De aanval op Fleury

Verdun have been called WW1s Stalingrad and not without reason. Between 400.000 and 600.000 men lost their lives during the fighting at Verdun. The battle started as a small operation with nine German divisions. But it grew huge, in the ten months the battle lasted three-quarter of the French army visited Verdun. Intro: I have in the last couple of months tried to find out what was the decisive factors for Das Alpenkorps success in taking Fleury on June 23rd 1916 at Verdun. Some sections in the analysis have been left out because I found them not important here. The analysis of grounds, the plan and the manoeuvre have been left out. This is in short what I found out. I have looked at the situation of Das Alpenkorps and the situation of the French units they attacked. The area was defended by units from the 130th division. And it is only the period upto when they take Fleury. Das Alpenkorps attack was a smaller part of a larger attack that was to take dominating positions, from where the Germans could force the French to surrender Verdun. Das Alpenkorps had to depend on its neighbours success as well. And this is the reason to why they were unable to hold the gained grounds later on the 23rd/24th.

The units situation: In general: Das Alpenkorps was an elite unit in the German army, and was considered amongst the very best troops in the German army. Their training was demanding and good. Compared with their enemy who were conscripts they had a huge advantage. French divisions with the numbers of 100 and above were divisions that had been reorganized after 1915, this meant that the education of the French troops in 130th division wasnt very good. And the French army had, in 1915, lost upto 50% of its officers, which must have had a huge effect on the training of the units and the leading of them in battle. This could be a decisive factor.

Education and training: Das Alpenkorps had been resting a month prior to the action at Verdun. Furthermore they had been training fighting in trenches like those at Verdun in upto division scale. This meant that they knew how (on their backbone) supported who, who attacked and gave them the possibility of attacking with greater pace. The French on the other hand had been fighting in the same area for months and were fed up with fighting in trenches. The French moral were much worst than the one of the Germans. The general education and the training upto Verdun could be a decisive factor. Weapons and support: Small arms: By comparing the machineguns used at Verdun at the time, I found that the Germans had a small advantage, but not enough to make it a decisive factor. The rifles used had more or less the same capacity and were therefore not a decisive factor. Support: Das Alpenkorps had a support from 50 pieces (that is twice the normal amount). The battle of Verdun was dominated by the massive use of artillery. On the 23rd the Ger-mans had used a new kind of poisons gas (Grnkreuz), a gas the French gasmasks werent effective against. This gas was used against the French artillery and the next days objectives, this meant that on the morning on the 23rd the French artillery had ceased fire, and the only pieces firing were the German ones. The French were therefore unable to use their, by the Germans feared, Sperrfeuer. It gave the Germans the possibility of attacking with greater pace than what was normal. The Germans had developed a doctrine where the artillery laid a barrage of fire just in front of the attacking infantry. This made it hard for the defending French to engage the attack-ers. Both the use of gas and moving barrage could be decisive factors. All units had Stosstrups attached, but because of the massive use of gas they were unable to infiltrate prior to the attack and they were therefore not decisive. The weather: The weather on the 22/23rd was without wind and was hot sunny. This meant that the gas didnt move and lay still making it impossible for the French to get supplies and reserves forwarded. Furthermore the troops were getting dehydrated thus not very combat ready. This could be a decisive factor. Conclusion: The use of gas, together with the calm and warm weather caused that the French units were unable to get neither supplies nor reserves forwarded. It also meant that they were unable to make use of the Sperrfeuer. This meant that the attack wasnt slowed by the French artillery. This was a decisive factor. The German use of moving barrage, the corporation between the infantry and the artillery hindered the French in engaging the attack before it was over them. This has without a doubt been a decisive factor to the success. Das Alpenkorps education and training prior to Verdun were far better than what were nor-mal. This made it possible to attack with greater pace than what the defenders were used to, thus surprising them. The fact that they had been educated together and that they were part of a standing unit meant that they had trained the drills better thus acting as a hole. This must be a decisive factor. Therefore I think that the high educational and training standard made it possible for them to make use of the moving barrage, together with the effect the gas had on the French prior to the attack were the decisive factors. It made it possible for them to attack with great pace thus surprising the defenders on their way against their goal. Outtro: The attack the 23rd brought the Germans close to Verdun, but due to lack of resources and reserves being forwarded the last great German chance of taking Verdun had passed. The German misfortune continued: On the 24th the preparation fire for the Somme began, and the

battle the 23rd were what the American politicians needed to get convinced that it did make a difference to participate in the war. The war became a real world war.

Prinz Heinrich of Bavaria and the third battalion of the Bavarian Leib Regimen (I.L.R.) on 23 June 1916.
This article is on the German attack of the second and third battalion (especially the third) on the village of Fleury in 1916 and about the Bavarian Prinz Heinrich. On 23 June 1916 the battalions of the I.L.R. as mentioned above succeeded in taking almost the whole village of Fleury. Besides that a part of the attackers succeeded in attacking further to the so-called Filzlausstellung. A position to the Southwest of Fleury, which from the air had the shape of a louse. A quotation from the article: Another German report that day stated that the soldiers of the prince hat pushed on to the Filzlausstellung. That the fighting in this area was fierce notes the French soldier Lon Rogez: Above the Poudrire of Fleury the Germans reach at a distance of fifty meters a battery of the artillery that is surrounded by several soldiers of the Regiment Infantry 39 (R.I. 39). In spite of the fact that the shelters were destroyed they managed to get machine gunfire on the enemy which stops their attack. Lieutenant Boisdon of the 10th company of R.I. 39: A relieve of four hours under poisoned gasgranates While reaching the lines I had already lost half of my men. On 11 am I got the order to go to the position west of Fleury and stop the progress of the enemy. In quick march we crossed the ravine of the Pourdrire and with the bayonets mounted on our rifles we climbed while shooting up the hill. We came just on time. The enemy was at a distance of fifty meters of two 75 millimetre guns of which the crew fired with courage. The surprised Germans were stopped. They jumped from shell hole to shell hole and we followed them while firing. In this condition we reached the top that I had to hold. Vizefeldwebel Rotthaler of the twelfth company passed with soldiers of Sturmbattailon Rohr the artillery line and arrived at the Filzlausstellung. Arrived he concluded that it was a good constructed, not much damaged position with narrow trenches. Because of not getting any support and under friendly fire, they decided to return. Later that day another group of ninth and fifth company reached the position but had to return also because of the same reason. Another source states that a part of the troops went in the direction of the position but had to stop because of flanking machine gunfire from the left and the right.

The attack on the Filzlausstellung. The French artillery position is clearly visible. The position on the map M is the Poudrire.

Later the writer P.C. Ettighofer wrote that the soldiers of the Leib regiment took the Filzlausstellung and not only that but also saw the city of Verdun and shot directly into the city: The Field grey soldiers in the position Filzlaus lift their filthy rifles, aim the barrel into the air and shoot at the highest angle into the city of Verdun. And two heavy machineguns arrive and than another one. The three guns were installed. Not much later the three machineguns shoot at Verdun. The fortress on the Meuse River, the heart of the battle of attrition, even more, the heart of France, is under German machine gunfire - - - There is no way the German effort, of Bavarian indestructible spirit of attack, can be shown. If one imagines this it must have been an impressive spectacle. William Marin writes eventually in his book on Verdun: By the end of the day, Bavarian machine gunners were firing admittedly, at long range into the streets of Verdun. The events, as mentioned above are however not similar to the German sources of the I.L.R. These sources dont mention this event. They dont indicate that the Germans took the position. Moreover the sources both dont indicate that from this position one could see the city of Verdun. Finally the sources dont indicate that the Germans shot directly into the city itself. Between the city and the Filzlaus lays a ridge. On this ridge lays in the west the fort of Belleville and in the east the fort of St. Michel. If one reconstructs the situation than the only conclusion can be that from the position it is not possible to see the city of Verdun or moreover to shoot into the city. This is because the ridge largely is higher or the same height as the hill of the Filzlaus.