Indian Logic and Medieval Western Logic: The Interactive and Epistemological Turn

Sara L. Uckelman
Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam S.L.Uckelman@uva.nl

Abstract. Many unique features of logic in the Navya-Ny aya tradition which have their origin in features of Sanskrit grammar and usage can also be found in the logical tradition of medieval Western Europe, yet the medieval western and Indian traditions are wholly distinct. It is a commonplace that both medieval logic and Indian logic do not generally resemble modern (Fregean) mathematical logic, yet recently scholars of logic have had much success using the tools and techniques of modern mathematical logic in order to understand the formal, regimented, but nevertheless not generally symbolic, systems of medieval logic. In this paper we highlight some of the shared features of medieval logic and Indian logic. These similarities suggest that the same modern logical tools can be used to shed light on Indian theories.

Introduction

The tradition of logic in medieval India is often contrasted with the tradition of logic in the West, both the traditional logic of ancient Greece and the modern developments of mathematical logic. Pahi describes the dierences between the Indian and western traditions as follows: The mainstream of western logic has been primarily concerned with the characterization and systematization of valid modes of deductive inference. It began in Greece as a deduction-centered discipline (nigamanakendrita s astra ) and has basically continued to remain so throughout its history. Logic in India though concerned with the problem of validity of inference (anum ana pram an . a ) as a mode of justication of knowledge claims, has focused primarily on the relation of pervasion (vy aptikendrita s astra ) [1, p. 235].
The author was funded by the NWO project Dialogical Foundations of Semantics (DiFoS) in the ESF EuroCoRes programme LogICCC (LogICCC-FP004; DN 23180-002; CN 2008/08314/GW). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at A Day of Indian Logic, Amsterdam, November 2009, and Modern Formalisms for PreModern Indian Logic and Epistemology, Hamburg, June 2010, and the author would like to thank the participants of both for useful feedback.

Similar points are raised by Matilal when he discusses the dierences between Indian logic and western logic [2, 1.3], pointing specically to the epistemological/psychological characteristics of Indian logic, the grounding of logic in grammar rather than in mathematics, and the lack of a distinction between deduction and induction. But such characterizations of the two traditions require a specic view of the composition and characterization of western logic. In particular, Pahis description appears to be equating historical western logic with Aristotelian logic, that is, the development of syllogisms in the Prior Analytics, perhaps also including the logical discussions in the Sophistical Refutations. Thus, in order to evaluate claims such as those given by Pahi and Matilal, we must rst isolate what we mean by western logic, both historical, or traditional, and contemporary, or modern. In particular, we will see that these dierences between Indian logic and western logic only obtain when western logic excludes the medieval tradition and denes modern logic in a very narrow way. In this paper we consider dierent ways that western logic can be demarcated, and discuss the placement of medieval logic1 in these dierent demarcations. Our primary goal in this paper is expository, to demonstrate the pragmatic similarities between two traditions of logic, Indian and medieval, and to point to where further conclusions may be drawn from our observations. After discussing western logic in the remaining sections of the introduction, we show in 2 how developments in what we call the interactive turn in modern logic have parallels in medieval logic and that logical tools developed in the last few decades can be used to clarify and interpret these medieval logical theories. In 3 we compare many of these medieval developments with developments in the Indian logical tradition, focusing specically on Navya-Ny aya. We use this comparison to argue in 4 that the similarity between these two traditions along with the utility of using modern logical techniques for modeling the former gives us strong reason to believe that there is similar utility in using these techniques for modeling the latter, thus giving us a route through which we may gain further understanding of Indian logical texts and doctrines. 1.1 Traditional vs. modern logic

The development of logic in the west is often demarcated into traditional logic and modern logic. There are many dierent ways that this demarcation can be done. One fairly typical example is to say that traditional logic encompasses such theories as Aristotelian syllogistic, and that modern logic was born with the development of mathematical logic by Frege and Russell at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. The hallmarks of modern logic, on this division, are then its mathematical and set-theoretical basis and its focus on formal deduction. On another approach, the logic of Frege and Russell, with its static approach to reasoning about abstracta (i.e., mathematical reasoning) and its universal
1

Throughout this paper, by medieval logic we mean the development of logic in the Latin Aristotelian tradition in western Europe from the mid-11th century to the beginning of the 15th century. We do not consider developments in Arabic logic here.

applicability, is considered traditional, and this is then contrasted with the developments in the last few decades, which stem from what we call the interactive turn. The interactive turn recognizes the intrinsic importance of interaction in the process of reasoning, and as a result there is an emphasis on dynamic systems designed for application to real world situations, for example, models of knowledge and belief, interaction, and reasoning, in both single- and multiagent systems). Logics developed in this trend are situationally-applicable (that is, which logic is appropriate depends on the context of usage), dynamic, and grounded in language and linguistic problems. Some typical examples include Dynamic Epistemic Logic [3], approaches to belief revision [4], dialogical logic [5], resource-sensitive logics for rational negotiation [6], and logics for interactive computer systems [7]. 1.2 The place of medieval western logic

In the two examples given in the previous section, logic covered the ancient Greek era and the modern era from about 1870 onwards. On these demarcations of logic into traditional and modern, where does medieval logic, as developed in the Latin west, t? While many people see the pedantic attention to detail of Scholastic logic as following in and building on the tradition of Aristotelian syllogistic, and hence as part of the traditional approach to logic, we will argue that medieval logic is best understood as being in the same tradition as the interactive view of modern logic discussed in the previous section. Medieval logicians, like those modern logicians working in the interactive turn, were concerned with techniques of reasoning that could be applied in real reasoning contexts. They developed dynamic, interactive systems, where reasoning is a dispute or debate between two or more agents, and their choice of logics were pragmatic, varying from context to context, building on a regimentation of natural language into a semi-formal language for reasoning. Discussing medieval logic and its placement in the western tradition is of interest because of a number of remarkable similarities between medieval logic and Indian logic. Many of the special features of, e.g., the Navya-Ny aya approach to logic and reasoning which have their origin in features of Sanskrit grammar and usage, can also be found in the medieval logical tradition, which also has its roots in natural language (in this case, Latin). While the two traditions are wholly distinct, there being no channel of inuence in either direction, recently scholars of logic have approached both traditions in a similar fashion, using the tools and techniques of modern mathematical logic in order to understand the formal, regimented, but nevertheless not generally symbolic, systems. Thus, if we can demonstrate that medieval logic ts into the interactive trend, thus allowing ourselves to use the formal tools developed in this context to build logical models of medieval logical theories, and that medieval logic and Indian logic share many common features and pragmatic similarities, then we can argue that the same tools which are useful in modeling medieval logic can also be used to model (certain aspects of) Indian logic. Thus the two traditions, western and eastern, should not be considered so dierent after all.

Dynamics and pragmatics in medieval logic

We give four examples of developments in medieval western logic which illustrate the features that are exemplied in the interactive and epistemological turn in modern logic. These are conditional necessity in Aristotelian modal syllogistics (2.1), Saint Anselm of Canterburys logic of agency (2.2), John Buridans interval-based temporal semantics (2.3), and dialogical and dynamic aspects of obligationes (2.4). Due to space constraints, we only give a brief overview of each of these examples; full details can be found in the cited sources. 2.1 Conditional necessity in Aristotelian modal syllogistics

Verdicts on Aristotles theory of modal syllogisms run the range from hopelessly muddled to outright inconsistent. Many people attempting to understand Aristotles theory have been unable to give an adequate explanation for why Aristotle thinks that arguments with the following syllogistic form are valid: Necessarily A belongs to all B . B belongs to all C . Therefore, necessarily A belongs to all C . while arguments of the form A belongs to all B . Necessarily B belongs to all C . Therefore, necessarily A belongs to all C . are invalid. Rescher and Parks oer an interpretation of the modal syllogistic whereby one premise of the syllogism should be understood as a general (physical law) and the other as a special case falling under this law. They introduce a type of conditional necessity whereby the modality of special case can be ungraded to the modality of the general law. This conditional necessity is the necessity arising from the fact (which in turn follows from tertium non datur ), that when a statement is true, it cannot be falsegiven that it is in fact true, it cannot also be false. This idea of conditionalizing on the sentence expressed by the premise which is the special case in the syllogism can be made formal using the notion of model update more commonly associated with public announcements in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. In [8], a precise denition of validity for apodeictic syllogisms (those containing only necessary or assertoric premises and conclusions) is given which corresponds exactly to the fragment characterized by Aristotle. 2.2 Anselms logic of agency

In philosophical fragments not completed during his lifetime, Saint Anselm of Canterbury (c.10331109) considered the logical and conversational uses of the word facere to do. From these notes, one can extract both Anselms views on

the relationship between grammar and logic and how the two elds should be demarcated (we discuss this further in 3.1) as well as a theory of agency and action, both single-agent and multi-agent (involving interactions between agents, including non-person agents). The latter is noteworthy as it is the rst treatment of agency as a modality in the history of agentive logics. Anselm provides a square of opposition which denes the interaction of the four dierent proper (that is, logically distinct) ways that facere can be used: to do, to do not, not to do, and not to do not. While syntactic characterizations of the logic which can be extracted Anselms comments were provided in the 1970s, the coherency of the system was in question because it became clear that Anselm accepts the equivalence a (p q ) (a p a q ) (that is, if agent a does such that p q is true, he does such that p is true and such that q is true), but this equivalence in conjunction with axiom T (a p p) in normal modal logics validates the rule of necessitation (from infer a ), which is in conict with our intuitions about agency and tautologies. In [9], we show that in fact the logic is a non-normal modal logic, and that the correct semantics corresponding to the syntactic developments of earlier writers involves neighborhood models. 2.3 John Buridans interval temporal semantics

In his Sophismata (treatise on logical puzzles/paradoxes), John Buridan (c.1300 after 1358) developed a pragmatic approach to tensed statements. Drawing on the standard medieval approach to truth values, wherein they attach to token statements rather than proposition types, he pointed out that unless we allow now to be an interval, no (spoken) sentence will have a truth value, because only a complete sentence can have a truth value, but by the time we have nished speaking it, the beginning of the sentence no longer exists, and so there is nothing for the truth value to attach to. After establishing that now should be understood as an interval rather than a point, he considers a number of pragmatic issues that arise, such as how long now can be, whether now is dierent for dierent people, and how internal and external negation (cf. 3.4) interact in these intervals. The answers to these questions are all context-dependent, thus the context must be fully specied before the truth value of a tensed statement can be determined. The semantics that he proposes for evaluating tensed sentences over intervals is upwards homogeneous; that is, if a sentence is true in some interval, it is true in every superinterval of that interval. This is in contrast with the standard approach taken to interval temporal logics in recent literature (cf. [10] for an overview), where the focus is on logics which are downwards homogeneous (that is, the truth of a sentence in an interval implies the truth of it in all subintervals). A formal reconstruction of Buridans theory, drawing on mathematical results in interval temporal semantics, is given in [11]. 2.4 Dynamic and dialogical aspects of obligationes

Perhaps the best example of the modernity of medieval logic can be found in medieval theories of obligationes, a dialogue/disputation framework with two

participants (the Opponent and the Respondent), where at each step in the dialogue the Opponent puts forward propositions and the Respondent is obligated (hence the name) to respond according to certain rules. In its most basic form, the Opponent starts by positing a positum 0 . The Respondent can admit or deny. If he denies, the disputation does not begin. If he admits the positum, the game starts. In each round n, the Opponent proposes a statement n and the Respondent either concedes, denies or doubts this statement according to certain rules. His obligation is that he must concede propositions following from the positum, propositions already conceded, and the negations of propositions denied; he must deny propositions whose negation follows from this set. However, if n neither follows from nor is repugnant to the foregoing, it is irrelevant, and he must concede it if it is true and deny it if it is false. Many modern researches studying obligationes have been puzzled by their use and purpose. In particular, they do not seem to provide a framework for real disputations. One explanation for the apparent content-freeness of obligational disputations is given by King when he says that they operate at a higher level of logical generality than that at which substantive debate occurs. If this is correct, then actual obligational moves perhaps even recognized as suchare the vehicle whereby real argument takes place. . . they provide meta-methodology for reasoning [12]. Understood from the context of formal dialogue systems that have been developed within AI and formal argumentation theory, we can understand the dierent rules for dierent types of obligationes as inducing dierent protocols for formal dialogue systems [13]. Particular obligational disputations can be modeled using Dynamic Epistemic Logic: In each round of an obligatio, the Respondent announces his action, and these cause the model under which the relevance of propositions is evaluated to be updated. This modeling approach, which is developed in [14, 15], provides a uniform framework within which many dierent varieties of obligationes can be studied and compared, and it also highlights the importance of epistemic clauses in the rules, which we discuss further below.

Comparing Indian logic and medieval logic

There are a number of interesting ways where the medieval approach and the Indian approach to solving certain problems of logic are similar. These similarities all stem from a shared approach to logic which grounds it in real-world applications, which include dealing with religious problems (cf. both [2, ch. 1] and [16]); clarifying specic problematic features of natural languages which make them ambiguous [2, 1.4], and hence unsuited for precise reasoning; and dialogical contexts where the roles of the participants are crucial. In this section we discuss ve: the relationship between grammar and logic (3.1) and the way this is exemplied in regimentations of natural language (3.2), truth conditions for basic statements (3.3), the distinction between term negation and sentence negation (3.4), and the role of knowledge (3.5).

3.1

The relationship between grammar and logic

The delineation of grammar and logic is important in both traditions. However, the importance is assigned dierently. In both traditions, the development of the logical side of things is closely connected to a grammatical analysis of the language in question, whether it is Sanskrit or Latin, and this is in turn connected to the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive uses of language. The Indian tradition, Pahi argues, is primarily descriptive. He links the development of the Navya-Ny aya technical language with the programme of developing an adequate deductive model of grammatical knowledge, that is, a system of grammar: [A] system of grammar for a language aims at characterizing the informal notion of grammatical correctness of words and sentences for the language in question. . . The grammarian is not at liberty to alter the boundary between admissible and inadmissible data. Grammar is descriptive subject only to minimal constraints on the admissibility of data [1, p. 239]. In medieval logic, similar attention to grammar and the grammatical correctness of language can be found in two contexts. The rst is in the writings of Anselm of Canterbury. He distinguished between the job of the grammarian (which is descriptive) and the job of the logician (which is prescriptive), but notes that the logician should not wholly discount the works of the grammarian, but should instead use his prescriptions to give a foundation for the descriptions of the grammarian. A clear explication of the proper, logical usage of terms can be used to give an explanation for the improper, ordinary usage of terms (cf. [9, p. 251] for further discussion). The second context is the speculative grammar of the modist grammarians, in the 13th and 14th centuries. The modists developed an attempt to systematise a universal semantic approach to language, leading to a high degree of sophistication and adequacy in linguistic description [17, p. 265]. The approach of the modist grammarians can be described as derivatively prescriptive: Their goal was to isolate the prescriptive rules governing actual linguistic use. When viewed this way, works of speculative grammar fall under much the same light as the axiomatic systems of grammar that Pahi is describing. 3.2 Regimentation of natural language

Both the Navya-Ny aya technical language and the regimented Latin used by medieval logicians were developed as a way to make precise ambiguities in the natural language used by the philosophers, either Sanskrit or Latin. Ambiguous terms occur in both Sanskrit and Latin, but these are generally easy to deal with when they arise. More problematic in both languages is the lack of denite and indenite articles and, in some cases, quantiers. For example, ghato lah . n . pot [is] blue

can mean the pot is blue, some pot is blue, or every pot is blue (cf. [18, p. 105]. Similarly, in Latin, homo est albus can be translated as the man is white, some man is white, or man is white, where the latter is understood to mean every man is white. An even more imprecise statement in Latin is: homo est animal can be translated as the man is animal (adjectival), the man is an animal (nominal), some man is animal, and so on. Both medieval logicians and the Naiy ayikas solved the problem of the variety of interpretations of such Latin and Sanskrit sentences in a similar fashion. In Indian philosophy of language, there were two solutions to the interpretation of an unquantied subject in a subject + predicate sentence: Meaning Particularism (vyakti saktiv ada ) and Meaning Universalism (j ati saktiva ada ). On the former, the unquantied subject of a subject + predicate sentence is understood as being existentially quantied, and has, as Ganeri puts it, genuine referring use [18, p. 106]. On the latter, the unquantied subject is understood in a universal sense, much like Russells treatment of denite descriptions. Medieval logicians were similarly faced with the question of how to interpret subject + predicate sentences with unquantied subjects. They identied four types of subject + predicate sentences, on the basis of their quantity: universal, particular, singular, and indenite. Sentences such as the examples above would count, on most medieval theories, as indenite. William of Sherwoods denition of indenite propositions is typical: An indenite statement is one in which the subject is a common term not determinated by any sign. Such statements are called indenite because they do not determine whether the discourse is about the whole [of the subject] or about a part [19, p. 29]. The inferential relations that held between universal and particular propositions were well known to the medieval logicians through the square of oppositions described by Aristotle. How indenite statements were t into the square of oppositions diered from author to author, with diering levels of success. Sherwood makes the incorrect move of equating indenite propositions with particular ones [19, p. 30]. A better approach is taken by Peter Abelard in his Logica Ingredientibus. There he argues that the simple armative statement A human being is white [homo est albus ] should be analysed as claiming that that which is a human being is the same as that which is white (idem quod est homo esse id quod album est ) [16, p. 192]. I.e., indenite statements have a universal character. The interpretation of unquantied subjects in a subject + predicate sentence is closely related to the truth conditions for such sentences, which forms the topic of our third comparison.

3.3

Truth conditions for predications

In [18, 6.1], Ganeri introduces what he calls a translation manual to move from his formalization of Navya-Ny aya and predicate logic. After presenting the translation manual, he concludes that every sentence in this language (NN ) has the structure: ()(/)()()( 1 R 2 ) [18, p. 117], where is negation, and R a binary relation with 1 and 2 being its arguments. If we restrict our attention to categorical propositions, and replace R with the relation E (for Latin est ), this formalization exactly matches the truth conditions given by Peter Abelard (cf. above). For an indenite statement such as homo est albus, the most natural way to understand that which is a human being is universally and that which is white is particularly. When an indenite statement is determined by a sign of quantity, such as omnis, quiddam or nullus, then we can simply replace that with the relevant quantier (everything, something, nothing). This gives us the following predicate logic notation for the four types of categorical propositions with explicit quantiers: A: xy (xEy ) E: xy (xEy ) I: xy (xEy ) O: xy (xEy ) We can rewrite the (E) and (O) statements as xy (xEy ) and xy (xEy ), respectively, to obtain four forms that match the pattern Ganeri gives for (NN ). Furthermore, in both cases (the Indian and the medieval), we usually use restricted quantiers, e.g., (in Ganeris notation): ()(/ : )( : )()( 1 R 2 ) to be read (It is not the case that) for every/some there is a such that the -object and the -object are (not) related by R. 3.4 Term negation vs. sentence negation

Both medieval logic and Navya-Ny aya are term logics (as opposed to predicate or propositional logics), though they can be simulated in predicate logic. One unique feature of term logics is the presence of two types of negation, term negation and sentence negation (also called internal and external negation, respectively). Medieval logicians indicated whether a negatory sign was to be interpreted as internal or external by its placement in the sentence. In the categorical sentence quidam homo non est albus, the negation non, coming before the copula est, indicates sentence negation and is correspondingly given negative quality. It can be translated as some man is not white. This is contrasted with quidam homo est non albus, where non is narrow-scope over albus only. This sentence can be translated some man is non-white, and it is considered to be armative, since the property non-white is armed of the subject quidam homo. This same type of term negation, expressed in terms of absence (atyant abh ava ),

is used in Ny aya. In both traditions, absence of a property is treated as another property [20, p. 116]. Where the two traditions dier is that in Ny aya, term negation is considered primary. Ganeri notes that Ny aya avoids sentential negation wherever it can by rephrasing sentences apparently containing sentential negation into ones which only have term negation by modifying the relation and the use of negative absential terms [21, p. 129], but it cannot eliminate it altogether [18, p. 110]. In contrast, both types of negation are found equally, and neither is preferred, in medieval logic. 3.5 The role of knowledge

An essential feature of logic and reasoning in Indian logic is its epistemological character, as witnessed by the pervasiveness of the notion of vy apti or inferencewarranting relation [2, p. vii]. In Navya-Ny aya, two of the three rules which establish the legitimacy of a hetu (ground, reason) crucially include epistemological clauses: 2 The ground must be present in at least one locus where the probandum is known to be present. 3 The ground must be absent in all loci where the probandum is known to be absent. In [2, 1.3], Matilal cites the epistemological character of Indian logic as the rst of four ways that Indian logic diers from the modern conception of logic [p. 14] in the western tradition. While Matilal may be correct (at least in some contexts) when he says that Epistemological questions. . . are deliberately excluded from the domain of modern logic [2, p. 14], Pahis description of logic in the western tradition (cf. 1) overgeneralizes. It overlooks developments in the medieval period which, like the Navya-Ny aya, recognize the fundamental importance of known truth, as opposed to simple (and potentially unknown) truth. This is most clear in the case of obligationes. Early treatises on obligationes couch the rules purely in truth-functional terms2 ; later treatises recognize that in the context of an actual dialogue between two real participants, the only way that the Respondent can correctly follow the rules is if either he is omniscient, or the rules are modied to reect the Respondents state of knowledge (so that he is not penalized for being unaware of, e.g., whether the pope is currently in Rome). For example, Richard Brinkley (late 14th C) includes the rules: Everything following from the positum during the time of its positing and known to be such must be conceded [23, p. 15 (15)].
2

For example, Obligationes Parisienses [22] has rules such as Everything which is put forward that has the same form of speech as what was rst put down [the positum ], everything following from the positum and a thing or things conceded [previously] and everything which is true and not repugnant to these must be conceded and the opposite of the positum and every false thing not following from the positum and a thing or things conceded and the opposite or opposites of a thing or things correctly denied and every true thing repugnant to these must be denied.

Everything repugnant to the positum during the time of its positing and known to be such must be denied [23, p. 15 (16)]. More examples can be found in the works of William of Ockham, Paul of Venice, Peter of Mantua, and others.3 Thus we can see that, in a dialogical context, the role of knowledge was not only recognized but explicitly included in the rules for determining the correctness of an inference.

Conclusion

From the preceding it is clear that many of the similarities between Navya-Ny aya and medieval logic arise from their shared focus on the applied, pragmatic aspects of reasoning and rationality, both in the modeling of natural language and in the context of dialogues. Connected to this focus on logic and reasoning as it occurs in natural language and natural-language contexts is the delineation of grammar and logic. Thus, we can see that the shared features of Indian and medieval logic stem from a shared concern in the appropriate regimentation of natural language, whether this is done in a descriptive or a prescriptive fashion, and the concomitant attention which must be given to epistemological concerns connected to natural language use. Furthermore, modern dialogical and epistemological approaches to logic have shown themselves well-suited for modeling medieval western logic. Therefore, it is likely that these particular tools are wellsuited for modeling Indian logic as well, and we stand to gain insight through their application in this way.

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Cf. [24, p. 737]; [25, pp. 50, 52, 54, 56, 64]; and [26, pp. 16869]. Im grateful to Catarina Dutilh Novaes for allowing me access to her notes on epistemic clauses in obligationes rules.

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