David S.

McDonough

The paradox of Afghanistan

Stability operations and the renewal of Canadas international security policy?
The Canadian commitment to Afghanistan has singularly focused the attention of policymakers in Ottawa. Canadas contribution was initially limited to a naval interdiction task group that, no matter how impressive in speed or size, seemed curiously out of place for a military campaign in a land-locked southwest Asian country. Boots on the ground, and all the dangers that that entailed, were the sine qua non for an impressive military contribution for this mission.1 Canada responded with the deployment of a small ground force contingent that would operate closely with US counterparts in combat operations in southern Afghanistan and be just as quickly withdrawn in mid-2002. These initial contributions might have been the beginning and the end of Canadas brief foray with interventionism. Canada would have signalled

David S. McDonough is a PhD student in political science at Dalhousie University in Halifax and a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Canadian graduate scholarship holder.
1 The importance of boots on the ground would even be noted by Richard Gimblett, who wrote the official Department of National Defence history of Operation Apollo and remains a prominent proponent of interoperable naval task forces. See his Combat capability and the Canadian forces: Where are we now? (And in the foreseeable future), paper presented to the annual seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations, 21 February 2002, www.cda-cdai.ca.

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its political approval of the American response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and could have simply withdrawn to the relative safety of its fireproof house in North America. Prime Minister Jean Chrtien would, however, make the strategically fateful decision to deploy relatively substantial Canadian forces (CF) ground troops in early 2003. This government decision, politically motivated as it was, would lay the foundation for this countrys principal theatre of operations in the wider US-led global war on terror. It would begin rather modestly in the relatively safe area of Kabul, but would be severely tested with the CF transfer to Kandahar, where the country appears mired in a complex (and seemingly intractable) stability operation that combines elements of counter insurgency and reconstruction in what Sean Maloney has described as a post-Apocalyptical environment in the wake ofa twenty-five year civil war.2 It is not an exaggeration to consider Canadas extra regional engagement of Afghanistan the largest and most significant Canadian commitment since its role in the Korean War. Indeed, it is the most recent and impressive example of Canadas de facto role in stability campaigns of the post-Cold War period, where the international community seeks to mitigate the worst excesses of the new world disorder by imposing or supporting with armed force the establishment of order in states or regions.3 There are clear antecedents for such a policy in the long standing Canadian efforts to maintain an institutional international order marked by rules of behaviour and predictability. Canada might have had only a small role in its construction, but there is no doubt that it was, to borrow Dean Achesons words, present at the creation of the postwar order. It is precisely this latent conservative interest in global order that informs Canadas international security policy in the 21st century. Canadas role in Afghanistan began as a means to assuage American concerns over its security in the post-9/11 perioda forward defence policy to complement domestic homeland security measures. But it is precisely this military engagement that will likely result in long-term consequences for Canadas international security policy. On one hand, the inter-

2 Sean M. Maloney, The international security assistance force: The origins of a stabilization force, Canadian Military Journal 4, no. 2 (summer 2003): 3. 3 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canadas Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueens University Press, 2004), 6.

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vention has provided some insight into the doctrinal and operational bases for Canadas use of military force. On the other hand, Canadas role in Afghanistan has created a strategic context that is more amenable and even conducive to the development of expeditionary forces, but paradoxically could result in such severe consequences (e.g. accelerated casualties and/or regional destabilization) as to poison any interventionist sentiment in Canada for decades. Despite such a risky gamble, Afghanistan does represent a potentially long-term strategic opportunity for Canada that should not be dismissed.
FORWARD DEFENCE AND CANADAS COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 renewed latent American concerns over its societal vulnerability that were largely, but never totally, held in abeyance during the Cold War. The dangers associated with a terrorist strike cannot be discounted, nor should it be assumedgiven the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologythat any future attack will remain conventional. A nuclear attack on a city is the worst-case scenario for homeland security planners in North America, and it is imperative that authorities on both sides of the Canada-US border use all their powers to prevent such a catastrophic attack, or any WMD attack for that matter. Canada is not immune to a terrorist attack, as evident by al Qaedas explicit threats to Canada and willingness to strike soft targets among American allies (e.g., the bombings in Bali, Madrid, and London). Canada also remains acutely aware of the vulnerability of the massive flow of trade across the Canada-US border, which is valued at $1.9-billion per day and represents 80 percent of Canadas exports and two-thirds of its imports. The danger that the US would unilaterally redefine the character of this security relationship necessitates a renewed Canadian emphasis on domestic and continental security measures. Yet forward defence remains an important component of Canadian security policy, and the current campaign against terrorism has proven to be no exception. North America represents a single target set, and its large territory, population, and relatively porous borders mean that the region remains highly vulnerable to terrorist infiltration and attack. Continental vulnerability can, however, be partly alleviated by forward defence operations that disrupt and/or neutralize the clandestine terrorist networks abroad, especially in places that serve as a sanctuary (or central node) for these networks.

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Canadas Operation Apollo would initially consist of the rapid deployment of a naval task group into the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. This was the first non-American task group to be sent into the Arabian Sea region and would be integrated immediately into the coalition maritime formation and assigned responsibility for interdiction, fleet support, and force protection operations. Canada deployed 16 warships and 4000 navy personnel during its two-year operation, and the navy was distinguished by its seamless interoperability and integration with the American fleet. The naval task group was not only assigned immediate force protection duties for US marine amphibious forces stationed near Pakistan, but had command of American warships as part of its duties. This integration culminated in the designation of a Canadian commodore as commander task force 151 (CTF 151) in the beginning of 2003, an operational command role that was practically unprecedented in a combat environment.4 Combat operations would, however, be limited to coalition ground and air operations in Afghanistan, where the US would ally with various factions and use its air dominance and selective ground deployments to destroy the Taliban regime. Canada would send joint task force 2 (JTF-2) counterterrorist units in December 2001, alongside an infantry contingent of 750-850 soldiers that would operate closely with US forces in counterinsurgency operations (e.g., Anaconda, Harpoon, Torii) in southeast Afghanistan. This might not have had a significant impact on the military conduct of these operations, but it did represent an important (and dangerous) symbolic contribution to US efforts. That being said, Canada would withdraw its infantry contingent after a six-month tour of duty in June 2002. The naval component of Operation Apollo would still continue until 2003, but Canadas role in the actual military combat operations in Afghanistan seemed destined to end nearly as soon as it began. It would be the Iraq issue that proved decisive for Canadas future role in Afghanistan. The Chrtien government had a highly ambiguous position on Iraq. Frequent statements that Canada would only participate in a war
4 It can also be compared quite favourably with the less seamless and/or effective command roles given to either Australia or European countries. See Richard Gimblett, Command of coalition operations in a multicultural environment: A Canadian naval niche? The case study of Operation Apollo, paper presented at the 2006 command and control research and technology symposium (CCRTS), office of the assistant secretary of defense.

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authorized by the UN were balanced by contradictory statements on the possibility of Canadian involvement without such authorization. This ambiguity was the result of a natural tension between the need to placate American security concerns, heightened in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and Canadas normative attachment to multilateralism and distrust of the Bush administrations penchant for unilateralism. It is certainly noteworthy that the Chrtien government announced to the house of commons the decision to support the international security assistance force (ISAF) mission in Kabul on 12 February 2003, which took place a little over a month prior to the Iraq War and would effectively preempt any American requests for a Canadian military deployment to Iraq.5 Canadas presence in Kabul began in the spring of 2003, with the arrival of theatre activation teams (TATs) that established the necessary support infrastructure for the Canadian military deployment under Operation Athena. The CF deployment would find ample use for its arsenal of LAV-III infantry fighting vehicles and Coyote reconnaissance vehicles, and would play an important role in the Canadian-led war in Kabul that was intelligence-oriented and designed to disrupt terrorist cells trying to interfere with the electoral and political processes, while at the same time facilitating these processes.6 Operation Athena would also feature the CF being assigned significant command responsibilities, with Canadian brigadiersgeneral Peter Devlin and Jocelyn Lacroix sequentially commanding the Kabul multinational brigade (KMNB) in 2003 and 2004 respectively, and culminating in Lieutenant-General Rick Hilliers command of ISAF in February 2004. Canadas promise to send a 2000-strong battalion group to Kabul represented a new chapter for its commitment to Afghanistan, and coincided with NATOs command of ISAFthe first significant out-of-area operation

5 The decision to deploy CF personnel to Afghanistan appears to have surprised Canadian defence planners, who had plans to send a battle group to Iraq, and led to the resignation of one senior military officer. For a good overview of Canadian decision-making leading up to the Iraq War, see Andrew Richter, From trusted ally to suspicious neighbor: Canada-US relations in a changing global environment, The American Review of Canadian Studies (autumn 2005), 471-502. 6 Sean Maloney, Canadas new and dangerous mission in Afghanistan, Policy Options (March 2006): 98. For more on this mission, see Houchang Hassan-Yari, Canada in Afghanistan: Continuity and clarity, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 9, no. 1 (fall 2006), www.jmss.org.

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for the alliance. ISAF was initially a token 4500 personnel military presence in the city of Kabul, dwarfed by local militias and the 18,000-strong US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition. Under NATO leadership, and with the gentle prodding of Canada, this soon evolved into a significant stabilization force for the region (as opposed to the city) of Kabul, with a clear mandate to support the government of Hamad Karzai and with a good working relationship with American forces. Meanwhile, the OEF acted as a mobile striking power and, with its growing deployment of civil-military joint regional teams (which were soon renamed provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs), experimented with stability and reconstruction activities.7 This was combined with a security sector reform effort that by 2005 resulted in a 23,000-strong Afghanistan national army under American, British, and Canadian tutelage, alongside the demobilization of 61,000 Afghan fighters and the collection of 35,000 light weapons and 90 percent of the heavy weapons in Afghanistan.8 The PRT concept soon became a key component of ISAFs efforts to establish stability and governmental authority throughout the country. The growing synchronization between OEF and ISAF on the need for PRTs and joint civil-military stability operations, despite the American prioritization of the military component of the PRT structure, raises questions about the accuracy of any simplistic analogies differentiating a war-fighting OEF force and a peacekeeping or peace support ISAF force. The strategic goal of both forces has become the expansion of the de facto authority of the internationally recognized Karzai government throughout the country. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against neo-Taliban forces and other spoiler groupsconsisting of disparate remnants of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters alongside Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

7 Sean Maloney, Afghanistan four years on: An assessment, Parameters 27, no. 3 (autumn 2005): 21-32. The PRT concept would have as its initial origins the OEF coalitions establishment of the joint civil-military operations task force to coordinate civil affairs activities and coalition humanitarian cells, deployed to several urban areas. The CHLCs would be replaced by the JRTs, which was first created in November 2002 and would be quickly renamed PRTs on the advice of the Afghanistan government. See Mark Sedra, The provincial reconstruction team: The future of civil-military relations? SITREP 65, no. 3 (May-June 2005): 7-9, 16. 8 See Mark Sedra, Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The continued march towards implementation, Research paper 22, NATO Defense College, July-August 2005.

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group that remains loyal to the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyarremain an integral component of this approach. Canada continued to play a key role in this strategy. The CFs 2000strong ground troop contingent in Kabul, which was critical in expanding the writ of the Karzai government in the capital region, was scaled back to 750 troops by August 2004. By early 2005, the integration of ISAF and OEF operations was nearly complete, and ISAF soon assumed command over the American PRTs and much of the OEFs area of responsibility. The remaining CF personnel were withdrawn from camp Julian in Kabul, and Canada recommitted itself by replacing the American PRT in the very dangerous region of Kandahar. Ironically, this took place almost partly by accident. Canada had been given a choice of PRTs throughout Afghanistan, but internal squabbling within Ottawa delayed the decision until Kandahar, the hottest PRT in Afghanistan, became Canadas default position.9 Canadian forces operated temporarily operate under OEF command as part of Operation Archer until ISAF finally assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan in mid-2006. The PRT currently consists of 220 members from various governmental agencies, such as the CF, Foreign Affairs, International Trade Canada, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the RCMP, all of which are based at camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City. This PRT is supported by a robust 2000-strong military force that has undertaken force protection and combat/counterinsurgency operations against neo-Taliban adversaries. It is noteworthy that Canadian Brigadier-General David Fraser had command of the multinational brigade for regional command south, which is responsible for 6000 Canadian and ISAF troops from six nations. Stability operations to expand ISAF and the Afghan governments authority in Kandahar have been joined by an independent Canadian effort of state-building at the governmental level. The strategic advisory team Afghanistan (SAT-A) consists of a small 15-man CF unit that is stationed in Kabul under Operation Argus and assists the Karzai government on issues of governance and state-building, with a particular emphasis on capacitybuilding and the development of the Afghan national development strategy (ANDS). Military efforts may be the most visible manifestation of Canadas
9 Maloney, Canadas new and dangerous mission, 101. Other accounts emphasize the role that Canadian military figures such as General Rick Hillier had in advocating for the deployment of troops to Kandahar. See Bill Schiller, The road to Kandahar, Toronto Star, 9 September 2006.

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commitment to Afghanistan, but one should also not underestimate the role of Canadas development assistance as a means for the government to fulfill the ANDS. The Canadian military has undertaken a number of small aid projects and CIDA has recently allocated roughly $100-million per year. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper has promised a total allocation of $1 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan for 2001-11. Canada may have been late in promising development aid, and ambiguity continues on the actual implementation of this assistance, but Afghanistan appears destined to become the largest recipient of the countrys bilateral aid program.
CANADAS INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: DOCTRINE AND POLICY ISSUES

With the Conservative governments promise of an extension of the Canadian military commitment until 2009, Canada appears set to be engaged in the region for nearly a decade, and perhaps longer if the statements by high-level military leaders of a generational commitment prove prescient. Afghanistan seems destined to be the defining issue for key policymakers and strategists at both National Defence and Foreign Affairs in the early 21st century. It has given the country a bit more credibility in the corridors of Washington, especially since the US must deal with a renewed neo-Taliban insurgency at a time when its own military remains overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. There might not have been strategic planning on the Afghan deployments, but as Rob Huebert acknowledges, we may have just stumbled into the right place.10 Canada is on the front lines of preventing the countrys relapse into a failed state and terrorist sanctuary. As noted earlier, Canadian participation in post-Cold War stability campaigns, of which Afghanistan is the latest and perhaps most strategically vital, follows logically from its tradition of liberal internationalism. Functional isolationism may have been a default Canadian policy in the 1990s, marked as much by the decline of international good citizenship as by its increasingly lofty rhetoric, but the countrys voluntary commitment to Afghanistan in the post-9/11 period shows

10 Cited in John Geddes, Bullets fly, Ottawa ducks: How Canada slipped into a war that our leaders cantor wontexplain, Macleans, 25 August 2006.

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that the internationalist tradition is far from dead.11 Internationalism is, however, constrained by the limited strategic resources available to this country. Successive governments in the 1980s and 1990s were more concerned with deficit cutting than the maintenance of hard power assets. In that regard, the current Canadian zeal towards interventionism in Afghanistan provides strategic clarity on the doctrinal and operational underpinnings of Canadas international security policy. At the broadest level, Canadas commitment in Afghanistan reflects the human security agenda that was promulgated during Lloyd Axworthys tenure as minister of foreign affairs. Canadian leadership in the so-called Ottawa process that led to the mine ban treaty in 1997 remains the most prominent example of these initiatives. The creation of the International Criminal Court and the efforts on war-affected children and child soldiers would be the two other pillars of the human security agenda. It was also under Axworthys tenure that $1 million was allocated to establish a peacebuilding initiative, and cooperation would begin with other likeminded countries to form an overarching human security network.12 It is true that the rhetoric of human security soon declined, as Axworthy was replaced with more traditionally oriented foreign ministers. But it would be equally premature to assume that this agenda had no resonance within the Lester B. Pearson building in Ottawa. Recent Canadian interventionism in Afghanistan appears to be informed by the human security agenda. The need to safeguard the Afghans from violent and nonviolent threats is certainly an important component of this commitment, and is reflected in Canadas efforts to provide security and reconstruction through its PRT in Kandahar. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that this intervention takes people as its point of reference. The Canadian effort is focused on requirements for state-building in the region. It is no surprise that any discussion over an exit strategy

11 For more on Canadas approach during the 1990s, see Douglas A. Ross, Canadas functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal 54, no. 1 (winter 1998-99): 120-42; and Kim Richard Nossal, Pinchpenny diplomacy: The decline of good international citizenship in Canadian foreign policy, International Journal 54, no. 1 (winter 1998-99): 88-105. 12 David Dewitt, National Defence vs. Foreign Affairs: Culture clash in Canadas international security policy, International Journal 59, no. 3 (summer 2004): 585, 590-91.

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is based primarily on the need to develop a state with sufficient authority to govern its territory and prevent the country from becoming a source of international instability.13 Indeed, this is precisely the basis for ISAFs authorization and mandate under chapter VII of the UN charter and various UN security council resolutions. Canadas effort to put this agenda into operation in the form of a more limited doctrine, which can provide better guidelines for future interventions, is represented in the notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P). This idea (and its expression in operational doctrine) has its origins in the aftermath of the controversial 1999 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, at which time the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a new consensus on the problem of intervention and a blueprint for responding to humanitarian catastrophes. Axworthy, fresh from his position at Foreign Affairs, would take part in the newly formed International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and Canada would have an important leadership roleincluding funding and organization support in this commission. The resultant R2P document transformed the international discourse away from humanitarian intervention and towards the responsibility to protect, by which states are given the primary responsibility for human security and, if unwilling or unable to do so, this responsibility falls to the international community.14 The ICISS recommendations constitute an attempt to square a universalist human security agenda with an international society defined by more pluralistic notions of sovereign equality. R2P represents a limited return to precolonial definitions of sovereignty, which were based as much on the internal characteristics of sovereignty (i.e., de facto sovereignty) as by external recognition (i.e., de jure sovereignty). The degree to which this doctrine legitimizes various forms of state interferencewhich range from prevention to more intrusive military interventionsreveals the underlying

13 The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) has a list of eight requirements for any exit strategy, but only two of them (human rights and democratization) are primarily about normative human security notions. The other six, while certainly concerned about the actual well-being of the Afghan populace, are primarily based on the need for state-building. See Paul Manson, A Rational Exit Strategy for Afghanistan, CDA Commentary, 6, 2006, www.cda-cdai.ca. 14 See The responsibility to protect, report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Research Development Centre, 2001, www.iciss.ca.

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tension between these principles. Yet its proponents argue that R2P also has significant safeguards to prevent its misuse by states or governments pursuing military adventurism. These include just war requirements (e.g. jus ad bellum and jus in bello) and the need to obtain multilateral institutional legitimization, through the UN security council, the general assemblys uniting for peace resolution, or a regional security organization. Canada remains a significant proponent of R2P, with then-Prime Minister Paul Martin going so far as to embrace this doctrine in his address to the United Nations on 22 September 2004 and codifying its principles in the 2005 international policy statement (IPS). To be sure, Afghanistan might appear to be a curious case of R2P, given that it had originally begun as a US-led regime change and counterterrorism operation. Yet the mission has since morphed into a NATO-led, UN-mandated stabilization and reconstruction effort that at least complements the R2P principles.15 The central purpose of ISAFs stabilization efforts today is to rebuild the state of Afghanistan and extend the governments authority in order prevent the country from reverting back into a destabilizing failed state. To do so, Canada has not only undertaken stabilization missions in Kabul and especially Kandahar, but has sought to maximize its limited resources by developing an all-of-government or 3D approach that combines defending, diplomatic, and developmental efforts into an integrated operational strategy. This holistic approach to state-building and postconflict reconstruction has already caught the attention of policymakers in other NATO countries, and seems to fit logically with the joint civil-military PRT concept first pioneered by the OEF. Ironically, the 3D approach has its origins in the US Marine Corps concept of the three-block war, an operational combat doctrine that acknowledges the possibility that land forces could be engaged in combat operations against well-armed militia forces in one city block, stabilization operations in the next block, and humanitarian relief and reconstruction two blocks over.16

15 The R2Ps emphasis on internal sovereignty, however, does open the door for other sovereign duties aside from the responsibility to protect. For example, two American academics have argued for the inclusion of counterterrorism and WMD nonproliferation as two other sovereign duties that, in the event of failure, can also justify interventionism. See Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A duty to prevent, Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (January-February 2004). 16 Canadas international policy statement: A role of pride and influence in the worlddefence, Ottawa, 2005, 8.

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One should not, however, assume that this doctrine has become a central guide for the conduct of Canadian international security policy, either at present or in the future. Declaratory doctrine does not necessarily amount to actual policy. The Canadian governments response to the Darfur tragedy has been marked by both lofty R2P rhetoric and operational policy paralysis.17 This is a result of the insufficient resources necessary to undertake two major regional interventions. Canadian military resources are stretched in Afghanistan, and it would be imprudent to assume that the CF would be able to undertake simultaneously an equally difficult mission in Darfur. A fiasco similar to Operation Assurance in 1996, when Canada sought to lead a robust intervention in Zaire until it realized that it lacked the military capability, would surely be the result. But it is equally a result of an actual policy on intervention that, while conducive to R2P doctrinal principles and concerns over human security, is not solely dependent on doctrine for guidance. Canadas commitment to Afghanistan originated in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Terrorist sanctuaries do pose a direct threat to Canada, given that the possibility of an attack on Canadian soil is certainly not negligible. But Canadas military involvement was foremost a means to satisfy American security concerns. This relates to the defence against help strategy, whereby a small states military capability is used to persuade its larger neighbour that it will not pose a security liability. This concept is normally used with reference to the North American context. However, given the newfound sense of US vulnerability in the post-9/11 period, the onus was on Canada to assure the Americans that it took the terrorist threat equally as seriously. As Joel Sokolsky notes, part of that test included a willingness to send forces overseas to participate in the forward defence of the North American homeland.18 The Canadian decision to send a naval task force and limited ground troops in 2001-02 should therefore be seen as a prudent show of political support to the initial American response to 9/11. To do otherwise could have imperilled Canadas economic security, and the normative and reciprocal foundations of the Canada-US strategic relationship. A similar logic
17 See Kim Richard Nossal, Ear candy: Canadian policy toward humanitarian intervention and atrocity crimes in Darfur, International Journal 60, no. 4 (autumn 2005): 1017-32. 18 Joel J. Sokolsky, Clausewitz, Canadian Style? Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 3 (autumn 2002): 9.

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also underlies Canadas decision to redeploy a significant contingent of ground troops to Kabul in 2003. The desire to preempt any American requests for a Canadian military contribution to the Iraq War was joined with an equal interest in assuring the US that Canada was not a security liability. The Afghanistan mission would also be a NATO-led multilateral endeavour in 2003. This creates a more amenable environment for military interventionism by a Canada still enamoured with multilateralism, while making it potentially more difficult for any future disengagement from this commitment. The mission represented an important test case for NATO, which appears committed to developing an out-of-area stabilization role. NATO has been plagued by growing structural challenges, due to the combination of American strategic unilateralism and EU efforts to construct a European security and defence policy, and is only recently recovering from the severe transatlantic rift that preceded the Iraq War.19 The Canadian commitment to Afghanistan represents a strategically sensible means of buttressing a NATO endeavour that, with the apparent shortfalls in alliance member troop commitments to the south, appears to be on the precipice of being engulfed in another transatlantic crisis. The CF does not have the capability to undertake robust unilateral stability operations, and requires a coalition environment for the most effective contribution. This is reflected in Canadas recent history of stability operations, from the Balkans to Afghanistan, and the growing acceptance of interoperability as a key component of the CFs force development and doctrine. Yet the current commitment also seems rooted in the Canadian desire to obtain a seat at the table.20 The CFs robust combat operations in Afghanistan reflects, at least in part, an attempt by Ottawa to ante up in order to recover Canadian credibility with its transatlantic allies. It is too early to say whether an effective Canadian voice has been recovered, and if so, whether Ottawa has been sufficiently adroit to strategically leverage its role. But at a time when it is concerned over the military commitment of its members, it is noteworthy that Washington has praised Canada (alongside

19 See Charles C. Pentland, Odd man in: Canada and the transatlantic crisis, International Journal 59, no. 1 (winter 2003-04): 145-66. 20 See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, From defence against help to a piece of the action: The Canadian sovereignty and security paradox revisited, CMSS occasional paper 1, May 2000.

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Britain and the Netherlands) and admonished other NATO countries for their lack of commitments or their stringent rules of engagement caveats.21
CF EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITIES AND THE PARADOX OF AFGHANISTAN

The CF has been plagued by chronic underfunding and increasingly dilapidated equipment, with scarce resources used to fund a high operational tempo and equipment maintenance rather than much needed capital replacement. Yet there is little doubt that Canada has been using its limited strategic capabilities in Afghanistan to play above its weight. Indeed, the military clashes between CF and neo-Taliban insurgents are unprecedented in terms of both operational complexity and combat severity. While Afghanistan might represent the only game in town, Canadas military commitment to Kandahar shows that Ottawa in effect has put all its chips on the table. This game does have some high risks, as Canada is finding with its growing list of military casualties, which in 2006-07 was running at five times the rate of other foreign forces. But one should not underestimate the consequences of this commitment for Canadas international security policy. Perhaps most importantly, the high tempo of current combat operationsand the dangers to Canadian soldiers associated with such action have placed a renewed emphasis on the need to maintain and expand the CFs expeditionary capabilities. As two well-respected defence analysts have argued, the high level of military operations in the post-Cold War period have transformed the capability-commitment gap from a hypothetical situation during the Cold War to a very real and pressing situation today. When you dispatch forces to dangerous placesyou had better make sure that you can protect not only the people you are helping, but your own forces as well.22 The Afghanistan commitment promises to be long in duration and severe in intensity, and represents an important if paradoxical strategic context for the current efforts at CF transformation by senior military and political leaders.

21 See the comments by Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, in Paul Koring, US backs NATO troop plea, Globe and Mail, 22 November 2006. 22 Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, Lloyd Axworthys legacy: Human security and the rescue of Canadian defence policy, International Journal 56, no. 1 (Winter 2000-01): 13.

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The 2005 IPS, while often given to lofty platitudes on Canadas unique values and internationalist traditions, was clear about the need to reinvest in the countrys core 3D capabilities. As Martin acknowledged in the foreword to the document, during the nineties, there were more cutbacks as our government made tough decisions to save the country from financial calamity. As a result, our international presence has suffered. The Conservative government may be less willing to repeat the previous governments rhetoric on these issues, but there is little doubt that they share the notion that we are now in a position to reinvest in our international role.23 The defence policy statement (DPS) constitutes Hilliers proposal for a reinvigorated Canadian Forces. While the Conservatives are keen to reinforce a sovereignty-oriented Canada first defence strategy, the ongoing operation in Afghanistan creates constant pressure on the need for expeditionary forces and may be highly conducive to the realization of the DPS. The DPS offers a particularly compelling vision of a CF expeditionary force that, while limited in resources and capability, would be redesigned for an important role in future coalition operations. Canada expeditionary force command (CEFCOM), an operationally focused command, was created as a means to integrate and focus global CF operations.24 CEFCOM would have at its disposal different task groups for rapid deployment. The special operations task force (SOTF) represents the sharp end of this capability, and consists of an expanded JTF-2 force and the newly created second-tier Canadian special operations regiment, the latter of which will be a 750-strong regiment that has similar reconnaissance and direct action capabilities as the US Army Rangers. The SOTF would be joined by a standing contingency force (SCF) consisting of designated land, air, maritime, and special operations forces capable of amphibious land and sea operations within littoral regions. The SCF is envisioned to be up to 2800-strong, with a land force component of approximately 500-600, which could be pre-positioned in various locations and held at 10 days readiness for urgent deployments. Strategic sealift capability will be provide by a yet-to-be-determined amphibious ship, colloquially termed a big honking ship (BHS) by General Hillier, while the recent

23 International policy statement: Overview. 24 This was joined by other operationally focused commands include Canada command (CANCOM), Canada special operations command (CANSOFCOM), and Canada operational support command (CANOSCOM).

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announcement of the planned acquisition of medium- to heavy-lift helicopterslikely the CH-47 Chinookwill give the SCF a tactical airlift capability.25 Further mobility will be provided by the acquisition of four C-17 Globemaster strategic lift aircraft, alongside the two proposed joint support ships capable of some modest lift and support capability. While the SOTF will be designed for high-intensity intervention operations, the SCF is intended for flexible and limited duration full spectrum operations ranging from presence and stability activities to limited war-fighting.26 The CFs transformation appears poised to reflect a strong emphasis on long-range, rapid-reaction expeditionary forces. This entails not only the prioritization of strategic lift capability by the air force and navy, but an equally important expansion of the armys capability, in both numbers of personnel and equipment. This has led to a planned 15,000 increase in the number of regular forces, with specific emphasis on the army, for a total of 75,000, alongside an additional 10,000 reservists. Robust stability operations, in partnership with the interoperable military forces of Canadas allies, would be the primary mission for such a force structure. As Canadas recent combat experience in Afghanistan has shown, stability campaigns may involve intense combat operations and require robust intervention capabilities that would not be out of place in high-intensity war-fighting operations against conventional adversaries (though possibly more ideal for the inevitable post-conflict stabilization phase). To be sure, the emphasis in the defence policy statement on the projection of land forces abroad has cre-

25 The amphibious BHS is the critical platform for the SCF: whether this platform is listed in the upcoming defence capabilities plan will provide an important indicator of the Conservative governments acceptance of expeditionary forces. The current government has, however, budgeted resources for a tactical lift capability. This will likely be the CH-47 Chinook, though an alternative tactical airlift option is the Marine Corps CH-53 Sea Stallion, which has the added advantage of being shipboard compatible and designed for amphibious operations. 26 R. D. Bradford, An amphibious task group for the SCTF, Canadian Naval Review 2, no. 2 (summer 2006): 16. Further information on the SCF can be found in the chief of defence action team 3 report. See executive summary, CDS action team 3 report, www.cds.forces.ca.

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ated some anxiety among the two other services.27 Yet the DPS vision appears to be a necessary and strategically savvy measure to prevent the further erosion of Canadas expeditionary capability at a time of limited strategic resources. By doing so, Canada would have sufficiently robust and selfcontained forces to play leadership roles in coalition operations like Afghanistan, and would thereby reinforce Ottawas limited political capital among the power brokers in Washington. The DPS uses R2P as the doctrinal rationale for the Canadian forces expeditionary capabilities. One should, however, be cautious when examining any publicly articulated reasons for such an expeditionary capability. On one hand, while Afghanistan may indeed have been a failed state, there are various other reasonssome more self-interested than othersfor Canadas military engagement in that country. Canadas operational intervention policy is not necessarily dependent on publicly articulated doctrines. On the other hand, expeditionary capabilities also promise to be sufficiently robust as to be useful in other scenarios. The DPS goes on to note other international security issues where the CF may have a role to play, including WMD proliferation, global terrorism, and regional flashpoints. Doctrines only partly inform operational policy and may be transformed with the advent of new governmentssuch as the Conservativesbut the successful redesign of the CF would in itself expand Canadas international security options. Indeed, the CF must not only undertake onerous combat operations in Afghanistan with dilapidated equipment, but it must do so while attempting to transform itself into a more lethal expeditionary force. The successful completion of either task would be, in itself, an impressive achievement. But, paradoxically, Afghanistan also created an ongoing strategic context that clearly prioritizes the further development of expeditionary capabilities. By consistently showing the government and public the risks associated with military operations, Canadas role in Afghanistan creates pressure on the government to fulfill its publicly stated promises to revitalize the CF and prevent unnecessary combat casualties.
27 This does not necessarily mean that the DPS has only negative consequences for the other services. For example, the prioritization of expeditionary capabilities would still entail a robust blue-water naval capability, and is complementary to the navys interest in littoral warfare. See Richard Gimblett, The defence policy statement: Implications for the Canadian navy, RCMI Commentary, May 2005, www.rcmi.org.

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Numerous challenges are, however, visible on the horizon. One should not be totally sanguine that the consecutive budgetary promises of the previous Liberal and current Conservative governments will be fulfilled. It was welcome news that the Conservative budgetary promises will be applied over the Liberal increases, which means that the CF budget will have be increased sooner rather than later (with an estimated $2.5-billion infusion by 2007-08). If the 2009-11 budgetary promises actually take place, the CF would be infused with an additional $15 billion. Yet Canada is limited by consecutive minority governments that are notorious for their instability and political motivation, while there remains continuing uncertainty over the long-term sustainability of the expected budgetary increases. The CFDS, according to recent leaks, seems to support such a bleak picture. The CFs budget is expected to increase to $36.5 billion in 2025 that, if one calculates inflation and the growth in the Canadian economy, does not represent as significant an infusion of resources as it may initially appear. In the short- to medium-term, the CFDS apparently advocates a general reduction in key CF capabilities, especially for the navy and air force, alongside the delay of major recapitalization projects several years into the future. The recent acquisitions in strategic and tactical airlift, rather than the start of a major rearmament program, may be seen retrospectively as simply another false start to the CFs rejuvenation.28 Moreover, while Afghanistan does provide an important impetus towards the need for expeditionary capabilities, it also represents a significant gamble. If the current mission maintains its high operational tempo, requirements for operations and maintenance, alongside urgent short-term mission-specific capital acquisitions, likely will take precedence over longterm recapitalization. The CF requires consecutive budgetary increases that the current government has promised, and also an immediate and long-

28 The draft CFDS advocates the elimination of six Aurora maritime patrol aircraft, 25 percent of the Griffon helicopter fleet, one Iroquois-class destroyer and two Protecteur-class refuelling and supply ships. Meanwhile, the continued delay in recapitalization projects raises questions on the governments commitment to fund replacements for major capability platforms. This includes future surface carriers to replace the navys ageing destroyer and frigate fleet, a direct-fire platform to replace the armys Leopard tanks and now cancelled mobile gun system (MGS), and a fighter aircraft replacement for the air forces CF-18s. See David Pugliese, Forces want to scrap gear, save for new, Ottawa Citizen, 31 January 2007, and Colin Kenny, Defending Canada on the cheap, Ottawa Citizen, 5 February 2007.

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term recapitalization plan to manage the major platform rust-out crisis. If CF casualties increase, the Canadian government might be under pressure to withdraw its forces and reassess its internationalist role. Internationalist rhetoric might be retained, but a more regional and continental approach to Canadas international security policywith overtones of neo-isolationismcould be the eventual outcome. Two strategically ominous situations can be imagined. On one hand, NATO (and especially American) pressure on Pakistan to halt its assistance to neo-Taliban forces could result in the internal destabilization of Pakistan itself. The worst-case scenario would be the rise of a fundamentalist Pakistani government and the potential haemorrhaging of Pakistani WMD capabilities to various state and nonstate actors. But even the best case would be a reinvigorated neo-Taliban insurgency that expands into the northwestern parts of Pakistan, and which necessitates NATO counterinsurgency and hot pursuit operations directly into Pakistan. On the other hand, the further deterioration of Iraq could result in American and British military disengagement from Afghanistan in order to reinforce their positions in the more strategically vital Persian Gulf region. The commensurate weakening of the NATO forces could lead to the gradual departure of various Alliance members from ISAF, alongside a renewed neo-Taliban insurgency campaign. The direct dangers to CF deployments, and the indirect challenges posed by such regional destabilization, make Canadas role in stability operations in Kandahar a high-risk commitment. Afghanistan could become the albatross around Hilliers neck and the tombstone of Canadian internationalism.
CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY OPTIONS

Canadas role in Afghanistan has provided a degree of strategic clarity on the complex nature of Canadian interventionism. The current stability operation is informed by doctrinal concerns over human security and R2P principles, but Canadian operational policy remains heavily guided by the selfinterested need both to assuage American security concerns and to have greater credibility with its allies. The disjunction between doctrine and policy has contributed to the confusion on Canadas exact role in Afghanistan, especially the need to conduct aggressive combat and counterinsurgency operations while expanding efforts at stabilization and reconstruction. The stability campaign in Afghanistan constitutes a strategic environment that could facilitate Hilliers redesign of the CF. But it also constitutes a high

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risk gamble that, if it continues to escalate in intensity and duration, could curtail any strategic plans for military transformation. Notwithstanding the uncertain prospects of Hilliers vision, it is important not to underestimate the urgent need to develop robust expeditionary capabilities in the post-9/11 period. An expeditionary CF represents the minimal means to exercise some modicum of a strategy of influence, as limited and modest as any such approach would be, towards the United States. While Canada sleptto borrow Andrew Cohens phrasein selfcongratulatory narcissism, a fundamental reassessment of American grand strategy was taking place south of the border throughout the 1990s. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross have identified four schools of thought on the issue: neo-isolationism, which would result in global disengagement and significantly reduced defence commitments/spending; the traditional realist notion of selective engagement, which would result in a more selective overseas commitment, based on a clear delineation of American national interests and cognizant of the need to act as a balancer among the great powers in Eurasia; cooperative security, which recognizes strategic interdependence in an age marked by WMD proliferation and the need for robust multilateral interventionist policies; and primacy, which inextricably links American security to its unipolar global supremacy and envisions highly aggressive policies to roll back potential peer competitors and to extend indefinitely such supremacy. Strategic clarity returned in the aftermath of 9/11, when security addiction created an environment conducive to a maximalist US international security policy and resulted in bipartisan consensus on the need for a primacist grand strategy.29 An effective strategy of influence must feed into the existing categories of strategic thought already in play in the larger polity and work to strengthen those schools of thought on international security that are most

29 See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing visions for US grand strategy, International Security 21, no. 3 (winter 1996-97): 5-53; and Barry R. Posen, Command of the commons: The military foundation of US hegemony, International Security 28, no. 1 (summer 2003): 6. For more on security addiction, see Frank P. Harvey, Addicted to security: Globalized terrorism and the inevitability of American unilateralism, International Journal 59, no. 1 (winter 2003-04): 1-37.

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likely to enhance, directly or indirectly, the security of the smaller power.30 Any expansion of Canadas expeditionary capabilities would certainly be welcomed by a Washington eager to expand its strategic influence abroad and represents a critical means of staying independent in an era in which our neighbour to the south is an imperial power engaging in a particularly unilateral definition of its foreign policy.31 A greater Canadian capacity to participate in US-led coalitions of the willingincluding both the initial high-end combat-phase of the intervention and the subsequent robust postconflict stability phase of the operationwould show that the countrys tendency for free-riding does have its limits. More importantly, in the critical moment when imperial overstretch is no longer just a hypothetical possibility, this greater expeditionary capacity could preempt any latent American arguments for neo-isolationism as a means of countering both international threats and the lack of allied burden sharing. Indeed, Canadas engagement in Afghanistan and its haphazard movement towards redesigning the CF should be seen as a preliminary (albeit insufficient) attempt to implement such a strategy. Yet Washingtons infatuation with primacy, while tempered by the sobering experience of regime change in Iraq and the spectre of imperial overstretch, should be of concern for a middle power still wedded to notions of liberal internationalism. The outcome of aggressive interventionism inherent in any primacist strategy could lead to the exacerbation, rather than diminution, of the global terrorist threat: the terrorist use of WMD against the US, or possibly its even more vulnerable western allies, could be the end result. Imperial overstretch could lead to global disengagement and a return of isolationist sentiment, with the severe strategic repercussions that any such neo-isolationist strategy would entail. Even the best-case scenario, that of a natural return of geostrategic rivalry among the great powers, especially vis--vis China and Russia, would not necessarily be in Canadas strategic interest.
30 Douglas A. Ross and Christopher N. B. Ross, From neo-isolationism to imperial liberalism: Grand strategy options in the American international security debate and the implications for Canada, in David S. McDonough and Douglas A. Ross, eds., The Dilemmas of American Strategic Primacy: Implications for the Future of Canadian-American Cooperation (Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2005), 166. 31 Michael Ignatieff, Canada in the age of terror: Multilateralism meets a moment of truth, Policy Options 24 (February 2003): 15.

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Canada might have neither the capability to balance a primacist United States, nor the strategic interest, nor inclination to do so. But it might be able to engage in a limited form of leash-slipping that Christopher Layne describes as acquiring the capability to act independent of the United States in the realm of security in order to slip free of the hegemons leashlike grip and gain the leverage needed to compel the United States to respect their foreign policy interests.32 At the very least, Canada could gain a greater ability to be more selective in giving its symbolic endorsement and political legitimacy to US policies, with the possibility of obtaining some quid quo pro in return for such support. Ottawa would be able to participate directly and more robustly in, and hence legitimize, operations that reflect its own preferences for an American grand strategy, the most feasible being cooperative securitywith its emphasis on humanitarian interventions and multilateral counterproliferation campaignsor selective engagement with its more prudential requirements on the use of force. The US rightly is alarmed by the threat posed by WMD proliferation, global terrorism, and failed states. Canada must recognize that the development of hard power assets is a necessary component to deal with the current challenges in cooperation with its allies, not least of which is the United States. While cooperative security is highly complementary to Canadian tradition, it also demands a serious Canadian commitment to the management of major international security issues, including the allocation of sufficient resources for a robust interventionist capability. The current plans to redesign the CF into an expeditionary force may be limited and far from ideal, but these are a necessary step in the right direction though a more sustained commitment and strategic outlook must also be realized. Canada would only have a junior voice at the table, but effective expeditionary capabilities would finally allow it to be heardif not heededby its superpower neighbour.

32 Christopher Layne, The unipolar illusion revisited: The coming end of the United States unipolar moment, International Security 31, no. 2 (fall 2006): 29-30.

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