CommunityDevelopment

in Mbeere

Martin Walsh

Schoolof African andAsian Studies

Universiw of Sussex

April1994

draft working paper

preparedfor the ODA ESCOR-fundedproject
Rural Livelihood Systemsand Fann/1,{on-farmLinkages in
Lower Embq Kenya,19721 to 1992-3
(Research SchemeR4816)
 Community Developmentin Mbeere

Contents:

1 The Rootsof Community Development

1.1 A Brief History of Community Development

1.2 Community Developmentin Kenya

1,2.1 Community Developmentin the ColonialPeriod

1.2.2 Harambeeand Community Development

2 Community Devclopmentin Mbeere

2.1 The ChangingRole of the State?

2.1.1 TechnicalInterventionsand Aid Projects

2.1.2 The Institutionalisationof Community Development

2.1.2.1 The District Focusfor Rural Development

2.1.2.2 PoliticalAsendas

2.1.2.3 The Emperor'sNew Clothes

2.2 GrassrootsInitiatives

2.2.1 Womcn'sGroups

2.2.2 Rotating Savingsand Credit Associations

2.2.3 Schoolsand Churches

2.3 The Roleof NGOs

3 Conclusions

Bibliography
 Community Developmentin Mbeere

I The Rootsof Community Developmcnt

In the pastdecadethe twin conceptsof communitydevelopmentandlocal participationin

the planningprocesshavebecomeessentialcomponentsof state-(donorandrecipient)-

sponsoreddevelopmentplansandproposalsin sub-Saharan
Africa. This is evident,for

example,in recent(1992) proposalsfor the provisionofBritish aid to strengthen

developmentplanningandimplementationcapacityin Embu,Meru andTharaka-Nithi
Districts. The termsof referencedrawnup by the British OverseasDevelopment

Administration(ODA) for the consultancyto preparetheseproposalsspecifiedthat they

"...will be madein the contextofa process-project
with participatoryplanningasa key

objective",whilea wholeannexofthe resultingreportwasdevotedto the subjectof

communitydevelopment(ODI 1992).

1.1 A Brief Ilistory of Community Development

This ernphasison communitydevelopmentis, aswe shallsee,equallyprominentin the

developmentstrategydrawnup by the Kenyangovemment.Despiteits apparentnovelty,

it hasa long pedigreedatingbackto the yearsfollowing the secondworld war, in Kenya

aswell as elsewherein the developingworld. The historyof communitydevelopmentasa

developmentpolicy providesimportantinsightsinto currentpracticeand suggestsa
numberoflessonswhich contemporarydevelopmentpractitionerswould do well to take
note of It alsosetsthe scenefor an examinationof communitydevelopmentin Mbeere,

to dateandthe potentialfor the future.

its effectiveness

approachto naturalresourcemanagement,
In a recentreviewof the community-based

Hassett(1994: 7) arguesthat communitydevelopmentin generalhasevolvedfrom the

. The first of theseis the tradition
mergingof two distincttraditionsof rural development

of "grassroots"developmentpursuedby non-government
organisations(NGOs) and

churchesthroughoutAfric4 Asia andLatin America. The secondis the tradition of state

management ofrural development,involving "penetration"by stateagencies(includingthe
of govemmentministriesanddepartments)
administrativeapparatusandrepresentatives
into rural areasin order to imolementnationalDolicies.

An early attemptto mergethe grassrootsapproachwith statemanagement

wasthe

statein
CommunityDevelopmentProgrammein lndia"initiatedby the newly-independent

the early 1950s. As Hassettremarks,despiteits populistrhetoricthis endedup mainlyas

a "top-down" programmeof agriculturalextensionin which the views of ordinaryfarmers

were not well represented(1994: 8). Nonetheless"communitydevelopment"initiatives

were startedin manycolonialandindependentcountriesaroundthis time. The emphasis

wasvery muchon extensionandtraining,particularlyin agriculture,though often with

evenlesseffectthan in the Indiancase. In the 1960sthe communitydevelopment

approachgaveway to the developmentprojectasa vehiclefor overseasaid and
investment,andthe rise of the developrnentplanningindustry. "Whereas",Hassettwrites,
"'communitydevelopment'hadbeenbasedon a moral critiqueofthe socialand

institutionalbasesof rural poverty,economicplanningtreatedpovertyasa technical

problem,which couldbe solvedby the applicationof scientifictechniques.The

developmentplansofthe 1960sand 1970swere almostuniversallystronglycentralised

andrelied on 'experts',often expatriates,to determinepeople'sneedson their behalf'
(1994:8).

Meanwhile,an altemativetradition wasbeingdevelopedin the NGO sector,throughthe

communitywork of radicalactMstsin Latin America. This tradition wastheorisedand

in thewritingsofPauloFreire(1972). Duringthe 1970sthe Freirean
widelypopularised
and "empowerment",hada significant
thought,with its stressupon "conscientisation"
impactuponthe practiceof NGOs, especiallythoseworking in Asia, andsawthe

of manylocal NGOs with a concemto eliminatepovertyandits corollaries.

emergence
Many NGOs beganto uselocal staf andfieldworkersto encouragecommunitiesor
groupsofthe rural poor to start their own smallenterprisesanddevelopmentactivities,

experienceandcapacitiesso that they would not be

andto developtheir own management
permanentlydependenton extemalaid.

The quiet successofthese "grassroots"initiativescontrastedmarkedlywith the failure of

anddonor-fundedprojects. As Hassettnotes(1994. 9-
manylarge-scalestate-sponsored

l0), developmentpractitionersincreasinglyquestionedthe designandphilosophybehind

on technologicalsolutionsto
suchprojects. Theywere criticisedfor their over-emphasis
problems(the quick "technicalfix") andcorrespondingdisregardfor the developmentof

humanresources;for the way in whichthey wereplanned,by professionalplannerswith

little knowledgeof local conditionsandwith a minimumof consultationwith the people

(includingthe "beneficiaries")who werelikely to be mostdirectly affected;andfor the
(theiruseofa "blueprint"ratherthan"process"
inflexibilityoftheir implernentation

approach).In the courseofthe 1980sthis led to a growing intereston the part of state
(bothdonorsandrecipientsof aid)in the socialdimensions
agencies in
of development,

institutionalandorganisationaldevelopment,andin participatoryandprocessplanningas

development:in other words to a renewedinterestin community

a meansto sustainable
 "the returnto
development,asdevelopedin interveningyearsby the NGOs. This,
(Shepherd1992,citedin Hassett1994:10),has,in the termsof
communitydevelopment"
Hassett's
analysis, the mergerofthe traditionsof grassroots
completed and
development

statemanagement.

While this accountofthe historyof communitydevelopmentis reasonablyaccuratein

outline,it doesencodea significantbias. It is written from the perspectiveof current

orthodoxy,which offersunqualifiedsupportfor the integrationof a participatory,

communitydevelopmentperspectiveinto developnrentplansandprogrammes.It is
possible,however,to take a more cynicalview, andrememberthe lessonsofthe

CommunityDevelopmentProgrammein India. In this andother casesthe mergerof the

two traditionsof developmentidentifiedby Hassettmight be betterdescribedasthe
by the other (the state),where
appropriationofone (grassrootsactionandrepresentation)

the stateadoptedthe rhetoric of popularparticipationbut continuedto manage

developmentin traditionalauthoritarianfashion. An examinationofthe history of

communityparticipationin Kenyaprovidessomesupportfor this scepticalposition,and

suggeststhat the cunent enthusiasmfor comrnunitydevelopmentandthe way in which it

is construedandput into practiceshouldbe subjectto more critical scrutinythan it usually

is.

1.2 Community Developmentin Kenya

1.2.1 Community Developmentin the ColonialPeriod

Communitydevelopmentasa policy was originallyintroducedinto Kenyaby the British

in a documentsentto all the colonies
colonialadministration.It madeits first appearance
 referredto by his
in November1948by the British ColonialSecretaryand subsequently

name,asthe "CreechJonescircular". The introductionofthis new policy - alsoreferred

and'socialdevelopment'
to at timesas'masseducation' - represented
a reinterpretation
of

colonialindirect rule asa d1'namicratherthan staticpolicy (shadesofblueprint and

process!)responding in the colonies.It was
to changeandthe demandfor development
locatedwithin the overall statedobjectiveof guidingcoloniesto eventual"self-
government".

Accordingto Hill (1991:23), from whomthis accountis drawn,theBritishgovernment

had a very definitesetof political objectivesin mind: "The CommunityDevelopment

policy wasdesignedin part to meetcriticismof colonialrule by liberal lobbiesin the

colonialcentre,but without putting colonialinterestsin jeopardy;in part it was also

intendedto defuseoppositionby nationalistgroupsin the colonieswhich were callingfor
political independence."This is a far cry from the "moralcritique ofthe socialand

institutionalbasesof rural poverty" referredto by Hassett,andit is temptingto seesimilar

ofthe policy. Certainlycommunity

agendasat work in conternporarymanifestations

developmenthasbecomeintimatelylinkedin somecontextswith the post-ColdWar

conceptsof"good governance"and "democratisation"beingtouted by the westempowers

with their new found political morality andfoistedupontheir former alliesin the

developingworld.

The Kenyangovemmentalsohasits political agendas,not leastofwhich arethe needto

defusepolitical opposition. It
satisrylocal aspirationsand,like its colonialpredecessor,

alsohasan interestin formulatingpolicieswhich areconsonantwith the wishesof its

donors,andaremore likely to attracttheir aid. Communitydevelopmenthelpsto achi€ve

all of theseobjectives.But herewe arejumping aheadof our argument: let us return to

discussionofthe colonialoriginsof communitydevelopment.

The implernentationof the new communitydevelopmentpolicy was slow andundramatic,

andhinderedin manyareasby the outbreakofthe Mau Mau uprisingandthe declaration

ofa StateofEmergencyin 1952. At first communitydevelopmentwas addedto the tasks

of District Officers: later on it becamethe responsibilityof newly-appointedDistrict

CommunityDevelopmentOfficers. In somedistrictsAfricanssubsequently
took over

thesepositionsfrom British colonialofEcers. They did so asAssistantAdministrative

Officers,the most seniorpost to which Africanswere admitted,their salariespaid by
District Councilsratherthan centralsovernment.

Theseofficersput the new policy into practicein a numberofways. This includedthe

oflocation Councils,women'sclubs,ex-servicemen's
organisation andsports
associations

activities. Most importantwasthe new emphasisupon'self-helpprojects' Accordingto

Hill, however,theseappearto havebeenlargelycommunallabourundera new name:
"They were unpaid,organizedby chiefs,approvedand sometimescontributedto by

District or Local Councils. The work centredon buildingprimaryschools,earthdams

(water reservoirs)andwater catchments,maintainingor extendinglocal roads,and soil

conservationwork. Severalofthe projectswere probablyinefficientin their useof

manpowerowing to poor organization,lack of co-ordinationanddeficienciesoftechnical

support"(1991:26). As a resulttheycontinuedto facecriticismfrom localactMstsand

nationalistpoliticians. As Hill remarks,"The reality of muchcommunity

.wasfar from the notion of self-helpasbeingbasedon voluntarism,popular

development..
participationandlocal decision-making.CommunityDevelopmentphilosophyin the
activity
to allowunderthis rubricanydevelopment
colonialworld ofthe 1950sappeared
invoMng the communityasa whole which wasjudgedby the authoritiesto be to its

benefit"(1991:26-27).
It is not difficult to draw parallelsbetweencommunitydevelopmentin the late colonial
period andits currentmanifestations.Someof theseparallelsarebasedupon real

continuitiesof policy andpractice,othersreflectbroadsimilaritiesin intentionsand

outlook. Hill's accouatof colonialcommunitydevelopmentinitiativesin Kitui District and

elsewherepointsto a numberoflocal experimentswhich areinterestingfrom this point of
view. OneDistrict Commissionerin Kitui formeda District DwelopmentTeamof

departmentheadsto establisha district developmentstrategy- an earlyattemptat

integated local planning. Theteamadopteda planfor eachlocationto build an

elementaryschoolanda dispensary,and seta targetoffifty damsa yearto be built in the

district. This plan entaileda considerableinput ofcompulsorylabourandwas met with

demandsfrom the KenyaAfrican Union that the work be paid Thesedemandswere

ignoredandthe work went on until the targetswere largelyachieved.At the sametime

the colonialagthoritieswere ableto congfatulatethemselveson the fact that suchprojects

kept their subjectsbusyandleft themwith little time to indulgein politics (Hill I 991: 27-

28).

Despitethe apparentsuccessof someprojects,it was evidentthat their negativeimpact

upon local perceptionsofthe administrationandits developmentefforts demandeda more

sensitiveapproach.Oneearlypointer in this directionwasprovidedby research

undertakenin 1949in SouthNyanzaDistrict by Philip Mayer, an anthropologistemployed

In hispublished
bythe colonialadministration. that
report(1951),Mayerrecommended

insteadof compulsionor evendemonstrationtechniques,muchvillageimprovement,and

especiallyagriculturalmodernisation,could be undertakenby utilisingtraditionalwork

party institutions. In 1953MachakosDistrict was chosenfor an experimentalproject

conductedalongthe lineswhichMayer had suggestedfor SouthNyanza. This project

washeadedby an African AdministrativeOfficer, JohnMalinda,andinvolvedusing

od myetlrya(singtlu muethya),as lhe
traditionalKambawork parties,the neighbourho
 groups- the objectbeingto get roundhatredofthe
basisofnew communitydevelopment
existingforced communallabour system.Local electedcommitteesofthe newmyethya
on whatprojectsto undertakeandhow to undertakethemandensurethe
took decisions

complianceof groupmembers.The Machakos myethyaundeftooka wide rangeoftasks

includingbuilding schools,soil conservationmeasures(especiallyterracing),makingfarm

boundaries(on newlyregisteredland),constructingdamsandother forms of water supply

andstorage(for livestockanddomesticuse),clearinglocalroadsandpaths,andbuilding
new houses.In the late 1950sthe Machakosprojectbecamesomethingof a showpiece,

andthe work party modelof communitydevelopmentappearsto havebeensubsequently

adoptedby districtofficialsin manyotherpartsof Kenya(Hill 1991:31-35).

As Hill argues,the Machakosproject serveda numberof purposes.Largepartsof

MachakosDistrict were seriouslyeroded,andattemptsby the administrationto reduce

livestockholdingsin the areahadfailedmiserably.Therewas somerisk that the Kamba

mightjoin the Mau Mau rebellioq andit wasrecognisedthat their economicaspirations

would haveto be met in definiteways. TheMachakosproject providedan ideal

opportunityto do so, andit owed muchof its successto the fact that it was designedand
headedby a local Kambaofficial, who phrasedthe projectasa reform of communallabour

in the directionof local organisationanddecision-making.Needlessto say,the new

myethyasystemdid not meetwith universalapproval,and someareasit was still

associatedwith compulsorylabourandattackedby nationalistsfor this reasonQlill I 99I :

madeby the
35-38). In spitethis criticism,themyethya,alongwith otherinnovations

colonialadministrationin the nameof communitydevelopment,were to providepotent

in the post-colonial
modelsfor sovemments era.
1.2.2 Harambeeand Community Development

Althoughthis fact is not widely advertised,the colonialpoliry andpracticeof community

afterKenya'sindependence
formedthebasisfor manydevelopments
development in 1963.

The ideaof communitydevelopment,andthe participationof all Katyans in that

"Harambee"(derivedfrom a
development,was enshrinedin the new nationalsloganof
"Let's pull together!"). Since
Swahiliwork-gangcry andusuallytranslatedinto Englishas
first formaluseofthe termin 1963,Harambee
Kenyatta's
@resident-to-be) hasbeenthe

motto on the Kenyannationalcrestandthe customaryrallying-cryat political andother

ralliesandmeetings.The centralmessageof Harambeewas self-reliance,andthis was

expressedmost concretelyin the rural self-helpmovement.As a political sloganandthe

catchwordfor an ideology,Harambeewasexplicitly meantto contrastwith colonialstate

control andits manifestationin forced communallabour. In practice,however,it meant

the continuationof manyofthe samekinds of interventio4 the adaptedtnwethyasystem

andits analogueswrit largeandlegitimisedby the new nationalist(andtherefore

unopposable)ideology. The rhetoricwas - and still is - different,but the methodsremain

remarkablysimilar,if muchmorerefined.

The self-helpmovementwasco-ordinatedandmonitoredby a new Ministry of

CommunityDevelopmentand SocialServices.In the first two decadesof independence

this achievedmuchmorethan its colonialprogenitorscould everhaveimagined.
Thousandsof primaryschoolsandhundredsof secondaryschools(known asTlarambee

Schools')werebuilt with substantialcontributionsof moneyandlabourfrom local

communities.Likewisemanyother kinds of local amenitywere constructedwith
Harambeecontributionsandlabour: healthfacilities,unmetalledroads,improvedwater

suppliesandcattledipsto namebut a few. For a time in the 1970srural developmentin

'Ujamaa" and
Kenyaseemedto be synonymouswith the Harambeemovement,muchas

l0
rural socialismdefinedthe policy andpracticesof developmentin Nyerere'sTanzania.It
hasbeenestimatedthat self-helpprojectsaccountedfor roughly30% of all rural capital
formation,and,between1967and 1973,11.4yoof nationaldevelopmentexpenditures
(Gachuki1982;Holmquist1982).Theeconomiccontributionofthe state,however,was

minimal:in 1979,for example,only onepercentofKenya'scapitaldevelopmentbudget

was devotedto self-helpprojects@arkanet dl. 1979,cited, togetherwith the above

in McCormackel al. 1986:47).
references,

by the mid-1980sthereweresignsthattheHarambee
Despiteits earlysuccesses,
movementwasrunningout of steam. "Harambee!"asa nationalsloganhadbeendiluted
Moi's additionof "Nyayol"(meaning"footstepsl"),a reference
by President to his

intentionto follow in the footstepsofKenyatta"whomhe succeeded

in 1978. The

Ministry of CommunityDevelopmentand SocialServiceshadlong sincebecomethe

Ministry of Cultureand SocialServices,with responsibilityflorcommunitydevelopment

falling to one departmentwithin it, the Departmentof SocialServices.The term

communitydevelopmentitself was dropped,andthe Department'sCommunity

DevelopmentAssistants,working at locationallevel andstill paidby their local district

councils,becameSocialDevelopmentAssistants.Harambeehadbecomethe common
namefor any collectivefund-raisingevent,for whateverpurpose,andthe financial

exactionsof chiefsandtheir assistantsin the nameof Harambeewerewidely resented,

muchascommunallabourhadbeenresentedin the colonialperiod. Now, however,

resentmentwas not directedat foreign ovemrle,but at the widespreadsysternof

comrption which hadbecomeendemicwithin local administration.To manypeople

Hararnbeehadbecomea tax imposedby the rich uponthe poor, a far cry from its original
purpose.

u
The last major resort of the self-helpprogr,unmewasin the women'sgtoup movement,

co-ordinatedby the Departmentof SocialServicesandmonitoredby the Women'sBureau

within the ministry. This will be discussedat lengthbelow. Otherwise,asBarkanet al.

(1979:23')noted,self-helpwas skewedtowardsthe provisionof socialservicesfor the

membersof rural communities.Exceptamongwomen'sgroups,little emphasiswas placed

upon increasingrural productioq andthe earlier(colonial)link betweenself-helpand

agriculturaldevelopmentwas largelylost. The apparentdemiseof self-helpand

communitydevelopmentasan aspectof developmentpolicy was matched,however,by
projectswhich requiredminimumlocal participationand,
the rise of larger,donor-assisted
in manycases,alsoinvolveda minimumof consultationwith the local beneficiaries- if

indeedthe beneficiarieswere meantto be local people. From the point ofview of some
politiciansandofEcialsthis shift certainlypaidbetter: therewas now a lot more moneyto

be madeout oflarge aid projects- the largerthe better- than local communitieswhich had
alreadybeenmilkeddry by local officials. Investmentandexperimentationin community

developmentinitiativeswere left largelyto the NGOs andchurches,whoseactivitieswill

alsobe examinedbelow.

in part,to the transitionidentifiedby Hassett(1994,

corresponds,
Thischangeof emphasis

and discussedin section1.I above)from a communitydevelopmentapproachto the more

of developmentby the statethroughlarge-scaleaid projects. The
explicit management

difference,in Kenyaat least,is that communitydevelopmentitselfhas alwaysbeen

managedby the stateasa policy andpracticewhich stemsfrom a variety of motives,both

transparentandopaque,economicandpolitical.

12
2 Community Developmentin Mbeere

The rest ofthis paperis devotedto an examinationof communitydevelopmentin Mbeere,

andlooksin detailat the role ofthe state,grassroots

initiatives,andthe role ofNGOs.

2.1 The ChangingRole of the State?

Despitethe rhetoric of Harambee,developmentin Mbeere,aselsewherein independent

Kenya,haslargelybeenconstruedasthe responsibilityofthe state,assisted,where

the natureofthe state'srole, and
by externaldonors.This sectionexamines
necessary,

askswhetheror not this role is really changing- in the directionof increasing

andcommunityparticipationin developmentplanning- asset out in
decentralisation
policy documentsandprescribedby Kenya'sinternationaldonors,the British ODA

included. Accordingto Hassett'sgeneralhistoryof communitydevelopment,outlined

above(section1.1),community-based arenow mergingwith the hitherto

approaches

andintervention,offeringnew promisefor
dominanttradition of statemanagement

equitableand sustainabledwelopment. Is this the casein Kenya"andin Mbeerein

particular?

2.1.1 TechnicalIntelTentionsand Aid Projects

The primary role of the public sectorin the developmentof Mbeereover the pasttwo

decadeshasbeendirective. The government,acting mainly through its different

ministrieS.hasfosterednumefoustechnicalinterventions,someof them in the form of
projects sponsoredby internationaldonorsand implementedwith the help of external

13
organisationsand expatriatestaff. Someof theseprojects, especiallythosedesignedto
improve the basic infrastructureand relatedservices,havehad a tremendousimpact

upon Mbeere. Almost every aspectof life hasbeenaffectedby the constructionof

roads,bridges,dams,schools,clinics,andthe provisionof electricity,telephone

services,and improvedwater supplies- to mentionjust someof the more obvious

'development', in Mbeereas elsewhere,hasbecomelargely
developments.Indeed
synonymouswith suchinterventions.

Riley and Brokensha(1988'.270-278,297-299)provide an overview of state-directed

interventionsin Mbeerewhich is consistentwith our own observationsand more

generalcritiquesof this "top-down" approachto development. Despitethe obvious

chengesin qudrty of life and somepositive impactsupon the local economy,the

benefrtshavebeenunevenlyspreadacrossMbeere(with greateradvantagesoften

accruing,as might be expected,to the higher potentialzones),nxrny interventionshave

failed or had negativeimpacts,and the overall return to developmentinvestmentsmade

by the govemmentand its donorshasbeenpoor (imagining that sucha balancesheet

could be drawn up, which of courseit cannot,exceptin notional terms)'

Many interventionshavebe€nmadein piecemealfashion, following the policies and

progilmmes of the different ministriesand agenciesworking in Mbeere, including the

ministries and departmentsresponsiblefor agriculture, livestock, public works, water

development,health, and education(the namesand departmentalcompositionof these

ministrieshavechangedon numerousoccasionsover the years, usually in responseto
political manoeuvresand reshuffles). Other interventionshavebeenco-ordinated,to a
great€ror lesserdegree,as part of wider programmes. One of the most important of

thesewas the SpecialRural Developmenthogramme (SRDP). In 1970Mbeerewas

chosenas one of six administrativedivisions in Kenyato take paft in the SRDP' a

t4
nation-wideintegrateddevelopmentprogrirmmewhich was to plry an important role in
promoting the institutionalisationof the state-managed,
donor-funded,model of

developmentin Kenya (compareRiley and Brokensha'sobservationthat the SRDP in

particular had "unintentionallyinduceda strongsenseof dependency,of relianceon
governmentto provide everything" (1988: 146). The SRDP in Mbeerewas financed

by NORAD, the Norwegiangovemmentdevelopmentagency,which spentsomeKshs

17 million in the period from 1970,when the programmewas inaugurated,through to
1977. NORAD alsoprovided technicalassistanceof different kinds as part of the
programme.

The main aims of the SRDP were to increaseagriculturalouput, reducerural

unemployment,improve agriculnral extensionand social services,encourage

decentralisationat divisional level, and to test the replicability of this programme. As
RJleyand Brokenshaobserve,theseaims were not met, and five main constraintswere

subsequentlyidentified: lack of credit, shortageof farm inputs, difficulties of

communication,shortageof waGr, and limited extensionfacilities. To theseRiley and
Brokenshaadd another,more general,constraint: failure adequatelyto understandthe

existing systemof agriculture(1988:-nG271).

The SRDP's main emphasisin agriculturewas on increasingthe productionof selected

cashcrops: cotton, Mexican 142beans,tobacco,castor,and, as a famine reserve,

Katumanimaize. However, insufFrcientconsiderationwas given to the various

constraintsreferred to above,and aboveall to existing productionpracticesand patterns

of resourceallocationat the householdlevel. Where someof thesecrops have since

beenmore widely adopted,it haslargely beenbecauseof the removal of someof these

constraintsand the developmentof reliable markets(for exampleby B.A.T., British

American Tobacco).ratherthan as a direct result of the SRDPand its extensionefforts.

l5
Otherwiseagricultural productionin Mbeere,and especiallyin the lower and more arid
zones,is gearedmore to coping with this environmentand the ever-presentthreat of

droughtthan to producingfor the market. The outcomeof farmers' risk-aversion

strategiesis considerablediversity of crop choice, and not the tendencytowardsthe

monocultureof cashcropsfound in more high potentialareas.

O,theraspectsof the SRDPalso met with limited success.One of thesewas the atempt
to improve water suppliesby meansof a complexnetwork of plpes. In Riley and
Brokensha'sjudgement 'this project hasneverworked properly. Water is often not

availableat the stand-pipesbecausethe PVC...pipes havebeenbroken, or damagedby

road machinery,or there is no dieselor no sparesfor the pump, or the intake on the

Ena river is silted or broken" (1988: 299). Similar assessments

can be madeof other

SRDPinterventions,as well astlose undertakenin the framework of other and more

recentdevelopmentprojects. This doesnot meanthat development,understoodin

terms of improvedtechnologyand infrastrucfure,and greateraccessto services,hasnot

takenplace. As indicatedat the start of this sectionit very clearly has. One of the

most successfrrlcomponentsof the SRDPwas the constructionof new roadsand

improvementof existing ones,leaving Mbeerewith an unusuallygood network of

mainly all-weatherroads. The nation-wideRural AccessRoadsProgrammeof the

1980ssawthe constructionof 210 km of roadsand significantly increasedaccessto

marketsin remoteareasof Mbeere, while the constructionof a tarmacroad running

from Kiamberethrough Kamburuand Kiritiri to Embu in the mid-1980shashad a

considerableimpact on the economyof the whole of southernMbeereand (what is

now) GachokaDivision (this road being a spin-off from the constructionof Kiambere

Dam, which also displacedmany peopleand provided employmentfor othersin

Mbeere).

lo
Other wide-ranginginterventionshavehad similarly mixed rezultsin Mbeere. These
include the government'sprogrammeof land reform and registrationof individual

freehold title, whosefar reachingeffectswe havedescribedelsewhere,and the various

interventionsmadeby the British/ODA-fundedEMI ASAL Programme,which will be

discussedbelow. It would not be difficult to generatea catalogueof project successes

and failures, though we do not intend to do so here. It is perhapsmore important to

considerthe wider implicationsof the top-down, project-oriented,approachto

development. This approachhasbecomeso well integratedinto developmentpractice

that it is often to difficult to assessit from any other framework than the one which its

own practicesand practitionersprovide. While it is tempting to view development

solely in terms of projectsand interventions,evaluatedby their technical, economicand

social impacts,the current emphasisupon communitydevelopmentinvites us to take a

wider perspective;wider, even, than the normal definition of communitydevelopment

and participationwould allow. We attemptto do this in the sectionswhich follow.

2.1,2 T\e Institutionalisation of Communit5rDevelopment

In the first part of this paper(section1.2 above)we saw how communitydevelopment

in Kenya has, throughoutits history, beensubjectto definition and manipulationby the

state. This history is rarely mentionedin the contemporaryenthusiasmfor community

development. According to current orthodoxy, this new emphasisupon local

participation in the developmentprocesshasevolved in direct responseto its former

absenceand the widespreadfailure of projectswhich havenot sufficiently involved the

communitiesthey affect. However, knowledgeof the pasthistory of community

development,and the continuity of this with the present,might lead us to questionthe

orthodox account.

1'f
2.1.2.1 The District Focusfor Rural Development

As notedabove(in section2.1.1),oneofthe aimsofthe SRDPin the 1970swasto

promoteadministrative andintegratedplanning.Thisaspectof the SRDP
decentralisation
failed, primarilybecauseofthe lack of commitmentof senioradministratorsin the sectoral

ministriesto decentralised (ODI 1992:E.l). In the early1980s,

decision-making

however,the governmentembarkedupon a new andapparentlyradicalstrategydesigned

to shift the responsibilityfor planningandimplementingrural developmentfrom the

of ministriesto the districts.Thisis the policyknownasthe District Focus

headquarters

thetitle of the document(the so-called"BlueBook") in whichit

for RuralDevelopment',

is codified(first issuedin 1982andrevisedin 1987).Thenewpolicybecameofficially

in 1983.
ooerational

TheDistrictFocusfocusesuponthe creationandoperationofa hierarchyofDevelopment

Committeeswhich is supposedto transmitdevelopmentproposalsupwardsfrom sub-

locationalto district level. In theory,then,developmentplanningbeginsat the local level

in theLocationalandSubJocational
Development (LDCsandSLDCs). As
Committees

stipulatedin the DistrictFocustslueBook' (Republicof Kenya1987)eachSLDCis to be

chairedby the AssistantChief andits membersareto includethe local KANU chairman,

of primary schoolsin the sub-

councillors, departmentalofficers and headmasters
location. The core compositionof the LDC is basicallythe same,exceptat a higher

level. It is chairedby the Chief of the location and its membersare to include the
relevantAssistantChiefs, the KANU locationalchairman,councillors, departmental

of parastatalsand headmasters
officers, local representatives of secondaryschoolsin the

area. Both LDCs and SLDCs are also to include cooptedlocal leadersand
representatives NGOsandself-helpgroups. The'Blue Book'further
of cooperatives,

18
statesthat women's organisationsmustbe adequatelyrepresentedin the LDCs and
SLDCS.

Developmentproposalsare, in theory, passedup from the SLDCs and LDCs and vetted

at eachstep, through the similarly constitutedDivisional DevelopmentCommittees

(DvDCs) and on to the District DevelopmentCommittee(DDC). The DDC is the most

importantofthe institutionsthroughwhichthe DistrictFocusstrategyis applied.It is a

largebody chairedby the District Commissioner,with the District DevelopmentOfficer as

its secretary,andotherwisecomprisingall district headsof department,Membersof

Parliament,district KANU chairmen,local authoritychairmen,DvDC chairmen(who are

the District Officers),representatives parastatals,andthe invited

of development-related

ofNGOs andself-helpgroups. The DDC meetsquarterlyandis assisted

representatives

by theDistrictExecutiveCommittee@EC), alsochairedby the DistrictCommissioner,

but limited in membershipto governmentofficials. The DEC in turn is servedby the

District PlanningUnit (DP[D, led by the Distria DevelopmentOfficer andincludingthe
District StatisticalOfficer andAssistantDistrict DevelopmentOfficers. Oneof the
principaltasksofthesedistrict-level
bodiesis to producefive-yearlyDistrictDevelopment

Plans@DPs), linkedto annualbudgetsby an annuallyupdatedDistrict Annex: this is

supposedto provideboth a work planfor the implementationofthe DDP during the year
anddetailsofthe budgetaryprovisionrequired(for a more detailedaccountseeODI
1992:8.5-6).

This looks all very well on paper,but doesit work in practice?Althoughthe District

Focusstrategyhadundoubtedlyfocusedattentionon the districtsasplanningand

administrativeunits, it hasachievedrelativelylittle in the way of decentralising

developmentplanning. Gven the prevailingscarcityof public sectorresources,the DDCs

havealmostno firndsto disburseandtherefore,asthe ODI consultancyteamnotes,

19
districts "continuewith routinesof planningthat areintendedto influenceline ministry

allocationoffunds at districtlevel(butbarelydo so) andto preparedistrictprojectsthat

havevery little hopeof beingfunded"(1992:E 8). At the sametimethe relationship
of

andNGOsto theDDCsremainsuneasy:theirrepresentation
both localauthorities is

frequentlylimited andthey often seethe DDCs asattemptingto control themandthereby

mandates.This impressionis confirmedby the fact that
subverttheir own, independent,

the DDCs arealmostwholly managedby the administrationandother seniorgovernment

officials,boththroughthe influenceofthe DECsandasa resultoftheir own composition.

As a mechanismfor participatoryplanning,the DDC systemis seriouslyflawed: "Despite

ofparticipatoryandbottom-upplanning,the essence
theBlueBook'sespousal ofthe

systemit describesis for requeststo travel up the system,with decisionsbeingtransmitted

andcontrol"(ODI 1992:
Theimplicitplanningmodelis oneof centralisation
downwards...
E8)

Even if the systemdid work in the oppositedirection, tlere are no guaranteesthat it

would meetthe participatoryideal. While the District Focusprescribesa mechanism

for communityparticipation, it doesnot ensurethat suchparticipationwill be a regular

and integral part of the planning process. LDC and SLDC membersare left free to

decidehow and when and who is cooptedonto their committees. This leadsto
considerablevariation in practice, ranging from adequateto minimal community and

women'sparticipationin the LDCs and SLDCs. To give but one examplefrom

Mbeere: in 1992Mbita SLDC had nine membersincluding the Assisant Chief, but
noneof thesewere women, althoughsomeof the men did representa variety of

community interests. This SLDC only met irregularly at the requestof its chairman,
and then it was, asone memberdescribed,to draw up requestsfor moneywhich were
rarely granted.
As a result there is considerabledissatisfactionin somelocal communitieswith the

existing system,which relies heavily upon the characterand actionsof individual chiefs
in the absenceof any formal mechanismfor communityrepresentationor involvement.

The revisededition of the District Focus 'Blue Book' (Republicof Kenya 1987)
recognisesthat the LDCs and SLDCs are not sufficiently active in all districts. It

ascribesthis to the fact that their personnelare not equippedwith basic skills in project
planning, monitoring, and the preparationof detailedrninutesso that they can

communicateeffectively with the DvDCs and DDCs. The suggestedremedyis

appropriatetraining. However, in the absenceof funds and with their requests
generallymeetingno or only negativeresponsesfrom above,it is unlikely that this

would remedymuch(compareWalsh 1992:3).

2.1.2.2 Political Agendas

The District Focusstrategyand its implementation,indeedthe developmentprocessas

a whole, is bestunderstoodin its wider political context (seeBarkanand Chege1989).

Different actorsacting at different levels havedifferent, sometimesconflicting, political

agendas,and we will not attemptto describeall of thesehere. A few main points can,
however,be made.

So far we havereferred to the Kenyanstateas a monolithic entity, and implied that

developmentplanning is virtually the solepreserveof the governmentand ministries in

Nairobi. The reality is somewhatmore complicated. Although political power is

wielded from the centre- by the President,his chief ministers,and other close

associates- the ethnic fragmentationof Kenyaand the absenceof a strong and all-
pervasiveapparatusof coercion(Kenyais not a military state,nor doesit rely heavily

21
upon a secretpolice force) hasproduceda much finer political balance. The key actors
in this balanceare regional power-brokers,operatingat district or wider level (as

determinedby the ethnic compositionand alliancesin a particular region) to deliver

political supportand legitimacy (most obviously in the form of votes)to the cenfe. In

return they are awardedpostsof varying importancein the government- hencethe

burgeoningnumberof ministriesand parastatalsin recentyears- while they in turn are

expectedby their local supporters(including other, intermediary,power-brokers)to

translatetheir influenceinto developmentprojectsand interventionsin their home
regions.

This processis active tlroughout Kenya. It is evident, for example,in Meru District,

where the seniorpolitician for many yearshasbeenknown nation-wideas "the King of

Meru". It is also evidentin Embu District, wherepower haslikewise beenbrokered
for many yearsby a singlepolitician, servingas a senior Minister in a successionof

different ministriesuntil his retirementat the 1992election. He hasremained,

however, district KANU chairman,while his son, althougha memberof anotherparty
(the DemocraticParty, DP), has succeededhim as a Memberof Parliament. His role

in bringing developmentto different pars of Embu District, including Mbeere(where

his family originally camefrom), is legendary: particular interventionsbeing often

linked to whicheverministry he happenedto be in chargeof at the time. Storiesof his

attempts,usually successfrrl,to frustratethe developmentinitiatives of his rivals are

also legion. Developmentprojectsthereforebecomegifts in the handsof politicians,
gifts to their supportersin reward or return for their support.

This systemprovidesthe District Focusstrategywith its political logic. From this

point of view the decentralisationof developmentplanning, or at leastsomeaspectsof

it, to the districts was not primarily intendedto foster communityparticipation and
makethe processmore efFrcient,but was an attemptto rationalisethe systemin which
political power and developmentprojectsare regularly tradedfor one another. It is not

surprising, therefore,that the DDCs are the District Focus,that the lower levels in the
chain of committees(the so-calledsub-DDCs)are largely ineffective, and community
participationin the whole processan empty promise.

The District Focusstrategyalso hasother benefitsfor the government. The rhetoric of

decenhalisationand participationhasattractedthe attentionand approvalof Kenya's

donors, and to this extent madethem more willing to provide financial assistanceand
supportthan they might havedoneotherwise(especiallyin an era when the catchwords

are good-governance,democratisationand accountability). The ODA's funding of

consultanciesto draw up proposalsfor District Supportprogrammesin Isiolo
(separately)and Embu, Meru and Tharaka-NithiDistricts can be interpretedas one of

the preliminary fruits of this. The District Focusalso providesthe governmentwith a

meansof monitoring and to someextentcontrolling the developmentactivities of

NGos. All throughthe 1980sthe governmentexpressedincreasingconcernabout the

proliferation of NGOs and its lack of control over them, accusingsomeNGOs of
possessingpolitical objectivesin conflict with its own. This concernintensifiedduring

the campaigl for a multi-party system- a campaignwhich directly involved a number

of churchorganisations- and generateda numberof attemptsto regulateand monitor

the NGO community, for examplethroughthe introductionof strict registration

requirements. The District Focussystemgives the govemmentan opporhrnityto

monitor and channelthe activities of NGOs at district and local levels, though any

attemptat exercisinggreatercontrol is ineviAbly underminedby the willingnessof

local politicians and power-brokersto contracttheir own allianceswith NGOs.

ZJ
2.1.2.3 The Emperor'sNew Clothes

Kenya'sbilateraldonorshavea very differentinterestin the District Focusstrategyandthe

waysin which it is implemented.While awareof the fact that the systemis subjectto
political manipulation,the donor agenciestend to view this asa form ofunwarrantedand

unwantedinterferencewhich detractsfrom the properobjectivesofthe strategyand

rendersthe systemlessefficientthanit couldbe. Theseobjectivesare,of course,those

whicharestatedin theDistrictFocustslueBook' andotherpolicydocuments

(seesection
2.1-2.1above),objectives
whichechothe overtpurposes
of colonialcommunity
policy- Justastherewasmoreto colonialpolicythanwasgivenpublic
development

expression,so the modernagenciescarrytheir own political agendas,couchedin the

rhetoricofthe "New World Order". Theirprincipalunderlyingobjectiveis, arguably,to
recreateKenya(and other countrieslike it) in our own image,so that the development
processcanbe controlledandmarketsopenedup without the needfor continuedlargeand
(to us) economicallyinefficientpay-offsto nationalpoliticiansandlocal power-brokers_

On this interpretation,then,the grandsubtextof developmentpolicy is a strugglebetween

differentinterests,Kenyanversusintemational,for a greatersliceofthe economiccake.
Thesupremeironyofthis situationis that both sidesshoulddresstheir strugglein the

languageof communitydevelopment,when,if it takesplaceat all, suchdevelopmentis no

morethana by-productofthe widercontest.

Thisis not to saythat thesearethe conscious

intentionsof all or evenmostofthe
individualactorsinvolved. As a descriptionofthe outcomeof individualactionsit does,

however,providean alternativeto the orthodoxaccountwhich acceptspolicy statements

at theirfacevalue. Accordingto this account,whichis particularlywell articulatedin the

donor community,the currentfashionfor communitydevelopmentandlocal participation

in the development
processhasevolvedin response
to the widespread
failureof
technically-oriented
aid projectswhich havepaid relativelyattentionto the statedneeds
andwishesofthe peopletheseprojectsaffect,whetherasbeneficiaries
or asthe subjects
of other kinds of impact. This provides,for example,the statedrationalefor recent
in the directionofBritish aid (proposedaswell aspast)to Embuand
changes
neighbouring
districts.Therestofthis sectionis devotedto a discussion
ofthis case,
which affectsMbeeredirectly.

In 1982the British government,working throughODd beganto implementa large

projectin Embu,Meru.andIsioloDistrictswhichwasdesigned
asa pilot technical
approachto naturalresourcedevelopmentin arid and semi-aridlandareas. the EMI
ASAL Project. The projectconsistedof five maincomponents(includingsoil andwater

conservation,smallstockbreedingandtree planting)which requiredreportingto four

differentministriesin the Kenyangoveflrment.EMI wasmanagedby expatriatestaff
working togetherwith Kenyancounterpartsandlastedthroughtill l99l .

Despitehavingsomelocalisedimpacts,EMI wasgenerally
judged,at leastby ODd to

havebeena failure. The termsofreferencedrawnup for a subsequent

projectpreparation

for these: "Whilehighprioritywas

missionlist a wholeseriesof problemsandthe reasons
givento achievingbetterunderstanding
ofthe socio-economicfactorsin the ASAL areas,
this waslargelyneglected
duringimplementation...At
best,the beneficialimpacton ASAL
households
wasmodest...[the]
objectiveof strengthening
the institutionsresponsible
for
planning,implementingandfacilitatingthe socialandeconomicdevelopmentof ASAL

peoplewasnot realised...
[poor coordination]
wasexacerbated
by the failureto perceive
the overallneedsoffarmersandtheirproductionsystems
in an integratedmanner..."(ODI
1992:L 1-2).

25
EMI was originallydesignedto work from the provinciallevel downwardsand partly asa

system:"SinceEMI wasoriginally
resultof this failedto adaptto the newlydecentralised

conceived,therehasbeena major shift in Govemmentpolicy affectinglocal level

development,
enshrined
in theDistrictFocusfor RuralDevelopment
Policy...and
adopted
in 1983. Thispolicyenvisages
muchmorelocalparticipation
in the development
process
with local communitiesbeinglargelyresponsiblefor their own development.It is intended

thatthe role ofthe Government

shouldbeto facilitatethe processofsocialandeconomic
developmentby creatingan enablingenvironmentwhereconstraintsto developmentare
removedandopportunitiesarecreated.EMI projectagreements
were not revisedto take
properaccountofthis policy changenor for the creationofnational research

weregivenmandates
institutions...which of directrelevance (ODI
to the Programme"
1992:L.2\.

In linewith this critiqueEMI waswounddownin mid-1991.In late l99l a teamof

consultants
wasdespatched
to IsioloDistrictto drawup, amongotherthings,proposals
for a newdistrictsupportprogramme
there. In 1992a secondteamwascommissioned
to
do the samefor Embu,Meru andthe newly-createdTharaka-NithiDistricts. The termsof
referencefor this secondconsultancymarkeda definiteshift ofapproachconsistentwith

the statedobjectivesofthe DistrictFocusstrategy:"Thestudywill designapproaches

to
strengthenDistrict and sub-Districtcapacitiesin resourceplanningandmanagement
in
EmbuandMeru. The aim will be to developreplicablemodelswhich focus on increasing

the efficiencyofuse ofthe resources for economicandsocialdevelopment

available in the
Districts. Proposalswill be madein the contextof a process-projectwith participatory
planningasa key objective. To promoteandencourageinitiativesaimedat achievingthe

foregoingmodestcapitalaid maybe madeavailable.Particularattentionwill be givento

meetingthe needsofthe poorest,the specialrole ofwomen,andthe conservation

ofthe
naturalenvironment"(ODI 1992:L l).
Theresultingproposalsmarkaninteresting
returnto the policiesadoptedby theBritish
colonialadministration
morethan40 yearsago,althoughthis fact is not madeexplicit,and
perhapsnot evenrecognisedby manyofthe consultantsandODA personnelinvolved
(thereis, however,a real link, in that somesenioradvisorswere onceemployedby the

colonialadministrationin Kenya,andalsoretainedby the govemmentafter independence

in 1963). Alongwith variousrecommendations
for improvingthe planningprocessat
district level, particularattentionis paidto strengtheningandincreasingthe involvementof

thelocalauthorities- theMunicipal,Town andCountyCouncils(CCs)- andespecially

the CommunityDevelopmentDepartmentswithin the latter. At present,andasa legacy

from the colonialperiod,the CCsareresponsible

for palng the salaries
of Social
DevelopmentAssistants(SDAs), but not for their management
andsupervision,which are
the tasksof the Departmentof SocialServicesin the Ministry of Cultureand Social

Services.It is proposedto shiftall of theseresponsibilities

to the Community
DevelopmentDepartmentsfor an experimentalperiod,aswell asmakingother provisions
(suchasa grantto the CCsfor the purchase
ofbicyclesandmotorcycles)to improvethe
efficiencyoftheir work. It is alsoproposedto givea grantto the CCsto enablethemto

assistwomen'sand self-helpgroupstkough a SmallProjectsFund.

Th€ SDASare normally recruitedfrom the communitiesin which they work- They are

expectedto work closely with local leadersin the identification, planning, monitoring

and evaluationof developmentprojectsfrom the sub-locationalup to divisional levels.

They are also expectedto act as secretariesto the different local development

committeesand sub-committees(specificallyWomen's and Social DevelopmentSub-

committees)and one of their major tasksin this contextis to ensurethe coordinationof

developmentactivities to avoid duplication. However, SDAs rarely havethe resources

or the necessaryfraining to carry out all of theseactivities effectively. The ODI report

thereforealsoproposedthat they shouldbe given training appropriateto their roles and

new responsibilities,including assistingin the administrationof the Small projects
Fund.

Theseproposalsreproducemanyaspects
ofcolonialcommunitydevelopment
policyand
practice. In commonwith existingpracticethe basicapproachrecommended
is still from
the top down, the major differencebeinga proposedshift in institutionalresponsibilityfor

communitydevelopmentawayfrom the administrationandgovemmentministries

(especially
theMinistryof culture andSocialServices)
andtowardsthe electedcouncils-
A similarshift took placein colonialpracticewhenthe responsibilityfor community

developmentwastransferredfrom District Officersto officialsappointedand employedby

the DistrictCouncils(thesewere,of course,the forerunners
of today'sSDAs). Fromthis
point of view, communitydevelopmentin Kenyawould seemto be movingin a circle.

Moreover,the new proposalsseemhardlyto recognisewhat haschangedin the

intervening40 years: not only havepolitical agendasandthe distributionofpower

changed,but alsotherehavebeenmanydevelopments
at grassrootslevel, includingthe
proliferationofinitiatives which the stateandits agentshasonly partiallybeenableto

control. Theseinitiativesarethe subjectofthe remainder

ofthis paper.

2.2 Grassrootslnitiatives

one striking featureofthe official andorthodoxrhetoricof communitydwelopmentis its

failure to recognisethe existenceofgrassrootsinitiativesexceptin so far asthesehave

beencapturedby the stateandincorporatedinto the developmentprocess.Women's

groupsare recognisedif only becauseofthe strenuousefforts by the govemmentandlocal
politiciansto usethemfor their own purposes,thoughtheseeforts havenot entirely

succeeded
andwomen'sgroupsare currentlyaccordedlesssignificancethan they once
were. Othergrassroots
initiativesarealmostentirelyignored:this appliesin particularto
rotatingsavingsandcreditassociations
andsomeofthe activitieswhicharelinkedto the
localchurches
andschools.Indeedthereis somedistrustoftheseactivitiesbecause
of
their presumed
politicalconnections,
andthis is especially
the casewhereNGOsare
involved.

2.2.1 Women'sGroups

The women's group movementin Kenyatracesa variety of origins, but its true history

beganin the mid- 1960swith the formation of large numbersof groupsby Kikuyu
womenin Cenfal Province. Many of thesebeganas mabai groups,functioning like
rotating savingsand credit associations(ROSCAs)with the aim of enablingtheir

membersto buy nmbai, iron roofing sheets,or to afford other homeimprovements.

The local contextin which groupswere formed placeda high premium upon mutual

assistanceamongwomen: land and malelabour (becauseof labour migration to the

towns) were becomingincreasinglyscarce,while women's agricultural and domestic

responsibilitieshad increasedand their accessto cashincomeremainedrestricted. This

was againsta backgroundof political supportfor self-helpinitiatives (Harambee)in

building the newly-independentstate(seesection1.2.2 above).

with official encouragement,similar groupsbeganto appearelsewherein the country.

The governmentfust declaredits commitmentto a women's group programmein

1966. In 1975, at the start of the United Nations' InternationalDecadefor Women, it

establisheda Women's Bureauto coordinatethe activities of a nation-wideprogramme.

In many respectsthe state'srelationshipto the women's group movementis an

ambivalentone, and its assistancecan alsobe interpretedas an attemptto control and

makebestuseof what are, essentially,grassrootsorganisations. This was particularly

evidentin the late 1980s,when the governmentintervenedto take over Maendeleoya

Wanawake("Women'sProgress')andincorporateit within the women'swing of
KANU, then the only political party (Maendeleohad hitherto beenan NG0, especially

active in women'sdevelopmentduring the late colonial period, thoughrather less

important for tlte women's group movementby the time it was takenover). In

different parts of the country women's group memberswere then told that they would
haveto join and subscribeto the new Maendeleoif they were to receiveany support

llom the government. Ultimately, however,this attemptto gain further control over

the women's group movementand its resources- including the funds allocatedto
groupsby outsideagenciesand NGOs - failed when KANU was forced to diseneage

itself from Maendeleofollowing tlle legalisationof other political parties.

The majority of women's groupsreceivelittle or no assistanceexceptthat provided by

the government. They are requiredto registerwith the Departmentof Social Services

and are subjectto the various attentionsof its extensionagents,along with agricultural

ofFrcers,chiefs and other officials in the local administration. Women's groupsare

usedin a numberof ways to promotethe government'sdevelopmentpolicies.
Registeredgroupsare eligible to receivegrantstowardstheir projects, though the

demandfor theseis much greaterthan the supply. Groupsare also encouragedto hold
fund-raisingharambeesfor the samepurpose. Otherwisethey typically raise

subscriptionsor sharesfrom their members,and engagein a wide rangeof economic

activities, including collective farm labour for payment,in order to gatler seed-money
for their projects. As a nrle it is difficult for groupsto obtain commercialcredit or

establishlarger enterpriseswithout externalassistance.While most groupsaim to

developcommunity servicesor profitable enterprises,they alsoperform a variety of

30
welfare and other functionsfor their own members: for example' by exchanging
labour or by operatingROSCAS'

Registeredwomen,sgroupshaveto possessan electedchairwoman,tfeasufer, secretary

and committee. within this framework actualdistributionsof authority and

organisationalproceduresmay vary considerably. Groupsalso differ considerablyin

size and composition,both from one anotherand as they developover time' Men may
also belongto women's groups,though in the majority of casesthey are excluded.

Groupswith more than five male membershaveto registeras self-help, not women's,
groups. In generalzuchgroups,including thoseformed exclusivelyby men, are few

and far between.

It is difficult to obtain accuratefigures for numbefsof women's goups and their

membership. Thereare a numberof reasonsfor this. while socialdevelopment
for
assistantsrecord the numberof registeredgtoupsin their reports, it is lesscommon
are
them (and not really in their interests)to deleteor draw attentionto groupswhich
nolongeroperative.Tothisextentofficialfigurestendtobeinflated,thoughthe

existenceof unregisteredand unreportedgroupsmay redressthe balancesomewhat.

figures
Meanwhile, for thosegroupswhich are registered,it is unusualfor membership

to be updatedfrom thosereportedat the time of registration. In somecases

membershipwill havegrown considefably,in othersthe active membershipwill only
be
be a portion of the total recorded. For thesereasonsthe reportedfigures haveto

treatedwith somecaution.

AccordingtotheWomen'sBureau,in1988therewere26,92|women,sgloupsinthe
for
country with a total of over one million members(1,053,391). Mbeereaccounts
just a small fraction of this total. The information compiledin the following table

3l
showsthat in 1982there were 140registefedwomen's groupsin the whole of lower
Embu (Siakagoand Gachokadivisions), I 11 in the Mbeerearea(lower Embu

excluding Mwea). The registeredmembershipof 91 of thesegroupstotalled 2,692

persons,a meanof 29.6 memb€rsper group. By 1990the numberof groupsin lower

Embu had risen to an estimated200 with a total of 7,517 membersand an overall mean

of 37.6 membersper group. While thesefigures offer no more than a rough

approximation,they suggestthat as many as one third, possibly more, of all adult

women(aged20andover)inlowerEmbubelongtowomen'sgroups.Givensucha
level of involvementit is probablethat the majority of womenhavebelongedto a

registeredwomen's group at sometime in their lives, evenif they do not do so now.

Welbourn(1990)speculatesthatsocialatrdeconomicchange,includingtheimpactsof

landreform,haveplacedalargerburdenuponwomenandthuscfeatedfavourable
"More wives havehusbands
conditionsfor the spreadof women's groupsin Mbeere:
workingaway,theirchildrenareatschool,andtheynolongerhavethemutual
farm and
traditional sup'portof closekin living nearbyto help them. All the effort of
the
householdlabour now falls on their own shouldersrather than being sharedwith
and
rest of the family...This I believeis an importantreasonfor the rapid emergence
growthofwomen'sgfoupsinMbeereaselsewhere"(Welbourn1990:38).Reference

shouldalsobe madeto the role playedby ROSCAsin the formation of women's

groups: indicative, in part, of a demandfor new conzumergods on the part of
This
women and theif limited accessto incomeand/or other forms of saving.
groupsin Central
explanationmirrors that given abovefor the rapid qrad of mabati
Provinceafterindependence,thoughitdoesnotmentiontheroleofofficialsupport'
given to women's groupsas part of the SpecialRural
including the encouragement
DevelopmentProgramme(SRDP) in Mbeere'

)L
Women's Groups and Their Membership in I-ower Embu' l9E2 and 1990
214) and ODI (1992: l'3)
sources: Mwaniki 1d1986:

Administrative Area Year

t9E2 1990

Siakago Division
numberof groups 53 84

numberof members 1430 2542

meanper group 27.0 30.3

Gachoka Division
numberof groups 87 116

numberof members N/A 4975

meanper group N/A 42.9

TOTAL LOWEREMBU
numberof groups 140 2N

numberof members N/A 7517

meanper group N/A 37.6

TOTALMBEERE

numbef of groups lll N/A

numberof members N/A N/A

meanper group N/A N/A

JJ
Despitethe evidentimportanceof women's gtoupsin terms of the large numbersof
of the women'sgroup movementand the
women who join them, many assessments
groupsthemselveshavebeennegative. This conclusionhasbeenreachedin studiesof

women's groupsin Mbeereas well as elsewherein Kenya. Following a surveyof 25

women's groupsconductedin 1982in three locationsin Mbeere, Mwaniki (1986:22G
225) listed a whole catalogueof internal and externalconstraintsupon their

effectiveness. Theseincludedwomen'sheavydomesticand agricultural responsibilities

(restricting their contributionsof time and moneyto groups); food shortages,water

scarcity and inadequatenutrition (especiallyduring periodsof drought); poor

organisationand weak leadership(eading to internal disputesand allegationsof the

misappropriationof funds); lack of zupportfrom members'husbands;the failure to

identifu viable projects; lack of adequatenumagementpractices,including book-

keepingskills; lack of capital; lack of goodroadsand isolation from markets;the lack

of marketsin any eventfor someproducts;lack of trained extensionworkers (Social

DevelopmentAssisans) and tlerefore appropriateadvice; and, last but not least, the
generalproblem of women's subordinationto men (which is at the root of someof the

constraintsmentionedabove). Given sucha long fist it is surprisingthat anyonewould

want to belongto a woman'sgroup at all. Mwaniki assertsthat he only saw one

project that had demonstratedsornepotentialfor generatingincome: a multi-purpose

hall built and ownedby the Union of Kithunthiri Women's Groups, one of two zuch

unions includedin his survey.

Welbourn(1990:45-a8)is equallypessimistic,andalsoassertsthat mostwomen's

groupsare not successful. The reasonsshegives do not add muchto Mwaniki's list,

and include resistanceby husbandsand the exclusionof singleor otherwise

troublesomewomen; lack of educationamonggroup membersand a consequentlack of

stronggfoup leadersand groupswith clear objectives;failure to identiry viable

projects; and women's lack of time and money. According to Welbourn tlis last

constraintsuggeststhat in somecasespoorer womenwill not be able to join groups,

althoughMwaniki doesnot provide any supportfor this conclusion(which in some

ways contradictsWelbourn's own thesisaboutthe formation of groupsand the type of

women likely to form them).

Similar analyseshavebeenproducedin virtually every study of women's groupsin

Kenya (seeMcCormacket al. 1986:.10-17for an overview). The pattern is: a

catalogueof constraints,longer or shorteras the casemay be, and the conclusionthat

the potential for further developingwomen's groups,and especiallytheir capacityfor
running successfulincome-generatingenterprises,is limited. Mwaniki concludes:
'...there are no easyor immediatesolutionsfor manyproblemsfacing Mbeere

women's groupsbecauseunderlying them are broad structuralfactors...In light of these

problemsMbeerewomen's groupswould perhapsbe better off if they concentratedon

their mutual assistanceactivities. . . " (1986: 225), althoughhe concededthat some

income-generatingprojectsmight work. Welbourn is similarly cautiousin

recommendingthat the (former) EMI Programmeshouldwork with women's groups:

'Working with women's groupsaloneis not necessarilygoing to give womenaccessto

long-term, sustainableincome; it is not necessarilygoing to lighten women's physical

and psychologicalburdens;nor will it ensurewomenan opportunity to speakout about

their problemsand needsto a sympatheticresponsiveaudience' (1990: 48). These

arealsoechoedin the ODI reporrQ992: 1.2-3).
conclusions

It is not difficult to reachsuchconclusionsafter scanningthe historiesof individual

groups. We collecteddetailedhistoriesof 2l women's groupsin Mavuria Location,

formed from 1974onwards(and only a sampleof all the groupsfonned during this
period: Mwaniki, for example,cites the existenceof 38 women's groupsin this

35
locationin 1982(1986:214)). 15 of the 2l goups in our samplehavesincecollapsed

or haveotherwisebecomedormant, for reasonswhich can all be found in Mwaniki's

list. KamacaciWomen's Group, for example,which was formed in Gatakavillage in

1979, disintegratedin 1984following the failure of its plansto constructa rental

building / businesspremises(the building stoneshad alreadybeenpurchased).

According to someformer membersthis wasbecausethe group's officials had

misappropriatedthe funds for the project: on anotheraccountownershipof the plot on

which the premiseswere to be built was assertedby the sonsof the man who had
donatedit, following which mernbersaccusedthe group's officials of incompetencefor

failing to ensurethat no suchproblemswould arise.

What suchaccountslack, however, is a broaderperspectiveon group formation and

memb€rshipover time in any one area, as well as an understandingof the underlying

reasonsfor group successas well as failure. The formation, developmentand decline

of groupsis a dynamicprocess. The fact that groupscontinueto be formed, and that

many women, despitehaving belongedto failed groups,continueto experimentwith

others, suggeststhat womendo gain somethingfrom group membership. One of these

gains may well be the experiencewhich leadsto later success:and it is not unusualto

find that the membersand officials of successfulgroupshavecomefrom groupswhich

havenot survived. ln any eventthe survival rate of women's groupsis probably not

much worse than that of other small enterprises.

A rather different picture emergeswhen successfulgroupsare analysed. In their study

of women's groupsin CoastProvince, McCormacket al.(1986) found that the initial

successof groupsrestson the extentof their accessto the labour of membersand to the

cashprovided by membersor their households.The amountof incomewhich these

households(and womenas householdmembers)are preparedto invest in groupsis
conditionedby the sum of demandsupon them, their ability to meetthesedemands,

and the returnsthey can expectfrom this as opposedto other investments. Under these
circumstancesit is not easyfor groupsworking aloneto establishviable enterprises. In

order to overcometheseobstacles,groupsneedallies, and the major allies availableto

them are the government(in the shapeof the Departmentof Social Services)and
various NGOs. Although there is often a price to be paid for its assisrrnce,the
governmentcan provide grantsto capitalisenew enterprises,while the NGOs can also

provide valuabletechnicalassistancein the planning and operationof enterprises.

Considerableimportancealso attachesto the choiceof enterprise: thosewhich are new

to a community, particularly thosewhich are capital and labour intensive, are diffrcult
for groupsto operatesuccessfully.

On the basisof thesefindings, the two NGOs working with thesegroups, Tototo Home
Industies (of Mombasa)and World EducationInc. (of Boston), designeda programme

of training and other assistancewhich firrther increasedthe profitability and

sustainabilityof women's group enterprises(seeKane et al. l99l\. The wider

significanceof this work was that it arguedthat a lot more could be doneto increase

the viability of women's groupsand their enterprises. For the most part, however,
women's groupshavereceivedlessattentionfrom NGOs and other agenciesthan they

did in the nid-1980s. one reasonfor this hasbeenthe negativeassessment

offered in
most reportsaboutwomen's groups, many of them, it mustbe said, basedupon quick

and impressionisticresearch. A secondreasonhasbeenthe generalshift in favour of

micro-enterprisecredit, especiallyon a group-lendingmodel (the loansbeing madeto
individuals), as a more cost-effectiveway of increasingincomesand employment,

fostering economicdevelopment,and alleviating poverty in both rural and urban

communities.

J I
A third reasonfor the relative lack of interestin women's groupson the part of

developmentpractitionersin both the public and private sectorslies, in a sense,behind

the two reasonsalreadygiven. While the stateand other agencieshavebeenkeento

captureand usewomen'sgroupsfor their own purposes,both political and economic,

they havebeenlessthan willing to engagegroupson their own terms. As a result most
researchon women's groupshasbeensuperficial, and hasled to the conclusionthat
groupsare not worth any significant investment. Micro-enterprisecredit, on the other

hand, offers a numberof advantages.It requiresminimal interactionwith the clients,

and developmentis, again, managedfrom the centre,b€ing reducedto the circulation

of funds and the simple monitoring of repaymentrates.

2.2.2 Rotating Savingsand Credit Associetions

The nabai groupswhich gaverise to the women's group movementin Kenya were, in

effect, rotating savingsand credit associations(ROSCAs)formed in part for the

purposeof financing homeimprovements. Even today the majority of registered

women's groupsin Mbeerehavegrown up aroundROSCAsof one kind or another,

and it is unusualto find a group which doesnot continueto operatea ROSCA in

addition to its other activities. ROSCAsare in fact ubiquitousin Mbeere: there are
very many more ROSCAsthan registeredwomen's groups,including associations

which are in transition betweenthe two and are sometimesdescribedds unregistered

women's groups. From this point of view ROSCASand the "informal' groupswhich

developout of them are part of an extensiveand fertile substratumof voluntaristic

organisationin local communitieswhich the stateand other agencieshave not beenable

to manageor otherwisetake advantageof, exceptin so far as they havecaptured,or

38
aftemptedto capture,the women's group movementat the most developedend of the
ROSCA-women's
groupcontinuum.

ROSCAsin Kenya are usually relegatedto a footnotein the developmentliterature, and

we do not know of any concertedattemptsto mobilise their developmentpotential or

evenunderstandtheir existing impacts. There is, however, somecomparativeliterature

on the phenomenonof ROSCAsworld-wide, in which debatehasfocusedupon

establishingtypologiesof ROSCAsand understandingtheir functionsin societyas a

whole. In a seminalpaperGeertzdescribedthe ROSCA as "essentiallya deviceby
meansof which traditionalistic forms of socialrelationshipare mobilized so as to fulfil

non-traditionalisticeconomicfunctions...[t is] an 'intermediate'institution growing up

within peasantsocial strucfure,to harmonizeagrarianeconomicpatternswith

commercialones,to act as a bridge betweenpeasantand trader attitudestoward money

and its uses"Q9A: 242). Following a more extensivesurveyof the literature,

Geertz'sconclusionwas questionedby Ardener, pointing to the persistenceof ROSCAs

alongsideformal financial institutionsand their absencein many societieswithout

commercialinstitutions (19&:221-222). Ardener arguedthat ROSCAs,including

someof the most "developed"ones,cannotbe understoodin termsof economicmotive

alone,althoughtheir "mostobviousfunction...isthat they assistin small-scale

capital-
formation, or more simply, they createsavings"(196/:217).

Subsequentanalyseshavenot addedsignificantly to theseconclusions(see,for

example,Kurtz 1973; Schraderl99l; and Brusleyet al. 1992). As hasoften turned out

to be the cas€in the comparativestudy of institutions, the searchfor a simple typology

and globally applicablefunction or functionsis probably doomedfrom the start.
Within MbeerealoneROSCAsperform a variety of functions, both social and

economic,and evenwhen they evolve into multi-activity women's groupswe cannot

39
say that one set of functions (for example,the economic)hasbecomemore important
than the other.

"An associationformed
Ardener providesthe most succinctdefinition ofa ROSCA as

upon a core of participantswho agreeto makeregular contributionsto a fund which is

given, in whole or in part, to eachcontributor in rotation" (196/.:2Ol). The two

essentialcriteria, accordingto Ardener, are rotation and regularity, to distinguish

ROSCAsfrom other mutual benefit clubs and cooperativeundertakings. In Mbeere

this definition might b€ stretchedto include cooperativeweedingby women (sometimes

helpedby men) when it is performedon a rotational and regular basis(a common

pattem is every Saturdayat one of the member'sfarms). This kind of cooperationis
quite commonin Mbeereand also often performedas one of the activities of women's

groups,though it may also be undertakenby groupsof peoplewho meetsolely for this

purpose. The essentialdifference, of course,is that the input to thesework groupsis

labour, whereasthe primary input to RoSCAs (as normally understoodand defined

here) are cashcontributions. Needlessto say a full accountof RoscAs and their

origins in Mbeerewould haveto considerboth typesof association.

ROSCAsin Mbeereare formed by women, men, and mixed groupsof men and

women, though as in the caseof registeredgroupswomen-onlyRoSCAs seemto be by

far the most common. sometimesthey are formed by groupsof closely relatedkin, but

the vast majority of RoscAs are composedof small groupsof neighbours,someof

whom nray be closely relatedbut othersnot. A few ROSCAsare formed on an

occupationalrather than a neighbourhoodbasis: markettraders,for example,often
form their own associationsin which the object is to assistin the purchaseof capital

inputs (usuallypetty commodities)to their businesses.As notedabove,the

proliferation and sheernumbersof RoscAs in Mbeereare striking. Just over half
(11/20)of a smallsampleof womenin Kamugu,nearSiakago,wereactivemembersof

ROSCAs,someof them(2i ll) beingmembersof two ROSCAssimultaneously,

while

other women (3/20) who were not current membershad belongedto ROSCAsin the
past: making a total ofjust underthree-quartersof the sample(14i20) who declared
past or presentparticipationin ROSCAs. A much smallerproportion of thesewomen,

one-fifth to be exact, were pastor presentmembersof regisGredwomen's groups.

Thesewomenmay well haveunderreportedtheir pastmembershipof ROSCAs. A

smaller sampleof 12 womenin the Ishiaraareashowedthat all of them had belonged

to ROSCAsat one time or another(7 of them currently and the remainderin the past).

Data collectedin the courseofa householdsurveyh 1992suggestthat comparable

levels of involvementcan be extrapolatedfor Mbeereas a whole.

ROSCAsin Mbeere,as throughoutrural Kenya, conform to the most basicpattern

describedin the literature (both Geertz(1962) and Ardener (1964) presentinformation

on a rangeof associationswhich are organisationallycomplexand extremely

sophisticatedfinancially). Most ROSCAson which we haYeinformation havebetween

l0 and 20 members,usually closerto the lower figure. Membersme€tto contribute

fixed amountsof cashweekly or monthly: contributions(calculatedon a montl y

basis)uzually fall in the rangeof Kshs 10 to IShs 120per month, this last example
coming from an associationof men and womenin Ishiara marketwhosemembersgive
IShs 30 eachper week. The sum of contributionsin any we€k or month is usually
presentedto just one of the members- In many casesthis moneyis alreadyearmarked

for a particular purpose. Women's ROSCAsoften savein order to enablemembersto

purchasecrockery and cutlery for their households.The exampleof market traders

buying inputs for their enterpriseshasalreadybeenmentionedabove. Other recorded

ROSCA objectivesinclude the purchaseof farm equipmentand (separately)goas.

4l
ROSCAssuffer from someof the sameconstraintsas women's groups,though perhaps
not to the samedegree. When hard-pressedfor cashmembersmay haveno option but

to drop out, therebyproducingcomplicationsin terms of contributionsowed. When

more than one memberdropsout this usually sp€llsinstantdoom for the association,
which may colapse in the midst of heatedrecriminations. However, the available

evidencesuggeststhat this is not a commonoccurrence: peer group pressureand the

mutual aid ethosengenderedby ROSCAstend to insulatethem againstmany stresses,

while unlike women's groupsthey operatewith fewer membersand on a fxed and

relatively short time cycle. ROSCAsare most likely to collapsein times of general

stress,for exampleduring periodsof food shortageand famine, and we havesome

evidencefor this happening. On the other hand, the facton which makeROSCAsquite
resilient, including tieir modestsize, degreeof organisationrequiredand short time

cycles, makeit easyfor them to reform following suchcrises, whetherwith a different

membershipor not.

In the absenceof comprehensivestatisticsit is difficult to assessthe overall impact of

ROSCAsin Mbeere, or anywhereelsein Kenya for that matter. We know for certain

that they play a critical role in the developmentof women's groups. It is also evident

that they play a very important role in the mobilisationof savings,as well as in tle
creationof local networksof mutual support. The initial successelsewherein Kenya of
micro-enterprisecredit programmesbasedupon group guarante€s(the Grame€nBank

model imported by the Kenya Rural EnterpriseProgrammeand PRIDE) undoubtedly

owes somethingto the samefactors. Ironically theseprogr:rmmeswere introduced

without referenceto or evenan understandingof existing savingsand credit systems,
including the ROSCAs,in rural and urban communities. In a sensecommunitieslike

thosein Mbeerealreadyhavetheir own indigenouscredit programmes,the difference

being that they are not directedfrom aboveand that they are generallytailored to more
modestdomesticrequirements.

2,2.3 Schoolsand Churches

Furtherindicationofthe dyramismofgrassrootsinitiativesis apparentin the development

anddevelopmentactivitiesassociatedwith largerlocal institutions,particularlyschools

andchurches.whereasthe historyof RoSCAsandotherformsof everydayassociation
is
almostinvisible,at leastfrom the state'sanda districtpointofview, the historyofthese
largerandmore permanentinstitutionsis alsomoretransparent,andcanbe readilytraced

backto the earlycolonialperiod. Theinitialestablishment

of both schoolsandchurches
was,ofcourse,a directconsequence
of externalinterventions
duringthe colonialperiod,
interventions
by boththe administration
(in the caseofschools)andmissionary
organisations
(in the caseofboth churches
andschools).Thereafter,
however,andwith
increasingpopulardemandfor education(to be translatedinto materialwelfare)andthe

spiritualwelfareprovidedby the christian churches(the two were often intimatelylinked),

manyofthese institutionshavetakenon a life oftheir own, with considerableinputsfrom

the communities
in whichtheyarelocated.

Primaryresponsibilityfor Kenya'seducationsystem- includingeducationpolicy, the

schoolcurriculum,the provisionof educational

facilities,the inspectionof schoolsand
paymentofteachers'salaries- restswith the governmentandthe Ministry ofEducation in

particular. However,the demandfor educationsinceindependence

hasfar outstrippedthe
state'scapacityto supplyall ofthe necessary
facilities,especially
schoolbuildings,
classroomsandthe fittings andmaterialequipmentwhich they require. As a resultthe
govemmenthasmorethan welcomedthe contributionsmadebv local communitiesto

43
buildingandequippingschools.Thisencouragement
of self-helpinitiativeshasledto the
construction includingthe ',Harambee,'
of manyschoolssinceindependence, secondary
schoolsaswell asmoremodestprimaryfacilities(seesection1.2.2above).Although
MbeerehaslaggedbehindupperEmbuandother high potentialareasin the demandfor

education,
therehasbeena considerable
proportionalincrease
in the numberofschools
constructedin the areaover the pasttwo decadesandmore (for an overviewofeducation

in Mbeere,includingits earlierhistory,seeRileyandBrokensha1988:25,301-308)

The constructionanddevelopmentof GatakaPrimaryschool, nearKiritiri, providesan

illustrationofthe kind oflocal initiativewhich hasbeenreproducedthroughoutMbeere.

In 1973a groupof localresidents,

all ofthem men,formeda committeeto pressfor
permissionfrom the govemmentto constructa primaryschool. After muchlobbyingand

waiting, a permitto do so was issuedthe following year,in 1974. Thereuponcommittee

members
beganthe difficulttaskof tryingto mobiliselocalpeopleto contributecashand
their own labourtowardsthe constructionof the school. In the endcommitteemembers

beganto build a nurseryclassroomthemselves,

usinglocal materials(earthandtimbers).
This work was intemrptedby shortrains,wheneveryoneturnedto the task of cultivating

their farms. In early 1975the committeebeganto run a nurseryclassin a nearbychurch

building,the teacherbeingpaid from contributionsby the children'sparents. This still left

the problemofwhere they would be taughtwhena secondintakewas admittedandthey
hadmoveduDto standardone.

Later on in 1975,anothergroupoflocal men,youngerthanthe committeemembers,

seizedthe initiative andcompletedthe nurseryclassroomwhich hadbeenbegunthe year

before. In order to raisethe fundsfor buildinga secondclassroomthey organiseddiscos

everyevening,chargingan entrancefee. At the sametime they alsobeganto cut timber

for the building mobilisingfriendsto helpthemwhenthey could. Incomefrom the disco
paidfor iron roofingsheetsandthe construction
ofthe classroom
aswell asa smaller
buildingto serveasa staff-room.Thisgroupofyoung menthensteppedasideto let the
committeecontinuewith its work.

In 1976theMinistryofEducationpostedtwo teachers
to the school,whichnow consisted
of a nurseryclassandstandardone. Thereafterat leastoneclassroomhadto be built
everyyearto accommodate
the school'sannualintakeofpupils. Fromthis point on the
heaviestburdenfell upon the pupils'parents,who providedcommunallabour in addition

to makingregularcontributionsofmoney to pay for materialsandthe input of

professional
builders.Not all of the classrooms
werecompletedon time,in whichcase
someclasseshadto be dividedinto morningandaftemoonshifts. The samesolutionwas
alsoappliedduring a periodwhenthe schoolwasunderstaffedandwaiting for more

to be postedthere.
teachers

By 1985a completesa of eightearth-and-timber-walled

classrooms
hadbeenbuilt. The
schoolcommitteethendecidedto embarkon the construction
of stone-wallclassrooms
to
replacethem. Parentsthereforecontinuedto contributeto a building fund everytime, and

NGO plan Intemationalbuilt two new

still do so today. In 1988the Embu-based
classrooms
for the school: parentscontributedKshs18,000to paythebuilderandalso
dug the foundationsandcarriedwater to the site. plan alsoerecteda largewater tank in
1990,againassisted
by the parents.In 1991the schoolwasgivenKshs 175,000by plan
to build anotherpair of classrooms. The schoolcommitteerequestedthis assistance

andparentsraisedKshs24,850to pay the builder. constructionofthe classrooms

is
still underway,and somearein usealthoughthey do not haveanywindowsyet.

In 1991the schoolcommitteedecidedto introducecompulsoryboardingfor standard

eight students,reasoningthat they would thereforebe ableto spendmoretime studying

45
andperformbetterin their final KCPE (Kenyacertificate of primary Education)exams.
Boardingbeganin March 1991andthe boarderswereaskedto contributesetquantitiesof
maizeandlegumes,to providetheir own beds,mattresses,
blanketsandboxes,andto pay
a feeof overKshs100to coverthe salaryofa cookandthe costofvariousingredients.
This went well until the next year, 1992,whenthe failure of manyparents'to pay these

feesledto the suspension

ofthe boardingfacility. our latestinformationis that no
decisionhasyet beenmadeaboutits future.

Thishistory,whichcouldbe repeated
for manyotherschoolsin Mbeere,indicatesthe
strengthandversatilityofgrassrootsinitiative.All ofthe majordecisions
aboutthe
developmentofthe schoolhavebeentakenby communitymembersworking, after they
had startedit, togetherwith the headmaster
andteachers(manyofwhom areor have
becomecommunitymembersthemselves).The schoolcommitteehasalsochangedand

developed
overtime: whileit beganassmallgroupofmen andelders,in late 1992it had
twelve members,a third of themwomen,andmost of themlocal farmersand,of course,
parents.

Many churchesin Mbeereare similarlyfoundedin local initiative andeffort. Unlike

schools,though,they areformally separatefrom the state,which guaranteesfreedomof

worship in its constitution. In fact this separationis so sharpthat the nationalchurches,

especiallythoseaffiliatedto the NCCK (Nationalchristian council of Kenya),areoften

perceivedasposinga threatto the government.This hasbeenparticularlyclearin the past

decade,with the NCCK spearheading

the campaignfor the introductionof multi-party
democracyandactingin somewaysasthe unofficialoppositionto the KANU
govemm€nt. This doesnot meanthat the local churchesareactivein nationalparty

politics,thoughlike all communityinstitutionsthey arefrequentlysubjectto local political

conflictsandmachinations.The separationof churchfrom statedoesmearLhowever.that

they presenta muchmorevariedanddyramic picturethanthe schools,which all conform

to a basicpattern.

Kenyais hometo a bewilderingvarietyof Christiandenominations

andsects,someof
themgrown on its own soil. Mbeeresharesin someof this diversity. Active churchesin

theKiritiri area,for example,includethe CPK (Churchofthe provinceofKenya,or

Anglicanchurch), the Romancatholic church, the East African pentecostalchurch, the
Full GospelChurch,theFull GospelAnglicanChurch(sic),andthe SeventhDay

Adventists. The mostprominentchurchesin Mbeere,at leastto an outsideobserver,are

the Anglican(cPK) andRomancatholic churches.This is becausethey were the first to

becomeestablished,
are part of wider national(andinternational)congregations,andas a
resultare ableto supporta numberof developmentactivities. The cpK doesthis in part

througha sisterorganisatioqcompassionIntemational,which hasassisteda numberof

schoolsin SiakagoDMsion. TheRomancatholicchurchis particularlyactivethroughits

separate
missions,
whichincludetheDon BoscoSalesians
in Gachokaandthe consolata
Fathers(and Sisters)in Ishiara. The missionin Ishiar4 to give but one example,has

sponsored
manylocalprojects,includingthe construction
of primaryschoolsand
classrooms,a hospitaland(by bringingin Italian governmentaid) the Nationalcerealsand
ProduceBoard (NCPB) depotandgrain storagefacility at Ishiara.

At grassrootslevel, andawayfrom the influenceof foreignmissions,local initiativesare as

evidentin churchorganisationandactivitiesasthey arein the schools. Therearemany

parallelswith the buildinganddevelopment
ofschools,asdescribed
in our earlierexample.
church committeesand(in the caseofthe cPK) parishcouncils canbe asactiveand
innovativeasthe schoolcommittees,ifnot more so. Theymayalsobe evenmore

representativeof local interests:the committeeof Nguru cpK church in Gatakavillage,

nearKiritiri, has,for example,I I members,5 of themwomen,all of themmembersof the

47
local farmingcommunity(a degreeof representation
far more impressivethan that on any

ofthe localdevelopment
committees).Thelocalchurches
alsocoordinateother

communityactMties:theseincludeyouthclubs,localbranches
of theMothers'Union
(which function muchlike women'sgroups)andvariousforms of assistance
to the poor

andneedy.

2.3 The Role of NGOs

The largerchurchdevelopmentorganisationsandprojectsreferredto abovefall into the

organisations.The term NGO is a catch-allfor

categoryofNGOs or non-government
privatevoluntaryorganisationsof all shapesandsizesabovethe local communitylevel,

rangingin a continuumfrom small,indigenous,bodiesup to large,international,agencies

like Oxfam. Kenyahasproveda very fertile groundfor NGOs over the pasttwo decades,

andthey haveproliferatedacrossthe country,the vastmajority ofthem operatingfrom

headofficesin Nairobi. TheNGO communityasa whole standsin an ambivalentrelation

to the state(comparethe discussion

in ODI I 992:G.l). On the onehandNGOshave

beenwelcomedby the govemmentandlocal politiciansfor the innumerableprojectsthey

undertakeandthe resourcesthey attract from donor agencies.On the other handthey

havebeensuspectedfrom time to time of working to underminethe govemment,a

suspicionenhancedby knowledgeof the closerelationswhich existbetweensomeNGOs

in theNCCK. Thegovernment
andthe churches hasthereforeactedon a numberof

occasionsto strengthenits control over both local andforeignNGOs, andthis, aswe have

seen,wasoneofthe objectivesofthe DistrictFocusstratery(seesection2.1.2.I above).

Judgingby the government'scontinueduneaseaboutNGO activitiesit would appearnot

to haveachievedthe degreeof control which it wishes. At the sametime it would be fair

48
to saythat manyNGos, indigenous
andinternational,
aretreadingverywarilyin orderto
avoidfallingfoul ofthe government
andlocaladministration.

In additionto the churches

andmissionprojects,a numberofNGOs operateor have
operatedin Mbeere.TheseincludePlanInternational,
CAREKenya,theKenyaFreedom
From Hungercampaign,the BelleriveFoundation,andHeifer International,to namebut a
few. The mostextensiveprograrnmeis run by PlanInternational(Fosterparentsplan

Internationalin full), an AmericanNGo which hasits Kenyanheadquarters

in Embutown.
Thedecisionto siteits officesin Embu,andnot Nairobi,is generallyascribedto successful

lobblng on the part ofEmbu's principalpower-brokerandgovernmentminister_

whatever the case,the rangeofactivities pursuedby plan andits staff sincethe early
1980sis very impressive.In lowerEmbutheseactivitieshavebeenconcentrated
in
GachokaDivision, thoughthereareplansto expandinto SiakagoDivision. plan'soriginal

andcoreactivityis childsponsorship,
on the basisofwhich it hasprovidedassistance
of
differentkindsto schools(hencethe constructionof classroomsandwater storage
facilitiesreferredto earlier)andworked in numerousother fields: the improvementof

water supplies,nutrition, healthcare,agriculturalpractices(includingpestcontrol and

andthe provisionof faminereliefinthe form ofa "food-for-work',

composting),
programme(diggingterracesandbunds).

Many NGo interventions,includingsomeof thosementionedabove,adoptthe technical,

top-dow4 approachwhich characterises

aid projectsin general. In other respects,
however,their approachis moregenuinelyparticipatory. This is achievedin different

ways. NGos typically employstaff andfieldworkersfrom the communitiesin which they

work: indeedthe bestindigenousNGOs arerun by local people(thoughexamplesof this

arefew andfar between,andtherearecertainlynonein Mbeere: for a caseelsewherein

Kenyaseewalsh 1989) Anotherstrategyis to setup localcommittees

aspart ofthe

49
frameworkof the NGos operations:Planhasdonethis with the creationof its own sub-

locationaldevelopment
committees,
aswell asin the contextofparticularprojects(for
exampleby institutinglocal boreholecommitteesto supervisetheir maintenance).
MoreoverNGOs like Planareusuallyvery responsiveto requestscomingfrom the

communities
in whichtheywork: hencePlan'spositiveresponse
to the requestsofthe
GatakaPrimarySchoolcommitteefor assistance
in buildingnewclassrooms.The scale
ofNGo activitiesalsomakesthemmoreflexible andcapableof both experimentingwith
newapproaches
andadaptingto changingcircumstances.
Thediversification
ofplan,s
programmesin GachokaDMsion andtheir rapidresponseto local famineconditions

provideillustrations
of this.

while it wouldnot be difficultto producea list of NGo mistakes,

the pointis that these
arelesslikely to occur andmore likely to be correctedin the contextofNGo prograrnmes

thanin that of otherkindsofaid project. Fromthis pointofview NGOsareideally

situatedto mediatebetweenthe grassrootsandother agencies,includingthe govemment

and donor organisations.certainly they arein a muchbetterpositionto foster initiatives

from the grassrootsthanthe formal structuresfavouredby the governmentand,in

modifiedfonn, in recentproposalsto the ODA. The ODI report, while acknowledgrng

the role that NGos play in promotingsmall-scaleprojectsat villagelevel, criticisedthe

lack of coordinationbetweenNGos andpointedto the presumedlimitationsof NGos in

handlinglargerprojects: "They do not havethe resourcesor the mandatesto tackle

projectswhich crosslocationboundaries,for example,majorwater projects,roads,etc.

Engineering
resources
andbusiness
adviceareareasof weakness"
(1992:G.9). Thisis
clearlynonsense:manyNGos, includingPlanInternational,arealreadyworking across
location (anddivision,anddistrict) boundaries,manyNGos havewell-developedbusiness
programmes;and,giventhat suchjobsareusuallycarriedout by privatecontractors,there

is no needto involveNGOs in large-scaleengineeringworks

50
Having presentedthis rather deficient assessment
of NGO capacity,the ODI report
concludesas follows: 'Apart ilom somehelp if the NGOs decideto form a district

associationand network, it is not recommendedthat ODA channelproject funds, aimed

at improvedplanning and management,to the NGOs" (192: G.9). The alternative

suggestedby ODI, as we haveseen,providesevenlessopportunity for the promotion
of grassrootsinitiatives.

3 Conclusions

The conclusionsreachedin this paperarerelativelystraightforward,thoughthey do

providea challengeto a largebody of receivedwisdom. Communitydevelopmentand its

analogues,ascurrentlypromotedby developmentpractitionersboth insideandoutsidethe

aid agencies,is at bestpoorly conceivedandat worst a sham. The claimthat a

community-based
approachhasevolvedsimplyin response
to the failureoftop-down
projectsis underminedby a considerationofthe very real continuities
technically-oriented

that exist betweencontemporaryprescriptionsandthe communitydevelopmentpolicy of

the colonialperiod. In both casesthe rhetoricworks to maskanothervariationon the top-

down approachandthe political agendasof communitydevelopment's

different
proponents.One ofthe governmentrs
agendas,andthat ofits regionalpower-brokers,is
to capturegrassroots
initiativesfor its (andtheir)own politicalpurposes.Manylocal-
level initiatives,however,evadecapture,aremisunderstood,or escapeattention

altogether. At the sametime the presentandpotentialrole of NGOs in promotingthese

initiativesis eithertreatedwith suspicion(by the government)or undervalued(in current
proposalsto revive communitydevelopmentin Embuandneighbouringdistricts) The

resultpromisesto be evenworsethanthe messwhich communitydevelopment- the

5l
orthodoxversion- is supposed
to clearup. We can,however,takesomepleasurein the
probabilitythat grassroots
initiativesofone kind or anotherwill continueto flourish,
whethersupportedor not.

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