Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I. Introduction
B. We are not part of the congressional "Joint Inquiry" whose report has been
in the news recently. The Joint Inquiry's mandate is more limited and
narrower than our mandate. The Joint Inquiry's investigation was limited
to the review of intelligence agencies' actions and the collection of
counterterrorism intelligence prior to the 9-11 attacks. We have a much
broader mandate, namely, to review the "facts and circumstances
surrounding" the 9-11 attacks. Among other areas of inquiry, our
Commission is looking at airport security, the FAA's interaction with the
four hijacked aircraft, the military's response to the attacks, the national
leadership's response to the attacks and U.S. immigration policies prior to
9-11.
E. We will use the information that we obtain from you in today's interview
to assist the Commissioners prepare their report to Congress and the
President. In this regard, we need to accurately record the information you
give us today. For that reason, the Commission's rule is to tape record all
interviews. A Memorandum for the Record ("MFR") will be created
following your interview and you will not be permitted to review this
MFR because of the time constraints faced by the Commission.
F. We appreciate you taking the time to meet with us today and tell us about
your job in general as well as your specific job experience on 9-11. We
trust that you understand the ground rules for the interview. Before we
begin the interview, do you have any questions about why we are here and
what we are doing? Did anyone discuss the subject matter of today's
interview with you prior to today? If so, who? Did anyone at the FAA or
elsewhere instruct you not to discuss or to discuss certain subject matters
today? If so, who? What subject matters?
C. What positions have you held? What period of time did you hold each
position?
D. What position did you hold on 9/11/01? How long prior to 9-11 did you
hold that position?
E. What classroom and/or field training did you receive to prepare you for
each position you have held?
B. Who was your immediate supervisor on 9-11? Was he/she present that
morning? If you know, describe his/her role.
E. How many aircraft were you responsible for handling on the morning of 9-
11?
H. Prior to 9-11, how often would you lose radio contact with an aircraft?
Approximately what percentage of the time was the lost radio contact
attributable to technical or mechanical failures? Percentage attributable to
non-mechanical failures?
I. Prior to 9-11, what is the longest passage of time that you lost radio
contact with a commercial aircraft? What is the longest time one of your
colleagues has lost radio contact with a commercial aircraft?
J. Prior to 9-11, what was the FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft
that stopped transmitting its transponder code?
K. Prior to 9-11, how often would you lose the transponder signal (i.e., mode
three code) of a commercial aircraft? How often was the loss of
transponder signal attributable to mechanical or technical failures? How
often was it attributable to something more serious like cockpit invasion,
hijacking or other criminal activity?
N. Prior to 9-11, what was FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft that
deviated slightly from its intended course? What about an aircraft that
deviated substantially from its intended course?
O. Prior to 9-11, how many times have you handled a commercial aircraft
that deviated substantially from its intended course? What were the
reasons for the aircraft's deviation?
P. Prior to 9-11, was there an FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft
that deviated substantially from its course and was NORDO? What was
the SOP?
Q. Prior to 9-11, how many times have you handled a commercial aircraft
that deviated substantially from its intended course and was NORDO?
What were the circumstances that caused such events?
R. Prior to 9-11, was there an FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft
that deviated substantially from its course, was NORDO and lost its
transponder signal? What was the SOP?
S. Prior to 9-11, how many times had you handled a commercial aircraft that
deviated substantially from its intended course, was NORDO and without
a transponder signal? What were the circumstances that caused such
events?
T. Prior to 9-11, what was FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft that
was deemed a hijacked aircraft? What was the SOP for notification to
FAA supervisors? What was FAA SOP for notification to the military?
NEADS?
U. Prior to 9-11, what was FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft that
was NORDO, without a transponder signal, deviated substantially from its
course and was deemed a hijacked aircraft?
D. What region of airspace were you responsible for on 9-11? What altitude
did you control?
F. What parts of the flight path of American Airlines Flight 11 were you
scheduled to control?
H. Did there come a point in time when you determined something was
unusual or suspicious with respect to the operation of AA 11? When did
you make that determination? What event(s) caused you to reach that
conclusion? What actions did you take?
I. When did you determine that AA 11 was NORDO? Were there FAA
SOPs regarding how to handle an aircraft that was NORDO? What was
the SOP for this situation? What actions did you take when you discovered
AA 11 was NORDO?
J. Did there come a time when you determined that AA 11 was NORDO and
had no transponder signal? What actions did you take when you
discovered AA 11 was NORDO and had no transponder signal? Were
your actions guided by FAA SOP?
K. Was AA 11 still following its intended flight path when it first went
NORDO?
L. Was AA 11 still following its intended flight path when the FAA first lost
its transponder signal?
N. Had you ever participated in an exercise (i.e., test drill) concerning the
control of a commercial aircraft that was NORDO for more than five
minutes?
O. Had you ever participated in an exercise (i.e., test drill) concerning the
control of a commercial aircraft that was NORDO and had lost its
transponder signal for more than a few minutes? What about an aircraft
that had substantially deviated from its course in addition to loss of radio
contact and transponder signal?
P. On 9-11, did there come a time when you or another FAA employee
deemed that AA 11 had probably been hijacked? When was that
determined? Who made the determination? What was the determination
based on?
Q. Prior to 9-11, had you ever participated in an exercise (i.e., test drill) that
involved the military's intercept of a hijacked commercial aircraft? How
about the military intercept of a hijacked commercial aircraft that was
NORDO, lost its transponder signal and had substantially deviated from
its intended course?
R. Prior to 9-11, had you ever participated in an exercise that involved the
military's intercept of a commercial aircraft hijacked by terrorists who
planned to crash the planes into buildings in the U.S.? Had you ever
received or heard about any internal or external intelligence reports, FAA
information circulars or Security Notices that described such a scenario?
T. What was the SOP for military notification? How was the military first
notified about AA 11? If you know, who at the FAA Boston Center first
notified the military about AA 11? Why did Boston ARTCC personnel
bypass protocol for hijacking notifications and call NEADS directly?
U. What capabilities, if any, did you have to determine the altitude and speed
of AA 11 in the absence of a transponder signal? Could you determine the
precise direction of AA 11 after the transponder was shut off? When an
aircraft changes its transponder code like UAL 175 did, what effect does it
have on your ability to track the aircraft (i.e., how, if at all, does it change
the data on your radar screen)?
V. Did there come a time prior to the media report of the first WTC crash
that you felt this was not the normal hijacking scenario (e.g., a hijacking
for ransom or political asylum)? What factors led you to believe that the
situation aboard AA 11 was much more ominous than the traditional
hijacking scenario?
Z. Explore the rebirth of AA 11. What capabilities, if any, did you have to
determine whether AA 11 had crashed somewhere in NYC or if it was still
airborne? Explore direct and indirect knowledge of FAA or NORAD
reports that AA 11 was airborne after 8:46 a.m. and the basis for such
reports.
AA. Describe the specific facts and circumstances that influenced the
timing of your FAA center's decision to ground all departures? Describe
the specific facts and circumstances that influenced the timing of your
FAA center's decision to declare ATC zero? Was there established
protocol for these decisions on 9-11? If so, did your facility practice for
this scenario? If not, is there protocol today to govern these decisions and
are they practiced?
CC. Discuss aspects of FAA Order to Ground all airborne aircraft. Had
you ever practiced implementing such an Order? Was there a plan in
place to implement the order to ground all traffic? If not, describe how the
ground stop was achieved without any incidents or accidents. Did
someone devise an ad hoc plan on 9-11 to ground all traffic? Is there a
written plan today? Is it practiced?
FF. Do you believe the FAA system in place on 9-11 to control aircraft
and respond to a potential hijacking contained the mechanisms (e.g.,
training, equipment, technology, etc.,) necessary to effectively respond to
the events of 9-11? If not, explain. What kind of training, equipment,
etc., do you believe was not in place? What lessons, if any, did you learn
from the events of 9-11 as they impacted your job?
GG. Describe (in your opinion) the most significant FAA policy
changes and SOP changes that have occurred since 9-11 that you believe
better prepares the FAA to handle events similar to those of 9-11 were
they to occur again.
II. Do you believe that your role as an FAA controller today has changed
from what that role was on the morning of 9-11? If so, how has your role
changed? Are you adequately prepared and trained to deal with your role
today? If not, what are you lacking?
JJ. Explore the nature of interaction between the FAA and the Military
(e.g., NEADS) prior to 9-11? After 9-11?
KK. Are there any recommendations you would propose that this
commission should make to Congress for changes within the FAA, the
military air defense system or the airline industry to better prepare the
country to defend against future terrorist attacks?
LL.If you recall any information after today's interview that you did not
discuss with us today, you believe is important and think the Commission
should know about, please contact me or someone at the Commission and
let us know.