Burke-Macgregor

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Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes when the organizaLon is transformed.

Frances Hesselbein, My Life in Leadership, 2011

Where is the Triumvirate Army, People and State headed now?

PresentaLon to Intermediate-Level EducaLon class Fort Lee, Virginia 17 May 2013 Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) U.S. Army +1 703 975 6954

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The People and their State:

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American public supports defense cuts and their representaLves in congress know it; Meanwhile, many economists argue the U.S. Economy is dominated by "crony capitalism" - a system that rigs the economy in favor of America's banks and bankers at the cost of average Americans. Neil Barofsky, former Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), says its not just that banks are too big to fail, bankers are also too big to jail! (No accountability!) PoliLcians have no palatable soluLons for an electorate raised on trust in "fair" rather than free markets and the myth that government creates and sustains economic prosperity. Today, for most Americans what happens at home makers. What happens abroad, does not.
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So, whats next in U.S. Defense and Foreign policy?

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The U.S. will no longer sustain open-ended military intervenLons in failing or failed states with the object of imposing cultural and poliLcal change with military power. In the 21st Century, seizing territory and controlling people for long periods who are not Americans is generally unnecessary, unaordable and. as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan counterproducLve. Given its weakened economic condiLon, the U.S. will now avoid conicts beyond our borders and will terminate future intervenLons before the cumulaLve human and poliLcal costs defeat the original purpose of U.S. military acLon as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, there is no appeLte inside the American electorate for more wars of choice in Iran, Syria or anywhere else.

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Whats the probable strategic direcLon? A Possible Outcome:

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1. Maintain the military power to ensure no one power or coaliLon of powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass and restrict the U.S. freedom of maneuver in any area of importance to the U.S. 2. Defend the Western Hemisphere and ensure the security of U.S. borders and coastal waters; 3. As required, conduct puni%ve military operaLons to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to U.S. naLonal security interests. 4. Defend and maintain the lines of communicaLon and bases necessary for the execuLon of the above tasks. The new quesLon in Washington, DC is do we really need the U.S. Army, and what are the alternaLves?

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Why not rely on the Army NaLonal Guard (ARNG)?

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Answer: The ARNG can mobilize huge numbers of soldiers if given months or years to do so. However, 21st Century military power is not based on the mass mobilizaLon of the manpower and the resources of the enLre naLon-state. Post-industrial warfare does not require the conversion of civilian industry from private to public management. In addiLon, ARNG units cannot culLvate and maintain the skills to employ todays complex armor, missile and ISR capabiliLes. When response Lmes are limited and the U.S. confronts enemy armies, air forces, and air defenses, shiping mobile armored forces, air and missile defense forces, as well as, a host of criLcal enablers into the ARNG renders these forces unavailable and unusable. In the 21st Century, the demand is for ready, deployable Army combat forces-in-being, highly trained forces capable of decisive acLon on land within a joint warghLng framework.
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Why not simply rely on the Marine Corps to replace the Army?

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Answer: The Marine Corps has very limited maneuver/exploitaLon capability. It deploys two small tank bakalions (33 tanks each) and four LAV (armored trucks) bakalions with very limited arLllery. In the words of a Naval War College Analyst: The Marines are similar to the Jordanian Army, with one third of the Jordanian Armys armored vehicles. It is force that depends heavily on air strikes for survival and eecLveness: in Najaf, two bakalions of the Armys tanks did what a lighter marine bakalion could not, inicLng huge casualLes on Mr. Sadrs insurgents while taking almost none of their own. The 70-ton tanks and 25-ton Bradleys pushed to the gates of the Imam Ali shrine at the center of the old city. Meanwhile, the marines spent most of the ght raiding buildings far from the old city. Even so, seven marines died, and at least 30 were seriously wounded, according to commanders here, while only two soldiers died and a handful were injured.
Alex Berenson, The New York Times, August 29, 2004

The Marine Corps ghts bakles. The Army ghts wars. A former Marine Corps Commandant
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Forward Military Presence: CriLcal or Not?

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The large, forward U.S. air, land and sea presence in the Mediterranean and the Pacic did nothing to prevent these events from occurring:

The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in taking over Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, using mostly nonviolent means to create Shariah Law- compliant consLtuLons/states. (Syria and Jordan are the new targets for Sunni Islamists). Civil wars, genocide, and anarchy in Africa will not be stopped by forward deployed U.S. forces. Iran is acceleraLng its drive for nuclear weapons. Sailing aircrap carriers up and down Irans coast changed nothing. Chinese tensions with Japan will rise in the future whether we are there or not. The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands potenLally entangle the U.S. in a dispute of no importance to U.S. interests.

These condiLons make the case for an Army that can surge from a joint rotaConal readiness base, not for a Cold War forward presence/engagement posture. Surging is more economical and, potenLally more eecLve in crises and conict; what Army forces do aper they arrive in a crisis or conict is far more important than how fast they arrive.
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So, what should the Army do?

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Build powerful synergies with the technologies and concepts developed by U.S. Aerospace and MariLme Forces; Prepare for WarghLng OperaLons that integrate funcLonal capabiliLes Maneuver, Strike, ISR, Sustainment across service lines inside an integrated Joint C2 operaLonal framework. Punch above its weight, mobilizing ghLng power disproporLonate to its size (High lethality, low density); Organize for joint operaLons in a non-linear, nodal and dispersed, mobile warfare environment inside a much more lethal bakle space than anything seen since WW II; Ensure the Army has the capability to close with the enemy, take hits, sustain losses, keep ghLng and strike back decisively. (Mobile, armored repower!)
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Will the Army Adapt and Thrive in its New Environment?

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To get ahead in the Army ocers must embrace the orthodoxy of how the Army ghts. Army Ocers learn early what quesLons are acceptable to ask, as well as, what answers are acceptable. Army Ocers discover that acceptable technologies, tacLcs and organizaLons are those that do not contradict or threaten to disrupt the Army Status quo views on warfare. Without a top-down Redeni%on of Land Warfare that is inherently joint, the Armys organizaLon for combat and modernizaLon parameters will not change. The Army is already re-equipping the old, shrinking ground force; the French Army approach between 1920 and 1940.

Armies don't innovate; people innovate.

Robert R. Leonhard, FighCng by Minutes, 1994

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Summary and Thoughts for ConsideraLon:

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A new U.S. NaLonal Military Strategy will evolve to focus on criLcal military tasks, rather than nice to do, terLary missions. Successful changes in military organizaLons and capabiliLes have occurred in conjuncLon with decreased budgets, but not always. The jury is out on the U.S. Army. Bold, new iniLaLves can succeed, but incremental changes on the margins of the status quo court failure and produce few real $ savings and no qualitaLve increase in capability. The start point is always the same: Organize for a dierent future. Today, this means organizing the Army for the unexpected, Strategic Surprise; a Korean-like Emergency in 1950 or a Sarajevo-like event in 1914, not counterinsurgency and naLon building; Modernize, but dont build a beker carburetor. Go for fuel injecLon with a new, inherently joint force design!
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