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McCain Debate and Decision Series: Afghanistan 2014 Should We Stay or Should We Go

Kurt Volker: [0:01] ...illuminate some complex policy issues, giving different points of view equal and fair time and making sure that we try to take the partisanship out of the debate so we get to the real issues that underlie our options as a country. [0:14] Tonight's debate will focus on Afghanistan. America's been involved in Afghanistan for nearly 12 years. There's been remarkable progress in education, health care, women's rights, children, governance, the economy. And yet, there has come, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars, thousands of lives. The question remains, is it really sustainable? [0:37] We're now committed to a transition in Afghanistan, as President Obama said, ending America's war in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. But is Afghanistan ready? And what will happen when America leaves? On the other hand, would it really be any better if we stayed? [0:54] We have four distinguished panelists tonight representing four distinct perspectives on Afghanistan and US policy. We hope that their debate helps eliminate the challenges that we still face as a country. [1:05] Before introducing our moderator, allow me to introduce the man whose life and whose family has inspired the creation of this institute, the man who's dedicated his family and his career to national service, Senator John McCain. [applause] Senator John McClain: [1:22] Thank you very much, Kurt. I'd like to thank Jenna Lee, who's going to be our moderator here and our panelists, all of whom I have had the opportunity of knowing and interacting with over a number of years. [1:36] The last debate we had was on Syria and it got to be a very spirited and engaging debate. I anticipate this one to be, as well. This issue could not be more timely. The administration is going to finalize their commitments or agreements as to troop strength, as to missions, as to participation of our allies. There are a lot of very serious decisions that are looming, and they need to be explained and receive the support of the American people. [2:16] The first time I met President Karzai was in 2001 at the fall of Kabul, and he came out to Bagram, where Lindsey Graham and Joe Lieberman and I were. We've been going back three or four times a year ever since. We've watched it progress. Two steps forward and one step back. Sometimes, one step forward and two steps back. [2:42] We have four very highly qualified individuals here tonight. This debate, in my view, particularly when we're talking about the cost in American blood and treasure, is one that needs to be conducted, frankly, all over America. I'm very pleased that we are addressing this issue, particularly in this timely fashion.

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Jenna: [3:05] , I want to thank you for your participation. I never watch Fox, so... [laughter] Senator McCain: [3:10] Thank you very much. Thank you all for coming. [applause] Kurt: [3:19] As we saw, we have a number of guests from Afghanistan in the audience, and I understand that many more are watching online in Afghanistan. In fact, I heard a story that the Foreign Ministry put out a notice to say, "We encourage you to watch this." So for all of you watching here or elsewhere, welcome. [3:36] This is also being broadcast live on Arizona State University Television, and we have students at ASU watching. We encourage you to send in your questions as well for later in the debate. After the opening stage of the debate, there will opportunities for questions from the audience, so please do think about and prepare your questions. [3:52] Without any further ado, I'd be very pleased to introduce to you our moderator for the debate, Jenna Lee from Fox News. [applause] Jenna Lee: [4:04] Hi, everybody. Thank you so much for having me this evening. We've heard a lot about the panelists. We haven't met them yet, so I thought I would introduce them first, give a few opening remarks to start us off, and then we can get going. [4:17] Sitting in the hotseat for the Kagans, I hear. This is the Kagan chair because last time there was another Kagan here. This is Frederick Kagan. He is the Director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. In 2009, he served in Kabul, Afghanistan as part of General McChrystal's strategic assessment team. He's also been back in recent years as well to conduct research for Generals David Petraeus and John Allen. We thank him for his presence today. Kenneth Roth: [4:46] is next to him. He is the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. As you know, this organization operates in about 90 countries around the world. They have a bureau in Afghanistan, where Ken has spent some time, so he'll share an interesting perspective for us tonight. [5:02] As will Steve Clemons...Oh, Steve Clemons is on the end. Seth. Seth G. Jones, not to be confused with Seth Jones the hockey player. Right, Seth? Just so we're clear on that. Seth G. Jones is Associate Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation. He has served as a plans officer and advisor to the commanding general of US Special Operation Forces, in Afghanistan, as well. [5:26] Finally, Steve, sorry about that. There you are. Steve Clemons, Editor-at-Large for "The Atlantic." He's also publisher of "The Washington Note." [5:38] Talking about war for me, I offer a little bit different perspective than a lot of moderators out there in that I haven't actually been to Afghanistan, although I have wanted to go. My grandfather was actually a war correspondent for the Associated Press during World War II, and his nickname was "Lucky Lee" because he never lost his typewriter. I can't imagine what it's like to cover a war with a typewriter, but he did.

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[6:05] I come at this from a little different perspective, and it's appropriate because of where we're at tonight. My husband is in the audience. He is a decorated Navy combat veteran, and when we met, he was serving as officer of a Navy SEAL team. I've watched him deploy. I have buried friends. War is personal. Policy is really personal. It's something that we should reflect upon a little bit tonight as we open up this conversation. [6:43] A couple things I just want to put out there for how long we've been in Afghanistan. We have actually been in Afghanistan longer than the Civil War, World War I, and World War II combined. It's the longest war that we've fought with an all volunteer force. We've spent more than a half trillion dollars in this war effort. [7:05] Right now, we have 66,000 troops at war, another spring fighting season yet to come. Interesting this week, a little news for again some more context. President Karzai this week made claims that some of our Special Forces are harassing and torturing and murdering local people, claims that are not substantiated by any evidence that is to be found at this time. [7:29] One counter-insurgency expert described this as post-withdrawal politics. As we know, we're aiming to withdraw in 2014. We all know the year. We don't know what that's going to look like yet. That leads us to the question, "Should we stay or should we go?" What is that going to look like? [7:49] We have two people up here who think we should stay, two that think we should go. They're divided right in the middle for ease of understanding of that, although they have very different reasons for why they think we should stay or should go. You might notice that they may debate themselves at certain times during this. [laughter] [8:09] It's quite a nuanced conversation. At the beginning, we're going to do three minutes of opening statements. They're going to give you their positions about why they think we should stay or why they think that we should go. We do have time on that. Three minutes. If they go over the three minutes, the Jaws music, like the Academy Awards, comes in. That was embarrassing, so we'll try not to let that happen. [laughs] [8:33] Fred, do you want to start us off? You believe that we should maintain a presence in Afghanistan. Why? Frederick Kagan: [8:40] The United States has vital national security interests in Afghanistan and in the outcome of the conflict. We need to do what is necessary to accomplish the mission which is involved in securing those interests. That means, therefore, that we will need to have a continued military presence in Afghanistan along the lines that the President has supported. [9:05] As we talk about the bipartisanship of this Institute, I can't think of anything more bipartisan than having someone from the American Enterprise Institute sitting here and largely defending President Obama's policy in Afghanistan against someone from "The Atlantic." [laughter]

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Frederick: [9:20] So bipartisanship does actually exist. It is a very nuanced conversation. It is a very complicated issue. We went into Afghanistan because it was a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda used that sanctuary to attack us. There is not now a significant Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. Therefore some, including some of my Colleagues on this panel, argue that we can and should leave. [9:47] The problem is that that imagines that the current situation will persist indefinitely, regardless of what we do. My observations in Afghanistan and In Iraq and in the world generally are that things don't stay the same when you change major elements of them. Our presence in Afghanistan today is a Major element. We are working to work ourselves out of a job in Afghanistan, but the Afghan security forces are not yet there. [10:13] So, what would happen if we withdrew our forces prematurely and the Afghan security forces were to fail, which I believe they would if we withdrew too rapidly? You would see a number dynamics emerge. One of them, the first would be that you would see, I think, the rapid re-emergence of Afghan civil war in the country. [10:36] We've seen signs of growing ethnic tension. It's remarkable that there has been so little ethnic conflict in Afghanistan over the past decade, but the seeds of ethnic conflict are there and we have been a critical factor in why there has not been ethnic conflict. I think that if it were believed that we actually were going to abandon Afghanistan quickly To its own devices, you would see renewed ethnic conflict, renewed civil war. [11:00] And that, in turn, would lead to the re-emergence of enormous governance vacuums and communal violence of a sort that provides a sort of safe haven and propitious environments for groups like Al-Qaeda to come in again. Now, we can talk about why would Al-Qaeda go back to Afghanistan. They have Pakistan. They have Yemen. They have Somalia. [11:22] And the answer is because, actually, within the Al-Qaeda ideology and the history of that movement, Afghanistan actually is central. It is incredibly important to their narrative. It's where Al-Qaeda was born. It's where the only just Islamic state in the world has ever reigned, from their twisted perspective. And it would be the place where Al-Qaeda, in its own narrative, had defeated two super powers. [11:44] They would return and we would find it very hard to deal with that. We Would not be able, in my view, to deal with it from off shore, from the Indian Ocean, from anywhere else, because of the simple logistics involved. As people compare Afghanistan to Yemen and Somalia, one of the things that strikes me is that it's important to understand the difference between a land-locked country and a country that has a long maritime border. We can operate freely from the sea in Yemen and Somalia. We have to fly over several hundred miles of Pakistani territory, at a minimum, or even more territory if you want to use [inaudible 00: [12:11] 12:21] to operate in Afghanistan. So I do not believe that it will be possible to conduct counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan from a distance while I do believe that we will be creating the conditions that will be propitious to the

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re-emergence of a sanctuary for our enemies at the same time. That's the basis of the reason why I think we need to stay. Jenna: [12:42] A few key reasons there. Is this on, too? We're OK? [12:47] I actually have props to bring out when it comes to Pakistan and the strategic importance of Afghanistan based on the point Fred made. Steve, I have those props for you, so be ready for that. But Ken, in the meantime, you also believe that there should be a presence in Afghanistan, but you come at it from a very different angle than Fred. Tell us about that. Kenneth Roth: [13:04] That's correct, Jenna. I think when most people thought about the topic of this evening's sebate, they thought about should the United States stay militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. My position is that the United States should stay engaged in Afghanistan. I don't take a position on whether that engagement should be militarily or not. But I do know that political engagement is essential. [13:25] Indeed, a lot of the problem is that Afghanistan has been seen from a US Policy perspective too much simply as a military matter. That has been utterly counter-productive. If you imagine yourself a Taliban commander, what would be fertile ground for the Taliban to expand in Afghanistan? It would be a massively corrupt Government that is repressive, where there is no serious effort to hold troops accountable. And, of course, you add onto that the so-called Occupying power, and this is just a bonanza. It's exactly what you would want for Taliban expansion. [14:00] The US has actually, in many ways, made that worse by initially starting off with a light footprint which basically didn't have the capacity to address these problems or political questions. It required reliance on local warlords to maintain security which, of course, made it impossible for Karzai to hold them to account because these were his allies. He needed them to keep the country together. This has really been a recipe for unaccountable, abusive government. [14:29] Now, I don't want to pretend there haven't been significant advances in Afghanistan. There have. If you look at the rights of women, they are dramatically better today than they were under the Taliban. There is a vibrant civil society. I was telling Jenna, I held a press conference last March in Afghanistan and 80 TV cameras showed up, to give you a sense of the vibrant press that is there. [14:49] These are big advances, but they are vulnerable. To just show how vulnerable they are, look at how President Karzai did about a year ago when he basically endorsed Sharia council view that women should go back to living in the home and requiring their husband's permission to travel. Beating women was OK. [15:08] This is our ally, President Karzai. And we're going to see much more of that as Karzai has to, or perceives himself as having to strike deals with conservative elements of Afghan society who do not share the US so-called red lines regarding women's rights or freedom of expression or the freedom of civil society. [15:28] My view is that much more attention has to be paid to this political dimension. I think, ironically, the departure of US troops is going to open the door for more attention to that. Up until now when the US ambassador periodically met with President Karzai,

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items one, two, three, four and five on the agenda were military matters. We saw just this week, as Jenna alluded to, how Karzai can cause problems militarily. [15:53] But with US troops largely out within a year and a half, suddenly this will be the Afghan war and there will be space on the agenda to address some of these other issues. The US will have leverage. We've promised to support the Afghan military effort for the last, for the next decade, so there is significant leverage there if it is used wisely. [16:14] If there is a clear plan to protect women's rights, to protect civil society, to protect the press, to demand accountability with respect to abuse of Afghan forces. And if it's clear that living up to that plan is going to be condition for the ongoing security assistance. So far all there is, is heartfelt desire that these things happen. There isn't a plan. Indeed, when we pushed the Obama administration for that plan, we get shock and dismay. "How can you distrust us? Of course we want these things." [16:46] Nobody argues that they want it, but they're not doing anything about it. Indeed, the way it tends to be addressed is through technical assistance programs. They'll write a check because there's lots of money to go around. So they'll have a plan to build up civil society or a plan to build up the Press or a plan to protect women's rights. They're sort of having technical assistance training programs. [17:06] They're not addressing it at the political level. What is needed is serious, sustained pressure on the government, on Karzai and whoever comes after him, to live up to these basic elements of a democratic society that are clearly works in progress. But if we're going to avoid backsliding, it's not just the Taliban we have to worry about, it's our allies. That's going to require much more than the military plan that, so far, has dominated US policy. Jenna: [17:32] Thank you, Kenneth. Seth, you have a different perspective. You think that we should leave, but there's an asterisk to that. Tell us a little bit about your position, about why you think we should leave Afghanistan. Seth Jones: [17:45] When I use the word, "leave," I mean downsize. You'll see I probably sit somewhere between several of the people sitting here. Let me start out by saying, when you go through what's not the declassified archives of the Soviet politburo discussions in the mid-1980s, where the Soviets, in my view, ended up losing in Afghanistan, was actually not in Afghanistan, it was in Moscow. It was the pressure that was put on Gorbachev from mothers of Soviet soldiers that were killed in the country. [18:16] And the economic and political collapse of the country that led, in part, to the decision to withdraw. I would argue, from a starting basis, we are in a different situation then we were in 2001 or '02. The Afghan support for the US presence, at least a major US presence, has definitely declined. That information is widely available, on a range of public opinion polls. [18:40] Second, the American support for the war has clearly gone down, in a significant way. Based on that reality, and that's partly based on the economy and other pressures, the war in Syria right now, which the McCain Institute has debated already, as well as the rise of China, have pushed US foreign policy to look at other areas as well. What that

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means is that the footprint and the strategy have got to evolve with those conditions. What's my argument along these lines? [19:19] First, I would agree with Fred here that I do think there is a national security interest in remaining. But I'll outline what that looks like. That is, there is an Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan today. I was up, along the border, several months ago, in Kunar. There is an Al Qaeda presence today. [19:39] There is some external plotting that appears to be going on, from there. There are individuals like Farouq Al-Qahtani, who are involved in establishing a small Al Qaeda safe haven. That border, where the Al Qaeda leadership sits, on the other side of the border in Pakistan, is there. That border is extremely porous. There is an interest here. [20:01] As well as, I would argue, to have safe havens like that means that they have allies. Both Taliban and Haqqani network allies in Afghanistan right now. But what are the conditions and what did that threat mean, as we look forward? I would say several things. One is, the goal of the US should be, deterring and defeating Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. [20:25] 2010, the US was nearly hit by a Tariqi Taliban Pakistan attack, in Times Square. The year before was Najibullah Zazi, who had been trained in Pakistan. This is not just an Al Qaeda issue. We've seen an increase in Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives in Afghanistan, as well. There are concerns about growing militancy. [20:46] Second, the US should work to proven the overthrow of the Karzai government and its successor, after the 2014 elections, [coughs] from a Taliban takeover. That should be prevented. Ken talked about the human rights aspect. From a military perspective, I would argue is, if you look at US efforts in places like the Philippines, El Salvador, Colombia, there is a strong argument for continuing to have a robust special operations presence and intelligence apparatus that can conduct not just counter-terrorism strikes, but assist the Afghans on the counter-insurgency front. [21:26] This does become an Afghan war, but with a much lower US profile. I would also make my final comment by noting, we often forget, we still have US forces in countries like Colombia. They're just playing a much more role well below the radar screen. But they've been training Colombian forces in what's still a low boil insurgency. We have several decades in the Colombian context. If we have a fairly low, but robust, soft special operations and intelligence presence, we'll have an ability to continue this struggle, but from a much lower US footprint. Jenna: [22:09] You have a number on that? Seth: [22:11] If you look at numbers in, say, the Philippines, on a per capita level, total US footprint, somewhere in the 6-7-8000 category, but soft and intelligence heavy. Jenna: [22:23] Thank you. Steve?

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Steve Clemons: [22:24] Thank you very much. I want to align my comments with John McCain. I think this is the kind of debate that should be taking place all over the United States. We've just had a presidential election, in which this was a very muted topic. The importance of these national security questions, and where the nation places its strategy equities, are vital to the country. This may be a very odd moment, historically, because there may be a possibility that Fred Kagan and Steve Clemons might co-write an Atlantic piece. Jenna: [22:54] Let's not get ahead of ourselves, Steve. [laughter] Kenneth: [22:59] What about the rest of us? Steve: [23:01] Fred's the only one I'm aligned with at the moment. [laughter] [23:07] When I was at the New America Foundation, I helped create, led and co-authored the Afghanistan Study Group Report, which came out a few years ago, one of the early reports. [23:17] What we wrote at that time is that recommended that President Obama engage in decrease to 68,000 troops by then, October 2011, 30,000 by July 2012. "These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives by the fall of 2012 and if not, withdrawn in full over time. That would save X amount of dollars," et cetera. [23:39] But in the report, which I associated myself with, it was never a question of a full withdrawal. We had to look at what the strategic mindset of this town and country was at that time, several years ago. My argument would be that, broadly, the strategic class in Washington believed we would never leave Afghanistan. That was the debate. We now have a remarkable consensus, where Ken Roth is saying, "We may not know what type of debate." [24:02] We have Fred Kagan basically saying he largely supports the administration's posture. But just 18 months ago, I would say the general consensus was a very large presence over a very long period of time and that the White House would not have the ability to draw down. I think this was a view shared by many generals. When you quickly look back, when I got drawn into this, it was very interesting to listen to some of the testimony that came along later. [24:28] When Richard Luger asked General Petraeus about the relevance of Afghanistan and America's commitment to Afghanistan to other, broader strategic objectives in the region, Petraeus said, "That's not my job. My job is to make Afghanistan succeed, to make sure that US forces there succeed and we can check off that box. Not to look at the broader strategic questions." [24:47] I think the broader strategic questions of what Afghanistan has meant to the United States are very important. We were spending $120 billion a year in a country with $14 billion of GDP. As we deployed more and more troops in Afghanistan, we saw the

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designated enemy increased, in numbers of troops. To a certain degree, this was, in my view, a self-defeating policy. [25:09] As we got deeper and deeper, two interesting things happened, when you began looking at how Iran was posturing itself and how China was posturing itself. They saw us tied down, militarily over-stretched, beleaguered and unable to do things elsewhere. [25:22] So from a strategic perspective, I've always had the view that while Afghanistan was a vital mission, that we should have done after 9/11, chasing those that caused such harm in New York and Washington, that was absolutely right. But there was a point at which the mission of this, like so many missions abroad, became state building, human rights, many of them laudable goals. But in my view, using the Pentagon to achieve those objectives when things went wrong. [25:47] I worked at the New America Foundation with Steve Coll, Peter Bergen, with whom I have great respect, but view this differently. I asked them at the time. I said, "We haven't done what Senator McCain did, which is to go talk to the American public about the strategic costs and consequences of this, over a period of time." [26:04] Anyone looking at those budget figures would know that we were raising expectations in Afghanistan. I have friends that work in Afghan ministries who are translators. One of them happens to be married into a tribal family. He is regularly subjected to threats from his own family members if he were to go back. He's trying, desperately, to get out of that country, to save his life. [26:24] There are expectations set that I do feel exactly what Ken does, that we have a moral responsibility that's very hard to sustain, given the fact that we created a contract with the Afghans that we would stay for a long time. But strategically, what really matters in my book is, are we influencing Iran's behavior? Are we influencing China's behavior? [26:45] I'll just close with a bit of...I don't mean to make it a joke, but it is a joke. There was a time when I was in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in their policy planning staff. I said, "Will you please tell me what your grand strategy is, China? I would love to see it." He says, "We really don't need one, as long as you Americans are distracted in small, Middle Eastern countries." [27:03] It was meant as a joke. But it does raise the broader question of weeds and forest, or trees and forest. And being able to look at the broader question of how do you position America's strategic assets in a way that enables us to be the shaper in the international system, as opposed to getting dragged down where American power is crimped and controlled, where Afghanistan, if it had gone better, might have been a point of leverage. [27:28] But it began looking at a place that became a suck for American power, not a leverage point for American power. Jenna: [27:32] If you could, would you pull everybody out tomorrow?

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Steve: [27:34] No. Jenna: [27:38] Why? Steve: [27:40] I've never held that position. Because I believe, as we wrote in the Afghanistan report then, that you need to use other elements of state craft, draw them in. We have a presence there today, so you need to draw down responsibly. If we left tomorrow, the Kabul government would be overthrown, you would create a vacuum of power immediately. You need to do what you can to try and hold a semblance, so that the other wheels can come on and take care of themselves. [28:03] I've always advocated a very modest troop presence, to prevent a coup or to prevent the overthrow of the Kabul government. At the same time, we see what's happening, that's happening today in Afghanistan, is the rest of the country is going to be hard to deal with. You're going to have a rise of the Taliban in certain areas. You're going to have a rise of warlord-ism in other parts. We're going to strike deals with those warlords. The Pakistanis are going to strike. [28:25] It's a very interesting problem, when essentially you're at war, inside a country, with the allies of Pakistan that we are sometimes allied with and sometimes at war with. It's a very complex beast, in which, when you look at India, you look at Pakistan, you look at China, you look at Iran, that all of them saw benefits to us being bogged down in Afghanistan. That's why I've raised many of the questions about the large military footprint strategy that we have. Jenna: [28:52] So to prevent too friendly of a partnership between you and Fred, Fred I'd like you to rebut to Steve and tell him why he's wrong. And why you believe that we should have a troop presence there that should look more like South Korea, rather than what we're talking about, which would be a withdrawal of troops to 6-7000 level, with what Seth says. Or maybe almost complete lack of military presence, more attention on other parts of the world, like Steve says. Frederick: [29:20] I'd be happy to do that. Steve, there's no risk that we'll be co-authoring that article any time soon. I also want to make it clear that I am not a supporter of President Obama's policy. I find myself in the weird position of defending, as you pointed out, any presence in Afghanistan, which the President is trying to maintain, in a circumstance where the overwhelming desire is to have no presence in Afghanistan. [29:42] But as Senator McCain has said many times and I've always fully agreed with it, setting timelines in war is an extremely foolish undertaking. The truth of the matter is that this conversation is premature. It is premature because we're talking about what are we going to need two full fighting seasons hence. I don't feel confident enough in my crystal ball to be able to say with any confidence what we're going to need and I think it's actually incredible folly on the part of this administration to be making this decision at this point. [30:11] This is not the time to be making this decision, but we are where we are. It's the "we are where we are" that I really want to focus on here. I would love to have no American troops in Afghanistan. There is a belief out there among some people that there

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is a desire on the part of the American military and military industrial establishment to be in Afghanistan. [30:32] Having spent 15 months of my life in Afghanistan, I have no desire to be in Afghanistan or to have my friends there, let alone have them die. The issue is what is required to accomplish the conditions that we all seem to be agreeing need to be accomplished and the problem is that what I'm hearing from Seth and what I'm hearing from Steve are conditions about what the American traffic will bear. [30:52] I'm not prepared to argue about that. I don't know what the American traffic will bear because that's not my area of expertise. What I know is that there are certain base requirements to do anything in Afghanistan that are based on physical realities and military realities and realities on the ground. What I know is if you want to have a special forces present somewhere, you have to have a base. [31:15] The base has to be secured. That requires a certain number of troops. They need to have certain kinds of equipment. They need to have certain kinds of logistics. They need to be able to move around. If you want to be training Afghans, you need to have a whole other set of capabilities that go into this. I've looked at this in detail. I've sat in on the planning exercises. I know Seth has also. [31:35] But the reality is I would love to be able to do this with 3,000 or 4,000 troops, as some people in the White House have suggested they'd like to do. I'd also like to look like Harrison Ford. Neither one of those things is going to be feasible I'm afraid. [31:51] I have to look at the actual realities and say, "What is required to have any presence in Afghanistan realistically if you're not prepared to have another Bin Ghazi, if you're not prepared to contract out your own security to local Afghan militias, which I for one am not comfortable doing." When you start to look at that, you find that the number that Seth put out, 6,000, 7,000, is the minimum that you can really have in my view and have one, maybe two bases in Afghanistan. [32:21] You can't secure more than that because this isn't Columbia. The situation is not the same. The threat environment is not the same. The enemy is not the same and their capabilities are not the same. If we're going to protect the troops that we put there and the diplomats and the OGA personnel that we put there, you are looking at a minimum requirement of 10,000, 15,000 just to be there at all. [32:43] If you want to be doing training, which the President says he wants to be doing; train, advise, and assist, you rapidly get up to requirements in 25,000, 30,000 troop level if you just look at the realities on the ground. Jenna: [32:54] Steve, if we don't do what Fred says we should do, are we repeating the mistakes of the Soviet Union, which Seth has referenced. If we do not change, if we do not leave a presence there, then are we just repeating the mistakes that we've already seen play out in that country?

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Steve: [33:11] We run the risk of it and I certainly don't advocate running back to an abandonment of Afghanistan. I once tried to get the Open Society Institute, which is associated with George Soros, to support one of our programs that raised a lot of these questions on Afghanistan and they said, "The chairman in Afghanistan is saying, 'We have women who are getting educations in Kandahar because of those US soldiers that are there.'" [33:34] I think that's a very powerful link and I want to be very humble about this. This is not something to be humorous about, but at the same time I think, as Ken was saying, he is ambivalent, maybe unsure about what elements of American engagement there should be. What I've seen happen is a real rise in the sense that the Pentagon can deliver on virtually all subjects, whereas virtually every other element of whether it's USAID, whether other elements of state craft, whether it's UN agencies and others, they have key responsibilities. [34:05] I once talked to Tony Zinni and he was very, very general and he was very dismissive of the aid and development functions of nonmilitary units. That they didn't have the discipline. They didn't do the scenarios. They didn't make the engagement and I largely agree with him. We should expect much more from these agencies who are engaging us so that a country like Afghanistan, which the United States has had a large presence, have other options, but it's not going to be the same and we raised expectations in a way. [34:33] When I come back to this number of $120 billion a year spent in a country with a $14 billion GDP, our performance should have been better. We say $9 billion leave that country in a month through a bank corruption scandal. It is a real mess and I think people living in Kabul today, many of whom I talk to, are very, very concerned about what will happen when the US draws down forces further. [34:54] I get that and I don't want to abandon them, but I don't believe that you should deploy US military men and women and deploy resources in the Pentagon indefinitely for indefinite outcomes when they don't check off the strategic boxes. The highest strategic concern I have in the world today right now is the course of Iran and making sure that Iran knows that the United States has capabilities and military resources to deal with it. [35:19] I also don't like to watch the Pentagon's assessment of the enemy grow in concomitantly and consistently with the troop levels that we have. That was a shocking thing to see. The more we went out into communities, the more enemies we were building. Somebody had to basically take a look at that and say, "What are we doing here? What are we creating? Are we not in a trap that then Pakistan," - Fred I think is absolutely right. [35:44] I agree with him in the way he defined the basing issues, the logistics questions, the supply, but that puts you in a position of dependency on that neighborhood. Puts you in a position of dependency on Pakistan, which I think is one of the most dangerous nations in the world today. The deeper we're engaged in Afghanistan, the more we are in fact caught in an Indian/Pakistani game that I don't think we fully understand.

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[36:08] Unless you have a Pakistan strategy, unless you have an India strategy, unless you have an Iran strategy, being sucked deep into Afghanistan despite the humanitarian concerns is the wrong place for US soldiers to be. Jenna: [36:19] Seth, go ahead. Seth: [36:20] I'm going to disagree a little bit with both of my colleagues here. First on the Steve front, Steve, I do think and I was waiting to hear something along these lines in your initial comments and didn't hear it, but I'd like to draw you out on it because I think when it comes to whether and what kind of presence the US has in Afghanistan, the question has to be what is the threat to the US homeland coming from this area? [36:43] If there is none and if your argument is that the threat from Al Qaeda groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan is zero, then I would say there is an argument for leaving despite human rights issues. That is not the case right now. Therefore, I think it is in the US interest to stay because that threat, while degraded, remains and has the possibility of resurging. [37:06] On the troop level issue, I'm working on a book right now that looks at a whole range of factors that have contributed to counterinsurgency success, roughly 135 cases. What I point out just in response to Fred's comment is there is general an inverse correlation between the size of an outside force and counterinsurgency success. [37:29] What you actually find is size matters to some degree, but it is the local element that is absolutely fundamental in providing a sustained counterinsurgency presence in winning a war over the long run. A large US presence, in my view, historically, and there are some outlier exceptions, generally has been inversely correlated with counterinsurgency success. [37:53] In fact, what you see is several factors generally come to the surface in counterinsurgency success. One is the competence of national and local security forces. This will become absolutely critical over time. That is the Afghan National Security forces. The quality of local governance, which can undermine and to some degree has undermined local support and then third the issue that Steve brought up, which is outside support. [38:21] Whatever we do in Afghanistan, with an insurgency that has a command and control node across the border in Pakistan, that is the Talibans in Ashura, as long as it continues to exist in places like Baluchestan and Karachi, the odds of winning in Afghanistan are terribly low. I think we've got to move to this issue sooner rather than later because this is not just an Afghanistan issue. Jenna: [38:46] Ken, would you like to weigh in quickly because we will move to Pakistan in just a moment. Kenneth: [38:50] I'd like to, first of all, distinguish between US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency goals because I think they're very different issues and we've been merging them so far in this debate. With respect to counterterrorism, yes, Afghanistan is going to pose an Al Qaeda threat for a long time, but so will western Pakistan, so will

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Somalia, so will Mali. [39:10] It's not clear to me that that in and of itself justifies a massive troop presence. Indeed what I draw from those four situations is that the terrorist threat thrives in situations of either bad governance or no governance and it loves the two together. If you look at why is there a terrorist threat in northern Mali, for example, it's because of the traditional neglect of the Tuaregs there. Why is there a terrorist threat in Somalia? It's because there was no government at all. [39:41] We do have an interest in enhancing the capacity of the Kabul government to govern all of Afghanistan and to govern it well. That's where I think the counterterrorism interests merge with the counterinsurgency interests. Otherwise Afghanistan is just another country facing an insurgency and other than the political embarrassment of the US losing Kabul after all these years, there isn't any special interest there, but there is, I think, a US interest in seeing good governance spread across the country. [40:11] That's going to be the best way over the long-term to avoid both the Taliban resurgence and an Al Qaeda resurgence. The problem is that the way the US has gone about that has really been quite hand fisted. There's this talk of the surge, but yes, the surge has made progress in say Helman and Kandahar. Those are the two provinces that everybody likes to cite, but if you look elsewhere, the trajectory in many ways has been downhill for the last five years. [40:36] Just a year ago that awful situation of the young woman in Parwan province who was executed because she has this rivalry between two Taliban lovers. Parwan is where Bagram base is. It was 100 miles from Kabul and this is where the Taliban are already coming back. The surge has had limited impact. [40:55] Instead what is going on is increasingly the US has allowed Afghanistan to pursue a military strategy, which has very little regard for the rights of Afghan people. We're promoting these Afghan local police, which basically is arming villagers and asking them, "Please don't engage in personal vendettas," which is obviously what happens. [41:17] There's been no serious effort to achieve an ombudsman who would hold abusive forces accountable. The US did make a modest effort to achieve some kind of anticorruption commission, but instead of having one with prosecutorial authority, it can simply monitor and report. On and on and on the political effort to achieve the rule of law, to make sure that Afghan forces are subject to the rule of law, that you don't generate the kind of resentment on which the Taliban and Al Qaeda will thrive, it's just failed. Jenna: [41:48] What happens if they don't want that? What happens if the local people don't want that either? Kenneth: [41:52] This is where I think a serious political strategy is necessary. Karzai doesn't terribly have an interest in these things because he is clinging to power by making alliances with the thugs. And the US has allowed him to do that because we've been so eager to get his cooperation on military matters that we've kind of given him the store in the political realm. That has got to change. [42:14] I don't think the military is the way to do this. The military is a disaster for running civilian programs. I also don't think the

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traditional state department approach of just throwing money at training programs is the way to go either. What is needed is a serious conditionality, a political effort to tell Karzai, "You want the US funding your military for the next 10 years when it's your war, not ours, these are the conditions. These are the bottom line rules you've got to live by." We're not doing that. Jenna: [42:39] Why not just kill the bad guys though? Kenneth: [42:41] Excuse me. Jenna: [42:42] Why not just kill the bad guys? Kenneth: [42:43] You can't kill your way to good governance. You can't kill your way to a government that the Afghan people want to support. You've got to provide them something. We have to a degree. There's better life for women. There's better education. There is the press. There is civil society, but at the same time they see local troops running around completely unaccountable and that is what turns them against the government. That is what hands them over to the Taliban. [43:08] We are nave if we think we can just kill all the bad guys. It will never happen. You've got to build a government that the Afghan people want and that is not necessarily what Karzai wants right now. He just wants to stay in power. Jenna: [43:19] We're going to take some questions from the audience in just a moment. I'm just going to move quickly here to Pakistan before we do that because it's something that all of you have mentioned and this is where the props come in. Steve, I got this for you. Steve: [43:31] Great. Jenna: [43:32] I keep a couple magazines in my office. Steve: [43:33] "The Ally from Hell" by Jeff Goldberg. Jenna: [43:35] That's right. This is the "Atlantic". It's from December 2011. "The Ally from Hell". It's a great article. I keep it in my office. Steve: [43:42] That's the watered down version. Jenna: [43:42] Really? Steve: [43:43] Yeah. Jenna: [43:44] I'd love to see the original if you ever get the chance, but you've all mentioned Pakistan as one of the reasons, Fred, that we should stay in Afghanistan so it gives us the logistics to actually reach these tribal areas where the greatest threat to our national security is. The question is then why not declare war on Pakistan? Why keep people in Afghanistan? Why not take Pakistan on directly instead of using Afghanistan as a strategy?

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Frederick: [44:10] That one's real easy to answer. 180 million people, more than a hundred nuclear weapons. Jenna: [44:19] Are we ever going to get the people there that we're so concerned about? Frederick: [44:24] If you want to talk about Pakistan, I think it's worth talking about Pakistan. It's very important not to subordinate Pakistan either simply to Afghanistan or simply to Al Qaeda. It is a huge problem that Pakistan, which does have more than a hundred nuclear weapons and so forth, and the largest, densest concentration of violent Islamists and Al Qaeda affiliates in the world, is an incredibly badly governed state and is not in fact moving in any positive direction from the standpoint of governance. [44:55] It's not even clear that its economy will remain functional or viable and its leadership lacks the will to do anything about that. Jenna: [45:01] Is it a bigger threat to national security than Afghanistan? Frederick: [45:06] In some respects it is a bigger threat, but here I'm going to say I refuse to be drawn into the trap of seeing every problem as a nail because we have a hammer. I can say that Pakistan is a bigger long-term threat than Afghanistan is in some respects without seeing an obvious military corollary to that because I don't think that it's a problem that's going to be solved by applying military force. Jenna: [45:30] Steve, what do you think about this? Because to Fred's point we need to keep people in Afghanistan so we can reach these areas. We're not going to declare war on Pakistan, so what do we do? Steve: [45:43] Again, I approach this with some humility and also the same with Senator McCain, who I know has different views. My view is that those troops and soldiers in Afghanistan, I support the missions, the counterterrorism missions going on after either resurgent Al Qaeda. I don't believe in conflating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Those are two different arenas. [46:02] But one element in this article that Jeff Goldberg wrote, which is very important to consider, is that it was revealed in there, and it may have been more broadly known, is that on the nuclear warheads, that they were key components that weren't mated so that they were held separately. [46:17] As technology has moved on, that's no longer the case. We had out at the Aspen Institute this year President Musharraf and also Michael Mullin and others and the concern of the group that was talking is that technology is driving these things so that the pieces aren't necessarily unmated anymore. The vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is rising with the technological sophistication of the systems. [46:43] This is very important to consider because I don't know and it wasn't revealed at Aspen what their plans are. We keep hearing from US generals that they have confidence in this, but my sense from having been there with seeing a fight between Mike Mullin and Musharraf about some things that happened is I think there are real levels of concern that are growing.

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[47:01] I also heard President Musharraf who put Kiani in power say, "I guess I really didn't know that guy as well." There were elements then about the Pakistani support for the insurgence inside Afghanistan that attacked the US Embassy complex and other facilities in Kabul. Again, we had lots of intelligence by this. This was being denied inside. I look at Pakistan as a very, very tough knot. They look at Afghanistan as their strategic depth in an ongoing war and fight at the throat of India. [47:28] India, talk about Lashkar-e-Taiba, I think everything Seth said is right, but India has its versions of Lashkar-e-Taiba. You can listen to the former president of Pakistan view in a way, not in front of cameras, that Lashkar-e-Taiba is a natural response to the assault they feel they're sustaining from India. [47:49] We saw many innocent people killed and slaughtered in Mumbai in one of the most horrific public displays of terrorism in cameras, but that was looked at by many Pakistanis as being a fully legitimate operation and Indians look at their own. This is a level of nastiness and two nuclear nations at each other's throats... Jenna: [48:10] But you think our presence in Afghanistan is stoking that? Steve: [48:12] That's important, but I don't think that we draw ourselves in to be put into a position of extortion of these powers and that's the problem I have. Jenna: [48:18] By presence, our presence there. Steve: [48:20] What's that? Jenna: [48:21] That we're stoking that by our presence in Afghanistan? Steve: [48:23] I don't think we're stoking it. I think we're not affecting it because we don't have a strategic approach to really broadly dealing with those issues. There's an interesting piece by Hussain Haqqani that came out today. [48:34] The Ambassador from Pakistan and the United States was held under house arrest and left, said, "We need to realize that Pakistan is never going to have major shared interest with us, is not going to be our friend, and we'll make smarter choices if we begin realizing that and trying to create an illusion of closeness with Pakistan what we are in." [48:52] That doesn't lead you to real easy policy prescriptions, but we need to understand that throwing 6,000, 7,000 troops inside Afghanistan with limited counterterrorism, perhaps protecting the Kabul government, perhaps shaping some kinds of the choices, doesn't mean owning the outcome in Afghanistan. We can no longer own that. [49:10] There was a very important change that I think Joe Biden influenced in the president's rhetoric. We stopped talking about targeting Al Qaeda and its affiliates, which is a way of talking about the Taliban and we're talking about shaping choices, but no longer really owning outcomes. I think that is important because it then sent messages to Iran. We now have more resources and attention for you. We have other capacity that's not tied down and that's where I think the strategic equities of the United States should be.

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Frederick: [49:38] Why don't you want Shindand Airbase if you're worried about influencing Irani policy? You can have an airbase 50 kilometers away from the Iranian border. Why wouldn't you want that? Steve: [49:47] I even said I didn't want to withdrawal all the troops out there, but I don't believe that that in itself is necessarily a protected base nor do I think it's protected inside the Afghan situation and I worry about the blowback that essentially comes back from the presence that's established inside Afghanistan, which we haven't discussed. Seth raised this. We're not wanted. We're seeing ourselves pushed out of key provinces in Afghanistan. Seth: [50:11] We're not wanted as much. Steve: [50:13] I think that base is... Kenneth: [50:15] Can I push back on one comment, which ties this issue to Pakistan that Ken raised earlier. The counterterrorism, counterinsurgency issue I think are more conflated and actually tied together more than most people, and he argued, and it's in this sense. [50:32] One is there are terrorist groups that are and will continue to target the US homeland from this area. I point to to Zazi and Shahzad the Times Square bombers, two somewhat recent examples. But based even on my last trip to Afghanistan and in the Northeast you cannot have an al-Qaeda presence without having local Taliban. Not just other Taliban allies at the district and the provincial level. [51:01] Therefore, for the counter-terrorism campaign to succeed over the long run the Afghan government cannot be overthrown by a Taliban regime that has elements of it at least that are willing to provide sanctuary to the kinds of groups that are targeting the US homeland. [51:17] That's why those two are more tied together than some people would like them to be. Because the argument I hear from some places is that we should focus on the terrorism mission and not the insurgency. I don't think, over the long run, you can disassociate those two. Despite the fact that this administration badly wants a political settlement and a Taliban that disassociates itself from Al Qaeda. [51:44] I don't see that happening, certainly not at a mid and lower level in some areas. One other point, and why does this matter on Pakistan. Because both this administration and the previous one, finished, at least the last one, both its terms, this one its first four years, and did not succeed in undermining the Taliban. Or for that matter, in a major way, the Haqqani sanctuary. Jenna: [52:10] Why not? Kenneth: [52:12] Nobody wanted to take on the Belugistan, Karacih problem. Jenna: [52:15] Why not? Kenneth: [52:16] Too politically sensitive. We have had no success in targeting the Taliban's senior leadership, which is not located in Afghanistan. It's in Pakistan.

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Jenna: [52:26] So why should men continue to die when our leaders are not brave enough to take on a politically sensitive topic? Kenneth: [52:32] That's a good question. Steve: [52:36] That's why he's on my side of the aisle. [laughter] Seth: [52:38] It's important to stress, thought, it's not politically sensitive. It's militarily sensitive. In other words, so long as there's a large military footprint in Afghanistan, you've got to worry about Pakistan as a route to resupply the troops. Otherwise you're stuck with Islam [inaudible 00:52:51] Uzbekistan. There is a situation of dependence. [52:54] On top of that, when there is this massive US military troop presence in Afghanistan, it leads the US to do what it's been doing, which is to treat Pakistan as if it's governed by the military and the ISI. Zardari, who we all understand is corrupt and a bit of a buffoon, but he's nonetheless the civilian president. He's a sideshow. [53:13] We actually end up reinforcing this military dominance of Pakistan. Of course, it's the military, not the civilian government that is building up and tolerating the militants in Pakistan, partly as their anti-India strategy, partly as their ability to influence their backyard in Afghanistan. [53:32] But as a more political strategy is pursued in Afghanistan, it opens the door to a more balanced approach to Pakistan, where we stop privileging the military and the ISI. Jenna: [53:44] Go ahead. Frederick: [53:46] I know you want to get to questions but look, first of all, we're all violently agreeing on one point, that I want to bring out, which is, neither the previous administration nor this administration has had a coherent political strategy for dealing with Afghanistan. Let alone for dealing with Afghanistan in the region. It has not, generally, had a coherent and intelligent aid strategy. We've done enormous damage. [54:07] I was a very vocal proponent of all of the various counter-corruption measures that got going in ISAF headquarters, because we saw the damage that was being done by throwing money at the problem, which was seen as a solution. And it clearly is part of the problem. Getting to the issue of cost, among other things. We would be doing better with less, in many respects, especially on the aid side the way we've been doing it. [54:27] But we need a political strategy. There's no question, we need a political strategy. And, "negotiate with the Taliban" is not a political strategy. It's an exit strategy and a bad one. Because the deal that needs to be made in Afghanistan is not the deal with the Taliban. It's a deal among the core power brokers and key ethnicities, within that country, on a government that everyone can live with. That is the one thing we have not been trying hard to do, over the last eight years, on the whole, with a number of exceptions. Jenna: [54:58] Should troops die to prevent a civil war in Afghanistan, if that's the risk? Frederick: [55:06] No. Troops should die to protect American interests. That's what we're trying to do. The question is, "How?" I agree with the points that are made up here.

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And especially, violently agree with Seth's point, about the impossibility of distinguishing between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, for all of the reasons that he laid out. You have to have some kind of governments. There has to be some element of state building, if this is going to work. [55:28] The question is to do that well, instead of doing it badly. But the point I want to make is, it is not and should not be an either/or. Now we need to stop doing military stuff so that we can have a political strategy. One could, in theory, will all the resources of the American government, have both at the same time. I would submit that that's what we should have been doing and what we need to do. [55:50] One last factual point, we have allowed ourselves to be captive of Islamabad. Much more than is, in fact, necessary from a logistical standpoint. Most of the time that I spent in Afghanistan, Pakistan had kept the ground lines closed. We were, in fact, supplying without going through Pakistan. We were flying over Pakistan. But the truth is, they're not really going to be able to stop... Steve: [56:12] We lost ice cream, by the way, in headquarters. Frederick: [56:15] I know. But we got it back as soon as we possibly could, Seth. We worked that out. Kenneth: [56:19] If I could say, first of all, on the question of...Obviously, in Afghanistan, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are very closely linked. But I think it's important to distinguish them conceptually, because the US' ultimate interest is counter-terrorism. Counter-insurgency is a subsidiary interest. [56:36] You say we should be able to do both the military and the political. In principle, that's true. In reality, there's not room for both. There's just not the bandwidth. When the ambassador goes in to talk to Karzai, all he talks about is the military stuff. When you ask them, "Will you bring up the political stuff?" They say, "Oh, they don't listen to us." Or, "There's sovereignty questions." There's a gazillion excuses and it never happens. I do think that the military has gotten in the way of a political strategy that would be more effective. Frederick: [57:04] I'm sorry. Our ambassadors talk with Karzai about a lot of things. I have to take issue with the characterization that you put out earlier, that no one's made any efforts on any of these issues. The truth is, a lot of effort has been made to hold Afghan security forces accountable, to get anti-corruption efforts going, to get the Afghans to go along with that. [57:24] A lot of it's been made by the military, some of it's been made by a succession of ambassadors. It has not, on the whole, been backed from Washington. Why not? Because it's been seen as state building by an administration that wants to get the hell out of there. The problem is, what I really can't see is a strategy that focuses on doing something meaningful with Afghan politics, by an administration or by a people whose fundamental approach is, we just need to leave. Right now, that's our set. Steve: [57:52] If I may, Fred. I know we want to move as well. I respect what you're saying. When John McCain was advocating for 40,000 troops in the surge, as opposed to the 30,000 that the President committed, I think I've got that about right, there were people like Bruce Riedel and others, advocating much larger numbers, if you wanted to

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get this right. It's a very interesting question, which I think is a legitimate one. [58:13] To think, if you had unlimited resources, you had unlimited manpower to devote, could you have engaged in a counter-insurgency strategy that would have been much deeper, much more profound, much more systematic. [58:27] I got to know many of the captains that were David Petraeus' best and brightest. They would go out into villages and become the de facto mayors. They would make sure that women were getting educated. They would try to deal with the governance issue. They would work with the intelligence communities to track and look who the bad folks were, the good folks. [58:43] When they left, these are Petraeus' people coming back and saying that they had a real problem in handover, to the next person that came in and took over that person's role. So much of that institutional memory and infrastructure of knowledge and connectivity in the those communities, was lost. [58:59] The problem is that now, this is America's longest war. We're well into this. This has been a debate I've had, occasionally, in a friendly way, with people like Max Boot and Bill Kristol, who share a lot of these views. But I said, "Have you had the strategic discussion with the American public? Have you convinced them that this is a vital national security issue?" Because I have legitimate questions about concerns for Iran, about looking militarily over-stretched. [59:27] When I look at the United States, without assigning blame to anyone, and I look at an era where we look, militarily over-stretched, what's the consequence of that. Your allies don't count on you as much. They begin making other bets in the world. They won't depend on the United States to be there as much. We had an economic crisis in this country, which really undermined America's economic leadership, the ability to tell other economies how to organize themselves. [59:48] We had, for a variety of reasons, issues in Bagram and Guantanamo and others, that Ken's people worked on a lot, that raised a lot of the moral questions and became recruiting techniques for many of those who wanted to do harm to Americans and Europeans and others. [60:02] When you look at these, I would call moral, economic and military deficits that the United States simultaneously showed, that then makes Afghanistan, what you're doing there, so much more important, both in terms of the weight and consequence of it. And it makes you ask, "Is that the best place for America to get its strategic echo effect? The best place to leverage its power? Or has it become a trap?" [60:24] I think that's a legitimate question to pose. I wish we had this debate at the McCain institute five, six, seven years ago. I wish we'd begin to drill down, into the question of, "Do we have an efficacious way of turning these communities around and getting things right?" We didn't do that. [60:38] So now we have the problem of where we are today. It would be nice to go back and do all the things Fred's saying. But we're not going to do that. It's not the question of

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getting the question of getting out because of this. It raises the appropriate question, "Are you abandoning people in Afghanistan?" Some are going to feel abandoned. Are there other elements of state craft and institutions we should [inaudible 01: [60:52] 00:56] ? Absolutely yes. Do we need to re-purpose the Pentagon in this and somehow hover or find other ways to go on with an important mission so that the worse atrocities don't happen in Afghanistan? Probably. [61:06] The idea of a large-scale deployment of men and women in a large footprint in another country, that time is probably over because of our failure to get these other issues right. We have to be cognizant that it's been our failure to get those other issues right that's led to this point. Kenneth: [61:23] A lot of why we haven't gotten it right is because as Fred said, we had focused on nation-building as a military exercise, and it's not. If we had focused on nation-building as a political exercise, one, it would've been much more palatable. You wouldn't have had the push-back from the Pentagon. [61:39] Two, it would've been more effective because you can have a brilliant captain, who sits there and is pro-council for the area. So long as he's there, everything's running well, but that's not a sustainable strategy. You've got to build up Afghan institutions, which require putting pressure when those institutions... Jenna: [61:54] Are the Afghan institutions going to be able to protect someone like her? Is that...? Kenneth: [62:00] No. Steve: [62:01] I can tell you, I've been into Women's Ministry in Kabul today. It's one of the most embarrassing, horrible things because they have no resources they've been promised, resources from the various friends of Afghanistan donor communities. [62:13] They're not given the money. There's no support inside that government. These are really heroic women inside Kabul trying to change the circumstances, and they get nothing inside their own government, miserable circumstances. We're not paying any attention,and so the answer is, they're not going to be protected. Jenna: [62:27] This is where you'd say this is the... Kenneth: [62:29] This is exactly what the US can be funding, and others are putting this massive money in. Make sure a significant amount goes to the women's shelters. It goes to the Women's Ministry. Jenna: [62:35] You think it'll be used the right way? Kenneth: [62:36] Yes. I actually have quite a bit of faith in the very embattled NGO sector in Afghanistan. Not the internationals, the locals. You ask, "Can Afghans protect this woman?" That's the only choice. The United States is not going to stay there forever protecting women. You've got to put pressure on the government, so ultimately, women have a decent chance of emerging as equals in that society.

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Jenna: [62:58] I know you guys have a lot of questions and there's been a lot said about the military. I would like to open it up with a veteran that's in our audience, who served in Afghanistan. [63:08] Congressman, would you like to have a question or comment? This is Congressmen Cotton. You could introduce yourself with whatever resume you would like. [laughs] Tom Cotton: [63:17] Hi, I'm Congressman Cotton. Jenna: [63:19] And served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tom: [63:21] Yes. I was in the Army for five years in Iraq in '06 in Afghanistan and '08 and '09 for [inaudible 01:03:26] construction team. [63:28] Quick question about our allies. What do you think we need from NATO going forward? What can we expect and what difference will it make to our strategic positions? Jenna: [63:39] Who would like to take that one? Seth, you want to...? Seth: [63:41] I'll start. I think, at least from a training perspective, the more, the better. If the British can stay involved in both counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and civilian operations, we're better off. If the Italians can stay to some degree in the west, we're better off. If the Germans can stay to some degree in the north, we're better off. [64:04] The more, I think, that we get both development assistance and training efforts to continue from a broader NATO perspective, the better off we are because I think it does relieve some of the pressure in areas like the north. Jenna: [64:20] How long can we expect them to stay? Seth: [64:22] I think if it's a training mission, that we can expect them to stay for decent periods of time the next several years. I would say, from a US perspective, US must largely stay focused on the east and the south. These are the most important areas for US national security. Jenna: [64:38] Fred? Frederick: [64:38] I agree with that. I think there's a corollary to that that's very important, though. I value the contributions of our allies enormously, as you do. I've been at ramp ceremonies for Romanian soldiers who were killed and I take exception when people talk about the fact that our NATO allies haven't been fighting and dying. They have been. [64:57] We created, long ago, a NATO alliance that was dependent on the American military to do a lot of things and did not consist of independent militaries that were capable of conducting overseas operations on a large scale and protecting themselves and moving around in an environment like this. [65:12] If we want to continue to have NATO alliance in Afghanistan, we are going to continue to have to enable them. We're going to have to continue to enable them. We're going to have to continue to provide with ISR. We're going to have to continue to provide them with some mobility assets.

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[65:24] We can call on them to provide more, but what you'll find rapidly is that the cupboard is bare for most of them. Some countries like Georgia, which has had two battalions, for God's sake, in Helmand, for a long time fighting heroically. Georgia doesn't have those things. [65:37] As you look at the bill that we need to pay, there's a tide, as it were, for every NATO soldier in Afghanistan that is going to have to be paid out of American support. I think it's worth doing. I think it's worth doing for the alliance. I think it's worth doing for all the reasons that Seth identified, but I think we need to be honest with ourselves, that there is a tradeoff. [65:57] If we are not going to be prepared to enable our allies, if we're going to tell them, "You know what? We'd love you to say. We'd love the Germans to stay in Mazar, but we're not going to give you anything. Good luck out there." I don't think we can expect them to stay. Frankly, I think we would deserve a fair amount of odium from them. Jenna: [66:11] Steve on that, I thought, to your point to being concerned about Iran. Why should we have our NATO allies stay in Afghanistan when there are places like northern Africa, for example, or Iran that may be of greater priority to our national security? Steve: [66:24] In a way, it kind of comments that's developed. We all worked in Libya together. The US and British provided air support at the Mali exhibit. There's a kind of comments...You can't just be a la carte in everything. You have to work together. [66:37] I think the Congressman's question is very complicated and important one. Couple of years ago, Senator McCain, you may remember John, Leon Panetta give a speech at the Halifax International Security Forum. [66:47] I was, in a friendly way, very critical of it because he only talked about....He talked about the coming decreases and the coming era of austerity for the US defense and how this would harm issues, but mind you, he didn't talk about roles and missions. The old Dom Rumsfeld, if he'd been there, when he talked about applying technology and finding other ways to deal with this, key to a robust spirit that America wants to be. [67:09] It was depressing listen go Leon. His comment to mostly NATO ministers was, "We need you to do more. We need you to hold the line." They were ticked off. They were saying, "How dare you continue to push us...," when as Fred just said, their cover is bare. They're basically saying these kinds of things. [67:27] I do think that the training mission and whatnot are important, but Ivo Daalder, Kurt Volker's successor in NATO, former successor, told me that the training expenses each year, at that time, were about $12 billion a year, almost roughly the same as the entire GDP of Afghanistan. [67:44] That's automatically unsustainable. Even at the various other levels of spending, the targeted, what we would provide, what allies would provide, there's still staggeringly high cost for training those soldiers.

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[67:55] I think it's very, very important. When you're looking broadly out at the various mix missions that we have in North Africa and tracking other areas, it's hard for France. It's hard for Germany. It's hard for the UK, in particular, right now that's seeing things done. [68:08] I think that we have to be humble and we have to figure out how to do the things that we're doing better than we're doing them. We have to demonstrate efficiency in some of what we're doing that I think we're not. I think that will help build confidence in our NATO allies in the kinds of requests we would make for them in place. I do agree with everything Seth said, though, in terms of the kind of direction. Jenna: [68:29] Hold on. Let's get another question in, then we'll continue the conversation. [68:32] Yes, sir? Kami Butt: [68:34] My name is Kami Butt, and I write for the "Pakistani Spectator." My question is this, does any one of you have any appreciation that Pakistan has lost more than $1 trillion in terms of opportunity lost after September 11? Pakistan has lost 40,000 civilians. Pakistan has lost more than 7,000 security people. We brought Mr. 10 Percent and these kind of crooks, and pushed them on poor Pakistani... [69:01] I know these are just statistics, because they are Muslim, and Muslim mothers' stomachs are very fertile. They can produce a lot more babies than we can kill them. Is there any way we could show a little sensitivity towards poor Pakistani. In terms of going after Pakistan, have you read Rick Perry, what he said? He said, "We are leveraging India and Pakistan." Jenna: [69:20] So the question is, "What about...?" Kami: [69:22] Let me tell, have you read Senator Hagel? He said that India is financing against Pakistan. Our Indian friends have put literally Pakistan on fire. Pakistan is burning. Pakistan is laughing [inaudible 01:09:34] involvement in Afghanistan. Jenna: [69:34] Hold on. We're not going to... Steve: [69:35] Kami, come on. Kami: [69:39] Please, show a bit of sensitivity toward that poor country. I'm a Republican, by the way. I live in ghetto part of Washington, DC. Democrat friends say that Republicans love to waste money abroad. Steve: [69:50] Kami, you're a friend, but you're overdoing it. Jenna: [69:50] Sir, we want to get some answers to your question, which is, "What about Pakistan?" That comes back around to, "What about the support we've also received from Pakistan in Afghanistan?" Is that roughly, generally what you'd like to...? Kami: [inaudible 01:10:07] [70:06] Jenna: [70:07] What about that? Kami: [inaudible 01:10:09] [70:08] .

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Jenna: [70:15] We're trying to get you an answer. Kenneth: [70:17] Let me just answer with reference to Balochistan, where the ISI's approach to fighting Baloch nationalists has been to empower Sunni extremists, who have been killing, in large numbers, the Pakistani Hazara Shia, who have taken refuge in Quetta. [70:37] That's just one set of Pakistanis, whose lives are being lost, because the military has chosen to support these militants. The militants don't only attack US forces in Afghanistan. They attack the Pakistani military, and they attack a lot of Pakistani civilians. [70:54] What I take from this is the need for all interlocutors with Pakistan to be much more rigorous in standing up to the Pakistani military's willingness to go to bed with these militants because they often find them convenient for the various fights that they're engaged in. Kami: [71:09] My friend, it defies the common logic that Pakistani Army would make trouble in their own country, in the largest part. It's India that is creating trouble in Pakistani Balochistan. There are 15 Indian... [crosstalk] Jenna: [71:20] Sir, I understand, but you're interrupting. Let me just try to get... Steve: [71:23] Kami, you're commandeering an event rudely. You're an old friend of mine. Cut it out. Jenna: [71:30] There's going to be time afterwards. You could talk about specifically when it comes to India. Steve: [71:33] What Kami is saying is that there is a passion about this. There is a sense of "Who's doing what to whom?" that's very complex. Many of the grievances, that various corners of this corner of the world have, are legitimate ones. The Untied States and its allies are out there trying and have been trying to create a framed [inaudible 01: [71:48] 11:52] . No disrespect to any of the players, but it does involve many, many passions and grievances, that it raises the fundamental question of "What can be done?" Can America really create a tipping point for change? Is the process of that moving the stock of American power higher or lower? Jenna: [72:12] We're going to take another question. Part of this debate is a US policy conversation, which is why we're coming at it from the point of view of the United States. That's why we're having it today. Seth, I'll let you answer, but let me just get some more questions in. Go ahead, sir. Doug Brooks: [72:33] Hi, Doug Brooks. I'm in the Afghan American Chamber of Commerce. Contractors have been there for over a decade now. We've trained up essentially a whole generation of Afghans. They're English-speaking, they're Western-oriented, they're very supportive of what's been going on. But on my last visit, most of them are looking to get out. They don't see a future with the current government in Afghanistan.

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Jenna: [72:55] Looking to leave the country permanently? Doug: [72:56] Looking to leave, as the US pulls out, as NATO leaves. These are the people that we need over there, if we're going to see the changes stick. Is there anything that you would suggest to help them to stay? Doug: [73:08] Interesting question. Steve? Steve: [73:11] This is, again, one of these horrible issues, because if you want Afghanistan to succeed and to come around, you want as much of that talent to stick as possible. At the same time, I fear particularly for smart women. Also in Iraq, what we saw there was that professionals, academics, doctors, those with finance were often kidnapped. [73:34] There's a whole other element of crime going on in these countries that has nothing to do with the Taliban. It has to do, basically, with kidnapping people for money and disrupting lives. A lot of the killing has to do with that. [73:45] In my view, what's really been odd, and I'd love to hear somebody just tell me I'm wrong, is that for this level of engagement, for this amount of time, I don't see the Harriet Tubman project. I don't see us ferreting out the best minds in that country and moving them into Europe and the United States. I see great talent in the ministries that I've been over, and I get these appeals to get out of the country. They can't get out of the country, or they're fearful for their lives. [74:11] There's another element, where the United States has been a bit derelict, which is dealing with the fact that those who have been part of the modernity experiment nonetheless have to feel like they're not entirely trapped. There's got to put a pathway in, and a pathway out. There's got to be going back and forth. [74:27] I just worry that that infrastructure is not there. I was going to say, not in a facetious way, when we're asked what our NATO allies could do, another element is non-military. It's basically to create these people-to-people, particularly people out exchanges of people that we... [74:41] I'm going on to the Rockefeller Foundation archives, recently. During World War II, the Rockefeller Foundation put a lot of money into identifying places where the Nazis had gone in. They were killing people left and right and really targeting the intellectuals in various areas. [74:54] The Rockefeller Foundation spent a lot of money getting people out. I'm writing about it for their 100th anniversary. I feel that that's not something that we're not doing, in many of the countries that are in these nightmare scenarios. We should be doing that. Jenna: [75:09] Sir, you had a follow-up question on that, so...Sure. Ayuk Harin: [75:17] My name is Ayuk Harin. I work for the Voice of America Afghanistan Service. We broadcast to the 30 million Afghans, who will be watching our show tomorrow. [75:29] From an Afghan perspective, the whole debate was very

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interesting. Thanks for providing the opportunity to talk about Afghanistan in this. The word "premature" I heard from Mr. Kagan, who said that the debate is a little premature. [75:45] I would say it's too late. It's not premature. We are less than two years. By the end of 2014, the military engagement is over. The Afghans, at least, they are talking about how many troops would remain after 2014. They're not talking about any more of the military, what's going on right now. [76:12] The two topics that are prevalent, or that all the talk shows, or is debated in Afghanistan are, "How many years troops would remain after 2014?" and "For what reasons?" which is also a good question. I heard also, again, I think, which was Mr. Kagan, that for greater US interests in Afghanistan, I think of that as the dangerous one. Many Afghans would not want that. [76:49] Karzai has been trying to assure the neighboring countries, Iran and Pakistan in central Asia, and even China and India that the US would be committed to only Afghan mission in Afghanistan. My question is yes... [crosstalk] Jenna: [77:02] So would there be zero troops there? Is that what...? Ayuk: [77:04] The troops, how many after 2014 and... Jenna: [77:10] For what purpose. Ayuk: [77:12] ...to clarify on the mission after 2014. Jenna: [77:17] That's a good question for it, but the speculation amongst the public. If there's no direct information about why we're there after 2014, it will lead to a lot of questions raised about what we're doing. Because you're an advocate of extra troops there, what do you think about that? Frederick: [77:32] Absolutely. [inaudible 01:17:32] It's an excellent question. I'm glad that you brought that up and gave me an opportunity to address it. [77:40] The United States sends troops abroad to serve the interests of the United States of America. That's why any country uses military force rationally. Sometimes, we also do it for humanitarian reasons, but that's not what's driving us primarily in this case. It is essential that our purposes be meshed with the interests of the Afghan people in a fundamental way, if we're going to continue to have troops there. That's always a requirement, anywhere that you're going to have a foreign military presence. [78:11] The people among whom that presence persists have to feel that that presence is serving their interests as well, in some way. It's the other reason why I think it is essential that we continue to focus on counter-insurgency, on good governance building, on helping Afghans create a state structure, and non-state structures, that they find acceptable and suitable.

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[78:35] I do think that we've made a lot of mistakes. It's obvious that we've made a lot of mistakes over the years, imposing Western models on Afghanistan, and so forth. Although, it's not as though Afghanistan had a functioning model at the time that we invaded, either. What we need to be doing, and I think what we have been trying to do in some parts, is helping Afghans figure out what they want, what will work for all of their communities, and how to enable that. [78:58] Our forces can provide a security backdrop and then help the Afghan security forces to be able to sustain that. Because, we're all agreed on the end state here. I think we are all agreed that the end state is that you have a stable Afghan government that is acceptable to its people, the basic definition of legitimacy, that is secured by its own security forces, that are able to do that with limited assistance from the outside. That's the objective. [79:24] We're simply talking about how to achieve that. What I was saying is we, the United States, would commit to that, because it's in our national interest for that to be the case. But I entirely agree with you that if we scope our presence in Afghanistan after 2014 down to say, "We are only there to kill bad guys, to kill people who are threatening us," then there is nothing in it for the Afghan people. I actually don't think that it will be sustainable. I think that that's a fast road to zero, in reality. Kenneth: [79:53] A lot of this discussion has assumed that post-2014, there's going to be a war without end. We're debating how much of that is going to be with US troops versus Afghan troops. [80:03] Let me put forward another scenario, which is that there's going to be a peace agreement of some sort. How do we, not ensure, but how do we promote the possibility that that peace agreement is better, rather than worse? I think there are a couple of things that can be done. Jenna: [80:19] Better for us, or better for Afghanistan? Kenneth: [80:21] I actually think they're pretty similar. One thing would be to be much clearer about the US red lines. The US has influence because of the massive aid that is being promised. When the US says, "Women's rights is a red line. We're going to insist that any Taliban who comes into the peace agreement abide by the Afghan constitution," that's ridiculous. That's like saying nothing. There has to be much clearer red lines with respect to basic rights issues. [80:49] I also think that there has to be a greater insistence on transparency. Because ultimately, I have the greatest faith in the Afghan people, in terms of shaping a peace plan that would ultimately be decent. But, when the peace negotiations take place secretly, people have no idea what's going on. [81:07] They suddenly wake up and hear that, "Aha, Karzai's offering the Justice Ministry and the chief justiceship to the Taliban," which is a report that Al Jazeera came out with this week. [81:16] Who knows if that's true, because there's zero transparency. If there was transparency, you would get an outpouring of rejectionism, I suspect, from the Afghan people, and we'd have a much greater likelihood of having a positive peace agreement, if

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one's possible, with the Taliban, rather than just having Karzai cutting a deal in the back room, which would be a disaster. Jenna: [81:34] You have a final question, ma'am? Frances Hardin: [81:38] Thank you. My name is Frances Hardin. I'm not representing anybody except myself. I wanted to address this issue of women's issues because I served in Afghanistan on a USAID project for most of 2011. I was communications director on our project, but one of the things that was in my portfolio was gender mainstreaming, which really meant including Afghan women as much as we could. [81:58] I have met on several occasions with the Minister of Women's Affairs and her deputies. We were working through this system of women's gardens that existed in Afghanistan. It's true the better ones are in the bigger cities, but our effort there was to establish training programs for Afghan women. There were quite a few, not tons, but quite a few Afghan women who are in business. [82:19] We were working on training programs. I organized a training program, a three-day seminar in Mazar-i-Sharif for businesswomen improving their skills. It was oversubscribed. We had to turn people away. There is a hunger for this kind of thing. [82:34] Then one final personal note. It's true we can't protect women there very easily. I have, in my home, at this moment...She landed in my lap three weeks ago, a young Afghan woman who worked for me. She's 23. Her life has been threatened because she and her family were working with Afghan women in their village in Parwan, teaching them reading and writing and computer skills and the sorts of things that you can work at home. [82:58] There's a recognition of trying to get women to be able to work, but in a traditional way or at least through the home. Anyway, my young friend is here now. Tomorrow, I'm taking her to a lawyer. We're going to try and start the asylum process. Jenna: [83:08] The question is? Frances: [83:10] There wasn't a question. It was a comment. There was a comment over there that there wasn't much being done for women. Kenneth: [83:14] We have a long way to go, even with this government. I was in Afghan to address an issue of the criminalization of running away from home, for women, when they're fleeing forced marriage or domestic violence. That's a crime in Afghanistan. It's not in the penal code. It's not in Sharia. They just made it up, but they enforce it. When I would meet with the Chief Justice or meet with the Attorney General, it was twisting arms to get them to even say, "We won't pursue these crimes," or, "Give us a list of people and we'll release them." [83:46] We have enormous work to be done with this government, on these basic issues. Let alone what might come later. But this is not something that the US or our allies are putting adequate political muscle into. We should be using conditionality behind this massive promise of aid, to get these things done.

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Steve: [84:03] Can I just do one contending to Kenneth's point there? It is terrific that we're having this discussion. I know that Fred Kagan and Seth and all of you are going to stay in this for a long time. But when the Obama Administration came in, the way to be at the top of the foreign policy, national security pyramid, was to have your stake in the Afghanistan pie. If you looked at Jim Jones, Karl Eichenberry, Richard Holbrooke, David Petraeus, it was like the old Cold War. [84:30] You had to be a Sovietologist or a weapons expert. That's how you were king of the crop. Afghanistan, no one wants to be involved in Afghanistan now, except Fred. [laughter] Seth: [84:40] , you're moving on to other thing. But my point is, there is an institutional distraction, where this topic is looked at as toxic for careers, toxic for deployments. It is increasingly becoming a forgotten issue. I think it is vital. So that's the environment we're walking into. I have been asking myself this question of, "How could we have gotten it right or different?" Again, I'm in the ideas business. I listen to aid, I listen to what the problems of cutting aid are, not being able to spend the amount we were there, a very earnest, "What can we do to them?" approach. [85:17] If you go back in history, what we did in Japan, John Foster Dulles was so worried about Japan falling back into a China-centric direction that he took... Japan's markets and Japan's economic success, and it was successful at one point, is not entirely about getting prices right. It was wedged deeply in the US economy. You had preferential trade, preferential economic deals. We built Japan in part because we wanted it to be our strong ally. [85:44] I have found this very odd that we've adopted a country that we don't want to really be close to. I've been waiting for the massive trade preferences that you would give. AFL-CIO is going to be very upset that you would give massive trade... If you want to change the economic vector and horizon for people and where they look to and where they're influenced, it's not through aid and throwing in military. It's by giving them economic opportunities by selling things to us and owning that and creating [inaudible 01: [85:59] 26:13] . Seth: [86:13] I agree with that. Steve: [86:13] That has not been done. Jenna: [86:15] You guys are on the same side. You're supposed to... Seth: [86:16] I know, I'm sorry. Jenna: [86:17] You're on this side, not another side. Seth: [86:18] I'm sorry, I didn't hear you. Steve: [86:19] But I agree, there are other ways to do it. Jenna: [86:20] I know there are so many questions, and I apologize for not getting to them all right now. We're just going to have some closing statements, and then you're all

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going to have some opportunities to mingle afterwards and talk to all of these guys. [86:30] We'll kind of go back around to where we started, which is that policy is personal. It is personal. What we say here has dramatic effect on lives of people all over the world, not only in Afghanistan, but also our own men and women that are serving over there. [86:43] The big question about should we stay or should we go is whether or not what we stay for or what we leave is worth dying for. This is very serious, this policy. It's not just a question of diplomacy or counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism. It's really about lives. [86:59] As we close here, a brief statement from you all, what is the one reason why we should stay and what's the one reason why we should go, Fred? Frederick: [87:09] The reason we should stay is because there continue to be people in Afghanistan and people who will come back to Afghanistan who wake up every morning and ask themselves how can I kill Americans and how can I bring this war to the United States? [87:25] We will not be able to end that threat until we have accomplished the objectives that we've all sort of collectively described here. I think we can have a very articulate discussion. Steve rightly raised questions about the importance of this versus other things. I have done that thinking, I have to look at other things, believe it or not, than Afghanistan, and I am still persuaded that this is worth it. That's reasonable, people can disagree about that. That's why to be here. [87:50] I just want to say something about the issue of American war weariness if I can because it bugs me. I've never worn the uniform, and so I feel comfortable saying this. The American people as a people have no right whatsoever to feel war weariness. [88:05] Unless by that is meant the weariness of reading and watching other people fight this war, because the overwhelming majority of American people have not fundamentally been involved in this war, not fundamentally had to make sacrifices for it, and it's not that kind of war weariness that we're talking about. [88:24] What we're saying really is we don't feel like dealing with this anymore. I don't think that's a sound basis for making policy decisions at the end of the day, and I don't think that it gets you where you need to be. I think it does break faith at a certain point with the people who actually have the right to be weary of this war. [88:43] Coming back and answering your question in another way, we may be weary of this war, but this war is not weary of us. The war doesn't end just because we decide we don't feel like playing anymore. [applause] Kenneth: [89:02] Whether we should be weary of this war or the American people are weary of this war, so I'm going to start from the assumption that the US is leading militarily. I'm going to look at it rather from the perspective what's best for the Afghan people. How do we prevent a Taliban re-takeover? That is a real question. [89:20] There is a military strategy that has to be part of that. As I've been saying, a military strategy

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alone will not work. Indeed, it could be counter-productive. I think a lot of the current military strategy is counter-productive. We have to seize this opportunity. [89:38] The fact that the US is not going to be as preoccupied with force protection. It's not going to be as embarrassed by defeats as it has been for a decade to reorient the way that the United States engages with the Afghan government. We have the economic leverage to do it right. We have to change the political strategy and have a real strategy that frankly has not been articulated. [90:00] When we press the state department on this, when we press the White House, we get kind of broad statements of concern, heartfelt statements of concern, but not a real plan and certainly not the communication of real conditions for the future to whatever Afghan government emerges after the elections there so that they are likely to be set on a political course that has a greater chance of success than the current one. Seth: [90:23] This is pretty straightforward. As long as there are threats to the US homeland coming from this region, we cannot leave entirely. It is counterproductive to US national security. Period. Exclamation point. There are common interests with the Afghans. [90:37] Let me just conclude with one other remark, which unfortunately we did not get into. Probably the most significant event over the next 12 months will not just be the fighting or not just be the settlement discussions. It's the elections next year in Afghanistan. [90:52] Much will hinge on what happens over the next 12 months, who gets elected, what sort of representation we have, what sort of support we have among Afghans. Again, to support Ken's political comment earlier in the discussion and to highlight one that hasn't come, watch this election process. It is very important for the future of this country. Steve: [91:14] I just say finally, American can't afford a whack-a-mole strategy in dealing with threats. The al-Qaeda threat has metastasized in other parts of the world. We have the dangers of real nuclear proliferation, of the movement and proliferation of other WMD materials. We have the rise of potential peers in nations like China that don't see the world like the United States does. [91:38] There are a lot of issues. If you go back to September 10th, 2001 and look at what we were spending on just defense, not other stuff, to make Americans feel safe, and you look over time and account for inflation, the bin Laden effect, just in DoD spending, is $2.7 trillion above that baseline. That's about six million sustained jobs if you were to be reckless and look at what would happen. It's an awful lot of money. [92:00] In many ways, it's been successful because we haven't had other large-scale attacks on the United States, but it does raise the question about, how do you get smarter? How do you begin dealing with these other things? We have not solved the Iran problem. We do have a metastasization of problems. I do worry a lot about what's going on in Africa, and I worry about sending American men and women into a place where we look mired down and stuck, as opposed to leveraging US power.

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[92:25] It's very important to always, whenever you're engaged, at the end of the day...I remember the chairman of Arco, Lod Cook, telling me, "If you're an oilman, it's not how much oil you produce or sell that matters. It's whether you have a sustainable situation, whether you have other oil stocks that are out there." [92:39] US power is much the same. You can go out and do great things in the world, but you can't do senselessly, recklessly, that spend everything you have. You've got to make sure you have leverage the next day to do other things. That's why I raise questions about Afghanistan. It feels to me that too many other rivals and observers of what we're doing have been looking at us as stuck and as overreaching. [93:00] It's important, if we're going to send American men and women in there, we make this matter. I don't think we've been doing that. Without strategy, it's almost criminal to leave these people there. We do not have a strategy today for dealing with the broad changing parameters in that region. Jenna: [93:17] There goes that budding friendship with Fred in that ending statement. [laughter] Steve: [93:21] We'll have a drink later. Jenna: [93:22] Steve, Seth, Ken, Fred, thank you very much. I know there's going to be a lot of questions. Kurt? [applause] Kurt: [93:34] Let me also say, "Thank you," to Jenna Lee for your terrific job moderating. Thank you for that and thank you again, everybody. [applause] Kurt: [93:43] It is hard to draw a conclusion after a debate such as this, but I will try to draw one, which is whatever we do, the consequences are very, very serious for the people of Afghanistan, for the region including Pakistan, for our own security, for the broader strategic issues in North Africa or elsewhere. [94:05] We can't drift passively along and hope it's going to be OK. We have to be serious about a strategy. That's what we're aiming to get at through this debate series. Thank you all for coming. Our next one will be April 17th on the subject of Iran. Thank you. [applause] [background chatter]

Transcription by CastingWords