Ars Disputandi

Volume 8 (2008)
issN: 15665399
Anthony Dupont
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Continuity or Discontinuity in
Augustine?
Is There an Early Augustine and What is his View of
Grace?
Review article of: Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustines Early
Theology: An Argument for Continuity, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006; xii + 302 pp.; hb. 67.00, pb. 21.99; isnN:
9780199281664/9780199543649.
1 The discontinuity thesis
In Rethinking Augustines Early Theology. An Argument for Continuity, Carol
Harrison
1
argues against the thesis proposed by Peter Brown (pp. 1516) that
Augustines thinking underwent a revolution around 396. According to this
thesis, the Ad Simplicianum that Augustine composed in that year is a rupture
between his early, philosophical thinking and his later theology.
2
This thesis is
basedon the presupposition that Augustines thinking in the periodmid380s-mid
390s was not fully matured by a study of Paul. This early period, 386396, should
show us a Platonic-optimistic Augustine believing in the natural capacities of
humanity to do the good. The second, real conversion should have happened
around 396/397, as is testied in Ad Simplicianum 1.2. In this view, Augustine
should nally have become Pauline orthodox, and according to Brown for the
rst time Augustine came to see man as wholly dependent on God. (p. 154.) Kurt
Flasch radicalised this thesis. After 396, after reading Paul, Augustine leaves his
original optimistic anthropology and constructs a theology based upon a Logik
des Schreckens (Logic of Terror).
3
More recently Gaetano Lettieri even dares to
speak about Laltro Agostino, the Augustine of Ad Simplicianum is allegedly alien
1. Dr. Carol Harrison is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Theology and Religion at
Durham University, and succeeded prof. dr. Gerald Bonner at the chair of History and Theology
of the Latin West. Her research focuses on Christian art and spirituality, Patristics in general and
Augustine in particular. She already published two monographs on Augustine, on his theological
aesthetics (Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine, Oxford 1992) and on the context
of his thought (Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity, New York/Oxford 2000).
2. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo. A Biography, London 1967, pp. 147152, A New Edition
with an Epilogue, London 2000, p. 490.
3. Kurt Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. Augustinus von Hippo, De diversis quaestionibus ad
Simplicianum I 2, (Deutsche Erstbersetzung von Walter Schfer. Herausgegeben und erklrt von
Kurt Flasch. Zweite, verbesserte Auage mit Nachwort), (Excerpta classica; 8), Mainz
2
1995.
c August 8, 2008, Ars Disputandi. If you would like to cite this article, please do so as follows:
Anthony Dupont, Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?, Ars Disputandi [http://www.ArsDisputandi.org] 8 (2008),
6779.
Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
to the one of the early writings (p. 155).
4
A parallel presupposition is that the
Augustine of 386396 was a (proto-)Pelagian. This assertion is based on the fact
that Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum appealed to Augustines early, so-called
philosophical, writings. It seems that Augustine was quite condent in the
natural capacities of human beings and advocated a strong version of human
freedom, was not convinced of the need of internal grace to nd the bonum,
des, iustitia before the year 396and this seems to be in contradiction with the
doctrine of grace he formulatedin the anti-Pelagian writings. Scholars advocating
the two Augustines thesis (pp. 1519) claimthat the Augustinian paradigmshift
took place in 396: in Ad Simplicianum. According to their reading of this work,
Augustine, commenting on Romans 7 and 9, starts reecting on the peccatum
originale for the rst time, and realizes also for the rst time the insuciency of
human nature, the complete dependence on an ecious and internal graceeven
the capacity to beg God for help is already inserted by grace. Put dierently, there
is a discontinuity between the early andthe later Augustine, and396 is the turning
point.
2 A plea for continuity
The thesis of this book is that the real revolution in Augustines thought
happened not in 396 but in 386, at his conversion, and that the dening features
of his mature theology were in place fromthis moment onwards. (p. 7) Harrison
connects with the thesis of Goulven Madec and others that the main concepts of
Augustines later theology were already in nucleo present in the early writings.
5
Concretely, Harrison takes positions against three misunderstandings about the
pre-396 Augustine: (1.) The early Augustine recognized in a proto-Pelagian way
the suciency of human nature. (2.) Augustine originally wrote that free will is
not subordinate to grace, but cooperates with grace on the same footing to achieve
the good. (3.) The year 396 presents a radical and even dramatic volte-face. For
the rst time Augustine realizes the absolute need for grace, not only for every
individual human action but also for the capacity to ask God for help.
Harisson criticizes the 396-revolution thesis from two angles. Firstly, she
proves that the Confessiones report of the conversion in the garden in Milan is
4. Gaetano Lettieri, Laltro Agostino. Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamor-
fosi del De doctrina christiana, Brescia 2001.
4. Harrison already published on this subject, i.a.: Delectatio Victrix: Grace and Freedom in
Saint Augustine, in Studia patristica 27, Leuven 1993, 298302; Augustine of Hippos Cassiciacum
Confessions. Toward a Reassessment of the 390s, Augustinian Studies 31 (2000) 219224; The Role
of creatio ex nihilo in Augustines Confessions, in Le Confessioni di Agostino (4022002): Bilancio
e prospettive. XXXI Incontro di studiosi dell antichit cristiana, Roma, 24 maggio 2002, (Studia
Ephemeridis Augustinianum; 85), Roma 2003, 415419. A summary of the main ideas of this book
can be found in The Early Works (38696), in T.J. van Bavel, B. Bruning (eds.), Saint Augustine,
Brussels 2007, 165179.
5. Goulven Madec, Sur une nouvelle introduction la pense dAugustin, Revue des tudes
augustiniennes 28 (1982) 100111. Ibid. Review: Kurt Flasch, Logik des Schreckens, Revue des
tudes augustiniennes 37 (1991) 38790. Ibid., Saint Augustin: Du libre arbitre la libert par la grce
de Dieu, (Lectures Augustiniennes), Paris 2001, 241255.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
authentic, andnot a post factumrecuperationof Augustine attempting to (unjustly)
represent his 386 conversion, which then actually was a choice for a Neo-Platonic
Christianity, as a conversion to the Pauline doctrine. Secondly, andthis is the main
research avenue of the book, she illustrates in depth that the early tractates are
genuinely Christian, having Christian theology as goal and using Neo-Platonic
tools for this aimand not vice versa. The essential Christian and theological
nature of these early writings is guaranteed by the presence of the biblical concept
of the creatio ex nihilo, a concept that as Harrison elucidates implies the human
tendency to sin and the intrinsic need for divine help. In the same way other key
concepts of Augustines gratia theology are not absent in his works before 396,
such as des and electio, both conceived as gratia.
One fundamental exception, that was a direct cause for the 396-revolution
hypothesis about the two Augustines, are Augustines comments on the letters
to the Romans and the Galatians (Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio, Exposi-
tio quarundam propositionum ex epistula Apostoli ad Romanos, Expositio Epistulae ad
Galatas), written in 394396. Reacting against Manichean determinism, Augustine
entrusts the initium dei to the human will. However, Harrison observes that this
can be considered as an hapax within Augustines oeuvre, fundamentally dierent
fromthe content of the earlier writings, a content Ad Simplicianumon the contrary
completely is concordant with. In Ad Simplicianum Augustine realizes that his
acceptance of the post-lapsarian free will, a concept he uttered for the rst time in
his Commentaries on Romans and Galatians, cannot be sustained. For this reason,
Ad Simplicianum rejects the hypothesis of human initiative in opting for faith, and
reconnects with his previous thinking, however with a renewed terminology and
clarity, according to which also the initium dei is grace. As such, Ad Simplicianum
does not imply a brutal rupture, but is rather a return to his original thinking, cor-
recting the mistakes he made in his anti-Manichean attempt to interpret Pauls
letters in 394395.
3 Arguments for continuity
The methodology Harrison opted for is a careful study and a close reading
of the early writings (e.g. Cassiciacum dialogues, De libero arbitrio, De moribus
ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichearum, De magistro, De uera religione, the
Commentaries on Paul, etc.) to show the presence of the main features of Augus-
tines doctrine in the early works, and she also compares these writings with later
anti-Pelagian writings (e.g. De dono perseuerantiae, De praedestinatione sanctorum,
etc.) in order to establish continuity.
In the rst part of her monograph (chapters 15), Harrison scrutinizes the
earliest works. In the rst chapter, The Context (pp. 319), she gives an overviewof
the discontinuity hypothesis as mentioned here above. The rst chapter sketches
the context of the rst decade in which Augustine was active as a writer: Cassici-
acum(386387), Milan and Rome (387388), Thagaste (389391), Hippo (391396),
the history of a convert devoting himself to study, later on being ordained and
taking the responsibilities of his oce.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
In the subsequent chapter, The Revolution of 386 (pp. 2034), Harrison dis-
mantles a rst prejudice, namely that the account of the Milanese Conversion in
the Confessiones 8 is an example of hineininterpretieren. Augustine is accused of
giving a retrospective reading of his conversio: in 386 Augustine did not grasp
the meaning of sin and grace, actually being converted to Neo-Platonism and not
to Christianity. In 397 however, when he started to compose his Confessiones, he
had already gained these insights and retrospectively puts themin his description
of his conversion experience of 386. This assertion questions the nature and the
impact of the conversion in 386, and alleges that the real conversion has to be
found in the rst mature synthesis of Ad Simplicianum. Harrison counters this
accusation by explaining that Augustines real conversion was not caused by his
reading of Paul in the 390s but has its root in his discovery of the books of the
Platonists in the period leading up to his conversion in 386. She points out the
intrinsic similarities between two other reports of the Milanese Conversion which
also indicate the important role of Augustines discovery of the Libri Platonici
in his conversion process (Contra Academicos 2.2.5 and De beata vita 1.4), written
much closer to 386 and years before the Confessiones, indicating that already in
386 sin and grace were an essential part of his faith and not some insights he
only found in 396. These earlier descriptions of his conversion have a twofold
parallel with the Confessiones: the historical, factual setting of the conversion and
the theological understanding of the human condition. This parallel guarantees
the authenticity of the Confessiones account. Underlying this critique on the 386
conversion is the prejudice that Augustines early writings essentially dier from
his (later) theology that made him write his Confessiones. In the next chapters
Harrison refutes this claim of discontinuity.
What did Augustine learn from the Platonists and how did they bring him
on the way to Christianity? This question is answered in Chapter 3 Ascent (and
Descent) (pp. 3573). The Platonists learnedAugustine to shift froma materialistic
interpretation of God to an acceptance of a spiritual transcendence. They also
gave him an answer to the problem of evil: evil as a priuatio boni. The Platonic
books provided Augustine with the concepts of a transcendent Creator and of
the ascent of the soul to God. Augustine combines these (Neo-)Platonic notions
with the Christian idea of a creatio ex nihilo. The philosophical ascensional scheme
and the Christian creational scheme worked together in Augustine: the Plotinian
levels of reality reect the levels of humanitys closeness and absence to God (as
consequences of grace and sin), and this is already the case before the Confessiones
(e.g. De ordine and De quantitate animae). Augustine considers ascent as the
gracious uplifting of humanity by God. The soul can not make any progress
without divine initiative. This idea again can be found before Confessiones, e.g. in
the Soliloquia. This observation rebukes Browns assertion that Augustines early
theology is characterized by a gradual abandonment of the idea of earthly human
perfection (p. 63). Besides this awareness of human imperfectness, in the early
works features also the insight that reason despite its importance is always
submitted to faith. Reason requires faith and authority, is weakened by the fallen
condition of mankind (p. 67).
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
Augustine conceived of the (Platonic) transcendent God as being a Creator
God. God created human beings from nothing (Chapter 4. Creation from Nothing.
pp. 74114). Augustine took the creatio ex nihilo as point of departure to reect the
articles of faith in his early writings, especially in his reaction against Manichean
and Gnostic dualism, giving his earliest thought a distinctive Christian substance.
The rst theological synthesis of Augustines processing of the notion of creatio ex
nihilo evil as the privationof good, the transcendence of God, humandependence
on God, the defect of the human will, the need of a continual inward grace to do
and will the good, grace as a constant (re)forming (of nothingness) is to be
found in the opening prayer of the Soliloquia, and these dierent elements also
appear in the other early works. Put otherwise, thanks to the idea of creatio ex
nihilo, the transcendence of God, the fallen state of humanity, and the need of
divine grace are the central tenets of Augustines theological system far before
390. This insight in the human contingency (and consequently the human need
for divine grace), as reaction against the ontological dualism of the Manicheans,
forecasts Augustines reaction against the Pelagian ethical dualism (p. 82). This
early Christian philosophy (creation as giving formto nothingness) of Augustine
is fully integrated into a Trinitarian theology (form as relation, as beauty and as
wordTrinity as form).
In the extensive fth chapter, Paul (pp. 115163), Harrison argues that Au-
gustines 390s reading of Paul was not a dramatic rupture with a so-called earlier
optimism regarding human autonomous free will. Instead it was a culmination
and armation of what he always believed: complete dependence upon gratia to
achieve the good life. Harrison shows that Augustine holds on to an orthodox
reading of Paul from the very beginning. Augustines early writings do not only
contain the Pauline theology of sin and grace, but also the Pauline understanding
of conversion and the Christian life (p. 118). His attempt to refute Manichean
determinism, combined with the pastoral concern to exhort his congregation to
live morally and to give a rational explanation of divine justice, and perhaps his
reading of Ambrosiaster, Tyconius and Hilary distanced himsomewhat fromPaul
by emphasising human freedom however without accepting absolute freedom
or completely denying grace resulting in the commentaries on Paul of the mid
390s (p. 141). Augustine expressed this freedomby placing the initium dei within
the initiative of human free will. His pastoral practice experiencing the fall-
eness of humanity in concreto however, urged him to reconsider, to leave this
optimism and to return to his earlier view of the absolute need for grace. In this
sense Ad Simplicianum represents a grace regained. Gods grace precedes every
human merit, precedes even mans answer to Gods call to faith. Augustine con-
nects with Pauls thinking on the post-lapsarian human will. The human will is
weakened by original sin, the sin of Adamin which whole humanity participates.
The will is impotent to do the good, unless justied by the grace of faith, a grace
that inspires by delight. Grace is not only external, but is essentially an internal
operation. Harrison shows the broader biblical framework by guiding us through
other biblical texts Augustine took interest in during this early period: the Psalms
and Matthew 57. In the same period, Augustine explores in his Pauline com-
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
mentaries Pauls concept of the human voluntas and gratia dei, he remains very
faithful to his deepest conviction in his sermons on the Psalms (Enarrationes in
Psalmos 132, 392) and on Matthew 57 (De sermone Domini in monte, 394), namely
that grace is given freely and unmerited to humanity. In these sermons there are
no indications to suspect Augustine of holding the opinion that faith is the result
of human initiative.
In the second part of the monograph (chapters 68), Harrison turns to the
subsequent writings up until Ad Simplicianum(396/397), and argues that the three
key concepts of Augustines theology fall, will, grace are also characteristic
features of his early thinking. First, she turns to Augustines early writings about
The Fall (Chapter 6. pp. 167197). According to Brown, Ad Simplicianum was the
moment of insertion of the notion of the fall within Augustines anthropology,
while Augustine previously thought it was possible to attain perfection in this
life. Athanase Sage and Patout Burns take this assertion even further. They claim
that the concept of humanitys fall only appears for rst time in anti-Pelagian writ-
ings.
6
Harrison responds. Augustine never sustained the thesis that perfection
on earth is possible. Specic technical aspects of his fall doctrine grew during the
years, especially through the Pelagian controversy, but the basis of this doctrine
and its impact on human will is already detectable before Ad Simplicianum. Har-
rison explains that the framework of the early Augustine to conceive of human
sinfulness is the creatio ex nihilo. Sin is the tendency to distance oneself from the
Creator towards nothingness, is proudly thinking having no need of God. That
pride is the root of evil, and is the failure to acknowledge the utter dependence
upon God. These notions can already be found in Augustines earliest writings
such as De beata vita (386) and De genesi ad Litteram (388389). Evil is giving the
creature the place the Creator should be given, is not maintaining the rightful
position between God and body. This turning away from God has devastating
consequences. It diminishes the human self and its powers, leads to losing control
over the body, making it impossible to return to God. These ideas appear in writ-
ings before 390 (e.g. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichearum, De
ordine, etc.). Put otherwise, the understanding of the fall and its consequences is
not something that revolutionized Augustines thought in 391396, instead it was
an integral part of his faith from the moment of his conversion (p. 184). Central
features of Augustines thinking on the fall human solidarity in Adams sin, the
relation between sin andmortality, causing ignorance, diculty in doing the good
and the consuetudo of sinning, the human incapacity to avoid sin, the concept of
lust, and sin vitiating and disordering the human will are far from absent in
Augustines writings before mid 390s.
Also in his early writings, Augustine holds the idea that the human will is
unable to act properly without divine help (Chapter 7. The Will. pp. 198237).
Brown c.s. contend that Augustine was in favour of the freedom of the human
6. Athanase Sage, Pch originel. Naissance dun dogme, Revue des tudes augustiniennes
13 (1967) 211248. James Patout Burns, The Development of Augustines Doctrine of Operative Grace,
Paris 1980.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
will before 396, and that he afterwards changed his mind. An early example of
this interpretation is that the Pelagians thought to have found a proto-Pelagian
in Augustines early works (p. 199). Harrison counters, there is proof that before
396, Augustine states that ignorance and diculty disable the human will, and
these are eects of Adams pride turning away from God. James Wetzel and Paul
Sjourn support Browns assertion of Augustines volte-face, and they apply this
idea of a shift to De libero arbitrio.
7
They perceive a split within this early writing.
The rst part, book I, is written by a young optimistic convert convinced that
happy life lays within reach, believing in the self-determination of the will. The
secondpart, books IIIII, reveals a disillusionedclergyman, correcting the concept
of human will he developed in book I. Ignorance and diculty of the will are now
the central features. As such De libero arbitrio in a micro cosmos brings together
the two Augustines: a condent and optimistic one versus one who accepts a
pessimistic fallen humanity. Harrison accepts the challenge and meticulously
reasons that also in this micro cosmos Augustines thinking oers a continuity
(p. 203). The unity of this writing is to be found in similar descriptions of pre-
and post-lapsarinan will in the three books of De libero arbitrio. Moreover, what
Augustine says about the human will in De libero arbitrio relates with what he says
on the same subject in other works he composed in the period 388 (beginning of
book I) to 394/395 (completionof the treatise) (e.g. De beata vita, Contra Fortunatum).
The latter illustrates that Augustine had from the start on a consequent structure
in mind encompassing the three books as a unity, and not a rst idea in book I he
corrected later on in books IIIII. In this context it is fascinating to observe that
De libero arbitrio appears at the same time of the Paul commentaries (mid-390s),
and that this tractate underlines the priority of the action of grace. Only by grace
are human beings, who are subject to original sin, empowered and enabled. This
insight contradicts the attribution of free choice to the will in responding to Gods
vocation to faith in the commentary on Romans. Instead De libero arbitrio holds
that the post-lapsarian will has to admit its absolute dependence on Gods grace
(p. 236). On the meta-level, scholars who claim to see a contradiction between
book I and books IIIII do not understand the basis structure of this writing: book
I covers the operation of the will before the fall while books IIIII deal with the
operation of the will after the fall. This dramatic opposition between the pre-
and post-lapsarian state of the human will was present in Augustines writing
especially his anti-Manichean tractates from the early beginning and precisely
this opposition constitutes the unity structure of De libero arbitrio (pp. 235236).
Fromhis conversion in 386 onwards, Augustine realizes that Grace (Chapter
8. pp. 238287) is necessary for being able to convert oneself and become a
believer for the rest of the human life because mankind is incapable of the
7. James Wetzel, Pelagius Anticipated: Grace and Election in Augustines Ad Simplicianum, in J.
McWilliam (ed.), Augustine. From Rhetor to Theologian, Ontario 1992, 121132. Ibid., Augustine and
the Limits of Virtue, Cambridge 1992. Ibid., Snares of Truth. Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,
in R. Dodaro/G. Lawless (eds.), Augustine and his Critics. Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner,
London/New York 2000, 124141. Paul Sjourn, Les conversions de saint Augustin daprs le De
libero arbitrio, Recherches de science religieuse 25 (1951) 243264; 333363.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
good without the divine help. Augustines later writings distinguish providentia
naturalis fromprovidentia uoluntaris. Harrison argues that, because of Augustines
belief in Gods providential care in his early works (esp. De vera religione), this
distinction is already present there. On the one hand, Augustine sees the work
of God in creation, in ordering the creation, in the continuance and growth of
creation. On the other hand, he stresses the need for Gods ineable healing
because of sin. The latter is a divine operation beyond natural providence, it is
grace operating upon and within the human will. Augustine never maintained,
also not in the early writings, that grace constitutes a synergy with man. On
the contrary, grace is laying hold, causing pain, disregarding, overriding. More
specic, grace is gratia Christi.
Christ is indeed a teacher, example, and authority for the early Augustine,
but he is also, and most importantly, the saviour of fallen humanity through
his sacricial death; the mediator between God and sinful humanity in his
humble descent and self-emptying in the incarnation; the one who eects the
reformation of the image of God in human beings which has been deformed;
and the life-giving source of grace in the mysteries. Those scholars who
suggest that the early Augustine maintained that all human beings need is
teaching and example seem to be motivated by a vain attempt to preserve
human beings free will, autonomy, and powers of self-determination in the
early works, and a fundamentally mistaken understanding of the nature and
eects of the Fall, of sin and evil, and of the need for grace. In short, they are
once again making the early Augustine a Pelagian before Pelagius. (p. 260.)
Brown c.s. assert that Ad Simplicianum introduces a threefold turn in Augustines
concept of grace: (1.) a new psychology of delight (delectatio), (2.) a new under-
standing of the manner in which grace works to eect the operation of the feeble
will, (3.) the introduction of the concepts of divine election and predestination.
Harrison shows how from the very beginning the idea of grace working via de-
light is featuring in the early writings. Delectatio is the place where Augustine
locates the operation of grace upon the will and inspires the fallen will to do
the good (pp. 267268). This delight is a gift of the Holy Spirit (p. 271) and is
beyond human control. Contrary to Burns hypothesis, namely that the early
writings only contain an acceptance of the external operation of grace, Augustine
perceives from the very beginning grace as not only the calling and assistance of
the human will, but understands it also as the divine activity within the will. The
example of the conversion of Saul to Paul in the early writings testify that Augus-
tine was convinced that election is based on Gods unfathomable mercy rather
than to look for any merit in fallen humanity. The only thing humanity deserves
is condemnation and punishment. There is no merit, everything is grace.
. . . in various ways scholars have been all too keen to make the Augustine of
the early works appear more Pelagian than Pelagius himself: they have failed
to identify anything resembling his later doctrine of the Fall and original
sin; they have understood his attack on Manichean determinism as a defence
of human autonomy grounded in a classical ideal of perfection; they have
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
argued that when he speaks of grace, he is referring simply to its external
operation; that he understood Christs role as purely pedagogical, not salvic;
that divine admonitio, including the work of the Holy Spirit, is merely external
and didactic rather than internal and therapeutic. Looking back on the early
works from the vantage point of the later Pelagian controversy scholars have
tended to reduce them to a caricature, which provides a sharp and satisfying
contrast with his later views, and which dramatically demonstrates just how
far he has advanced from philosophical, classical ideals and a late-antique
mindset, to a distinctive and radical interpretation of Christianity. (p. 280.)
In conclusion, Harrison argues fervently that everything that can be labelled typ-
ically Augustinian is already to be perceived in the early writings. Throughout
the early writings, following the grace experience of 386, there was already the
primacy of faith above reason, grace above law, love above fear, spirit above letter,
humility above pride, dependence above autonomy (p. 286). The fundamental
features of Augustines theology, which some scholars think only emerge from
390s and Ad Simplicianum, are actually very much present in the early works: fall,
original sin, awed will, need for divine grace. The fundamentals or the content
of Augustines faith and doctrinal position did not change, the specic circum-
stances in which he found himself, however, and the questions and concerns that
urged him to write did change. Being bishop of Hippo is not the same context
as a philosophical retreat in Cassiciacum. His duty to preach brought him to a
better knowledge of Scripture and this inuenced the way in which he expressed
his thinking on grace (cf. pp. 813, p. 72, pp. 127135).
4 Some observations
4.1 A plea for evolution and development
I strongly support Harrisons plea for continuity, but I would even suggest
to enlarge the scope of continuity she suggests. Can we really say that 386 was a
landmark, a complete transformation from unbelief to belief? Put in terms of the
philosophy of history: should Augustines conversion be considered as an event,
or as a product, or as a process? We can only observe that Augustine, unlike
his father, was never a pagan. The quest that led him through Manichaeism,
Scepticism, (Neo-)Platonism was precisely a search for genuine Christianity, the
correct understanding of Christian faith. From this point of view, 386 and here
Harrison is right in rebuking Brown and the two Augustines thesis was not a
turn from being not-Christian to Christian, but from (Neo-)Platonic to Catholic
Christianity, with Paul as catalytic converter. Harrison does not neglect this,
but prefers to regard 386 as a breaking point. Here, I would like to underline
the continuity of this discontinuity, a continuity that may not be disregarded,
namely that Augustine was always Christian and that the orthodox faith of the
(new) convert has very important pre-conversial roots. This sense of a continuity,
extending also before his conversion, makes it even more understandable that
Augustines doctrine was the result of a development and not a Deus ex machina.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
Harrison admits that she at times. . . failed to allow for the new convert
to evolve into the new bishop (p. vii). I agree with Harrisons argument for
continuity, but I am also somewhat concerned about how continuity should be
construed. Continuity does not imply that no change occurred between August 1,
386 and August 28, 430. Firstly, this would be an insult to Augustines intellectual
capacities and would depict him as forced to clinging to some positions without
critically investigating the alternatives, precisely this explains better his excursion
into the concept of the meritum dei in the commentaries on Paul of the mid 390s.
Secondly, enlarging or opening up the concept of continuity leaves more space
for the idea of growth and development. Also Augustines thinking on grace
of which the fundamental intuitions are indeed present from the very beginning
of his writing (since they were the reason and the essence of the 386 conversion)
underwent a process of deepening, development and renement. This evo-
lution is caused because Augustines thinking in general matures, by aging, by
his pastoral experiences and the theological controversies he was entangled in.
His reections on the matters of grace and free will were originally conditioned
by his own wrestling with Manichaeism and Neo-Platonism, later he faced the
challenges of Donatism and Pelagianism. This led to new perspectives, new ap-
proaches, the constant adaptation of the theological vocabulary and grammar of
Augustines system. Augustine himself constantly indicates the importance of
progress to his faithful in his sermons, progress stimulated by study, fastening
and praying. Ultimately, he sees this progress as the gift of the Holy Spirit.
Harrison refers to Augustines attempts in his Retractationes to present his
early writings as proto-anti-Pelagian. Firstly, this is not a valid argument against
the two Augustines thesis, it even supports their thesis of Augustines post
factum recuperation strategy: as he represented his conversion in a way that
was dierent from what really happened in his autobiography Confessiones, he is
now rewriting his early works in his autobibliography Retractationes. Moreover,
using the testimony of the accused as a witness for the defence is not really the
appropriate juridical strategy. Inthis context we shouldnot forget that the accused
himself admits some of his early mistakes. In De dono perseuerantiae, an anti-
Pelagian stronghold, in which Augustine stresses that his opinions on the grace
of perseverance and on predestination were already set out in Ad Simplicianum
(De dono perseuerantiae 21.55), he at the same time warns his readers for his early
mistakes, he confesses his thinking was far fromperfect in the beginning and that
he gained theological insight during the course of years. The monks of Provence
appealed to De libero arbitrio. Augustine admits that he discussed the fate of the
new born in such an anti-Manichean way that the Pelagians can nd support
in it for denying the existence of original sin (11.2612.28). Augustine defends
himself by pointing out he was writing against Manichean dualism, and was not
dealing with the topic of the gratuity of grace, and as such this writing should
not be used for discussing the latter (12.29). And even more fundamentally,
Augustine notes that at the moment he began to write De libero arbitrio he was still
a layman, in doubt about the fate of the paruuli, and no one, I think, would be so
unjust and envious that he would forbid me to make progress (12.30). Augustine
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
himself states that a dierent context results in a dierent formulation, and that
he also was a child of progress. In the same context we should accept that when
Augustine in some early writings utters the opinion perfection can be reached in
this life an opinion he will strongly refute later on this is a result of process
and progress, instead of trying to read something else in these early writings.
Augustines doctrine of grace, the core ideas, as he fully developed in the Pelagian
Controversy, were already in Augustines mind from the beginning. However,
to label this early thinking as proto-anti-Pelagian is perhaps a bridge to far, is
anachronistic, is actually making the same mistake that the two Augustines
tenet is Augustine accusing of in the Confessiones: changing the past afterwards
with the desired future in mind. The clash with the Pelagians, resulting in
a polemical and sometimes black-and-white thinking and writing, just was not
present in the context and set of mind of the early Augustine. Mutatis mutandis
one could call the zealous young Augustinian monk Luther a proto-anti-Catholic.
As an avenue for further research, I would also like to note that continuity
works in two directions. Harrison solidly illustrates that Augustines so-called
later thinking is present in his early writings. Naturally, this has its reverse, which
kind of escaped her attention. Continuity also includes that the so-called early
thinking is not absent in his later writings. An example of this is Augustines
interest in philosophy (vera philosophia as philosophia christiana) in Contra Iulianum
(421/422).
8
This kind of archaeology, the earlier in the later, would supply addi-
tional arguments for continuity. Forced as a reviewer to give at least some critical
comments, I would like to make the observation that the book, despite its many
repetitions and syntheses, lacks a somewhat sharp conclusion. The second part of
the book, especially approaching the end, sometimes gives the impression of an
exhausted top athlete, who lacks a bit of the nesse of the beginning of the game.
Actually a compliment for this praiseworthy book is the amount of book
reviews it already received.
9
A recurring critique is that the reviewers suggest a
more nuanced presentation of Neo-Platonism. This is a valid remark, if this book
would have been a study of Neo-Platonism. However, it is a study of the early
Augustine and his perception, use and recontextualisation of Neo-Platonism.
4.2 Court of Appeal
One can hardly consider Harrison as a lonely voice crying in the desert.
The discontinuity hypothesis is already thoroughly countered by amongst others
8. Goulven Madec perceives continuity in Augustines writing around the concept of (vera)
philosophia Christiana. Goulven Madec, Philosophia christiana, in ibid. & Jean Ppin, Petites tudes
augustiniennes, (tudes augustiniennes. Srie Antiquit; 142), Paris 1994, pp. 163177.
9. John Rist, New Blackfriars 87 (2006), 542544. Joseph Lam Cong Quy, Augustinianum
46/2 (2006) 539544. Chad Tyler Gerber, Journal of Early Christian Studies 15/1 (2007) 120122.
Josef Lssl, The Journal of Theological Studies 58 (2007) 300302.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
Thomas Gerhard Ring,
10
Volker Henning Drecoll,
11
Pierre-Marie Hombert,
12
and
Nello Cipriani,
13
standard works that are not given a strong voice in Harrisons
analysis while they laid the basis for her argument. Indeed, Augustine really de-
serves a lawyer against unjust complaints. His cause is however already pleaded
by eminent jurists. Harrison, as a good lawyer defending her client, repeats the
arguments in favour of her plea and is less inclined to give much room for the
counter arguments that could lead to a dierent reading of some texts, and as such
help to give a more nuanced insight in the complexity of Augustines continuity.
In this sense Harrison somewhat missed the opportunity to be, instead of being a
enthusiastic lawyer that splendidly complements and elaborates the pleas of her
predecessors, a judge in a Court of Appeal or even an Appeal in Cassation: to list
and to evaluate, precisely because of her exhaustive knowledge of the case, all the
arguments pro and contra, and as such be able to conclude that the discontinuity
appeal cannot be sustained, that the claim is dismissed and that Augustine can
be cleared of all charges.
More specic, there is one particular chance of higher appeal, deeper evalu-
ation of continuity in Augustines concept of grace: Christology. Harrison refers
to Augustines early thinking on Christ (pp. 252265), however she does not elab-
orate on this. For doing this, she could have consulted Tarsicius Jan van Bavel.
14
In his study of Augustines Christology he explicitly investigates the early works
regarding Christ, and compares them on the one hand with Neo-Platonism and
on the other with his later writings, and doing so he proves that the early works
(386391 and 394397) contain a synthesis of Augustines mature Christology,
that they are Christian writings. Harrison restricts herself to stating that her
monograph does not aim at studying Augustines early Christology. Such kind
of a study however could prove itself being essentially to establish continuity
regarding grace. Augustine precisely holds that there is no grace without Christ,
connecting Christology and soteriology.
I would cordially recommend reading this study, since it is an example
for all who want to reect critically, to approach a text and an author without
prejudices, to allow the text to say what it intends to say, and not evaluating it
in a specic way to t it in an already extant (ideological) framework. Seldom I
have read such a erce defence of Augustine in recent literature. Harrison oers
10. Thomas Gerhard Ring, Bruch oder Entwicklung im Gnadenbegri Augustins? Kritische
Anmerkungen zu K. Flasch, Logik des Schreckens. Augustinus von Hippo, Die Gnadenlehre von 397,
Augustiniana 44 (1994) 31113.
11. Volker Henning Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins, (Beitrge zur his-
torischen Theologie; 109), Tbingen 1999. Ibid., Gratia, Augustinus-Lexikon 3 (2004) 182242.
12. Pierre-Marie Hombert, Gloria Gratiae. Se glorier en Dieu, principe et n de la thologie
augustinienne de la grce, Paris 1996. Ibid., Augustin, prdicateur de la grce au dbut de son piscopat,
in G. Madec (ed.), Augustin prdicateur (395411). Actes du Colloque International de Chantilly (57
septembre 1996), Paris 1998, pp. 217245.
13. Nello Cipriani, Laltro Agostino di G. Lettieri, Revue des tudes augustiniennes 48 (2002)
249265.
14. Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. Lhumain et le divin
dans le Christ daprs saint Augustin, (Paradosis 10), Fribourg 1954.
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Anthony Dupont: Continuity or Discontinuity in Augustine?
the reader a brilliant anthology of the early Augustine and is as such a valuable
thematic introduction in the writing and thinking of Augustine before 396. But
the monograph is much more, it is a meritorious overview of the several key
elements in the continuity of Augustines development, a well constructed plea
to see this continuity and a lesson in understanding how the central features of
Augustines conversion remain fruitfully present in his thinking.
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