HAITIAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION <hrdf.

org>
Aldy Castor, M.D., President
United States: 854 Marina Drive, Weston, Florida 33327 Ph 954.659.7953. 954.873.0064, fax 954.659.7957, aldyc@att.net Haiti: 17, 2me ruelle Wilson, Pacot, Port-au-Prince, ph 509.3.461.5225 25, Rue Stnlo Vincent, Aquin

The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), a 501 (c ) 3 non-profit organization, with United States Federal Tax I.D. No. 72-1074482, was established in 1987 in the State of Louisiana. This Foundation is also recognized by the government of Haiti as a Non-Governmental Organization (N.G.O.) under the RE: No. MPCEFP/1993/94/17 and registered in the archives of Le Ministre de la Planification et la Coopration Externe under the number B-0167. HRDFs mission is to initiate or support projects whose goals are to develop Haitis resources and focuses its effort on outcome-based programs in the fields of health care, education, scientific research, arts and culture and economy.

DISASTER SOCCER VS. RECOVERY SOCCER TALKING POINTS ABOUT NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS [NGOS] A PROPOSITION FROM HRDF TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI [GO]: 1. HOW TO PREVENT COLLISION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL NGO COMMUNITY 2. THE NEED FOR A REFEREE AND A RULEBOOK
Background: The President of HRDF chaired the NGO Roundtable during the Diaspora Unity Congress in August 2009 and then accepted lead responsibility for Diaspora oversight and liaison with nongovernmental organizations that work in and for Haiti. This preceded the earthquake. After the earthquake and in addition to its own response projects, HRDF has advised NGOs and analyzed their roles, especially in relation to the needs and expectations of the Government of Haiti to get the most from the presence and resources of international NGOs. The following are talking points that can lead to a course of action for HRDF in service to the Government. GOVERNMENT OF HAITI NOT HAPPY BUT ALSO NOT SPECIFIC The current Prime Minister has expressed dissatisfaction with the nongovernmental community, and has called for their coordination. But he has not defined coordination, nor issued a policy paper on the subject, nor brought any specific allegations against NGOs in general or any in particular. In September 2008, Guy Grard Georges, a representative in the General Assembly advocated for better control of NGOs in Haiti, numbering approximate 3000-4000.

Salient Questions:
How many NGOs actually operate in Haiti? Approximately five hundred are registered with the Ministry of Planning. Approximately ten to twelve thousand may be in the country, according to statements by Haitian officials, United Nations Special Envoy Bill Clinton and the media. But there is no definitive census. The trend has been to inflate the numbers for dramatic and rhetorical effect, the same as earthquake fatalities have been inflated approximately fifty percent since last year. There are pitfalls, both in a) misstating the numbers, b) inferring that numbers alone account for their respective or cumulative impact and c) thinking that they require or must be coordinated alike. Who are the NGOs? The complaints have never distinguished the many kinds of nongovernmental organizations one from the other, for example, native versus foreign, humanitarian versus developmental, religious versus secular, large versus small, etc.

 What and how much resources do NGOs have at their command? Some organizations have durable assets in Haiti offices, farms, workshops, vehicles, etc. - while others have primarily core staff and experts whose scope of work, investments and hiring pattern that increase or decrease with the ebb-and-flow of income for products and services. If NGOs are not performing according to their mandate, have any legal actions been taking against them? Since the earthquake, the courts have pursued and investigated, for example, selected organization members relating to the care and treatment of orphans and abandoned children, but no one has been found guilty. A review of existing laws will likely show that the government can already take a variety of legal actions to examine, regulate and coordinate nongovernmental organizations should it desire to do so. Could the Government of Haitian coordinate NGOs in the country if it cannot even provide the citizenry with basic coordination it needs for daily life? This is a critical question. Citizens clearly lack land title and status surveys, filing and retrieval of sales and purchase documents, fair and ample taxation policy and distribution of revenues, safety-conscious building codes and enforcement, honest and transparent elections, community emergency response mechanisms, and so on. NGOS NOT HAPPY, EITHER Nongovernmental organizations, as well as private investors, in normal times and during disasters, habitually complain about the difficulty of working productively in Haiti because of antiquated and/or antagonistic government preparedness, policies and programs, plus corruption and non-standard operating procedures. Salient questions: How should they proceed: as friends or foes of Haiti? Unlike the government, NGOs are not obligated to work in Haiti, they are voluntarily present and will remain so only as long as conditions permit them to work toward their goals and objectives. In particular, if they are to be obligated to work with or be coordinated by the Government of Haiti, then the relationship must be helpful and reliable, not burdensome, predatory or capricious. Why so many onerous administrative procedures to customs humanitarian shipments of equipment and supplies? NGOs are nonprofit by definition, and they are heavily dependent on imported equipment and supplies. In both good and bad times, importation/customs processes have proven to be slow and expensive, thus negatively affecting Haitians chance for survival and development. NGOs expect the government to expedite their shipments, not impede them or try to profiteer from them. RECOMMENDATIONS: Every year, Haitians probably receive for free a billion dollars or more in resources, cash, loans and expertise from foreign nongovernmental organizations. This is also a direct benefit to the Government of Haiti in terms of helping avoid the cost of public services and emergency response. Haiti should make good use of these free assets and not look a gift horse in the mouth. While oversight can be pursued and should be expected in the recovery, reconstruction and decentralization processes, the Government of Haiti would be well-served to: Drop the words control and regulation of NGOs in its conversation because: These terms imply a dictatorial stance and will not be well-received, They bring on suspicions about government motives for controlling voluntary organizations. Cultivate a different approach toward NGOs: Help them identify, verify, prioritize and solve problems, and then evaluate their effectiveness.

 Treat them as friends not foes. See them as resources to be developed not as organizations to be blamed. Convene periodically with their representatives to see where NGOs can be fit best into government policies, programs and projects, and where they would like to fit. Link the benefits they can bring, their capacities to respond, and the assets they command to real-life governance priorities. Include the NGO community into the overall post-disaster recovery plan. Create an NGO network, not just a list, that challenges organizations to work cooperatively, including with the government, and rewards them for doing so. Develop mechanisms to transplant and transfer the expertise and experience of foreign NGOs to native ones. For better development of NGO resources, identify the major players, measure their capacities and effectiveness, and propose to double this within five years through: Improve communications between GOs and NGOs. In particular, promote English fluency among Haitian officials and staff who work with foreign NGOs. Promote accompaniment and embedding of government staff with foreign NGOs in the field. Establish special import docks for NGOs and streamline customs procedures for clearing humanitarian supplies. Prohibit ad hoc or surprise surcharges, fees and bribes. Set a goal to reach a GO/NGO balance point by 2015 where both sides share the planning responsibilities in the realm of essential social, technical and humanitarian services across the country. Propose a set of ethical principles, guidelines and performance criteria for NGO. Refer to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action to harmonize, manage and monitor the effectiveness of foreign aid. Hold periodic NGO Appreciation Days, conferences, tours and other events to compare notes, inform and interact with communities through a newly-created government Office of NGO Appreciation. Sponsor annual NGO Appreciation Days in every commune, and national GO/NGO Summits to review and improve the status of governmental and non-governmental cooperation in Haiti: As a way to introduce innovation. As a link to the outside world in every sector To create alliances with the town structures where NGOs work - amounts of money spent, materials, educational and employment opportunities into Haitian communities. To estimate the contributed value of NGOs in Haiti. To create an Encyclopedia of NGOs in Haiti [The NGOs Among Us]. Todays Haitians have intensive and extensive contact with nongovernmental organizations, and especially since the earthquake, more Haitians may owe their lives to these organizations than they do to the government.

Include, facilitate and accelerate NGOs in preparedness for future emergency, for example, as parts of Community Emergency Response Teams [CERT] in every commune.

The Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) proposition, in view that: HRDF is the lead for NGO concern and follow-up, per 2009 Diaspora Unity Congress. HRDF is accepted inside and outside of Haiti, and has satisfactorily worked side by side with different NGOs and government organizations internationally. HRDF has a 23-year track record of innovation, longevity and expertise. HRDF can apply these attributes to identify and improve what NGOs have to offer Haitians. HRDF can assemble a brain trust to: Design a road map for doubling the NGO effectiveness and satisfaction Establish a set of measurements for periodic monitoring of progress. Bring new expertise and resources to bear on cooperation among NGOs and GOs. Serve as a referee in matters of contention between the NGO community and the Government of Haiti.

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http://www.lenouvelliste.com/article.php?PubID=&ArticleID=89982 English translation April 11, 2011

KICKING THE BALL: WHEN GOS AND NGOS PLAY DISASTER SOCCER, WHO LOSES WINS
For about thirty years, Ive closely observed the pursuit of social development conducted by the Haitian government [GOs] and by non-governmental organizations [NGOs], both native and foreign. On both sides, there have been many combinations and configurations of programs and projects, in a range of subjects - health, ecology, agriculture, food, education, jobs, infrastructure, public works and disaster preparedness. The relatively few that succeed are sources of pride, especially to local communities. The rest we tend to forget, but the worst cause continuing embarrassment, shame and damage. The past years attempt by GOs and NGOs to recover from the earthquake is an example of few successes and many failures. I. GOS VS. NGOS Even before the earthquake, GOs and NGOs together launched hundreds, perhaps thousands of projects every year. In total, they compete for billions of dollars annually, but ironically they also anticipate that many programs and projects are doomed from birth, never to reach maturity. There are start-up problems, funding problems, staffing problems, supply problems, problems with oversight and quality control, operations and maintenance these can be overcome. But there is also the Haitian syndrome: illiteracy, corruption, poor communications, lack of transparency and accountability - these are not so easily overcome. There is also the attitude that development can be a profitable business first, a moral imperative second - this is very problematic because it is an incentive to prolong development projects, not complete them. Thus, despite the dire need for development,

GOs and NGOs have grown accustomed to expecting and even contributing to waste, delay and disappointment. So, instead of eliminating poverty, they often perpetuate it, each in their own way. In fact, the high rate of failure creates a sort of competition between GOs and NGOs. They are like two opposing soccer teams, playing on the same field but with different reasons for being there - the NGOs to introduce development and the GOs to control the pace and the payoff. What they have in common is strange. On the one hand, they can spend the whole game just passing, dribbling and kicking the ball around, without scoring, i.e. competing for money, materials and workers to continue doing what they have always done. On the other hand, they are constantly either blocking or positioning themselves to avoid blame for their lack of engagement - i.e. the expected failure of their projects. What kind of game is this? The spectators, including ten million Haitians and a few million Diaspora, are wondering, too. They sit and watch GOs and NGOs unproductively running around the field, sidestepping, heading, waving at the crowd, fouling, tackling, accumulating penalties, scoring handballs and seldom a goal. When they do, it is often by chance or the other teams egregious mistake and it is always a big surprise. For the spectators, watching and waiting for a real engagement, this game can become very tiring - the same as waiting for development to occur. II. DISASTER SOCCER For the past year, GOs and NGOs seem to be playing a game of disaster soccer. This is a variation played without referees and rules. When the earthquake occurred, the GOs and NGOs rushed onto the field and started the kicking ball. Their cheerleaders, i.e. fundraisers and public relations specialists, began yelling for money. In response, the spectators threw millions onto the field, expecting a high-scoring game. It didnt happen. In the absence of referees, the players became distracted by money on the field. As a result, for more than a year, both team are still playing the same disengaging game. The spectators are disappointed. Under these conditions, they would be leaving the stadium, but approximately a million have nowhere to go. We are now in the second half of the game. Suddenly, many spectators have cholera, they are afraid of touching each other, they cannot drink the water and they are suspicious of the food. But down below, the game continues. The cheerleaders are still yelling for money, there are no referees to call penalties or clean the field, and the GOs and NGOs are still running and kicking unproductively. Instead of making goals, they are issuing press releases about the goals they will make, not now but in the future. The spectators finally realized that the game was fixed and both teams were expecting to lose. Predictably, the competition to avoid blame becomes more important that scoring goals. The GOs have a fantastic story: their players are not well-qualified and their cheerleaders are not good fundraisers, but they want more money and constant possession of the ball. Also, they will tell the NGOs where to stand on the field. For their part, the NGOs are much better at picking up the money. But they would rather play other NGOs than GOs. At this point, the spectators stop throwing money and ask each other, What kind of game is this? Where are the rules and the referees? III. THE POWER OF GOS, THE SERVICE OF NGOS By and large, NGOs appear when GOs are absent or, as in Haiti, not doing their jobs or not a match for the problems at hand. Said another way, their purpose is to repair or help rebalance social disparities when, in the language of soccer, the referees have left the field. But unlike GOs - ministries, offices, etc. - that are meant to be permanent features on the governance landscape, NGOs are intended to be temporary unless forced to continue providing essential services and helping people survive from day to day. The history of NGOs in Haiti goes back to 1860 with the Concordat between the Government of Haiti and the Roman Catholic Church. For a century, NGO involvement in Haiti was limited to social, health care and educational activities. Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, organizations, such as Cooperation for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Haiti Christian Service (SCH), Haitian-Netherlands Cooperation (COHAN) and the North American Protestant Churches became involved in humanitarian affairs. Finally, the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986, led to a massive return of cadres from different fields of exiled Haitians. This led the creation of new NGOs, especially concerned with human rights and professional training.

Lately, some Haitian leaders have complained that the NGO community has become a kind of parallel government," a state within a state affecting the lives and livelihoods of Haitians much as a government would, or should. The fact is, NGOs are limited to providing services. They have no interest in running the country, they have no authority to tax the people, they cannot run for office, hire or fire ministers, or change the political regime. Despite their complaints, others believe the Haitian government needs NGOs more than NGOs need the government. Among the reasons: - In recent years, and especially at the local level, many NGOs have filled gaps for Haitian governance. - NGOs consistently infuse large amounts of money, materials, educational and employment opportunities into Haitian communities; these are things the government can't, wont or hasnt provided for many years. - The backbone of Haitis future civil service is likely to be provided at first by NGO personnel who have been working in the country for several years. - NGOs are not powerless against government power plays to control their activities and take their funds. There may be exceptions, but it could be that since the earthquake, more Haitians may owe their lives to NGOs than they do to the government. These survivors represent a significant constituency for social and political change. - NGOs can choose to save "Haitians" rather than "Haiti." This means that instead of risking time and resources on development projects that may never bear fruit, they could just as easily use the money to attract, evacuate and resettle tens of thousands of promising Haitian college students and young professionals for NGO work overseas. Why not? Emergency response, rescue and recovery after disasters are growth industries, and will be for years to come. Haitians could learn these trades and be in demand all over the world. IV. TRANSITION TO A BALANCE POINT If it takes the initiative, the next Haitian government can improve relations and chances of success without getting confrontational. It can: - Reinforce the managerial and technical capacity of the Coordination Unit of Non-Governmental Organizations Activities (UCAONG) from Haiti Ministry of Planning Coordination [Unit de Coordination des Activits des Organisations Non Gouvernementales]. A permanent liaison between UCAON representatives and NGO communities would improve understanding and cooperation through regular meetings, alerts, project opportunities, broadcasts, expositions and model communities. - Propose a set of ethics, relations and operating principles for NGOs in Haiti, - Apply the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. These are international agreements signed by more than one hundred ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials who pledged to harmonize, manage and monitor the effectiveness of foreign aid. - Sponsor annual NGO Appreciation Days in every commune, and national GO/NGO Summits to review and improve the status of governmental and non-governmental cooperation in Haiti. - Separate humanitarian shipments from commercial imports by designating special docks to speed incoming equipment and supplies, and streamline and modernize customs administrative procedures for humanitarian shipments. This will win immediate friends at home and abroad and increase contributions of material goods needed for disaster and health emergencies. . - Set a goal to reach a GO/NGO balance point by 2015 where both share the planning and providing of essential social, technical and humanitarian services across the country. Instead of competing in a game of mutually-assured failure, GOs and NGOs, with the help of experienced referees, could reach a balance point where development is shared according to the strengths and mandates of each team. .

Aldy Castor, M.D. President, Haitian Resource Development Foundation (HRDF) Director, Emergency Medical Services, Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad (AMHE) Haiti Medical Relief Mission March 4, 2011

Stuart Leiderman <leiderman@mindspring.com> Recovery Soccer Requires Referees and a Rulebook Haitian Resources Development Foundation (hrdf.org) June 7, 2010 On April 11, Le Nouvelliste kindly published our article concerning relations between the Haitian government (GOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the year and a half of post-disaster response, January 2010 to the present. http://www.lenouvelliste.com/articleforprint.php?PubID=1&ArticleID=89982 The article compared these relations to a game of Disaster Soccer where teams of GOs and NGOs run up and down the field, vigorously kick the ball, but seldom score goals. Further, these teams have no referees or rulebook. The result is that fouls are committed and bones are broken. In a sense, Disaster Soccer turns skilled athletes into brutal gladiators. Many fans of the home team - particularly, the earthquake refugees who live in camps - do not like to watch a scoreless game. They dont enjoy highly-paid, celebrities who merely kick and run, push and shove, escape penalties, and so on. These fans want to see goals made, in this case, their freedom from camps, and their resettlement to safe and secure locations. Likewise, fans of the visiting team - the world of foreign charities, donors and international banks are tired of watching disaster soccer. They are losing interest and are not buying many tickets. Clearly, the national game needs to change. Haiti needs to begin playing recovery soccer. Recovery Soccer requires referees and a rulebook. In post-disaster response, referees are the essential third force on the field. Like the GOs and NGOs, referees are skilled players and have distinctive uniforms. But they have a different purpose. They run among the teams without interfering, they are responsible for conducting a fair and honest game, they keep track of time, they confirm goals, and they decide disputes between teams. As any student of sociology knows, a system with three legs is more stable than a two-legged system. Therefore, it is logical that recovery soccer should have three elements - GOs, NGOs and referees not just two teams alone on the field. From where do referees come? To answer that, it is important to look at the big picture: The game of recovery soccer is played all over the world, wherever disasters occur. Looking at the past fifty years or so, one could say that a World Recovery Soccer League (WRSL) exists, where several games are simultaneously played every week of the year. Right now, the games concern the aftermath of earthquakes in Haiti and Pakistan, nuclear accidents in Japan, wildfires in Arizona, tornadoes and floods in the American Midwest and so on. All are closely watched and monitored on worldwide websites such as globaldisasterwatch.blogspot.com The World Recovery Soccer League is a necessary response to the unfortunate but constant collision of humanity with natural forces, something that HRDF has written and taught about since the Haitian earthquake last year. The League is big business. The annual budget is billions of dollars. It involves hundreds of thousands of players (disaster workers) and millions of spectators (disaster survivors). Much of these resources are needed to insure that the Game of Recovery does not itself descend into a Game of Disaster. Even in the most advanced nations, a disaster can overwhelm the home team. When this happens, recovery requires what might be called a non-scheduled game with a visiting team. The home team, however, may not usually have a choice of visiting team. In other words, it takes what it can get. The visiting team could be strong or weak, experienced or nave, friendly or hostile. It could be a complete team or just a fragment of what is needed to play. It could be a team that is in good health or one that has sick players. It might be assembled in a professional and orderly manner, with adequate leadership, equipment and supplies. Or it might be randomly and hurriedly assembled, filled with whomever and whatever is available. This has significant consequences. When the disaster game clock runs out, say after six months, poorlymatched teams will have produced few goals if any, and made many fouls. The spectators will not be satisfied; in fact, some may have died during the game. On the other hand, well-matched and well-behaved teams accompanied by referees and a rulebook will have made several goals and few fouls. The spectators will be satisfied, and all will have survived.

The rules of conventional game of soccer as played internationally and codified by the Fdration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) are specified at http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/lawsofthegame/ There are seventeen basic laws governing the game: the field of play, the ball, the number of players, the players equipment, the referee, the assistant referees, the duration of the match, the start and restart of play, the ball in and out of play, the method of scoring, offside, fouls and misconduct, free kicks, the penalty kick, the throw-in, the goal kick and the corner kick. In a surprising way, the laws of the game of Recovery Soccer mirror those of FIFA. The field of play is the disaster zone, bounded by geography and population. Instead of a leather ball inflated with air, the Recovery Soccer ball is a sphere of supplies and equipment, sewn together and then filled with money. The number of players must be sufficient to cover the whole field rescue and recovery, logistics, communications, fundraising, procurement and storage, monitoring and evaluation, etc. If one or more of these positions are vacant, the game cannot proceed. The players equipment uniform and protection must clearly distinguish the members of the teams, and the teams from each other. In disaster recovery, vague identification, unofficial affiliations, conflicts of interest and other sources of confusion cannot be permitted. Further, the teams equipment must be equal in quality. If, for example, the visiting team has better equipment - radios, vehicles, medicine, earthmovers, etc. than the home team, this will create an unfair advantage. In post-disaster conditions, this can cause accusations, jealousy, insecurity and even loss of innocent life. As in the conventional game, Recovery Soccer requires referees who are independent of the teams and who have the power to completely stop the match if necessary to resolve problems. These referees must have quick reflexes and boundless knowledge of disaster recovery that comes from years of experience. Unlike the teams who are on the field as competitors to score goals, the referees are on the field as a conscience and catalyst of the game. Accordingly, their voices, whistles and penalty cards must be obeyed. The time factor in the conventional game is also important in Recovery Soccer. The occurrence of disaster signals the start of the match. When it happens, the teams must take the field punctually and then play at full strength until a predetermined completion has been reached. A common fault is disagreement about completion, causing one or both teams to leave the field too early. Haiti has already experienced this violation. Permitting spectators onto the field after the start of the match is also detrimental. Their presence can interfere with the game, distract the players and even risk their safety. Recovery Soccer should only be played by those who are adequately-prepared for strenuous activity and recognized as competent to be on the field. Concerning scoring, this is a two-part process determined by a) the configuration of a relatively large field, and b) the placement of the goal posts, one set at each end. Said another way, scoring requires both maneuvering across a large field and then hitting a relatively small target. That is the only way goals can be made. Any diversion, for example playing in only a small part of the field, or kicking too wide of the goal posts, or kicking into the wrong goal, will result in failure, even loss of the game. Also note that the field is equally divided between home and visiting teams. Thus, while the whole field may represent the zone of disaster, the teams territorial responsibilities assignments, authority and allegiances are the same size but for different purposes. In Disaster Soccer the teams play as if the lines are blurred and can be moved at will. But in Recovery Soccer the lines are distinct and dont move. The home team (comprised of government agencies) is primarily responsible to its citizens, while the visiting team (comprised of nongovernmental organizations) is primarily responsible to the overseas donors and organizations that assembled and sent them there. Thus, there is shared occupation of the field, but with distinct obligations to national versus foreign constituents. The teams are equally motivated to kick and score goals, but they have different reasons for engagement. This validates the presence and need for referees. Fouls and other violations are expected whenever teams compete intensively over the same field. To minimize this, FICA rules are uniquely intended to alter the normal use of the body. These have interesting effects. For example, prohibiting the use of arms and hands forces players to become highly specialized in the coordination of lower-body movement and the use of lower-body force. Emphasis on legs and feet also brings the center of gravity closer to the surface of the field. In similar fashion, players of Recovery Soccer must constantly remember that they are operating under emergency conditions (legs and feet) rather than normal conditions (arms and hands). In a sense, disaster means that the world seems to be upside down. Forgetting this, for example moving the ball, i.e. resources and money with their hands, i.e. for non-emergency purposes is a

violation. Likewise, aggressively engaging opposing players with their arms or hands will likely draw a foul and stop the game. Several rules define the variety and placement of kicks and throws during the game, for example at the start of periods, when a ball goes out of bounds or after players commit fouls. In Recovery Soccer, this repertoire of rules that punctuate normal play offers GOs and NGOs a formula for initiating projects and making corrections with regard to each others strengths and weaknesses. For example, one teams mistake generally means that the ball is given to the other team to kick or throw, in other words, to lead the next step in a program or project. In the opinion of HRDF, were this rule followed more often in post-disaster relations among GOs and NGOs, recovery might proceed more smoothly, effectively and in balanced fashion. Besides the interesting comparisons in FIFA rules to the play of Recovery Soccer, there is a contemporary set of recommendations governing the use of foreign assistance that could apply to humanitarian response to disasters. This is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness agreed to internationally on March 2, 2005. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf In summary, these are approximately fifty time-tested rules, grouped into eighteen categories: 1) scaling up for more effectiveness, 2) adapting and applying to differing country situations, 3) specifying indicators, timetable and targets, 4) monitoring and evaluating implementation, 5) exercising effective leadership, 6) aligning donors with partners strategies, 7) strengthening country systems, 8) strengthening development capacity, 9) strengthening public financial management capability, 10) strengthening national procurement systems, 11) getting better value for money, 12) implementing common arrangements and simplifying procedures, 13) having more effective division of labor, 14) having incentives to work together, 15) delivering effective aid in fragile states, 16) promoting environmental assessments, 17) managing for results and 18) establishing mutual accountability. These are good rules for GOs and NGOs to observe when attempting to play Recovery Soccer. Without a doubt, international humanitarian response to disasters is a form of foreign aid, although it is a) provided in an accelerated manner and b) little if any actually contributes to long-term development. In Haitis case, it seems that the teams never completed playing the first period (disaster relief) before moving on to the second period (long-term development). Evidence of this is the large number of earthquake survivors still residing in tents. Neither team has implemented practical and humane resettlement for these hundreds of thousands, yet hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent on long-term infrastructure projects in areas undamaged by the earthquake. Were refugees present, serious fouls would be called on GOs and NGOs alike. Finally, we return to the subject of referees what is the need for them, who will they be, from where will they come, and what will be the source of their authority? First, the need. Among dozens of national and international assessments of post-earthquake recovery in Haiti, few if any are satisfied with the quality and quantity of progress, especially compared to the money spent, the labor invested and several other indices of recovery. Poor coordination is the deficiency most often cited. But Haiti today seems to be full of coordinators, on the teams of GOs and NGOs alike. There may even be a surplus of coordinators. So what is their problem? HRDF has a different assessment, namely there is a lack of independent referees with authority to officiate the games, and who are assigned to get the most from each and every world-class player who has come to rescue Haiti since the earthquake and, more recently, the cholera outbreak. Second, who will they be and from where will they come? In a fashion, the Interim Recovery Commission was an attempt to referee post-earthquake Haiti. But by direct experience, external assessments and the publicized discord among board members, chairmen and staff, the Commission seems to have failed this role. It was essentially compromised by a) the unbalanced composition, i.e. almost entirely GOs of domestic and foreign origin, without significant NGO and private sector participation, and b) the rush to approve projects with little or no transparency, oversight, criticism and debate. The era of the Recovery Commission is probably over. As an alternative, HRDF suggests that referees come from the Haitian and international private sectors. This is because, in the last analysis, near-term disaster response in any country relies greatly on the worlds private economies for technology, supplies, equipment, donations, medicines, aircraft, construction materials, inspectors, architects, engineers, physicians, builders, firemen and teachers and other skilled professionals.

Certainly, GOs are needed to permit and prioritize activities, and NGOs are needed to advocate for equity, fairness and transparency of response. GOs and NGOs alike are needed to insist that recovery and reconstruction employ massive numbers of Haitians and that the money stays within the country. But the private sector, comprised of organized labor and expert production, is arguably the ultimate source of national recovery on the material plane. Hence, referees drawn from the private sector will be particularly motivated when the game is predominantly played between GOs and NGOs, such as in post-earthquake Haiti. There must be safeguards against corruption, however. This means that referees must have demonstrated success in Recovery Soccer. They must not have private or competing economic interests in who wins the game. Said another way, betting on the outcome of games will be prohibited. Further, if and when the private sector begins to put teams on the field, the referees must be drawn from another sector. Like many others, HRDF hoped that the great flow of foreign experts, money and resources into Haiti after the earthquake would result in decisive action and measurable improvements in the human condition. Yet this did not happen. Instead, there seems to be an endless game of Disaster Soccer too much kicking and running around the field, and not enough goals. HRDF supposes that GOs and NGOs alike have grown tired of this game and would rather start playing Recovery Soccer. With the introduction of independent referees and a rulebook based on the Paris Declaration for Effective Foreign Aid, it may be possible. Thank you. Aldy Castor, M.D., President, Haitian Resource Development Foundation, hrdf.org Stuart Leiderman, Environmental Refugees and Ecological Restoration, leiderman@mindspring.com ------