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2011722
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:
1.
2
2.
3
3.
4.
5.
6.
QE2
3R
2
(1)
200810
(1)(2)
()
(2008) :
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/CBC_sktsang_081011.pdf
g
_
g_
p
(1)(profit
realization) ()(2)
(international repayment) (
)
/GDP
/GDP
/GDP
/G
(1)
GDP
1970
IMF
(1)
15.00
10 00
10.00
5.00
0.00
-5.00
-10.00
15 00
-15.00
-20.00
-25.00
-30.00
1980
19
8
19 0
8
19 1
1982
8
19 3
1984
8
19 5
8
19 6
1987
8
19 8
8
19 9
1990
9
19 1
1992
9
19 3
9
19 4
1995
9
19 6
1997
9
19 8
9
20 9
2000
0
20 1
0
20 2
2003
0
20 4
2005
0
20 6
0
20 7
08
(%
)
(NIIP)
(GNI)
IMF
((1))
(debt
destruction)
/
(derivatives)
(
g )
(leverage)
8
19
1970M
1971M1
7
19 2M1
1973M1
7
19 4M1
1975M1
1976M1
7
19 7M1
1978M1
1979M1
8
19 0M1
1981M1
8
19 2M1
1983M1
1984M1
8
19 5M1
1986M1
8
19 7M1
1988M1
1989M1
9
19 0M1
1991M1
1992M1
9
19 3M1
9
19 4M1
9
19 5M1
1996M1
1997M1
9
19 8M1
2099M1
0
20 0M1
2001M1
2002M1
0
20 3M1
2004M1
2005M1
0
20 6M1
2007M1
08 1
M
1
(%)
(1)
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
99
(1)
(OTC)
( )
GDP ( )
700000
12
600000
10
8
400000
6
300000
500000
200000
100000
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
10
(1)
(financial derivatives)
2008
2008-09
09
30
(long wave)
11
((2))
(QE1)
/
/
Economic Outlook 20109
Interim Projections
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/10/45971907.pdf
/
QE180%
Q
12
13
((2))
14
(2)
: Harding (2010)3
(2010) 3
15
16
(2)
(PIIGS)
(
)--
17
2007-2009:
18
(3)
QE1
(yield curve)
19
20
21
(4) QE2()
22
(4) QE2()
23
(4) QE2
(exit)
2010 (QE2)
QE(Tsang Shu-ki, 2008)
2003 06
2003-06
QE2
QE2QE1
QE1 1.725
1 725
2010112011
QE2
QE3QE4
24
(4) QE2
QE
QE1
(
)
(currency wars)
25
(4) QE2
QE1QE2
26
(4) QE2
27
(4) QE2
28
(4) QE2
()
(liquidity
(liq idit trap)
(Keynesian rescue)
(Paul Krugman)
(i fl ti targeting)
(inflation
t
ti )
(QE)
1930(New Deal)
29
(4) QE2
30
/GDP:2007-12
/GDP:2007
12
31
((4)) Q
QE2
1980
: IMF
32
(4) QE2
Q
QE2
AAA
33
(4) QE2
34
(4) QE2
35
(4) QE2
36
((5))
QE3
(: 1930
21
(Tsang Shu-ki, 2010)
QE2
QE
QE
37
((5))
381.17
(03/09/1929)
- 89.2%
41.22
(08/07/1932)
38
(5)
54%
39
(5)
225
38,916
(29/12/1989)
- 80.5%
7,608
(28/04/2003)
9,202
(29/10/2010)
40
(5)
(stagflation)
(stagflation)
(BRIC)
(BRIC)
1930
((1)(2)(
) ( )(
)
41
(5)
G-20
IMF
42
(5)
:
IMF
43
(5)
(2002-2004
)
)
QE1
()
(5)
45
46
(5)
50100
BRIC
C
()
47
48
(5)
--
( l b l rebalancing)
(global
b l
i ) (Tsang
(T
Shu-ki,
Sh ki 2009),
2009)
QE2 .QE3
49
((5))
(hurt tiger)
tiger)
(internationalization)
( g
(regionalization)(globalization)
)
(g
)
"3R
" ((20091028)
):
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Tsang3R091028.ppt
50
(6)3R
3R
3R
(1) ()
((Rebalancing);
g); ((2))
(Regionalization); (3)
(Resource)
3R
3R
51
52
(6)3R
53
()
54
()
()
55
(6)3R
19
56
()
()
57
(6) 3R
(6)3R
1970-80
(
)
)
58
59
(6)3R
60
(6) 3R
(6)3R
3R
(Regionalization)
((Resource))
(Rebalancing)
61
http://www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Com%20on%20I
MF%20AREO.pdf
p .
62
(2010) (6/11/2010)
htt //
http://www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Tsang-DWIIkt
/A hi III/T
DWII
20101106.pdf
(2010)3R
-
()
131-153
Tsang Shu-ki (2009), Whither the global polity/economy?
(15/9/2009) www.sktsang.com/RF/Tsang_0909.pdf .
(2009) 3R
3R (28/10/2009)
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Tsang3R091028.ppt
Tsang, S.K., (2008), The Economic Basis of
Regionalization, The Pan-Pearl
Regionalization
Pan Pearl River Delta: An emerging
regional economy in a globalizing China, in Y.M. Yeung and
Shen Jianfa (eds.), The Chinese University Press: pp.89-113.
63
(2008)
(11/10/2008)
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/CBC_sktsang_081011.pdf
Tsang Shu-ki (2008), How to save the economy as an
irresponsible central bank" (20/4/2008)
www.sktsang.com/RF/CB_2008A.pdf.
Tsangg Shu-ki (2005), Historyy unfoldingg - economic crisis
in an uneven world" (4/5/2005)
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/History_unfolding.pdf.
Tsang Shu-ki
Shu ki (2004), Delayed
Delayed calls: the paradox of
demand side deflation versus supply side inflation
(16/5/2004)
www sktsang com/ArchiveIII/Delayed calls pdf
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Delayed_calls.pdf.
(2003) (27/6/2003)
www.sktsang.com/ArchiveIII/Long-WaveAgain.pdf
64