Nietzsche and the Obscurity of Heraclitus Author(s): Sarah Kofman and Francoise Lionnet-McCumber Source: Diacritics, Vol.

17, No. 3 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 39-55 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/464834 Accessed: 21/08/2009 16:56
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TEXTS/CONTEXTS
NIETZSCHE AND OBSCURITY OF HERACLITUS
SARAH KOFMAN

THE

a topic to which of Heraclitus, If I have chosen to writeon the obscurity Nietzschedevotes only a few pages of a so-calledearlywork,Philosophyin the Tragic Age of the Greeks,in otherwords, a detail which hardlyinterests minds, it is firstof all because a "detail"can revealmore and contemporary centraltheme, as is well known than an apparently be more symptomatic Freud. Nietzsche and to both in thanks largepart to holdthe has been sufficiently intriguing Also, it is becausethis "detail" as if beforea problem,a realenigma:each attention of all greatphilosophers to liftor sublateit, thereby in his own way has triedto clarifythis obscurity, was who of this thinker the alreadynamed"TheObscure" erasing originality which oblitthese For in preclassical Nietzsche, reading, precursors' antiquity. eratesHeraclitus's it, is partof the conspiracyformed obscurityby shrouding the againstthe forces of affirmation, by the nihilisticforces of ressentiment betterto controlthem. Nietzsche identifieshimselfwith Heraclitus-one of his ancestors-and, accused like him of obscurity(he knew this, but farfrom complaining,he lays claim to it as a cause for glory [cf. The Gay Science ? 371: "We incomprehensible ones"]), and proposesa differentsolutionto while prethis enigma, a solutionwhich restoresthe true face of Heraclitus for representing potential along with thatpersonality's servinghis personality, and irreplaceable. and for being therebyirrefutable singularity, Now, Heideggerdenies the radicalnoveltyof Nietzsche'sreadingof the des Anaximander"]; in "TheAnaximander Presocratic ["Der Spruch Fragment" a vital "Evenif the young Nietzschesucceeds in his own way in establishing of their with the figuresof the Preplatonic era, his interpretations relationship texts are nonethelessconventional,if not superficial." is to allow both for To privilegethe questionof "Heraclitus's obscurity" of Nietzsche'sartof readingand to confrontit to Heidega betterillustration of metaphysicsthegreat demystifier ger's.Itiswell knownthat,forHeidegger, is unavoidable thisconfrontation Nietzsche-is indeedthe lastmetaphysician: of this or or truth it the in not at stake is What is falsity "philological" today. of Heraclitus, of such and such a fragment or interpretation that translation but a whole conception of philosophy,of its history,of thought,language, These are the questionswhich arise fromthe extextuality,and translation. andwhichcontinue "Heraclitus's of thisdistant"detail," amination obscurity," to drawour interest today. was named "The Obscure"by his own contempoBecause Heraclitus his obscuritymightbe due to the fact that we do that we cannot raries, argue of his texts,such as citations or possessonly fragments not speakhis language, diacritics / fall 1987 39

drawnfromother works,shredsof sentences remaining out of contextor re-inscribed in a totallydifferent the lossof textsprevents context.Certainly, us fromknowing"theinternal structural and book, from which might be derivedthe articulation unity of Heraclitus's dispositionof all its parts,and which mightallow us to see the originalcontext of each andtheway inwhicheach of themcan be understood as an assertion" fragment, [Heidegger, Butthesearguments can only be, forus, the belatedreasons of a supplementary "Aletheia"]. obscurity,which hides the reasonsof a more fundamental obscurity,one which no "historical"explanationin the usual sense of the term mightbe able to dispel (namely:that a textoriginally or at leastfor Heraclitus clearforthe contemporaries, himself,would have becomeobscureovertime,the lossorerasure of the corpusentailing the lossof itsmeaning). If Heraclitus's text was consideredobscurefromthe start,this mightbe because of a form of obscurityinherent to his text, to his language.Since he wrote in Greek,it would seem that Heraclitusmight have needed to be translated-into Greek-even for the Greeks, unless-and this would be anotherhypothesis-his contemporaries needed to learntheir own language,Greek,from Heraclitus. What then is the Greek language?What is the languagewhich properlybelongs to an author?Fromwhere does its uncanniness,its come for all others?Evenfor himself? Forall others,or only forthose who might obscurity be unfitto understand (hear)it?Is it possiblethatthe authorhad clear thoughtswhich he, or not, obscuredwhen transmitting them?Whatis the "clarity" of a text?And intentionally will will is there this to rather than to This moves all those who why clarity obscurity? have triedto answerthese questionsaccordingto such and such a line of interpretation. The most "simplistic" Cicero'sfor example, which is underscored interpretation, by the anecdotes told by Diogenes Laertius, is a psychologizingone: it is Heraclitus's idiohis proudand scornfulpersyncraticillness, his bilious and melancholictemperament, for the obscurityof his style, for his esotericism.He would sonalitywhich are responsible havechosento be obscureon purpose,in orderto remainmisunderstood by, and to protect himselffrom,the ignorant crowd. Hence the symbolicgestureof depositinghis work in Artemis's temple in orderto benefitfromher protection:"Thisbook he deposited in the temple of Artemisand, accordingto some, he deliberatelymade it the more obscure in orderthatnone butadeptsshouldapproachit,and lestfamiliarity shouldbreedcontempt."' as when Heraclitus wants he can be clear and distinctas anyone: to, Counter-proof: are clear and distinct,so that even the dullestcan "Sometimes,however,his utterances and follow the driftof his thought"[DiogenesLaertius 415]. easily understand If it is a case of "badwill" on the partof the author,obscuritydisappears by itselfif the readerallows herselfto be guided by an initiatewho explainsthe aporiasand lights up the difficultand darkpathsof this esoterictext.2With an initiate,it is possibleto get pastthe impassesof the text: indeed,the obscurityof a text is constitutedby the absence of a way or a method which would allow access and "penetration" withoutdifficulty. Heraclitus's text is alwayscomparedeitherto a highand isolatedsite withouta pre-traced pathorporos, or to the sea which is the verysite of riskand aporiaforthe Greeks-[Kofman,
Comment s'en sortir]. Thus, according to Diogenes Laertius [II, 22, IX], Socrates used to

a Delian swimmerto make his way throughthis book." say that "it requires This psychologizingexplanationwas consideredthe most two-dimensional by both to the epoch Hegel3and Nietzsche,neitherof whom would retainit. Hegelwould attribute the Heraclitean moment and the momentthe scornfuland proudsolitudeof Heraclitus: is the one when philosophersin generalstartedto withdrawfrom public affairsand the lives in isolationnot because of his nastypersonality, interests of the country.Heraclitus but because he wants to devote himselfentirelyto philosophy.A disdainfulrelationship
andcontradictory sentencesbecause wrotemanyincomplete thatHeraclitus reports "Theophrastus he was tormented 413]. by bile" [DiogenesLaertius the Ephesian's 2"Donot be in too greata hurryto get to the end of Heraclitus book; the path is hardto travel.Gloom is thereand darkness devoid of light.Butif an initiatebe yourguide, the path shinesbrighter thansunlight" [423]. Anysuch purposelywroteobscurely. wrongidea, as often happensto him: he thinksthatHeraclitus designwould,however,be a veryshallowone, and it is reallynothingbut the shallownessof Cicero himselfascribedby him to Heraclitus" 2811]. [Hegel, Lectures 40
3"Cicero (De Natura Deorum, /, 26; III, 14; De Finibus 11,5) [Diogenes Laertius 12, 6] takes up a

is "a relationship such as we have nowadays,when each man exists for himself, and Inthecase of thisnoblecharacter, the disdainandsenseof separation else. despiseseveryone of the ordinary ideas and fromthe crowd emanatesfromthe deep sense of the perversity life of his people" [Hegel, Lectures 279]. conUnlike Hegel, who shows reticenceabout the anecdotesof Diogenes Laertius, and from Laertius does not however them Nietzsche often borrows mere gossip, sidering and nastiness:for him too, this is a based on premeditation accept the interpretation the point of view of the frog,fromthe groundup, an attemptto flattenand "projection," to reduceto its own level the pointof view of the eagle; or, in Heraclitean terms,it is the to the of which straw or that of which barksat of view "the ass prefers gold," dog point which dissimulate theirown beastliness All are beastsof resentment anythingunfamiliar. If in fact Heraclitus had been obscureon purpose, and wickednessby indictingHeraclitus. it would be necessaryto give the reasonswhy he mighthave wantedto hide his thoughts. Forpolitical reasons?But his text is not a politicalone. To dissimulatethe emptinessor lackof his thoughts,the way woman hides her sex?Thishypothesisis unacceptablesince his thoughtbearson a mostdifficultand leastaccessibletruth(thatis, the presenceof law in the process of becoming and of play in the law of necessity),a truthof universal on such a importance.How can one will to expressoneself obscurelyand mysteriously subject?This will is in conflict with the philosophicalwill to say the truth.The solitude in the most traditional and prideof Heraclitus do not follow from his idiosyncrasies psybut from the fact that he represents nor from his moment and sense, epoch, chological and figuresa pure type of philosopher(that is, a possibilityof life and thought),a type the religiousreformer, and figuredby Pythagoras, which differsfromthe one represented and from that of Socrates,the untiringtheoreticalsearcher.Heraclitus's solitaryway is thatof the necessaryindependence typicalof the philosophical figurewhich he represents: is not the result of the thinker who refusesto be destroyedor broken.His inopportuneness of deliberate of the greatphilosophical which unites wickedness,butpartakes temperament Nietzsche substitutes truthto eternityand not to an "epoch."To a psychologizing reading, a typologicallydifferentialreading.A fortiori,Heideggerwill not explain Heraclitus's Such a positionwould still be the adoptionof a metaobscurityby his "unwillingness." physicalpointof view which stressesthe subjectof the thought,whereasthis thoughtwas obscure to Heraclitushimself.To put Heraclitus's obscurityin question is to turn away fromthe man and his psychologyin orderto lend an ear to the logos, to that which has been gatheredand depositedthere, modestlyheld in reserve,in check, unthought,and which he himself has not thoughtas such, that which we cannot yet think, and which alone can inviteand provokeus to think. A second line of interpretation to explain Heraclitus's obscurityby the form attempts of his discourse:a poetic, mythicor metaphoric and non-conceptual style. This has been the traditional and Hegel. metaphysical reading,thatof Plato,Aristotle, of concealing his thoughtin poetry[Theatetus A) Plato:while he accuses Heraclitus 155e], of having neglected to lower his sight onto the crowd so as to bother noticing whetheror not the people were following his development,and of having made fun of 243a], Platodoes not hold Heraclitus's men, muchas an oraclewould [Sophist psychology it to the very style of his mythical but ratherattributes responsiblefor this dissimulation, for the truthor non-truth of the content it carries: discourse, which is "irresponsible" because the fatherof a mythicaldiscourse is not presentto answerfor it, irresponsible, norto give an accountof the words he uses. In mythicaldiscourse,the fatheris not there to answeror to question, in other words, to help along his own discourse.Becausethis discourse is inspired,it teaches nothing, it cannot submitto questioning,to dialectical in otherwordsto confrontation withthe thought of another.Unlikedialectical examination, discourseis necessarily discourse,whicheven a cobbleror a slavecan understand, mythical in essence "obscure," a problemby its solitaryand aristocratic, enigmatic,and constitutes of myths]grow up on theirown, receivingtheirinspiration verynature."They[theauthors fromwhereverthe wind blows, each holdingin low esteem the other'sknowledge.Thus, they . . . will neverexplainanything,willinglyor unwillingly: they mustbe looked at and studied the way one would a problem [Sophist245e seqq.]. Fundamentally obscure, which mythicaldiscourseis destinedto a more or less violent and infiniteinterpretation
diacritics / fall 1987 41

triesto makeit say what it "meant" to say, butcould not exactlysay, since a mythattempts in vain to clarifythe obscurityof the other.Thus,for the benefitof his thesis on love, in the Symposium,Eryximachus erases the contradictionin a certain assertionmade by andharmony of opposites,of the one andthe many,by interpreting Heraclitus on the identity it accordingto Empedocles who "resolves" the contradiction and its obscurityby making rulesof love and hatred:". .. which the oppositessucceed each otheras in the alternating meantus to understand is, perhaps,what Heraclitus by thatrather crypticpronouncement as being in conflict,or as arising (.. .). Of course it is absurd(alogia)to speakof harmony it is becausethe universal move187a-b]. IfHeraclitus's "obscure," thoughtis particularly mentwhich it triesto affirm demands,so to speak,this kindof enigmaticand contradictory or fixed,has no decidableand determined discoursewhich says nothing"finished," meanthe veryconflictwhich is immanent to the processof becoming,to the ing, thus mirroring The dangerof such an enigmaticdiscourseis thatthere is always madnessof becoming.4 who triesto appropriate a sophist someone like Eryximachus it, a doctor like Protagoras, or a specialistwho triesto profitand gain power fromthatobscurityby pretending to be itthanks to his knowledgeandcompetence.Before the only one who can fully"illuminate" of Nietzsche, Plato denounced the will to power and to masteryof those interpreters becausethey play intothe handsof all dictatorships obscurediscourseswho aredangerous (intellectualas well as political ones): to have a will to truthand claritymore than to obscurity(and thus to rejectthe doctrineof universalmovementwhich is its necessary that is an attemptto resisttyrannyin all its forms. ForNietzsche, however, correlative), what Platodoes not say and does not know is thatneitherdialecticaldiscoursenorclarity are exemptfromthe will to power:they may in fact be a morecunningand subtlewayInthe Sophist,Platowill be close becausedemocraticin appearance-of exertingmastery. ones friendsof ideas and the "vulgar" to recognizingthis, puttingas he does the "subtle" of the sensible realmback to back, in orderto show thatthey both attemptto conceal in to them (but Nietzsche evaluates a fictitiousway that partof realitywhich is intolerable morethan Plato,and he neverappealsto those textswhich could genealogicallyPlatonism justifyhis own position). B) Aristotleis preciselyone of those doctorswho takes advantageof the gap which existsbetweenwhatthe Presocratics say and whatthey are supposedto be saying,in order their thoughtand mastertheir discoursebecause its mythicalor poetic to reappropriate If in the Rhetoric(111, form authorizesall such gesturesof appropriation. 5), as will be more paratactic obscurityis imputedto his grammar, emphasizedby Hegel, Heraclitus's which makes it unclearwhethera than syntactic,to the carelessnessof his punctuation on the otherhand, word belongsto what precedesor what succeeds, in the Metaphysics, the obscuritywill be explainedby way of a more generaland metaphoric conceptionof myth and of its relationto the philosophicallogos. Unlike Plato, Aristotleadmitsthat mythical language is the childhood of philosophy:that it is potentiallyphilosophical. and obscure,"becauseall that is said metaphorically inarticulate, Althoughit is indistinct, the concept and the clear meaningwhich it is obscure,"the metaphor alreadyrepresents matterand ambiguouspowerof opposites,the mimicsthroughanalogy.As indeterminate its univocityand clarityfromthe conceptuallanguage receivesitsdetermination, metaphor which informsit, and which elevates to actualitythe potentialtruthstherein.Hence it is which can explainthe deficiencies of the author,his unwillingness, not the "psychology" to any dawn, and which of the Heraclitean text, but the state of incompletenessnatural makes it touch upon truthwithoutreallyseeing it in a clear and distinctmanner.It thus
to theirown treatisesthey are literallyin perpetualmotion;their 4Cf.Theatetus,179e: "Faithful of question or a questionor fora quiet interchange capacityforstayingstill to attendto an argument and answeramountsto less thannothing(.. .). Whenyou put a question,theypluckfromtheirquiver to let fly at you, and if you tryto obtainsome accountof theirmeaning,you littleoracular aphorisms Youwill neverget will be instantly transfixed by another,barbedwithsome newly forgedmetaphor. but theytake they cannotget anywherewithone another, anywherewithany of them;forthatmatter verygood care to leave nothingsettledeitherin discourseor in theirown minds.I supposethey think that would be somethingstationary-a thing they will fightagainstto the last."[See Hamiltonand Cairns 884]. 42 out of elements which are still conflicting. But perhaps he meant that . . ." [Symposium

to become clearon what it meantto say withoutreallyknowing a laterphilosophy requires so. Hence, for example,Heraclitus's on the unityof opposites,an famouspronouncement assertionabsurdlymade againstthe fundamental of If Heraprinciple non-contradiction. clitusassertedthis, it is eitherbecause he did not reallybelieve what he was saying"since one does not necessarilyhave to believe everything one says,"and since it is in any case impossible"to ever imaginethat the same thing is and is not, as some people believe to be saying"[Metaphysics Heraclitus IV.3.1005b23-25],or else it is because "he himself did not quite understand what he meant that Heraclitus embracedthat opinion. If one could questionHeraclitus, one mighthave forcedhimto admitthat it is neverpossiblefor to be true of the same thingsat the same time" [Metaphysics contradictory propositions XI.5.1062b31ff.]. Historyof philosophyallows for the sublationof the philosophers of dawn-whose eyes are not yet focused, since they see and do not see truth(they only touch upon it, and that by accident)-by the laterphilosophers who can help them grow fromchildhoodto adulthood,frommetaphorical obscurityto conceptualclarity.The necessity for doing the historyof philosophyis groundedin this gap between the potential and the actual. Becausehumanthoughtis finite-unlike divine thoughtwhich is eternallyactive-it to help it acquire requireshistoryof philosophyas a field of meaningand investigation over time.5The transition from thoughtto action coincides, surreptitiously, self-mastery with a whole operationof masteryperformed on the childrenby the fathers,who keep thementirelyundertheirthumbson the pretenseof enlightening and raising them:in other are interesting insofar as announce and confirm words, these early precursors only they Aristotelian truths.Aristotleviolentlyassimilatestheir originalityinto the identityof (his) philosophy.He "takes"whatever can be taken from them, abandons the rest, which constitutestheiroriginality, and which he considersnegligibleand infantile. YetAristotleknows that he is not divine, and that philosophicalsublationdoes not end with him:as an imperfectly drilledsoldier,he too mustbe somewhatof a liar,a poet, a child, in otherwords, he mustuse metaphoric language-and do so at the very moment when he attemptsto "clarify" the firstphilosophers by way of his own concepts, and to reinscribe them in the trial(s) of his truth:obscurity/clarity, childhood/adulthood, experienced or inexperienced to articulate the necessity soldiers,thesearejustso manymetaphors of accedingto the conceptuallevel, to theory,which is itselfsimplya metaphor (theorein). Aristotle's successorsare less modestthan he is, they rely undulyon the authority of the greatmaster in theirgesture who becomestheiryardstick, and they will go even further of appropriation.6 Greek philosophyis to C) Hegel. Thus Hegel writes: "The best way to understand 166 Like he tries to dispel Heraclitean [Lectures ff.]. Aristotle, studyAristotle's Metaphysics" obscurityby sublatingit into the clarityof the concept, not like Aristotleby means of a which remainstributary of a simple logic of non-contradiction, concept of understanding valid in mathematics or the sciences, but rather onto the level of the speculativeconcept of philosophicaland dialecticalreason.Heraclitus's obscurityis a pseudo one, and is so which firmlymaintainsa dichotomybetween being and only just for the understanding and for which each of those non-being,subjectiveand objective, realityand non-reality, in isolation considered true. taken is opposites Speculativereason, on the other hand, recognizesthatthe one is withinthe other, is contained in its other. Eachis the otherof its other.And Heraclitus did not say anythingelse. His greatprinciplenow appearsto be thatof the unityof opposites."Hemayseem obscurebuthe is speculative." WithHeraclitus, "landis in sight." Far frombeingobscure,his languageis familiar becausehe hasunderstood dialecticalprinciples.He has reachedthe pointof formulating being as becoming.Thatis the absolutein that it containsthe unityof oppositeterms."WithHeraclitus, we have, for
5For "oneswallowdoes not makea summer" [Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a 18 seq.]and Aristotle, "menbecome buildersby building" [NicomacheanEthics 1. 1.1103a35].At the dawn of philosophy, are still like "untrained men ... in fights;for they ... often strikefine blows, but they philosophers do not fighton scientificprinciples"[Metaphysics, 985a 14 ff. See McKeon943, 952, and 696 ff., respectively]. 6For moredetailson Aristotle see SarahKofman, and the Presocratics, Quatreromansanalytiques. diacritics / fall 1987 43

the firsttime, the philosophicalidea in its speculativeform"and that is what makes it of Heraclitus profound.So much so that Hegel considersthat there are no propositions the firstmomentof the that he was unableto take up in his Logic.Heraclitus represents and that makes him Hegel'strue ancestor.As for Nietzsche, spirit'sself-reappropriation, because he views the world as a divine game situated(occurring) beyond good and evil, and ancestor.How can Heraclitus be viewed he too makes Heraclitusinto his precursor the ancestor of dialectic and as the of a as conception of the precursor simultaneously world as polemicalgame, as a processof becomingamongantagonist forces,eternallyin text conflictand neverto be reconciledby any dialectic?Is thereanythingin Heraclitus's Aresuch opposite interpretations authorizedby his which allows for this double reading? Is it because each of those two authorsonly reads his "irresponsibility"? "obscurity," them to his out of contextthateach in his own way feels free to reappropriate fragments own ends?Doesn'tHegel,at any rate,betraythe pseudo-benevolenceof the fathertoward into his systemwhen he declaresthat the child whom he refusesto let go and reintegrates that he cannot "takeup,"much as Aristotle of Heraclitus there is not a single proposition Doesn't he betraya father's will to overpowerand did by his use of the verb lambanein? masterthe son, thus puttinghim completelyat the serviceof the one who enlightenshim his own truth? ForHegel,to readHeraclitus forthe sole purposeof affirming is to translate of speculative intothe language his pronouncements reason,thatis, intoHegelianformulae. To translateis to reduce the son's languageto that of the father,a reductionwhich is identicalto what Hegel calls the Aufhebung.Thus, Heraclitus's expression,"Beingand to Aristotle-this the are same," profound supposedlymeaninglessaccording nothingness assertionstatedby a daringmind, the firstto defy the principleof non-contradiction-is and reducedby Hegel to: "The absolute is the unity of being and replaced,translated, to the level of truth: elevatesthis assertion non-being." Hegeltherefore being is becoming. He elevatesand sublatesit, and with it, itsobscurity, the latter. Nevertherebysuppressing assertionsare not so easily translated or theless, Hegel recognizesthat all of Heraclitus's sublatedinto the languageof speculativeclarity,because outsideof this generalprinciple the discourse is "still"natural: expressed in a conceptualway, the form of Heraclitus's authorstill expresses his ideas in a "real"and more concrete manner.in other words, Heraclitusbelongs to the firstmomentof the because he is a Greek and a Presocratic, developmentof the spirit,the momentof beauty,when the spiritis still lost in naturemoment.He is thusforcedto use images,metaphors, oriental the poorestand mostabstract and infantile expressions,which are obscureif taken in theirvulgarsensorymeaning.But intospeculativelanguage: thesetoo must,andcan, be translated since the metaphor already the other:the speculativeis figuratively the spiritin figural One mirrors language. prefigures presentin the figure.Thatis why the fierinessof the world mightbe a way of representing the universallife of the Spirit. throughimagination Itwouldthusbe possibleto sublateHeraclitus's withoutleavinganyresidueobscurity if we discountthe obscuritywhich is inessentialand superficial, because unsublatableobscurity,which is the resultof syntacticalnegligence, poor namely, the grammatical Forgrammar the literal represents developmentof the languageand lack of punctuation. aspect of the Spirit,it belongs to the empiricaland mechanicalrealms,to a positionof Because it is foreignto the Spirit,its defects can in no way detract excessive exteriority.7 of Heraclitus's thatis, fromthefullsublation of its"obscurity" fromthe "profundity" thought, intothe clear languageof the speculativeconcept. Itthusbecomesveryhardto understand why traditionhas named so profoundand daringa philosopher"the Obscure":indeed such an epithetwould have been moresuitablefor Empedocles who, accordingto Hegel, of Heraclitus's was "morepoetthanphilosopher." booksthatdestinyhasallowed Everything is worthyof havingbeen preserved. One can therefore to surviveis in any case "excellent," either inferthatthe restwas also excellent, or conclude that destinyis fairto books, and that the best has been preserved:in other words, only the speculative,which can be Whetherlost or not (andthat is why lost textsare not to be missed), sublatedby posterity. else is literature. Providedof course we agree with Hegel's metaphysical opeverything
mechanism also, like material, consists in this, that the things related in the spirit remain 7"Spiritual external to one another and to spirit itself" [Hegel's Science of Logic 711].

44

of a discourse,and havethusalreadytranslated and "content" positionbetweenthe "form" or ratio.ForHeidegger,Hegel'stranslation Greeklogos into the (Roman) the Heraclitean like that of his him in from Heraclitus: fact endeavor, explaining prevents interpretation the Aufklarung, is rather obscuring,becauseto understand logos as ratiois to close all the 164 WhatIs Called Thinking? roadswhich lead to the thoughtof the Greeks[Heidegger, as the ancestorof his great logic and his dialectic, then ff.]. If Hegel chooses Heraclitus those are preciselythe worst possible approaches(of the methods)to try and understand wordof Heraclitus's silenton thisfundamental (hear)Heraclitean logos. Yet,Hegelremains meansthe gathering which allows all thatis to lie(a termwhich, accordingto Heidegger, beforeand appearas a whole, as beings, if it is understood(heard)in Greekand not in Latin[Heidegger, "Hegelund die Griechen"255-72]). D) Nietzsche.Alongwith Heidegger,but not for exactlythe same reasons,Nietzsche of clarification, as well as that of the metaphysicians would agree that Hegel's enterprise that who precede him, is in fact rather is, obscuring: occulting, because it is an attempt to books,ithaspreserved Far frombeing"just," to master andre-appropriate. destinyis unfair the most infamous aspectof Greekthoughtand partsand purloined"themostmagnificent of the first even if a single fragment of its verbalexpression." This is an enormousdisaster, the of life and their and to to suffices style thought qualities legitimate philosophers prove The loss of texts is all the more deplorablebecause which they indisputably represented. it has encouragedthe violent seizure by the forces of nihilismof what did survive,those and engulfing remainson which they have exertedtheirreductive, flattening, fragmentary the eagle's point of view loweredto that of approaches,on the pretenseof clarification: To unearth the firstphilosophers to the pointof being unrecognizable. the frog,disfigured is not, for Nietzsche,to sublatetheir infantileobscurityto the level of conceptualclarity, to restoretheirtruefaces by paintingthem on the whetherspeculativeor not; it is rather walls a thousandtimes; to restorenot theirtruthbut their beauty,understoodnot as the as the splendorand plenitudeof firstmomentof the developmentof the spirit,but rather and the dawn of a surginglife. Indeed,with the loss of theirtexts, it is not a stammering of life and thoughtpreviously which is lost, it is a possibility moreor less obscure"truth" To remove their "obscurity" is to and irreplaceable. unknown,and as such, irrefutable of the coats of greyconceptswith which the metaphysicians deprivethe firstphilosophers have clothed and obfuscatedthem, and thus to restoretheirfull mastery,denied though them to the figureof Socrates,the it may have been by those who, wishingto subordinate only acceptable master,the standardof measure,have named them the "Presocratics." And yet, those early philosophersare true masters,not because they possess truth,but because they are models for livingand thus worthyof recurring eternally. of the metaphysical Does Nietzsche'sreadingperform a simplereversal pointof view, as Heideggersuggests?Indeed,doesn't he oppose to the initialpovertyof a stammering of dawn, those firstmasters, childhoodthe opulence and plenitudeof those philosophers with respectto whom, the laterones, farfrom"developing" thatfirst"moment" (which is and decadence?Certainly, no longera moment),constituteinsteadonly impoverishment but of for Nietzsche,dawn is no longerunderthe sign of deficiencyand incompleteness, pregnancy:dawn gives birthto the most refinedtypes of philosophywhich historywill big with all futuretypes, the first only succeed in repeating, mixing,debasing,corrupting: mastersare full, pregnant,that is, complete: in them, instinctswhich will laterbecome enemies harmoniously assertthemselves;the instinctfor knowledgeand the instinctfor life are harnessed to a single yoke. Theirnaivety,theirsimplicityor innocenceare not the sign of an infantilepoverty,but of the absence of division (between being and thought, theoryand practice,etc.). Thisdivisionis establishedby a laterphilosophywhose instinct its excesses, for knowledge,cut off fromthe instinctfor life or artwhich used to restrain with Plato(hencethe term"Preplatonic" becomesdominant: thatis decadence,and it starts The fact to "Presocratic"), who is the firstof the greathybrids. which Nietzsche preferred is, we are not dealing with a pure and simple reversalwhich would situate Nietzsche it in his own way while thuspresumably insidethe same system,in metaphysics, repeating to the "PreHis return to denounce its questionableand foggy interpretations. pretending of the origin,of the archaicas such: "the not the markof a simplevalorization socratics"is The firstthinkers are masters to the originsalways leadsto barbarism." pathwhich returns
diacritics/ fall 1987 45

not because they inhabitthe origins,but because they knew how to mastera previous those into a culture,to assimilatethe scatteredelementsof different peoples,to transform new livingunit.They knew that in orderto masterthe excessive bulimiaof theirmultiple is not linkedto a question instincts they needed to harnessthem to a single yoke. Mastery of origin, it is a questionof style, of greatstyle, of art and/orlife. The firstGreeksjustify (vindicate) philosophybecausethey knew when to start:not duringchildhood,but at the valiantand of at the height of this burningjoy which characterizes virile age maturity, victoriousadulthood,the time of conquest,of going beyondthe formlessand coarse state of childhood-a statewhich is no morevalorizedby Nietzschethanby the metaphysicians, althoughfor him, the substituteis not old age or the end which determinesthe "development." Neitherdoes Nietzschesimplyreversethis pointof view to makethe "end"the sole momentof decadence. Indeed,decadence startsat the very dawn of philosophy.If the Greeksknew when to start(during maturity), they did not knowwhen to stop, and that is Thus Partheir beautifulphilosophyinto "pious subtleties." why they have transmuted menides,who was a Greek,produceda most anemic concept of being because he philosophizedwronglyat an advancedage and livedout the leastGreekmomentof all during the two centuriesof the tragicage. The momentwhich separatesthe two periodsof his life is also the one which divides the "Presocratic" period into two, therebyintroducing avantla lettre. into it decadence and Christianity If Nietzsche'sreadingis not thatof a simple reversal,it is afterall because he has a of the history of philosophytotallydifferent conceptionof timeand history-and therefore fromhis predecessors. Toa linear, teleological,indeeddialecticalconception,he substitutes a typologicalone: historyis not the historyof truth,but thatof types of forceseternallyin conflict.And neitherof those has, thanksto a "dialecticalinstinct," any kindof certainty beforehand as to the outcome of the struggle,neitherthe strongest,nor the best, nor the most truthful, northe obverse.Chance ruleseverywhere,and both the confusionof types is eternallypossible.This and the return of old types, which seemed to have disappeared, in that of the whom some had its own ancestor, Heraclitus, way conception "repeats" thatthey sharedneitherhis conceptionof time wantedto reappropriate-without realizing nor of the logos, and thatthey could in no way sharea common measurewith him. Fromwhere does Heraclitus's obscuritycome for Nietzsche?And can this question the metaphysicians forwhomclarity, meanthe samethingforhimand forhis predecessors, and light-and thusthe eye as modelof understanding-were truth, indisputably privileged? in the sameHow can Nietzsche formulatethe question of Heraclitus's"obscurity" metaphysical-termsas his predecessorsexcept by giving a totallydifferentmeaningto old words, except by displacingthem in a singularmanner? At firstsight, Nietzsche'sanswer is hardlydifferentfrom Hegel's: Heraclitusis not obscure,but only for those who read him by subjectinghis textsto the logic intrinsically of Aristotle's concepts, and accuse him of the highestcrimeagainstreason.To Aristotle's obscuringconcepts, however, Nietzsche does not oppose the clarifyingpower of the dialecticaland speculativeconcept, but thatto which, in this "early" work, he still refers term relatedto sight and clarity,the term intuition.In his text on undera metaphorical Thales, he defines it as "a forebodingwhich puts wings on one's feet" by means of the force which allows one to see analogiesin a flash this foreignand "illogical" imagination, and to elucidate them. Unlike science and calculatingreasonwhich progressclumsily, in their to graspeverything wishingin an indecentand vulgarmannerto knoweverything, or imagination concepts,intuition only seizes uponwhatdeservesto be known,the knowlis the regalgiftof the wise, Sapiens, edge which is greatand essential.Thatis why intuition fromSisyphus,the man with the noble taste, extremelysubtleand capable of perceiving differences:clear sight is thus tributary-andthis is one of the displacementsperformed by Nietzsche-of a sense debased by the whole traditionbecause it is not sufficiently and too intimatelymixed with matterand the body, the sense of taste. "representative" withthisterm:knowledge intuition a typologicalreading is introduced Furthermore, through with one and knowledgethroughconcepts do not reflecttwo modes of understanding, Book being betterthan the other with respectto truth.A concept, as The Philosopher's the resultof the same "illogical" teaches it, is itselfa condensationof forgotten metaphors,
46

artistic force as an intuition [cf. Kofman, Nietzsche et la metaphore]. (Since both concept and metaphor are illogical, this word loses all meaning because of its very generality.) The conceptual mode of understanding and the intuitive one reflect two different perspectives, two different evaluations of the world. The first, to a regal and aristocratic taste, the other to a democratic and vulgar taste, both of them mutually incommensurable. Lynx-eyed and short-sighted, neither Aristotle nor Hegel could see that their logic and their concepts, far from illuminating the Heraclitean logos, are in fact fictions aimed at falsifying the world of becoming (such as Heraclitus's genius envisioned it) by restraining it within human, too human dimensions, in order to make the intolerable, tolerable: change, contradictions, death, the endless conflict of opposing forces. Their logic and their concepts allow them to perceive "some solid ground in the sea of becoming." The "intuition" of Heraclitus is that of a living being who is not afraid to affirm becoming as the essence of all things, to contemplate it in a state of happy amazement and sublime emotion, because for him it is not in any way terrifying or frightening. And this is because unlike Anaximander (one of those Christian "Presocratics"avant la lettre), he does not see becoming as an unruly and disorderly chaos, the realm of atonement and the site of torment for humans,8 but sees it as subjected to the laws of dike and logos, laws which, without introducing the idea of permanence and stability, only that of a necessarily endless ebb and flow, cleanse the world of any notion of sin or guilt. The world of becoming is the only one, it presents the spectacle of natural forces perpetually in conflict, but brought under the law of sovereign justice and of the logos returnedto its state of innocence; it thus no longer requires, as for Anaximander, the fiction of a hereafter. Now, the Heraclitean logos which introduces law and necessity into becoming cannot be interpretedas a form of speculative reason capable, in the final analysis, of sublating all contradictions. The Heraclitean model of the world is not dialectical but juridical and agonal, truly Greek: (the process of) becoming implies the splitting of a single force, such as fire, into two qualitatively different activities which, while they tend to merge, also fight each other without either one being capable of ultimately triumphing.9The two rival forces are not two contradictory concepts which can be sublated and reconciled into a third term, but rather two fighters, each of whom in turn has the upper hand, and who remain eternally in conflict. Becoming arises from this eternal conflict of opposites. The apparent stability of certain qualities simply reveals a momentary advantage gained by one of the fighters, and not the end of the war. One must however see this war as the continual action of a coherent and stern justice. To Anaximander's interpretation which is nihilistic (as Schopenhauer's will be), Heraclitus opposes a Dionysian and esthetic view of becoming: the world is a spectacle under the gaze of an enchanted spectator who is himself a part of the spectacle, and participates in the fight much like the fighters in the spectacle-the spectacle of the identity of the one and the many, an identity which cannot be computed with the help of any "dialectical instinct." How can it be possible, then, to formulate this identity, to translate this flash of intuition about becoming, into anything other than vulgar or speculative, petrifying language, that most obfuscating, miserable, and inadequate means of communication, a conceptual language which is but a stammering in a foreign language, a (metaphorical) transposition into an entirely different sphere?10Ifno language is capable of adequately "translating"an intuition, a (metaphorical) 81n"DerSpruchdes Anaximander," Heideggerwill oppose this readingof Anaximander, proposing insteadawhollydifferent ofAdikiaandTisis,on whichthewhole weightof his interpretation translation has bearing.According to him, these termswould not referto a moralandjuridicalinterpretation of is not pessimistic nature,and "theexperienceof the beings in its Being, which is here articulated, and not optimistic.It remainstragic(. . .). Wepossiblyget onto the traceof the tragicwhen we do not explainit in psychologicaland aestheticterms,but ratherfirstthinkthroughits essentialnature, the Beingof the beings. . " ["Spruch" 330]. 9Inthis versionof the world,Heraclitus of mighthave erectedthe endlessspectacleof the struggle which he saw beforehim. politicalpartiesand gymnasiums in a foreignlanguage,in order wordand verseare so much stuttering '"Just as for the dramatist to say in it whathe livedand saw and whathe can proclaimdirectlyonly through gestureand music, so is the expressionof everyprofoundphilosophicalintuitionthroughdialectic (. ..) doubtlessthe means, one which is at only means to communicatewhat has been seen; but it is a troublesome bottommetaphorical, a whollyand utterly untruetransposition into a different sphereand language"
[Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen ? 3, Werk1, 277 (A propos of Thales)]; also see Nietzsche et la metaphore on this whole question.

diacritics / fall 1987

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than transposition into metaphoricallanguage is "better" into conceptual transposition Thatis why Heraclitus triedto expresshis intuition language. by meansof an "extraordinary and unheardof" metaphor:that of the world as a game of Zeus's, of fire with itself, and deconstructs, his analogousto the game of a child who, in all innocence, constructs instinctfor play beingconstantlyreawakened and callingfor new games. One should not then "see"a culpableand inordinate pride-hybris- in thisneedto create,in thistransition fromthe pureone to the impuremany,for this would be to reestablish guilt (flaw)at the transform heartof things,as Anaximander the Greek did, and to improperly Heraclitus, artistfull of serene happiness,into "a melancholic and lachrymoseChristian, somber, bilious, pessimisticand loathsome." Alreadyin Antiquity,those who considered Heraclitus"obscure"did not miss an to performsuch a transformation, opportunity applyingto his text the melancholicand standards of dampmen who are incapableof understanding "fire." Theirlack lachrymose of understanding is, however,necessaryand still resultsfrom compliancewith law and justice. Forno one is supposedto know the logos just because he is human.Thatwould be to introduce finalityin nature,with the privilegeof the human,in otherwordsto adopt a narrow,moral,and theologicalpointof view which sees the separateness of thingsand not the harmonyof the whole. And yet, the world of becoming is not the best possible one: in it, man does not occupy a privilegedposition;the idiot is as important as the there is no roomfor superior type. Forthe contuitivegod, for the fierylook of Heraclitus, even a drop of injustice,for any kindof flaw. neitherto Heraclitus, Heraclitus's nor to obscuritymust be attributed Consequently, his readers,but rather to the distortionbetween two types of forces, two pointsof view, two senses of taste or smell which cannot "stand(smell)"each other,11 or between two earswhich cannotget along (heareach other)withoutmisunderstanding, withoutentering ina dialogueof deafears.Thecorrect(harmonious) of a textis notdetermined understanding by the size of the ear: that is certainlythe privilegeof asses "who preferstrawto gold," butrather Itis to Ariadne's smallearsthatDionysusspeaks.Tothe intuitive by itssharpness. earsof womenwho knowhow to "understand" withoutdemanding logicor demonstration, withoutattempting to "unveil" truthin an indecentfashion,since "womendon'tcareabout truth!" in orderto find, hidden,some profound Withoutsearchingbehind"appearances" reason:woman is sufficiently of life and itsenigmas, fondof masks,appearances, surfaces, not to attemptvainly and dangerously to clarifyand dispel them. Women'ssmall ear is this thirdear mentionedby Nietzsche, the artisticear which, positioningitself beyond oppositionssuch as truthand falsehood,good and evil, depth and surface, metaphysical andobscurity, an incredible is capableof hearing (unheard) clarity (understanding) language an incommensurable with vulgarlanguageand its logic or metaphysical presuppositions, ear which is sufficientlynoble to discern the pathos of distance, the differencewhich who later appropriated ear from that of the metaphysicians that separatesHeraclitus's a in it to in virile manner to obscure and it order reduce reason vulgar by way language of illuminating it. Had it fallenon deaf ears, his text would have runa lesserriskof being misunderstood for deaf personsknowthatthey can only heartheirpeers, and vulgarized: those relatedto them by the same disability,much as Nietzschewho, preferring not to be heard at all ratherthan misunderstood, dedicates his moralityto deaf-mutes,'2 protects himselffromvulgarization and foul-smellingbogs by using a high aphoristicstyle which attractsreaderssuitablydaringand noble to venture"onto new and secret paths, new Thatis why Heraclitus neither"showsnor hides"anythingin his prodancinggrounds." nouncements:he signals and only to those who, like deaf-mutes,unable to understand
1 are books thathave oppositevaluesforsoul and health,dependingon whetherthe lower "There or the higherand more vigorousones turnto them:in the former soul, the lower vitality, case, these in the latter,heralds'cries that call and disintegration; books are dangerousand lead to crumbling books:the smell of small the bravest to theircourage.Booksforall the worldare alwaysfoul-smelling people clings to them. Wherethe people eat and drink,even where they venerate,it usuallystinks. One shouldnot go to churchif one wantsto breathepureair"[BeyondGood and Evil42-43]. and fordeaf-mutes '2"With himself.Outof a morality language,the speakerimmediately vulgarizes Nietzsche531]. otherphilosophers" of an UntimelyMan,"The Portable ["Skirmishes 48

vulgarlanguage,agree at leastto understand sign language,a languagefor which there is no poros, no easy access, which is reservedfor deaf-mutes,and accessible only to them. It is probablethatfor such ears no man has ever writtenin a clearerand more luminous of Heraclitus's assertions ceases to be obscureand insane, style. Forthose ears,the brevity as it is for the mediocreone. It signifiesthe nobilityof the wise who did not tryto make his thoughtpublic, did not need to have it ratifiedby the chorusof his contemporaries: for he was convincedof beingthe sole favoredloverof truth,the only one who knew how to approachthis woman who "has reasonsfor not lettingus see her reasons,"and who is thus not "clarity" perhapsdid revealher secretsto him and for him alone. Heraclitus's Heraclitus sun (suchas Empedocles's or Pythagoras's). thatof a healingand compassionate he is the wise proudlylives insideof his own solarsystem,like a starwith no atmosphere: type who turnsaway fromthe crowd he scorns and whose bad taste disgustshim: "his That burning sightis turnedinward,and revealsonly a dull and cold glareon the outside." the wild deitywho also protects women is why he carrieshis workto the templeof Artemis, in childbirth, to a remotesanctuary amidstdivine statues,surrounded by cold, calm, and Becausehe does not wait for information fromothersto increasehis sublimearchitecture. own knowledge,he is scornfulof men who interrogate-allfutureSocrateses-collectors and historians,in a word: he only questions and interprets himself, acting as his own fromthatoracle, he holdsto be an immortal oracle. Butwhat he succeeds in deciphering wisdom, eternallyworthy of being commented, and assured of an infinite process of deciphering,just like any Sibyllineor oraculardiscourse.Althoughthis prophetof fire announces his wisdom "withoutsmile, ornamentor balm,"but ratherspits it out of his "foamingmouth" like a volcano, this wisdom will necessarilysurvivefor millenniato and come. Foreven if Heraclitusdid not need the world, the world needs his "truth," needs to contemplatethe sublime spectacle which he presents:that is, the presenceof child in need of law in becomingand of play in necessity.Farfrom being a stammering futureelucidations,he deliversa sublimetruthof which the plenitude-a symptomof the of his innerfire-is assuredof an infinitenumberof interpretations. Or misinterintensity of his style-his noble style-with its laconic as the case mightbe. Thegrandeur pretations, and sententiouscharacteristics-could not preventthe more mediocre-quite the conit into and beautiful trary-from seizing his rich,profound, eloquence in orderto translate this book theirown shallownessand triteness(norcould the Halcyontone of Zarathustra, for all and none, and Nietzsche's aphoristicstyle, protecthim from reappropriation by of precautions-whetherintentional or not-a Nazi ideology, among others).Regardless can alwaysfall intothe handsof anyone:thatis how the Stoicswhich is orphaned writing only what they always alreadyknew-have debased his funhaving read in Heraclitus damentallyesthetic and tragicconceptionof the universeas play to the level of a vulgar moral concept. Having privilegedthe point of view of man and of his interests,they a coarse formof finalismand optimism.As is usual when the introducedinto Heraclitus weak take hold of the text of the strongwhose weight they cannot evaluate,because the distanceof a wide abyss separatesthem from it, they end up turningit into a downright caricature. If the question, then, is not to find fault with Heraclitus's obscurity,a differential are notequally would at leastpermit to concludethatall interpretations typologicalreading valid, that some of them are more in tune than otherswith the author'stext: a modern in preclassicalantiquity-who has not reader-and one can already find "modernity" learnedto elevate readingto the statusof an art, "a goldsmith'sart and connoisseurship of the word which has nothingbut delicate, cautiousworkto do and achieves nothingif it does not achieve it lento" [Daybreak 3], the art of an honest and rigorousphilologist who knowshow to readcautiously, and IikeJanus beforeandaft,with reservations, "looking with doors leftopen, with delicateeyes and fingers"[Daybreak 5], such a modernreader, too hurried,will necessarilyfind Heraclitus obscure: his flaw-if it is a flaw-is that he does not know how to take time, the time to "ruminate" like a cow [Genealogy23], in other words, to "assimilate" the text, to transform it in orderto allow its meaningand himself:after having been secretly wounded, to let clarityto occur, and to transfigure himself be enraptured, not that of the modernscholar delighted.That'sreal "culture," diacritics /fall 1987
49

and and external,13 whose culture,likethe bindingof an encyclopedia,remains superficial to shed is not transforming. To understand a text well and to find it clear is not therefore an initial,obscuring,and dumb animality:on the contrary,to become intelligentis to become like a dumb animal,to learnto read with the caution, the slowness, the transto swallow too formativeand assimilatory capabilitiesof an animal, withoutattempting of modern,too modernhumans. fast, to digest nothing;it is to forgetall our scholarship When Nietzsche stresses"rumination" as the imperative for any seriousreading,he the meaningof a text and reintroduces intelligenceinto animality,just as he reinscribes its clarityintothe senses: hearing,smell, sight,taste,withoutprivileging any single one as of metaphors a model of knowledge.The couplingand the multiplication displace each one in turnand sift out of the notionsof clarityand obscuritywhateverresidueof far-too meaningthey mightstill hold. speculativeand metaphysical E)Heidegger.How then can Heideggersay that Nietzsche'sreadingof the "Presoin a word, metaphysical? cratics"remainsconventional,superficial, some of his Withoutgoing into the detail of Heidegger's analyses,I shall summarize and, on occasion, criticizethem. arguments of the texts differsfromthat of Diels by motivation 1. While Nietzsche'stranslation between the two. It is a traditional and by design, it is nonethelesshardto discriminate adikiaby injustice.Thisallows him, translation-forexample, he rendersAnaximander's to makehim intoa Christian wrongly,to count thatauthoramongthe pessimisticnihilists, the sereneand truly avantla lettreand to distinguish him-typologically-from Heraclitus, is not yet essentiallyaccurate.It is accurate"when Greekartist.Now, a literaltranslation its words are sayingsutteredfromthe languageof the thing in question,"in otherwords, attentionthe fact that fromthe thought["Spruch" 297]. One mightbringto Heidegger's translation Nietzschegives of Heraclitus's the traditional, dike, "byjustice,"did "juridical" not preventhim fromfreeingthis authorfroma moraland theologicalconceptionof the world. For certainlywords, and thereforeGreek words, are not for Nietzsche, unlike the repositories of "meaning": they have as manymeaningsas thereare types Heidegger, and Heraclitus used a word of forcescapableof seizingthem. BecausebothAnaximander thinks-that in factthey might belongingto the same spheredoes not mean-as Heidegger have said the same thing. 2. It would appearthat Nietzscheonly reversesthe metaphysical reading.Insteadof he would seem to be "end" of the only the beginningby history, privileging valorizing and decadence:this conceptionis as childishan denouncingthe restas misunderstanding or "Preplatonists," as as the one which labels the firstthinkers"Presocratics" aberration Is Called as thatof Socrates or Plato[What thoughtheirthoughtwas not at leastas mature than even if dawnlikethoughtis more pregnant 183 ff.]. ForHeidegger, (fuller) Thinking? that which follows it, it cannot be radicallycut off fromthe latter,as ontology mightbe from metaphysics,in a sterileopposition.Metaphysicsis alreadythere at the origin,for since the origin, being only revealsitself in concealing itself.Since the origin,there has does not owe his obscurityto subsequentobbeen an unthoughtin thought.Heraclitus fuscation,to appropriation by late and decadent readersof his dawnlikethoughtwhich and for himselfbecause his speech is aimed at questioningclarity:but what is clearestis also the most obscure, what is closest, furthest,what is unconcealed, concealed, and and sayswhatenlightens, is obscurebecausehe is illumination unveiled,veiled. Heraclitus
clarity, while trying to invite light to enter into the language of thought. It is in the nature of light to illuminate, to bring out the shine, to liberate brilliance, to allow it to appear, to disclose it. Unconcealment is the fundamental trait of what has already appeared and has left concealment behind. The fact of remaining unconcealed has the upper hand in that it directs the concealment and unconcealment which hold for all the other manners in which present things are present. The presence of things which are present speaks only in so far as it shines, allows itself to be known, is laid out, emerges, occurs, and offers itself. But just as Homer's paradigmatic verse reveals it, stating that "Odysseus, with respect to his tears, remains hidden from the others"-the concealed and the unconcealed are cor'3This comparison can be found in the first Untimely Meditation.

belongs to a totally different realm. Heraclitus is already obscure for his contemporaries

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related.Thereis an occultationwhich conceals him, presentthoughhe may be, fromthe eyes of others.To be presentis to be concealed and yet at the same time to be brought of being, its withholding or its reservewhich preserves the essential out. It is the sheltering its being to disclosure: of its emergence.It is its concealmentwhich guarantees possibility are not two separate concealmentand unconcealment events,butone and the same thing. of Ever since Homer,such is the still unthought meaning the wordbeing: being as present/ out, meaningwhich has alreadybecome destiny, that of the absent, concealed/brought which and of its interpretation of being, an interpretation whole of Westernmetaphysics the firstGreek thinkersusher in, ratherthan being opposed to it. What Heraclitushas thought-without reallythinkingit-is thatthe logos, which mortalsencounteron a daily turned basis, remainsunknownto them by its very presence."Themortalsare constantly towardsthe gathering which revealsand sheltersand which, lightingevery being, makes it firstappear.Theyturnaway fromthe clarity,however,turning only towardsthe present beings which they encounterdirectlyin theirdaily trafficwith anythingand everything. They think this trafficwith what is present providesthem, almost ipso facto, with an And yet it remainsforeignto them. They suspect nothing( . .) of familiarity. appropriate the presencewhich, in illuminating them, firstmakesany presentbeing appear.Forthem, the logos is forgotten,remainshidden.The morethey know aboutthings,the morethings und Aufsatze 273]. "Asses preferstrawto are uncannyfor them" [Heidegger,Vortrage gold": this fragment#9 does not point to a typologicaldifferencebetween forces, but means that men do not see the secret which always shines quietly in what is simple, in burstof clarity,does not allow itself to be light (clarity).But gold, the non-appearing unobtrusive because it does not itselfgrasp;it is pureevent. The non-apparent, "grasped" burstof clarityemanatesfrom unviolatedsheltering,underthe watch of destiny.That is why clarityand itssuddenburstis bothan unveilingand a mostobscureevent. IfHeraclitus it is because he thinkswhile questioning towardsclarity.14 has been called the "obscure," and those who came afteris thatthe former The differencebetweenthe firstthinkers and beings (the present beings grasp the differencebetween Being (presence/absence) which it concedes while holding back in its reserve),a differencewhich later became occulted. Butthey graspit as in a flashand immediately after,it is forgotten.Nowhereare and yet more the same: there is consequentlyno clearBeingand beings more different cut demarcationbetween an originarylanguagewhich mightbe kindred,authentic,onand metaphysical. tological,and anotherinauthentic Arethese arguments performed reallyvalidagainstNietzsche?As we saw, the reversal by Nietzsche is not simple, because his conceptionof time and historyis not the same as and non-metaphysics, he does howeverset up thatof metaphysics.Betweenmetaphysics the distanceof an immenseabyss.Butthisdistancedoes notrelateto a certaindetermination of being as presence; it is typologicaland vital. Also Nietzsche and Heideggerdo not When Nietzsche mean the same thing by Lifeand Being,any morethan by metaphysics. to ourselvesas life,"Heidegger declares:"Beingis justa wordwhich we can only represent detertranslatesLife(which allows him to say that Nietzsche too gives a metaphysical of minationto Being)-Life, "thatis, the productionwhich sees light, the manifestation the when to he so at the moment Nietzsche and does attempts replace very presence," of life viewed as a field by a representation emptiestand shallowestword of metaphysics of impulseseternallyin conflict, its hypotheticalprincipleof intelligibility being the will to power. It is trulya dialogueof deaf ears betweenthose two thinkers. 3. But also, in Heideggerianlanguage, it is preciselythis hypothesiswhich would Justlike Descartesand Hegel, he would seem makeNietzsche intothe lastmetaphysician. This is the most obfuscating to understand the essence of being in termsof subjectivity. the differencebetween Beingand beings, on behalfof a techmodernway of forgetting of texts, Nietzsche'sart of nologicalwill to dominate.Thusthe typologicalinterpretation should not To readwell, on the contrary, reading,would tend towardthis "voluntarism." to lend one's be a matterof seizing or grabbinga text in orderto transform it, but rather earto it (to listenin),andthusto allow whatlies beforeto occurwithoutcoercivemanipulation [What Is Called Thinking? 165]. 249-74. '4For this whole analysis,see "Aletheia" diacritics / fall 1987 51

Is it possibleto reduce in this way the will to power to a will to dominate?Doesn't the latterresultfroma certaintype of will which is the weakest and the most decadent? And which does not relate,any more than the stronger type of will does, to the free and Cartesian demystifiedit. The Nietzscheanart voluntary subject,as Nietzsche thoroughly of readingis not a conceptual,metaphysical methodwhich violentlycoerces texts,thereby therein.Itimpliesthe inventionof a uniquepath what is impregnable takingor recovering so as to allow a certain irreducible possibilityof life and thoughtto recurbecause it is reaffirmed and resonatesharmoniously. 4. Butapparently Nietzsche is statinga trivialfact when he stressesthe multiplicity does not speak of interpretations: very well that Heraclitus "Anykeen mind understands to a Christian ecclesiasticalwriter,to Hegel or in the same mannerto Plato,to Aristotle, to Nietzsche" ["Aletheia" 253]. And what's more, Nietzschewould seem to be causing the "awfulspectreof relativism" to hover menacingly,because the questioningdialogue with the thinkerhas been abandoned.In point of actualfact, on the one hand, all interare not equally valid for Nietzsche;and on the other hand, we mightwonder pretations what anxietysuddenlystrikesHeidegger, and if the one he admitsto does not correspond to the displacementof anotheranxietybeforethe ghost of Nietzschehimself,who never ceases to haunthim in an unheimlich/heimlich way. To the multiplicity of interpretations-asign neitherof the multiplicity of evaluating forces, norof the plenitudeand richnessof Heraclitus's thought,but of a plenitudewhich cannotbe said,andwhich Heraclitus himselfwas unableto articulate otherwisethanalong the lines of the perspectiveswhich remainedopen to him-Heidegger does not oppose Heraclitus's if we were objectiveand exact doctrine,the one which could be articulated to rushafterhim. This would be a scientific,philologicalendeavor,relatedto the same "voluntarism" which avoidsthe salutary dangerof beingtouchedby the truthof a thought. Heraclitus's doctrine, Heideggerdoes not give in to the illusionof "absolutely grasping" for he knowsvery well thatno interpretation is absolutelyvalid, each is always relatedto a given perspective.'5 "He limitshis effortsto the close readingof the text of Heraclitus's 253]. Whatdifferenceis there between this effortto enter ["Aletheia" pronouncements" into dialogue with a thinker,and to get close to the domain of what must be thought, between this effortto "embraceclosely a text" (and Heideggeris skilled in the art of questioningit), and the will to rushafterobjectivemeaning? amountto confessing Anddoesn'tconcedingthatwe cannotdo withoutinterpretation thatwe cannot shakeoff the ghost of Nietzsche? 5. And yet, accordingto Heidegger,Nietzsche is not a valid interlocutor. Seeking with the philosophers of the past, with what is to establisha living relationship primarily in the historyof thought.Althoughhe sharesthe unique in them, he was never interested or "Preplatonists," are so-called "Presocratics" reigningconvictionthatthe earlythinkers 298 ff.], because the only Western thinker who mustbe contendedwith is Hegel ["Spruch" he is the firstto thinkof Greek philosophyas a totality,and as a philosophicaltotality 256]. Because,unlike Nietzsche, he absorbs ["Hegelund die Griechen,"in Wegmarken the uniquenessof the philosophersinto the historyof philosophy,his "reappropriating" moreto his own and metaphysical projectseems nonethelessto Heideggerto correspond on behalf one, then?),which also neglectsthe life of the thinkers reading(a metaphysical of Being. determinations of a historyof thoughtand of the different Fromthis perspective, all the "Presocratics," nay, all the Greeks,say the same thing. to Nor is it advisable to oppose, as Nietzsche does quite conventionally,Parmenides the formeras the greatthinkerof Beingand the latter,of Becoming:this is a Heraclitus, 341 . Norto oppose Heraclitus meaningless gesture"whichdropsintothe void" ["Spruch" the artistto Anaximander the pessimisticnihilist.What is contained in the Heraclitean mofra.has already been thoughtthroughin Anaximander's logos and in Parmenides's chreon. To inquireinto mattersof dependence and influenceamong thinkersis a "misof thought"because "everythinkeris dependenton the addressof Being. understanding
15"Theattempt at translation hereproposed... is possibleonly on the wayon whichwe arealready of engaged when we ask the question:'Whatcalls on us to think?'Withthis, the priorassumption fordiscussion" and submitted our interpretation is both identified 177]. /WhatIs CalledThinking?

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The extent of this dependence is decisive for his or her freedom from influences which lead the thinker astray. The greater the dependence, the more powerful is the freedom of thought-and the greater is the danger that it will wander past what was once thought and yet-perhaps only by such wandering-think the Same.... We latecomers must of course have previously thought the fragment of Anaximander through in remembrance in order to think in accordance with that which is thought by Parmenides and Heraclitus" ["Spruch" 340]. Because they also think the same and depend on the address of Being, neither Plato nor Aristotle represents-for those who can hear their voices in Greek-a departure from the firstthinkers. Contraryto what Nietzsche proclaims, Aristotle is not the great conceptual philosopher, separated by the distance of an abyss from his naive, simple, metaphorical predecessors. "In its totality, the great thought of the Greek thinkers, Aristotle included, thinks without concepts," that is, for them, thinking is not "grasping," a Begriff; and that was not at all because thought was not well developed then, but because it was not yet imprisoned within boundaries which limit it by erecting barriersbefore the deployment of its Being. To think without a concept does not mean without accuracy and precision, and the subsequent limitations performed by the "conceptual work" do not constitute an "improvement" in clarity and in maturity. On the contrary, it means to think straight, to be on the road which leads to that which is worthy of questioning: namely, what beings are in their Being. Now, even Aristotle was never able to "grasp"this; it forever remained an open question for him too. It is in that sense that he is neither a man of the concept nor of the system (Nietzsche, who expressly rejects the concept and the system, would then be the prisoner of their tyranny).16If it is true that Aristotle's thought must not be transferred retroactively into that of Heraclitus and Parmenides, it nonetheless freely (no dialectical necessity there) continues dawnlike thought and brings it to completion [Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? 61 ff.]. But if it is not necessary to divide between Aristotle and the first thinkers, neither should there be a division with the later philosophy. Despite mutations, and thanks to them, "philosophy from Aristotle to Nietzsche remains the same (. . .), it is precisely the mutations which help to safeguard kinship within the same" [Heidegger, What Is Philosophy? 61; also "Spruch" 307]. Thus, energeia, the fundamental characteristic of presence, of Being, for Aristotle; idea, the fundamental characteristic of presence for Plato; the Heraclitean logos, the chreon of Anaximander, the hen and the moTraof Parmenides, all fundamental words of Greek philosophy, all speak the language of the key word "being." Words never cease to speak in the later philosophy of the West, and on down to our own time ["Hegel und die Griechen" 263 ff.; "Spruch" 342 ff.]. Each thinker, in his own way, thinks into the richness gathered in the Same. And yet, this essential richness of being, stored in the fundamental words of the dawn, remained buried: the translation of Greek words into Latin, energeia, for example, into actualitas, into reality, into objectivity (which, again, still needs presence to remain the same) and the logic born of metaphysics, and which dominates it, have buried Greek speech; and because of logic, being (which, contrary to what Nietzsche says, Parmenides had not interpreted logically), was elevated by Nietzsche to the fatal ranks of the emptiest and most general of concepts ["Spruch"325], while the totality of beings became the sole object of a single will to conquer and the simplicity of Being is buried under the one and only forgetting ["Spruch"342 ff.]. The forgetting of difference is in no way the result of negligent thought or hurried readers: "the forgetting of Being belongs in the essence of Being, which that forgottenness itself conceals. . . . The history of Being begins with the forgottenness of Being, so that Being keeps to itself with its essence, with its distinction from beings. The difference falls away, it remains forgotten. . . . Even the earliest trace of the distinction is extinguished because presence itself appears like something present .. ." ["Spruch"336]. If this does not entail a radical split between metaphysics and dawnlike thought, we can nonetheless think that their difference was clarified-without ever having been named as such-in the first words of Being ratherthan in later pronouncements: for if difference was veiled, it has also been unveiled in the presence of the present, thus leaving a trace which remains protected in the language into which Being arrived ["Spruch"336]. a completediscussion,see WhatIs CalledThinking? '6For diacritics/ fall 1987 53

And that is why Heraclitus's thoughtis at once clear and obscure. Residingin the realmof the eon as in the being presentof the presentbeing, he did not put into words and with all possible the being presentof the presentbeing fromall possible perspectives of the presentbeing. "Beingpresent(for clarity.He did not considerthe characteristics did not become questionableas the presenceof Heraclitusas for other Greekthinkers)
the present being" [What Is Called Thinking? 238].

The Beingof languagewhich is explicablethroughthe relationof what lies beforeto "lettinglie before"itself remainsconcealed from the Greeks,even though their Saying was moves withinthis Being"[WhatIs CalledThinking? 238]. Thatis also why Heraclitus obscure to himself, and why it would be fruitlessto try to translateand interprethis well is to rediscover To translate to explain him "by himself." properly, pronouncements us. The our abilityto allow ourselvesto be surprised by that which no longersurprises too our acclimatize It is to and its for word "Being," instance, Roman, Roman, simplicity. to allow Greekwords to the realmof speech of the Greeklanguage, way of understanding17 themselvesto specifywhat they mean. Only the Greeklanguageis logos. It is only when the word logos with a Greekear that we are amenableto what it we hear (understand) 45]. and to what is beforeus [WhatIs Philosophy? discloses withoutintermediary, did hear(understand) Buthow arewe to knowwhetherHeidegger logos with a Greek termby ratio,seems nevertheless this Heraclitean ear?Nietzsche,who does not translate of ear which makesthem it with the same ear.A difference not to have heard(understood) it is a systemof for of own the in his each Nietzsche, understand, being language: way, of communication.A conception which, signs uniformlyusable by all, an instrument according to Heidegger,"debases"language which, in terms of the more "elevated" conception he proposesfor it "says, in one great moment,one single time, something and thereforebeyond because it is always originary uniquewhich remainsinexhaustible the reach of any sort of levelling-down.""Itjust might be time for languagenot to be tonalityfromits speech butfor it to draw its fundamental placed in the chainsof ordinary or as a as evaluated in degeneration speech being highestSaying-without, this, ordinary Do we have to choose between those two ears?In this dialogueof deaf ears, must we take sides?Mustwe decide underpain of feelingendangeredby the "awfulspectreof thatof relativism"? perspective, This,again,would be to situateoneself in a metaphysical shows at any and the debate of the two authorson Heraclitus "truth." The confrontation It is preciselyin orderto ratethat it is not easy to reduce Nietzscheto a metaphysician. andto shakeoffthe ghostwhich hauntshimthatIsuspectHeidegger out thisoperation carry and rigorousphilologicalapproachin his did not always use an honest, straightforward, readingof Nietzsche.
Translatedby Francoise Lionnet-McCumber inferior" [What Is Called Thinking? 192].

CITED WORKS RandomHouse, 1941. McKeon.New York: Ed.Richard Aristotle.The Basic Works. Loeb R. D. Hicks. Cambridge: Trans. Eminent Lives of Laertius. Philosophers. Diogenes 1925. ClassicalLibrary,
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KeganPaul, 1892. 1976. . Hegel's Science of Logic.Trans.A. V. Miller.New York:Humanities, "Aletheia." Neske, 1978. Heidegger,Martin. Vortrageund Aufsatze. Pfullingen: 1963. ."Der Spruchdes Anaximander." Klosterman, Holzwege. Frankfurt:

as soon as, in interpreting 17"The Greeklanguagespeaksdifferently it, we put aside the Roman, and cease lookingin the Greekworldforpersonalities medieval,and modernformsof representation determined of as 'subject' ... man remains or forconsciousness.[Manshouldnot be thought by the logos.... He is the essence that, Saying,allows what is presentto lie-beforein its presence and as he is the Sayer" Mancan only speakinsofar ["Hegelunddie Criechen" perceiveswhatlies-before. 269-711]. 54

. Hegel und die Griechen." Wegmarken. Frankfurt:Klosterman, 1967. . What Is Called Thinking?Trans. FredWieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York:Harper, 1968. . What Is Philosophy? Trans. W. Kluback and J. Wilde. New Haven: College and UP, n.d. Kofman, Sarah. Comment s'en sortir? Paris: Galilee, 1983. . Nietzsche et la metaphore. Paris: Galilee, 1983. . Quatre romans analytiques. Paris: Galilee, 1974. Nietzsche, Friedrich.Daybreak. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982. . The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:Vintage, 1974. . Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen. Samtliche Werke. Stuttgart: A. KronerVerlag, 1964. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:Vintage, 1966. . The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York:Vintage, 1969. . The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann.New York:Viking, 1954. Plato. The Collected Dialogues. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961.

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