Feminism seeks, in essence, to dissolve false dichotomies.

Commencing with the position that knowledge is situated and influenced by the socio-historical standings, especially those of gender, feminist philosophy is in actuality rather practical or even pragmatic (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1996). On the whole, the discipline does not place an emphasis upon situated knowledges influence upon basic cognitive interpretations such as those given in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy i.e basic arithmetic or the colour of grass, but rather to represent a position within a power relation (Anderson, 2011). Anderson summarizes a group of key factors that perpetuate the dominant perception and position of men, including, but not exhaustive to, denigrating styles of knowledge, presenting women as inferior, deviant or subservient to men, and also by producing knowledge that is not helpful to those in subordinate positions. The perspectivism that feminist theory presents, acknowledges the grounding and positions of others, but does not offer all viewpoints equal value, allowing it to admit its own work to be context-specific (Grosz, 1990).

Sarah Harding marks the diversity of the feminist epistemological and philosophical sphere, suggesting, practioners [of feminist philosophy] differ both philosophically and politically in a number of significant ways (1986). Thus, in many ways, feminism may be understood as a polyphonic narrative. The field parallels undertakings made by theorists and writers of subordinated social positions of power, including race or colonised countries, an endeavour that Narayan suggests restores a richness beyond the homogenised narrative of the

dominant, in both the practical and theoretical spheres (Narayan in Solomon, 2008, p.276)

Uma Narayan discourse upon feminist epistemology draws attention to how womens exclusion from the social and academic spheres of activity has by consequence defined them as male (in Solomon p.275). This exclusion in turn may be self-fulfilling prophecy, reiterating and reinforcing the capability of one of the binary genders. Narayan highlights that womens involvement in an increased number of areas will not simply expand knowledge, but will involve an evolution in the approach and perception to these studies and activities.

On the grounds that gender is performance, as feminist theorist Judith Butler would suggest, or in the briefest of understandings, utilizing the work of and Dorothy and W.I Thomas (Thomas & Thomas, 1927, p.572), that gender and its attributes are defined as real, and are subsequently such in their consequences and social embodiment; the issue remains, should the defined and established dualistic characteristics of the binary genders be rejected, or should we examine the neglected aspects of the typified feminine attributes and actively apply them? Rosi Braidotti identifies two potential outlooks from this question, the reformist and the radical approaches (1991). The former does not confront the mainstream interpretation of rationality, and chooses rather to address the issues of social power within philosophy (Alcoff, 1995, p.11). The later submits however, contrary to the reformists, that ultimate or perfect reason is

unachievable and that masculine symbolisms and language should be substituted for pre-existing masculine ones (Braidotti, 1991). Radical feminists oppose any assimilation towards oneness, or that which establish one truthmethodlogic so forth (Grosz in Solomon, 2008, p.272). This in itself might become synonymous with a relativistic viewpoint, multitudes of perspectives all quality as valid as each other with no absolute or established truth. The question arises as if we are ever to accept a perspective of relativism or idealism; if all is perspective, or all views are equal in truths, what should be adopted and abandoned. Radical feminism however does not adhere to a relativistic perspective with any absolutism, they are neither objectivists nor relativists not subjectivists (p.272). They establish a middle ground of perspectivism that rejects an equivalent value or power to each, nevertheless recognizing other standings and viewpoints.

Due to the fields general dismissal of universalism, feminist philosophy is in majority anti-foundationalists. This is the basis for criticising the objective approach, as the personal anecdotes and lived experiences of feminist writers often emphasizes their understanding of what it felt like to be known, to be the object itself that is known. To move beyond the conceptual restrains of the potentiality of linear reasoning, feminism opens a dialogue or explorative rhetoric through practice, focusing upon histories and writings, ensure that theory and practice are intertwined (Grosz in Solomon, p.274). The Platonic notions of the disembodied rationality, in which pure knowledge is attainable once the body is shed, places rationality on a transcendental scale (1961, p.49).

Linda Alcoff focuses upon the genealogy of this viewpoint throughout Western philosophy down through to Kant, even if it has become weakened and diluted over time (Alcoff, 1995, p.8). The alternative to this somewhat deterministic resolve upon rationality is embodiment. When gender is the centrality of feminist discourse, and accepting a position of disembodied rationality subsequently de-sexes authors into a place of neutrality, Judith Butler asks how can one become a woman if one wasnt a woman all along, and at what level should we accept a rationality that is natural and non-situated? (1993).

To understand this integral constituent of the feminist philosophy one must begin with the understanding of sexualized knowledge, which complements and parallels the understanding of knowledge being embodied and situated, consequently leading to the frequent utilization of the lived experiences of women, experience inseparable from the body while an active agent seeking reason (Grosz in Solomon, 2008, p273-74). However, a continued search for disembodied rationality may further exclude women as the realm of rational mind is so typified as masculine (Alcoff, 1995, p.9).

Nevertheless, feminist philosophy on the whole is not a rejection of traditional rationality, nor is it an exploration through pure rhetoric, and rather than resolving in an absolutist position, it continues to appeal to reason, and some level of objectivity, nevertheless maintaining the importance of situated knowledge and experience, including emotions (Nussbaum, 1994). Martha Nussbaum emphasized however, the issue of equating patriarchy or typified

masculine attributes with the reasonings of philosophy; that when one writes outside the framework of patriarchy, rationality automatically becomes negated and unusable as it as been established to be associated with the it (1994, p. 59). What the feminist critique of reason submits (at least from the Reformists) is not in its entirety a revision or addition to theory, but at its core, it challenges the discourse of philosophys self-understanding in its quests for truth (Alcoff, 1995, p.4).

The crux of the issue lies within the prejudice and chauvinism that up until, and perhaps continuing through modernity, resides within academia, holding women as irrational, reason itself as been defined in opposition to the feminine, leaving us to examine language and semiotics (Alcoff, 1995, p.8). Regarding itself situated within the social rather than viewing its philosophy as a deterministic quest for an inevitable state or process of reason, feminism is a philosophy that critiques and renders binary oppositions problematic (Grosz in Solomon, 2008, p.273). This position is embodied by Hlne Cixous in her work Sorties, that thought has always worked through opposition. Through dual hierarchical oppositionsEverywhere (where) an ordering intervenes, a law organizes what is thinkable by (dual, irreconcilable, or sublatable dialectical) oppositions (1986). To substitute this innate dualism, feminist theory coins oppositions, e.g. subject/object, or male/female, as the softer differences, which does not suggest exclusion from attributes, that the word opposition holds. The traditional approach to this language, that which feminism wishes to replace, appears to be entrenched in systematic foundations that are based upon the

masculine traits when referring to rationality or reason. There exists a history of association between the rational and the masculine, with their counterparts being exclusives opposite, to which Susan Hekman writes, also perpetuates the feminine way of known as substandard (1990, p39). It is here we may begin to understand why feminist philosophy seeks to dissolve or displace false dichotomies that continue to be perpetuated.

Simone De Beauvoir utilized the dialectic of the binary oppositions of genders given stereotypically to emphasize that women are often defined by their relation to men, as a wife or a mother, but this does not apply when defining men (1949). Through this, De Beauvoir suggests that women are made metaphoric, noting the undercurrent of defining places, or vessels, e.g. the ocean, as a woman. How then, do we go about adjusting language? This may be a decision made upon a micro level, and is situational for each feminist writer. Without necessarily referring to the dual and consequently exclusive opposite of typified language, the search for language, reason or dialectic that is not disembodied becomes vital, thus the practice of feminist authorship must begin with some presumptions. From the position of postmodern feminism, Teresa de Lauretis, proliferates the anti-foundationalist viewpoint by suggesting that subjectivity arises from a complex of habits resulting from the semiotic interaction of outer world and inner world, the continuous engagement of a self or subject in social reality (in Klein, 1995, p.135). Yet, to conclude with de Lauretis proposition negates the root of the physical embodiment of women, an essential part of the feminist discipline, so the query arises, is there a middle-ground that

recognizes the validity of the interpretation of phenomena from different standings?

Feminist theorists, while not necessarily defined by a singular theory, may find advantage in utilizing the work of Gadamer whose hermeneutics work finds a middle ground through rejecting subjectivism and relativism, basing his work on the mediation of tradition (Malaps, 2009). It is through Gadamer, that the potential for truth or reason beyond a disembodied one may be understood, that language and history are not barriers to truth but possible vehicles of it (Wachtekhauser, p. 150). He equates a standpoint that is beyond any standpoint, i.e. a disembodied rationality, with an impossible ideal that is in suit with a divine perspective (Healy, 2005, p.40) Rather than approaching our prejudices as an obstacle or defilement in the pursuit of reason, Gadamer proposes that we bring them into play when working with a subject (p.37). Gadamer goes so far as to reject both the notion of neutrality, that a homogenous method of validation of knowledge claims in the objectivist understanding, and that the relativistic concern of a multitude of observers or inquirers examining different aspects of the same material and therefore arriving at different standings (p.38).

However, Gadamer disagrees with a social constructionist viewpoint through proposing that objects, or things independently exist, pertain essence and are generated through history and language (Wachterhauser, p.150). Brice Wachterhauser, when examining Gadamers realism, brings to light his

deduction that while our access to reality is in terms of language, our linguistic perceptions predominantly accurately reflectthe way the world is, that reality is multifaceted enough to support the multitudes of interpretations that history and linguistics can offer (Wachterhauser, p.153-55).

Gadamers conception of mediation through tradition, that meaning and understanding arises through a process, a dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien, does offer some grounds for the feminist philosophy to examine rationality within (Malpas, 2009). While the feminist philosophy may gain from utilizing Gadamers notion of tradition, many feminists, such as those of the post-modern persuasion may have difficulty with his view that essences have an independence from a particular time and place (Wachterhauser, p.150). Gadamer does in many ways avoid a positivist or idealist position, and while resembling the work of Alcoff who (drawing on MacIntyre) concludes that reason is not timeless, may not correlate Alcoff when she proposes that rationality and reasons are embedded within history (Alcoff, p.15). This point remains a primary position for the feminist philosophy in its situated and pragmatic endeavour for liberation from oppositional thought and perception. No matter the direction that is taken within the study of feminist philosophy, one should hold fast to the purpose of its enquiry, and looking to the words of Helen Logino that by ignoring the context of justification and choosing to focus upon the circumstance and context of our discovery are both problematic (1993, p.102). If then, we choose to move beyond a rationality centred upon oppositions, disembodiment or male dominated linguistics, towards a feminist philosophical tradition, we may find it mediates its position and justification for

a perspectivism in a manner that eclipses the conclusive boundaries of absolute relativism and objectivism.

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