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Ciceros humanitas

1. A brief review of research-history on humanitas 2. From virtus vetus to sapientia nova 2.1 clementia vs. amicitia 2.2 pietas vs. societas 3. The meaning of humanitas 3.1 humanitas as means studium humanitatis 3.2 humanitas as object humaniter vivere 4. The relationship between studium humanitatis and humanitas itself 5. Conclusion

Ahn Jaewon (HK Research Fellow, Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University)

1. A brief review of research-history on humanitas


What does humanitas mean? Par excellence Rieck suggested that the idea of humanitas contains the following components1: natura humana, conditio mortalis, natura hominis, natura generis humani, mansuetudo, cultus, doctrina, dignitas, pietas, fides, honestas, iustitia, gravitas, virtus, integritas, lepos, facetiae, elegantia, eruditio, urbanitas, hilaritas, iocositas, festivitas, sapientia, moderatio, modestia, aequitas, comitas, benignitas, clementia, misericordia, benevolentia, facilitas, mollitudo, liberalitas, munificentia. There is no one who would not agree on this arsenal of the concept of humanitas in modern sense. However, the problem with Riecks suggestion is that this arsenal does not reflect historical aspects of the concept of humanitas. For example, the component gravitas is a longestablished Roman virtue which is identified as severitas. On the contrary, the component iocositas is a new-fangled virtue in Ciceros time. In fact, there was a great divergence and dissimilarity between severitas and iocositas. Therefore, it is difficult for us to understand how they can stand together as friend-idea. Thus, in this analysis I will try to give some details on historical context of the concept of humanitas.

2. From virtus vetus to sapientia nova


Let us begin our analysis with the so-called standard definition of humanitas. Scholars have explained that the idea of humanitas has originated from the concept of clementia which means mercy, forgiveness, leniency, or clemency in English. This is the opinion of Der Neue Pauly. However, the author of Der Neue Pauly has overlooked the problem of whether clementia is to be consistent with the concept of Ciceros humanitas. Clementia is a definitely good candidate-component for the concept of humanitas. However, historically seen, clementia stands on the hierarchy of class, not on the equal terms. The reason why clementia can not be a good component of humanitas is as follows.

2.1 clementia vs. amicitia


The concept of Ciceros humanitas is principally based on his homo-definition. On this issue, scholars still show little interest in the relationship between Ciceros humanitas-problem and his homo-definition. In any case, Cicero gives us his homo-definition: Man they deemed to be, so to say, a part of the state and of the human race as a whole, and they held that a man was conjoined with his fellow men by the partnership of humanity.2As read, the principal feature of Ciceros homodefinition is concerned with the partnership of humanity (humana quaedam societas).
1 2

cf. J., Christes (1995), p. 11 Acad. 1. 21. hominem esse censebant(sc. Academici) quasi partem quondam civitatis et universi 2

The partnership of humanity is indisputably based on the idea of friendship (amicitia). In relation with this Cicero says that it springs from nature: And of the objects in harmony with the plan marked out by nature from which sprang friendship and also justice and fairness.3 This nature is related with love (amor) which is unconditional. On this account, amor can be generous and liberal because it does not demand repayment. If someone puts first his desires for his own shakes, it is not regarded as amor. The same is true with amicitia. This is why amicitia is desirable, not because someone is influenced by the hope of gain, but because his entire gain is in love itself.4 Also, according to Cicero, amicitia is based fundamentally on goodwill (benevolentia): second, that our goodwill towards our friendships should correspond in all respects to their goodwill towards us.5

Clementia depends on voluntas domini or imperatoris. For better understanding, I want to provide some background details on clementia particularly on Caesars clemency: in Roman mythology, Clementia was the goddess of forgiveness and mercy. She was deified as a celebrated virtue of Julius Caesar, who was famed for his clemency. In 44 BC, a temple was consecrated in her honor by the Roman Senate. Within this temple stood a cult statue of Caesar and Clementia clasping hands. There was a head-wear to symbolize Clementia, a crown made of oak leaves, which Caesar was frequently portrayed as wearing. Caesar was considered to possess the virtue of clementia. In a letter to his friend Atticus, Cicero is discussing Caesar's clementia: You will say they are frightened. I dare say they are, but Ill be bound, if theyre more frightened of Pompey than of Caesar. They are delighted with his artful clemency and fear the others wrath. Again in For Deistarus Cicero discusses Caesar's virtue of clementia. Yes, you, Gaius Caesar, () We, free men born in freedom's fairest clime, so far from finding you a tyrant, have seen in you a leader of unbounded mercy in the day of victory. There is not much information surrounding Clementia's cult; it would seem that she was merely an abstraction of a particular virtue, one that was revered in conjunction with Caesar and the Roman state. Clementia was seen as a good trait within a leader, it also is the Latin word for humanity or clemency. This is opposed to Saevitia, which meant savagery and bloodshed.6

On this account, Cicero does not use the word clementia. As an alternative to clementia, he suggests

generi humani, eumque esse coniunctum cum hominibus humana quadam societate : English translation is quoted continually from H. Rackhams Text 3 Acad. 1. 21 earum rerum quae erant congruentes cum descriptione naturae, unde et amicitia exsistebat et iustitia atque aequitas 4 cf. Lael. De amic. 31 5 Lael. De. Amic. 56 alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae partier aequabiliterque respndeat ; Cicero explained difficulty of the so-called quantative-exact balance of credits and debits and reinforced the importance of goodwill. 6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clementia 3

the idea of kindness (beneficentia) or generosity (liberalitas): Next in order, as outlined above, let us speak of kindness and generosity. Nothing appeals more to the best in human nature than this, but it calls for the exercise of caution in many particulars.7

In this passage, what we must notice is the phrase caution in many particulars (multas cautiones). According to Cicero, we must, in the first place, see to it that our act of kindness shall not prove an injury either to the object of our beneficence or to others; in the second place, that it shall not be beyond our means; and finally, that it shall be proportioned to the worthiness of the recipient, for this is the corner-stone of justice and by the standard of justice all acts of kindness must be measured.8 Based on this, Cicero directly criticized Julius Caesar because Caesar was ambitious for the power and the glory, and he robbed one to enrich another. This means that the so-called clementia of Caesar is not a kind of liberalitas because it is on one hand far from moral duty, but it is opposite to iustitia on the other hand.9

Finally, the author of Wikipedia also regards clementia as a component for humanitas. However, clementia can not belong to humanitas, at least not in a sense of Ciceros humanitas. As we have seen above, Caesar s clementia is only a kind of exhibition of his imperium. In this sense, clementia of Caesar is neither love nor beneficentia which functions only on the ground of benevolentia. In addition, it does not go with the standards of iustitia.

2.2 pietas vs. societas


Now let us talk about our topic Ciceros humanitas with one more traditional concept of humanitas: For example, pietas. Pietas is a quintessential virtue in Rome. It is usually translated as duty or devotion, and it simultaneously suggests duty to the gods and duty to ones family, particularly to the father, which is expanded to include the duty to the community and the duty to the state via the analogy between the family and the state, conventional in the ancient world. Aeneas embodies this virtue and is particularly emblematic of it in Aeneis 2 when he flees Troy bearing his

De off. 1. 42 alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae partier aequabiliterque respndeat 8 De off. 1. 42 Videndum est enim, primum ne obsit benignitas et iis ipsis, quibus benigne videbitur fieri, et ceteris, deinde ne maior benignitas sit, quam facultates, tum ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia. 9 cf. De off. 43Sunt autem multi et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis, quod aliis largiantur, ique arbitrantur se beneficos in suos amicos visum iri, si locupletent eos quacumque ratione. Id autem tantum abest ab officio, ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium. Videndum est igitur, ut ea liberalitate utamur. quae prosit amicis, noceat nemini. Quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri; nihil est enim liberale, quod non idem iustum. 4

father on his shoulder, who in tern carries the household gods on his shoulder.10Virgil described Aeneas as a hero who is a distinguished man with piety11.

As said above, Virgils pietas is a kind of duty. However, Cicero does not emphasize pietas as strongly as Virgil even though pietas is a significant virtue for Cicero as well. As for this, what I want to mention is that Cicero uses the term amicitia as an alternative virtue for pietas. A decisive document for this is as follows: Est etiam quaedam quasi materies subiecta honestati, quae maxime spectatur in amicitiis. Amicitiae autem caritate et amore cernuntur; nam cum deorum tum parentum patriaeque cultus eorumque hominum qui aut sapientia aut opibus excellunt ad caritatem referri solent, coniuges autem et liberi et fratres et alii quos usus familiaritasque coniunxit, quamquam etiam caritate ipsa, tamen amore maxime continentur. In his igitur rebus cum bona sint, facile est intellectu quae sint contraria12.

Cicero does not regard pietas as a central virtue, as read, because amicitia is an imperative virtue.13Hence, one can ask why Cicero preferred amicitia to pietas. One can answer this in two ways. On one hand, though pietas is a good virtue, it is just a kind of duty. Thus, it is not as strong as amicitia by nature. For Cicero, amicitia is by nature a kind of amor. On the other hand, a more fundamental argument is that the core reason for Ciceros underlining of amicitia is related directly with res publica Romanorum. The analogy of Virgils pietas strengthened the authority of pater familias and was extended to the justification for imperium of princeps. Thus, this was very perilous for Roman republic because the analogy of pietas was used to engender the spirit of obedience to ruler, and subsequently, to justify despotism of Roman emperor.

Virgils pietas, consequently, is a rule for family relationship. Contrary to this, Cicero says that it seems clear to me that we were so created that between us all there exists a certain tie which strengthens our proximity to each other. Therefore, fellow citizen are preferred to foreigners and relatives to strangers, for with them Nature herself engenders friendship, but it is one that is lacking in constancy. For friendship excels relationship in this, that goodwill may be eliminated from relationship while friendship it cannot; since, if you remove goodwill from friendship the very name of friendship is gone; if you remove it from relationship, the name of relationship still remains. Moreover, how great the power of friendship is most clearly realized from the fact that, in

10 11

cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/pietas(virtue) Verg. Aen. 1.10 insignis pietate vir 12 Part. Orat. 88 13 See to it, H. Strasburger, Der Scipionenkreis, in: Hermes 96 (1966) pp. 60-72: W. R. Raschke, arma pro amico Lucilian Satire at the Crisis of the Roman Republic, in : Hermes 115 (1987), pp. 299-318; cf. Ter. Adel. Neque faciam neque me sati pie posse arbitror! 5

comparison with the infinite ties uniting the human race and fashioned by Nature herself.14

On his citation, I would like to mention two points. On one hand, Cicero declares that amicitia is more important and necessary than propinquitas (family relationship). On the other hand, Cicero mentions that amicitia originated from the infinite ties uniting human race.

[These] infinite ties are societas in Latin, which Cicero explains as the following: This, then, is the most comprehensive bond that unites together men as men and to all; and under it the common right to all things that Nature has produced for the common uses of men is to be maintained, with the understanding that, while everything assigned as private property by the statutes and by civil law.15

For res publica, then, what should be preferred between societas and pietas? Undoubtly societas! For this, there is a significant document that shows Cicero clearly preferred societas to pietas: Surely I (sc. Cicero) think that he (sc. Cato) and all natives of Italian towns have two fatherlands, one by nature and the other by citizenship. Cato, for example, though born in Tusculanum, received citizenship in Rome, and so, as he was a Tusculan by birth and a Roman by citizenship, had one fatherland which was the place of his birth, and another by law. ( ) But that fatherland must stand first in our affection in which the name of republic signifies the common citizenship of all of us. For her it is our duty to die, to her give ourselves entirely, and as it were, to place to her service, all that we possess. But the fatherland which was our parent is not much less dear to us than the one which adopted us. Thus I shall never deny that my fatherland is here, though my other fatherland is greater and includes this one within it. [And in the same way every native of an Italian town, in my opinion, has [two] citizenships but thinks of them as one citizenship had one fatherland 16.
14

Lael. De amic. 19-20 Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnis esset societas quaedem maior autem, ut quisque proxime accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam peregrine, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit, sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevollentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quo des infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, () . 15 De Off. 1. 51 Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est. In qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, ut quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur, ut sit constitutum e quibus ipsis 16 De Leg. 2. 5 Ego mehercule et illi et omnibus municipibus duas esse censeo patrias, unam naturae, alteram civitatis: ut ille Cato, quom esset Tusculi natus, in populi Romani civitatem susceptus est, ita<que> quom ortu Tusculanus esset, civitate Romanus, habuit alteram loci patriam, alteram iuris; ut vestri Attici, priusquam Theseus eos demigrare ex agris et in astu quod appellatur omnis conferre se iussit, et sui erant idem et Attici, sic nos et eam patriam dicimus ubi nati, et illam <a> qua excepti sumus. Sed necesse est caritate eam praestare <e> qua rei publicae nomen universae civitati est, pro qua mori et cui nos totos dedere et in qua nostra omnia ponere et quasi 6

In this context, what needs to be mentioned is the political situation of Rome. In late republic, Rome was torn into two fatherlands through a series of civil wars, which can be enumerated as the following:

(1) Social War (9188 BC), between Rome and the Italian nations - Roman victory. (2) Sulla's first civil war (8887 BC), between Lucius Cornelius Sulla's supporters and Gaius Marius' forces - victory to Sulla. (3) Sertorius' revolt in Hispania (8372 BC), between Rome and the provinces of Hispania under the leadership of Sertorius - Roman victory. (4) Sulla's second civil war (8281 BC), between Sulla and Marius' supporters - Sullan victory. (5) Third Servile War (7371 BC), between Rome and a slave insurrection in Italy led by Spartacus - Roman victory. (6) Catiline Conspiracy (6362 BC), between the Senate and the dissatisfied followers of Lucius Sergius Catilina - Senatorial victory. (7) Caesar's civil war (4945 BC), between Julius Caesar and the optimates (conservative republicans), initially led by Pompey - Caesarean victory. (8) Post-Caesarian civil war (44 BC), between the Senate army (led first by Cicero and then by Octavian) and the army of Antony, Lepidus, and their colleagues - Truce results in union of forces. (9) Liberators' civil war (4442 BC), between the Second Triumvirate and the Liberators (Brutus and Cassius, Caesar's assassins) - Triumvirate victory. (10) Sicilian revolt (4436 BC), between the Second Triumvirate (particularly Octavian and Agrippa) and Sextus Pompeius, the son of Pompey - Triumvirate victory. (11) Fulvia's civil war (4140 BC), between the forces of Lucius Antonius and Fulvia Antonia (the younger brother and wife of Mark Antony) and Octavian - Octavian victory. (12) Final war of the Roman Republic (3230 BC), between the Western provinces (under the leadership of Octavian and Agrippa) and the East (under Mark Antony and Cleopatra) - Western victory.17

In so-called discordia, it was necessary for Rome to find an alternative program. As for this, according to my analysis, there were two groups of movements. One was a group which tried to restore the traditional virtues as modestia, fortitudo, simplicitas, dignitas, auctoritas, gravitas, and pietas among others. In Rome, people who preferred these virtues tried to re-establish traditional consecrare debemus. Dulcis autem non multo secus est ea quae genuit quam illa quae excepit. Itaque ego hanc meam esse patriam prorsus numquam negabo, dum illa sit maior, haec in ea contineatur. * duas habet civitatis, sed unam illas civitatem putat 17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_War 7

Roman heroes just like Cornlius Lucius Scipio Barbatus:

Cornerlius Lucius Scipio Barbatus Gnaiod patre/ prognatus, fortis vir sapiensque, Quoius forma virtutei parisuma fuit, Consul, censor, aidilis quei fuit apud uos, Taurasia, Cisauna,/ Samnio cepit, Subigit omnne Loucanam opsidesque adoucit.18

Typically, as seen above, Virgil belongs to this group. I think, Julius Caesar or Augustus is a new Cornelius Scipio Barbatus. On the opposite side stands a group which tried a new way to unite populi romani as a whole. To this group belongs Cicero who tried to provide for Roman citizens socalled nova sapientia, to which belong the concepts that include amicitia, societas, iustitia, aequitas, and urbanitas among others. This is manifested in the Ciceros description of Scipio like this: haec Scipio, (), homo doctissimus atque humanissimus.

Finally, in order to eradicate discordia and to unite the populus romanus as a whole, it was necessary for Romans to find an integration-program. For this, Cicero suggests so-called humanitas-program, while Virgil puts forward pietas-program. In history, Virgils pietas-program won over Ciceros humanitas-program. Nevertheless, Virgils program was based on arma (violation), not on humanitas. This is symbolized in the last verses of Aeneis:

Ille, oculis postquam saevi monimenta doloris exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira terribilis: tune hinc spoliis indute meorum eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit. Hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit Fervidus. Ast illi solvuntur frigore membra vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.
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CIL I 2, 6.7. s. 337: Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus, sprung from Gnaeus his father, a man strong and wise, whose appearance was most in keeping with his virtue, who was consul, censor, and aedile among you - He captured Taurasia, Cisauna, Samnium - he subdued all Lucania and led off hostages.
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Aen. 12. 945-952 Aeneas' eyes took sure and slow survey/of spoils that were the proof and

memory/of cruel sorrow; then with kindling rage/and terrifying look, he cried, Wouldst thou,/clad in a prize stripped off my chosen friend,/escape this hand? In this thy mortal wound/'t is Pallas has

As read above, Aeneas remains in pietatas. This can be indicated through the phrases mearum (of my own) and mihi (to me). Thus, hoc loco, we can ask whether Aeneas is an adequate statesman who can suggest a solution for Roman political crisis, e.g., the Social War. It broke out between Rome and the Italian nations and it stemmed from the Romans' policy of land distribution, which led to a great inequality of land ownership and wealth.20 Appian describes Italian as a race [...] declining little by little into pauperism and paucity of numbers without any hope of remedy.21 The Social War began in 91 BC, when the Italian allies revolted. The intentions of allies were not only to separate the Italian nations from Rome, but also to form an independent nation called Italia and to form a capital at Corfinium, which was later renamed Italica.22 On the other hand, the Social War was, in part, caused by the assassination of Marcus Livius Drusus. Drusus wanted to grant the Roman allies Roman citizenship, giving them a greater say in the external policy of the Roman Republic. However, he was assassinated and most of his reforms were declared invalid. This angered the Roman allies greatly, and most of them allied with one another against Rome. Without a doubt, in such crisis what was need was not pietas, but societas.

3. The meaning of humanitas


Now let us try to give some details on Ciceros humanitas. As for this, what is remarkable is that the discussion of Ciceros humanitas was related with the Social War because the main subject of dialogue began with the problem of Roman social crisis. The date of dialogue of Cicero s De oratore was exactly 91 BC and the scene of dialogue is laid at a time which is at once one of the most obscure and one of the most important in the last century of the Republic. 23 During that year, Rome was torn into two parts. One was supported by optimates, and the other by populares. The main point of contention between them was the problem of reform of social system. About this, Cicero articulates as the following: For it so happened that in my early years I (sc. Cicero) witnessed the very disruption of traditional order and morals; during my consulship, I had to confront a critical conflict of universal proportion; at all my time since that consulship I have spent

a victim; Pallas takes/the lawful forfeit of thy guilty blood!/He said, and buried deep his furious blade/in the opposer's heart. The failing limbs/sank cold and helpless; and the vital breath/with moan of wrath to darkness fled away.;cf. Kristina P. Nielson, Aeneas and the Demands of the Dead, The Classical Journal Vol. 79, No. 3 pp. 200-206. 20 cf. Appian, Bellum civile, 1.7 21 cf. Appian, Bellum civile, 1.9 22 See to this, E.T. Salmon (1958) Notes on the Social War. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 89: 159-184. 23 Wilkins(1902), p. 5 9

in trying to break the waves that, while prevented by my intervention from wreaking general destruction, have recoiled upon me personally. Nevertheless, despite this difficult situation and these constrains upon my time, I will heed the call of our studies and will devote, especially to writing, as much leisure time as I am afforded by the intrigue of my enemies, the cause of my friends, and my duty to the state.24

In this declaration, what is important for our topic of humanitas is that Cicero here proclaims to study and to write about the very idea of humanitas. In De oratore, Cicero uses the term humanitas 18 times (1. 27, 32, 53, 71, 106, 256 ; 2. 40, 72, 86, 154, 230, 270, 271, 362 ; 3. 1, 29, 58, 94). According to my interpretation, humanitas always means paideia (liberal education). It shows that Cicero used humanitas as a technical term. In my opinion, the statement of Gellius on this point is in part correct: sed "humanitatem" appellaverunt id propemodum, quod Graeci paideian vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus. Quas qui sinceriter cupiunt adpetuntque, hi sunt vel maxime humanissimi. Huius enim scientiae cura et disciplina ex universis animantibus uni homini datast idcircoque "humanitas" appellata est. II. Sic igitur eo verbo veteres esse usos et cumprimis M. Varronem Marcumque Tullium omnes ferme libri declarant. Quamobrem satis habui unum interim exemplum promere.25

However, Gellius statement Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt, "humanitatem" non id esse voluerunt, quod volgus existimat quodque a Graecis philanthropia dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam benivolentiamque erga omnis homines promiscam26 is not acceptable because Cicero uses humanitas in two meanings.

3. 1 humanitas as means studium humanitatis


First of all, Cicero uses humanitas as a technical term with which Cicero comprises so-called all kinds of bonae artes27, to which belong Grammatik, Literature, Rhetoric, Dialectic, History, Music,

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De orat. 1. 3 Nam prima aetate incidimus in ipsam perturbationem disciplinae veteris, et consulatu devenimus in medium rerum omnium certamen atque discrimen, et hoc tempus omne post consulatum obiecimus eis fluctibus, qui per nos a communi peste depulsi in nosmet ipsos redundarent. Sed tamen in his vel asperitatibus rerum vel angustiis temporis obsequar studiis nostris et quantum mihi vel fraus inimicorum vel causae amicorum vel res publica tribuet oti, ad scribendum potissimum conferam ; Translation from J. M. May & J.Wisse (2002), p. 58 25 Gellius Noct. Att. 13. 17. 1 26 Gellius Noct. Att. 13. 17. 1
27

Cf. De. Orat. 1. 158 Legendi etiam poetae, cognoscendae historiae, omnium bonarum artium

doctores atque scriptores eligendi et pervolutandi et exercitationis causa laudandi, interpretandi, corrigendi, vituperandi, refellendi; disputandumque de omni re in contrarias partis et, quicquid

10

Geometry, and Arithmetic among others: Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt; ut in musicis numeri et voces et modi; in geometria lineamenta, formae, intervalla, magnitudines; in astrologia caeli conversio, ortus, obitus motusque siderum; in grammaticis poetarum pertractatio, historiarum cognitio, verborum interpretatio, pronuntiandi quidam sonus; in hac denique ipsa ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere, ignota quondam omnibus et diffusa late videbantur. 28

Related to this, what we must notice is that Cicero tries to build method and system for science in general (generatim). For this, Cicero introduces so-called dihaeresis as the following: Tum sunt notanda genera et ad certum numerum paucitatemque revocanda. Genus autem id est, quod sui similis communione quadam, specie autem differentis, duas aut pluris complectitur partis; partes autem sunt, quae generibus eis, ex quibus manant, subiciuntur; omniaque, quae sunt vel generum vel partium nomina, definitionibus, quam vim habeant, est exprimendum; est enim definitio rerum earum, quae sunt eius rei propriae, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta quaedam explication.29

Philologically seen, this passage is the first place in Latin literature where humanitas is treated as ars from the standpoint of science. Cicero regards this dihaereis, which he calls partitio, as a general principle which is universal and regular to all kinds of artes bonae. The most significant evidence for that Cicero intended to establish the scientific system for studium humanitatis, is found in Ciceros own manifestation as the following: (...), ut primum omne ius civile in genera digerat, quae perpauca sunt, deinde eorum generum quasi quaedam membra dispertiat, tum propriam cuiusque vim definitione declaret, perfectam artem iuris civilis habebitis, magis magnam et uberem quam difficilem et obscuram.30 Cicero suggests that ius civile also can be organized as a science,31and thus scientia iuris civilis is a member of ars humanitatis. As for the relationship between humanitas and ius civile, we see it later in this analysis. At any rate, what we should not overlook is the attribute perfecta of ars perfecta. What does this mean ?

In order to explain the meaning of perfecta, I would like to mention a few things about the wellknown Ciceros orator perfectus. In short, orator perfectus is based on two elements: one of them erit in quaque re, quod probabile videri possit, eliciendum atque dicendum. 28 De orat. 187 29 De orat. 188 30 De orat. 190 31 cf. De orat. 188 Adhibita est igitur ars quaedam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi totum philosophi adsumunt, quae rem dissolutam divulsamque conglutinaret et ratione quadam constringeret. 11

relates to philosophy, the other to rhetoric. Cicero thinks that one can not accomplish a perfect speech without philosophy.32 Based on this, Cicero maintains that his orator perfectus is not a person whom one can see with eyes. For example, the famous Athenian speaker Demosthenes also is not an orator perfectus33because that orator perfectus, so as in Ciceros text, is a forma: Vt igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur eaque sub oculos ipsa [non] cadit, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus. About forma, Cicero maintains that he has learned it from Academia.34 From this, it is clear that Ciceros forma comes from the Platos idea. In our discussion about perfecta, what is important is that Cicero gives explanation about qualities of his forma as the following: has rerum formas appellat ideas ille non intellegendi solum sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato, easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intellegentia contineri; cetera nasci occidere fluere labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu.35

According to this passage, Ciceros forma is a system (ratio) and an intellectual construction (intellegentia) which stays always the same (semper esse) and thus remains unchangeable in universal status (eodem statu). This is exactly a definition of theoria. Evidence for this is quicquid est igitur de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum.36 Through this processing of perfectio is constructed orator perfectus.

Then let us try to submit an application of perfectio to ars and ars perfecta itself. As for this, we can mention two points. One of them is that ars iuris civilis is a science which is not a compilation of case by case collected examples. This can be applied in the same way to all kinds of bonae artes. Grammatik, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astrology among others are also to be constructed as science through this perfectio. Regarding this, what I would like to cautiously
32

See to it Or. 11 Ac video hanc primam ingressionem meam non ex oratoriis disputationibus ductam sed e media philosophia repetitam, et eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram aut reprehensionis aliquid aut certe admirationis habituram. Nam aut mirabuntur quid haec pertineant ad ea quae quaerimus--quibus satis faciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur--aut reprehendent, quod inusitatas vias indagemus, tritas relinquamus. 33 See to it Or. 11 [or.104] Nec enim nunc de nobis, sed de re dicimus; in quo tantum abest ut nostra miremur, et usque eo difficiles ac morosi sumus, ut nobis non satis faciat ipse Demosthenes; qui quamquam unus eminet inter omnis in omni genere dicendi, tamen non semper implet auris meas; ita sunt avidae et capaces et saepe aliquid immensum infinitumque desiderant. 34 Or. 12 Ego autem et me saepe nova videri dicere intellego, cum pervetera dicam sed inaudita plerisque, et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse; illa enim sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum sunt impressa vestigia. 35 Or. 10 36 Or. 11 12

introduce the idea that the very fons of liberal arts in Latin Tradition is found in Ciceros De oratore, exactly in the speech of Crassus (1. 186-190). The other is related to the question of what the meaning of ars perfecta precisely is in Cicero.

Cicero formulates it clearly as the following: Nearly all subjects that are nowadays covered by a systematic art were once disconnected and scattered, such as rhythms, notes, and tones in music, () and finally in our subject here (the theory of speaking), devising what to say, style, arrangement, memory, and delivery, were once, it seems, in disorder and scattered far and wide. And so a certain art was invoked from outside, from some different branch, if knowledge the philosophers claim is entirely theirs, in order to cement together material that had previously been disjointed and keep apart, and to tie it together with the help of a certain method. 37

In this passage, we can find some traces for the explication of ars perfecta. Id est a certain art (quaedam ars). About this Cicero says that it comes from philosophy. What we may conclude from this is that this ars quaedam is a species of ars perfecta (as genus) and ars perfecta (as species) is a species of philosophia (as genus). Whats more, ars perfecta is to be regarded as philosophy. Evidence for this is that for instance, as you of course know, the most learned consider philosophy, as the Greeks call it, to be creator and mother of all the valuable arts, so to speak. Yet even her in philosophy it is difficult to reckon how many people there have been (so notable for their abundant knowledge and for the variety and vast range of their studies!) who have not only worked as specialists in one single area, but have embraced all that exists in their thorough investigations or their dialectical reasoning.38

In addition, what is remarkable for our topic humanitas is that there are two points to be made in this passage. One is related to the problem of whether Cicero had intention to build studium humanitatis as science. As for this, I am sure that Cicero had intention to construct the system for single art based on the help of dialectical reasoning (disserendi ratio) because this dialectical reasoning is, as seen above, partitio, based on which all kinds of bonae artes are organized and systemized as science. Based on this, I would like to suggest that Cicero was truly the father of
37

De. Or. 1. 187-188 Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quondam fuerunt; ut in musicis numeri et voces et modi; () in hac denique ipsa ratione dicendi excogitare, ornare, disponere, meminisse, agere, ignota quondam omnibus et diffusa late videbantur. [188] Adhibita est igitur ars quaedam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi totum philosophi adsumunt, quae rem dissolutam divulsamque conglutinaret et ratione quadam constringeret. 38 De orat. 1.9 [9] Neque enim te fugit omnium laudatarum artium procreatricem quandam et quasi parentem eam, quam philosophian Graeci vocant, ab hominibus doctissimis iudicari; in qua difficile est enumerare quot viri quanta scientia quantaque in suis studiis varietate et copia fuerint, qui non una aliqua in re separatim elaborarint, sed omnia, quaecumque possent, vel scientiae pervestigatione vel disserendi ratione comprehenderint. 13

liberal arts in Latin tradition.

The other is related to the term humanitas. On this instance, we can ask on what ground Cicero delineates bonae artes as humanitas as a whole. The trace for this can be found in the phrase: who have not only worked as specialists in one single area, but have embraced all that exists in their thorough investigations or their dialectical reasoning.

Ciceros remark specialists in one single area pointed to the fact that there were a lot of scholars (docti) in Rome who showed little interest for politics or social engagement. Most of them were indulged in their own single area. However, this way of life was perilous for Roman republic, especially in Ciceros Time. From the viewpoint of Ciceros political position, thus, he needs to find an argument for the appeal that one must have interest for res communis and duty to res publica.

Here, Ciceros reason for criticizing those who just wanted to enjoy their life in single area of art is exposed in two ways. First, Cicero formulated his criticism with the argument that liberal arts are relevant to one another,39and they are based on common fundament. Id est partitio. However, according to Cicero, specialists do not see this common fundament. This kind of art is to be either so-called lart pour lart, or a skill for money. A distinctive signal for this can be found in rhetoric during Ciceros time. Second, artes suitable to the only knowledge itself, or ad vitam contemplativam, are good ways to a happy life (ad vitam beatam). This vita contemplativa was, for Cicero, not the best way to the happiest life (ad vitam beatissimam). As for this, let us examine Ciceros own remark: accordingly, the whole of then great philosophy of antiquity held that happiness lies in virtue alone, yet that happiness is not supreme without good suitable for the body and all the other goods suitable for the employment of virtue that were specified above.40

From this passage, we know that for Cicero the happiest life lies necessarily in the following two elements. One is vita contemplativa, and the other is vita activa. Through this medium of vita activa, artes bonae are directly connected with humanitas, because bene vivere meant humaniter vivere for Cicero.41 In this way, humanitas becomes the final end of artes bonae. In conclusion, we can say that Ciceros humanitas was devised not for a specific science but as general education-program for human-being from the beginning itself of liberal arts.
39

cf. Vitr. 1.12 Cum autem animadverterint omnes disciplinas inter se coniunctionem rerum et communicationem habere, (...), encyclios enim disciplina uti corpus unum ex his membris est composita. 40 Acad. 1. 23 Itaque omnis illa antique philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam, nec tamen beatissimam nisi adiungeretur et corporis et cetera quae supra dicta sunt ad virtutis usum idonea. 41 See to it, Pro Archia 14

3.2 humanitas as object humaniter vivere


Then let us explore the second meaning of humanitas. Cicero formulates it as the following: Indeed, the subtle bond of a mutual relationship links together all arts that have any bearing upon humanitas.42 N. H. Watts has translated this humanitas as the common life of mankind.43 This translation can be commonly accepted, but the problem lies in the fact that it does not show clearly the relationship between humanitas and studia humanitatis (liberal arts). According to my reading, the sense of humanitas in this passage means human-being or human-becoming which can be comparable to Mensch-Sein oder Mensch-Werden in German44because humanitas means human-being itself as an object-idea for the liberal arts45on the one hand, and studia humanitatis are means and mediums for human-becoming on the other hand.46 Again, regarding this, let us call to mind Cicero. For him humanitas means, in concrete, humaniter vivere: if I (Cicero) will have relaxed myself from this, I will certainly teach even you, who have studied nothing else for many years, what it is to live humanly.47

It may then be more meaningful if we formulate this question as the following: what is necessary for someone, if that someone wants to live humanly? For this, he must have ius hominis. In Roman law, nullum ius means nullum caput, and nullum caput is commonly used for slaves.48 Thus, a slave in some sense was not a truly homo because he was treated just as a movable property. Moreover, if there is someone who lost his citizenship, it was also difficult to say in a sense that he was a homo.49 Therefore, one must have the ius of civis, if he wants to live humanly at least. So far, civitas was, then, a necessary condition for humanitas in Rome.
42

Pro Archia 2 Etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur 43 Pro Archia 2. Watts (1923, rep. 1956) 44 cf. F.I. Niethammer, Philanthropinismus-Huamanismus. Texte zur Schulreform, bearb, v. W. Hillebrecht, Weinheim-Berlin-Bassel 1968, 79445 (Kleine Pdagogische Texte 29), cited from J., Christes(1995), p. 3 45 As regards this, Fr. I. Niethammer suggests humanismus. For this Niethammer separated den humanismus als das andere Erziehungsprinzip from the sog. Philanthropinismus der von der Aufklrung gefrderten Realschule in a School-program 1808. 46 The humanismus idea of Niethammer originally comes from the Humanittsbegriff des wahren Menschseins of J. G. Herder. 46. According to him, it is Inbegriffs aller menschlichen Wesensvollendung, aller sittlichen, vernnfitigen und sthetischen Bildung 47 Ep. Ad fam. 7.1 quibus si me relaxaro, te ipsum, qui multos annos nihil aliud commentaris, docebo profecto quid sit humaniter vivere 48 Gaius, Inst. 1. 16. 4 49 Dig. XLVIII 19, 2 pr. Rei capitalis damnatum sic accipere debemus, ex qua causa damnato vel mors vel etiam civitatis amisso vel servitus contingit 15

On a related issue, what we can add is that ius hominis comes naturally from oikeisis and that civitas also is derived from oikeisis, because civitas is the bond of ius hominis and the agreement of the partnership which unites the community of those gathered together. 50Regarding oikeisis, based on Stoic philosophy, Cicero defines it as a principle for living-beings: As soon as a living creature is born-for this should be our starting-point-it has an attachment to itself and commends itself to selfpreservation and to loving its own condition and whatever preserves that condition, but sets itself against death and whatever obviously contributes to death. The Stoics demonstrate this as the following: before pleasure or pain affects them, infants reach out for what is health-giving and reject the opposite, and this would not happen unless they love their own condition and feared its destruction. It would be impossible for them to reach out for anything unless they had awareness about themselves and so had self-love. Consequently, the primary instinct should be recognized as derived from self-love.51

According to Wright, awareness of self brings with it love of self and of its condition of being alive; the newly born is, therefore, impelled towards the preservation of self in the continuation of life, and so moves towards what is life-sustaining and away from what is life-threatening. This is generally referred to as oikeisis. Based on this, Wright concludes that Cicero was in a unique position to trace and legitimize the moves from self-love via family affection, friendship, and civic justice, to the propagation of a love of humanity which could accord with ideas of natural law and enlightened world government to which he was sympathetic, and so find a context for the practical realization of Stoic ethical theory.52

However, in order to live humanly, according to Cicero, one must be obliged to fulfill officium, meaning duty in English. The reason why Cicero emphasized the importance of officium is as
50 51

See to it, De Rep. 3. 43, 45, Fin. 3.66 ;cf. Wright(1995), p. 187 simulatque natum sit animalhinc enim est ordiendum, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari

ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, quae conservantia sint eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo: English translation is cited from M. R. Wright, Self-love and love of humanity in De Finibus 3, in: Cicero the Philosopher, ed., J.G.F. Powell, Oxford 1995, p. 171
52

M. R. Wright, Self-love and love of humanity in De Finibus 3, in: Cicero the Philosopher, ed.,

J.G.F. Powell, Oxford 1995, p. 173

16

follows: If some one has obtained ius from nature, then he must also have duty to follow the law of nature because this is a rule of dare et accipere (give and take), id est iustitia commutativa. Regarding this, Cicero says that first of all, nature has endowed every species of living creature with the instinct of self-preservation, ().53 This is, as said above, oikeisis which gives the faculties and the ius to live humanly. On the other hand, Cicero requires responsibility for this ius as the following: But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man s use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man.54

This is a definite view of Cicero about officium. Owing to his idea of officium, as read above, everyone has duty to nature itself, to state, to friends, to family, and finally to himself. On the other hand, because of this duty, one can get some position or some function as being in the society. Cicero calls this position persona. Thus, everyone has, according to him, at least four personae: homo (persona universalis), civis (persona civitatis), persona familiaris, and persona propria.55 To live humanly is then accomplished, if someone completes these duties which are attributed to each persona. Cicero calls this state of completion honestas. In this sense, regarding the phrase to live humanly, officium is more imperative than ius for Cicero because honestas itself is the final object of humanitas or humaniter vivere, the state which one can reach with the help of officium, not ius.

53

De Off. 1. 11 11] Principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se, vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura videantur, omniaque, quae sint ad vivendum necessaria anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem. Commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint. Sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu movetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est se accommodat, paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum. Homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.
54

De off. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque

nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 55 See to it, De off. 105-125 17

4. The relationship between studium humanitatis and humanitas itself


Based on the analysis above, I would like to offer some details on the nature of the relationship between humanitas as object and humanitatis as means. On this point, Cicero formulates his idea as the following: Even if you (Crassus) think that a man of my (Scaevola) age should not be listening to those commonplace and hackneyed topics, can we afford also to ignore the things that you have claimed an orator must know? You mentioned human characters and behavior, the ways of stirring and checking human feelings, history, ancient times, governing the state, and the last but not least, our own civil law. Indeed, I did realize that the whole abundant store of this knowledge fell within the compass of your understanding, but in the equipment of the orator as such, I had never before observed furnishings this sumptuous.56

What is noteworthy is the remark the things that you have claimed an orator must know. According to Cicero, studia humanitatis are necessary means for human being and human life, as read above, because the knowledge of psychology, history, and law is inevitable for human life. However, this does not justify the necessity of studium humanitatis for humanitas. Thus, we can ask on what ground Cicero holds the necessity and inevitability of studium for humanitas itself.

The argument for this is to be found in Ciceros position on the relationship between humanitas and civitas. As said above, civitas is the bond of ius hominis and the agreement of the partnership which unites the community of those gathered together. From this, a state is, on the one hand, for which the fundamental condition is ius hominis. This condition is reflected in the partnership which unites the community. On the other hand, what does he mean by the agreement?

For the agreement of the partnership, there is to be common and universal ground on which

56 De or. 1. 165 "Enimvero" inquit Crassus" mirari satis non queo etiam te haec, Scaevola, desiderare, quae ego neque ita teneo ut ii qui docent, neque sunt eius generis, ut si optime tenerem, digna essent ista tua sapientia ac tuis auribus." "Ain tu?" inquit ille: "si de istis communibus et pervagatis vix huic aetati audiendum putas, etiamne illa neglegere possumus, quae tu oratori cognoscenda esse dixisti: de naturis hominum, de moribus, de rationibus iis quibus hominum mentes et incitarentur et reprimerentur, de historia, de antiquitate, de administratione rei publicae, denique de nostro ipso iure civili? Hanc enim ego omnem scientiam et copiam rerum in tua prudentia sciebam inesse; in oratoris vero instrumento tam lautam supellectilem numquam videram."

18

anyone can agree. This is, in my opinion, humaniter vivere, that should be considered as the justifying ground or grounds of civitas.

If the existential ground of civitas is based on the phrase to live humanly, then civitas should come under humanitas because civitas is just an attribute of humanitas (human-nature). Based on this, we can define the relationship between humanitas and civitas as the following: humanitas est civitas in homine, qui ius in civitate habet. The ius in civitate in this definition is ius civile which means civil right or civic justice in English. Through this is born civis (citizen). Civis is a person who has right for himself, of himself and by himself. Id est ius sui.57

However, a civis has no right to violate ius of another because ius of theirs are equivalent. Therefore, in this case, citizens can and must solve their problem through the intervention of civitas. The justifying ground for the intervention of civitas lies in the argument that civitas as a nature of humanitas can mediate ius of each civis and is in a higher state because ius of civitas as a united ius is to be superior to ius of individual civis.

Regarding the relationship between humanitas and civitas, however, humanitas is, ontologically seen, prior to civitas, though civitas is, in practice and in reality, mightier than humanitas. As grounds for this, I suggest the following two arguments: One of them is derived from the concept of oikeisis which comprises, as seen above, the ius hominis on the world itself, on the state, on the family, on the individual property as well. For better understanding, I will term the ius on the world as oikeisis universalis, the ius on the civitas as oikeisis civitatis, the ius on the family as oikeisis familiaris, and the ius on the individual property as oikeisis propria.

What is evident from this is that oikeisis civitatis is a part of oikeisis unversalis which also is an attribute of humanitas itself, if civitas is a part of the world, and if it is a constitution which is the bond of the partnership of each members, and finally if the part of this partnership is to be regarded as so called oikeisis civitatis. On this account, civitas is a part of the concept of humanitas.

57

See to it, Gai. Inst. 48-53 Sequitur de iure personarum alia divisio. Nam quaedam personae sui iuris sunt, quaedam alieno iuri sunt subiectae.49. Sed rursus earum personarum, quae alieno iuri subiectae sunt, aliae in potestate, aliae in manu, aliae in mancipio sunt. 50. Videamus nunc de iis, quae alieno iuri subiectae sint: Nam si cognoverimus, quae istae personae sint, simul intellegemus, quae sui iuris sint. 51. Ac prius dispiciamus de iis, qui in aliena potestate sunt. 52. In potestate itaque sunt servi dominorum. Quae quidem potestas iuris gentium est: Nam apud omnes peraeque gentes animadvertere possumus dominis in servos vitae necisque potestatem esse, et quodcumque per servum adquiritur, id domino adquiritur. 53. Sed hoc tempore neque civibus Romanis nec ullis aliis hominibus, qui sub imperio populi Romani sunt, licet supra modum et sine causa in servos suos saevire: 19

The second argument is based on a historical report about the foundation of Roman republic or civitas Romana. Cicero explains it as the following: Though Brutus was only a private man, he sustained the whole burden of the government and was the first in our State to demonstrate that no one is a mere private man when the liberty of his fellows needs protection. On his initiative and under his leadership, the people aroused not only by the bitter complaints, still fresh in their memories, of Lucretias father and kinsmen, but also by their own recollection of the pride of Tarquinius and the many acts of injustice committed by him and his sons, banished the king himself, his children, and the whole race of the Tarquinii.58

In this passage, what is remarkable is the phrase the people aroused. This is formulated as concitata civitas in Latin. The nature of concitata civitas, according to my reading, is a constitutive condition for civitas because the separation of res publica from res privata is derived from the principle of suum cuique and thus the public should belong to the public.59 From this principle should emerge the concept of civitas. Based on this, the calling for arousing of civitas is to be justified and rectified. However, this civitas is neither an institutional state, nor does it stands for res publica as a form of state-constitution. This is, therefore, a constitutive condition for the organization of a state. What we must see at this juncture is that this condition lies in the relationship between populus and civitas. Depending exactly on this relationship, Brutus provoked the populus Romanus to stand up in order to fight against a dictator who offended the liberty of people. This is, according to Cicero, justified on the argument that civitas is required and called for precisely at that moment when the liberty and ius of people are in danger. On this account, civitas has the duty to protect his people.60

Furthermore, what I want to emphasize from the history of the beginning of Roman republic is that there is no civitas, before populus exists, and no populus, before homo exists. It means that human

58

De re pub. 2. 46 tum vir ingenio et virtute praestans L. Brutus depulit a civibus suis iniustum illud durae servitutis iugum. qui cum privatus esset, totam rem publicam sustinuit, primusque in hac civitate docuit in conservanda civium libertate esse privatum neminem. quo auctore et principe concitata civitas et hac recenti querella Lucretiae patris ac propinquorum, et recordatione superbiae Tarquinii multarumque iniuriarum et ipsius et filiorum, exulem et regem ipsum et liberos eius et gentem Tarquiniorum esse iussit. 59 Ulp. D. 1.1 Publicum ad statum conservandum, ne pereat. Sed cum publicum ius sit in sacris et similibus hoc etiam in qualibet villa fiat, qualiter pertinet ad statum rei Romanae tantum? dic quod villam quamlibet conservari, et ibi talia fieri, pertinet ad civitatem Romanam: cum non esset perfecta, nisi ex suis partibus constaret: ut j. tit. j. l. j. nec placet quod dicas publici appellationem ad alia loca referri, quam Romanae civitatis: ut j. de ver. sig. l. eu. qui vectigal. 60 See to it, De off. 2. 78 Id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque custodia. 20

must exist first, and state comes later, in order to protect the ius of human. It is so far evident that civitas depends necessarily on humanitas. In history, this ius of populus and homo is formulated into lex, and this lex is embodied into civitas. At this point, however, is exposed a disagreement or a conflict between humanitas and civitas. This conflict can be termed as politics.

This is manifested in cases such as capital punishment which shows the conflict between humanitas and civitas. Regarding this, Tabula XII formulates as the following: De capite civis nisi per maximum comitiatum ne feronto. According to this, civitas as embodied corpus of leges, i.d., legislative government itself has no right to determine the capital punishment of civis. Such right comes from the maximum comitiatum. The maximum comitiatum is a public and official committy in which populus romanus as a whole participated and explained his ius on civitas and his political will. From this, we see the tension between politics and laws, the latter as positive and written form of rules, by nature, tends to vindicate the very position of politics. This is clearly observed later in medieval times.

Anyway, the ius of civitas is derived from each civis. In this way, each civis has his ius civile. Thanks to this character of ius civile, civitas comes under humanitas. On the contrary, without civitas, it means, if someone lost citizenship, he is regarded no longer as homo because he has no ius. This is manifested in the case of Gaius Mancinus. Even though he was a very distinguished and excellent man and a former consul, but he lost his civic status61which means literally caput.

On a related issue, as said above, if someones civic status was said to be at stake when his life was endangered, either his life as such or his life as a Roman citizen, for Roman citizens, capital punishment often took the form of exile and thus loss of citizen status. Cicero was the very person who was often in exile in his life. From this, the ius civile should be understood as a necessary condition to live humanly. On this account, one must study and learn studia humanitatis, to which belongs the knowledge about how to defend his ius civile in order to live humanly.

Then let us examine meaning of the term humanly. About this Cicero formulates as the following: above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to human. And so, when we have leisure from the demands of business cares, we are eager to see, to hear, to learn something new, and we esteem a desire to know the secrets or wonders of creation as indispensable to a happy life. Thus we come to understand that what is true, simple, and genuine, appeals most strongly to mans nature. To this passion for discovering truth there is added a hungering, as it were, for independence, so that a mind well-molded by nature is unwilling to be subject to anyone save one
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See to it, De or. 1. 181 21

who gives the rules of conduct or is a teacher of truth or who, for the general good, rules according to justice and law. From this attitude come greatness of soul and a sense of superiority to worldly conditions.62

As read in the passage, Cicero attributes the peculiarity of learning and investigating for truth to the nature of human. Then in order to live humanly, one must fulfill also this condition of human being. However, this is not fulfilled in humanitas itself. On this account, as read, Cicero emphasizes studia humanitatis which are suitable for the fulfillment of humanitas. These are Grammatik, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Music, Astrology, Geometry, and the like. These are so-called liberal arts in western tradition. As for this, what I would like to note that studium iuris civilis was placed, as seen above, in the center of studia humanitatis by Cicero. However, after Cicero, this studium remained no more as a member of liberal arts. Philologically seen, the reason for this should be explained immediately. In any case, on this account, liberal arts are considered to be peripheral, not essential study in modern world either.

5. Conclusion
Based on this analysis above, I would like to summarize the nature of Ciceros humanitas-program. This is a civil-education program which is suitable for uniting the Roman state, integrating the Roman citizen, and thus rescuing res publica of Rome from its destruction. Therefore, the quintessence of Ciceros humanitas-program is an endeavor after the revitalizing of Roman politics. For this, Cicero tried to build a general program for civil education.

This is manifested in his criticism on specialists, who were included in particular subject. Rhetoricians, for example, did not show little responsibility for society and had interests only for financial benefits. Further, one of the important targets of Ciceros critique was probably jurists, who wanted to remain in the region of law and thus did not see the great problem of, for example, the conflict between humanitas and civitas. Jurists, in Ciceros time, gave a massive attention to the legal cases of trivial proportion, for example, the case of inheritance. This was indeed a great danger to res publica. As regards this, I want to suggest that Ciceros humanitas itself was a kind of criticism on those who preferred the solution on strict application of positive laws to political
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De off. 1. 13 Inprimisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre, audire, addiscere cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum, simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi existit humanarumque rerum contemptio. 22

solution and persuasion because the kind of ruling and governing the state based on leges means the disappearance of politics and the end of res publica. These people might be so called analogists. One of them was the famous imperator, Julius Caesar and his successor, princeps Augustus.

In this historical background, we can say that Ciceros humanitas is a kind of weapon with which one can fight against absolute rule of a tyrant or dictatorship. However, this humanitas is a longterm program and thus is not efficient or practical to secure democracy in modern sense against its immediate invaders. All the same, humanitas is a base camp for democracy and a primary defensive measure against violence.

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