i/ •/;; !

j v v : ••
" - '' --' ;
21 January 2002 *>
" £A -•

MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview With Major Gregory A. Krager, United States Air Force (USAF),

Air National Guard (ANG) C-4 Senior Permanent Party Staff, ANG Crisis Action Team

(CAT), at Andrews AFB, Maryland, concerning ANG C-4 Community participation hi

Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.

1. Krager is a regular USAF officer. Has been assigned to the National Guard Bureau

(NGB) for four years in the C-4 organization. Has been working at the ANG CAT

since September 2001.

2. Krager said biggest problem has been that the USAF and the NGB do not understand

each other. Access to the ANG is confusing and too many people are involved. We

limited our mistakes hi the ANG C-4 call-ups this time, compared to Operation Allied

Force hi 1999, by not mobilizing our units instantly upon getting call-up messages.

Have waited this time for validated requirements. Can tailor the requirements for

mobilization. In Allied Force, lots of people mobilized who were not needed.

3. Air Control Squadrons (ACS) and Ah" Defense Sectors (sectors already there?) were

stood up first in the C-4 community in response to terrorist attacks on the CONUS on

11 September 2001. ACS try to help you find enemy aircraft and then shoot them

down. Our ANG aircraft controllers were sent to Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) centers to validate threats that showed up on the latters' radar and then to get

NCT0036183
 authority for NORAD's CONR [i.e., Continental United States Region] region to

shoot down those threats. Total of 30 aircraft controllers sent to FAA (10 centers x 3

controllers each). Controllers would also monitor gaps in radar coverage. Still doing

all of this. Relied on a combination of ANG volunteers and then partial mobilization

authority to fill those positions.

4. Base communications support was critical after our ANG bases went to 24/7

operations on 11 September 2001. Had to make sure all ANG wings had classified

and unclassified computers and telephones. Volunteers for this mission tapered off

after 60 to 90 days. Had to rely then on partial mobilization. Units with fighter

combat air patrols (CAPs) had the biggest requirements for increased base

communications support followed by airlift. Big plus-up required in our

communications networks at the ANG wings.

5. Needed better radar coverage within the CONUS. Turned to Air Control Squadrons

(ACS). Wisconsin unit (128th) with radar sent to cover Chicago. Oregon unit (116th)

sent to Washington state to cover Whiteby Island. Kansas unit (134th) sent to

Whiteman AFB, Missouri.

6. Starting in late September and then into October, sent mainly combat

communications units overseas first [for Operating Enduring Freedom]. Also sent

joint combat communications units to support USCENTCOM. Combat

communications units sent to Turkey and central Asia. Sent initial teams to scope out

NCT0036184
 what was required then sent the rest to set up long haul communications, SATCOM,

and microwave communications. Have about 200 of these folks in theater. No big

difficulties..

7. Most surprising aspect of the current situation has been the need of the active duty

USAF to "borrow" lots of ANG communications equipment [for its Operation

Enduring Freedom requirements]. ANG did not like this. USAF borrowed land

mobile radios, repeaters, UHF satellite equipment, arid (?). USAF had to upgrade a

lot of this borrowed equipment to meet its requirements. Some doubts whether ANG

will ever get this stuff back.

8. Basically a three-step process in deploying our ANG C-4 assets overseas for

Operation enduring Freedom. First to go were the combat communications units that

set up long haul satellite communications and UHF radios. Then, eventually we got

lots of E&I people over there after bed down locations were established in the AOR.

They wired the bases for communications. Combat Communications folks were

supposed to leave at this point but were kept in theater for sustainment purposes.

Finally, as airfields were captured, air traffic control assets and air control assets

were sent in to determine threats and then to direct attacks on those threats.

9. When special operations (193rd SOW?) went in to the AOR, had to send in 193 SOW

communications flight to supplement them. 193rd doing PSYOPS in the AOR.

NCT0036185
10. Eventually had to mobilize ANG personnel for the Aerospace Expeditionary Foeces

(AEFs). Began deploying such persLel on 1 December 2001. Mobilized for 120

days with 90 days in the sand for mission. Rest of the time was for spin-up time

(ANG mob requirement has been 72 hours for decades with no spinup?), leave, and

spin downtime. Did mobilization for AEFs 9 and 10. Only 51 ANG C-4 community

folks have been mobilized for AEFs.

11. ANG C-4 community getting ready to support the 2002 Winter Olympics. Providing

gap filler radar and air control folks.

A /^\

\
CHARLES J. GROSS, Ph.D.

Chief, ANG History

NGB-PAI-H

NCT0036186