, the degree to which they possess free will increases at the same time as they learn to exercise those abilities specifically in terms of their cultures specific moral obligations. That is, as they acquire the ability to act in accord with their knowledge of themselves and the world, they acquire the relevant knowledge of the values in terms of which their actions will be judged by others in their culture. Children, as they grow up, gain responsibility as well as free will. Furthermore, children learn language, which, as I mentioned above, surely increases their ability to conceptualize their desires and contrastively compare them.42 But some chimps (and other apes) have been raised within a human family and trained to use sign language (or some other symbolic language). Not surprisingly, their human trainers anthropomorphize them, and this includes treating them as responsible for some of their behavior. The human parents see the
41

See Figure 3. See also Byrne (1995: 224). See Taylor (1977). 17

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chimps as able to manipulate and deceive, and they blame the chimps for breaking rules when they should have known better.43 These parents take rudimentary reactive attidudes towards their ape charges in the same way other parents do. Compare Peter Strawsons point about how we move from the objective attitude to the reactive attitudes in our relationships with children: Thus parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of children cannot have to their charges either kind of attitude [objective or reactive] in a pure or unqualified form. They are dealing with creatures who are potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being objects of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not yet truly capable of either. (1962: 75). We gradually grow into free and responsible creatures. But, I would suggest, the development of free will is tied more closely to our evolutionary and genetic heritage, while the development of moral responsibility is tied more closely to our maturation within a particular culture with its particular set of moral obligations. Free will involves cognitive processes that we develop given any normal upbringing; moral responsibility involves specific content relative to our particular upbringing. Nonetheless, like any other cognitive ability, free will may be developed and improved. In addition to learning the content of our culture and hence increasing our ability to act responsibly, we can learn how to improve our ability to consider our motivations rather than acting on them without thinking. We can learn to know ourselves better. And most significantly, we can learn techniques of self-control and strength of will so that we can more effectively act on our selfknowledge. Moral education and experience increases moral responsibility. Practical education and experience increases free will. There are limits to how much a chimp can develop its free will. There are also limits to how much we can develop our free will. Much of who we are is given, and our reflective knowledge and self-control works within boundaries, those that apply to all of us because of our human nature and those that apply to each of us because of our individual history. But within any boundaries there are degrees of freedom. The more we know, the more we can move within those boundaries and perhaps even push them back. Knowledge is power.

Accounts from these human trainers are filled with the language of relationships and responsibility. For instance, Roger Fouts writes of new volunteers to care for his chimp, Washoe: [They] left their chimp myths behind and built respectful relationships with the individual members of Washoes family. They were rewarded with one thing only: chimpanzee friendship (1997: 291). Of course, many of us take similar attitudes towards our pets, and we are likely making a mistake if we really endow them with free will and responsibility. But when it comes time to punishing them, we usually recognize that they couldnt help it precisely because we believe they either didnt know any better or didnt know how to control themselves. 18

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